Introduction Perhaps the Best-Known Evolutionary Challenge to Theism

DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF

ABSTRACT ABSTRACT Problem one: why, if God designed the human mind, did it take so Problem one: why, if God designed the human mind, did it take so long for humans to develop theistic concepts and beliefs? Problem two: long for humans to develop theistic concepts and beliefs? Problem two: why would God use evolution to design the living world when the dis- why would God use evolution to design the living world when the discovery of evolution would predictably contribute to so much nonbelief covery of evolution would predictably contribute to so much nonbelief in God? Darwin was aware of such questions but failed to see their evi- in God? Darwin was aware of such questions but failed to see their evidential significance for theism. This paper explores this significance. dential significance for theism. This paper explores this significance. Problem one introduces something I call natural nonbelief, which is sig- Problem one introduces something I call natural nonbelief, which is significant because it parallels and corroborates well-known worries about nificant because it parallels and corroborates well-known worries about natural evil. Problems one and two, especially when combined, support natural evil. Problems one and two, especially when combined, support naturalism over theism, intensify the problem of divine hiddenness, naturalism over theism, intensify the problem of divine hiddenness, challenge Alvin Plantinga’s views about the naturalness of theism, and challenge Alvin Plantinga’s views about the naturalness of theism, and advance the discussion about whether the conflict between science and advance the discussion about whether the conflict between science and religion is genuine or superficial. religion is genuine or superficial.

Introduction Introduction Perhaps the best-known evolutionary challenge to theism stems from Perhaps the best-known evolutionary challenge to theism stems from biological evil (Draper 2007a; Kitcher 2007; Murray and Ross 2006; biological evil (Draper 2007a; Kitcher 2007; Murray and Ross 2006; Smith 1991). Natural selection is a highly cruel process, and as Darwin Smith 1991). Natural selection is a highly cruel process, and as Darwin noted long ago, a “devil’s chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, noted long ago, a “devil’s chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering, low and horribly cruel works of nature” (1856). But Darwin blundering, low and horribly cruel works of nature” (1856). But Darwin wasn’t just concerned about evil. He also worried about nonbelief. In par- wasn’t just concerned about evil. He also worried about nonbelief. In particular, Darwin seems to have realized that ticular, Darwin seems to have realized that

(1) Evolution gave rise to early humans who lacked a concept of (1) Evolution gave rise to early humans who lacked a concept of God, the result of which has been much nonbelief in God. God, the result of which has been much nonbelief in God.

As Darwin appreciates, the human mind was not originally biased toward As Darwin appreciates, the human mind was not originally biased toward theistic belief since, as he puts it, “the idea of a universal and beneﬁcent theistic belief since, as he puts it, “the idea of a universal and beneﬁcent Creator does not seem to arise in the mind of man, until he has been ele- Creator does not seem to arise in the mind of man, until he has been ele-

“Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief” by Jason Marsh, “Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief” by Jason Marsh, The Monist, vol. 96, no. 3, pp. 349–376. Copyright © 2013, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354. The Monist, vol. 96, no. 3, pp. 349–376. Copyright © 2013, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354. 350 JASON MARSH 350 JASON MARSH vated by long-continued culture” (2004, 682). In addition, Darwin’s own vated by long-continued culture” (2004, 682). In addition, Darwin’s own struggles with belief in God (or at least the struggles of many since him)1 struggles with belief in God (or at least the struggles of many since him)1 reveal that reveal that

(2) An acquaintance with evolution directly leads many to sense that (2) An acquaintance with evolution directly leads many to sense that the universe is indifferent to them, which often weakens or the universe is indifferent to them, which often weakens or destroys their belief in God. destroys their belief in God.

(3) An acquaintance with evolution generates certain atheological (3) An acquaintance with evolution generates certain atheological arguments and further tends to undermine biological design argu- arguments and further tends to undermine biological design arguments, which for some weakens or destroys their belief in God. ments, which for some weakens or destroys their belief in God.

Claim (1) concerns the process of evolution and its impact on the beliefs Claim (1) concerns the process of evolution and its impact on the beliefs of early humans. Claim (1) also introduces what I call the problem of natural of early humans. Claim (1) also introduces what I call the problem of natural nonbelief. Claims (2) and (3) concern, not the process of evolution or its nonbelief. Claims (2) and (3) concern, not the process of evolution or its impact on the religious beliefs of early humans, but how our discovery impact on the religious beliefs of early humans, but how our discovery and awareness of evolution impacts the religiosity of present human beings. and awareness of evolution impacts the religiosity of present human beings. My task will be to show that these three claims, especially when com- My task will be to show that these three claims, especially when combined, have widespread significance for philosophy of religion. In particular, bined, have widespread significance for philosophy of religion. In particular, they support naturalism over theism, corroborate the evolutionary problem they support naturalism over theism, corroborate the evolutionary problem of evil, according to which the cruel workings of natural selection provide of evil, according to which the cruel workings of natural selection provide evidence that evolution is blind as opposed to guided, and challenge a evidence that evolution is blind as opposed to guided, and challenge a widely endorsed view within religious epistemology about the naturalness widely endorsed view within religious epistemology about the naturalness of belief in God. In addition, these claims make a solution to the problem of belief in God. In addition, these claims make a solution to the problem of divine hiddenness more difficult to come by and further reveal that the of divine hiddenness more difficult to come by and further reveal that the conflict between evolution and theism is, despite what many respectable conflict between evolution and theism is, despite what many respectable thinkers have claimed in recent years (Sober 2011;2 Plantinga 2011; Van thinkers have claimed in recent years (Sober 2011;2 Plantinga 2011; Van Inwagen 2003; Haught 2000; Miller 1999) not entirely superficial. Inwagen 2003; Haught 2000; Miller 1999) not entirely superficial. I will proceed as follows. Section One recalls the problem of natural I will proceed as follows. Section One recalls the problem of natural evil in the distant past and explains how our knowledge of evolution evil in the distant past and explains how our knowledge of evolution intensifies this problem. This will set the reader up for Sections Two and intensifies this problem. This will set the reader up for Sections Two and Three, which explore the interestingly analogous problem of natural non- Three, which explore the interestingly analogous problem of natural nonbelief in the distant past and how our knowledge of evolution intensifies belief in the distant past and how our knowledge of evolution intensifies this problem. Here some implications for Alvin Plantinga’s remarks about this problem. Here some implications for Alvin Plantinga’s remarks about the naturalness of belief in God are also drawn. Sections Four and Five the naturalness of belief in God are also drawn. Sections Four and Five turn to the present time and explore how evolution gives rise to nonbelief turn to the present time and explore how evolution gives rise to nonbelief after Darwin. These sections further explore neglected Darwinian and after Darwin. These sections further explore neglected Darwinian and cognitive dimensions to the argument from divine hiddenness, dimensions cognitive dimensions to the argument from divine hiddenness, dimensions DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 351 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 351 which strengthen that argument. Finally, to clarify my aims in this paper which strengthen that argument. Finally, to clarify my aims in this paper (unlike some popular figures in the conversation about science and reli- (unlike some popular figures in the conversation about science and religion) I am not attempting to disprove theism here—theism could still be gion) I am not attempting to disprove theism here—theism could still be true, for all I say, and could find better support than naturalism in other true, for all I say, and could find better support than naturalism in other data, like cosmic fine-tuning.3 I am also not attempting to devalue theism. data, like cosmic fine-tuning.3 I am also not attempting to devalue theism. My goal is merely to explore some overlooked challenges for theism, My goal is merely to explore some overlooked challenges for theism, challenges that can impact our view of how it fares on our public evi- challenges that can impact our view of how it fares on our public evidence, including our scientific evidence. dence, including our scientific evidence.

1. Terminology 1. Terminology Since my main focus in this paper is with theism and naturalism,4 I Since my main focus in this paper is with theism and naturalism,4 I will have little to say about nontheistic religion or about secular alterna- will have little to say about nontheistic religion or about secular alternatives to naturalism. By ‘theism’ I mean the claim that an unsurpassably tives to naturalism. By ‘theism’ I mean the claim that an unsurpassably powerful, intelligent, and loving God exists and has designed the world.5 powerful, intelligent, and loving God exists and has designed the world.5 By ‘naturalism’ I mean the claim that no supernatural agents exist, that the By ‘naturalism’ I mean the claim that no supernatural agents exist, that the world was not intentionally designed, and that nature is causally closed world was not intentionally designed, and that nature is causally closed and morally indifferent to human beings and to their flourishing.6 By ‘evo- and morally indifferent to human beings and to their flourishing.6 By ‘evolution’ I mean the claim that all biologically complex life forms are related lution’ I mean the claim that all biologically complex life forms are related and are gradually modified descendants from less complex single-celled and are gradually modified descendants from less complex single-celled organisms. By ‘Darwinism’ I have in mind the claim that natural selec- organisms. By ‘Darwinism’ I have in mind the claim that natural selection, working on random mutation, is the driving force behind much, if not tion, working on random mutation, is the driving force behind much, if not most, evolutionary change. By ‘natural selection’ I mean, very roughly, the most, evolutionary change. By ‘natural selection’ I mean, very roughly, the process by which traits are selected in a population because of their sur- process by which traits are selected in a population because of their survival and reproductive value. I realize that some will reject Darwinism, or vival and reproductive value. I realize that some will reject Darwinism, or even evolution, though I should clarify that this paper is primarily intended even evolution, though I should clarify that this paper is primarily intended for those who accept Darwinian evolution.7 It is also intended, as shall for those who accept Darwinian evolution.7 It is also intended, as shall become clearer later on, for those who are open to scientific, including become clearer later on, for those who are open to scientific, including cognitive, accounts of religion. cognitive, accounts of religion.

1.1. The problem of natural evil 1.1. The problem of natural evil With these definitions and qualifications in mind, let us now consider With these definitions and qualifications in mind, let us now consider Draper’s claims about evolution and evil, which will, in turn, help to set up Draper’s claims about evolution and evil, which will, in turn, help to set up our largely parallel discussion about evolution and nonbelief. Draper begins our largely parallel discussion about evolution and nonbelief. Draper begins with the age-old problem of natural evil. He states his evidence as follows: with the age-old problem of natural evil. He states his evidence as follows: E: For a variety of biological and ecological reasons organisms compete for E: For a variety of biological and ecological reasons organisms compete for survival, with some having an advantage in the struggle for survival over survival, with some having an advantage in the struggle for survival over others; as a result, many organisms, including many sentient beings, never others; as a result, many organisms, including many sentient beings, never 352 JASON MARSH 352 JASON MARSH

flourish because they die before maturity, many others barely survive but lan- flourish because they die before maturity, many others barely survive but languish for most or all of their lives, and those that reach maturity and flourish guish for most or all of their lives, and those that reach maturity and flourish for much of their lives usually languish in old age; in the case of human for much of their lives usually languish in old age; in the case of human beings and some nonhuman animals as well, languishing often involves beings and some nonhuman animals as well, languishing often involves intense or prolonged suffering. (2007a) intense or prolonged suffering. (2007a) Draper rightly notes that there are many losers in the competition for sur- Draper rightly notes that there are many losers in the competition for survival. We can get a more vivid sense of the kind of competition and vival. We can get a more vivid sense of the kind of competition and suffering in question, however. Quentin Smith, for instance, presents us suffering in question, however. Quentin Smith, for instance, presents us with the following example that we are supposed to feel in our bones: with the following example that we are supposed to feel in our bones: Not long ago I was sleeping in a cabin in the woods and was awoken in the Not long ago I was sleeping in a cabin in the woods and was awoken in the middle of the night by the sounds of a struggle between two animals. Cries of middle of the night by the sounds of a struggle between two animals. Cries of terror and extreme agony rent the night, intermingled with the sounds of jaws terror and extreme agony rent the night, intermingled with the sounds of jaws snapping bones and flesh being torn from limbs. One animal was being sav- snapping bones and flesh being torn from limbs. One animal was being savagely attacked, killed and then devoured by another. A clearer case of a horrible agely attacked, killed and then devoured by another. A clearer case of a horrible event in nature, a natural evil, has never been presented to me. It seemed to event in nature, a natural evil, has never been presented to me. It seemed to me self-evident that the natural law that animals must savagely kill and devour me self-evident that the natural law that animals must savagely kill and devour each other in order to survive was an evil natural law and that the obtaining each other in order to survive was an evil natural law and that the obtaining of this law was sufficient evidence that God did not exist. (1991, 159) of this law was sufficient evidence that God did not exist. (1991, 159) With these things in mind, Draper argues as follows: With these things in mind, Draper argues as follows:

(P1) We know E to be true. (P1) We know E to be true. (P2) Naturalism has much more predictive power with respect to E (P2) Naturalism has much more predictive power with respect to E than theism. than theism. (P3) Naturalism starts out at least as plausible as theism (i.e., natural- (P3) Naturalism starts out at least as plausible as theism (i.e., naturalism is at least as probable as theism independent of all evidence). ism is at least as probable as theism independent of all evidence). (C) So, other evidence held equal, theism is very probably false. (C) So, other evidence held equal, theism is very probably false.

