Foundationalism: Dead or Alive? Millard J. Erickson

Millard J. Erickson is the Distin- Introduction foundationalism is said to be dead, clas- guished Professor of Theology at One of the most prominent terms in sical foundationalism is usually meant. George W. Truett Theological Seminary, recent characterizations of the differences However, since about 1975, significantly Baylor University. In addition to teach- between modern and postmodern is different versions of foundationism have ing at a number of institutions during foundationalism. Modernism made a been proposed. These make more mod- his career, Dr. Erickson also served as strong appeal to foundationalism, but est claims about their effectiveness. the Vice President and Dean at Bethel postmodernists are virtually unanimous Triplett comments, “It is not clear that the Theological Seminary. He is the author in the opinion that foundationalism must standard arguments against foundation- of numerous books and articles, includ- be rejected. Indeed, James McClendon and alism will work against these newer, more ing the recently published Making Sense Nancey Murphy regard holism rather modest theories. Indeed, these theories of the Trinity (Baker) and a forthcom- than foundationalism as one of the crite- were by and large designed with the pur- ing work titled Truth or Consequences: ria of postmodernism.1 The purpose of pose of overcoming standard objections.”2 The Promise and Perils of Postmod- this article will be to examine the nature An accurate discussion of foundation- ernism (IVP). of this dispute to determine whether alism must take into account these devel- foundationalism is indeed untenable as a opments. William Alston speaks of two means of justifying theological doctrine. types of foundationalism,3 while Triplett has a much more elaborate morphology. Definition of the Issue He separates varieties of foundationalism In general, classical foundationalism is into two large groups, in terms of their the contention that in the knowing pro- “specifications of the nature of basic cess, there are certain unshakeable start- propositions,” and “accounts of the rela- ing points that are not justified by any tion between basic and nonbasic proposi- other propositions. They are immediately tions.” Within each of these two major justified because they possess a character groups are subgroups, with two or more such that they are indubitable (i.e., can- varieties of each, leading to no fewer than not be doubted) or incorrigible (i.e., it is twenty labels for foundationalist views.4 not possible to be mistaken about them). In addition, Reformed epistemology, In the rationalist form of foundationalism, which is the most sustained critique of found in Descartes, such a foundation is classical foundationalism, constructs its known rationally, or by pure thought. For own type of foundationalism. Thus it is an empiricist like Locke, the foundation extremely important to identify the exact is sense data. The second element of character of the foundationalism we are foundationalism is that these foundations discussing. serve as justification for other beliefs, Awareness of this variety does not which are therefore mediately justified. always translate into discrimination in Usually, postmodernists have concen- discussion, however. So, for example, trated their attacks on a model of classi- Rodney Clapp acknowledges that “the cal foundationalism, often singling out word foundationalism hardly has a single, Descartes. In some ways that has pre- univocal meaning. Thus there are some sented a relatively easy target. When important Christian thinkers, perhaps 20 most notably Alvin Plantinga and William I believe this, and would probably give Alston, who call themselves foundation- some answer such as, “because I see it alists but are certainly not foundationalists there,” or “I am having a sensory percep- of the sort worried over through these tion of it.” Suppose, however, that I am pages.”5 Yet this distinction does not seem asked, “How do you know that your sen- to enter into his discussion of such evan- sory perception is accurate?” I may give gelical theologians as Ronald Nash and some further justification for this belief, Kenneth Kantzer, whom he finds guilty but then I am faced with justifying that of slipping back into quasi-foundationalist justification, and so am involved in a language and thought.6 Clapp’s failure to vicious infinite regress. Furthermore, distinguish these theologians from the Plantinga points out that foundationalism sort of foundationalism he is describing, does not fulfill its own criterion: In classi- as he did with Plantinga, is particularly cal foundationalism, a belief must be curious, since he closely identifies evan- either foundational or derivative in order gelical foundationalism with the common to be rational. Foundational beliefs are sense realism of Thomas Reid.7 He does (a) self-evident (e.g., mathematical state- not comment on the fact that Plantinga has ments like 2+2=4 and definitional or ana- in his later writings indicated a consider- lytic matters, like all cows are mammals), able affinity for the thought of Reid.8 (b) evident to the senses (i.e., reporting In the last quarter-century, not only immediate experiences), or incorrigible postmodernists but also most philoso- (i.e., matters about which