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2021-08-06
Secularism: A Measure of Explicit Agreement With Assumptions of Secularism (MEAAS)
Conner Douglas Jones Brigham Young University
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Secularism: A Measure of Explicit Agreement With Assumptions
of Secularism (MEAAS)
Conner Douglas Jones
A sdissertation ubmitted to the faculty of Brigham Young University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Aaron Paul Jackson, Chair Kristina Hansen Ross Larsen Richard Williams
Department of Counseling Psychology and Special Education
Brigham Young University
Copyright © 2021 Conner Douglas Jones
All Rights Reserved ii
ABSTRACT
Secularism: A Measure of Explicit Agreement With Assumptions of Secularism (MEAAS)
Conner Douglas Jones Department of Counseling Psychology and Special Education, BYU Doctor of Philosophy
Values are inherent within cultures, relationships, and many other systems, however, little study has been done on the extent to which individuals may explicitly agree with the metaphysical assumptions that much of psychological science relies upon. Psychological science, which uses scientific methodology, is a trusted source of knowledge for many students. Scientific methodology is conceptually linked to assumptions of naturalism, whichs ma c ke laims about the truth of reality. These naturalistic assumptions pertain to ideas of disenchantment, which describe the world as free from any transcendent quality. These same ideas have become popular among people of t he Western world and are foundational to the worldview of secularism. Accessing whether, and to what extent, individuals explicitly agree or disagree with ideas of disenchantment inherent within secularism may help to better understand relationships between cultural, educational, and spiritual beliefs, and the underlying presumptions of psychological science. A measure of 30 items in length was created in order to evaluate the extent to which individuals agree with statements about some of the foundational assumptions of secularism as it relates to naturalism. A random sample of online participants (N=395) completed the items through an online survey platform. A 1-factor model provided sufficient statistical fit for the data, suggesting that items appeared to support the idea that this measure addresses attitudes of secularism, however no claims on the validity of the measure in t he current study can be made. Suggestions for future study are provided.
Keywords: naturalism, secularism, philosophy, metaphysics, psychology, assumptions, epistemology, disenchantment iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was inspired by learning more about how worldviews can unknowingly influence thought and opinion. These worldviews incorporate a plethora of ideas and are often adopted through contact and interaction with those groups with which we identify. While cultural values are well studied, I found that there is little research that measures the degree to which individuals agree with statements reflecting ideas of disenchantment (Taylor, 2009), and the relationship between these ideas and other beliefs the individual may hold.
While many people who reside in the Western world are steeped in belief in science, which has contributed to popularization ideas of secularity, they may be unaware of the relationship between these ideas and their other belief systems. I became very interested in understanding to what degree individuals have broadly accepted or come to believe in the fundamental tenets of secularism, and the relationship between secularity and other adopted worldviews within the individual. The measure developed as part of the present study, developed to assess and quantify the extent of individual belief in secularism and some related constructs, is the beginning of a line of research into sometimes contrasting values, and the relationships between beliefs in secularity and other cultural values.
Much of the success leading up to this endeavor is due to those professors that took time outside of class to help me see the world in a thought-provoking manner. My wife, Jesse, was the person who really brought this to life. To all of those involved, thank you for your guidance. iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE PAGE ...... i
ABSTRACT ...... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... iv
LIST OF TABLES ...... vii
LIST OF FIGURES ...... ix
DESCRIPTION OF STRUCTURE AND CONTENT ...... x
Introduction ...... 1
Assumptions of Secularism...... 6
Determinism ...... 6
Universalism ...... 7
Reductionism ...... 7
Materialism ...... 8
Objectivism ...... 8
Measuring Secularism ...... 9
The Current Study ...... 10
Method ...... 13
Participants ...... 14
Item Design ...... 15
Results ...... 16
Hypothesis 1...... 20
Research Question 1 ...... 32
v
Research Question 2 ...... 32
Research Question 3 ...... 37
Discussion ...... 38
People and Natural World Oriented Items ...... 39
The 1-Factor Model ...... 39
Demographic Analyses ...... 40
Item Analysis ...... 43
Items Removed ...... 43
Trends Among Participants’ Responses ...... 44
Limitations ...... 47
Future Considerations ...... 50
References ...... 53
APPENDIX A: Review of the Literature...... 66
Epistemology ...... 66
Naturalism ...... 68
Objectivism ...... 70
Reductionism ...... 71
Universalism ...... 72
Materialism ...... 73
Determinism ...... 74
Relationship Between Naturalism and Secularism ...... 76
Measuring Secularism ...... 78
Practicality of Measuring Secularism ...... 80
vi
APPENDIX B: Methods ...... 82
Measure ...... 82
Item Design ...... 82
Sample...... 83
Procedures to Collect Data...... 83
Procedures to Analyze Data ...... 83
DISSERTATION REFERENCES ...... 85
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 EFA Eigenvalues...... 17
Table 2 CFA With One-Factor Solution of Secularism Measure ...... 18
Table 3 Items Removed From Final Measure...... 22
Table 4 Demographic Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for Items 1, 5, 7, 9, and
14...... 23
Table 5 Demographic Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for Items 15, 16, 21, 22,
and 23...... 26
Table 6 Demographic Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for Items 24, 25, 29, and
30...... 29
Table 7 Bivariate Pearson Correlations of Years of Education and Secularism Measure ...... 32
Table 8 Independent Sample t-tests Between First-Generation Students and Secularism
Measure...... 33
Table 9 One-Way ANOVA Statistics Between First-Generation Parents and Secularism
Measure...... 33
Table 10 Means and Standard Deviations of Secularism Measure on Number of First-
Generation Immigrant Parents ...... 34
Table 11 One-Way ANOVA Statistics Between Race and Secularism Measure ...... 34
Table 12 One-Way ANOVA Statistics Between Areas of Study and Secularism Measure ...... 35
Table 13 Means and Standard Deviations of Secularism Measure on Areas of Study...... 35
Table 14 One-Way ANOVA Statistics Between Political Affiliation and Secularism
Measure...... 36
Table 15 Means and Standard Deviations of Secularism Measure on Political Affiliation ...... 36
viii
Table 16 One-Way ANOVA Statistics Between Religion and Secularism Measure ...... 37
Table 17 Means and Standard Deviations of Secularism Measure on Religious Affiliation ...... 37
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Hypothesized Model of MEAAS...... 12
Figure 2 One-Factor Model of Secularism ...... 20 x
DESCRIPTION OF STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
This dissertation, Secularism: A Measure of Explicit Agreement With Assumptions of
Secularism (MEAAS), has been formatted according to the requirements of the Brigham Young
University Counseling Psychology Doctorate Program. This format is a hybridization that looks
to satisfy both journal publication formats as well as traditional thesis requirements concurrently.
The literature review for this dissertation is included in Appendix A. This hybrid format
contains two separate reference lists of references used in the journal-ready article and the
literature review. The reference list for the journal-ready article is located at the end of the
journal article, right before the beginning of Appendix A. The list of references for the literature
review can be found at the end of this document in the section entitled Dissertation References.
A previous version of the Methods section that was used in the prospectus defense is included in
Appendix B. MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 1
Introduction
In Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2009), he provides a brief historical account of the belief system of secularity, and describes it in three taxonomies: (a) A vocational and political
separation of the sacred from the secular, (b) the production of ideas that buffered the individual
from the transcendent and popularization of the idea that religious belief was irrational, which
was associated with a separation of religious ideals from institutions, and (c) a societal
cultivation of exclusive humanism and figurative space for all beliefs to be contestable.
Taylor describes secularism to be a set of ideas that were produced by society and gained
popularity over time, that began with the division of political and vocational roles between the
temporal and the sacred, later developing into a construction of meaning within people without
reference to the divine (Calhoun, 2010; Hichy et al., 2012; Taylor, 2009). He states that there
was a migration of belief that led people to more readily adopt ideas of disenchantment, which
buffered the individual from the cosmos and framed belief of the supernatural or divine as
irrational, in turn affecting what people considered to be real, or in other words their
metaphysical beliefs (Taylor, 2009). As secularist ideas began to be believed more widely among
people, so too did ideas of disenchantment. People began to believe the world to be without
magic or the supernatural, and popular belief began to reflect a separation of human beings from
anything transcendent (Taylor, 2009).
Secular thought was introduced into academic contexts, and society popularized the use
of scientific belief systems (Baker, 2012; Bishop, 2007; Slife & Reber, 2009; Sorell, 2013;
Stenmark, 2020), which relied upon these ideas of disenchantment that reality is limited to the
natural world only, discounting any supernatural explanations for events (McLeod, 2000; Shapin,
1996; Taylor, 2009; Wuthnow, 1989). This belief that reality consists only of a natural world MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 2
with natural laws and forces is also known as naturalism, and is a belief that consists of ideas that
are foundational to secularism (Bishop, 2009; Cobern, 2007; Griffin, 2000; Hook, 1944; Jones,
2019; Leahey, 1994; Mills, 2002; Pennock, 2001; Rectenwald, 2013; Smith, 2015; Taylor,
2009). These ideas of naturalism (i.e., ideas of disenchantment) that are foundational to secularist belief make conceptual contact, in the way they are deployed in the culture generally, and particularly within the social sciences, with the worldviews of determinism, universalism,
reductionism, materialism, and objectivism (Crick & Clark, 1994; Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018;
Griffin, 2000; Leahey, 1994; Miller, 1990; Mills, 2002, 2013; Taylor, 2009).
To further elaborate on how worldviews of determinism, universalism, reductionism,
materialism, and objectivism are representative of ideas foundational to secularism, attention can
again be turned to Taylor’s writings on secularism. As Taylor (2009) explained in his account of
the history of secularism, the buffering of the individual from the transcendent required ideas the
development of a reductive materialistic worldview, such that people began to believe
themselves to be fundamentally individuals and part of the natural world, rather than being tied
to something divine or supernatural. As people began to believe more in the ideas of
disenchantment and separated themselves further from beliefs in supernaturalism, they
developed methods for understanding the world around them through natural means that utilized
ideas of determinism, or causality. Therefore, people no longer required a transcendent force to
predict events or to cause things to happen. As these ideas became more popular in society,
people began to construct a social narrative that these ideas of disenchantment must have always
been true (i.e., universal), regardless of whether they may have been believed at the time (Taylor,
2009). For the purpose of this study, the term, secularism, then serves as a way to organize the
worldviews of determinism, universalism, reductionism, materialism, and objectivism. For the
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 3 sake of providing a quick and organized reference of these worldviews, they will further be abbreviated as DURMO (an acronym composed of the first letters of each of these concepts) for the rest of this paper.
In psychological science, the effects of popular secular belief have led to research that has rejected notions of an immaterial mind or soul, and instead has described such things in a material (i.e., defined in terms of the objective manipulation that produces a sensable manifestation of the construct) manner, labeling the learning process of the mind as a series of neurochemical processes found in the physical matter of the brain (Eichenbaum & Fortin, 2005;
Mills, 2002; Villarreal & Steinmetz, 2005). Crick and Clark (1994), in discussing these neurochemical processes, explain that the desires, ambitions, personality, and the mind itself are merely the result of interacting neurons, reducing these phenomenological experiences (i.e., those experiences of the conscious mind of the individual) utilizing ideas of DURMO in secularism (Churchland, 2018; Schroeder, 2001). Researchers have also studied neurochemical processes and their relationship with mood states, and several studies have found correlations between levels of serotonin in the brain and feelings of anxiety and sadness (Richardson-Jones et al., 2011; Waraich et al., 2004), hostility (Harmer et al., 2004; Harmer et al., 2006), attention
(Luciana et al., 2001), and even prosocial behaviors (Crockett et al., 2010). These studies provide evidence for how researchers’ beliefs in the ideas of disenchantment of secularism have affected their beliefs on the non-immaterial nature of human beings.
In regard to the relationship between secular beliefs and beliefs about human agency and meaning-making, Wilks (2018) in a review of literature surrounding the practice of psychotherapy and counseling, outlines how some mental health professionals utilize ideas of
DURMO in their work. He also describes how other mental health professionals believe in
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 4 worldviews outside of DURMO that allow for a more agentic approach to human cognition and behavior. Some researchers within the field of psychology have even utilized beliefs of human agency in their investigation of the human meaning-making process (Borowa et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018).
While there exists studies of human meaning and values, one area of psychological study, however, is still in its infancy. This field of study examines the roots of psychology, specifically in evaluating underlying philosophical assumptions, values, and worldviews that people may believe (Bernstein, 2011; Durant, 1961; Haig, 2011; Reber, 2006). These philosophical assumptions are similar to those ideas that shape beliefs on reality, or metaphysics, and include ideas such as secularism. While philosophical assumptions or worldviews may at first glance seem similar to belief and value systems, they differ in some very important ways. These philosophical assumptions often go unrecognized by the lay person, or even researchers within the field of psychology (Slife & Reber, 2009; Taylor, 2009). These assumptions on reality are the basis on which people create ideas and beliefs. These assumptions affect what other beliefs an individual is likely to have, just as beliefs in ideas of disenchantment are often held in association with a disbelief in the transcendent or divine (Hook, 1944; Mills, 2002; Taylor, 2009;
Willoughby et al., 2019). For example, one such assumption is that humans are merely biological machines. With this assumption, a resulting belief would be that that moral agency is an illusion.