As for the argument, P1 is difficult to deny. That is, the kind of suf- As for the argument, P1 is difficult to deny. That is, the kind of suffering described in E is clearly observable for all to see, even for those fering described in E is clearly observable for all to see, even for those who doubt the truth of Darwinism. As for P2, this too seems plausible. We who doubt the truth of Darwinism. As for P2, this too seems plausible. We have more reason to expect E on naturalism than on theism. This is have more reason to expect E on naturalism than on theism. This is because, as Draper notes, an unsurpassably loving and powerful God because, as Draper notes, an unsurpassably loving and powerful God couldn’t care more about the earthly flourishing of sentient creatures and couldn’t care more about the earthly flourishing of sentient creatures and couldn’t be more capable of securing it. If naturalism is true, by contrast, couldn’t be more capable of securing it. If naturalism is true, by contrast, the universe can be expected to be quite indifferent to our suffering, the universe can be expected to be quite indifferent to our suffering, including the suffering reported by E. True, God might have reasons that including the suffering reported by E. True, God might have reasons that DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 353 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 353 we can’t imagine for permitting E, as so-called skeptical theists will point we can’t imagine for permitting E, as so-called skeptical theists will point out.8 But it is no less likely that God has reasons that we can’t imagine for out.8 But it is no less likely that God has reasons that we can’t imagine for never permitting E, which leads Draper to focus on the moral reasons we never permitting E, which leads Draper to focus on the moral reasons we are aware of in connection to E. Since the issue is over what reasons we are aware of in connection to E. Since the issue is over what reasons we are aware of, and since we are aware of good reasons for E on naturalism, are aware of, and since we are aware of good reasons for E on naturalism, P2 seems plausible. P2 seems plausible. Turning to P3, Draper actually thinks that naturalism starts out much Turning to P3, Draper actually thinks that naturalism starts out much more plausible than theism.9 But I prefer my weaker premise that natural- more plausible than theism.9 But I prefer my weaker premise that naturalism starts out at least as plausible as theism. To avoid disputes about ism starts out at least as plausible as theism. To avoid disputes about intrinsic probability, however, we could put the argument in the form of a intrinsic probability, however, we could put the argument in the form of a likelihood inequality: likelihood inequality:

Pr (E | naturalism) > Pr (E | theism) Pr (E | naturalism) > Pr (E | theism)

Now the basic argument here could have been formulated before Darwin. We Now the basic argument here could have been formulated before Darwin. We have long known about natural evil. But the second stage of Draper’s argument have long known about natural evil. But the second stage of Draper’s argument is to suggest that our acquaintance with evolution intensiﬁes the problem. is to suggest that our acquaintance with evolution intensiﬁes the problem.

1.2. What Darwinism contributes to the problem of natural evil 1.2. What Darwinism contributes to the problem of natural evil The reason that Darwinism makes E even more problematic for theism The reason that Darwinism makes E even more problematic for theism is that E is to be expected on Darwinism, and because Darwinism is itself is that E is to be expected on Darwinism, and because Darwinism is itself more to be expected on naturalism than on theism. In Draper’s words, more to be expected on naturalism than on theism. In Draper’s words, Given naturalism, we are justly confident in the truth of Darwinism, not Given naturalism, we are justly confident in the truth of Darwinism, not because we know in any historical detail exactly how natural selection led to because we know in any historical detail exactly how natural selection led to biological complexity, but rather because natural selection provides a way of biological complexity, but rather because natural selection provides a way of explaining such complexity without having to appeal to the purposes of a explaining such complexity without having to appeal to the purposes of a supernatural designer. If theism is true, however, then natural selection is not supernatural designer. If theism is true, however, then natural selection is not needed to solve the problem of apparent teleological order in the living needed to solve the problem of apparent teleological order in the living world. Theistic evolution could be Darwinian, but it could also proceed in a world. Theistic evolution could be Darwinian, but it could also proceed in a variety of other non-Darwinian ways. As long as a perfect God is guiding variety of other non-Darwinian ways. As long as a perfect God is guiding evolutionary change, natural selection is not crucial for the development of evolutionary change, natural selection is not crucial for the development of biological complexity. Thus, given theism, it would not be surprising at all if biological complexity. Thus, given theism, it would not be surprising at all if natural selection played no significant role in the development of such com- natural selection played no significant role in the development of such complexity. This means that, if E is to be expected on Darwinism, then that is a plexity. This means that, if E is to be expected on Darwinism, then that is a predictive success for naturalism, but not for theism. predictive success for naturalism, but not for theism. Put in a slightly different way, if naturalism is true, and if there is to be Put in a slightly different way, if naturalism is true, and if there is to be biological life,10 we have reason to expect that evolution will be heavily biological life,10 we have reason to expect that evolution will be heavily guided by cruel ‘survival selection’, to borrow a phrase from Draper, and guided by cruel ‘survival selection’, to borrow a phrase from Draper, and 354 JASON MARSH 354 JASON MARSH thus reason to expect something like E. For when it comes to producing thus reason to expect something like E. For when it comes to producing complex structures and establishing them in a population, evolution by complex structures and establishing them in a population, evolution by natural selection appears to be essential, given naturalism. On the other natural selection appears to be essential, given naturalism. On the other hand, if theism is true, and if there is to be biological life, the situation hand, if theism is true, and if there is to be biological life, the situation looks different. God, being omnipotent, has various creative options. God looks different. God, being omnipotent, has various creative options. God could perhaps use various non-Darwinian forms of evolution to create. could perhaps use various non-Darwinian forms of evolution to create. But God could equally use some form of special creation, or some com- But God could equally use some form of special creation, or some com- bination of special creation and evolution to create. This creative flexibility bination of special creation and evolution to create. This creative flexibility would give God a way around E. In light of these claims, then, given the would give God a way around E. In light of these claims, then, given the truth of Darwinism, the ratio of the predictive power of naturalism to the truth of Darwinism, the ratio of the predictive power of naturalism to the predictive power of theism has increased. predictive power of theism has increased.

1.3. Suffering in the past 1.3. Suffering in the past A final point about the argument from evil is worth considering A final point about the argument from evil is worth considering before moving on to discuss nonbelief. Once we appreciate that much of before moving on to discuss nonbelief. Once we appreciate that much of the suffering reported by E has been going on for millions of generations, the suffering reported by E has been going on for millions of generations, this only seems to further strengthen the case for P2, which says that nat- this only seems to further strengthen the case for P2, which says that naturalism has more predictive power with respect to E than theism. The uralism has more predictive power with respect to E than theism. The reason for this is not that we now have even more evidence for suffering. reason for this is not that we now have even more evidence for suffering. We already have plenty of such evidence. The reason is rather that the We already have plenty of such evidence. The reason is rather that the reality of animal suffering over millions of generations deflects certain reality of animal suffering over millions of generations deflects certain objections that might otherwise be raised against P2. For instance, many objections that might otherwise be raised against P2. For instance, many theists, in an attempt to preserve the natural goodness of God’s creation, theists, in an attempt to preserve the natural goodness of God’s creation, have been tempted to attribute the world’s seemingly natural evil and suf- have been tempted to attribute the world’s seemingly natural evil and suffering to a human fall. But this move becomes highly implausible if fering to a human fall. But this move becomes highly implausible if natural evil predates humans by millions of years. natural evil predates humans by millions of years. In light of these claims, some theistic philosophers have sought out In light of these claims, some theistic philosophers have sought out other ways around the problem of animal suffering in the distant past. I other ways around the problem of animal suffering in the distant past. I have my doubts about these attempts.11 Instead of pursuing them here, have my doubts about these attempts.11 Instead of pursuing them here, however, let us now turn to our discussion about evolution and nonbelief however, let us now turn to our discussion about evolution and nonbelief (and specifically evolution and nonbelief in a theistic or theistic-like God).12 (and specifically evolution and nonbelief in a theistic or theistic-like God).12

2. The Problem of Natural Nonbelief 2. The Problem of Natural Nonbelief A common claim made by theists is that human beings have been A common claim made by theists is that human beings have been made for a divine-human relationship, not just in the hereafter, but in the made for a divine-human relationship, not just in the hereafter, but in the present. Indeed, it is widely thought, especially in the Abrahamic tradi- present. Indeed, it is widely thought, especially in the Abrahamic traditions, that such a relationship is of serious value, the main goal of creation, tions, that such a relationship is of serious value, the main goal of creation, and something that urgently needs to be entered into by everyone. Some and something that urgently needs to be entered into by everyone. Some DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 355 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 355 go further, claiming that the very concept of unsurpassable love, whatever go further, claiming that the very concept of unsurpassable love, whatever Abrahamic theists have said, rules out the prospect that some would, Abrahamic theists have said, rules out the prospect that some would, through no fault of their own, fail to enjoy a relationship with God during through no fault of their own, fail to enjoy a relationship with God during their natural lives (Schellenberg 2007, 202). Claims like these have led their natural lives (Schellenberg 2007, 202). Claims like these have led many believers to be puzzled by the so-called hiddenness of God, which many believers to be puzzled by the so-called hiddenness of God, which permits apparent cases of blameless nonbelief in a theistic God and which permits apparent cases of blameless nonbelief in a theistic God and which prevents some from entering into a divine-human relationship in this life. prevents some from entering into a divine-human relationship in this life. In fact, many philosophers see the puzzle in question as clear evidence for In fact, many philosophers see the puzzle in question as clear evidence for atheism, since a perfectly loving God wouldn’t, goes the worry, tolerate atheism, since a perfectly loving God wouldn’t, goes the worry, tolerate anyone’s failing to enjoy a divine-human relationship on account of his or anyone’s failing to enjoy a divine-human relationship on account of his or her poor epistemic situation. her poor epistemic situation. Some theists, hoping to resist the atheological import of divine hid- Some theists, hoping to resist the atheological import of divine hiddenness, attempt to deny the existence of blameless or nonresistant denness, attempt to deny the existence of blameless or nonresistant nonbelief,13 where ‘nonresistant nonbelief’ means, roughly, that the non- nonbelief,13 where ‘nonresistant nonbelief’ means, roughly, that the non- believers in question are not resisting the divine and would believe in a believers in question are not resisting the divine and would believe in a theistic God given sufficient opportunity. Such denials are already contro- theistic God given sufficient opportunity. Such denials are already controversial enough, even among theists. But they should become more versial enough, even among theists. But they should become more controversial in light of a phenomenon I will call ‘natural nonbelief’, controversial in light of a phenomenon I will call ‘natural nonbelief’, which may be the most significant species of nonbelief. By ‘natural’ in which may be the most significant species of nonbelief. By ‘natural’ in this context, I mean what philosophers mean when they call certain forms this context, I mean what philosophers mean when they call certain forms of evil natural, viz., natural in the sense of being built into the physical or of evil natural, viz., natural in the sense of being built into the physical or biological structure of the world, and being generally outside the scope of biological structure of the world, and being generally outside the scope of human agency and control. I do not mean to imply that nonbelief is ‘cog- human agency and control. I do not mean to imply that nonbelief is ‘cognitively natural’, though I will soon suggest that belief in a theistic God is nitively natural’, though I will soon suggest that belief in a theistic God is less ‘cognitively natural’ than we might expect if theism were true. Thus less ‘cognitively natural’ than we might expect if theism were true. Thus the problem of natural nonbelief is the problem that much of the world’s the problem of natural nonbelief is the problem that much of the world’s nonbelief, if theism is true, will be a consequence of the manner in which nonbelief, if theism is true, will be a consequence of the manner in which God decides to create the world and the human mind, and will not be plau- God decides to create the world and the human mind, and will not be plausibly attributed to human agency, free will, or moral shortcomings. sibly attributed to human agency, free will, or moral shortcomings.

2.1. Nonbelief in the past 2.1. Nonbelief in the past So why should we think that natural nonbelief in God really exists? So why should we think that natural nonbelief in God really exists? Here it is helpful to look to the past. As Darwin notes, there was a time in Here it is helpful to look to the past. As Darwin notes, there was a time in human history without theism, a time where the religious landscape was human history without theism, a time where the religious landscape was restricted to cruel and limited spirits: restricted to cruel and limited spirits: I am aware that the assumed instinctive belief in God has been used by many I am aware that the assumed instinctive belief in God has been used by many persons as an argument for His existence. But this is a rash argument, as we persons as an argument for His existence. But this is a rash argument, as we should thus be compelled to believe in the existence of many cruel and should thus be compelled to believe in the existence of many cruel and 356 JASON MARSH 356 JASON MARSH

malignant spirits, only a little more powerful than man; for the belief in them malignant spirits, only a little more powerful than man; for the belief in them is far more general than in a beneficent Deity. The idea of a universal and is far more general than in a beneficent Deity. The idea of a universal and beneficent Creator does not seem to arise in the mind of man, until he has beneficent Creator does not seem to arise in the mind of man, until he has been elevated by long-continued culture. (2004, 682) been elevated by long-continued culture. (2004, 682) Darwin’s aim in this passage is not to challenge the truth of theism14 but Darwin’s aim in this passage is not to challenge the truth of theism14 but to challenge the idea that the cognitive naturalness of theism is evidence to challenge the idea that the cognitive naturalness of theism is evidence for the truth of theism. In any case, Darwin’s words remind us of some- for the truth of theism. In any case, Darwin’s words remind us of something that both advocates and critics of the hiddenness argument tend to thing that both advocates and critics of the hiddenness argument tend to overlook, namely that a concept of a High God appears to be a relative overlook, namely that a concept of a High God appears to be a relative latecomer in the cultural history of religion. latecomer in the cultural history of religion. Darwin’s claims are corroborated by recent work in the cognitive Darwin’s claims are corroborated by recent work in the cognitive science of religion (hereafter CSR). Consider the following words from science of religion (hereafter CSR). Consider the following words from Justin Barrett, for instance: “Arguably the oldest and most widespread Justin Barrett, for instance: “Arguably the oldest and most widespread form of god concepts is the ancestor spirit or ghost, a type of afterlife form of god concepts is the ancestor spirit or ghost, a type of afterlife belief” (2007, 775).15 Elsewhere Barrett notes that, even in the present, the belief” (2007, 775).15 Elsewhere Barrett notes that, even in the present, the human mind is naturally disposed to believe in various forms of superhuman mind is naturally disposed to believe in various forms of supernatural agency and not just theism. He states, natural agency and not just theism. He states,

