Grove, Brandon.Toc.Pdf
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project AMBASSADOR BRANDON H. GROVE, JR. Interviewed by: Thomas Stern Initial interview date: November 14, 1994 Copyright 1998 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Early Years Growing Up in Chicago Nazi Germany, Holland and Spain Wartime Washington Fordham, Bard, and Princeton Military Service in the US Navy Waiting to Begin: The USSR and Chester Bowles The A-100 Foreign Service Orientation Course April, 1959 The Rosslyn Garage An Offer to Resign Vice Consul, Abidjan, Ivory Coast 1959-1961 Breaking New Ground The First Ambassador Soviet and Chinese Diplomats in West Africa Staff Assistant to Under Secretaries Bowles and Ball 1961-1962 Robert Kennedy in Abidjan Chester Bowles as Under Secretary Lucius D. Battle as Executive Secretary The Kennedys and Bowles Departure of Bowles George Ball as Under Secretary With Robert Kennedy Around The World March, 1962 Special Assistant to Management Under Secretary Orrick 1962-1963 Special Assistant to Bowles, New Delhi, India 1963-1965 The Ambassador's Office President Kennedy's Assassination 1 Merging Political and Economic Work The Bowles Style During Nehru and Shastri Life in Delhi Us Mission, West Berlin 1965-1969 Berlin in the Mid-1960s Brandt and Ostpolitik The US Mission East Berlin Assassinations of King and Robert Kennedy Director, Office of Panamanian Affairs 1969-1971 Reassignment to Washington The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Resuming Canal Negotiations General Omar Torrijos The Senior Seminar, Foreign Service Institute 1971-1972 Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff 1972-1974 The Nature of Policy Policy Planning The NSC Under Secretaries Committee Contingency Planning Crisis Management The World Outside Deputy Chief of Mission, The German Democratic Republic, 1974-1976 Berlin Status of Berlin Ambassador and Mrs. Cooper Establishing the Embassy Arrival of the Ambassador Relations with the Soviets During Détente Working in East Germany The Berlin Wall The Nazi Past Office of The Inspector General 1976-1978 The Inspection Process: Eastern Europe The Bureau of Oceans, and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs The US-Mexican International Boundaries and Water Commission The Philippines and an Experiment The Iberian Peninsula Value of Inspections 2 Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs 1978-1980 Grenada and Haiti Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Central America: Somoza Guyana: The Jonestown Suicides Assessment of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Consul General, Jerusalem 1980-1983 O Jerusalem Jerusalem and its Consulates Life and Work at the American Consulate The Camp David Accords A Visit to Batir The "Village Leagues" Proposal Congressional Delegations Visit of Former President and Mrs. Carter Other American Visitors Jerusalem's Mayor Kollek Places on the West Bank and Gaza The Habib Negotiations Writ of Ne Exiat Middle East Peace Turned Down by Kuwait 1983-1984 The Meaning of Agrément Communications Policy The CAPSTONE Seminar The Operations Center and History of the Bureaus Ambassador to Zaire 1984-1987 US Objectives Accreditation of an Ambassador Mobutu Sese Sekou Mobutu with Bush and Reagan The American Embassy The AIDS Virus Soviet and Chinese Diplomats in Africa Mariana "Fish Day" Management Reforms 1987-1988 An $84 Million Budgetary Shortfall Listening to People "The Administrative Function for the 1990s" A Report 3 Director, Foreign Service Institute 1988-1992 Opportunities Without Precedent Working at FSI Rosslyn Managing FSI Training Priorities Building the National Foreign Affairs Training Center Downgrading Training For Training to Succeed Diplomat-in-Residence at Georgetown University Director, Somalia Task Force 1992-1993 Somalia Background Setting Up a Task Force Somalia Decision Ambassador Oakley's Role Task Force Operations Failure of UNOSOM II Bureaucratic Aftermath Policy Planning Staff 1993-1994 The Policy Environment Under Christopher Preventive Diplomacy Lack of Interest in Policy Planning Concluding Thoughts Postscript INTERVIEW Preface The Cold War began on July 2, 1947 when Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov led his delegation out of the conference in Paris that launched the Marshall Plan for European recovery. It ended on December 25, 1991 with Gorbachev's resignation as president of the USSR, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It encompassed whole careers. Someone like myself, who was 18 in 1947, was 62 when the struggle ended. Rarely is a defining period in history so sharply delineated. This memoir is based on an expansion of and additions to oral history interviews. It attempts to convey what it meant to me to be a Foreign Service officer during the Cold War years of 1959-1991. Waging cold war was the chief activity of our government in its 4 foreign, defense, and intelligence policies, and in many areas of our national economy as well. From vantage points during assignments abroad and in Washington, I will describe