it is impossible phers have asserted or assumed that to be wrong, usually one’s immediate sub- foundationalism, having been refuted, is jective states). Derivative beliefs are those dead. Sometimes the rhetoric has been beliefs that one can infer by logical prin- almost moral in tone: “Suddenly ‘anti- ciples from these foundational beliefs. foundationalist’ is a good thing to be,” The question, according to Plantinga, said Simpson;9 and Levi pronounced that is whether classical foundationalism is “opposition to foundationalism ought to rational. Which of the two criteria of be the philosophical equivalent of resis- rationality does the contention that these tance to sin.”10 are the criteria of rationality fulfill? It would appear that it does not meet either The Rejection of Foundationalism of these. In other words, foundationalism A major problem for most forms of is self-referentially inconsistent.11 hard foundationalism is the epistemic A further problem with foundation- regress problem. This is the question of alism, according to Plantinga, is that many how we justify some item of belief or of the common beliefs of ordinary life, on knowledge, and then, how we justify the which we base our living, are clearly jus- justifier. If I say that I believe j, and then tified beliefs, yet they are excluded by the am asked why, my answer is that I believe criteria of classical foundationalism. These j because of k. The further question may are matters that are not evident to the then be pressed, however, as to why I con- senses, self-evident, or incorrigible. Con- sider k to be adequate justification for j. sequently, they must be justified by a For example, if I assert that there is a yel- demonstration of their relationship to low table in the room, I may be asked why foundational or properly basic beliefs. No 21 one, however, has ever produced such lish theology without recourse to the demonstration. Plantinga says, “Consider foundationalist methodology. all those propositions that entail, say, that Van Huysteen is concerned with the there are enduring physical objects, or that question of the reality of the Christian there are persons distinct from myself, or faith, its validity or credibility. Are theo- that the world has existed for more than logians indeed saying anything credible five minutes: none of these propositions, about God? He says that the task of sys- I think, is more probable than not with tematic theology is “to demonstrate respect to what is self-evident or incorri- through creative reflection that the Chris- gible for me; at any rate no one has given tian faith has its own integrity: an integ- good reason to think any of them is.”12 rity and uniqueness that may integrate the Clark comments: “Any philosophical divergent dimensions of our modern principle that excludes cases of obviously experience, to give it the maximum degree rational beliefs ought to be rejected.”13 of meaning and significance.”14 Van This latter criticism appears less Huysteen intends to formulate a theologi- impressive than the first. While these may cal method that will not draw a sharp dis- well be rational beliefs, and may in some tinction between what is usually termed sense be inescapable if one is to function fundamental theology and systematic in ordinary daily affairs, “obviously ratio- theology. By that he means that the ques- nal” is a bit too strong. Whether such are tion of a confessional theology grappling rational, and on what basis, is what is at with contextual issues is not to be sepa- issue here. Certainly George Berkeley did rated from an apologetic theology that sets not think some of them obvious. None- forth its discourse to those outside the theless, the first objection indicates the Christian faith.15 problem of epistemic regress. From a prac- In so doing, van Huysteen has a spe- tical standpoint, one must stop the pro- cific definition of Christian theology in cess of justification at some point, but mind: “Accounting critically for their faith where and why? This is the dilemma that presupposes that theologians must be faces any epistemology. prepared to reflect on their own thought processes, and this places upon them the An Attempted fundamental task of relating the essence Postfoundationalist Theology of their faith to the question of the very In light of these problems, a wide- nature of rationality, as posed in contem- spread conviction has arisen among both porary philosophy of science.”16 Thus, the philosophers and theologians that if the- treatment of theology in relationship to ology is to be done, it cannot be done on a philosophy of science will be a major part foundationalist basis. One theologian who of his endeavor. This is because “It is, has attempted to develop a postmodern after all, this branch of philosophy which and postfoundationalist theology is concerns itself with analyzing and criti- Wentzel van Huyssteen, formerly of the cally assessing the premises of science and University of Port Elizabeth in South thus seeks to construct rational theories Africa and now of Princeton Seminary. of science.”17 His theological method may serve as an Van Huysteen appears to commit example of one type of attempt to estab- himself to metaphysical realism and to a 22 correspondence view of truth, when he was tied to a method of theology that defines cognitivity: “The word cognitivity assimilated it to logical positivism in sci- is used throughout in the sense of refer- ence. Even Karl Barth, who sought to free ence or reality depiction in theological his theological method from any philoso- statements: in what sense theological phy and make theology autonomous, statements refer to reality or claim to be rather than assimilated to the methods of true, in the provisional sense of the any other sciences, fell into the trap of a word.”18 He is quite clear about what he basically positivistic view of rationality.23 does not envision as the nature of this The alternative view of rationality that rationality, however. He is clearly opposed van Huyssteen offers will not be a tradi- to all forms of authoritarianism. These tional foundationalism. By foundation- would be especially the case with an alism, it is apparent that he is referring absolutist view of doctrine: “Thus one of to something like the rationalism of the most significant and incisive shifts in Descartes or the empiricism of Locke, each modern systematic-theological thought of which in its own way attempted to must surely be the swing away from a build upon some indisputable or indubi- type of theology in which seemingly table bedrock starting point. Rather, he immutable conceptual models cause theo- proposes a postfoundationalist approach, logical statements to be seen as precise “moving beyond the absolutism of foun- and true dogmatic propositions, toward dationalism and the relativism of anti- a new sensitivity to the relational nature foundationalism.”24 This approach will be of the language of religious experience.”19 found in critical realism. Compared to He is especially critical of dogmatic and most realisms, critical realism makes a authoritarian positions that result from rather modest claim: “it purports to the dismissal of the quest for a meaning- explain why it makes sense not to aban- ful and credible basis for systematic the- don some of the Christian faith’s most ology. An example is “the claim that basic realist assumptions. Critical realism theology as such is founded on divine thus will turn out to be at least in part an revelation and that this revelation has empirical thesis and not just a metaphysi- come to us through the exclusive author- cal claim about how the world must be.”25 ity of the Bible or the church.”20 Any such This does not mean, however, that the claim to infallible insight into divine rev- choice of critical realism in theological elation “poses nearly insurmountable reflection necessarily requires a choice of problems to understanding the question some form of realism in the natural sci- of the origins of theological conceptual ences or the social sciences. This is because models and of the question of the truth of the different sciences require not only dif- theological assertions.”21 Rather, we must ferent strategies but also different concep- see that any theological conception, even tions of what would be regarded as an one that claims to come from Scripture, explanation. What must be asked, how- “has been shaped by series of traditions ever, is “whether theology in any way and historically determined presupposi- exhibits a rationality comparable to the tions.”22 rationality of scientific reflection.”26 Van Huyssteen believes that the con- When he faces the question of the ori- ception of immutable theological models gin of theological statements, van 23 Huyssteen’s answer is clear and definite: “the language of our spontaneous reli- The basic metaphor of our Christian faith—which I myself would call gious experience is, in the most profound salvation in Jesus Christ—thus sense, the origin of our theological lan- develops from the complex biblical guage.”27 Such prescientific and pre- language, through the numerous dimensions and meanings of a long- reflective language cannot simply be standing tradition of Christian assimilated uncritically into systematic reflection, into models and eventu- theology’s vocabulary, however. It must ally into theological concepts, which become accessible through faith and undergo a transformation from the meta- various devotional forms (including phorical language of religious experience creeds, liturgies, and confessions) and thus in turn direct the religious to obtain maximum conceptual clarity.28 experiences of Christian believers.34 Yet theology must always go back to that experiential basis: “In the wider Christian Doctrines, then are not to be thought interpretative framework all religious lan- of as literal descriptions of what they guage refers directly or indirectly to a type claim to describe. Rather, “The theologi- of religious experience that Christians cal doctrine of the Trinity of God, for through all ages have come to call an example, is not a conceptual construction 29 encounter with God.” These theological designed to describe God’s essential statements, however, are not to be being in an absolutist literal and final divorced, as if in some purely objective sense; its purpose is to unlock the essen- way, from the theologian’s own basic tial implications of the basic biblical meta- convictions and religious commitments. phor with the aid of a number of further These enter into both the religious metaphoric models from the Bible (Father, experience, and the choice of models to Son, Holy Spirit).”35 