Such assumptions play a very powerful role in how beliefs and ideas come about, how people will approach learning about their reality, and how people will ultimately define what is moral or ethical.
Many studies focus on the subject of belief systems (Hamilton, 2015; McCright &
Dunlap, 2011; Willoughby et al., 2019), but there is little study on how individuals view reality
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 5 itself. With little research having been yet completed on the philosophical or metaphysical assumptions that the lay person or psychologists hold, there is need for further study.
Specifically, there is a need for better understanding in the degree to which individuals and psychologists believe in the philosophical or metaphysical assumptions that inform secular belief, as this may aid in better understanding the relationship between secular beliefs and other beliefs the individual may hold. As Taylor (2009) notes, these ideas are still widely popular, and it may prove useful to better understand how these often-unrecognized beliefs relate to other beliefs and ideas that individuals hold to be true.
Researchers within the field of psychology often utilize scientific methodology that inherently relies upon assumptions of secularism (Durant, 1961; Haig, 2011; Lederman et al.,
2002). Further analysis of the secular beliefs psychological researchers hold, specifically inherent to the use of scientific methodology, may help to better inform the practice of research in psychology by increasing awareness of how ideas of secularism are utilized to inform research and mental health treatment (Durant, 1961; Griffin, 2000; Kuhn, 1963 Lederman et al., 2002).
Education systems within the United States are largely influenced by secular beliefs, as they commonly utilize scientific methodology as an evaluative standard (Jones, 2019; Sorell,
2013; Stenmark, 2020). As a result, students within these academic systems are provided education that is inherently laden with secular ideas. Research into the extent of agreement students hold with ideas of secularism may help in better understanding how they navigate relationships between secularism and their personally held cultural or spiritual beliefs. This is important, as it has been suggested through previous research that secular ideas presented in academic contexts may conflict with personal beliefs of students (Gottlieb, 2007; Lawson &
Weser, 1990; Reber et al., 2012).
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 6
This study attempts to assess the relationship between metaphysical assumptions, worldviews, and demographic variables. Specifically, this study investigates the degree to which students may hold specific metaphysical assumptions or worldviews (i.e., secularism) inherent in the education system within the United States. This study (a) created a measure of secularism based on the measurement of domains of DURMO and (b) examined how various demographics relate to the measure of secularism.
Assumptions of Secularism
Determinism
Determinism is a worldview that every event or object must have an antecedent cause and that each cause must lead to a subsequent reaction. Ideas of determinism are not harmonious with spontaneous creation, as ideas of determinism require the existence of an uninterrupted causal relationship between all things (Evans, 2013; Mills, 2013; Scott, 1998). These causal and uninterrupted relationships described by the worldview of determinism imply an ability to predict future effects from initial causes (Bohman, 1993; Kirsch & Hyland, 2017). Bear and
Knobe (2015), in studying the beliefs individuals had on whether ideas of determinism applied to human behavior, found results that suggested that participants held beliefs of a contextual determinism in regard to the predictability and causal nature of human behavior. Results from this study indicated that participants held both a belief in determinism in regard to human behavior if behavior was considered to be passive, as well as a belief in an indeterminism in regard to human behavior if behavior was considered to be active. Passive behaviors were
considered to be those that did not require reasoning, or were understood to be reactive, while
active behaviors were those that were understood to be actions involving higher levels of
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 7 reasoning and thoughtful decision-making (Bear & Knobe, 2015). Worldviews of determinism had been noted by researchers to be held among various cultures (Sarkissian et al., 2010).
Universalism
Universalism posits that there exists fundamental principles, forces, or truths that do not change over time or according to location (Ingram, 2014). In regard to the natural world, ideas of universalism are associated with beliefs in the consistency of natural laws as they occur, and ideas of universalism in turn support the idea of generalizability (Durant, 1961; Kinnier et al.,
2008). Much research around universalism in psychological research is related to morality and ethics. For instance, Schwartz (2007) found that in a study of 21 countries, when asked about moral issues, respondents indicated an overall high consensus on what they considered to be stances that reflected a moral good. This consensus suggests a commonality for moral judgment among people, and could suggest a preference for universal beliefs on morality or ethics among societies (Schwartz, 2007; see also Sarkissian et al., 2010).
Reductionism
Reductionism claims that all that exists can be broken down into smaller parts of which it is primarily composed and is often associated with materialism (Crick & Clark, 1994; Scott,
1998). These ideas of reductionism are often associated with worldviews that describe a biological or material belief that the mind is simply a function rooted in the brain, and explains beliefs, desires, and aspirations as merely illusions (Schroeder, 2001). Further, reductionism has been tied to determinism (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018).
Research has suggested that students who are educated in a reductionist science more commonly believe in the worldview of reductionism (Lawson & Weser, 1990). Alternatively,
Embree and Embree (1993) found that undergraduate students from a church-related academic
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 8 institution indicated that they primarily believed that the mind cannot be reduced to matter. In this same study, however, the second-highest endorsed belief was reductionistic, which suggested that even undergraduate students within a church-related academic system may hold conflicting beliefs on reductionism in regard to the mind. In a separate study on associations between morality, meaning-making, and beliefs in reductionism, results suggested an association between beliefs in a biological non-reductionism with a heightened sense of meaning in life, a belief in morality’s legitimacy, and higher moral standards (Bergner & Ramon, 2013).
Materialism
Materialism is a belief that all that exists is made of physical material that can be observed (Bennett et al., 2003; Embree & Embree, 1993; Mills, 2002). Modern science operates under the assumption of materialism, with the lens of reductionism, in that all matter can be divided indefinitely (Bennett et al., 2003; Crick & Clark, 1994). Studies that mention materialism have frequently mentioned it in relation to immaterialism, which includes the belief that the mind is not composed of matter like the world surrounding it. In a number of studies, people supported that the mind was made of something other than matter, and that the mind or soul itself was immaterial (Embree & Embree, 1993; Stanovich, 1989). In a study that assessed the relationship between a belief in reductionism and free will, results suggested that people tend to believe in free will if they hold only a belief in an immaterialism as a result of believing that the mind is immaterial (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018).
Objectivism
Objectivism indicates that all that exists can be sensed and experienced, but that truth and reality are independent from human interpretation (Bernstein, 2011; Kuhn, 1963). Ironically, objective truth, especially in psychological science, must be interpreted through a subjective
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 9 observer (Fitch, 2018). Still, in an attempt made by researchers to understand how individuals discriminate between sources of truth, results from one study suggested that inferences on objective truth are often influenced by the most popularly held opinions (Heiphetz & Young,
2017). Results from a separate study indicated that individuals perceived empirical methods of science to be a more objective source of truth than other sources of information (Ryder et al.,
1999). Individuals reported that an objective understanding is gained solely through empirical observation, with proper rationalization, and with an absence of bias (Leary et al., 1986). Leone
(1996) suggested that a trust in the objectivity of one’s own experience was correlated with a tendency towards more polarized opinions. While some psychological researchers rely upon beliefs of objectivity in their research, Kirsch and Hyland (2017) have highlighted a skepticism of the worldview of objectivism, noting that it only required one experience of disconfirmatory evidence to cast doubt on any previously perceived objective truth.
Measuring Secularism
One of the challenges of attempting to measure worldviews or values is that these ideas are intangible and nuanced. Psychological science measures ideas through operationalization, assigning numbers to attitudes and values in self-report questionnaires, assessment, and quantified observed behaviors. In reality, it becomes difficult to say that any observance of behaviors can objectively define or measure what remains to be solely intangible within the mind. Psychological science attempts to circumvent this dilemma by measuring agreement with value statements; however, this approach may still prove inadequate, as it requires a form of
quantified measurement of values or ideas. Ultimately, there exists the dilemma that no
measurement escapes subjective interpretation, weakening arguments for objective
measurements (Kauffman & Sasso, 2006; Gallagher, 2006; Weber, 1949). A study of secular
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 10 worldviews grapples with the same difficulties of intangibility and measurement, however attempts have been made in psychological research to understand these worldviews through the lens of individuals’ belief systems by assessing the relationship of belief in secularist ideas with the identities and life circumstances of individuals.
A brief review of literature in psychological research shows studies that have assessed the relationship between beliefs in secularism and gender and age (Baker & Smith, 2009; Cragun,
2007; Glenn, 1987; Hayes, 2000; Kosmin & Keysar, 2006; Tamney et al., 1989), education
(Bainbridge, 2005; Sherkat, 2008; Uecker et al., 2007), politics (Hadaway & Roof, 1979; Roof &
McKinney, 1987), religious belief (Baker, 2012; see also Baker et al., 2018; Hall et al., 2008; Li
& Bond, 2010), and health (Eliassen et al., 2005; Galen & Kloet, 2011; Lim, 2015; Mochon et al., 2011; Riley et al., 2005; Ross, 1990; Shaver et al., 1980). Studies have also been performed to assess the presence of concurrent secular and non-secular beliefs (Lawson & Weser, 1990;
Reber et al., 2012; Shapiro & Fitzgerald, 1989; Shtulman, 2013). While there has existed study of relationships between identities and secular belief, much of the literature in psychological research lacks investigation into the specific metaphysical assumptions foundational to secularism that individuals may hold. Further, there has been little study of whether these metaphysical assumptions or beliefs on reality might influence human thought or behavior.
The Current Study
This study on secular beliefs may prove important in providing better understanding of to what extent specific assumptions of secularism are believed to be true by participants, and may help in specifically assessing whether there exists a relationship between participant agreement with statements reflecting ideas of secularism and the level of education the individual has obtained. Results could lead to further research that will better assess how belief
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 11 systems of individuals are related to the secularist assumptions that United States educators use as foundations for teaching (Bainbridge, 2005; Sherkat, 2008; Uecker et al., 2007). It may also further understanding of how to navigate potential incompatibilities between secular beliefs and other belief systems in the course of mental health treatments, as the differences in concurrently held yet incompatible beliefs may result in cognitive dissonance and may be related to poor mental health outcomes (van Nieuw Amerongen-Meeuse et al., 2018; Genia, 1994). As, studies focused on metaphysical assumptions within psychological science are sparse (Lawson & Weser,
1990; Ryder et al., 1999; Lederman et al., 2002), results from this study could aid in increasing awareness of how secular beliefs influence the metaphysical assumptions of psychologists and the epistemologies they utilize in psychological research.
This study proposes a series of agreement statements that reflect ideas of secularism, based on the disenchanting ideas in the worldviews of DURMO, that may serve as a way to measure the explicit agreement individuals may have with the worldview of secularism. As prior research has suggested that people believe in the worldview of determinism differently when asked about human agency or the human soul in contrast with the natural world (Bear & Knobe,
2015, 2016; Embree & Embree, 1993; Sarkissian et al., 2010; Stanovich, 1989), agreement statements for each worldview of DURMO were created to address the context of people and the natural world specifically. Efforts were made to avoid a combination of the contexts of both people and the natural world when items were created, and this was done to more accurately assess whether participants would answer differently based on the context of the item.
Initially, it was hypothesized that patterns in participant responses would be reflected in a model that demonstrated each worldview of DURMO as first-order latent variables, two second-
order latent variables represented by items that were context dependent to either people (PNAT)
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 12 or the natural world (NWNAT), and that each second-order latent variable would then load onto a third-order latent variable, which was hypothesized to be secularism. For the purpose of this study, it is important to note that while ideas and concepts are being addressed as variables that are superordinate to one another, this merely serves as a conceptual tool to demonstrate how secularism is a term used as a way of organizing the worldviews of DURMO. The measure created in this study is named Measure of Explicit Agreement with Assumptions of Secularism
(MEAAS). See Figure 1.
Figure 1
Hypothesized Model of MEAAS
This study is novel in its attempt to provide a more complete or multidimensional approach to measuring belief in secularism. In order to solidify this measure of secularism, I hypothesized the following:
H1: Responses on the statements in this measure will support the idea that this measure
accurately assesses the degree to which individuals agree with secular ideas (i.e., the
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 13
measure will have face validity in terms of the definition of the construct of secularism
developed above).
This study will also seek to address three other research questions, laying a foundation for subsequent studies of construct validity:
RQ1: Is there a positive correlation between years of education within a United States
academic system and high ratings of agreement from participants on this measure?
RQ2: Is there any relationship between cultural background and scores on this measure?
RQ3: Is there any relationship between religious background and scores on this
measure?
Method
The survey was created in collaboration with content experts, drafting items that could
reflect ideas of secularism that could be included in this measure. Items were organized into an
online survey through Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT), an online platform for survey design.
The survey was then distributed through Amazon Mechanical Turk (Amazon, 2021), an online
survey distribution platform that allows for anonymous administration and collection of survey
results. Along with the items regarding secularism, participants were asked to indicate their
gender, age, sexual orientation, race, religion, political affiliation, years of education, and area of
study. They also indicated if they were a first-generation college student and if their parents are first-generation immigrants. Because this study seeks to validate the creation of this measure, this demographic information was requested to utilize in item analysis. Each participant who gave consent and completed the survey were given a compensation of one U.S. dollar in the form of an indirect electronic transfer through the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. Using a combination of preferences set by Amazon and Qualtrics, respondents with a Geo-IP address
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 14
(Geographical Internet Protocol Address) located outside of the United States were excluded from participation, redirected to the end of the survey, and no responses were collected from these individuals.
