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Separating equilibrium
Equilibrium Refinements
Recent Advances in Understanding Competitive Markets
Political Game Theory Nolan Mccarty Adam Meirowitz
1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
Perfect Bidder Collusion Through Bribe and Request*
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Dynamic Bayesian Games
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium When Players Move Sequentially and Have Private Infor- Mation, Some of the Bayesian Nash Equilibria
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Approximate Equilibria in Large Games a Dissertation
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Epistemic Game Theory and Logic
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Collusion in a One'period Insurance Market with Adverse Selection
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Some Dynamics of Signaling Games
A Strategic Mediator Who Is Biased Into the Same Direction As the Expert Can Improve Information Transmission
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Communication Without Common Interest: a Signaling Experiment
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Deploying Affect-Inspired Mechanisms to Enhance Agent Decision
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Signaling Games
Cooperation in Infinite Games: Applications to Finance and Public
For Those About to Talk We Salute You: an Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC*
Equilibrium Performance
Game Theory 14.122: Handout #L Finding PBE in Signaling Games
Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
Team Governance: Empowerment Or Hierarchical Control
Credible Deviations: a Refinement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Economics 2010A Game Theory Section Notes
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Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
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An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics
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Equilibrium Refinement in Signaling Games As Truth Conditions of Counterfactuals∗
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Competitive Markets with Informational Asymmetries and Trading Restrictions: Welfare Analysis and Applications to Finance
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PUBLIC ECONOMICS ELSEVIER Journal of Public Economics 59 (1996) 117-136
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