Commonly scholars in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have advanced Commonly scholars in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have advanced the naturalness of religion thesis. That is, ordinary cognitive resources [for the naturalness of religion thesis. That is, ordinary cognitive resources [for e.g. agency detection devices, theory of mind capacities, creationist biases, e.g. agency detection devices, theory of mind capacities, creationist biases, dualist biases, and a tendency to recall and spread minimally counterintuitive dualist biases, and a tendency to recall and spread minimally counterintuitive or MCI narratives] operating in ordinary human environments typically lead or MCI narratives] operating in ordinary human environments typically lead to some kind of belief in supernatural agency and perhaps other religious to some kind of belief in supernatural agency and perhaps other religious ideas. Special cultural scaffolding is unnecessary. Supernaturalism falls near ideas. Special cultural scaffolding is unnecessary. Supernaturalism falls near a natural anchor point . . . . (Barrett 2010, 169) a natural anchor point . . . . (Barrett 2010, 169) Paul Bloom is even more explicit. He claims that diverse and, we might Paul Bloom is even more explicit. He claims that diverse and, we might add, often incompatible forms of religious expression are cognitively add, often incompatible forms of religious expression are cognitively natural, with the result that theism is not especially cognitively unique: natural, with the result that theism is not especially cognitively unique:

. . . there is no evidence that belief in a single God . . . is unlearned . . . Planti- . . . there is no evidence that belief in a single God . . . is unlearned . . . Planti- nga (2000, 197) asserts that ‘awareness of God is natural, widespread, not nga (2000, 197) asserts that ‘awareness of God is natural, widespread, not easy to forget, ignore or destroy,’ but these properties apply better to super- easy to forget, ignore or destroy,’ but these properties apply better to supernatural belief more generally, not to belief in God. (Bloom 2009, 127) natural belief more generally, not to belief in God. (Bloom 2009, 127) Now it might be thought, if religion is cognitively natural, that CSR would Now it might be thought, if religion is cognitively natural, that CSR would in reality soften worries about religious diversity and divine hiddenness. in reality soften worries about religious diversity and divine hiddenness. After all, if religion is part of our natural cognitive endowment, this evi- After all, if religion is part of our natural cognitive endowment, this evi- dences that God, if God exists, is personal and is doing something to make dences that God, if God exists, is personal and is doing something to make DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 357 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 357 us religious: God is not just leaving things up to chance or to patterns of us religious: God is not just leaving things up to chance or to patterns of sociology, in other words. Such a response conflates two very different sociology, in other words. Such a response conflates two very different claims, however. One claim is that God would want people to be religious. claims, however. One claim is that God would want people to be religious. Another claim is that God would want people to be religious in a particu- Another claim is that God would want people to be religious in a particular way, namely a way that includes belief and trust in a high moral God lar way, namely a way that includes belief and trust in a high moral God in order to enjoy a divine-human relationship. Since theists typically in order to enjoy a divine-human relationship. Since theists typically affirm the second, more specific, claim and not just the first, one cannot affirm the second, more specific, claim and not just the first, one cannot alleviate the problem by saying that religion in general is cognitively alleviate the problem by saying that religion in general is cognitively natural or by saying that most people have some sort of religious belief. natural or by saying that most people have some sort of religious belief. Put another way, the problem of natural nonbelief is not a problem Put another way, the problem of natural nonbelief is not a problem for religion in general or for supernatural religion in general, but for for religion in general or for supernatural religion in general, but for theism in particular. That many people naturally fail to believe in a theis- theism in particular. That many people naturally fail to believe in a theistic God plausibly sits much better with naturalism or deism than with tic God plausibly sits much better with naturalism or deism than with theism. This is because it seems very surprising, given theism, but not given theism. This is because it seems very surprising, given theism, but not given these other views, that the human mind would be naturally so insensitive these other views, that the human mind would be naturally so insensitive to the truth about religion. (True, one could always claim that the religious to the truth about religion. (True, one could always claim that the religious mind is sensitive to the truth or is adequately truth-tracking, if placed in mind is sensitive to the truth or is adequately truth-tracking, if placed in the right theistic environment. But then the problem becomes that it is too the right theistic environment. But then the problem becomes that it is too easy not to be in the right environment.16) easy not to be in the right environment.16)

2.2. Two objections 2.2. Two objections Some may object to my arguments by claiming that theism is more Some may object to my arguments by claiming that theism is more cognitively natural than its religious and secular rivals.17 But it is difficult cognitively natural than its religious and secular rivals.17 But it is difficult to see how this claim (still controversial in CSR) would alleviate the to see how this claim (still controversial in CSR) would alleviate the problem. The problem, recall, is that the kind of mind we possess, along problem. The problem, recall, is that the kind of mind we possess, along with the way in which our religious concepts have evolved, has con- with the way in which our religious concepts have evolved, has con- tributed to much nonresistant nonbelief throughout history. Claiming that tributed to much nonresistant nonbelief throughout history. Claiming that theism is more natural than its competitors won’t change this: it will still theism is more natural than its competitors won’t change this: it will still be true that millions and millions of people have, in many cases naturally, be true that millions and millions of people have, in many cases naturally, failed to believe in a theistic or theistic-like God. If we add, with many failed to believe in a theistic or theistic-like God. If we add, with many exclusivists in the Abrahamic traditions, that people’s salvation literally exclusivists in the Abrahamic traditions, that people’s salvation literally depends on their having rather specific religious beliefs, beliefs that go depends on their having rather specific religious beliefs, beliefs that go well beyond mere theism, then the problem gets even worse. In that case, well beyond mere theism, then the problem gets even worse. In that case, it wouldn’t matter if everyone were a theist. The problem will still emerge. it wouldn’t matter if everyone were a theist. The problem will still emerge. People would still fail, if theism is true, to enjoy the right kind of divine- People would still fail, if theism is true, to enjoy the right kind of divine- human relationship. (But of course not everyone is a theist. Belief in God human relationship. (But of course not everyone is a theist. Belief in God is not nearly that natural). is not nearly that natural). 358 JASON MARSH 358 JASON MARSH

Another objection concerns the problem of early nonbelief. Some might Another objection concerns the problem of early nonbelief. Some might downplay the reality or significance of such nonbelief by claiming that God downplay the reality or significance of such nonbelief by claiming that God really was there “in primitive times . . . revealing himself within the very really was there “in primitive times . . . revealing himself within the very limited capacities of humans to understand” (Stark 2007, 5). But there are limited capacities of humans to understand” (Stark 2007, 5). But there are problems with this strategy. For one, on Stark’s own estimation, which is problems with this strategy. For one, on Stark’s own estimation, which is based on ethnographic data for roughly four hundred “pre-industrial” cul- based on ethnographic data for roughly four hundred “pre-industrial” cultures, a huge portion of these cultures (from what I can tell, less than 50 tures, a huge portion of these cultures (from what I can tell, less than 50 percent) have apparently affirmed a High God, with far fewer affirming an percent) have apparently affirmed a High God, with far fewer affirming an active or moralistic High God that cares about the morality of human active or moralistic High God that cares about the morality of human beings (2007, 60–61).18 If these numbers are anywhere near correct, they beings (2007, 60–61).18 If these numbers are anywhere near correct, they just restate the worry, for that is consistent with a lot of natural nonbelief. just restate the worry, for that is consistent with a lot of natural nonbelief. As for the idea that God was present in the past, despite people’s lim- As for the idea that God was present in the past, despite people’s lim- itations, this can be hard to accept once we think of the kinds of limited itations, this can be hard to accept once we think of the kinds of limited supernatural agent concepts in question. As Darwin noted, many of the supernatural agent concepts in question. As Darwin noted, many of the spirits affirmed in earlier cultures were hardly very powerful or very nice. spirits affirmed in earlier cultures were hardly very powerful or very nice. Indeed, many similar spirits are still affirmed today. As Pascal Boyer Indeed, many similar spirits are still affirmed today. As Pascal Boyer notes, some spirits affirmed in certain regions of Africa want to eat notes, some spirits affirmed in certain regions of Africa want to eat people’s children but can be outsmarted if parents refer to their children people’s children but can be outsmarted if parents refer to their children as ugly (2001, 7–8). Other spirits, affirmed in certain regions of Haiti, as ugly (2001, 7–8). Other spirits, affirmed in certain regions of Haiti, allegedly want to steal the corpses of the recently deceased, but thank- allegedly want to steal the corpses of the recently deceased, but thank- fully, they are rather easily fooled out of it. Finally, even when it comes to fully, they are rather easily fooled out of it. Finally, even when it comes to higher deities, it is important to see that not all of these are interested in higher deities, it is important to see that not all of these are interested in human salvation or well being. It can be difficult to imagine that the God human salvation or well being. It can be difficult to imagine that the God of theism is all that present through ideas like these. It can be even more of theism is all that present through ideas like these. It can be even more difficult to imagine that cultures that have been restricted to ideas like difficult to imagine that cultures that have been restricted to ideas like these experience the kind of valuable divine-human relationship that an these experience the kind of valuable divine-human relationship that an unsurpassably loving God would arguably want for them during their unsurpassably loving God would arguably want for them during their lives. Since some present cultures, but especially earlier ones, were so lives. Since some present cultures, but especially earlier ones, were so restricted,19 Stark’s suggestion is inadequate. restricted,19 Stark’s suggestion is inadequate.

2.3. The initial argument 2.3. The initial argument To formulate the problem, recall claim (1) from the outset of this article: To formulate the problem, recall claim (1) from the outset of this article: (1) Evolution gave rise to early humans who lacked a concept of (1) Evolution gave rise to early humans who lacked a concept of God, the result of which has been much nonbelief in God. God, the result of which has been much nonbelief in God.

I think (1) is true. But our target claim at this point is only that there I think (1) is true. But our target claim at this point is only that there was nonbelief among early humans, not that evolution played a causal role was nonbelief among early humans, not that evolution played a causal role DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 359 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 359 in giving rise to this nonbelief. We should thus bracket our knowledge of in giving rise to this nonbelief. We should thus bracket our knowledge of biological evolution at this stage of the argument by replacing (1) with E*. biological evolution at this stage of the argument by replacing (1) with E*.

E*: For a variety of biological, cognitive, and environmental reasons, E*: For a variety of biological, cognitive, and environmental reasons, early humans, including many anatomically and behaviorally early humans, including many anatomically and behaviorally modern humans, originally lacked a concept of God and were modern humans, originally lacked a concept of God and were religiously restricted to concepts of limited, and sometimes mean, religiously restricted to concepts of limited, and sometimes mean, supernatural agents. As a result, many early humans, including supernatural agents. As a result, many early humans, including many early anatomically and behaviorally modern humans, failed many early anatomically and behaviorally modern humans, failed to believe in God or in anything like God. The nonbelief in ques- to believe in God or in anything like God. The nonbelief in question was both naturally occurring and nonresistant. tion was both naturally occurring and nonresistant.

Just as there have been eons of natural suffering, E* suggests that there was Just as there have been eons of natural suffering, E* suggests that there was a notable period of naturally occurring nonbelief among early humans. To a notable period of naturally occurring nonbelief among early humans. To put the argument in a way that resembles Draper’s argument from natural put the argument in a way that resembles Draper’s argument from natural evil, we can say: evil, we can say:

(P1) We know E* to be true (or at least E* is very plausible). (P1) We know E* to be true (or at least E* is very plausible). (P2) Naturalism has much more predictive power with respect to E* (P2) Naturalism has much more predictive power with respect to E* than theism. than theism. (P3) Naturalism starts out at least as plausible as theism (i.e., natural- (P3) Naturalism starts out at least as plausible as theism (i.e., naturalism is at least as probable as theism independent of all evidence). ism is at least as probable as theism independent of all evidence). (C) So, other evidence held equal, theism is very probably false. (C) So, other evidence held equal, theism is very probably false.

We have seen the evidence for P1. The testimony of scientists and We have seen the evidence for P1. The testimony of scientists and religious scholars combined with our knowledge of how cultural evolu- religious scholars combined with our knowledge of how cultural evolution works supports P1. As for P2, given how we have deﬁned naturalism tion works supports P1. As for P2, given how we have deﬁned naturalism and theism, P2 can also seem hard to resist. Given naturalism’s commit- and theism, P2 can also seem hard to resist. Given naturalism’s commit- ment to indifference about whether early humans would be theists, and ment to indifference about whether early humans would be theists, and given that a perfect God would desire to enter into a divine-human rela- given that a perfect God would desire to enter into a divine-human relationship with early humans, naturalism makes E* comparatively much tionship with early humans, naturalism makes E* comparatively much more likely than theism. Again, God might have reasons that we can’t more likely than theism. Again, God might have reasons that we can’t imagine for permitting E*, as so-called skeptical theists will point out.20 imagine for permitting E*, as so-called skeptical theists will point out.20 But again, it is no less likely that God has reasons that we can’t imagine But again, it is no less likely that God has reasons that we can’t imagine for never permitting E*. (Besides, that we know what to expect on natu- for never permitting E*. (Besides, that we know what to expect on naturalism seems to count in favor of naturalism.) Finally, as for P3, it is a ralism seems to count in favor of naturalism.) Finally, as for P3, it is a 360 JASON MARSH 360 JASON MARSH widely held assumption that I am making throughout this paper that widely held assumption that I am making throughout this paper that theism and naturalism start out roughly equally likely. To avoid disputes theism and naturalism start out roughly equally likely. To avoid disputes about intrinsic probabilities, however, we could state the argument in the about intrinsic probabilities, however, we could state the argument in the form of a likelihood inequality. form of a likelihood inequality.