This study was approved by the IRB, and all participants provided consent. The only requirements of participation were that participants must be 18 years of age or older and living in the United States. This was done in an effort to preserve reliability and validity in survey responses, as the measure was created to address aspects of secularism found within education systems located in the United States.
Participants
The measure was distributed to 395 random respondents. Participants were mostly male
(62.8%; N = 248), 36.5% were female (N = 144), and three individuals preferred to not indicate their gender identity (0.8%). Ages of participants ranged from 19 to 77 years old (M = 39.86;
Med = 36; SD = 11.957). Several sexual orientations were represented among participants:
83.0% straight (N = 328), 12.2% bisexual (N = 48), 3.3% gay/lesbian (N = 13), 0.8% “prefer not
to say” (N = 3), 0.5% asexual (N = 2), and 0.3% “other” (N = 1). The majority of respondents
were White (77.2%; N = 305), while 9.9% were Asian (N = 39), 5.6% Black/African-American
(N = 22), 4.6%Hispanic/Latino (N = 18), 2.3%Multiracial (N = 9), and 0.5%American
Indian/Alaska Native (N = 2). Further, 58% identified as Christian (N = 229), 13.2% were atheist
(N = 52), 10.6% agnostic (N = 42), 5.3% “prefer not to answer” (N = 21), 3.5% spiritual/non-
affiliated (N = 14), 2.3% Buddhist (N = 9), 2.3% “other” (N = 9), 1.8% Jewish (N = 7), 1.8%
Islam (N = 7), and 1.3% Hindu (N = 5). Specific religions indicated in corresponding open-ended
response fields provided a variation of representations among Christian sects (i.e., Catholic,
Baptist, Evangelical, Latter-Day Saint, Lutheran, Methodist, non-denominational, Orthodox,
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 15
Protestant, Seventh Day Adventist, and Roman Catholic), Judaism (i.e., Messianic Judaism),
Islam (i.e., Sunni), spiritual/non-affiliated (i.e., Deism), other (i.e., Jehovah’s Witnesses).
Participants indicated their areas of study were business/finance (27.8%; N = 110), STEM
(13.9%; N = 55), no specific educational background (11.9%; N = 47), humanities (10.4%; N =
41), communications (7.8%; N = 31), fine arts (7.1%; N = 28), education (5.1%; N = 20),
medicine (4.3%; N = 17), construction (4.3%; N = 17), other (4.3%; N = 17), and religion (0.5%;
N = 2). Open-response answers included commerce, computer science, criminal justice,
engineering, general studies, healthcare, history, information technology, liberal arts, natural
sciences, philosophy, political science, psychology, science, social science, and undeclared.
Item Design
The items included in the measure were produced based on an overview of the literature
and with the input of content experts. It consisted of five subscales (i.e., determinism,
universalism, reductionism, materialism, and objectivism), and 30 items that represent the
worldview of secularism, but were written in such a way as to be sufficiently understood by
those without a philosophical background. Efforts to make the language of items accessible to
those without a background in philosophy were taken in the form of seeking face validity of
items from several non-participants during the phase of item creation. Items were revised five
times based on content expert feedback to further ensure face validity and content validity.
Because no other scales exist that mirror the current scale, it was not possible to test for
convergent or discriminant validity.
All final items were structured as statements, to which participants were then asked to
rate their agreement on a 6-point scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree with
no neutral option. Because of the possibility that participants could apply assumptions and laws
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 16 differently to people and the natural world, variations of items were created in relation to people
(i.e., PNAT) or the natural world (i.e., NWNAT) to address each domain of DURMO. These variations were created in an effort to more accurately describe how beliefs in naturalism (i.e., ideas of disenchantment foundational to secularism) could manifest differently based on nuances of participants’ worldviews. Three items were created to address PNAT and NWNAT, separately, within each worldview of DURMO, resulting in a total of 6 items per domain.
Results
After data collection, data were analyzed in SPSS. All participants with missing data were retained. Using Mplus, the measure was analyzed with all 395 cases, which is considered a good sample size for measurement reliability (Comrey & Lee, 2013).
Initial use of EFA assessed if patterns of participant’s responses represented the worldviews of DURMO which were hypothesized to have been subscales for the statistical model. Factor loadings were assessed through the analyzing eigenvalues, yielding values that suggested up to 6 factors in the data (see Table 1). The use of the Kaiser-Guttman rule (Kaiser,
1991) with a scree plot suggested a 1-factor model; however, based on the rule that allows for factors with eigenvalues > 1 (Zwick & Velicer, 1986), I extracted all six factors for analysis.
Several iterations of EFA were analyzed, ranging from 1 to 6 factors. The 2-factor model was unstable when items with weak factor loadings were removed. And as items were removed for better fit for all other factor models, eigenvalues no longer supported the Kaiser-Guttman rule.
Both 1-factor and 3-factor models provided good fit statistics, however due to poor Cronbach’s alpha values (George & Mallery, 2003) in the 3-factor model, the 3-factor model was assessed to be unreliable. Due to this, the 1-factor model was assessed to be the only model to provide an accurate and reliable measure of secular belief, and the 3-factor model was not retained. As a
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 17 result, all further results will only be discussed in relation to the 1-factor model. All items of this measure with factor loadings below < .30 were removed (Hair et al., 2006; Hair et al., 2009;
Nunnally, 1978). There were 14 items retained for the 1-factor EFA with adequate fit (χ2 =
166.579, p < .001; RMSEA = .054; CFI = .92; TLI = .91; SRMR = .049).
Table 1
EFA Eigenvalues
Factor Eigenvalue
1 8.509 2 2.286 3 1.965 4 1.554 5 1.262 6 1.092
CFA was performed to check responses with the newly identified models. Using and
MLR estimation, fit statistics for the 1-factor CFA (χ2 = 166.579, p < .001; RMSEA = .054; CFI
= .92; TLI = .91; SRMR = .049) had adequate fit. See Table 2 for factor loadings. See Figure 2
for the 1-factor model.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 18
Table 2
CFA With One-Factor Solution of Secularism Measure
Item L SE
1. What people do is most often because of the circumstances they are in. .53 .05 2. Every event in the natural world has a cause. 3. Every person is a product of the relationships and environment they live in. 4. The past is hard to escape; it has a strong effect on our present thoughts and actions. 5. Whatever a person does can be traced to a simple cause behind it. .62 .04 6. If you have any preconceived ideas on what you may observe, you can never be sure of the truth about the world. 7. With enough understanding, we can predict the results of all events in the .70 .03 natural world. 8. To know someone, pay attention to what they do, not what they say. 9. “A leopard can’t change its spots,” and a person can’t really change their basic .53 .05 personality. 10. People are free to make their own choices in spite of the circumstances they are in. 11. When a machine is not working, it is always because some part of it is broken. 12. To study nature, you have to observe it without really caring one way or another about what you think you will find. 13. The basic desires and motives of human beings are essentially the same now as they have always been. 14. To understand a complex mechanism, you really only need to understand the .66 .03 smaller parts that make it up. 15. All that really exists in the world is physical material. .65 .04
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 19
Table 2 (continued)
Item L SE
16. To really understand a person, you really have to understand them from the .56 .04 outside. 17. The laws that govern nature have always been true. 18. There are things in nature that are not made up of physical material. 19. There are exceptions to everything, even natural laws. 20. There are always multiple explanations for why things happen, even in the physical world. 21. All of the events in the physical world happen due to a chain of other .55 .04 physical events. 22. Down deep, people are the same wherever and whenever you find them. .53 .04 23. Emotions and desires arise from chemicals in the body. .51 .05 24. Being too involved in a person’s life can prevent you from truly .51 .05 understanding them. 25. People often think they are free to do what they choose, but their actions are .69 .03 really only caused by what their brains and physical bodies are doing. 26. The laws that govern nature are true everywhere in nature. 27. Human beings have a soul or spirit that is not made up of physical material. 28. Although many things seem to change over time, our basic human nature doesn’t change. 29. Matter and laws of nature explain everything in the world. .65 .04 30. Problem solving in any system just requires that we break the problem down .62 .04 to its simplest parts. Note. This table shows significant factor loadings of items onto factors. Items with no factor
loading were not retained in the final model due to poor factor loadings. L = factor loading; SE =
estimated standard error.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 20
Figure 2
One-Factor Model of Secularism
Cronbach’s alpha for the one-factor measure was reliable (α= .88) and scores ranged
from 6 to 84. Following the construction of this model, I (i.e., first author of this study)
investigated the hypotheses and research questions using the one-factor measure through the use
of SPSS.
Hypothesis 1
In order to answer H1, EFA and CFA were performed on the 1-factor model. Fit statistics
of EFA and CFA showed adequate fit of the model for the data, providing support for the idea
that statements in this measure have some similarity in the concepts they reflect, however this is
insufficient to make any claims that these ideas indeed provide an accurate measure of secular
belief (See beginning of Results section for EFA and CFA fit statistics).
An item analysis was also used to answer H1. I performed an item analysis of both those
items that were removed and were retained from the final version of the measure. Said item
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 21 analysis was performed in order to explore patterns in those items that were removed, as well as how scores for each demographic group reflected on those items that remained in the measure.
See Table 3 for the list of items that were removed from the final version of the measure due to poor factor loadings. 16 of the proposed 30 items were removed during the EFA process.
Removed items reflected patterned use of reverse-coded and absolute language, which may have led to poor factor loadings that suggested removal. See Tables 4, 5, and 6 for tables
demonstrating the means and standard deviations for scores of each item according to each
demographic variable of participants (Table 4 for items 1, 5, 7, 9, and 14; Table 5 for items 15,
16, 21, 22, and 23; Table 6 for items 24, 25, 29, and 30). Again, similarities in ideology can be
seen among those items that remained, however this is still insufficient to make any claims at
this time that these items reflect a measurement of secular belief. Additionally, items that were
removed reflected similar ideas as those items that remained in the final measure, further