30 employ. Van Huyssteen insists that it is impor- It is important to see that theological tant to have criteria for a critical-realist language is necessarily figurative or meta- model of rationality. He proposes three of phorical. By a metaphor, he means “a these: the reality depiction of theological word or expression used in an unusual statements; their critical and problem- 31 context to lead us to new insights.” A solving ability; and their constructive and metaphor opens up insights into the progressive nature.36 Drawing upon criti- world that cannot be conveyed by literal cal realism in science, he observes with language. So it is a way of knowing, not Hilary Putnam that scientific realism is the 32 just a means of communication. only theory that does not make the suc- Some of these metaphors ascend to the cess of science a miracle.37 Rather than the level of models, which enable us to for- convergent realism sometimes utilized in mulate theories or networks of theories. scientific realism, however, he advocates Van Huyssteen agrees with Sally McFague a more restricted type of realism, along the that a model is a dominant metaphor, a lines proposed by Ernan McMullin. Sci- 33 metaphor with staying power. The mod- entific realism’s claim is that theology is els have the power to provide continuity discovering the structures of the world: in religious traditions. For example, he “Realism therefore has to do with the illustrates the nature and role of models existence implications of the theoretic or doctrines as follows: entities of successful theories.”38 Of 24 course, this must be understood, not as a back into a naive-realist, unrevisably literal description, but as metaphor, descriptive position.”43 “theory-laden,” and conditioned. One The basic metaphor of Christianity has must be careful not to make an uncritical, maintained itself through the history of superficial transfer of the realism of sci- Christianity, as theology has reflected ence to religious belief and to theology.39 upon the religious experience of believ- Yet the method he is proposing involves ers. Beyond that it has given and is giv- “the conviction that what we are provi- ing maximal meaning in answering the sionally conceptualizing in theology really existential questions of life. This is “sound exists. This basic assumption and the good and adequate grounds (albeit never final, reasons we have for it make it possible for positivistic proof) for believing what is theologians, like scientists, to believe they directly or indirectly alleged in our theo- are theorizing in a valid, progressive, and logical statements about God.”44 It is not therefore successful way.”40 He cites with necessary to give some empirical proof of approval Arthur Peacock’s statement that the existence of God. Rather, “The com- Christians believe they are making mean- munity of Christians all over the world— ingful assertions about a reality that they and therefore also of theologians—share encounter in faith experiences, a reality in the same basic ultimate commitment by beyond our experience. The further accepting the reality of God’s existence.”45 important question for van Huyssteen is This is supported by two other features what, within the Christian context, evokes of theology: its critical and problem-solv- such religious experiences, and here he ing ability, and its progress. By using the identifies especially the biblical text.41 Bible, the tradition of Christian reflection, While insisting that human imagination and contemporary scientific thought, the- plays a role in the constructing of theo- ology shows itself able to solve its prob- ries, he steadfastly resists the suggestion lems.46 And as to the third criterion, that these metaphors and models only growth, he believes that what he sets forth describe the human condition, without shows that “Despite frequent paradig- raising the question of reference or real- matic shifts and breaks in the develop- ity depiction at all.42 ment of theological knowledge, theology This still leaves unanswered, however, has shown steady and indisputable the question about the explanatory role of growth.”47 theological models. In contradiction to Van Huyssteen has made a valiant those who contend that the ability to effort to develop a rational theology on a evoke an emotional, ethical, or spiritual postfoundationalist basis. There is much response does not mean that a model has about his effort that is commendable. He any cognitive function, he contends that has genuinely wrestled with the question the opposite is true. A model can only of rationality. In so doing, he has correctly evoke an affective response because it seen that theology cannot simply be sub- explains something. He says, “In conclu- mitted to some sort of universal criteria, sion, the metaphoric language of theologi- yet it must employ criteria that are sub- cal models and theories can therefore be ject to criticism, lest it become a ghetto seen as referential and as reality depict- endeavor. He has also offered us insight- ing. This can be achieved without falling ful understanding of the nature of reli- 25 gious and theological language, noting of God. correctly that it does not give us a literal Third, very different models are drawn or exact rendition of its object. And he has from religious experiences, both