Pr (E* | naturalism) > Pr (E* | theism) Pr (E* | naturalism) > Pr (E* | theism)

Lastly, since other factors besides E* might better support theism Lastly, since other factors besides E* might better support theism than naturalism, it is important to see that the argument here is: than naturalism, it is important to see that the argument here is:

Pr (E* | naturalism) > Pr (E* | theism) Pr (E* | naturalism) > Pr (E* | theism) as opposed to: as opposed to:

Pr (Naturalism | E*) > Pr (Theism | E*).21 Pr (Naturalism | E*) > Pr (Theism | E*).21

3. What Darwinism Contributes to the Problem of Natural Nonbelief 3. What Darwinism Contributes to the Problem of Natural Nonbelief We have seen that belief in God is, cognitively speaking, much less We have seen that belief in God is, cognitively speaking, much less natural than we would expect if theism were true, but not less natural than natural than we would expect if theism were true, but not less natural than we would expect if naturalism were true. This fact, if it is a fact, does we would expect if naturalism were true. This fact, if it is a fact, does seem to favor naturalism over theism. But we can say more than this. In seem to favor naturalism over theism. But we can say more than this. In the same way that the problem of natural evil was intensified by our the same way that the problem of natural evil was intensified by our awareness of evolution, and specifically Darwinian evolution, something awareness of evolution, and specifically Darwinian evolution, something similar may be said here as well. Darwinism intensifies the problem of similar may be said here as well. Darwinism intensifies the problem of natural nonbelief. The reason for this is twofold. First, Darwinism is natural nonbelief. The reason for this is twofold. First, Darwinism is highly optional on theism: it is much more to be expected on naturalism highly optional on theism: it is much more to be expected on naturalism than on theism. Second, Darwinism gives us reason to expect E* and than on theism. Second, Darwinism gives us reason to expect E* and further helps to explain E*. If these two claims are correct, then the ratio further helps to explain E*. If these two claims are correct, then the ratio of the predictive power of naturalism to the predictive power of theism of the predictive power of naturalism to the predictive power of theism with respect to E* will further increase. with respect to E* will further increase. So are these two claims correct? The answer seems to be yes. Begin- So are these two claims correct? The answer seems to be yes. Begin- ning with the first claim, we have already seen reason for thinking that ning with the first claim, we have already seen reason for thinking that Darwinism starts out more likely on naturalism than on theism. This is Darwinism starts out more likely on naturalism than on theism. This is because an omnipotent God would have many non-Darwinian ways to because an omnipotent God would have many non-Darwinian ways to create minds, bodies, and souls and would not be limited to Darwinian or create minds, bodies, and souls and would not be limited to Darwinian or even physical constraints. For instance, God might infuse souls with reli- even physical constraints. For instance, God might infuse souls with religious knowledge, or God might hardwire a tendency to form belief in God gious knowledge, or God might hardwire a tendency to form belief in God in the brains of nonresistant persons, while finding ways of dissuading in the brains of nonresistant persons, while finding ways of dissuading DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 361 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 361 people from affirming the competitors to theism. (I am of course assum- people from affirming the competitors to theism. (I am of course assuming here that God could orchestrate and oversee the process of creation to ing here that God could orchestrate and oversee the process of creation to ensure that fairly specific ends would be obtained in the world. But this ensure that fairly specific ends would be obtained in the world. But this assumption should not be too controversial to the evolutionary theist.22) assumption should not be too controversial to the evolutionary theist.22) By contrast, if naturalism is true, then the options for developing life are much By contrast, if naturalism is true, then the options for developing life are much more constrained, especially in the relevant time frame. In the absence of more constrained, especially in the relevant time frame. In the absence of Darwinian processes, life’s development seems exceedingly unlikely. Darwinian processes, life’s development seems exceedingly unlikely. Turning now to claim two, this, recall, says that Darwinism gives us Turning now to claim two, this, recall, says that Darwinism gives us reason to expect E* and indeed helps to explain E*. This claim also seems reason to expect E* and indeed helps to explain E*. This claim also seems true. To see why, it is helpful to consider the relationship between evolu- true. To see why, it is helpful to consider the relationship between evolution and religion. According to those working within CSR, there are three tion and religion. According to those working within CSR, there are three basic ways of thinking about religion and natural selection. Religion might basic ways of thinking about religion and natural selection. Religion might be an evolutionary byproduct stemming from mental architecture and capac- be an evolutionary byproduct stemming from mental architecture and capacities that evolved for nonreligious purposes (Barrett 2004); or religion ities that evolved for nonreligious purposes (Barrett 2004); or religion might be adaptive, and so selected for directly (Norenzayan and Shariff might be adaptive, and so selected for directly (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008); or religion might start out as a byproduct of evolved capacities and 2008); or religion might start out as a byproduct of evolved capacities and later be co-opted for adaptive purposes (Powell and Clarke 2012). No later be co-opted for adaptive purposes (Powell and Clarke 2012). No matter which option one favors, the point is that serious religious diver- matter which option one favors, the point is that serious religious diversity and early nonbelief in a theistic or theistic-like God is to be expected. sity and early nonbelief in a theistic or theistic-like God is to be expected. Beginning with the byproduct interpretation, there is no reason to Beginning with the byproduct interpretation, there is no reason to expect that cognitive tools that were designed by natural selection for non- expect that cognitive tools that were designed by natural selection for nonreligious purposes would, in turn, lead people to favor theism and disfavor religious purposes would, in turn, lead people to favor theism and disfavor alternatives to theism. In fact, since the outputs of our mental tools, like alternatives to theism. In fact, since the outputs of our mental tools, like our agency detection devices, are likely to be highly nonspecific and our agency detection devices, are likely to be highly nonspecific and highly sensitive to local factors in the environment, then the byproduct highly sensitive to local factors in the environment, then the byproduct view gives us reason to expect serious religious diversity and early nonbelief view gives us reason to expect serious religious diversity and early nonbelief in God. For instance, consider our hypersensitive agency detection device in God. For instance, consider our hypersensitive agency detection device (HADD), which helps us to detect agents in our environments but which (HADD), which helps us to detect agents in our environments but which can easily misfire. With this mental tool in play, those in the forest might can easily misfire. With this mental tool in play, those in the forest might come to a belief in forest spirits, whereas those in more stormy regions come to a belief in forest spirits, whereas those in more stormy regions might come to believe in angry sky deities. Nothing about HADD or other might come to believe in angry sky deities. Nothing about HADD or other capacities discussed in CSR requires that one will come to believe in God. capacities discussed in CSR requires that one will come to believe in God. If anything, it seems like theistic concepts would later evolve from non- If anything, it seems like theistic concepts would later evolve from nontheistic concepts that were initially triggered by mental tools like HADD. theistic concepts that were initially triggered by mental tools like HADD. Turning to the evolutionary interpretation of religion, there is no Turning to the evolutionary interpretation of religion, there is no reason to expect that theism would be adaptive and the religious rivals to reason to expect that theism would be adaptive and the religious rivals to theism maladaptive. Even in the absence of theism, after all, the belief that theism maladaptive. Even in the absence of theism, after all, the belief that 362 JASON MARSH 362 JASON MARSH vengeful ancestor sprits, ghosts, or invisible witches are watching could vengeful ancestor sprits, ghosts, or invisible witches are watching could arguably play the role of taming possible cheaters in a group and of moti- arguably play the role of taming possible cheaters in a group and of moti- vating prosocial behavior (Piazza and Bering 2011; Norenzayan and vating prosocial behavior (Piazza and Bering 2011; Norenzayan and Shariff 2007). Adding with the hybrid view, finally, that religion starts out Shariff 2007). Adding with the hybrid view, finally, that religion starts out a byproduct and is later co-opted for adaptive purposes will not make E* a byproduct and is later co-opted for adaptive purposes will not make E* any more or less likely, since there is nothing about this option that would any more or less likely, since there is nothing about this option that would have new bearing on E*. These claims support the conclusion that E* is have new bearing on E*. These claims support the conclusion that E* is unsurprising, and even somewhat likely, on Darwinism—at least, again, if unsurprising, and even somewhat likely, on Darwinism—at least, again, if human-like creatures are to emerge.23 If that is correct, then even in the human-like creatures are to emerge.23 If that is correct, then even in the absence of a detailed scientific account of religion, there is a meaningful absence of a detailed scientific account of religion, there is a meaningful relationship between natural selection and E*. In other words, we have relationship between natural selection and E*. In other words, we have new Darwinian support for naturalism. new Darwinian support for naturalism.

3.1. Implications for religious epistemology and the fall 3.1. Implications for religious epistemology and the fall I am not the only person to raise this last problem. Justin Barrett I am not the only person to raise this last problem. Justin Barrett seems to appreciate the worry, albeit only briefly, when he says: seems to appreciate the worry, albeit only briefly, when he says: If . . . God created humans so that they might enjoy a relationship with Him, If . . . God created humans so that they might enjoy a relationship with Him, why would God leave such important cognitive capacities to chance plus natural why would God leave such important cognitive capacities to chance plus natural selection . . . why do the documented conceptual biases only encourage belief selection . . . why do the documented conceptual biases only encourage belief in superhuman agents generally and not in one true, accurate god concept? . . . in superhuman agents generally and not in one true, accurate god concept? . . . why not hard-wire into our brains a fully formed belief in God? (2008, 97) why not hard-wire into our brains a fully formed belief in God? (2008, 97) These are good questions, though Barrett’s own response is surprising. He These are good questions, though Barrett’s own response is surprising. He states, in effect, that God did hardwire a fully formed belief in God into states, in effect, that God did hardwire a fully formed belief in God into the minds of the first humans, adding that the “diversity of god concepts the minds of the first humans, adding that the “diversity of god concepts we see is a consequence of human error and not divine design” (2008, 97). we see is a consequence of human error and not divine design” (2008, 97). Barrett adds that in the absence of certain moral flaws in the world, “perhaps Barrett adds that in the absence of certain moral flaws in the world, “perhaps children would inevitably form a perfect concept of God” (2008, 97). children would inevitably form a perfect concept of God” (2008, 97). These are strong claims, and I am not sure how seriously Barrett These are strong claims, and I am not sure how seriously Barrett intends them. Aside from being poorly evidenced, they are problematic on intends them. Aside from being poorly evidenced, they are problematic on various levels (and ignore some of the richer literary features of fall nar- various levels (and ignore some of the richer literary features of fall narratives). For one, they contradict Barrett’s earlier claim that ancestor ratives). For one, they contradict Barrett’s earlier claim that ancestor spirits are the first and most widespread of religious concepts. Second, the spirits are the first and most widespread of religious concepts. Second, the above remarks further make a prediction that few scientists will bet on: above remarks further make a prediction that few scientists will bet on: namely, that if we look long and hard enough, we may well uncover evi- namely, that if we look long and hard enough, we may well uncover evidence that the earliest humans had full-blown theistic beliefs. Third, dence that the earliest humans had full-blown theistic beliefs. Third, whatever scientists would be willing to bet on, animal suffering in the whatever scientists would be willing to bet on, animal suffering in the distant past already diminishes the explanatory power of the fall, histori- distant past already diminishes the explanatory power of the fall, histori- DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 363 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 363 cally conceived. This should lower our confidence that the fall can explain cally conceived. This should lower our confidence that the fall can explain nonbelief in the distant past. Fourth, it can seem historically and theolog- nonbelief in the distant past. Fourth, it can seem historically and theolog- ically implausible to think that religious concepts were reset in response ically implausible to think that religious concepts were reset in response to the moral failure of early humans, such that the social world gradually to the moral failure of early humans, such that the social world gradually underwent the kind of cultural evolution that we would expect if natural- underwent the kind of cultural evolution that we would expect if naturalism were true: beginning, roughly, with ancestor spirits, animism, ism were true: beginning, roughly, with ancestor spirits, animism, polytheism, henotheism and then eventually moving on to theism, at least polytheism, henotheism and then eventually moving on to theism, at least in some regions. Fifth, there is no clear normative connection between the in some regions. Fifth, there is no clear normative connection between the fall and its alleged doxastic consequences. Why should moral failure lead fall and its alleged doxastic consequences. Why should moral failure lead to serious religious diversity in the first place, and why should it disad- to serious religious diversity in the first place, and why should it disad- vantage some cultures far more than others? Aren’t most cultures, on vantage some cultures far more than others? Aren’t most cultures, on standard theological views, supposed to be comparably fallen? Sixth, standard theological views, supposed to be comparably fallen? Sixth, although science cannot strictly rule out that an early human pair fell, although science cannot strictly rule out that an early human pair fell, leading to radical changes in people’s religious environments and/or the leading to radical changes in people’s religious environments and/or the structure of human cognition, this causal connection can seem highly structure of human cognition, this causal connection can seem highly implausible, even if we suppose that theism is true. I am thus doubtful implausible, even if we suppose that theism is true. I am thus doubtful that appeals to the fall will resolve the problem of natural nonbelief. that appeals to the fall will resolve the problem of natural nonbelief. Finally, these remarks, aside from challenging Barrett’s claims, further Finally, these remarks, aside from challenging Barrett’s claims, further cast doubt on a basic tenet of the most familiar expression of religious cast doubt on a basic tenet of the most familiar expression of religious epistemology, according to which belief in God is natural, and according epistemology, according to which belief in God is natural, and according to which the failure to believe in God is, far from natural, wholly due to to which the failure to believe in God is, far from natural, wholly due to sin. For instance, Alvin Plantinga, drawing on the writings of Aquinas and sin. For instance, Alvin Plantinga, drawing on the writings of Aquinas and Calvin, states: “Were it not for sin and its effects, God’s presence and Calvin, states: “Were it not for sin and its effects, God’s presence and glory would be as obvious and uncontroversial to us all as the presence of glory would be as obvious and uncontroversial to us all as the presence of other minds, physical objects, and the past. Like any cognitive process, other minds, physical objects, and the past. Like any cognitive process, however, the sensus divinitatis can malfunction; as a result of sin, it has however, the sensus divinitatis can malfunction; as a result of sin, it has indeed been damaged” (2000, 177). Plantinga, in understanding the indeed been damaged” (2000, 177). Plantinga, in understanding the sensus divinitatis in highly theistic terms, makes an apparently historical sensus divinitatis in highly theistic terms, makes an apparently historical claim that we have reason to believe is not borne out, namely, that “human claim that we have reason to believe is not borne out, namely, that “human beings as originally created . . . had extensive and intimate knowledge of beings as originally created . . . had extensive and intimate knowledge of God” (2000, 204). The present discussion makes it harder to affirm this God” (2000, 204). The present discussion makes it harder to affirm this widely held claim.24 This suggests that the significance of natural nonbe- widely held claim.24 This suggests that the significance of natural nonbelief extends beyond mere theism to much Abrahamic religion.25 lief extends beyond mere theism to much Abrahamic religion.25