suggesting a lack of certainty that secularism is the concept being reflected by this measure.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 22
Table 3
Items Removed From Final Measure
Item
2. Every event in the natural world has a cause. 3. Every person is a product of the relationships and environment they live in. 4. The past is hard to escape; it has a strong effect on our present thoughts and actions. 6. If you have any preconceived ideas on what you may observe, you can never be sure of the truth about the world. 8. To know someone, pay attention to what they do, not what they say. 10. People are free to make their own choices in spite of the circumstances they are in. 11. When a machine is not working, it is always because some part of it is broken. 12. To study nature, you have to observe it without really caring one way or another about what you think you will find. 13. The basic desires and motives of human beings are essentially the same now as they have always been. 17. The laws that govern nature have always been true. 18. There are things in nature that are not made up of physical material. 19. There are exceptions to everything, even natural laws. 20. There are always multiple explanations for why things happen, even in the physical world. 26. The laws that govern nature are true everywhere in nature. 27. Human beings have a soul or spirit that is not made up of physical material. 28. Although many things seem to change over time, our basic human nature doesn’t change.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 23
Table 4
Demographic Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for Items 1, 5, 7, 9, and 14
i1 i5 i7 i9 i14 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD Gender Male 4.66 .98 4.30 1.25 4.02 1.47 4.02 1.47 4.13 1.47 Female 4.51 .79 3.81 1.25 3.55 1.32 3.89 1.24 3.78 1.44 Prefer not to say 3.67 .58 3.33 1.15 2.33 .58 4.33 .58 3.67 1.53 Sexual Orientation Straight 4.54 .92 4.03 1.26 3.76 1.39 3.90 1.37 3.90 1.41 Gay/Lesbian 4.38 .65 3.69 1.25 2.85 1.41 3.08 1.19 2.62 1.19 Bisexual 5.12 .82 4.88 1.10 4.85 1.30 4.71 1.32 5.02 1.38 Asexual 4.00 .00 3.50 .71 3.00 1.41 3.50 2.12 4.00 1.41 Other 5.00 .00 5.00 .00 5.00 .00 5.00 .00 5.00 .00 Prefer not to say 3.67 .58 3.33 1.15 2.33 .58 4.33 .58 3.67 1.53 Ethnicity American Indian or Alaska Native 5.00 1.41 3.50 .71 4.00 1.41 4.00 .00 4.50 .71 Asian 4.62 .85 4.23 1.39 4.31 1.13 4.54 1.23 4.00 1.47 Black or African American 5.05 .72 4.59 1.14 4.32 1.32 4.19 1.40 4.68 1.17 Hispanic/Latino 4.67 .84 3.78 1.31 3.61 1.42 3.56 1.62 3.83 1.42 Multiracial 4.33 1.22 3.56 1.67 3.00 1.58 3.56 1.67 3.33 1.58 White 4.57 .93 4.11 1.25 3.78 1.46 3.92 1.37 3.97 1.47 MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 24
Table 4 (continued)
i1 i5 i7 i9 i14 Religious Affiliation Christian 4.76 .87 4.47 1.15 4.24 1.39 4.33 1.31 4.41 1.30 Jewish 4.43 .53 4.43 .98 3.71 1.50 3.86 1.35 4.14 1.46 Muslim 4.86 .69 4.43 1.51 4.14 1.35 3.43 1.51 3.43 2.07 Hindu 4.60 .55 4.40 .55 4.40 .89 3.80 1.64 3.80 1.64 Buddhist 4.78 .83 3.67 1.32 4.22 .83 3.67 1.00 4.11 1.17 Agnostic 4.33 .75 3.64 1.19 3.29 1.33 3.38 1.31 3.43 1.31 Atheist 4.23 1.08 3.12 1.40 2.88 1.31 3.06 1.43 3.17 1.53 Spiritual/non-affiliated 4.36 1.08 3.71 1.20 2.93 1.00 4.14 .86 3.23 1.24 Other 4.44 .73 3.67 .87 2.78 .97 4.00 1.22 3.00 1.32 Prefer not to answer 4.43 1.25 4.00 1.05 3.76 1.34 3.90 1.22 3.62 1.72 1st-Gen College Student Yes 4.79 .81 4.41 1.22 4.25 1.38 4.21 1.34 4.31 1.41 No 4.46 .97 3.91 1.27 3.57 1.42 3.80 1.39 3.77 1.46 1st-Gen Immigrant 0 4.46 .92 3.79 1.25 3.37 1.36 3.62 1.33 3.56 1.44 Parents 1 4.76 .85 4.30 1.17 4.31 1.34 4.39 1.22 4.54 1.25 2 4.69 .91 4.53 1.15 4.49 1.23 4.35 1.42 4.40 1.39 3+ 5.35 .79 5.65 .70 5.25 .86 5.13 1.09 5.35 .70
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 25
Table 4 (continued)
i1 i5 i7 i9 i14 Area of Study Business/Finances 4.80 .89 4.32 1.43 4.37 1.35 4.27 1.38 4.28 1.45 Law 4.90 .74 4.70 1.25 4.30 1.42 4.00 1.63 4.40 1.43 Fine Arts 4.32 .61 4.25 1.11 4.00 1.19 4.07 1.30 3.93 1.27 Medicine 4.47 1.12 4.24 1.15 3.82 1.42 3.94 1.34 4.18 1.51 STEM 4.49 .88 3.87 1.32 3.49 1.54 3.73 1.48 3.64 1.67 Humanities 4.59 .77 3.78 1.31 3.35 1.12 3.51 1.43 3.76 1.53 Religion 4.50 .71 4.50 .71 6.00 .00 3.00 1.41 3.50 .71 Construction 4.94 .83 4.94 .83 4.82 .95 4.29 1.45 4.71 1.45 Communications 4.48 1.03 4.10 1.04 4.06 1.46 4.06 1.29 4.16 1.39 Education 4.60 .94 4.35 1.09 4.00 1.45 4.20 1.44 4.30 1.34 Other 4.53 1.23 3.59 1.12 3.00 1.37 3.94 1.03 3.71 1.53 Does not apply to me 4.40 1.06 3.74 1.09 2.91 1.19 3.72 1.26 3.46 1.11 Political Affiliation Republican Party 4.62 1.04 4.40 1.22 4.23 1.45 4.27 1.29 4.51 1.31 Democratic Party 4.66 .87 4.08 1.28 3.92 1.37 3.89 1.44 3.95 1.48 Green Party 4.33 .52 4.17 .98 4.50 .84 4.33 1.03 4.00 .89 Libertarian Party 4.40 .55 5.00 .00 3.00 1.41 4.00 1.00 4.60 .89 Non-affiliated 4.36 1.03 3.78 1.25 2.96 1.34 3.78 1.28 3.30 1.40 Other 4.25 .96 2.75 1.50 2.00 1.41 4.25 1.26 2.75 1.50 Note. i1 = item 1; see Table 2 for wording of items.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 26
Table 5
Demographic Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for Items 15, 16, 21, 22, and 23
i15 i16 i21 i22 i23 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD Gender Male 3.93 1.70 3.93 1.36 4.64 1.05 4.12 1.39 4.45 1.25 Female 3.36 1.46 3.83 1.31 4.44 .84 3.99 1.18 4.13 1.15 Prefer not to say 3.00 2.00 3.00 .00 3.67 1.53 3.33 1.53 3.00 1.00 Sexual Orientation Straight 3.58 1.61 3.77 1.31 4.51 .99 4.01 1.27 4.26 1.23 Gay/Lesbian 3.77 1.54 3.31 1.32 4.31 .75 3.15 .80 4.00 1.08 Bisexual 4.71 1.54 4.89 1.22 5.09 .88 4.71 1.50 4.92 1.11 Asexual 3.50 .71 4.50 .71 4.00 .00 5.00 .00 4.50 .71 Other 2.00 .00 3.00 .00 5.00 .00 5.00 .00 4.00 .00 Prefer not to say 3.00 2.00 3.00 .00 3.67 1.53 3.33 1.53 3.00 1.00 Ethnicity American Indian or Alaska Native 4.50 2.12 4.50 .71 3.50 .71 3.50 .71 5.00 1.41 Asian 3.74 1.74 3.74 1.48 4.85 .90 4.13 1.36 4.54 1.10 Black or African American 4.05 1.62 4.18 1.59 4.91 .75 3.82 1.59 4.14 1.21 Hispanic/Latino 4.00 1.41 4.17 1.15 4.17 1.42 4.17 1.42 4.33 1.33 Multiracial 2.67 1.50 3.33 1.58 4.22 1.09 2.89 1.27 4.00 1.50 White 3.70 1.64 3.88 1.31 4.54 .97 4.11 1.28 4.31 1.23
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 27
Table 5 (continued)
i15 i16 i21 i22 i23 Religious Affiliation Christian 4.00 1.60 4.24 1.34 4.69 .97 4.32 1.26 4.42 1.20 Jewish 4.00 1.29 3.43 1.13 4.14 .69 4.00 1.15 4.29 .76 Muslim 3.43 1.99 3.57 1.27 4.57 1.40 4.57 1.72 4.71 .95 Hindu 3.80 2.28 3.40 1.52 4.75 .50 3.80 1.64 3.60 1.52 Buddhist 3.67 1.41 3.11 .93 4.44 .88 3.89 1.27 3.89 1.05 Agnostic 3.17 1.48 3.38 1.13 4.43 .94 3.76 1.16 3.90 1.16 Atheist 3.58 1.71 3.35 1.23 4.42 1.00 3.37 1.30 4.54 1.34 Spiritual/non-affiliated 2.36 1.01 3.43 1.16 3.93 .73 3.71 1.07 3.86 .86 Other 2.56 1.01 3.00 1.00 4.11 1.27 3.67 1.41 3.22 1.09 Prefer not to answer 3.48 1.83 3.86 1.42 4.52 1.17 4.00 1.58 4.48 1.40 1st-Gen College Student Yes 4.22 1.48 4.26 1.26 4.73 1.01 4.34 1.33 4.43 1.15 No 3.34 1.63 3.63 1.33 4.44 .96 3.87 1.28 4.24 1.26 1st-Gen Immigrant Parents 0 3.23 1.57 3.46 1.28 4.45 .98 3.81 1.28 4.11 1.25 1 4.30 1.51 4.36 1.09 4.67 1.00 4.46 1.15 4.58 .91 2 4.17 1.55 4.33 1.33 4.62 .99 4.16 1.41 4.41 1.35 3+ 5.35 .79 5.50 .52 5.24 .83 5.24 .90 5.41 .71
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 28
Table 5 (continued)
i15 i16 i21 i22 i23 Area of Study Business/Finances 4.15 1.61 4.26 1.34 4.72 1.08 4.41 1.22 4.42 1.33 Law 4.20 1.93 3.80 1.81 4.80 1.23 5.00 .82 5.10 .88 Fine Arts 3.82 1.61 3.93 1.25 4.46 .58 3.93 1.09 4.50 .96 Medicine 3.59 1.42 4.29 1.21 4.53 1.07 3.53 1.50 4.18 1.01 STEM 3.55 1.71 3.45 1.09 4.64 .97 3.69 1.45 4.27 1.24 Humanities 3.15 1.39 3.66 1.35 4.54 .87 3.61 1.20 4.17 1.12 Religion 3.50 3.54 5.00 .00 3.00 1.41 5.50 .71 5.50 .71 Construction 4.18 1.38 4.35 1.41 4.75 1.06 4.35 1.54 4.29 1.36 Communications 4.26 1.63 4.17 1.39 4.45 1.12 4.55 1.12 4.29 1.27 Education 3.90 1.52 4.15 1.66 4.60 .94 4.25 1.41 4.40 1.19 Other 2.88 1.58 3.76 1.15 4.41 .87 3.76 1.30 4.65 1.22 Does not apply to me 2.98 1.52 3.13 1.06 4.26 .90 3.72 1.23 3.87 1.21 Political Affiliation Republican Party 3.92 1.61 4.29 1.29 4.77 .96 4.44 1.37 4.57 1.13 Democratic Party 3.84 1.62 3.88 1.35 4.56 .96 4.03 1.31 4.33 1.23 Green Party 4.83 1.17 3.83 .75 4.50 .84 4.00 .89 4.33 .82 Libertarian Party 4.80 1.30 4.20 1.30 5.00 .71 3.20 1.48 4.20 .84 Non-affiliated 2.58 1.26 3.20 1.21 4.30 .99 3.78 1.11 3.82 1.30 Other 2.25 2.50 3.75 .96 2.75 1.71 2.50 1.29 4.50 1.91 Note. i15 = item 15; see Table 2 for wording of items.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 29
Table 6
Demographic Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for Items 24, 25, 29, and 30
i24 i25 i29 i30 M SD M SD M SD M SD Gender Male 4.07 1.44 4.12 1.41 4.33 1.34 4.54 1.07 Female 3.88 1.38 3.78 1.18 3.97 1.27 4.12 1.14 Prefer not to say 3.67 .58 3.67 .58 3.67 1.53 4.00 1.73 Sexual Orientation Straight 3.90 1.40 3.90 1.34 4.09 1.31 4.32 1.09 Gay/Lesbian 3.54 1.27 3.46 .97 3.54 1.20 3.69 .95 Bisexual 4.75 1.39 4.85 1.11 5.08 1.09 5.06 1.10 Asexual 4.50 .71 3.50 .71 5.00 .00 3.50 .71 Other 5.00 .00 4.00 .00 4.00 .00 5.00 .00 Prefer not to say 3.67 .58 3.67 .58 3.67 1.53 4.00 1.73 Ethnicity American Indian or Alaska Native 4.50 .71 3.50 2.12 5.50 .71 4.00 .00 Asian 4.49 1.32 4.03 1.33 4.23 1.35 4.56 1.10 Black or African American 4.14 1.32 4.09 1.41 4.45 1.30 4.64 1.18 Hispanic/Latino 3.67 1.53 4.17 1.42 4.44 1.29 4.67 .69 Multiracial 4.56 1.42 4.00 1.66 3.67 1.50 3.33 1.58 White 3.92 1.42 3.98 1.32 4.17 1.32 4.36 1.11
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 30
Table 6 (continued)
i24 i25 i29 i30 Religious Affiliation Christian 4.31 1.33 4.22 1.33 4.38 1.32 4.59 1.09 Jewish 4.00 1.00 4.29 1.11 4.43 1.13 4.29 .95 Muslim 3.14 1.86 4.29 1.25 4.71 1.25 4.71 1.38 Hindu 4.40 1.52 4.20 1.30 4.40 1.52 4.00 1.73 Buddhist 4.00 1.12 3.44 1.24 4.00 1.22 4.44 .73 Agnostic 3.31 1.39 3.43 1.23 3.76 1.10 4.05 1.03 Atheist 3.48 1.45 3.81 1.37 4.19 1.41 4.06 1.21 Spiritual/non-affiliated 3.57 1.45 3.36 .84 3.21 1.05 3.64 1.01 Other 3.22 1.09 3.22 1.30 3.22 1.20 4.11 .78 Prefer not to answer 3.95 1.47 3.90 1.41 4.00 1.38 4.19 1.08 1st-Gen College Student Yes 4.25 1.29 4.29 1.32 4.53 1.19 4.68 1.00 No 3.81 1.46 3.79 1.31 3.97 1.35 4.18 1.15 1st-Gen Immigrant Parents 0 3.60 1.41 3.64 1.28 3.90 1.35 4.20 1.04 1 4.48 1.22 4.38 1.23 4.52 1.12 4.57 1.13 2 4.36 1.29 4.39 1.33 4.51 1.28 4.51 1.27 3+ 5.35 .70 5.18 .88 5.24 .90 5.41 .62
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 31
Table 6 (continued)
i24 i25 i29 i30 Area of Study Business/Finances 4.12 1.39 4.24 1.38 4.48 1.20 4.64 1.09 Law 4.00 1.33 4.00 1.83 4.30 1.49 5.10 .88 Fine Arts 4.32 1.36 4.32 1.36 4.43 1.20 4.43 1.03 Medicine 4.06 1.39 4.06 1.25 4.06 1.20 4.12 1.41 STEM 4.07 1.51 3.85 1.34 4.07 1.39 4.20 1.24 Humanities 4.00 1.40 3.59 1.05 4.07 1.27 4.07 .79 Religion 2.50 2.12 5.50 .71 5.50 .71 3.50 2.12 Construction 4.06 1.60 4.47 1.33 4.59 1.37 4.71 1.31 Communications 4.48 1.23 4.42 1.12 4.39 1.36 4.48 1.06 Education 3.90 1.48 4.10 1.29 4.30 1.30 4.50 1.05 Other 3.59 1.23 3.53 1.07 3.59 1.77 4.06 1.39 Does not apply to me 3.30 1.30 3.36 1.29 3.53 1.21 4.11 .96 Political Affiliation Republican Party 4.20 1.43 4.26 1.37 4.41 1.37 4.80 .99 Democratic Party 4.02 1.40 4.04 1.31 4.32 1.22 4.30 1.12 Green Party 4.50 .84 4.33 .82 4.33 1.03 4.17 .75 Libertarian Party 3.20 1.30 4.00 1.41 4.40 .89 3.80 1.64 Non-affiliated 3.68 1.41 3.24 1.22 3.34 1.38 4.18 1.14 Other 2.25 1.26 3.75 .50 2.00 .82 3.25 .96 Note. i24 = item 24; see Table 2 for wording of items.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 32
Research Question 1
To answer RQ1, I performed a Pearson correlation with a bootstrap (1000 samples) for confidence intervals. The relationship between years of education and secularism was not
significant for any of the scales or subscales. See Table 7.
