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The Problem of Evil As a Moral Objection to Theism

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The Problem of Evil As a Moral Objection to Theism View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Birmingham Research Archive, E-theses Repository THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AS A MORAL OBJECTION TO THEISM by TOBY GEORGE BETENSON A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY. Department of Philosophy School of Philosophy, Theology and Religion College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham September 2014 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract: I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non- existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral ‘anti-theodicists’, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the plausibility of a morally motivated non-cognitive atheism, offering an example (Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov), before finally distilling the central claims of this thesis into the form of a slogan: God lacks humanity. To Kirsty Acknowledgements: I gratefully acknowledge all the influences that have shaped this thesis, and all those who have made it possible. My supervisor, Prof. Yujin Nagasawa, for his constant calm and insightful advice, and to the department at Birmingham for providing me with the opportunity to do this PhD. My family, without whose financial and moral support I would have been unable to pursue this silly idea of teaching in a university. Kirsty, whose love and companionship of the past seven years deserves a lifetime of reciprocation. And to all those who have shaped my philosophical views: Paul Broadbent, for introducing me to McDowell. Joseph Walsh, for his many conversations and feedback. Steve Reed, for giving me my first philosophy book. Nick Trakakis, for helpful discussions at a crucial stage in this thesis. And to Raimond Gaita, though he will no doubt never hear about it, whose lectures and presence sparked an interest in a mystery that I had almost lost sight of. Three chapters of this thesis are based upon articles that have been accepted for publication elsewhere, so I acknowledge their permission to reprint here. Chapter 3, ‘Evaluative Claims within the Problem of Evil’, is forthcoming in Religious Studies, and I gratefully acknowledge the feedback of an anonymous reviewer for contributing to the development of that chapter. Chapter 8, ‘Non-Cognitive Atheism’, is forthcoming in Atheisms, a volume edited by Harriet Harris and Victoria Harrison, and published by Ashgate. Chapter 9, ‘Ivan Karamazov is a Hopeless Romantic’, is forthcoming in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Table of Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 Section One: The Logical Problem of Evil 1. The Problem of Evil Remains Logically Binding .............................................................. 6 1.1 The logical problem of evil: J. L. Mackie vs. Alvin Plantinga ........................................ 6 1.1.1 The shift towards evidential formulations of the problem of evil ........................ 9 1.1.2 The relevant difference between logical and evidential formulations ................ 11 1.2 Option 1: Deductive versus inductive formulations ...................................................... 11 1.2.1 Plantinga evaded ................................................................................................. 12 1.2.2 The shift to evidential formulations on the basis of the perceived failure of the logical argument from evil: William Rowe and Michael Tooley ................................ 17 1.2.3 ‘Logical’ arguments ............................................................................................ 20 1.2.4 ‘Evidential’ arguments ........................................................................................ 23 1.2.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 24 1.3 Option 2: Evil per se, or evil specified? ........................................................................ 24 1.3.1 Logical formulations: God’s incompatibility with all evil (evil per se) ............. 25 1.3.2 Evidential formulations: God’s incompatibility with certain types of evils ....... 27 1.3.3 These logical formulations are unreasonable ...................................................... 27 1.4 Option 3: Necessary incompatibility versus contingent incompatibility ....................... 29 1.4.1 A specific response to option 3 ........................................................................... 30 1.5 Option 4: Strong versus weak conclusions .................................................................... 33 1.5.1 Reducing option 4 to options 1 or 3 .................................................................... 33 1.6 Genuinely ‘evidential’ arguments: e.g., homeopathy .................................................... 35 1.6.1 Evidential formulations are inappropriate for the problem of evil ..................... 37 1.7 Conclusion: The problem of evil remains logically binding ......................................... 38 2. A Morally Aware Formulation of the Problem of Evil .................................................. 40 2.1 A full-fledged formulation of the argument from evil ................................................... 42 2.2 A morally-aware formulation of the problem of evil ..................................................... 43 2.3 Solving the problem ....................................................................................................... 44 2.4 Retreating to a ‘meta-formulation’ ................................................................................ 48 2.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 49 3. Evaluative Claims within the Problem of Evil ................................................................ 51 3.1 A ‘meta-formulation’ of the problem of evil ................................................................. 52 3.2 The argument from evil has a non-evaluative conclusion ............................................. 56 3.3 The First Problem: Underlying normative inconsistency .............................................. 58 3.3.1 Consistency within the problem.......................................................................... 58 3.3.2 Consistency between problems ........................................................................... 60 3.3.3 Examples of evaluative claims in the problem of evil ........................................ 62 3.4 The Second Problem: Crossing the is-ought gap is problematic, especially the wrong way; Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God ......................... 64 3.5 Conclusion: The argument from evil is vulnerable to Mackie’s challenge ................... 68 Table of Contents Section Two: A Moral Objection 4. Ethics and Theodicy: A Call for Consistency .................................................................. 70 4.1 The dilemma .................................................................................................................. 71 4.2 Consequentialism ........................................................................................................... 71 4.3 Premise 1: Theism tends to entail non-consequentialism .............................................. 73 4.3.1 Scriptural support ................................................................................................ 73 4.3.2 Empirical support ................................................................................................ 75 4.3.3 Philosophical support .......................................................................................... 76 4.4 Premise 2: If certain traditional theodicies are true, then consequentialism is true ....... 79 4.4.1 Soul-Making Theodicy is consequentialist ......................................................... 79 4.4.2 Strengthening the connection between SMT and consequentialism................... 80 4.4.3 Objections ..........................................................................................................
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