4. Nonbelief After 1859 4. Nonbelief After 1859 The problem we have considered is roughly this: why, if God exists, The problem we have considered is roughly this: why, if God exists, did it take so long for humans to develop theistic concepts, and why is the- did it take so long for humans to develop theistic concepts, and why is the- 364 JASON MARSH 364 JASON MARSH istic belief not, in general, more cognitively natural than it is? I now want istic belief not, in general, more cognitively natural than it is? I now want to turn to a related problem that runs as follows: why would God use evo- to turn to a related problem that runs as follows: why would God use evolution to design the living world when the discovery of evolution would lution to design the living world when the discovery of evolution would predictably contribute to so much nonbelief in God? This last question is predictably contribute to so much nonbelief in God? This last question is rarely asked, but in light of the serious impact of Darwinism on science rarely asked, but in light of the serious impact of Darwinism on science and culture, it should be. Roger White nicely discusses some of this Dar- and culture, it should be. Roger White nicely discusses some of this Dar- winian impact on culture: winian impact on culture:

Prior to Darwin there was a quite compelling argument from design, a kind Prior to Darwin there was a quite compelling argument from design, a kind of inference to the best explanation. William Paley (2006) was right to think of inference to the best explanation. William Paley (2006) was right to think that the intricate machinery of the mammalian eye and other biological that the intricate machinery of the mammalian eye and other biological wonders cried out for explanation, and that the only compelling explanation wonders cried out for explanation, and that the only compelling explanation available at the time was theism, or at least some kind of powerful intelligent available at the time was theism, or at least some kind of powerful intelligent agency. But Darwin (1998) changed that. In giving a better explanation (or agency. But Darwin (1998) changed that. In giving a better explanation (or at least the framework for such an explanation) Darwin undermined Paley’s at least the framework for such an explanation) Darwin undermined Paley’s argument, thus removing this potential source of justification for theism. argument, thus removing this potential source of justification for theism. (2010, 584) (2010, 584) White is no doubt correct about the biological design argument.26 But he White is no doubt correct about the biological design argument.26 But he adds a qualification that I think is mistaken. He states: “I think something adds a qualification that I think is mistaken. He states: “I think something like the explanation above is the only credible way that evolutionary like the explanation above is the only credible way that evolutionary biology could be thought to have epistemological relevance to theism” biology could be thought to have epistemological relevance to theism” (2010, 584). This claim is mistaken, at least if the claims of evolutionary (2010, 584). This claim is mistaken, at least if the claims of evolutionary biology can include factors like evolutionary evil and evolution-based biology can include factors like evolutionary evil and evolution-based nonbelief. For as I shall now argue it is not true that the only way for these nonbelief. For as I shall now argue it is not true that the only way for these evolutionary factors to pose epistemic trouble for theism concerns the evolutionary factors to pose epistemic trouble for theism concerns the design argument. design argument.

4.1. Experiential considerations 4.1. Experiential considerations First, there is the reality of irreligious experiences in nature, which First, there is the reality of irreligious experiences in nature, which are epistemically significant. Coming to see that our biological origins are are epistemically significant. Coming to see that our biological origins are compatible with theism’s main epistemic competition in the West— compatible with theism’s main epistemic competition in the West— namely, metaphysical naturalism—can, whatever its inferential namely, metaphysical naturalism—can, whatever its inferential significance, lead some persons to directly and justifiably sense that we significance, lead some persons to directly and justifiably sense that we live in a naturalistic universe. As with Smith’s experience of biological live in a naturalistic universe. As with Smith’s experience of biological suffering and competition, cited earlier, the problem here is noninferen- suffering and competition, cited earlier, the problem here is noninferential. One may just immediately come to sense that “God wouldn’t do tial. One may just immediately come to sense that “God wouldn’t do things this way.” Or one might come to sense that “the world is a chancy things this way.” Or one might come to sense that “the world is a chancy and in many ways cold and impersonal place,” and that “there is no ulti- and in many ways cold and impersonal place,” and that “there is no ulti- mate reason for our existence.” Experiences like these can and often do mate reason for our existence.” Experiences like these can and often do DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 365 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 365 happen. And although many theists can and do accommodate evolution happen. And although many theists can and do accommodate evolution (Miller 1999), the claim here is only that many find the task of accommo- (Miller 1999), the claim here is only that many find the task of accommo- dation intellectually and experientially difficult. For instance, consider the dation intellectually and experientially difficult. For instance, consider the following testimony from Louise Antony: following testimony from Louise Antony: It seemed to me that if evolutionary theory was correct, then biological dif- It seemed to me that if evolutionary theory was correct, then biological dif- ferences were a matter of degree: apes just gradually become people. But that ferences were a matter of degree: apes just gradually become people. But that seemed parlously at odds with a religious picture: that human beings, in seemed parlously at odds with a religious picture: that human beings, in virtue of possessing immaterial souls, were fundamentally different from virtue of possessing immaterial souls, were fundamentally different from everything else in nature. I decided that I should try not to believe in evolu- everything else in nature. I decided that I should try not to believe in evolution. (2007, 45) tion. (2007, 45) In response to this passage, one might be tempted to object that it rests on In response to this passage, one might be tempted to object that it rests on two inferential mistakes: evolution does not establish that we lack souls, two inferential mistakes: evolution does not establish that we lack souls, and theists can be materialists about human persons. But all of this misses and theists can be materialists about human persons. But all of this misses the point. Even if no decent argument against theism can be constructed the point. Even if no decent argument against theism can be constructed from the above passage, the best way of reading the passage is more per- from the above passage, the best way of reading the passage is more personal: it reveals a fairly common, understandable, and powerful form of sonal: it reveals a fairly common, understandable, and powerful form of irreligious experience. Since a divine being would presumably care about irreligious experience. Since a divine being would presumably care about this consequence, and since noninferential defeat is something that many this consequence, and since noninferential defeat is something that many theistic philosophers worry about,27 passages like those above are clearly theistic philosophers worry about,27 passages like those above are clearly significant. Finally, since irreligious experiences seem highly involuntary, significant. Finally, since irreligious experiences seem highly involuntary, the nonbelief they give rise to is a good candidate for being nonresistant. the nonbelief they give rise to is a good candidate for being nonresistant. In light of these remarks, claim two from the outset of the paper In light of these remarks, claim two from the outset of the paper seems plausible: seems plausible:

White’s suggestion thus fails on account of (2), particularly if the nonbe- White’s suggestion thus fails on account of (2), particularly if the nonbelief described in (2) is often epistemically justiﬁed.28 lief described in (2) is often epistemically justiﬁed.28

4.2. Inferential considerations 4.2. Inferential considerations White’s suggestion also fails to appreciate the many ways in which White’s suggestion also fails to appreciate the many ways in which an awareness of evolution can do inferential epistemic damage. For an awareness of evolution can do inferential epistemic damage. For instance, there is Draper’s evolutionary argument from evil, and his argu- instance, there is Draper’s evolutionary argument from evil, and his argument that evolution starts out more likely on naturalism than on theism. ment that evolution starts out more likely on naturalism than on theism. Similarly, there is the ancient-earth thesis, which is often thought to be Similarly, there is the ancient-earth thesis, which is often thought to be part of evolution. As some theists will acknowledge, that the earth (and part of evolution. As some theists will acknowledge, that the earth (and 366 JASON MARSH 366 JASON MARSH universe) is old is required on naturalism but optional on theism (Moler universe) is old is required on naturalism but optional on theism (Moler 2010). Claims like these are epistemically significant. In fact, we know 2010). Claims like these are epistemically significant. In fact, we know empirically that much less plausible evolutionary arguments than these, empirically that much less plausible evolutionary arguments than these, for instance arguments from Richard Dawkins, can have serious impact for instance arguments from Richard Dawkins, can have serious impact on people’s belief in God (Shariff, et al. 2008). Some of these claims cer- on people’s belief in God (Shariff, et al. 2008). Some of these claims certainly have bearing on the force of biological design arguments. But their tainly have bearing on the force of biological design arguments. But their epistemic significance is not exhausted by their impact on such argu- epistemic significance is not exhausted by their impact on such arguments. They also give rise to nonbelief, which is a form of higher-order ments. They also give rise to nonbelief, which is a form of higher-order evidence and which can be relevant to hiddenness arguments, as we shall evidence and which can be relevant to hiddenness arguments, as we shall soon see. Thus claim three: soon see. Thus claim three:

In short: even in the absence of (1), facts (2) and (3), when combined, In short: even in the absence of (1), facts (2) and (3), when combined, make the claim that a divine being would opt for an evolutionary means make the claim that a divine being would opt for an evolutionary means of creation more surprising than this claim would otherwise be. This is of creation more surprising than this claim would otherwise be. This is particularly so if we are concerned about divine hiddenness, which we particularly so if we are concerned about divine hiddenness, which we will soon consider in more detail. If we add Draper’s argument from will soon consider in more detail. If we add Draper’s argument from natural evil and my claims about natural nonbelief to the mix, then the natural evil and my claims about natural nonbelief to the mix, then the combined force of these various arguments might be thought to offer a combined force of these various arguments might be thought to offer a particularly important challenge to theism. The challenge here, to clarify, particularly important challenge to theism. The challenge here, to clarify, need not be that theistic belief is irrational or that it requires arguments (or need not be that theistic belief is irrational or that it requires arguments (or answers to every objection that arises) for its rationality. We can easily answers to every objection that arises) for its rationality. We can easily make rationality very easy or very hard, if we want to (Marsh forthcom- make rationality very easy or very hard, if we want to (Marsh forthcoming). The challenge is, rather, that theism is notably less likely to be true ing). The challenge is, rather, that theism is notably less likely to be true than we thought, given the present claims, which is surely signiﬁcant, at than we thought, given the present claims, which is surely signiﬁcant, at least for those who care about the evidence and who have doubts about least for those who care about the evidence and who have doubts about whether theism is true.29 whether theism is true.29