within made a strong effort to tie theology to Christianity and across the spectrum of divine revelation. Nonetheless, we must different religions. In light of competing judge his attempt unsuccessful, for sev- models based on religious feelings, how eral reasons. does one justify the Christian models that First, he has tied the understanding of van Huyssteen accepts simply on the theology very closely to the model of sci- basis of such feelings? It appears that his ence. He states that philosophy of science argument for the reality of the objects of is the discipline that concerns itself with theological reflection on the basis of the questions of truth or reality. Yet, strangely, conviction of the community of Christian that connection is never really argued for. believers around the world does not He speaks of “the indisputable interrelat- really take into account the endeavors of edness of philosophy of science problems the “scientific study of religion” by such and fundamental-theological ques- disciplines as sociology and anthropology, tions,”48 and “We have seen that the ques- or of the empirical fact of religious tion of rationality leads theology directly pluralism. to the question of criteria that would also Fourth, it is not always clear what be valid from a philosophy of science criteria he is employing, or how he justi- point of view.”49 Yet he really has not fies the use of such criteria. It is true, for offered adequate evidence for this conten- example, that he considers progress to be tion, and it certainly is not the case that one of the critical criteria. Yet just what this interrelatedness is indisputable. He constitutes progress in theology, and why seems to regard the philosophy of science these developments are so designated, is as exhaustive of the field of epistemology, not self-evident, despite his statement that which most philosophers would not do. such progress is indisputable. Second, van Huyssteen has bound A final difficulty is one that attends all theological language very closely to reli- claims of contextuality, of the condi- gious experience. He asserts that this is tionedness of all thought. Van Huysteen not simply an expression of religious feel- seems to hold to this idea on the primary ings, but that it refers to the reality of God. level, but not on the secondary level. By Bearing in mind, however, that he is seek- that I mean that although such condition- ing to make his theology answer the ques- ing must be present in all thought, there tions posed by philosophy of science, are no indications of his awareness of the including presumably, the behavioral sci- presence and effect of such conditioning ences, this creates a problem for him. For on his own theory. The assertions he there are behavioral sciences that study makes are very categorical in some cases. religious experience as simply a matter of This comes out most clearly when he talks subjective human feelings. It is question- about authoritarian views, and of abso- able whether he has presented enough lutist identification of revelation with the grounding for these religious experiences Bible, in a particular understanding of it. to be able to contend that they are indeed But if his view is true, then it must also reality depicting, of a reality of the nature apply to itself. Van Huyssteen finds him- 26 self in much the same sort of predicament tions in the system. that the sociologists of knowledge recog- For this approach there is a problem of nized but to which they could not respond epistemic regress as well, but it is a differ- adequately. ent type of regress than that encountered Van Huyssteen is endeavoring to avoid by foundationalism. Here the problem is the dual problems of subjectivism and that we are caught in a regress in a vicious pluralism on the one hand, and of dog- circle. If m is justified by n, and n is justi- matic naive realism on the other. In his fied by o, and o is justified by p, and p is effort to avoid the latter, however, he so justified by m, then it appears that m is qualifies his positive case that although justified by itself. In most cases, of course, there is much discussion of the reality of the circle is considerably larger than this, theology’s objects, there is little real argu- so that the direct circularity is not quite ment. He frequently makes statements so obvious. Furthermore, a number of such as “I am fully convinced that,”50 “it coherentisms in effect say that each propo- now becomes clear that,”51 “indisputable sition is justified by each of the others. interrelatedness,”52 and “in conclusion,”53 These are versions of coherentism that when insufficient support has been escape the major effect of this form of the offered for the conclusion advanced. regress problem, and they are best termed holistic coherentism. The central concep- Coherentism tion of coherentism with respect to justi- As philosophers have rejected tradi- fication is that a belief is justified by its tional or hard foundationalism, they have coherence with one’s other beliefs. The turned to other forms of justification. unit of coherence theoretically varies with While some of them have embraced prag- the size of the set of beliefs one holds, since matic criteria, most have adopted it may involve all of one’s other beliefs. coherentism. The major difference Some of these, of