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- Monotone Strategyproofness Hanna Halaburda Guillaume Haeringer August 2013
- Reflections on Arrow's Theorem and Voting Rules
- Compressed Equilibrium in Large Repeated Games of Incomplete Information
- Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions Via SAT Solving
- UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations
- Game Theory, Alive Anna R
- Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections
- Machine Learning, Game Theory, and Mechanism Design for a Networked World A
- On the Tradeoff Between Efficiency and Strategyproofness
- Empirical Strategy-Proofness∗
- Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem
- Incentive Compatible Regression Learning ✩ ∗ Ofer Dekel A,1, Felix Fischer B, ,2, Ariel D
- Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms Without Money for Scheduling
- Convex Strategyproofness with an Application to the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
- On the Equivalence of Coalitional and Individual Strategy$Proofness
- Three Essays on Mechanism Design
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms∗
- Mechanism Design and Analysis Using Simulation-Based Game Models
- Partial Strategyproofness: Relaxing Strategy- Proofness for the Random Assignment Problem∗
- Strategyproofness, Leontief Economies and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
- Group Strategyproof Cost Sharing: the Role of Indifferences
- Collusion-Resistant Cost-Sharing Mechanisms: Design Techniques, Analyses, Trade-Offs
- Set-Valued Solution Concepts in Social Choice and Game Theory Axiomatic and Computational Aspects
- Mechanism Design in Public Decisions and the Clarke-Groves
- Strategyproofness in the Large As a Desideratum for Market Design
- Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design
- (12) United States Patent (10) Patent No.: US 8,874.477 B2 Hoffberg (45) Date of Patent: Oct
- Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite
- Collusion-Proof Cost Sharing Mechanisms (Draft)
- Contents of Current Periodicals 1403
- Second-Price Proxy Auctions in Bidder-Seller Networks
- Strategic Factor Markets: Bargaining, Scarcity, and Resource Complementarity
- Approximate Strategyproofness
- Strategic Abstention Based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities
- Strategyproofness in the Large
- Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections
- Approximation Algorithms and Mechanism Design for Minimax Approval Voting1
- Economics and Computation Ad Auctions and Other Stories
- CSC304 Lecture 22
- Strategyproofness in the Large As a Desideratum for Market Design
- Consensus Reaching with Heterogeneous User Preferences, Private Input and Privacy-Preservation Output Hélène Le Cadre, Jean-Sébastien Bedo
- A Game-Theoretic Approach Nandan Garg Wayne State University