Table 7
Bivariate Pearson Correlations of Years of Education and Secularism Measure
r p CI [lower, upper]
1-factor Secularism -.07 .08 [-.17, .03]
Research Question 2
In order to understand how cultural background is related to secularism, I examined
scores of respondents to assess if there existed any relationship between first-generation student
status, the number of first-generation immigrant parents, race, area of study, and political
affiliation on the secularism measure. First, using an independent sample t-test, results from the
1-factor secularism measure indicated significant differences between first-generation students and non-first-generation students. First-generation students had higher scores of secularism than non-first-generation students. See Table 8.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 33
Table 8
Independent Sample t-tests Between First-Generation Students and Secularism Measure
p First-generation Non-first- Cohen’s d student generation M(SD) student M(SD)
1-factor Secularism .001 61.52(11.26) 54.72(10.76) 10.96
Next, I ran a one-way ANOVA with a Tukey post-hoc test to investigate the relationship between the number of first-generation immigrant parents and secularism. Participant responses on 1-factor secularism measure resulted in significant differences between groups. See Table 9.
People with one immigrant parent reported higher secularism scores than those with zero, two,
and three or more immigrant parents (all p < . 001); and those with three or more immigrant parents had lower secularism scores than those with one or two immigrant parents (both p <
.001). See Table 10 for means.
Table 9
One-Way ANOVA Statistics Between First-Generation Parents and Secularism Measure
F df (between groups, within groups) p
1-factor Secularism 38.89 (3, 391) .001
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 34
Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations of Secularism Measure on Number of First-Generation
Immigrant Parents
# of first-gen immigrant parents 1-factor Secularism
0 53.18(9.31)
1 62.52(11.04)
2 61.68(11.65)
3+ 57. 55(11.48)
Note. Table shows M(SD).
Using a one-way ANOVA and a Tukey post-hoc test, there were no significant differences between racial groups and scores on the secularism measure. See Table 11.
Table 11
One-Way ANOVA Statistics Between Race and Secularism Measure
F df (between groups, within groups) p
1-factor Secularism 1.54 (5, 389) .18
In order to evaluate if there existed any relationship between areas of study and secularism, I ran a one-way ANOVA with a Tukey post-hoc test. Scores from the 1-factor secularism measure indicated significant differences between groups. See Table 12. Results indicated that business/finance majors had higher scores of secularism than STEM majors (p =
.03), humanities majors (p = .01), and for those who responded Does not apply to me (p < .001);
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 35
communications majors had higher scores for those who responded Does not apply to me (p =
.007); and construction majors had higher scores for those who responded Does not apply to me
(p = .003). See Table 13 for means.
Table 12
One-Way ANOVA Statistics Between Areas of Study and Secularism Measure
F df (between groups, within groups) p
1-factor Secularism 4.84 (11, 383) .001
Table 13
Means and Standard Deviations of Secularism Measure on Areas of Study
1-factor Secularism
Business/Finance 61.24(12.33) Law 62.60(12.13) Fine Arts 58.71(9.64) Medicine 57.06(11.61) STEM 55.02(10.87) Humanities 52.76(6.99) Religion 61.00(12.73) Construction 63.18(12.86) Communications 60.23(11.42) Education 59.55(12.78) Other 53.00(9.35) Does not apply 50.43(8.72) Note. Table shows M(SD).
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 36
Another one-way ANOVA with a Tukey post-hoc test was used to evaluate the
relationship between political affiliation and secularism. Results from the participants’ responses
indicated significant differences between groups. See Table 14. Republicans scored higher on
secularism than non-affiliated individuals (p < .001) and those who said Other (p = .02); and
Democrats scored higher than non-affiliated individuals (p < .001). See Table 15 for means.
Table 14
One-Way ANOVA Statistics Between Political Affiliation and Secularism Measure
F df (between groups, within groups) p
1-factor Secularism 7.98 (5, 387) .001
Table 15
Means and Standard Deviations of Secularism Measure on Political Affiliation
1-factor Secularism
Republican Party 61.45(12.90)
Democratic Party 57.76(11.01)
Green Party 60.17(8.47)
Libertarian Party 57.80(2.17)
Non-affiliated 50.50(7.96)
Other 43.00(6.68)
Note. Table shows M(SD).
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 37
Research Question 3
A one-way ANOVA with a Tukey post-hoc test indicated a significant difference between religious affiliation and secularism for the 1-factor secularism measure. See Table 16.
Christians reported higher secularism than agnostics, atheists, spiritual/non-affiliated, and Other
(all p < .001). See Table 17 for means.
Table 16
One-Way ANOVA Statistics Between Religion and Secularism Measure
F df (between groups, within groups) p
1-factor Secularism 8.60 (9, 385) .001
Table 17
Means and Standard Deviations of Secularism Measure on Religious Affiliation
1-factor Secularism
Christian 61.24(11.66) Jewish 57.43(6.63)
Muslim 58.00(11.85)
Hindu 56.40(14.05)
Buddhist 55.33(5.79) Agnostic 51.26(8.88) Atheist 51.25(7.96) Spiritual/non-affiliated 49.21(7.37)
Other 48.22(3.03) Prefer not to answer 56.10(11.90)
Note. Table shows M(SD).
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 38
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to create a measure that could assess the degree to which individuals explicitly agree with statements reflecting metaphysical assumptions foundational to ideas of secularism. These metaphysical assumptions of secularism are beliefs that the world is not enchanted by ideas of anything supernatural, but that the natural world and its natural processes are all that are real, and are informed by the worldviews of determinism, universalism, reductionism, materialism, and objectivism (DURMO). Due to the number of items that were removed due to poor factor loadings, as well as the significantly higher scores of secularism for
Christians and Republicans that contrast results from previous studies, no claims on the validity of this measure can be made at this time. This study, however, does appear to support the idea that this measure assesses attitudes similar to secularism, and evidence for this support is found in the good fit statistics of items, suggesting similarities in the concepts addressed among statements that were written to reflect attitudes of secularism.
It had been initially hypothesized that participants’ responses would reflect a pattern which would suggest worldviews of DURMO to be first-order latent variables, that there would exist two second-order latent variables representing different responses based on the contexts of people-only items (PNAT) or natural world-only items (NWNAT), and that each second-order latent variable would then load onto a third-order latent variable, which was hypothesized to be secularism.
Eigenvalues indicated from an initial EFA suggested that up to 6 potential latent variables could exist among the results, and further use of EFA’s suggested that only a 1-factor model could reliably and sufficiently describe the patterns found among participants’ responses.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 39
In regard to the hypotheses of this study, statistical analyses and item analyses resulted in
no clear claims of the validity of this measure in assessing the secular belief of participants,
however results appear to support that items in this measure may reflect secular attitudes. An
examination of scores showed that (RQ1) there existed no positive correlation, nor significant
relationship between the acquired years of education of participants within United States education systems and scores on this measure. Further, elements of cultural background (RQ2)
and religious background (RQ3) of participants showed some significant differences among
groups. These results will be discussed subsequently.
People and Natural World Oriented Items
Because the 1-factor model was the only model to reliably and accurately represent the
patterns that were seen among participants’ responses, this suggested that participants did not
answer items differently based on whether the item addressed people rather than the natural
world. The previous hypothesis for the inclusion of PNAT and NWNAT was therefore
weakened, and the single latent variable that was represented in the final model was interpreted
to represent secularism. A CFA with this single latent variable yielded a working model with
sufficient fit.
The 1-Factor Model
The use of the Kaiser-Guttman rule (Kaiser, 1991) with a scree plot of results suggested
that there exists only one factor amongst the items. Cronbach’s alpha for this variable was good
(α= .88) according to suggestions made by George and Mallery (2003). This model provided
sufficient fit statistics to be considered a working model in both EFA and CFA, suggesting that
the model was a sufficient representation of the patterns observed among participant responses.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 40
Out of the original 30 items proposed for this measure and provided to participants, only
14 items were retained after removing those items that provided poor factor loadings. Of those items that were retained, the resulting model represented items that reflected every worldview of
DURMO, and most items reflected worldviews of materialism and reductionism. It may even be that participants interpreted items pertaining to reductionism as questions about materialism, which could be argued due to their close conceptual ties. If such is the case, those items that measured agreement with the worldview of materialism were most abundant amongst items loaded onto the latent variable. As DURMO was represented through the remaining items, the latent variable was interpreted to be secularism. Because only one latent variable was discovered in this model, arguments for PNAT and NWNAT as potential second-order variables were rejected. Patterns in responses according to demographic variables will be further discussed.
Demographic Analyses
An exploration of the relationships between participant responses and demographic variables may help in providing further understanding for whether there is support for the validity of this measure. As such, an analysis and possible explanations for such trends will be given below. Following this analysis of scores between groups of demographics, these same patterns will then be examined in regard to the specific items retained in the measure (see the section titled Item Analysis below).
An analysis of participant responses showed that there was no significant difference between years of education and the agreement with statements reflecting the worldview of secularism. Though a previous study found that belief in secularism is related to education, that study measured secularist belief in opposition to religious belief (e.g., including questions such as “science and religion are incompatible”; see Baker, 2012) rather than measuring the explicit
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 41
metaphysical foundations of secularism. Though the hypothesis of this study was based on the
assumption that secular belief was related to years of education obtained within United States
academic systems, people’s belief of secularism could vary in the presence of other demographic
variables or beliefs (e.g., geographic location, cultural background, religious affiliation). Further,
the finding that secular belief had no significant relationship with years of education within a
United States academic system could be due to random chance or potential nesting of the sample,
as the 1-factor model was marginally significant (p = .08). Another potential confounding factor may include response bias (e.g., social-desirability bias), as it may be possible that face validity contributed to participants’ desire to answer favorably to value sets that are widely considered positive (Chung & Monroe, 2003; Grimm, 2010).
Further, first-generation students had higher scores of secular belief. First-generation students may feel more pressure to adopt attitudes and assumptions that are more commonly taught in academic institutions as a way to culturally assimilate into a new environment, to more readily identify with an academic identity as a means to predict success, or to adopt a mindset they feel is expected of them (Rice et al., 2017).
Those participants with first-generation parents also had higher scores for belief in secularism. For the number of immigrant parents, having one or two immigrant parents may correlate with a pressure for acculturation to Western value systems. Children of first-generation parents may feel a pressure to identify more with United States culture to fit in or to facilitate learning from peers (Renzaho et al., 2017).
No difference was found between racial groups and secular belief. This could be due to
insufficient sample sizes, or insufficient representation of ethnic diversity among participants.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 42
There also could exist no real relationship between ethnicity and agreement with assumptions of
secularism.
Responses showed significant differences between areas of study. Business/finance
majors had higher scores of secular belief than STEM majors; yet no other areas of study had
significant between-group differences (Does not apply to me is not accounted for, as the response
lacks heterogeneous interpretations and cannot account for a large variance of differences;
therefore, it lacks a meaningful interpretation). Training or education systems for business or
finance differ significantly from those of STEM or humanities, and the worldview of secularism
may be more represented in business or finance education. Future studies should explore
qualitative analysis of business/finance educational programs and how they may incorporate
secularism into curriculum differently than STEM or humanities programs.
As for political affiliation, Republicans scored significantly higher on belief in secularism
than those who identified as non-affiliated or Other. There could exist some tie between having a
defined political stance/platform and the preference for clear metaphysical boundaries or
definitions of secularism, as it was noted in another study that there existed a significant
correlation between unclear political affiliation and greater reports of mental health distress
(Rodriguez, 2017). Because of the correlations found in other studies between identities of
Republican affiliation and Christian affiliation (D’Antonio et al., 2013; Pew Research Center,
2014), reasons for higher scores for Republicans may be similar to those of Christian affiliation.
The notion of defined political stances may also illuminate why Democrats scored higher than non-affiliated participants. Significant scores between secular belief and party affiliations of
Republican and Democrat were consistent with significant scores seen by Beard et al. (2013).
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 43
For religious differences, Christians had significantly higher scores than spiritual/non- affiliated. It may be that Christian participants could have determined a face validity of what the measure was assessing and overcompensated in responses due to a social desirability bias, perceiving that disagreement with secular beliefs may be undesirable. This same reasoning may apply to why Christians had greater belief in secularism than agnostics and atheists. According to
Taylor (2009), belief in secularism has become so popular in society that even people of
Christian beliefs are unaware of the secular beliefs they hold. It may be that higher scores on this measure among Christian participants reflects the unaware beliefs that Taylor (2009) was alluding to, or that these same participants were unaware of how statements reflected ideas that opposed religious or spiritual beliefs. Because the choice of Other in religious affiliation lacks heterogeneous interpretations and can account for a large variance of differences, it lacks interpretative power, and therefore no meaningful interpretation of the difference between
Christians and Other was made.
