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Mere Christian Theism and the Problem of Evil

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Mere Christian Theism and the Problem of Evil LIBERTY UNIVERSITY MERE CHRISTIAN THEISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: TOWARD A TRINITARIAN PERICHORETIC THEODICY A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF LIBERTY UIVERSITY SCHOOL OF DIVINITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY RONNIE PAUL CAMPBELL JR. LYNCHBURG, VA JUNE 2015 Copyright © 2015 Ronnie P. Campbell Jr. All Rights Reserved ii APPROVAL SHEET MERE CHRISTIAN THEISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: TOWARD A TRINITARIAN PERICHORETIC THEODICY Ronnie Paul Campbell Jr. Read and approved by: Chairpersons: David J. Baggett Reader: C. Anthony Thornhill Reader: Leo R. Percer Date: 6/29/2015 iii To my dad, Paul Campbell Thank you for first introducing me to Jesus so many years ago. I owe you much gratitude for setting an example of Christ-like service. To my wife, Debbie, and children, Abby, Caedmon, and Caleb It was your kindness, encouragement, and love that gave me great joy and kept me going. You deserve much more than my words could ever express. To my father-in-law, Bob Bragg Though you’ve had your bout with suffering, I will see you again one day, my friend, in the renewed heavens and earth, where we shall experience no more sickness, pain, or sorrow. We will dwell together in that country—Sweet Beulah Land! iv CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... viii ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. ix CHAPTER 1: WHY GOD AND EVIL MATTER?................................................................... 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 Purpose and Method ................................................................................................................... 4 Key Terms and Concepts .......................................................................................................... 13 Evil, Kinds of Evil, and the Good ......................................................................................... 13 Pain and Suffering................................................................................................................. 25 Summary of Chapters ............................................................................................................... 31 CHAPTER 2: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 1 ...................................... 34 Evaluating Metaphysical Systems ............................................................................................ 35 The Classification of Evil ......................................................................................................... 42 Naturalism and Evil .................................................................................................................. 44 Naturalism and Life .............................................................................................................. 47 Naturalism and Consciousness ............................................................................................. 51 Naturalism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility ......................................................................... 55 CHAPTER 3: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 2 ...................................... 64 Pantheism and Life ................................................................................................................... 70 Pantheism and Consciousness................................................................................................... 84 Pantheism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility .............................................................................. 86 Concluding Matters ................................................................................................................... 96 CHAPTER 4: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 3 ...................................... 97 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 97 Defining Panentheism ............................................................................................................... 97 Alfred North Whitehead ......................................................................................................... 103 Primary Categories.............................................................................................................. 103 God and the World .............................................................................................................. 107 Charles Hartshorne.................................................................................................................. 109 Critique of Classical Theism ............................................................................................... 110 The Concept of God ............................................................................................................ 111 Process Panentheism and Evil ................................................................................................ 114 Process Panentheism and Life ............................................................................................ 114 Process Panentheism and Consciousness............................................................................ 119 v Process Panentheism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility ....................................................... 130 CHAPTER 5: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 4 .................................... 144 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 144 Theism and Evil ...................................................................................................................... 150 Theism and Life .................................................................................................................. 150 Theism and Consciousness ................................................................................................. 157 Theism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility ............................................................................. 169 CHAPTER 6: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 5 .................................... 189 Factual Adequacy.................................................................................................................... 189 Logical Consistency ................................................................................................................ 192 Explanatory Power and Scope ................................................................................................ 195 Ad Hoc-ness ............................................................................................................................ 199 Plausibility .............................................................................................................................. 201 Livability ................................................................................................................................. 204 Concluding Thoughts .............................................................................................................. 207 CHAPTER 7: THE TRINITY AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD ........................................ 210 Light, Love, and Fellowship ................................................................................................... 211 Trinity, Human Freedom, and Sin .......................................................................................... 220 The Kingdom, Creation, Gospel, and Church......................................................................... 226 Theosis and the Kingdom of God ........................................................................................... 238 Concluding Thoughts .............................................................................................................. 246 CHAPTER 8: TOWARD A FULLER THEODICY ............................................................. 247 Theodical Suggestions ............................................................................................................ 248 Freewill Theodicy ............................................................................................................... 248 Soul-Making Theodicy ....................................................................................................... 253 ‘O Felix Culpa’ Theodicy ................................................................................................... 265 Concluding Thoughts .......................................................................................................... 270 Trinitarian Perichoretic Theodicy ........................................................................................... 270 TPT and The Existential Problem ........................................................................................... 276 Evil and Divine Suffering ................................................................................................... 276 Evil and Divine Action ....................................................................................................... 283 Evil and the Church ............................................................................................................ 286 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUDING MATTERS
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