Copyright © 2017 by Lok-Chi Chan Thesis supervisor: Professor David Braddon-Mitchell Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney Cover design: Chan Man Yuk i Declaration I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work. Assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged. Lok-Chi Chan ii Abstract The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the connections between metaphysical naturalism and the categorical ignorance thesis – offered by Rae Langton (1998), David Lewis (2009), Frank Jackson (1998), and Simon Blackburn (1990) – and determine whether the latter will challenge the former. According to metaphysical naturalism, the actual world contains only metaphysically natural things. According to the categorical ignorance thesis, all we can know about things are their dispositional properties, but the categorical properties that bear these properties remain in principle unknowable. In this dissertation, I will determine whether the ignorance of categorical properties – as Rae Langton (1998), David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson (2007), John Foster (1993) and Alyssa Ney (2007) argue (or worry about) – is consistent with metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism), and whether it will lead to a scepticism about the metaphysical naturalness of categorical properties, which will, in turn, significantly decrease the probability that metaphysical naturalism is true. Being attracted to metaphysical naturalism, the categorical ignorance thesis, and also the philosophical position that the two theses are consistent, I will argue that the answer to the former question is yes, and that the answer to the latter question is no. Russellian Monism, an influential doctrine in philosophy of mind that is relevant to the topic, will also be considered. According to the doctrine, our first-person experiences are constituted by their categorical bases in some manner that is not (solely) via the dispositions borne by these bases. Some philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell (1992/1927a, 1927b), thus consider categorical properties to be knowable through our acquaintance with those experiences. On the other side, some philosophers, such as Daniel Stoljar (2001a, 2001b, 2006), David Chalmers (1996), and Galen Strawson (2013), argue that Russellian Monism is compatible with metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism). In this dissertation, I will determine whether the acquaintance view put forward by some Russellian Monists, understood as an objection to the categorical ignorance thesis, is true and whether it is compatible with metaphysical naturalism; I will argue that the answers to both questions are no. Keywords: naturalism; physicalism; Russellian Monism; categorical properties; intrinsic properties; qualia iii To my most important mentors, Belinda, David, and Graham iv This page intentionally left blank v Acknowledgements I am heavily indebted to many mentors, colleagues, friends, and my family. Firstly, I wish to thank my current and former supervisors. They are David Braddon-Mitchell, my current supervisor at the University of Sydney, Graham Oppy, my honours supervisor at Monash University, and Daniel Stoljar, my mentor during my visit to the Australian National University. I am grateful for the rich philosophical knowledge, the interesting ways of thinking and the writing skills these three great philosophers have taught me. Many of my debts to them should be apparent as this dissertation goes on. More importantly, what they have taught me is not limited to academic knowledge and skills. In particular, I will be forever grateful to David for his enthusiastic support in every respect. I was and am very fortunate to have been working with a colleague, Andrew James Latham, on many joint research projects up until the present day. In this process, he has contributed many important ideas to this dissertation. My parents, On-Fat Chan and Flora Chung, are of course on the list. Without their selfless and unconditional support, I could not have even started studying philosophy and working on this dissertation in the first place (let alone the fact that I would not have existed in the first place). For helpful discussions, comments and/or non-academic assistance in the course of this research, and/or on my way towards doing it, I am grateful to Frank Jackson, John Bigelow, Jakob Hohwy, Mark Colyvan, Tristram McPherson, Toby Handfield, Karen Green, Nicholas J.J. Smith, Kristie Miller, Wai-hung Wong, Monima Chadha, Alyssa Ney, David Macarthur, Maureen O'Malley, Michael Duncan, Ben Blumson, Sam Baron, Luke Roelofs, Ryoji Sato, Simon Varey, Alex Sandgren, James Norton, Belinda Calderone, Kristall Rozen, Man Yuk Chan, Lina Ginz, Wayne Chung, Erick Llamas, Naoyuki Kajimoto, Donald Nordblom, Rose Kyo, Kevin Lam, Priscilla Ho, Hei Man Ho and finally, my secondary school teacher who seriously recommended studying philosophy to me, Ms. Au. A special appreciation and gratefulness is due to a good friend and mentor of mine, Belinda Rickard, with whom I did not only have a good exchange of philosophical ideas, but was also educated by her much richer life experience and insight, without which I could not possibly work with the spirit and insight I had when I was writing this dissertation. This dissertation is dedicated to her, David and Graham. vi This page intentionally left blank vii Contents Declaration .......................................................................................................................................... ii Abstract .............................................................................................................................................. iii Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................ vi List of abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. x Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 1 Part I: Metaphysical naturalism ....................................................................................................... 7 Section 1. A method for characterising metaphysical naturalism ........................................................ 9 Section 2. Characterising metaphysical naturalism ............................................................................ 23 Section 3. The content of metaphysical naturalism ............................................................................ 52 Part II: Categorical ignorance ........................................................................................................ 77 Section 4. Introduction to categorical properties ............................................................................... 79 Section 5. The existence of categorical properties ............................................................................. 87 Section 6. The nature of categorical properties ................................................................................ 112 Section 7. Categorical ignorance ...................................................................................................... 123 Part III: Russellian Monism .......................................................................................................... 143 Section 8. Russell and Stoljar’s Russellian Monism ........................................................................ 145 Section 9. The categorical acquaintance thesis ................................................................................ 166 `Section 10. The naturalistic unacceptability of Russellian Monism ............................................... 189 Section 11. Qualia, the explanatory gap, and metaphysical naturalism ........................................... 202 Part IV: Metaphysical naturalism and categorical ignorance ................................................... 229 Section 12. Metaphysical naturalism and categorical ignorance ..................................................... 231 References ........................................................................................................................................ 244 Appendix A. The meaning(s) of the term ‘naturalism’ .................................................................... 259 Appendix B. The historical path approach to defining metaphysical naturalism and its rivals ....... 270 viii This page intentionally left blank ix List of abbreviations MN Metaphysical naturalism. See p. 1. CI The categorical ignorance thesis. See p. 3. RM Russellian Monism. See p. 4. SCI The scientific categorical ignorance thesis. See p. 4. CQ The categorical qualia thesis. See p. 4. CB The common bases thesis. See p. 4. DC The disciplinary characterisation. See p. 23. SA The similarity approach. See p. 23. HPA The historical path approach. See p. 24. DHP Definition by the historical path. See p. 38. CP The core paradigm. See p. 54. EH The epistemic humility thesis. See p. 79. CIF properties Properties that are categorical properties, and/or intrinsic properties, and/or fundamental properties. See p. 80. NDE Near-death experience. See p. 101. OSR Ontic structural realism. See p. 107. AMI The argument from modal intuition. See p. 116. HI The Humean intuition. See p. 116. CA The categorical acquaintance thesis. See p. 166. PPJ The paradox of phenomenal