Tempting Fate a Volume in the Series
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Tempting Fate a volume in the series Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt A list of titles in this series is available at cornellpress.cornell.edu. Tempting Fate Why Nonnuclear States Confront Nuclear Opponents Paul C. Avey Cornell University Press Ithaca and London This book is freely available in an open access edition thanks to TOME (Toward an Open Monograph Ecosystem)—a collaboration of the Association of American Universities, the Association of University Presses, and the Association of Research Libraries—and the generous support of Virginia Tech. Learn more at the TOME website, available at: openmonographs.org. Copyright © 2019 by Cornell University The text of this book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. To use this book, or parts of this book, in any way not covered by the license, please contact Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress.cornell.edu. First published 2019 by Cornell University Press Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Avey, Paul C., author. Title: Tempting fate : Why nonnuclear states confront nuclear opponents / Paul Avey. Description: Ithaca, [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2019. | Series: Cornell studies in security affairs | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifi ers: LCCN 2019019612 (print) | LCCN 2019020251 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501740404 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501740398 (pdf) | ISBN 9781501740381 | ISBN 9781501740381 (cloth ; alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Asymmetric warfare—Case studies. | Nuclear weapons—Government policy—Case studies. | No fi rst use (Nuclear strategy)—Case studies. | Security, International— Case studies. Classifi cation: LCC U163 (ebook) | LCC U163 .A983 2019 (print) | DDC 355.02—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019019612 To Mom and Dad Contents Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 1. The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Monopoly 12 2. Iraq versus the United States 40 3. Egypt versus Israel 63 4. China versus the United States 88 5. The Soviet Union versus the United States 114 Conclusion 135 Appendix A: Counting Wars in Nuclear Monopoly 153 Appendix B: Additional Cases 159 Notes 181 Index 233 vii Acknowledgments Nuclear weapons hold out the promise of peace through the prospect of devastation. That is a dangerous bargain. The number of wars that have occurred when only one side has nuclear weapons suggest that it is also a fragile one. Regardless of whether one views nuclear weapons as a benefi t or danger to humanity, they are not likely to disappear anytime soon. Like many other students of nuclear politics, then, I believe that it is important to grapple with the nature and the limits of the nuclear shadow. This book represents one contribution to that effort. It is common in acknowledgments to note that many individuals had a profound infl uence on the fi nal product. I never fully appreciated just how true that was until I went through the process myself. This book is very dif- ferent today from when it began. Its strengths are due to the patience of many friends and colleagues who took time to engage with this project. Its weaknesses remain those of its author. My biggest intellectual debt is to Michael Desch. The idea for this book took hold while I was working with him on a separate project at Notre Dame. Mike is a model for how to be a scholar, and his support has been instrumental at every stage of this book and in my career. Keir Lieber, Dan Lindley, and Sebastian Rosato shaped much of my thinking on interna- tional relations. They have each read and offered incisive comments on multiple drafts, particularly during the critical early period, and continue to provide guidance today. Frank Gavin, Todd Sechser, Nicholas Miller, James Wilson, James Cameron, and Tim McDonnell all graciously read the entire manuscript and gave up a full day to meet to discuss it. Their insightful suggestions led to signifi cant changes that made the book much stronger. Eric Jardine, Barry Posen, Robert Reardon, Joshua Shifrinson, ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Rachel Whitlark, and Zachary Zwald all read multiple chapters, in many cases multiple times, and provided detailed feedback. At Cornell Univer- sity Press I thank Roger Haydon, the anonymous referee, and the series editors for their direction and careful reading of the manuscript. Their sug- gestions helped me clarify many key claims. Portions of this book draw on material previously published in Paul C. Avey, “Who’s Afraid of the Bomb? The Role of Nuclear Non-use Norms in Confrontations between Nuclear and Non-nuclear Opponents,” Security Studies 24 (2015), reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd. I benefi ted greatly from the diverse intellectual environments at several institutions that provided me