Foundationalism: Dead or Alive? Millard J. Erickson Millard J. Erickson is the Distin- Introduction foundationalism is said to be dead, clas- guished Professor of Theology at One of the most prominent terms in sical foundationalism is usually meant. George W. Truett Theological Seminary, recent characterizations of the differences However, since about 1975, significantly Baylor University. In addition to teach- between modern and postmodern is different versions of foundationism have ing at a number of institutions during foundationalism. Modernism made a been proposed. These make more mod- his career, Dr. Erickson also served as strong appeal to foundationalism, but est claims about their effectiveness. the Vice President and Dean at Bethel postmodernists are virtually unanimous Triplett comments, “It is not clear that the Theological Seminary. He is the author in the opinion that foundationalism must standard arguments against foundation- of numerous books and articles, includ- be rejected. Indeed, James McClendon and alism will work against these newer, more ing the recently published Making Sense Nancey Murphy regard holism rather modest theories. Indeed, these theories of the Trinity (Baker) and a forthcom- than foundationalism as one of the crite- were by and large designed with the pur- ing work titled Truth or Consequences: ria of postmodernism.1 The purpose of pose of overcoming standard objections.”2 The Promise and Perils of Postmod- this article will be to examine the nature An accurate discussion of foundation- ernism (IVP). of this dispute to determine whether alism must take into account these devel- foundationalism is indeed untenable as a opments. William Alston speaks of two means of justifying theological doctrine. types of foundationalism,3 while Triplett has a much more elaborate morphology. Definition of the Issue He separates varieties of foundationalism In general, classical foundationalism is into two large groups, in terms of their the contention that in the knowing pro- “specifications of the nature of basic cess, there are certain unshakeable start- propositions,” and “accounts of the rela- ing points that are not justified by any tion between basic and nonbasic proposi- other propositions. They are immediately tions.” Within each of these two major justified because they possess a character groups are subgroups, with two or more such that they are indubitable (i.e., can- varieties of each, leading to no fewer than not be doubted) or incorrigible (i.e., it is twenty labels for foundationalist views.4 not possible to be mistaken about them). In addition, Reformed epistemology, In the rationalist form of foundationalism, which is the most sustained critique of found in Descartes, such a foundation is classical foundationalism, constructs its known rationally, or by pure thought. For own type of foundationalism. Thus it is an empiricist like Locke, the foundation extremely important to identify the exact is sense data. The second element of character of the foundationalism we are foundationalism is that these foundations discussing. serve as justification for other beliefs, Awareness of this variety does not which are therefore mediately justified. always translate into discrimination in Usually, postmodernists have concen- discussion, however. So, for example, trated their attacks on a model of classi- Rodney Clapp acknowledges that “the cal foundationalism, often singling out word foundationalism hardly has a single, Descartes. In some ways that has pre- univocal meaning. Thus there are some sented a relatively easy target. When important Christian thinkers, perhaps 20 most notably Alvin Plantinga and William I believe this, and would probably give Alston, who call themselves foundation- some answer such as, “because I see it alists but are certainly not foundationalists there,” or “I am having a sensory percep- of the sort worried over through these tion of it.” Suppose, however, that I am pages.”5 Yet this distinction does not seem asked, “How do you know that your sen- to enter into his discussion of such evan- sory perception is accurate?” I may give gelical theologians as Ronald Nash and some further justification for this belief, Kenneth Kantzer, whom he finds guilty but then I am faced with justifying that of slipping back into quasi-foundationalist justification, and so am involved in a language and thought.6 Clapp’s failure to vicious infinite regress. Furthermore, distinguish these theologians from the Plantinga points out that foundationalism sort of foundationalism he is describing, does not fulfill its own criterion: In classi- as he did with Plantinga, is particularly cal foundationalism, a belief must be curious, since he closely identifies evan- either foundational or derivative in order gelical foundationalism with the common to be rational. Foundational beliefs are sense realism of Thomas Reid.7 He does (a) self-evident (e.g., mathematical state- not comment on the fact that Plantinga has ments like 