how widespread and engrossing that costly war quickly became. My perspective is that of only one of many Americans whose foreign service careers span this nearly 45-year chapter in world history. We served our country during a global struggle understood by many policy makers and large large portions of the American people as a contest between good and evil, "us and them," the right side winning in the end without a global holocaust. Certain of the justness of our causes, we had prevailed in the century's two great wars before its mid-point, and established ourselves as the preeminent world power. Sands of Iwo Jima , the enduringly successful John Wayne movie with its famous flag raising scene, was released in 1949. Four years after the end of World War II, it offered audiences early in the Cold War an inspiring tale of US Marines inching their way to hard-won victory. For these audiences a different struggle against quite a different enemy was beginning. For nearly half a century it would require the dedication and sacrifice extolled in this film. This time we would be "containers," in George Kennan's word, and our enemies would be "contained" in their expansionist ambitions, not overrun. This concept suggests a subtle edge of superiority for those doing the containing, an implied military and moral advantage for the West, even if the moral aspect would lose its luster during the conflict in Vietnam. Only during local wars in Korea and Vietnam would we become engaged in military conflict--through surrogates--with our Cold War enemy. Berlin's occupation status would be kept intact until the wall came down without a struggle. Japan, freed of Soviet influence, would become a vital democracy, an economic power rivaling Western Europe and America. Throughout the Cold War, we and the Russians lived with the possibility of nuclear strikes and counter-strikes that were always, although not inevitably, avoided. This is the highest tribute to the efficacy of great power diplomacy, backed by overwhelming military might on both sides, in dealing with situations of brinkmanship, misunderstanding, terrible mistakes, posturing, and deception. On both sides, fundamental values were rightly considered at stake. The outcome of the Cuban missile crisis speaks to the success of such high-risk diplomacy. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech in December, 1950 William Faulkner said of these times, "Our tragedy today is a general and universal fear so long sustained by now that we can even bear it. There are no longer problems of the spirit. There is only the question: When will I be blown up?" Today, with the Cold War behind us, "the enemy" is harder to identify and confront. The clear-cut differences are gone. A moral basis for international engagement has eroded since the Vietnamese war. Political will and popular support are difficult to mobilize in the absence of an obvious threat to our security. There is little public understanding of the need 5 to commit resources to preventive diplomacy, which seeks to defuse a problem before it gets beyond control, and is therefore based on hard-to-sell speculation about what might happen in the future. At the end of the most violent century in history, and in the early stages of an information revolution that makes violence harder to conceal, much of the world now favors democracy and free-market economies in a global marketplace. Breathtaking possibilities for humanity are in reach without the prospect of global conflict. Even as we push ahead, we need to pause and assess these last fifty years, which have placed us all where we are today. A comprehensive understanding of the Cold War on which most people could agree is still beyond reach. The review by scholars of emerging historical records of the past half century exposes subtleties, ambivalences, and misperceptions on both sides that compel a much more complex appreciation of the Cold War. Questions of whether it could have been ended sooner, and been less costly to both sides, will trouble us for a long time to come. --- Here, I retrace worn footpaths in dappled light, pausing occasionally to kick aside dry leaves and offer some observations about issues that engaged Americans during the Cold War, and the unavoidable untidiness of foreign policy-making in our democracy. Diplomacy, itself, is the management of international relations by negotiation, whether around a conference table or in less formal conversation between representatives of different governments. Given my experience, I found it natural to answer the question: What does a diplomat do? I recall why I chose a foreign service career and share thoughts and feelings about places in which I served, how things worked (or failed to work) and a few of the extraordinary people I met along the way--some of the heroes and villains of our times. This is also a story of the human side of Foreign Service life. I write this with appreciation and affection for many friends and colleagues of great abilities, American and foreign alike, with whom I served during these perilous years.