course, may be closer to between coherentism and foundational- the belief at issue, and thus may be more ism is how propositions are related to one significant for producing coherence with another in terms of their justification. In it. While such a definition of coherence foundationalism there is a monodirec- would apply to circular views of justifi- tional justification. Basic or foundational cation, holistic forms of coherence differ beliefs justify the derived beliefs, but not from such in not being linear. That is to vice versa. In coherentism, however, the say, justification for a given belief does not relationship is more complex. There really necessarily emerge from a direct inferen- are no basic propositions. All proposi- tial line running to it from propositions tions, even those about sensory experi- that serve as premises for it, which in turn ence, must be justified by relationship to are related by a similar direct inferential other propositions within the epistemic line to other premises, until there is a system. Justification of a proposition is return to the original proposition as a sought, not by showing the relationship premise. Audi expresses a moderate ver- to certain epistemologically privileged sion of holistic coherence as follows: propositions, termed basic or founda- tional, but by showing the coherence of II. For any S and any t, if S has any justified beliefs at t, then at t, (1) they any proposition with the other proposi- are each justified by virtue of their 27 coherence with one or more others deal not with a single foundationalist of S’s beliefs; and (2) they would remain justified even if (other things theory but with a variety of related theo- remaining equal) any justification ries.” His further comment is a helpful they derive from sources other than caution: “Whether the arguments that coherence were eliminated.54 have been made against foundationalism are successful against all theories that On this model, coherence is not neces- might be appropriately described as foun- sarily a straight-line type of relationship dational remains to be seen.”57 In fact, to another (justified) belief or proposition. many of these more modest varieties of It is a question of the relationship between foundationalism were designed to over- this belief and potentially a large number come the standard objections to classical of propositions, conceivably even all the foundationalism.58 beliefs one holds. It avoids the problem Triplett gives a more general character- of the regress by drawing a distinction not ization of foundationalism: ordinarily found in foundationalism. It contends that the epistemic chain termi- EF1: There are basic propositions. nates in a belief that is psychologically EF2: Any justified empirical propo- direct but epistemically indirect. As belief, sition is either basic or derives its justification, at least in part, from the the last link in the process is direct since it fact that it stands in an appropriate is non-inferential. As knowledge, how- relation to propositions that are 59 ever, it is indirect, not simply in the usual basic. sense that it is inferential, but in a broader sense. This belief “constitutes knowledge This means, simply, that there are propo- only by virtue of receiving support from sitions that form starting points. They are other knowledge or belief.”55 It is not not justified by derivation from any other inferred from other elements of knowl- propositions. These are called basic, and edge, but its status as knowledge depends are justified by that status. There are other upon its coherence with one’s other justified propositions that derive their jus- beliefs, many of which are presumably, tification from “standing in an appropri- knowledge themselves. As Audi puts it, ate relationship to basic propositions.” “It is thus knowledge through, though not Note that this definition does not by inference from, other knowledge—or specify the nature of the basic proposi- at least through justified beliefs; hence it tions, whether renditions of sense is epistemically indirect and thus non- experience or logical a prioris, whether foundational.”56 indubitable in some sense or not. This means that in theory a large variety of Coherentism and Foundationalism views can be classified as founda- We must now ask whether this type of tionalisms. In fact, the concept of coherence is necessarily exclusive of foundationalism becomes so expanded foundationalism. Such judgments should that even ostensive anti-foundationalists be tempered by an awareness of the are classified as foundationalists of a type. immense outpouring of literature on With respect to his category of context foundationalism especially since 1975. dependence of basic propositions he has Triplett’s comment here is well-taken: “At a class termed “contextual foundation- this point in time, however, we have to alism.” A subcategory of this group 28 maintains that what functions as basic escape those difficulties. propositions varies with different cultural, historical, or scientific conditions. This Modest Foundationalism socio-cultural form of contextual founda- The question now is whether there is tionalism includes the later Wittgenstein, any form of foundationalism that retains Quine, and Sellars, none of whom have the epistemic directness of knowledge, but seen