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The Naturalist Challenge to Religion

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The Naturalist Challenge to Religion Michael Ruse The Naturalist Challenge to Religion Michael Ruse (b. 1940) presents a comprehensive case for a naturalist worldview that embraces both methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism. Rather than seeing methodolog­ ical naturalism as worldview neutral, Ruse argues that it actually helps the case for metaphysical naturalism because it rules out forms of explanation that look for causes beyond the natural realm. So, Ruse's case for metaphysical naturalism is heavily influenced by how he sees the role of methodological naturalism. He cites methodological naturalism's ability to explain the origin and structure of organisms without appeal to divine design and even it~ ability to explain religion as a purely human phenomenon without assuming it relates to a divine realm. ((Naturalism'' is one of those words with many naturalism;' claiming that there is nothing beyond this meanings. When I was a teenager growing up natural world. No gods or such things. Today, many in England, it was a euphemism for "nudism:' With methodological naturalists are also metaphysical natu­ some regret, it is not this sense that is the subject of this ralists. This would be true of so-called "New Atheists" discussion. Another sense is that of "philosophical like Richard Dawkins. 1 But today and in the past there naturalism:' Here one is referring to an intention to let have been methodological naturalists who deny meta­ one's philosophical discussions be as science-like and physical naturalism. This is true of the great seven­ science-based as possible. You will see evidence of this teenth-century chemist Robert Boyle who spoke of the philosophy in action in this paper, but again it is not "wisdom of God" in making the world like a clock the main focus of discussion. Getting to the point, and "where all things are so skillfully contrived that the certainly not that distinct from philosophical natural­ engine being once set a-moving, all things proceed ac­ ism, are two senses that have been much in the public cording to the artificer's first design;' and where there forum in the past twenty years-and these are my is no need of "the peculiar interposing of the artificer focus. On the one hand, we have "methodological nat­ or any intelligent agent employed by him:'2 Early in uralism;' trying to understand the world in terms of this piece, I am going to focus primarily on method­ unbroken law. No appeal to supernatural interventions ological naturalism, although at the end I address is allowed. On the other hand, we have "metaphysical metaphysical naturalism. Used by permission of Michael Ruse. 427 428 ATHEISM AND NONRELIGIOUS APPROACHES TO RELIGION THE CASE FOR METHODOLOGICAL merely unexpected or especially meaningful to the NATURALISM actual violation of the laws of nature. 4 The raising of Lazarus from the dead for instance or the Angel I argue that methodological naturalism is true in the Moroni showing Joseph Smith the hiding place of the sense that it embodies the proper procedure for ac­ Golden Plates that when transcribed gave rise to the quiring knowledge. Although I recognize that not all Book ofMormon. I take it that at some level you really would agree, I take it that at a general level today, four cannot argue against people who believe in these hundred years after the Scientific Revolution, no spe­ sorts of things, but that if you are prepared to enter cial pleading is needed to make this case. The world the realm of evidence and reason then (for the sorts does run according to law, and increasingly we know of reasons that David Hume expounded) it really is the nature of those laws and how they operate. Re­ more reasonable to conclude that, even if something peatedly, things that seemed anomalous or difficult to did happen, it is more likely explicable in natural explain have found a solution, according to unbroken terms than by invoking the unseen supernatural. So law. If a strange body appeared in the heavens, no one let us move on to other arguments. would think it something outside law and explicable A major problem for (methodological) naturalism only in supernatural terms. If a new and unpleasant was the existence and nature of organisms. In the disease strikes, for instance the HIV crisis of the opinion of some today it still is a major problem. The 1980s, even those who would imbue the event with distinctive thing about organisms is that they are theological significance would agree that there will what the biologists call "adaptively organized;' that is be natural causes, as indeed proved to be the case. they are not just thrown together randomly but are Note that pseudo-scientists such as the late Immanuel complex, int~grated, and above all functioning-they Velikovsky who explained biblical phenomena like work towards ends, thus seeming to display what the parting of the Red Sea in terms of comets and the Aristotle called "final causes:'s Mountains and rivers like did not go beyond law. 3 His problem was that the have no purpose or point. Hands and eyes do have laws to which he appealed were known only to him purposes, respectively grasping and seeing. But how and to no one else! Note also that the reason why can organisms come about without some designing many religious scientists today-one thinks for in­ intelligence, a deity who makes them and sees that stance of someone like Francis Collins who was head they or their parts serve specific ends? Immanuel of the Human Genome Project-feel absolutely no Kant tqought it impossible. "We can boldly say that it tension between their religion and wholehearted would be absurd for humans even to make such an methodological naturalism is that it works and be­ attempt or to hope that there may yet arise a Newton cause it works they feel that they can better reveal and who could make comprehensible even the generation understand this wonderful world that came at the of a blade of grass according to natural laws that no hand of its Creator. Far from feeling uncomfortable intention has ordered; rather, we must absolutely with methodological naturalism, such believers wel­ deny this insight to human beings:'6 come it as a tool ultimately provided by God. Using In the opinion of naturalists, it was Charles Darwin our powers of reason and observation is precisely who solved this problem. In his On the Origin of Spe­ what is meant by being made in the image of God. cies, published in 1859, he argued that all organisms So why go beyond the general level? Why not end are the end product of a long, slow process of change, the discussion right now? Obviously because there natural selection. More organisms are born than can are those who think that there is more to be said and survive and reproduce, those that are successful (the that, when said, it can be seen that methodological "fitter") have features not possessed by the unsuccess­ naturalism is inadequate. Let us therefore respond to ful and that over time this leads to change-but some of these naysayers. Start with those who simply change of a particular kind, namely in the direction of invoke miracle, meaning events that go beyond the adaptive advantage, features showing final cause. The Naturalist Challenge to Religion 429 Let it be borne in mind how infinitely complex and Is NATURAL SELECTION ADEQUATE? close-fitting are the mutual relations of all organic beings to each other and to their physical conditions of From the time of Darwin on there have been a spate life. Can it, then, be thought improbable, seeing that of objections. Some focus on the origin of life itself. variations useful to man have undoubtedly occurred, that other variations useful in some way to each being Recently both the religious (Calvinist) philosopher 9 in the great and complex battle of life, should some­ Alvin Plantinga and the secular philosopher Thomas times occur in the course of thousands of generations? NageF0 have complained that Darwinism does not If such do occur, can we doubt (remembering that many explain the ultimate origin of organisms from the more individuals are born than can possibly survive) non-living, that it never will, and that this is a severe that individuals having any advantage, however slight, challenge to naturalism. Frankly, one would have a over others, would have the best chance of surviving little more sympathy for this objection if either of the and of procreating their kind? On the other hand, we critics gave evidence that they had made the slightest may feel sure that any variation in the least degree inju­ effort to look at the pertinent science, but one sus­ rious would be rigidly destroyed. This preservation of pects that, as with believers in miracles, it would not favourable variations and the rejection of injurious make the slightest difference if they had done so. For variations, I call Natural Selection? the record, it is certainly true that the origin-of-life That's all there is to it. Organisms are what Richard problem has not been cracked and probably won't be Dawkins has called "survival machines:'8 Of course, for some time. But to say no progress has been made after Darwin we are no longer Aristotelians, in the is just ridiculous.U It is known now that to carry in­ sense of believing that there are special life forces­ formation probably the early life forms used the mac­ what the French philosopher Henri Bergson called romolecule RNA ~ather than (as most organisms elans vitaux-directing organisms or their parts to today) the macromolecule DNA, because RNA has ends.
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