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From Sea Power to Cyber Power Learning from the Past to Craft a Strategy for the Future

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From Sea Power to Cyber Power Learning from the Past to Craft a Strategy for the Future From Sea Power to Cyber Power Learning from the Past to Craft a Strategy for the Future By KRIS E. BARCOMB U.S. Navy cryptologic technicians preview Integrated System for Language Education and Training program at Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture, Pensacola, Florida U.S. Navy (Gary Nichols) 78 JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BARCOMB Naval strength involves, unquestionably, the possession of strategic points. —Alfred Thayer Mahan lfred Thayer Mahan saw the both economic growth and security akin to and overcome resource constraints: “The ocean for what it is. While it Mahan’s approach to sea power a century ago. search for and establishment of leading prin- spans the globe and covers a ciples—always few—around which consider- A predominant portion of the A Mahanian Approach to Cyberspace ations of detail group themselves, will tend to Earth, not all parts of it are equally impor- Mahan did not view the Navy as an reduce confusion of impression to simplicity tant. Mahan offered a focused naval strategy end unto itself, but as a key component of and directness of thought, with consequent in an era when America was struggling to the larger economic welfare of the Nation. facility of comprehension.”3 In accordance define itself as either isolated from, or an He tied the very existence of the Navy to with these two principles, this article identi- integral part of, the larger international com- commerce when he wrote, “The necessity of fies seven strategic points of concentration munity. The force structure of the U.S. Navy a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, in cyberspace: operating systems (OSs), hinged upon leaders deciding between pro- springs, therefore, from the existence of search engines, physical communications tectionism and expansionism. Rather than a peaceful shipping, and disappears with infrastructure, cloud computing, governance simply a mechanism to defend the coasts, it.”1 Similarly, while cyberspace originated forums, cryptography, and Internet Protocol Mahan envisioned the Navy as a powerful through U.S. Government investment, version 6 (IPv6). means for promoting American economic the domain owes its rapid expansion and Each of these categories has unique prosperity. In one sense, his strategy allowed modern character to commerce. In this challenges, and some are more established the Nation to achieve both objectives simul- sense, sea power and cyber power share a than others. Fortunately, the United States taneously. By projecting naval power at key common objective. They both primarily exist holds dominant roles in many of these points around the globe, Mahan’s approach to protect economic interests within their categories, such as operating systems and allowed for economic expansion and had the respective domains. search engines, and it must define strategies second-order effect of pushing conflict away from U.S. shores. Cyberspace represents a similar chal- sea power and cyber power both primarily exist to protect lenge. The United States now faces a contem- economic interests within their respective domains porary struggle between expansionism and protectionism in this domain. We can learn a great deal from Mahan’s methodology for Two principles guided Mahan’s analy- to maintain those positions. In others, such delineating and prioritizing the sea domain sis. First, Mahan looked for strategic points as physical communications infrastructure into actionable terms. Thus, this article of convergence and concentration. He stated, and cloud computing, the United States has identifies strategic categories in cyberspace “In general . it will be found that by sea, as played a leading role in their early develop- by adopting Mahan’s approach. In doing so, by land, useful strategic points will be where ment, but the future share of influence is still it seeks to identify similarities and differ- highways pass, and especially where they uncertain. Here, more proactive measures ences between sea power and cyber power. cross and converge.”2 As a result of his fore- must be taken to help assert U.S. influence. The aim is to provide senior leaders with a sight and the willingness of key U.S. leaders better understanding of the salient aspects of to act on it, such as President Theodore Roos- Key Differences cyberspace, offer insights for securing those evelt, American influence secured the Hawai- Before continuing with a detailed points, and suggest a new paradigm for the ian Islands, the Philippines, Guantanamo review of each category, it is important to proper role of the military in this domain. Bay, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal, to evaluate the salient differences between the This tailored expansionist strategy for cyber- name a few. Despite both the realities and nature of the sea and the essence of cyber- space should provide the United States with perceptions of the decentralized nature of space. First, while the government played a cyberspace, careful