themselves as foundationalists. Even at the same time preserves the values Rorty falls into this group: found in holistic coherentism? A moder- ate or fallibilistic type of foundationalism Although his metaphilosophical is the best candidate for such a role. By conclusions imply the rejection of any positive theory of knowledge, fallibilist we mean that not even founda- Rorty’s specific comments on and tional beliefs are indisputable. Further- criticisms of traditional theories of more, in this type of foundationalism, the knowledge seem to imply one sort of Contextual Foundationalist justification of superstructural beliefs by account, according to which basic relationship to foundational beliefs is not propositions are whatever fun- necessarily deductive. Rather, they may damental assumptions remain accepted and unchallenged in a be inductively justified by foundational given social or even conversational beliefs. That means that they may be false context.60 even if the foundational beliefs are true. Holistic coherentism also fits within one Just as one’s foundational beliefs may be of Triplett’s varieties of foundationalism, fallible, so may one’s inferences, so that namely, psychological foundationalism, the superstructural or derived beliefs are for it holds that if we have any beliefs at fallible. all, we have some that are direct or non- Moreover, a fallibilist foundationalism inferential. Nonetheless, it denies episte- must allow for discovering error, both in mological foundationalism, since it rejects the foundational and the superstructural the idea that for there to be knowledge at beliefs. Foundational beliefs may be found all, some of it must be epistemically di- to conflict with other, justified founda- rect. tional beliefs, or with superstructure It is interesting to note that when beliefs that are sufficiently well supported analyzed by Tripplett’s categories, van to be considered justified. This latter Huysteen’s thought can be seen to be a variety might, for example, be the case type of foundationalism, albeit of a much where one superstructure belief conflicts more modest sort than that usually asso- with another superstructure belief that is ciated with the term. He is working with deductively inferentially derived from or an approach in which certain propositions implied by a justified foundational belief. are justified by appeal to their relationship This means that the foundations, while to certain other propositions, namely, necessary, need not be absolute. Audi those that are either scientific in nature or puts it this way: “it requires epistemic are derived from religious experience. Yet, unmoved movers, but not unmovable as we have seen, the approach he prac- movers. Solid ground is enough, even if tices leads him into serious difficulties. We bedrock is better. There are also different must now ask whether there are other kinds of bedrock, and not all of them have forms of modest foundationalism that the invulnerability apparently belonging 29 to beliefs of luminously self-evident truths the former does not. Nor is it even, in of logic.”61 While this analysis applies pri- Audi’s judgment, a question of whether marily to justification, it also means that coherence is necessary to justification. foundationalism with respect to knowl- Rather, it is a question of whether coher- edge can be fallibilistic, for the grounds ence is a basic source of it and is a suffi- for one’s knowledge are not indefeasible. cient basis for justification.63 Perceptual grounds can be overridden, for example. One can fail or cease to know a Conclusion proposition, not because it is false or dis- We have examined the widespread cur- covered to be so, but because one ceases rent criticisms of foundationalism and to be justified in believing it. observed that they are directed primarily How, then, does this type of modest at classical foundationalism—the belief foundationalism relate to coherentism? that there are certain basic propositions There is one obvious point of relationship, that do not depend upon anything else for which is negative in nature. This is that their justification, being in some sense or incoherence, or contradiction, may serve other indubitable. We have examined one to defeat justified, even directly justified attempt at a postfoundationalist episte- and hence foundational, belief. An mology, and observed the serious prob- example would be the defeat of a memo- lems attached to it. rial belief, such as remembering an oak Yet we have seen that in recent years a tree growing in a certain spot, but being more modest form of foundationalism has unable to find sensory evidence of such a arisen. While not claiming indubitability tree growing there or having grown there. for its foundational propositions, it none- Second, although not attributing its theless holds that there are two types of truth to coherence, a fallibilist foundation- propositions: those that are themselves alism can employ the principle of inde- not justified by dependence upon any pendence. This is one of a whole set of other propositions, and those that are principles coherentists commonly utilize. justified by their relationship to these This is the principle that “the larger foundational propositions. In this type of the number of independent mutually foundationalism, the derivation of super- coherent