Item Analysis
Because the current study looks to validate the use of this measure for measuring agreement with assumptions of secularism, and some of the trends observed among the relationship between responses and participant identities, it would prove useful to take an in- depth look at the items of this measure and how they were answered.
Items Removed
Of the 30 original items created and proposed for this measure, 16 items were removed due to the poor factor loadings they provided (See Table 3). Removal of these items was done in order to improve the overall fit statistics of the model. An examination of these items yielded suggestions for further revision of this measure. Among those items removed, a pattern of the
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 44 use of absolute language (e.g., every, never, have to, always) in the wording of statements can be seen. This absolute language may have influenced participant responses in such a way as to provide poor factor loadings. Five of the removed items were reverse-coded (i.e., items 10, 18,
19, 20, and 27), representing ideas contrary to secularism, and this reverse-coding may have also resulted in poor factor loadings for these statements. Of course, it could always be that participants misread or misunderstood items in their wording. While all worldviews of DURMO were represented among items that were removed, all worldviews were also represented among those items which were retained. No single worldview represented among items was exclusively included or excluded from the final measure. Because items reflecting secularism were both retained and removed, this suggests doubt in whether ideas of secularism are really being represented among items.
Trends Among Participants’ Responses
Among those items that were retained in the final measure, several trends in responses are notable. One such notable trend is that of the significantly higher scores on this measure amongst participants who identify as either Republican or Christian (See Tables 4, 5, and 6). It may be that there exists overlap between these identities among many participants of this study, as prior research has demonstrated patterns among individuals in holding both identities concurrently (D’Antonio et al., 2013; Pew Research Center, 2014). The pattern of higher scores may suggest some problems for the validity of this measure.
Because ideas of secularity often share ideas of disenchantment, secular ideas are frequently understood to oppose religious or spiritual beliefs. Beliefs of secularism buffer and separate the individual from ties to the transcendent or divine, which does not align with religious ideals (Taylor, 2009). As such, higher scores from Christians and Republicans on this
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 45
measure then suggest that ideas of secularism are not represented amongst items in this study. In
Taylor’s (2009) writings on secularism, however, he notes that the current popular belief in
secularism in society has led to a culture of contestable beliefs, and that this has permitted people
to even believe in Christianity. Further, he describes how beliefs in secularity are so popular that
even Christians are among those that belief in secular ideas, although they may unaware of such
beliefs (Taylor, 2009). This presents the possibility that, while secularism may not be a belief
traditionally understood to be held by Christians, and by association, Republicans, the higher
scores of these participants on this measure may still suggest how items could represent ideas of
secularity.
Specific trends found among Christian participants can be seen in the mean scores for all
items in the final version of the measure. Average scores for this group ranged from 4.00 to 4.76,
meaning that Christians, on average, did not rate any items lower than Slightly Agree. These
averages were less varied, and higher than all other religious affiliations. The lowest average
score for items among Christians was still higher than most averages on items for other groups.
Those items that had lower average scores for Christians were items describing ideas attributed
to materialism. In relation to those who identified as atheist, these items had higher average
ratings. It is possible that higher average-scored items for Christians were perceived to not
contain words that were directly in opposition to spiritualism or religiosity, or that participants
were unaware of how these items may reflect ideas that contrast their spiritual or religious
beliefs. As was stated before, there may have existed a sense of agreeableness among Christian participants that influenced them to rate agreement on items higher than other groups. This idea would support how average scores were much higher for this group than others, however the idea that they may also hold secular beliefs may still be true.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 46
Trends for Republican participants are also similar to those of Christian participants.
Items reflecting materialism had lower scores on average, and average scores for Republicans
still showed a pattern of agreeableness to ideas in items, with the lowest average being 3.92 (item
15), which was near Slightly Agree. The highest averages for items among Republicans were
nearly the same items that were highest rated among Christian participants. Given the previously
noted positive correlations between these two identities, this could have been a reason for such
similarities in responses to arise.
Those items that had the highest average scores among Christians and Republicans
reflected ideas of problem solving by breaking down problems (item 30), cause and effect
phenomena of the natural world (item 21), understanding things by understanding their smaller parts (item 14), and how emotions and desires are connected to bodily chemicals (item 23). The
last of the ideas in that list (item 23) is most notable due to how it relates to ideas of materialism,
and it may be that Christians or Republicans separate the idea of the body from the spirit, thereby
preserving a space or context for the belief of a soul. This was the highest average score for an
item that reflected the worldview of materialism, and other items of materialism were rated
lower by these groups. Meanwhile, items reflecting materialism were rated higher by atheists,
specifically item 15, suggesting that other items reflecting materialism may have had better
wording or representation of that worldview.
Other items from the list of items scored highest by Christians and Republicans (items
14, 21, 23, and 30), while representing ideas of secularity, may have been rated with higher
agreement due to how they relate to scientific reasoning and methodology. It could be that these
items suggest ideas of secularity that these groups unknowingly believe in, however these items
may also contain poor wording in their ability to reflect secularism.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 47
Limitations
This study had several limitations that could have negatively impacted results or interpretations. Because of the sample size of this study (N = 395), attempts to use cross- validation methods with the EFA and CFA lacked sufficient sample size, and therefore statistical power, needed to provide reliable and valid results. Therefore, results of the CFA performed in this study should be interpreted with care, as interpretations may not be truly representative of the attitudes or values of the participants. A larger sample size would provide more trust in results and interpretations.
The decision to use Amazon Mechanical Turk was influenced by the ability to survey many different people from different locations and cultures in a quick manner. It could be, however, that the use of Amazon Mechanical Turk resulted in a nested sample, as this is a service that many people may not be aware of. This could have limited the demographics or value systems available amongst participants, thereby affecting results for a measure that was still in testing. Other limitations exist in how this online survey distribution platform provides more reward for quicker completion of surveys. Responses to the survey used in this study showed that there were some participants who completed the survey in anywhere from one to three minutes. It may be that some individuals can answer some of these items in a quicker fashion due to how some items were easily understood and answered; however, there also exists the risk that quick responses were made in an effort to get quicker access to compensation. These quicker responses could have been manifestations of poor attention to items and could have yielded poor results. It may also be that a larger sample gathered on this platform could have helped in gathering more reliable data.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 48
Further, it is difficult to encapsulate philosophical or metaphysical meaning in such a
small number of words. The English language attempts to use isms to provide this quick
informational reference; however, this use could also lead to misinterpretation or
misrepresentation. Ironically, this study attempted to make quantitative measurement of
intangible and all-too-easily-categorized philosophies that embody great complexity. Attempts to quantify these ideas through measurement may not be entirely possible, as they are based on subjective experience.
Item creation for measurement was done with the aid of content experts; however, meanings can be lost in translation when trying to reduce philosophical ideas into single statements. This proves especially difficult when trying to create distinctions between the close conceptual ties among worldviews of DURMO. It could be that items were misinterpreted or mistranslated by participants, and therefore the measurement could have been measuring something different than what was interpreted by investigators.
While the measure in this study has good fit statistics, only 14 of the original 30 items were retained after analyzing factor loadings. It could be that the removal of 16 items represented poor wording or representation of ideas within items. Of those items that were removed, a majority of them utilized absolutes in their phrasing, which was done in an attempt to better discriminate agreement with said items. Although this was the intent with these items, the use of absolutes in wording may have influenced participants to be wary of said items, and poor or inaccurate responses may have been provided. Five of the original 30 items utilized reverse-
coding language for the purpose of providing an ability to better discriminate reported
agreements on items. Reverse-coded items were ultimately among those items that were
removed due to poor factor loadings. Reverse-coded items may have been interpreted as double-
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 49 barreled items or could have led to the measurement of an entirely different concept than what was intended, as the wording on these items reflected opposing worldviews or beliefs to secularism. The use of opposing worldviews or beliefs meant that the items were not asking directly about secular attitudes, and as such, these items could have demonstrated less ability to represent the worldview of secularism. This could have been a reason for the poor factor loadings on these items. Had these items not been reverse-coded, it may have resulted in more items being retained, yielding a measure that could have had more potential power for discriminating agreement with worldviews of secularism. Avoidance of the use of absolute language may have resulted in a similar manner.
In regard to addressing research questions of this study, since the validity of this measure in assessing attitudes of secularism is yet unclear, no definitive stances can be taken on results gathered from the current study. The information did prove useful in analyzing patterns found among items, and suggestions for potential revisions of items were examined. Once this measure has provided more evidence for being a valid assessment of attitudes of secularism, it may be possible to then interpret results in a more meaningful way.
As little testing had been completed on the agreement with metaphysical assumptions of secularism, no previous measures or tests were used to provide a source for convergent or divergent validities. This decision was made due to the manner in which other studies have asked specifically about secular beliefs. Previous studies have made mention of secularism as a whole, have measured belief in secularism in contrast to religious or spiritual beliefs, or have asked about the use of secular attitudes in the removal of spiritual or religious attitudes from social organizations, but little has been done in asking directly about the metaphysical claims that are represented in the disenchanting ideas foundational to secularism. It may be that attempts to
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 50 measure agreement with direct philosophical attitudes may have been too difficult to do with the current items used in this study.
While no other measures or tests were used in conjunction with this measure, it is strongly suggested that future studies involve other measures in an effort to provide more evidence for the validity of this measure on secular beliefs. Again, this study could make no clear claims on the validity of these items, however results appear to suggest that items of this measure assess ideas of secularism. The validation of a measure such as the one used in this study requires much testing, and further efforts to examine its validity are greatly needed. Because results suggest a possibility that these items may measure secular belief, results of the current study are hopeful, and further validation studies using these items are strongly encouraged in order to provide more evidence to support the use of these items in measuring these worldviews.
Future Considerations
While there exist real limitations and difficulties in this study, the ability to measure agreement or trust with assumptions behind secularism would prove useful. As was discussed in the review of literature, previous study in the field of psychology has mainly investigated values of secularism among participants in contrast to religious values. Various trends have been correlated with these value sets; however, this study is novel in its attempt to provide a more complete or multidimensional approach to measuring belief in secularism. Future research into this area may provide more insight into how certain patterns of thinking are supported or rejected by individuals and may provide more support for why certain value sets become more compatible for certain people.
Specifically, further study of agreement with philosophical foundations of secularism may help to identify positive matches between therapists and clients (van Nieuw Amerongen-
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 51
Meeuse et al., 2018). Value sets for assumptions could help screen for like-minded individuals, which may positively impact therapeutic rapport and overall mental health results. If a reliable or valid manner of measuring these attitudes is ascertained, there may exist a possibility in understanding where problematic contradictions of belief exist, thereby informing therapy practices.
As secularism is pervasive and inherent among Western ideologies and systems, it is possible there are connections between the amount of time an individual is exposed to secular attitudes and that of acculturation, immigration status, and generational status. This information could potentially provide more insight into how values or beliefs may or may not shift in developmental models for acculturation. Further research should also investigate the differences between first- and second-generation immigrants’ value systems, and how immigrants and children of immigrants relate to or interact with each other in relation to the time they have spent among United States systems that inherently employ the use of secular attitudes.
If secularist attitudes are to be understood as cultural value sets, then this measure may also be able to further investigate the developmental trajectories of acculturation to secularism among students in general. This information may help provide further understanding of how value sets shift over time, especially when individuals are interacting within the education system of the United States. This measure could also help provide individuals insight into their own identities or value/belief sets, which can help them understand their own behavior.
Further inquiry into the measurement of philosophical assumptions could help in elaborating the nuances between secular and religious belief systems. It may help to further illuminate how individuals with these value sets interact with each other, how individuals manage carrying assumptions from both of these value sets, and if there exist inconsistencies in
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 52
how each of these individuals utilize each value set. Future study of this area could inform the
possibility of a secular code-switching, or a shift for religiously-affiliated individuals towards
secular attitudes for the sake of managing social desirability. It may help in understanding if
secular values are applied contextually (e.g., religiously-affiliated students) and if it presents any difficulties for these individuals. Such research could suggest how clinicians can help people manage distress relating to a contextual application of these value sets.
Because belief and value systems rely heavily upon philosophical foundations of
metaphysics and epistemology, further study of this area is heavily warranted. A better
understanding of an agreement with these foundations could elaborate on numerous areas of
study, especially in regard to value or belief systems. Results from this study demonstrated a
need for further efforts to validate this measure, as no clear claims on the ability of this measure
to accurately assess secular belief could be made at this time. Responses, however, appeared to
suggest support for the idea that items of this measure assess attitudes known as secularism.
Further efforts to validate these items may result in a future measure that could be a provide a
more valid measurement of these attitudes. This study aims to be the one of the few inquiries into
this field, and a great deal of further study is needed.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 53
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APPENDIX A
Review of the Literature
Assumptions that inform epistemologies are not very conceptually different from belief systems. Assumptions claim certain truths to hold constant about existence, much like how belief systems hold certain claims to be true. Regardless, the way an individual believes a system to operate will guide how they perceive their environment and react to it. As such, there exists a relationship between the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of the individual
(Gottlieb, 2007; Hook, 1944; Lawson & Weser, 1990; Mills, 2002; Williams, 2000; Willoughby et al., 2019).