5. Implications for Divine Hiddenness 5. Implications for Divine Hiddenness In this final section I will draw some implications for the evidential In this final section I will draw some implications for the evidential argument from divine hiddenness, which, recall, says that nonresistant argument from divine hiddenness, which, recall, says that nonresistant nonbelief in God provides evidence against theism.30 Now we have nonbelief in God provides evidence against theism.30 Now we have already considered some implications for divine hiddenness. As we saw already considered some implications for divine hiddenness. As we saw earlier, my arguments make it harder to reject the reality of nonresistant earlier, my arguments make it harder to reject the reality of nonresistant nonbelief. My claims also uncover a more severe form of nonbelief. For nonbelief. My claims also uncover a more severe form of nonbelief. For DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 367 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 367 given (1), it wasn’t merely difficult, but impossible, for many early given (1), it wasn’t merely difficult, but impossible, for many early humans to have a divine-human relationship. This is because if the rele- humans to have a divine-human relationship. This is because if the relevant individuals and groups lacked a theistic concept, they couldn’t have vant individuals and groups lacked a theistic concept, they couldn’t have believed. Such a claim is significant, for although some will debate believed. Such a claim is significant, for although some will debate whether religious belief is really required for religious faith, or for a cor- whether religious belief is really required for religious faith, or for a cor- responding divine-human relationship (Audi 2008; Schellenberg 2007; responding divine-human relationship (Audi 2008; Schellenberg 2007; Schellenberg 1993), few will deny that having a relationship with God Schellenberg 1993), few will deny that having a relationship with God requires at least a concept of God. requires at least a concept of God. True, some will insist that we already have plenty of evidence for True, some will insist that we already have plenty of evidence for nonresistant nonbelief. But my claims also pose an explanatory challenge nonresistant nonbelief. But my claims also pose an explanatory challenge for theism and undermine traditional solutions to divine hiddenness. for theism and undermine traditional solutions to divine hiddenness. Beginning with the explanatory challenge, the shiftiness of nonbelief over Beginning with the explanatory challenge, the shiftiness of nonbelief over evolutionary time is much easier to explain on naturalism than on theism. evolutionary time is much easier to explain on naturalism than on theism. After all, given naturalism, we can simply point to the kinds of Darwin- After all, given naturalism, we can simply point to the kinds of Darwin- ian and cognitive factors that make (1), (2), and (3) plausible. Naturalism ian and cognitive factors that make (1), (2), and (3) plausible. Naturalism thus doesn’t have an especially hard time explaining historically uneven thus doesn’t have an especially hard time explaining historically uneven patterns of nonbelief. What about theism? Theism has a much harder time patterns of nonbelief. What about theism? Theism has a much harder time here. (Of course, if theism is conjoined with evolutionary and cognitive here. (Of course, if theism is conjoined with evolutionary and cognitive science, then scientifically minded theists could invoke the same natural science, then scientifically minded theists could invoke the same natural explanations for nonbelief held by the naturalist. But part of the lesson explanations for nonbelief held by the naturalist. But part of the lesson here, recall, is that God has reasons not to opt for modes of creation that here, recall, is that God has reasons not to opt for modes of creation that give rise to facts like (1), (2), and (3), that (1), (2), and (3) are surprising give rise to facts like (1), (2), and (3), that (1), (2), and (3) are surprising on theism.) on theism.) Finally, whatever we make of naturalism’s comparative advantage in Finally, whatever we make of naturalism’s comparative advantage in explaining (1), (2), and (3), these facts tend to undermine traditional the- explaining (1), (2), and (3), these facts tend to undermine traditional theistic solutions to divine hiddenness. Again, the process and discovery of istic solutions to divine hiddenness. Again, the process and discovery of evolution have apparently had a highly uneven impact on belief in God evolution have apparently had a highly uneven impact on belief in God throughout history. This matters, since shifty patterns of nonbelief in the throughout history. This matters, since shifty patterns of nonbelief in the present already pose a problem for theism (Marsh 2008; Maitzen 2006).31 present already pose a problem for theism (Marsh 2008; Maitzen 2006).31 If we factor in the temporal unevenness of nonbelief and its connection to If we factor in the temporal unevenness of nonbelief and its connection to evolutionary and cognitive factors, then traditional explanations of divine evolutionary and cognitive factors, then traditional explanations of divine hiddenness become even less plausible. hiddenness become even less plausible. For instance, consider John Hick’s well-known Irenaean theodicy, For instance, consider John Hick’s well-known Irenaean theodicy, according to which divine hiddenness and serious religious uncertainty according to which divine hiddenness and serious religious uncertainty are good for us. The basic idea here is straightforward enough: only in are good for us. The basic idea here is straightforward enough: only in environments of genuine religious ambiguity, where a sufficient epistemic environments of genuine religious ambiguity, where a sufficient epistemic distance from God exists, can genuine freedom and moral development distance from God exists, can genuine freedom and moral development take place for human beings. If that is right, then we shouldn’t be too sur- take place for human beings. If that is right, then we shouldn’t be too sur- 368 JASON MARSH 368 JASON MARSH prised if nature is both “capable of being seen as a purely natural phe- prised if nature is both “capable of being seen as a purely natural phenomenon and of being seen as God’s creation” (1981, 43). Since, as Hick nomenon and of being seen as God’s creation” (1981, 43). Since, as Hick realizes, the religious ambiguity he speaks of is encouraged when we realizes, the religious ambiguity he speaks of is encouraged when we come to see ourselves and our world in evolutionary terms, it might be come to see ourselves and our world in evolutionary terms, it might be thought that we have a good theistic explanation, not just of nonresistant thought that we have a good theistic explanation, not just of nonresistant nonbelief in general, but of evolution-based nonbelief in particular. nonbelief in general, but of evolution-based nonbelief in particular. In response: whatever the merit of the moral development or soul- In response: whatever the merit of the moral development or soul- making reply in response to more traditional hiddenness arguments, it making reply in response to more traditional hiddenness arguments, it seems powerless against my claims. For one thing, the discovery of evo- seems powerless against my claims. For one thing, the discovery of evolution is a relatively recent one. Prior to 150 years ago, people generally lution is a relatively recent one. Prior to 150 years ago, people generally believed in some form of special creation, in part because there wasn’t a believed in some form of special creation, in part because there wasn’t a credible naturalistic answer to the question of how complex life devel- credible naturalistic answer to the question of how complex life developed. And yet these individuals, assuming the truth of theism, were oped. And yet these individuals, assuming the truth of theism, were presumably capable of properly relating to God. Our knowledge of Dar- presumably capable of properly relating to God. Our knowledge of Dar- winism thus isn’t required for soul building or for human autonomy. winism thus isn’t required for soul building or for human autonomy. Second, given E*, early humans were at a rather radical epistemic dis- Second, given E*, early humans were at a rather radical epistemic distance from God. Are we to seriously suppose that people at different times tance from God. Are we to seriously suppose that people at different times required vastly different degrees of epistemic distance from the divine? required vastly different degrees of epistemic distance from the divine? Are we to suppose that contemporary individuals, for instance, require Are we to suppose that contemporary individuals, for instance, require much more epistemic distance from the divine than, say, medieval Euro- much more epistemic distance from the divine than, say, medieval Euro- peans, for whom God’s existence was largely taken for granted, but much peans, for whom God’s existence was largely taken for granted, but much less epistemic distance from the divine than early humans, who hadn’t so less epistemic distance from the divine than early humans, who hadn’t so much as a concept of God? Since the answer to these questions is surely much as a concept of God? Since the answer to these questions is surely no, Hick’s theodicy fails to touch the historical unevenness of nonbelief no, Hick’s theodicy fails to touch the historical unevenness of nonbelief described in (1), (2), and (3). described in (1), (2), and (3). Something similar can be said of Michael Murray’s related anticoer- Something similar can be said of Michael Murray’s related anticoer- cion response to divine hiddenness (2002), which takes the form of a cion response to divine hiddenness (2002), which takes the form of a defense as opposed to a theodicy.32 According to this defense, were God defense as opposed to a theodicy.32 According to this defense, were God known with clarity to exist, and were God taken to be a personal judge of known with clarity to exist, and were God taken to be a personal judge of human beings, then this could provide too much incentive to obey divine human beings, then this could provide too much incentive to obey divine commands and could detract from our ability to disobey. (Just as we commands and could detract from our ability to disobey. (Just as we cannot easily resist a thief with a gun, given what is as stake, so too we cannot easily resist a thief with a gun, given what is as stake, so too we couldn’t freely resist God, if divine truths were too clear.) Since God is couldn’t freely resist God, if divine truths were too clear.) Since God is not coercive, the implication is that we shouldn’t be surprised to find that not coercive, the implication is that we shouldn’t be surprised to find that God’s existence and nature is less than clear. God’s existence and nature is less than clear. In response: again, such claims, whatever truth they contain, fail to In response: again, such claims, whatever truth they contain, fail to explain the relevant facts. We have no reason to expect that early nonbe- explain the relevant facts. We have no reason to expect that early nonbe- DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 369 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 369 lievers were any more prone to divine coercion than later humans, just as lievers were any more prone to divine coercion than later humans, just as we have no reason to suppose people in the centuries preceding Darwin we have no reason to suppose people in the centuries preceding Darwin were less sensitive to divine coercion than those living after Darwin. As were less sensitive to divine coercion than those living after Darwin. As in the case of Hick’s theodicy, Murray’s defense is not sensitive to how in the case of Hick’s theodicy, Murray’s defense is not sensitive to how much the hiddenness of God has fluctuated over evolutionary time. much the hiddenness of God has fluctuated over evolutionary time. Other examples could be cited as well.33 The result is that some of Other examples could be cited as well.33 The result is that some of the best-known solutions to the traditional problem of divine hiddenness, the best-known solutions to the traditional problem of divine hiddenness, whatever insights they may have, go little or no distance when it comes to whatever insights they may have, go little or no distance when it comes to explaining evolution-based nonbelief and its shifty character throughout explaining evolution-based nonbelief and its shifty character throughout history. Combining these various strategies won’t help either, unless they history. Combining these various strategies won’t help either, unless they can plausibly explain the patterns described in (1), (2), and (3). can plausibly explain the patterns described in (1), (2), and (3).

6. Conclusion 6. Conclusion To sum up: this paper explored the problem of why God would use To sum up: this paper explored the problem of why God would use natural selection to design the living world when the process and discov- natural selection to design the living world when the process and discovery of Darwinism would contribute to so much nonbelief in God. This ery of Darwinism would contribute to so much nonbelief in God. This problem can be seen as an interesting puzzle for theists to explore. But as problem can be seen as an interesting puzzle for theists to explore. But as we saw, it also has evidential significance for the debate between natural- we saw, it also has evidential significance for the debate between naturalism and theism, for Draper’s evolutionary argument from evil, for ism and theism, for Draper’s evolutionary argument from evil, for Plantinga’s religious epistemology, for divine hiddenness, and for the dis- Plantinga’s religious epistemology, for divine hiddenness, and for the discussion about whether the relationship between evolution, cognitive cussion about whether the relationship between evolution, cognitive science, and theism is problem-free. science, and theism is problem-free. This last issue is important, for although there is no shortage of evo- This last issue is important, for although there is no shortage of evolutionary critics of religion who wrongly suppose that science somehow lutionary critics of religion who wrongly suppose that science somehow straightforwardly disproves theism, there is also no shortage of overly straightforwardly disproves theism, there is also no shortage of overly cheery theistic assessments of evolution. For instance, Martin Nowak’s cheery theistic assessments of evolution. For instance, Martin Nowak’s claim that evolution should be “as little problem for religion as [the claim that evolution should be “as little problem for religion as [the concept of] gravity” (2007) seems highly questionable in light of the concept of] gravity” (2007) seems highly questionable in light of the above arguments.34 Finally, my arguments, although they lend support to above arguments.34 Finally, my arguments, although they lend support to naturalism, do not show that theism is false or implausible or irrational, naturalism, do not show that theism is false or implausible or irrational, all things considered—nor have I suggested otherwise. But my claims are all things considered—nor have I suggested otherwise. But my claims are significant for those who, like me, want to take on the difficult task of significant for those who, like me, want to take on the difficult task of weighing the evidence for naturalism and theism, and who want to assess weighing the evidence for naturalism and theism, and who want to assess the relationship between religion and science.35 the relationship between religion and science.35

Jason Marsh Jason Marsh St. Olaf College St. Olaf College 370 JASON MARSH 370 JASON MARSH

