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Studia Philosophiae Religionis 21 STUDIA PHILOSOPHIAE RELIGIONIS 21 Editores: Catharina Stenqvist et Eberhard Herrmann Ulf Zackariasson Forces by Which We Live Religion and Religious Experience from the Perspective of a Pragmatic Philosophical Anthropology UPPSALA 2002 Doctoral Dissertation in Philosophy of Religion for the Degree of Doctor of Theology at Uppsala University 2002. ABSTRACT Zackariasson, Ulf. 2002. Forces by which We Live. Religion and Religious Experience from the Perspective of a Pragmatic Philosophical Anthropology. Studia Philosophiae Religionis 21. 254 pp. ISBN 91–628–5169–1. ISSN 0346–5446. This study argues that a pragmatic conception of religion would enable philosophers to make important contributions to our ability to handle concrete problems involving religion. The term ’philosophical anthropology’, referring to different interpretative frameworks, which philosophers draw on to develop conceptions of human phenomena, is introduced. It is argued that the classical pragmatists embraced a philosophical anthro- pology significantly different from that embraced by most philosophers of religion; accordingly, pragmatism offers an alternative conception of religion. It is suggested that a conception of religion is superior to another if it makes more promising contributions to our ability to handle extra-philosophical problems of religion. A pragmatic philosophical anthropology urges us to view human practices as taking shape as responses to shared experienced needs. Religious practices develop to resolve tensions in our views of life. The pictures of human flourishing they present reconstruct our views of life, thereby allowing more significant interaction with the environment, and a more significant life. A modified version of reflective equilibrium is developed to show how we, on a pragmatic conception of religion, are able to supply resources for criticism and reform of religious practices, so the extra-philosophical problems of religion can be handled. Main- stream philosophy of religion attempts to offer such resources by presenting analogy- arguments from religious experience. Those arguments are, however, unconvincing. A comparison of the two conceptions of religion thus results in a recommendation to reconstruct philosophy of religion. Keywords: pragmatism, conception of religion, James, Dewey, Mead, philosophical anthropology, views of life, religious experience, Alston, reflective equilibrium, emotions. Ulf Zackariasson, Department of Theology, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 1604, SE–751 46 Uppsala, Sweden © Ulf Zackariasson 2002 ISBN: 91–628–5169–1 ISSN: 0346–5446 Printed in Sweden by Akademitryck AB, Holms gård, SE–590 98 Edsbruk. Distributor: Almqvist & Wiksell International, Sweden. Contents 1. Religion’s predicament and its relation to contemporary philosophy of religion................................................................................................................ 9 1.1 An inevitable ambivalence.............................................................................. 9 1.2 Problems of religion and a philosophical response..................................... 11 1.3 Why not a quick pragmatic argument?......................................................... 22 1.4 Conceptions of religion: a first encounter..................................................... 23 1.5 Recovering pragmatism today ....................................................................... 28 1.6 Outline of the chapters .................................................................................... 33 1.7 Philosophy as criticism .................................................................................... 34 2. Philosophical anthropology and the prospects of exchange and argument in cases of anthropological disagreement.................................................... 39 2.1 The purpose of the present chapter ............................................................... 39 2.2 Anthropological inquiry as interpretative.................................................... 40 2.3 Anthropological inquiry and transcendental arguments........................... 48 2.4 Philosophical anthropologies as interpretative frameworks..................... 57 2.5 Exchange and argument: two models........................................................... 64 2.6 Introducing metaphilosophical pragmatic arguments ............................... 70 2.7 Conclusion: how to develop the argument .................................................. 78 3. Philosophical inquiry from the perspective of a pragmatic philosophical anthropology...................................................................................................... 79 3.1 My objectives..................................................................................................... 79 3.2 Instinct, habit, and intelligent behavior ........................................................ 80 3.3 Mind, self, and meaning in a social setting................................................... 87 3.4 The primacy of human practices.................................................................... 95 3.5 Some philosophical topics pragmatically considered................................. 100 3.6 Summary: understanding human practices ................................................. 113 4. A pragmatic analysis of religion and religious experience....................... 115 4.1 Introductory remarks....................................................................................... 115 4.2 Views of life outlined....................................................................................... 116 4.3 Tension and resolution: the function of religious practices ....................... 127 4.4 Religious experience as an experience........................................................... 132 4.5 The goods of religion and a pragmatically real God................................... 143 5. The epistemology of religious experience: the arguments evaluated..... 152 5.1 Background and aims of the current debate ................................................ 152 5.2 The relevance of reductionism ....................................................................... 155 5.3 Swinburne and the principle of credulity..................................................... 162 5.4 Alston’s reformed doxastic practice-approach ............................................ 169 5.5 Conclusions from two failed analogy-arguments ....................................... 181 6. Criticism, reform, and justification of views of life and religious prac- tices...................................................................................................................... 186 6.1 The connection between criticism and justification .................................... 186 6.2 Reflective equilibrium for my purposes ....................................................... 190 6.3 Emotions: concern and construal................................................................... 198 6.4 Emotional responses as appropriate and inappropriate ............................ 204 6.5 Views of life in reflective equilibrium ........................................................... 208 6.6 Reflective equilibrium and competence........................................................ 212 6.7 Criticism and reform of views of life and religious practices.................... 218 6.8 The problems of religion and the preservation of goods ........................... 221 7. Conclusion: A metaphilosophical pragmatic argument and the future of philosophy of religion ..................................................................................... 225 7.1 A metaphilosophical argument explicated................................................... 225 7.2 Consequences for philosophical practice...................................................... 231 7.3 A basis for philosophical plurality................................................................. 233 8. References........................................................................................................... 238 Acknowledgements When I started writing this dissertation, someone told me that only 20% of what a philosopher writes is ever published. The rest ends up in the trashcan. In my view, that is far too optimistic, at least if you are as privileged as I have been with getting critical and inspiring comments on various drafts of my disser- tation. Needless to say, I am to blame for remaining deficiencies. First and foremost, I am grateful to my supervisor, Eberhard Herrmann. God knows if I would ever have come this far without his constant intellectual and moral support. I am also thankful to all the participants of the research seminar in philosophy of religion for exciting and stimulating discussions throughout the years. A special thanks goes to Erica Appelros, Stefan Eriksson, Mikael Stenmark, and Hugo Strandberg. I also wish to thank Thomas Ekstrand, who (as opponent) was an admirable constructive critic of a penultimate draft of my dissertation. Thanks to an invitation from Montey Holloway and Stephen Watson, I was able to spend six stimulating months at the University of Notre Dame, for which I am duly grateful. I also want to express my gratitude to Cornelius Delaney, Gary Gutting, Alven Neiman, Philip Quinn, and Paul Weithman for help and inspiration. Finally, I want to thank my family for their constant support. My sister Laila proof-read parts of the dissertation, and my parents and parents-in-law have generously provided accommodation
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