Epistemology
Epistemology is the issue of the nature of knowledge, the sources of knowledge, how it comes about, what counts as knowledge, and the limitations of knowledge. In studying how children begin learning to discern truth from error and what are appropriate sources of knowledge, Corriveau and Harris (2009) observed that children have a preference for any information that seems accurate to the majority of people. In a study performed by Corriveau et al. (2009), the researchers assessed the degree to which children would trust an adult who seemed informed versus an adult who was more dissenting with popular opinion. The results suggested that children readily invested more trust in the adult that belonged to the majority opinion than the adult who played the lone dissenter. Children can recognize the popular opinion and seemed to place more trust in the consensus rather than differing information. This is akin to approximating towards the mean in statistics, in which an individual is more trusting of data that is close to the mean or median (Harries et al., 2004).
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 67
According to other research, adults use very similar forms in their use of consensus in order to determine truth (Asch, 1956; Harries et al., 2004; Sherif, 1936; Shtulman, 2013). Adults tend to look for generalizations of truth and will often assume the truth to be the most widely held opinion. Even when looking at what is considered appropriate behavior, adults will look to others to find social evidence for how to act (Cialdini, 1993; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). In addition,
Schtulman (2013) found that slightly more than half of respondents in his study claimed that their scientific beliefs were undeniably true, though they had difficulty explaining why such knowledge was true. This claim of understanding and knowledge is similar to what other studies have found, which suggests that the more an individual believes in the certainty of knowledge, the more likely they are to readily and blindly accept undefended information as absolute
(Schommer, 1990). Because assumptions of epistemology inform individuals in sources of truth and how they understand truth to be discovered, it also informs their decision-making. This suggests an importance for understanding the metaphysical assumptions of the individual, and how they relate to their epistemological beliefs. Since there is no prior research on the measurement of metaphysical assumptions that inform epistemology, this study seeks to establish a measure that can assess the strength of these assumptions. Further understanding of these assumptions, in turn, could improve understanding of human behavior and values.
Human beings can sometimes hold contradicting beliefs (Taylor, 2009). This often occurs unknowingly, but inconsistencies in belief often go unrecognized until they are more forcibly brought to attention (Keil, 2010). When individuals are more aware of their beliefs and are presented with information that is contradictory to said beliefs, they tend to discount any contradicting data that threatens their current beliefs (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Kunda, 1990). If
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 68 contradicting data is very convincing in its argument, there is a chance that people might partly revise their current beliefs (Kunda, 1990).
It is even possible then that those who are perceived as authorities, and who are perceived as informed, may also be at risk to these tendencies that were previously mentioned. Due to this risk, it is recommended that individuals be open to questioning their own beliefs, even if new beliefs are not readily accepted by the majority, and to be open to the possibility of utilizing different methods for finding truth (Kuhn, 1963; Lakatos et al., 1979).
While epistemology is concerned with the process of learning truth, it relies upon assumptions and beliefs of what is considered to be real (Gottlieb, 2007; Hook, 1944; Lawson &
Weser, 1990; Mills, 2002; Willoughby et al., 2019). Epistemologies that are popular in Western academic systems rely heavily upon the assumptions of naturalism, namely ideas of a material reductionism (Baker, 2012; Bainbridge, 2005; Sherkat, 2008; Sorell, 2013; Stenmark, 2020;
Uecker et al., 2007). Taylor (2009), in his accounting of a brief history of secular beliefs, describes how people began to separate the sacred from the secular, and that a pattern of belief in ideas of disenchantment (e.g., denial of anything supernatural) began to emerge in how people attributed ideas of reductionism and materialism to their understanding of the self and others.
Naturalism
The worldview of naturalism claims that what exists is matter, and is governed by natural causal laws and can be observed (Bishop, 2009; Griffin, 2000; Hook, 1944; Leahey, 1994; Mills,
2002). Often, the term naturalism is seen in literature in conjunction with supernaturalism, which is a more widely recognized term. Naturalism is typically placed in opposition to supernaturalism, in that naturalism claims that only that which can be observed can exist whereas supernaturalism does not. In this sense, those who hold naturalistic ideals would be opposed to
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 69
beliefs in anything spiritual (Hook, 1944; Mills, 2002; Sheldon, 1945). Subsequently, those who
employ naturalistic agendas seek to operationally define anything spiritual into an experience of
human thought or behavior, rather than deeming the experience unobservable or spiritual to any
degree (Donovan & Laudan, 2012; Lakatos et al., 1979; Reber, 2006). Bishop (2009) defines two
forms of naturalism: metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism. Metaphysical
naturalism is a worldview that claims that nothing exists but that which is natural and arises from
natural causes. Methodological naturalism, on the other hand, describes a way of gaining
understanding of the world through observing the natural and utilizing natural means. These
natural means include the measurement and observation of matter. While these distinctions
between types of naturalism can help in understanding how it applies differently to both
metaphysics and epistemology, for the sake of this study both metaphysical naturalism and
methodological naturalism will be regarded as just naturalism. This decision to combine these
two terms is supported by arguments that epistemology or methods pertaining to naturalism
cannot be divorced from their metaphysical assumptions about reality (Durant, 1961; Griffin,
2000; Haig, 2011; Leahey, 1994; Mills, 2002).
Naturalism can be understood as a family of assumptions about reality. The assumptions
are guiding thoughts that help to establish what is real and create guidelines for thought and
learning. This family of assumptions are determinism, universalism, reductionism, materialism,
and objectivism (DURMO; see Crick & Clark, 1994; Griffin, 2000; Leahey, 1994; Miller, 1990;
Mills, 2002, 2013). These assumptions are often related and dependent upon each other. Each of these assumptions will be briefly defined and explored as to better illuminate what naturalistic thinking entails, and its effects on human behavior and belief.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 70
Objectivism
Objectivism is a belief that all information received from our senses and observation can be void of subjective interpretation (Bernstein, 2011; Kuhn, 1963). Scientific measurement then is an accurate representation of reality, and there is a clear and concrete measurement or explanation for everything. Sciences that involve mathematics are a good example of what is understood as objectivism. Numbers are free from human value and abstractly represent processes and eventualities of existence. There is a need for the certainty of objectivism in science, as researchers within psychological sciences often rely on describing truth through the use of null-hypothesis testing. These null hypotheses then give way to answers for research questions, which science then generalizes where it can, thereby achieving a predicting power
(Bernstein, 2011; Kuhn, 1963).
There is skepticism toward objectivism, however. Kirsch and Hyland (2017) indicated that while observations can be made about the reality around us, all it takes is one instance of disconfirmatory evidence to falsify a previously objective truth. Therefore, any differing accounts result in the lack of a previously objective conclusion. This is often explained away by describing differing accounts as subjective, indicating that they were unable to give an objective account due to faulty observation or measurement. This, however, is also a paradox, as all individuals are not free from a subjective interpretation, and are inherently tied to biased understandings. Therefore, there exists a skepticism to whether objective truths can be claimed.
One study of objectivism assessed the degree to which individuals believed their own self-understandings to be objective. It was hypothesized that if self-understandings were perceived as more objective, then respondents would be more likely to believe their own thoughts to be more favorable and become more polarized and extreme on opinions over time.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 71
This hypothesis was confirmed, and those who were more subjectively-minded had less
polarized opinions (Leone, 1996). The article rested on the definition of objectivism as believing
oneself to have a tendency to base beliefs on empirical information and proper rationalization
(Leary et al., 1986).
Other studies on objectivism echo these findings, stating that objective belief is influenced by how strong held opinions are (Goodwin & Darley, 2010). Both children and adults perceive the more objective side of an argument to be the one that is most widely agreed upon, suggesting a social influence on perceived objectivism (Heiphetz & Young, 2017). Statements supported by science through empirical methods are also perceived as more objective by students
(Ryder et al., 1999).
Reductionism
Reductionism is the belief that things can be split into smaller and more simple parts in order to provide a more complete understanding (Crick & Clark, 1994; Scott, 1998).
Reductionism relies heavily on the understanding that all of reality holds physical properties and was influenced greatly by the discovery of the atom (Mills, 2002). As reductionism made its way into psychology, it incorporated ideas that attempted to eliminate the need for a Cartesian
Dualism, placing an eliminative reductionism on the mind (Schroeder, 2001). This led to a more material and biological view of the mind through the brain, and explained beliefs, desires, and aspirations as merely illusions (Schroeder, 2001). Another assumption that opposes reductionism is nonreductionism. Nonreductionism preserves Cartesian Dualism by indicating that the mind cannot be reduced to matter, and that there may exist a soul within the self that contains unique properties (Embree & Embree, 1993).
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 72
Research has suggested that as undergraduate students are educated in biology, any pre- existing beliefs in a soul, or nonreductionism, were significantly reduced over the course of the semester (Lawson & Weser, 1990). Pre-testing from this study indicated that approximately 100 to 150 students of a sample of nearly 1000 students believed in a nonreductionism before taking the biology course. This suggests that studies that include a science that focuses on a hard reductionism will affect the metaphysical assumptions of the individual.
A belief in reductionism is also correlated with a belief in determinism, suggesting a possible tie between these two metaphysical assumptions (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018).
According to a study performed by Embree and Embree (1993), a sample of 251 undergraduate students from a church-related institution indicated that they primarily believed that the mind cannot be reduced to matter. The next highly endorsed belief was reductionistic, which suggests that undergraduate students may hold conflicting beliefs on reductionism of the mind or self. A belief in a biological nonreductionism was associated with a heightened sense of meaning in life, a belief in morality’s legitimacy, and higher moral standards (Bergner & Ramon, 2013).
Universalism
Universalism claims that all concepts or truth derived from the world are generalizable, and that truth itself is fundamental. This definition of universalism was popularized by early
Greek philosophers and is important in the current scientific paradigm (Durant, 1961; Kinnier et al., 2008). Universalism claims that all natural laws hold true in all contexts without exception.
In this way, truth is unchangeable, and ethics and metaphysics arise from that truth. For example, laws such as gravity fall within the claims of universalism. Gravity is a law that is true of all objects that have mass. It is the mass that these objects will draw objects of lesser mass towards them. It has held true in countless circumstances, is understood as truth, and is without context. It
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 73 operates in opposition to relativism, which presumes that truth is malleable based on the observer of said truth. It is also flexible to the context in which the truth is to be observed (Bernstein,
2011; Kuhn, 1963; Mills, 2002). Science requires universalism in order to make claims and to make predictions about the future (Donovan & Laudan, 2012).
Much research in the area of universalism is conducted in the area of morality and ethics.
In a study of samples across 21 countries, when asked about their stances on moral issues, respondents indicated an overall high consensus on what they considered to be moral stances.
This suggested that there exists some sort of universalism in terms of morality between different groups of people (Schwartz, 2007). A clear majority of students from four different countries indicated that they believed our own reality to be indeterministic, and that it was impossible to have moral responsibility in a determined universe. This again suggests a universal belief system regarding free will and morality (Sarkissian et al., 2010). When researchers asked children between the ages of four to six in China and the U.S. about free will, results suggested that there may be a similar development for how beliefs regarding determinism arise, thereby again suggesting a potential universal occurrence. These children also responded similarly on how they believed it more possible for people to be able to freely choose to act against their desires than to choose to inhibit desires (Wente et al., 2016).
Materialism
Materialism is a belief that everything in reality is tangible and is composed of matter.
Everything has a biological base for explanation. In this way, empirical measure and explanation of phenomena are made possible through the use of operational definition (Bennett et al., 2003;
Embree & Embree, 1993; Mills, 2002). Modern science operates under the assumption of materialism, with the lens of reductionism, in that all matter can be divided indefinitely. If
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 74 science is to claim anything based on measurement, materialism must hold true (Bennett et al.,
2003; Crick & Clark, 1994). Immaterialism, or the belief that there exist things that do not contain physical matter, is in opposition to materialism (Embree & Embree, 1993; Forstmann &
Burgmer, 2018; Stanovich, 1989).
Studies that mention materialism more frequently mentioned it in relation to immaterialism, especially as it relates to a Cartesian Dualism, which is defined as a belief that the mind is not composed of matter like the world surrounding it. The majority of respondents from observed studies were more inclined to believe that the mind was made of something other than matter, and possibly that the mind or soul itself was immaterial (Embree & Embree, 1993;
Stanovich, 1989). In a study that assessed the relationship between a belief in reductionism and free will, results suggested that people tend to believe in free will if they hold only a belief in an immaterialism as a result of believing in a substance dualism. A belief in both substance dualism and reductive physicalism (reductionism) was more positively related to a belief in determinism
(Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018).
Determinism
Determinism dictates that all events in reality are caused by initial events. Forms of determinism that include materialistic assumptions often assume biology to be the ultimate cause for behavior (Evans, 2013; Mills, 2013). Determinism holds that existence is following a course that is unaffected by what some may call human agency. All of reality is determined in a mechanistic fashion, including human will, and will continue to be determined by external and biological factors. As such, determinism calls into question an inherent morality and human agency (Churchland, 2018; Mills, 2002; Runes, 2001). Every event will follow its course of trajectory from its antecedent, which has been set into place by a domino effect of natural events
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 75
(Scott, 1998). Scientific prediction and definition rely heavily upon this principle, as
mathematics and physics cannot operate under a flimsy formulaic design (Bohman, 1993; Kirsch
& Hyland, 2017).