NOTES NOTES

1. Darwin’s own views about religion are complex. It is sometimes said that Darwin 1. Darwin’s own views about religion are complex. It is sometimes said that Darwin became an agnostic later in life and that his agnosticism was largely attributable to his became an agnostic later in life and that his agnosticism was largely attributable to his daughter’s death and to the problem of evil. I am no historian of Darwin, but some pas- daughter’s death and to the problem of evil. I am no historian of Darwin, but some passages give me the sense that evolution also played a role in giving rise to his religious sages give me the sense that evolution also played a role in giving rise to his religious doubts, robbing him of his former sense of teleology, even while keeping his sense of doubts, robbing him of his former sense of teleology, even while keeping his sense of nature’s grandeur intact. nature’s grandeur intact. 2. It is not entirely clear to me whether Sober thinks there are any serious evidential 2. It is not entirely clear to me whether Sober thinks there are any serious evidential conflicts between evolution and theism (as opposed to, say, evolution and something more conflicts between evolution and theism (as opposed to, say, evolution and something more specific like young earth creationism). He certainly seems right that the theory of evolu- specific like young earth creationism). He certainly seems right that the theory of evolution and theism are logically compatible, and that talk of unguided mutations in science tion and theism are logically compatible, and that talk of unguided mutations in science does not vindicate naturalism (2011). He also seems right to say, if we’re talking about a does not vindicate naturalism (2011). He also seems right to say, if we’re talking about a bare designer, that we will not know much about the designer’s aims or goals, something bare designer, that we will not know much about the designer’s aims or goals, something that creates trouble for the ID movement. But Sober also occasionally seems to admit that that creates trouble for the ID movement. But Sober also occasionally seems to admit that evil, or bad design in nature, could pose an evidential problem for theism, which is a much evil, or bad design in nature, could pose an evidential problem for theism, which is a much more specific hypothesis than the bare hypothesis of intelligent design. He states: “Maybe more specific hypothesis than the bare hypothesis of intelligent design. He states: “Maybe the existence of so much evil is evidence against such a [theistic] being . . . In an earlier the existence of so much evil is evidence against such a [theistic] being . . . In an earlier publication (Sober 2004b), I took the view that the organismic design argument and the publication (Sober 2004b), I took the view that the organismic design argument and the argument from evil are precisely on a par in that both require assumptions that we are not argument from evil are precisely on a par in that both require assumptions that we are not entitled to make. Now I am not so sure. Perhaps the design argument requires more knowl- entitled to make. Now I am not so sure. Perhaps the design argument requires more knowledge of the designer’s goals than the argument from evil does” (2008, 166–67). edge of the designer’s goals than the argument from evil does” (2008, 166–67). 3. Despite something White (2007) calls the preference problem for design arguments, 3. Despite something White (2007) calls the preference problem for design arguments, he seems to think that cosmic fine tuning and life’s origin, which are of course distinct he seems to think that cosmic fine tuning and life’s origin, which are of course distinct from life’s evolutionary development, are at least somewhat more likely on a design from life’s evolutionary development, are at least somewhat more likely on a design hypothesis than on other hypotheses, including the chance hypothesis. hypothesis than on other hypotheses, including the chance hypothesis. 4. My focus on theism and naturalism in this paper is explained by my sense that these 4. My focus on theism and naturalism in this paper is explained by my sense that these are two of the most plausible world pictures on offer, at least at the present time, and are two of the most plausible world pictures on offer, at least at the present time, and because they are in conflict with one another. I realize that theism is much more than a because they are in conflict with one another. I realize that theism is much more than a world picture or hypothesis for theists and that some would resist testing it at all. world picture or hypothesis for theists and that some would resist testing it at all. 5. I should clarify that I think that the concept of an “unsurpassably loving God” is 5. I should clarify that I think that the concept of an “unsurpassably loving God” is incompatible with certain Calvinist ideas of the divine, according to which God’s love incompatible with certain Calvinist ideas of the divine, according to which God’s love looks pretty selective. I will take for granted that God’s love, being perfect, extends radi- looks pretty selective. I will take for granted that God’s love, being perfect, extends radi- cally toward all individual persons and even creatures in history. cally toward all individual persons and even creatures in history. 6. The claim here is not that nature literally has a mental state that we might refer to 6. The claim here is not that nature literally has a mental state that we might refer to as indifference. The claim is rather that there is nothing at the core of reality, if naturalism as indifference. The claim is rather that there is nothing at the core of reality, if naturalism is true, to display care for human beings. is true, to display care for human beings. 7. I realize that there are genuine debates about the extent to which natural selection, 7. I realize that there are genuine debates about the extent to which natural selection, as opposed to other mechanisms, is responsible for evolutionary change and that we might as opposed to other mechanisms, is responsible for evolutionary change and that we might learn more about this. But if Darwinism, or more accurately neo-Darwinism, is nearly as learn more about this. But if Darwinism, or more accurately neo-Darwinism, is nearly as well evidenced as most scientists seem to suspect, then those who reject it already face well evidenced as most scientists seem to suspect, then those who reject it already face enough epistemic trouble as is. That the theist who rejects a Darwinian, or even evolu- enough epistemic trouble as is. That the theist who rejects a Darwinian, or even evolutionary, outlook can avoid many (though not all) of the problems developed here should tionary, outlook can avoid many (though not all) of the problems developed here should thus be of minimal consolation. thus be of minimal consolation. 8. According to skeptical theists, inferences like the following are highly question- 8. According to skeptical theists, inferences like the following are highly questionable: we cannot see a good moral reason for X, so there probably isn’t one (if there were able: we cannot see a good moral reason for X, so there probably isn’t one (if there were such a reason for X, after all, we’d likely know what it is). I agree that such noseeum infer- such a reason for X, after all, we’d likely know what it is). I agree that such noseeum inferences are often fallacious, but I also think that we reasonably make them in some contexts, ences are often fallacious, but I also think that we reasonably make them in some contexts, DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 371 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 371 including some moral and scientific contexts. In any case, it is worth noting that compar- including some moral and scientific contexts. In any case, it is worth noting that comparative arguments like Draper’s, and those I raise later on, do not clearly succumb to ative arguments like Draper’s, and those I raise later on, do not clearly succumb to skeptical theist worries. In fact, some well-known skeptical theists seem to admit this. skeptical theist worries. In fact, some well-known skeptical theists seem to admit this. Bergman and Howard-Snyder, for instance, state that Draper-style arguments “seem to Bergman and Howard-Snyder, for instance, state that Draper-style arguments “seem to refrain from depending on noseeum assumptions” (2004, 16). These thinkers add that “the refrain from depending on noseeum assumptions” (2004, 16). These thinkers add that “the focus here is not on our inability to see a justifying reason but on our supposed ability to focus here is not on our inability to see a justifying reason but on our supposed ability to see that an atheistic explanation is superior to a theistic one” (2004, 24). A similar point is see that an atheistic explanation is superior to a theistic one” (2004, 24). A similar point is made by Elliott Sober when he tells us that “the evidential argument [from evil] is consis- made by Elliott Sober when he tells us that “the evidential argument [from evil] is consistent with our having considerable uncertainty about what God’s motives would be in tent with our having considerable uncertainty about what God’s motives would be in allowing horrible evils to exist. The question is whether E’s improbability increases if allowing horrible evils to exist. The question is whether E’s improbability increases if there is no God” (2008, 167). there is no God” (2008, 167). 9. Draper’s actual premise is this: “Naturalism is more plausible than theism (i.e., nat- 9. Draper’s actual premise is this: “Naturalism is more plausible than theism (i.e., naturalism is more probable than theism independent of all evidence).” Draper’s arguments uralism is more probable than theism independent of all evidence).” Draper’s arguments for this stronger premise, which concern simplicity and scope, are interesting, but I will set for this stronger premise, which concern simplicity and scope, are interesting, but I will set them aside. As Draper notes elsewhere (2007b), his strong premise is not required to get them aside. As Draper notes elsewhere (2007b), his strong premise is not required to get his conclusion. My weaker premise will also get his conclusion. Anyhow, I confess that it his conclusion. My weaker premise will also get his conclusion. Anyhow, I confess that it can be difficult to have confidence about the a priori factors determining the prior proba- can be difficult to have confidence about the a priori factors determining the prior probability of a hypothesis. Figuring out the a posteriori factors is hard enough. bility of a hypothesis. Figuring out the a posteriori factors is hard enough. 10. I am assuming that the existence of biological beings, including intelligent biolog- 10. I am assuming that the existence of biological beings, including intelligent biological beings, isn’t terribly unlikely on either naturalism or theism. This assumption may of ical beings, isn’t terribly unlikely on either naturalism or theism. This assumption may of course be false, which could pose a problem for everyone. For instance, if naturalism is course be false, which could pose a problem for everyone. For instance, if naturalism is true, then the existence of any life might be highly unlikely (perhaps it is hard to get the true, then the existence of any life might be highly unlikely (perhaps it is hard to get the right number of planets or universes). But something similar goes for theism. After all, a right number of planets or universes). But something similar goes for theism. After all, a perfect God, for all we know, might not create at all, or might not be interested in the kind perfect God, for all we know, might not create at all, or might not be interested in the kind of life we in fact observe. Perhaps this God would only want angels or immaterial souls of life we in fact observe. Perhaps this God would only want angels or immaterial souls who, lacking bodies, are more like God than us. Certainly the fact that we are physical and who, lacking bodies, are more like God than us. Certainly the fact that we are physical and biological beings seems more likely on naturalism than on theism, even if other facts about biological beings seems more likely on naturalism than on theism, even if other facts about us (e.g., that we are good at abstract science and math) are more likely on theism. I thus us (e.g., that we are good at abstract science and math) are more likely on theism. I thus don’t think that the theist should try to get out of the quandary by pointing out that life’s don’t think that the theist should try to get out of the quandary by pointing out that life’s existence is relatively improbable on naturalism. existence is relatively improbable on naturalism. 11. Many of which seem rather far-fetched, even for defenses. Here, some claim, in a 11. Many of which seem rather far-fetched, even for defenses. Here, some claim, in a neo-Cartesian fashion, that such animals, for all anyone knows, were not conscious in a neo-Cartesian fashion, that such animals, for all anyone knows, were not conscious in a morally significant way (Murray and Ross 2006). Others have offered an antiregularity morally significant way (Murray and Ross 2006). Others have offered an antiregularity defense (Van Inwagen 2006), according to which a world without the kind of suffering defense (Van Inwagen 2006), according to which a world without the kind of suffering reported by E may well have to be massively irregular—which is alleged to be at least as reported by E may well have to be massively irregular—which is alleged to be at least as undesirable as a world marked by animal suffering. Still others raise the suggestion that undesirable as a world marked by animal suffering. Still others raise the suggestion that animals might be compensated with post-mortem goods in the hereafter (Bergman and animals might be compensated with post-mortem goods in the hereafter (Bergman and Howard-Snyder 2004, 24–25). These are not the most controversial moves, however. Howard-Snyder 2004, 24–25). These are not the most controversial moves, however. Some, resting on a rather sharp normative distinction between doing and allowing, appeal Some, resting on a rather sharp normative distinction between doing and allowing, appeal to the fall of angels, claiming that God might allow “Satan and his minions” to “play a role to the fall of angels, claiming that God might allow “Satan and his minions” to “play a role in the evolution of life, steering it in the direction of predation, waste and pain” (Plantinga in the evolution of life, steering it in the direction of predation, waste and pain” (Plantinga 2011, 59). Finally, some claim that human sin can still be causally responsible for animal 2011, 59). Finally, some claim that human sin can still be causally responsible for animal suffering if we accept some form of backward causation (Dembski 2010). suffering if we accept some form of backward causation (Dembski 2010). 12. I am not worried about nonbelief in highly limited supernatural agents. As long as 12. I am not worried about nonbelief in highly limited supernatural agents. As long as God is imagined to be exceedingly powerful, loving, and intelligent, my arguments carry God is imagined to be exceedingly powerful, loving, and intelligent, my arguments carry some force. My arguments are especially designed for theism, however, where they carry some force. My arguments are especially designed for theism, however, where they carry the most force. the most force. 13. In some contexts Moser’s strategy seems to be one of attributing all nonbelief to sin 13. In some contexts Moser’s strategy seems to be one of attributing all nonbelief to sin (Moser 2002). This move is unsurprising, since he also grants that “God as perfectly (Moser 2002). This move is unsurprising, since he also grants that “God as perfectly 372 JASON MARSH 372 JASON MARSH loving toward all people would seek to communicate with people if this was in their best loving toward all people would seek to communicate with people if this was in their best interest, and this God would offer in that case some kind of evidence of God’s reality” interest, and this God would offer in that case some kind of evidence of God’s reality” (2008, 37). In another context Moser claims that the problem of divine hiddenness arises (2008, 37). In another context Moser claims that the problem of divine hiddenness arises from a presumptuous spirit, one that overlooks that Abrahamic religion is filled with nar- from a presumptuous spirit, one that overlooks that Abrahamic religion is filled with narratives about divine hiding (2004). Such a response, however, misconstrues the argument ratives about divine hiding (2004). Such a response, however, misconstrues the argument and the technical meaning of divine hiddenness—which is really about nonresistant forms and the technical meaning of divine hiddenness—which is really about nonresistant forms of nonbelief. As Schellenberg notes in his reply to Moser: “I agree with Paul Moser that of nonbelief. As Schellenberg notes in his reply to Moser: “I agree with Paul Moser that there is no reason to expect a God of the sort whose existence is at issue here to ‘be there is no reason to expect a God of the sort whose existence is at issue here to ‘be obvious to all normal humans,’ or to encourage ‘mere intellectual assent’ to theistic claims obvious to all normal humans,’ or to encourage ‘mere intellectual assent’ to theistic claims . . . I also agree that there is something deeply wrong with the ‘kind of cognitive idolatry . . . I also agree that there is something deeply wrong with the ‘kind of cognitive idolatry where we demand a certain sort of knowledge or evidence of God inappropriate to a filial where we demand a certain sort of knowledge or evidence of God inappropriate to a filial relationship with God’ . . . But I do not agree that significant arguments from divine hid- relationship with God’ . . . But I do not agree that significant arguments from divine hiddenness against theism are to be associated with such expectations and demands” (2004, denness against theism are to be associated with such expectations and demands” (2004, 54). 