CHAPTER 8

THE COMPATIBILITY OF AN EXISTENTIAL PERSPECTIVE WITH RELIGION

“In discussions of Existentialism, this idea of the baselessness and arbitrariness of human values is almost always the one that arouses protest.” (Van Cleve Morris, 1990, Existentialism in Education, p. 41)

Concerns raised in response to any perspective described as existential are usually based upon the apparent ‘arbitrariness’ of values as identified by Morris in the passage above. A perspective of existential spirituality might be assumed to be potentially at odds with religious views because it privi- leges the centring of the person rather than of a doctrinal framework and therefore it might be considered as being inappropriate for religious-based schools. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the perspective of existential spirituality being developed here can be compatible with religious views, and if so, how it must be conceptualised. If existential philosophy is unable to readily lend itself to an acceptance of a deity and is unable to be seen as being able to embrace religious views, then opposition towards the adoption of existential spirituality for education could fairly be raised, not least because many educational institutions in western societies are clearly affiliated with various religions, especially those of Christianity. Sartre’s views have often made Existentialism appear inherently atheistic. A well-known connotation imputed to the philosophy is its denial of the existence of a deity or even of his ‘death’ but who in turn might be otherwise able to provide meaning to the lives of individuals. Christian theologians such as Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Paul Tillich and Rudolf Bultmann, who have used existential philosophy as a basis for their interpretations, often tend to demythologise religion giving little notice to the deity as an aspect of their particular world-views. In this chapter, the religious per- spective that will be addressed specifically will be a Christian one, because this is considered here to be the most relevant one for western societies and the major philosopher to be discussed will be Kierkegaard.

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THE DIFFICULTY WITH EXISTENTIALIM FROM A RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE It is important initially to clarify what existentialists generally mean by ‘religion’ (or specifically from Kierkegaard’s perspective – Christianity) before being able to judge whether an existential spirituality has the potential to embrace a religion rather than require it to be dismissed. Existentialists oppose systems that force individuals to live what they regard as an inauthentic existence. ‘Christendom’ is a term used by Kierkegaard to refer to such a system and he often contrasted it with the more authentic ‘Christianity’. His Climacus accused Christendom of “attempting to make one forget what Christianity is” claiming therefore that it was his “resolution” or task to find out the misunderstanding between Christendom (often described as modern Christian speculative thought) and Christianity (Kierkegaard, 1992, vol. 1, pp. 384, 241). He was opposed to formalising Christian religion into a dehumanising institution which operated in such a way that the whole notion of an authentic Christian existence was annulled and argued that Christianity ought to be understood as a way of life for individuals. He stated that: But if what one sees all over Europe is Christendom, a Christian state, then I propose to start here in Denmark to list the price for being Christian in such a way that the whole concept – state church, official appointments, livelihood – bursts open. (Kierkegaard, 1992, vol. 2, p. 145) The price to pay of course is what sort of person must one become in order to become a member of this religion. This challenging stance has provoked criticism both to Kierkegaard personally and also to his philosophy but which is considered here to often misunderstand his intent. Similarly Nietzsche too was also against the systemisation of Christianity for various reasons. He likened Christian morality to slave morality where people are urged to abolish their individual characters and adopt the apparent weak and obedient attributes according to the gospel message. He argued that “From the start, the Christian faith is a sacrifice: a sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of the spirit; at the same time, enslavement and self-mockery, self-mutilation” (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 60). He not only singled out Christianity in his attacks but claimed that “all religions are in their deepest foundations systems of cruelties” (Nietzsche, 1998, p. 38). As for Buddhism he claimed that it was more realistic than Christianity yet he referred to it as being simply a “system of hygiene” (Nietzsche, 1992, p. 16). However, it is Christianity that bears the brunt of much of his most vehement accusations.

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