factors one believes to support structure beliefs from foundational beliefs the truth of a proposition, the better one’s is not necessarily deductive, but may be justification for believing it (other things inductive in nature. Furthermore, justifi- being equal).”62 Thus, the confirmatory cation of this type can utilize coherence effect of more than one sense, or of sense of the holistic type. Yet, unless there is and memory, or of sense and self-evi- added to coherence a measure of deriva- dence, provides stronger justification. tion from some source such as sense While the role of coherence in this type of experience, there is no real basis for dis- fallibilist foundationalism is restricted, it tinguishing true beliefs from very consis- is a significant one. tent and coherent false beliefs. What, then is the difference between a But is foundationalism that important fallibilist foundationalism and a holistic to evangelicalism? I would contend that coherentism? It is not that the latter allows evangelicalism, as ordinarily understood, a place for, or appeals to, coherence and has a strong commitment to a correspon- 30 dence view of truth. Today some contend 7Ibid., 83. that doctrines do not make truth claims 8E.g., Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian about God, but function as rules for Belief (New York: Oxford University speech about God, the way the rules of Press, 2000) 218-227. grammar do not themselves make asser- 9Evan Simpson, “Introduction: Colloqui- tions of fact but govern how we use lan- mur, ergo sumus,” in Anti-Founda- guage.64 Evangelicalism, and orthodox tionalism and Practical Reasoning, ed. E. Christianity in general, has always con- Simpson (Edmonton: Academic Printing tended that its assertions about God are and Publishing, 1987) 2. actually affirming truths about his nature 10Isaac Levi, “Edification According to and actions, and that its historical asser- Rorty,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 tions refer to actual occurrences. I would (1981) 590. further contend that all persons who make 11Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in assertions that they expect others to God,” in Faith and Rationality, ed. Alvin understand and believe, in practice, as- Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff sume what I would term a primitive or (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame non-reflective correspondence view of Press, 1983) 60-61. truth. And of the several tests for truth, 12Ibid., 59-60. foundationalism, coherentism, and prag- 13Kelly James Clark, Return to Reason: A matism, foundationalism, of the fallibilist Critique of Enlightenment Evidentialism sort that I have outlined above, can best and a Defense of Reason and Belief in God sustain such a view of truth.65 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990) 138. 14Wentzel van Huyssteen, Theology and the ENDNOTES Justification of Faith: Constructing Theories 1Nancey Murphy and James Wm. in Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: McClendon, Jr., “Distinguishing Modern Eerdmans, 1989) x. and Postmodern Theologies,” Modern 15Ibid., xi. Theology 5, no. 3 (April 1989) 191-193; 16Ibid, xii. 198. 17Ibid. 2Timm Triplett, “Recent Work on 18Ibid., xiii. Foundationalism,” American Philosophi- 19Ibid., xvii. cal Quarterly 27, no. 2 (April 1990) 93. 20Ibid., xviii. 3William Alston, “Two Types of Foun- 21Ibid. dationalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 22Ibid. 73.7 (April 1976) 165-185. 23Ibid., 11. 4Triplett, 97. 24Wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in 5Rodney Clapp, “How Firm a Founda- Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand Rap- tion: Can Evangelicals Be Nonfound- ids: Eerdmans, 1997) 40. ationalists?” The Nature of Confession: 25Ibid., 41. Evangelicals and Liberals in Conversation, 26Ibid. ed. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. 27van Huyssteen, Theology and the Justifi- Okholm (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, cation of Faith, 127. 1996) 269-270, n. 9. 28Ibid. 6Ibid., 85-89. 29Ibid., 130. 31 30Ibid. and John R. Franke, Beyond Founda- 31Ibid., 131. tionalism: Shaping Theology in a 32Ibid., 133-135. Postmodern Context (Louisville: John 33Ibid., 138. Knox, 2000). 34Ibid., 141. 65For a much fuller statement and 35Ibid., 142. argument for this contention, see 36Ibid., 148. chapters 12 and 13 of my Truth or 37Ibid., 149. Consequences; The Promise and Perils 38Ibid., 151. of Postmodernism (Downers Grove: 39Ibid., 155. InterVarsity Press, 2001). 40Ibid., 155-156. 41Ibid., 157. 42Ibid., 159. 43Ibid., 161. 44Ibid., 162. 45Ibid. 46Ibid., 177. 47Ibid., 162-163. 48Ibid., 125. 49Ibid., 144-145. 50Ibid., 155. 51Ibid., 163. 52Ibid., 125. 53Ibid., 161. 54Robert Audi, The Structure of Justi- fication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 138. 55Ibid., 140. 56Ibid. 57Triplett, 96. 58Ibid., 93. 59Ibid., 96. 60Ibid., 101. 61Ibid., 134. 62Ibid., 136. 63Ibid., 162. 64George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doc- trine (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984). For an evangelical version of this conception of doctrine, see Stanley J. Grenz, Renewing the Cen- ter: Evangelical Theology in a Post- Theological Era (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), and Stanley J. Grenz 32