54). 14. Elsewhere Darwin states, “there is ample evidence . . . that numerous races have 14. Elsewhere Darwin states, “there is ample evidence . . . that numerous races have existed, and still exist, who have no idea of one or more gods.” But he adds, “The ques- existed, and still exist, who have no idea of one or more gods.” But he adds, “The question is of course wholly distinct from that higher one, whether there exists a Creator and tion is of course wholly distinct from that higher one, whether there exists a Creator and Ruler of the universe; and this has been answered in the affirmative by some of the highest Ruler of the universe; and this has been answered in the affirmative by some of the highest intellects that have ever existed” (2004, 116). Darwin’s qualification is correct. But of intellects that have ever existed” (2004, 116). Darwin’s qualification is correct. But of course the data in question might nonetheless have relevance to the truth of theism. course the data in question might nonetheless have relevance to the truth of theism. 15. The point here, to clarify, is not that we know exactly how long it took for belief in 15. The point here, to clarify, is not that we know exactly how long it took for belief in God to emerge, or even to claim that we know all that much about early religion. The point God to emerge, or even to claim that we know all that much about early religion. The point is, rather, that scientific testimony, combined with our knowledge of how cultural evolu- is, rather, that scientific testimony, combined with our knowledge of how cultural evolution works, suggests that there was a time in the history of religion without theism. tion works, suggests that there was a time in the history of religion without theism. 16. To cite an analogy, if the earliest humans and some later humans naturally found 16. To cite an analogy, if the earliest humans and some later humans naturally found themselves in environments in which they couldn’t breathe, one might question whether themselves in environments in which they couldn’t breathe, one might question whether their breathing apparatus was properly designed for breathing. Surely, however, one would their breathing apparatus was properly designed for breathing. Surely, however, one would wonder about their environments. wonder about their environments. 17. For an argument that theism is more cognitively natural than both metaphysical nat- 17. For an argument that theism is more cognitively natural than both metaphysical naturalism and highly abstract forms of religion like Schellenberg’s Ultimism, see my uralism and highly abstract forms of religion like Schellenberg’s Ultimism, see my forthcoming “Assessing the Third Way.” forthcoming “Assessing the Third Way.” 18. Thanks to Josh Thurow for leading me to this source and for raising the objections 18. Thanks to Josh Thurow for leading me to this source and for raising the objections that he did. that he did. 19. I am thus not denying that present day cultures who affirm limited spirits sometimes 19. I am thus not denying that present day cultures who affirm limited spirits sometimes also affirm a High Moral God. also affirm a High Moral God. 20. For my earlier discussion of skeptical theism, see note eight. 20. For my earlier discussion of skeptical theism, see note eight. 21. The likelihood of a hypothesis, in other words, is the probability that a hypothesis 21. The likelihood of a hypothesis, in other words, is the probability that a hypothesis confers on an observation and not the probability that an observation confers on a hypoth- confers on an observation and not the probability that an observation confers on a hypothesis. To be sure, there are complexities and disputes that arise even over views like esis. To be sure, there are complexities and disputes that arise even over views like ‘likelihoodism’, which are much more modest than views like Bayesianism (Sober 2008), ‘likelihoodism’, which are much more modest than views like Bayesianism (Sober 2008), but I will leave these complexities aside. Philosophers have many disagreements about but I will leave these complexities aside. Philosophers have many disagreements about probability and about how to best express arguments like those we are discussing. probability and about how to best express arguments like those we are discussing. 22. As Plantinga states: “God could have preserved populations from perils of various 22. As Plantinga states: “God could have preserved populations from perils of various sorts, and so on; in this way, by orchestrating the course of evolution, he could have sorts, and so on; in this way, by orchestrating the course of evolution, he could have ensured that there come to be creatures of the kind he intends” (2011, 4). Plantinga’s claim ensured that there come to be creatures of the kind he intends” (2011, 4). Plantinga’s claim provides a plausible response to those who, like Stephen J. Gould and Michael Ruse, seem provides a plausible response to those who, like Stephen J. Gould and Michael Ruse, seem to think that humans might not have evolved at all, even if theism is true, given the highly to think that humans might not have evolved at all, even if theism is true, given the highly contingent nature of evolution. But it also raises the likelihood that God could orchestrate contingent nature of evolution. But it also raises the likelihood that God could orchestrate DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 373 DARWIN AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL NONBELIEF 373 the course of evolution to ensure that there come to be the kinds of religious minds and the course of evolution to ensure that there come to be the kinds of religious minds and religious outlooks that God intends. Finally, as for those who think that God would basi- religious outlooks that God intends. Finally, as for those who think that God would basi- cally never intervene in nature, I have yet to see convincing arguments for this conclusion. cally never intervene in nature, I have yet to see convincing arguments for this conclusion. 23. See note 10. 23. See note 10. 24. Stephen Maitzen (2006) advances a similar challenge to a highly theistic concep- 24. Stephen Maitzen (2006) advances a similar challenge to a highly theistic concep- tion of the sensus divinitatis by focusing on current patterns of nonbelief around the world. tion of the sensus divinitatis by focusing on current patterns of nonbelief around the world. I think Maitzen’s case can be improved by factoring in temporal and specifically, evolu- I think Maitzen’s case can be improved by factoring in temporal and specifically, evolutionary, patterns of nonbelief. I will discuss these patterns more in due course. tionary, patterns of nonbelief. I will discuss these patterns more in due course. 25. This is important since, as Richard Otte (2012) notes, following Carnap, some evi- 25. This is important since, as Richard Otte (2012) notes, following Carnap, some evidence can disconfirm the core of a set of beliefs without disconfirming the larger set of dence can disconfirm the core of a set of beliefs without disconfirming the larger set of beliefs. For instance, the reality of evil might be thought to disconfirm theism without beliefs. For instance, the reality of evil might be thought to disconfirm theism without thereby disconfirming Christian theism, since the latter entails that there will be evil. thereby disconfirming Christian theism, since the latter entails that there will be evil. Unfortunately, for many Abrahamic theists, however, the same cannot be said about Unfortunately, for many Abrahamic theists, however, the same cannot be said about natural nonbelief. In fact, many Christian theists think that scriptures, such as the first natural nonbelief. In fact, many Christian theists think that scriptures, such as the first chapter of Romans, require that all nonbelief is culpable, foolish, and never natural. chapter of Romans, require that all nonbelief is culpable, foolish, and never natural. Natural nonbelief at the very least poses a problem for believers who interpret scripture Natural nonbelief at the very least poses a problem for believers who interpret scripture this way. this way. 26. Some go further than White. For instance, Peter Van Inwagen claims that “the very 26. Some go further than White. For instance, Peter Van Inwagen claims that “the very existence of Darwin’s account—whether or not it is true—renders all versions of the existence of Darwin’s account—whether or not it is true—renders all versions of the design argument considerably less cogent than they would have been if no one had thought design argument considerably less cogent than they would have been if no one had thought of it” (2003, 348). of it” (2003, 348). 27. Interestingly, Alvin Plantinga grants that noninferential defeaters are the most pow- 27. Interestingly, Alvin Plantinga grants that noninferential defeaters are the most powerful threat in the context of the problem of evil (2000, 484). erful threat in the context of the problem of evil (2000, 484). 28. Perhaps White does not intend to deny (2), and perhaps he would grant my claims 28. Perhaps White does not intend to deny (2), and perhaps he would grant my claims about the significance of noninferential defeat. Still, the mistake I attribute to him is suffi- about the significance of noninferential defeat. Still, the mistake I attribute to him is suffi- ciently common as to be worth correcting. ciently common as to be worth correcting. 29. Draper makes a similar point in his response to Plantinga (2007b). 29. Draper makes a similar point in his response to Plantinga (2007b). 30. Again, nonresistant nonbelief is supposed to offer evidence against God’s existence 30. Again, nonresistant nonbelief is supposed to offer evidence against God’s existence since (a) such nonbelief seems to preempt persons from enjoying a valuable divine-human since (a) such nonbelief seems to preempt persons from enjoying a valuable divine-human relationship in this life and since (b) God, being perfectly loving, wants this relationship relationship in this life and since (b) God, being perfectly loving, wants this relationship for people in this life and arguably just as soon as it is possible. There are also nonevi- for people in this life and arguably just as soon as it is possible. There are also nonevi- dentialist or deductive versions of the hiddenness argument (Schellenberg 2007), versions dentialist or deductive versions of the hiddenness argument (Schellenberg 2007), versions that, if successful, would disprove theism all by themselves. But I confess that I find these that, if successful, would disprove theism all by themselves. But I confess that I find these versions of the argument too strong. versions of the argument too strong. 31. One might wonder whether my Molinist solution to the geographic problem of 31. One might wonder whether my Molinist solution to the geographic problem of divine hiddenness has bearing on my present arguments. That response says, roughly, that divine hiddenness has bearing on my present arguments. That response says, roughly, that Maitzen’s worries about uneven patterns of nonbelief in the present overlooks that God Maitzen’s worries about uneven patterns of nonbelief in the present overlooks that God could use divine middle knowledge (roughly the knowledge of what people would do in could use divine middle knowledge (roughly the knowledge of what people would do in any feasible circumstance) and divine hiding to help to secure the eventual salvation of any feasible circumstance) and divine hiding to help to secure the eventual salvation of everyone, especially those who were most hidden from in the present. Now I think that the everyone, especially those who were most hidden from in the present. Now I think that the very existence of such a response, whether or not it is true, weakens the force of problems very existence of such a response, whether or not it is true, weakens the force of problems raised by Maitzen and myself. This is because such explanations, whether or not they are raised by Maitzen and myself. This is because such explanations, whether or not they are true, evidence that there might be a grand and morally satisfying reason for divine hiding true, evidence that there might be a grand and morally satisfying reason for divine hiding that we are missing. That said, I do not think that Molinist accounts of divine hiddenness that we are missing. That said, I do not think that Molinist accounts of divine hiddenness fully undermine the force of my present arguments. In fact, my present arguments seem to fully undermine the force of my present arguments. In fact, my present arguments seem to pose a problem for Molinist solutions to divine hiddenness. After all, Molinism does not pose a problem for Molinist solutions to divine hiddenness. After all, Molinism does not predict that various nontheistic religious outlooks, and not just theistic ones, would be cog- predict that various nontheistic religious outlooks, and not just theistic ones, would be cognitively natural. Relatedly, God could presumably isolate various individuals for their nitively natural. Relatedly, God could presumably isolate various individuals for their 374 JASON MARSH 374 JASON MARSH eventual benefit, if theism were true, without giving them over to a religion of cruel spirits. eventual benefit, if theism were true, without giving them over to a religion of cruel spirits. In short, naturalism might still be said to better explain the relevant data than theism. In short, naturalism might still be said to better explain the relevant data than theism. 32. Whereas theodicies have traditionally sought to give us God’s actual reasons for 32. Whereas theodicies have traditionally sought to give us God’s actual reasons for causing or permitting evil and/or divine hiddenness, defenses are more modest: they are causing or permitting evil and/or divine hiddenness, defenses are more modest: they are supposed to give us reasons that, for all we know, would justify God’s actions. supposed to give us reasons that, for all we know, would justify God’s actions. 33. For instance, according to Dougherty and Poston (2007), once we adopt a more 33. For instance, according to Dougherty and Poston (2007), once we adopt a more dynamic view of belief, one that permits various degrees of belief and periods of serious dynamic view of belief, one that permits various degrees of belief and periods of serious doubt, we can largely overcome Schellenberg’s classic problem of divine hiddenness. Whether doubt, we can largely overcome Schellenberg’s classic problem of divine hiddenness. Whether or not that is so, the relevant claims do nothing to challenge early (full-out) nonbelief. or not that is so, the relevant claims do nothing to challenge early (full-out) nonbelief. 34. And there remains some conflict even if evolution also leads to certain forms of 34. And there remains some conflict even if evolution also leads to certain forms of cooperation and altruism. It is not just Nowak who upholds the no-conflict view, however. cooperation and altruism. It is not just Nowak who upholds the no-conflict view, however. According to Peter Van Inwagen, the “truth or falsity of Darwinism has no more to do with According to Peter Van Inwagen, the “truth or falsity of Darwinism has no more to do with truth or falsity of theism than does, say, the hypothesis of continental drift” (2003, 352). truth or falsity of theism than does, say, the hypothesis of continental drift” (2003, 352). Perhaps Van Inwagen simply means that the theory of evolution and theism are not in Perhaps Van Inwagen simply means that the theory of evolution and theism are not in logical tension. If so, I agree. But many theistic scientists, theologians, and some philoso- logical tension. If so, I agree. But many theistic scientists, theologians, and some philosophers seem to mean something much stronger than this. They seem to mean that, perhaps phers seem to mean something much stronger than this. They seem to mean that, perhaps with the exception of natural evil, there are no serious evidential tensions between evolu- with the exception of natural evil, there are no serious evidential tensions between evolution and religion. tion and religion. 35. Thanks to Tim Mawson, Klaas Kraay, J. L. Schellenberg, Richard Swinburne, Paul 35. Thanks to Tim Mawson, Klaas Kraay, J. L. Schellenberg, Richard Swinburne, Paul Draper, Bill Harper, Gillian Barker, Helen De Cruz, Michael Murray, Robert Audi, Josh Draper, Bill Harper, Gillian Barker, Helen De Cruz, Michael Murray, Robert Audi, Josh Thurow, Pascal Boyer, Stephen Stitch, Jon Marsh, John Thorp, Justin Barrett, Kenny Thurow, Pascal Boyer, Stephen Stitch, Jon Marsh, John Thorp, Justin Barrett, Kenny Boyce, and James Beebe for helpful comments and discussion. Thanks also to my audi- Boyce, and James Beebe for helpful comments and discussion. Thanks also to my audi- ence at the conference 150 Years After The Origin of Species, held at the University of ence at the conference 150 Years After The Origin of Species, held at the University of Toronto, and to audiences at Oxford, Duke, Western Ontario, and British Columbia, where Toronto, and to audiences at Oxford, Duke, Western Ontario, and British Columbia, where earlier incarnations of this article were presented. Thanks most of all to the Cognition, earlier incarnations of this article were presented. Thanks most of all to the Cognition, Religion, and Theology (CRT) project at the University of Oxford, supported by the Tem- Religion, and Theology (CRT) project at the University of Oxford, supported by the Tem- pleton Foundation, for funding this research. The ideas presented here are mine and should pleton Foundation, for funding this research. The ideas presented here are mine and should not be assumed to reflect the views of the Templeton Foundation or any other institution not be assumed to reflect the views of the Templeton Foundation or any other institution with which I am affiliated. with which I am affiliated.

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