2+2=4 and definitional or ana- in his later writings indicated a consider- lytic matters, like all cows are mammals), able affinity for the thought of Reid.8 (b) evident to the senses (i.e., reporting In the last quarter-century, not only immediate experiences), or incorrigible postmodernists but also most philoso- (i.e., matters about which it is impossible phers have asserted or assumed that to be wrong, usually one’s immediate sub- foundationalism, having been refuted, is jective states). Derivative beliefs are those dead. Sometimes the rhetoric has been beliefs that one can infer by logical prin- almost moral in tone: “Suddenly ‘anti- ciples from these foundational beliefs. foundationalist’ is a good thing to be,” The question, according to Plantinga, said Simpson;9 and Levi pronounced that is whether classical foundationalism is “opposition to foundationalism ought to rational. Which of the two criteria of be the philosophical equivalent of resis- rationality does the contention that these tance to sin.”10 are the criteria of rationality fulfill? It would appear that it does not meet either The Rejection of Foundationalism of these. In other words, foundationalism A major problem for most forms of is self-referentially inconsistent.11 hard foundationalism is the epistemic A further problem with foundation- regress problem. This is the question of alism, according to Plantinga, is that many how we justify some item of belief or of the common beliefs of ordinary life, on knowledge, and then, how we justify the which we base our living, are clearly jus- justifier. If I say that I believe j, and then tified beliefs, yet they are excluded by the am asked why, my answer is that I believe criteria of classical foundationalism. These j because of k. The further question may are matters that are not evident to the then be pressed, however, as to why I con- senses, self-evident, or incorrigible. Con- sider k to be adequate justification for j. sequently, they must be justified by a For example, if I assert that there is a yel- demonstration of their relationship to low table in the room, I may be asked why foundational or properly basic beliefs. No 21 one, however, has ever produced such lish theology without recourse to the demonstration. Plantinga says, “Consider foundationalist methodology. all those propositions that entail, say, that Van Huysteen is concerned with the there are enduring physical objects, or that question of the reality of the Christian there are persons distinct from myself, or faith, its validity or credibility. Are theo- that the world has existed for more than logians indeed saying anything credible five minutes: none of these propositions, about God? He says that the task of sys- I think, is more probable than not with tematic theology is “to demonstrate respect to what is self-evident or incorri- through creative reflection that the Chris- gible for me; at any rate no one has given tian faith has its own integrity: an integ- good reason to think any of them is.”12 rity and uniqueness that may integrate the Clark comments: “Any philosophical divergent dimensions of our modern principle that excludes cases of obviously experience, to give it the maximum degree rational beliefs ought to be rejected.”13 of meaning and significance.”14 Van This latter criticism appears less Huysteen intends to formulate a theologi- impressive than the first. While these may cal method that will not draw a sharp dis- well be rational beliefs, and may in some tinction between what is usually termed sense be inescapable if one is to function fundamental theology and systematic in ordinary daily affairs, “obviously ratio- theology. By that he means that the ques- nal” is a bit too strong. Whether such are tion of a confessional theology grappling rational, and on what basis, is what is at with contextual issues is not to be sepa- issue here. Certainly George Berkeley did rated from an apologetic theology that sets not think some of them obvious. None- forth its discourse to those outside the theless, the first objection indicates the Christian faith.15 problem of epistemic regress. From a prac- In so doing, van Huysteen has a spe- tical standpoint, one must stop the pro- cific definition of Christian theology in cess of justification at some point, but mind: “Accounting critically for their faith where and why? This is the dilemma that presupposes that theologians must be faces any epistemology. prepared to reflect on their own thought processes, and this places upon them the An Attempted fundamental task of relating the essence Postfoundationalist Theology of their faith to the question of the very In light of these problems, a wide- nature of rationality, as posed in contem- spread conviction has arisen among both porary philosophy of science.”16 Thus, the philosophers and theologians that if the- treatment of theology in relationship to ology is to be done, it cannot be done on a philosophy of science will be a major part foundationalist basis.