space to work on this book. I am grateful to each one. The research began at the University of Notre Dame and expanded with the support of the Managing the Atom and International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. The Stanton Foundation provided generous funding to allow me to spend a year with MIT’s Security Studies Program. I thank Chris Alkhoury for his excellent guidance through the Iraqi docu- ments then held at the Confl ict Records Research Center. The John G. Tower Center for Political Studies at SMU offered me the ability to refi ne my thinking at a key stage of the project. I owe special thanks to Joshua Rovner for his support and willingness to discuss a wide range of issues while I was there and since. I fi nished the book as a faculty member in the political science department at Virginia Tech, which offers a collegial and stimulating environment spurred on by a wide range of perspectives. It is a great place to call home. For helpful conversations, feedback, and support, I thank Megan Becker, Mark Bell, Kirstin J. H. Brathwaite, Robert Brathwaite, Stephen Brooks, Matthew Bunn, Peter Campbell, Mauro Caraccioli, Fotini Christia, Owen Coté, Rebecca Davis-Gibbons, François Debrix, Priya Dixit, Melissa Emmert, Greg Endicott, Charles Fagan, Patrick Flavin, Gene Gerzhoy, Nicholas Goedert, Kim Hedge, James Hollifi eld, Karen Hult, Caitlin Jewitt, Jason Kelly, Karin Kitchens, Margarita Konaev, Alexander Lanoszka, Chris- tine Leah, Chad Levinson, Timothy Luke, Susan Lynch, Sean Lynn-Jones, Richard Maass, Martin Malin, Jonathan Markowitz, Steven Miller, Vipin Narang, Scott Nelson, David Palkki, Soul Park, Abigail Post, Bruce Pencek, Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, Miranda Priebe, Besnik Pula, Ray Rafi di, Matthew Reitz, Joli Divon Saraf, Ji Hye Shin, Gregory Shufeldt, Ray Thomas, Edward Weisband, and William Wohlforth. My sincere apologies to anyone I have forgotten. Most of all, I thank my family. I dedicate this book to my parents, Kathy and Donald. Their support at each stage of my life has been unwavering. I would not have been in a position to even begin this book without them. Their biggest infl uence, though they may not know it, has been through their own example of humility, fairness, and hard work. I have tried to x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS bring these traits to my research and how I live my life. My sister, Laura, has offered her encouragement as long as I can remember. I could not ask for a better one. Finally, I thank my wife and best friend, Megan. Her grace and good humor while we moved from Indiana to Massachusetts to Texas to Virginia made completing this book possible. She is an unfailing source of love and support to a grateful husband. xi Tempting Fate Introduction Surveying the devastation in Japan after World War II, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that “no more forceful arguments for peace and for the international machinery of peace than the sight of the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have ever been devised.” 1 The world quickly sought to make sense of the “absolute weapon.” 2 Yet the power of the two bombs unleashed in 1945 would pale compared to the thermonuclear variants that would follow. The sheer speed and destruc- tiveness of nuclear arms seemed to constitute a “nuclear revolution,” destined to upend international politics. 3 Any country that lacked a nuclear arsenal would fi nd itself vulnerable, unable to prevent becoming the target of a nuclear strike by threatening retaliation on the same scale. Despite these weapons’ awesome power, though, countries without nuclear arms have not shied away from challenging and resisting nuclear- armed states. In 1948, less than three years after the United States had dem- onstrated its willingness to use nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin, directly challenging the American nuclear monopoly. The Soviets then stood fi rm for nearly a year against US efforts to under- mine that blockade. Two years later, the young People’s Republic of China attacked US troops in Korea. Egypt and Syria combined to launch a mas- sive assault on Israeli forces in October 1973. Iraq ignored US threats in 1990, and Serbia did likewise in 1999. In 1979, nonnuclear Vietnam fought a war against nuclear-armed China. The list goes on. According to one widely used confl ict list, there have been sixteen wars between nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states from 1945 to 2010 and hundreds of lower-level militarized disputes. During that same period there were nine- teen wars between states with no nuclear weapons. In other words, wars in which one side holds a nuclear monopoly occur about as often as those between states where neither side has nuclear weapons. Moreover, the non- nuclear weapon state (NNWS) frequently starts the trouble. In other cases, 1 INTRODUCTION the NNWS could have ceded to the demands of the nuclear weapon state (NWS) without giving up its rule or territory.