In the areas of philosophy and psychology, there is a call from theorists to move away
from deterministic assumptions in an attempt to find truths using other metaphysical assumptions
(Wilks, 2018). Such a movement may be inspired by skeptics of determinism, as it is posited that
no amount of confirmatory evidence can create an initial cause or universal proposition (Kirsch
& Hyland, 2017; Scott, 1998).
Literature in psychology is fraught with subjects on free will and how it might relate to
determinism (Churchland, 2018; Evans, 2013; Mills, 2002, 2013; Runes, 2001). Individuals who
were asked to evaluate the extent to which determinism might exist in a hypothetical universe,
and the majority disagreed with a hard-causal determinism, indicating that they might feel as
though free will exists to some extent. Participants across several countries came to the same
verdict, indicating a consensus about the existence of a soft deterministic universe. Specifically,
this meant that individuals believed that things could still be determined from causal events, but
that the human mind contains some special status outside the effects of that determinism (Bear &
Knobe, 2015).
Bear and Knobe (2016) suggested that individuals believe that there is a difference
between passive and active behavior, and that only active behavior was not compatible with determinism. A more positive belief in determinism was correlated with a belief in both a substance dualism and a reductive physicalism (i.e., reductionism) (Forstmann & Burgmer,
2018). Sarkissian et al. (2010) suggested that a lack of belief in determinism was cross-cultural.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 76
Relationship Between Naturalism and Secularism
In describing secular ideas, Taylor (2009) provides a brief historical account of the belief system of secularity, and describes it in three taxonomies: (a) A vocational and political separation of the sacred from the secular, (b) the production of ideas that buffered the individual from the transcendent and popularization of the idea that religious belief was irrational, which was associated with a separation of religious ideals from institutions, and (c) a societal cultivation of exclusive humanism and figurative space for all beliefs to be contestable.
Taylor describes secularism to be a set of ideas that were produced by society and gained popularity over time, that began with the division of political and vocational roles between the temporal and the sacred, later developing into a construction of meaning within people without reference to the divine (Calhoun, 2010; Hichy et al., 2012; Taylor, 2009). He states that there was a migration of belief that led people to more readily adopt ideas of disenchantment, which buffered the individual from the cosmos and framed belief of the supernatural or divine as irrational, in turn affecting what people considered to be real, or in other words their metaphysical beliefs (Taylor, 2009). As secularist ideas began to be believed more widely among people, so too did ideas of disenchantment. People began to believe the world to be without magic or the supernatural, and popular belief began to reflect a separation of human beings from anything transcendent (Taylor, 2009).
Secular thought was introduced into academic contexts, and society popularized the use of scientific belief systems (Baker, 2012; Bishop, 2007; Slife & Reber, 2009; Sorell, 2013;
Stenmark, 2020), which relied upon these ideas of disenchantment that reality is limited to the natural world only, discounting any supernatural explanations for events (McLeod, 2000; Shapin,
1996; Taylor, 2009; Wuthnow, 1989). This belief that reality consists only of a natural world
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 77
with natural laws and forces is also known as naturalism, and is a belief that consists of ideas that
are foundational to secularism (Bishop, 2009; Cobern, 2007; Griffin, 2000; Hook, 1944; Jones,
2019; Leahey, 1994; Mills, 2002; Pennock, 2001; Rectenwald, 2013; Smith, 2015; Taylor,
2009). These ideas of naturalism (i.e., ideas of disenchantment) that are foundational to secularist
belief are specifically those of determinism, universalism, reductionism, materialism, and
objectivism (Crick & Clark, 1994; Forstmann & Burgmer, 2018; Griffin, 2000; Leahey, 1994;
Miller, 1990; Mills, 2002, 2013; Taylor, 2009). For the sake of providing quick reference, these
philosophical or metaphysical assumptions of secularist belief will further be abbreviated as
DURMO throughout this paper.
A brief review of literature in psychological research shows studies that have assessed the
relationship between beliefs in secularism and gender and age (Baker & Smith, 2009; Cragun,
2007; Glenn, 1987; Hayes, 2000; Kosmin & Keysar, 2006; Tamney et al.,1989), education
(Bainbridge, 2005; Sherkat, 2008; Uecker et al., 2007), politics (Hadaway & Roof, 1979; Roof &
McKinney, 1987), religious belief (Baker, 2012; see also Baker et al., 2018; Hall et al., 2008; Li
& Bond, 2010), and health (Eliassen et al., 2005; Galen & Kloet, 2011; Lim, 2015; Mochon et
al., 2011; Riley et al., 2005; Ross, 1990; Shaver et al., 1980). Studies have also been performed
to assess the presence of concurrent secular and non-secular beliefs (Lawson & Weser, 1990;
Reber et al., 2012; Shapiro & Fitzgerald, 1989; Shtulman, 2013). While there has existed study of relationships between identities and secular belief, much of the literature in psychological research lacks investigation into the specific metaphysical assumptions foundational to secularism that individuals may hold. Further, there has been little study of whether these metaphysical assumptions or beliefs on reality might influence human thought or behavior.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 78
Measuring Secularism
One of the challenges of attempting to measure worldviews or values is that these ideas
are intangible and nuanced. Psychological science measures ideas through operationalization,
assigning numbers to attitudes and values in self-report questionnaires, assessment, and
quantified observed behaviors. In reality, it becomes difficult to say that any observance of
behaviors can objectively define or measure what remains to be solely intangible within the
mind. Psychological science attempts to circumvent this dilemma by measuring agreement with
value statements; however, this approach may still prove inadequate, as it requires a form of
quantified measurement of values or ideas. Ultimately, there exists the dilemma that no
measurement escapes subjective interpretation, weakening arguments for objective
measurements (Kauffman & Sasso, 2006; Gallagher, 2006; Weber, 1949). A study of secular
worldviews grapples with the same difficulties of intangibility and measurement, however
attempts have been made in psychological research to understand these worldviews through the
lens of individuals’ belief systems by assessing the relationship of belief in secularist ideas with
the identities and life circumstances of individuals.
Secularism is a set of ideas that are exhibited in several contexts. Secularism exists in a
cultural sense, aiming to separate religious or spiritual beliefs from practices within
governments, education, or other systems (Calhoun, 2010; Hichy et al., 2012). Secularism is also
a cultural movement that separates science from religion and does so to preserve science as an
epistemology free of immaterialism (McLeod, 2000; Shapin, 1996; Wuthnow, 1989). It has even
had a presence in the realm of psychological science as a way to measure values, and has become
a preferred value set that guides future scientific inquiry (Bishop, 2007; Slife & Reber, 2009).
While these contexts provide more modern examples of secularism, the secularist movement
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 79 primarily began as an intellectual movement against what was understood to be fantasy. With its emergence in intellectual pursuits, secularism began as a denial or rejection of what was unobserved. As such, it sought to disenchant the individual from what was magical or spiritual
(Smith, 2014).
A review of the literature showed that there existed a plethora of studies into secularism and its relationship with individual identities and life circumstances. Secularism has been contrasted against religion, revealing patterns of belief or agreement according to gender and age
(Baker & Smith, 2009; Cragun, 2007; Glenn, 1987; Hayes, 2000; Kosmin & Keysar, 2006;
Tamney et al.,1989), education (Bainbridge, 2005; Sherkat, 2008; Uecker et al., 2007), politics
(Hadaway & Roof, 1979; Roof & McKinney, 1987), and health (Eliassen et al., 2005; Galen &
Kloet, 2011; Lim, 2015; Mochon et al., 2011; Riley et al., 2005; Ross, 1990; Shaver et al., 1980).
Ties between secularism and naturalism can be observed by secularism and its reliance upon the domains of DURMO (Cobern, 2007; Jones, 2019; Pennock, 2001; Rectenwald, 2013;
Smith, 2015). A study by Baker (2012) investigated the perception of connections between secularism and scientific epistemology. The study reported that participants, particularly those who identified as atheists and agnostics, had perceptions of science that correlated with secularism. Scientism, a more rigid dogmatism that denotes scientific methodology as the only accurate epistemology, has been debated to have some place in some forms of secularism and is held to observe naturalistic assumptions on metaphysics (Sorell, 2013; Stenmark, 2020). As such, it can be argued that assumptions of secularism, scientism, and naturalism are related, and give further support for how agreement with philosophical assumptions of secularism might be suitable as a proxy of measure agreement with naturalistic assumptions.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 80
Practicality of Measuring Secularism
Though secularism has been measured in a number of studies, it is typically measured as non-adherence to religion or an agreement with scientific discoveries and theories (e.g., “humans evolved from primates over millions of years,” Baker, 2012; see also Baker et al., 2018; Hall et al., 2008; Li & Bond, 2010). A number of these studies assume that religion and secularism exist as opposite ends of a spectrum (Baker, 2012; Hall et al., 2008), which does not account for the possibility that religious individuals may hold metaphysical assumptions of secularism. Much of the literature lacks investigation into metaphysical assumptions, and namely, how these assumptions interact with each other and guide human thought and behavior. Individuals are often unaware of the metaphysical assumptions they hold to be true (Taylor, 2009), which also raises concerns for the direction that the epistemology of science is taking in the current paradigm of research.
Subsequently, the current study may prove important in providing a more complete or multidimensional understanding of secular belief. Results could lead to further research that will better assess how belief systems are affected due to the inherent assumptions taught through the
Western academic system (Bainbridge, 2005; Sherkat, 2008; Uecker et al., 2007). It could also provide more context and suggestions on how to navigate the effects of dissonance between secular beliefs and non-secular beliefs in how it affects mental health treatment (van Nieuw
Amerongen-Meeuse et al., 2018; Genia, 1994).
This study assessed secularism in a novel way by examining the metaphysical assumptions that naturalism is contingent upon. More specifically, it assessed agreement to metaphysical claims on reality that inform secularism and naturalism. Results from this study could allow for a more critical examination of scientific methods and assumptions, which may
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 81 help to shift attitudes in how the scientific method is understood, how scientism or naturalism are assumed to be unbiased, and how secular beliefs may relate to other beliefs.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 82
APPENDIX B
Methods
Measure
A measure comprised of 75 items will be created and distributed in order to assess its psychometric strength. All items will be agreement statements that will be placed on a 5-point
Likert scale, and will be representative of the domains of Objectivism, Determinism,
Reductionism, Universalism, and Materialism. Items will be split evenly among these categories, and a conglomerate quantitative result will look to assess the overall alliance with Naturalism.
Item Design
Sufficient care will be taken to create properly worded items that can be understood better by those without a philosophical background. Steps will be taken to create an abundance of items, specifically 375 items, after which there will be consultation with content experts with backgrounds of philosophical study to eliminate items until they are reduced to 75 items, and until they best represent the intended philosophical assumptions.
Following this, a random small sample of 10 individuals will be picked to review the items to address laymen comprehension of items. These individuals will answer each question, and then will be asked to rate the clarity and understanding of each question in a yes/no forced response. A qualitative response option will be given for them to indicate what is misunderstood about the test item. This comprehension testing will take place on the Qualtrics platform.
A final revision of items will then take place, with another review by content experts. The items will then be compiled and organized on the platform of Qualtrics.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 83
Sample
The measure will be distributed to at least 300 respondents who are currently in either their undergraduate or graduate degree programs. A sample of students will be taken from both a primarily religious university, as well as other universities which possibly contain more religious and spiritual diversity. Demographic questions will be asked to each respondent in terms of their current year of education, ethnicity, spirituality/religious affiliation, age, gender, sexual preference, and whether English is their first language. The sample will look to represent students at large who are in a 4-year university or graduate-level program.
Procedures to Collect Data
After the completion of measurement creation, the items will be input in the Qualtrics
platform. This will allow for easy distribution and collection of results. The measure will be
distributed to students at random at Brigham Young University, University of West Georgia, as
well as other universities that are willing to participate. For sake of convenience, it is likely that
most students will be in a psychology field of study.
Procedures to Analyze Data
After the collection of results, the results will be uploaded into SPSS. Missing data will
be removed and cleaned in order to better assure statistical reliability and validity. Cronbach’s
Alpha will be assessed in order to understand how interrelated items are. Those items that are
statistically significant in their relation to each other will be investigated. If theoretical
explanations cannot provide enough reason for significantly related items, other reasoning will
be introduced to provide a better explanation. The aid of content experts in philosophy will be
sought after if this occurs.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 84
Content and Face Validity will have already been obtained prior to the collection of
results. Due to the novel state of the measure, convergent and divergent validity will be difficult
to obtain for this measure.
An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) will be performed through the use of MPlus to
better understand if domains of Determinism, Reductionism, Materialism, Universalism, and
Objectivism are actually being measured. An EFA will also help to reveal if there is yet another
variable that is being measured that can better explain the data. This will be done through the
investigation of factor loadings and eigenvalues. An analysis of fit indices with the aid of a
statistician expert will be performed, and the utilization of a computer-generated sample will be compared to results from a human sample to better assess the strength of fit indices.
MEASURING ASSUMPTIONS OF SECULARISM 85
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