inspection reveals several key role in helping establish the technological points of concentration. foundations of the Internet, commercial Major Kris E. Barcomb, USAF, is a Cyberspace Second, Mahan emphasized the need interest quickly surpassed the government in Strategist for 24th Air Force at Lackland Air Force to minimize the total number of points con- terms of influence over the domain. Martin Base, Texas. sidered important to communicate priorities Libicki, a senior policy analyst at the RAND ndupress.ndu.edu issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013 / JFQ 79 FEATURES | From Sea Power to Cyber Power Corporation, succinctly described the current William McNeill wrote about how European for centuries.9 Europeans recognized that state of government influence: “As it is, the sea power in the 16th century was quasi- they could not control the outcome of the days when governments were leading-edge private in character. Neither the British Royal economy as a whole. Instead, they established consumers and manipulators of information Navy nor Spanish Armada significantly dif- policies to facilitate economic growth. In con- technology are long past. Man for man, it ferentiated themselves from their respective trast, China’s attempt to control its economy cannot compete with Microsoft.”4 merchant shipping enterprises until after too tightly led to its decline. Given that The second important difference is the 1600.7 The utility of a government-led navy commercial interests dominate cyberspace, relationship between hard and soft power was not realized until the barriers to self- and influence is based largely on merit, the in each domain. Mahan emphasized hard protection increased beyond practical limits United States must act more like the Europe- power, and he viewed the threat or use of of individual commercial entities. As barriers ans than the Chinese of the middle ages. force as foundational to protecting maritime to entry increased, the security paradigm So far, we have established conver- interests. He also tied sea power to command shifted from a distributed model to a central- gence and simplicity as key components of a when he asserted, “These national and ized one. This belief in a centralized security Mahanian-style analysis for cyberspace. We international functions can be discharged, model persists today, even though it may not have also established how the proper employ- certainly, only by command of the sea.”5 Yet be relevant in cyberspace. Instead, the much ment of both sea power and cyber power is his view of command and the role of force lower barriers to entry into cyberspace may intimately linked to promoting economic do not translate well into cyberspace, where require the reversion to a distributed security growth. Yet the two also have important soft power plays a predominant role. In model dominated by private interests. differences. Commercial entities wield more influence over cyberspace technology than governments, power and influence in cyber- USS George H.W. Bush in Naples, Italy, in support of maritime security operations and space are based on attraction and coopera- theater security cooperation tion rather than command, and low barriers to entry into cyberspace likely require a decentralized security model. Seven Strategic Points in Cyberspace The first strategic point is operating systems. While cyberspace is distributed and lacks a centralized authority, a single company has tremendous influence over nearly every desktop computer on the planet. Microsoft Windows commands 92 percent of the global market share, followed by Apple’s Mac OS at a distant 6 percent, and Linux trailing at only slightly more than 1 percent.10 In real numbers, this equates to over 1.25 billion computers running versions of the Windows OS.11 Despite the complaints about security flaws and functionality restrictions in Microsoft product offerings, the United States can be thankful that Microsoft is a U.S.-based company subject to its own laws U.S. Navy (Betsy Lynn Knapper) U.S. Navy (Betsy Lynn and cultural norms. Similarly, U.S. companies currently cyberspace, strategies centered on relation- While Western navies were expanding dominate the global market share of mobile ship-building, performance, and legitimacy the sphere of European influence, events in operating systems, although not to the degree will be more effective than those based on the East were unfolding differently. In 1433, of concentration seen in the desktop market. force. In contrast to Mahan, Joseph Nye in an attempt to inhibit the link between The breakdown of the top four companies stated, “To succeed in a networked world military and commercial enterprises, the is Google Android at 43 percent, Nokia requires leaders to think in terms of attrac- Chinese imperial court halted naval expedi- Symbian 22 percent, Apple iOS at 18 percent, tion and co-option rather than command.”6 tions. Then, in 1436, the Chinese government and Research in Motion at 12 percent (Micro- The final differentiator is ease of access. banned the construction of new seagoing soft carries less than a 2-percent share).12 Cyberspace has much lower barriers to entry ships.8 Because the Chinese economy was The U.S.
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