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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

2009 The Role of U.S. Women Diplomats Between 1945 and 2004 Rachel Jane Beckett

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

THE ROLE OF U.S. WOMEN DIPLOMATS BETWEEN 1945 AND 2004

BY

RACHEL JANE BECKETT

A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2009 The members of the Committee approve the Thesis of Rachel Beckett defended on December 10, 2008.

______Suzanne Sinke Professor Directing Thesis

______Charles Upchurch Committee Member

______Michael Creswell Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above named committee members.

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables iv Abstract v

INTRODUCTION 1

1. ACCOMPLISHED BUT STILL LAGGING BEHIND 13

2. “PERCEPTION” AS THE STANDARD 29

3. STRATEGICAL GATEKEEPERS 48

CONCLUSION 68

REFERENCES 74

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 83

iii LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Degree Type 17

Table 1.2 Degree Concentration 17

Table 1.3 Number of Foreign Languages Spoken 18

Table 1.4 Type of Languages Spoken 19

Table 1.5 Female Chiefs of Mission by Region, 1933-2004 27

Table 2.1 Where Female Ambassadors are Most Frequently Assigned 34

Table 2.2 Percent of Women in National Legislatures, by region, 1975-97 35

Table 2.3 Appointment of Women as Chiefs of Mission and to other Senior Posts by Administration, 1933-2004 44

iv ABSTRACT

Though historical scholarship on gender and international relations has grown over the last few decades, there has been little work done on women in the Foreign Service. The main objective of this thesis is to examine the role of women diplomats within the Foreign Service since 1945 and to examine how gender differences related to the low numbers of women within the field during a time when women’s representation in other male-dominated fields increased substantially. The study is divided into three chapters that focus on determining how certain factors affected women’s marginalization within the field. The first chapter examines the basic statistics of the women diplomats. Chapter two explores the policies of other countries towards accepting female diplomats, and the last chapter investigates how women conducted foreign policy and carried out the goals of the administration. The conclusion provides an analysis of the findings of all three areas and how they relate to women’s access to fields both within and outside politics.

v INTRODUCTION

For well over a hundred and fifty years women in the United States participated in politics in various ways, sometimes in organizations devoted to promoting moral reform, sometimes as legislators within the system. The scholarship covering women’s political history runs the gamut from exploring the ways in which women played a part in the political process to investigating how gender constructs affected the political decision making process. Also, while the field expanded from looking only at women within the top levels of government to examining those at the grass-roots level, the widening of the field only led to more questions as scholars of women’s political history sorted through the discrepancies that existed between women of different social classes, races, and ethnicities. Today, many of the questions arising in the field of women’s political history do not stem from trying to find out where women carved out a place for themselves within the political arena, but in uncovering the ways in which gender stereotypes shaped politics. The purpose of this study is to build upon the work of scholars of women's political history by examining the way gender perceptions affected women in diplomacy. While the post World War II period ushered in new and exciting possibilities for women in the political arena, it was not until 2001 that the number of women achieving top level positions grew significantly. This thesis examines the roles of women in the Foreign Service since 1945 and examines how gender differences related to the low numbers of women within the field during a time when women’s representation in other male- dominated fields expanded substantially. In addition, it presents an overview of women's history in order to assess why the advancement of women into the political arena, specifically in the field of foreign relations and diplomacy, fell behind other male-dominated fields that saw significant increases in women’s representation. The investigation seeks to provide a general history of the role of women within the Foreign Service over the past sixty years, from the end of World War II to the beginning of the 21st century. One of the challenges in writing this type of history is where to place it in relation to other women’s political histories. This study of women’s diplomatic roles combines

1 more traditional feminist historical approaches with other methods stemming from the fields of international relations (IR) and political science. The literature in the field of women and politics largely ignored women in foreign relations. For much of the last three decades the scholarship written about women’s role in politics centered on the women’s movement or the “feminist” movement, activist groups such as those in or on broadening the definition of politics, or finding gender in political thought. While these works offered insights into the history of women’s access to political equality and helped publicize areas in which women and gender shaped politics, they did not delve into all areas of politics. Some provided insights for other areas of feminist/gender studies, and hence deserve study as a first step in examining the feminist political past. Many historians who studied women’s political activities during the nineteenth century noted that individuals tended to draw a distinction between the “public” and the “private," in fields such as formal politics and economics, the “public” defined as the domain of men, and the “private” defined as the domain of women. Linda K. Kerber, for example, in No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship explored how the public/private division acted as an impediment to women's participation as full-fledged United States citizens.1 Kerber identified a key component as the legacy of "coverture" by which women's rights transferred to their husbands at marriage; therefore, husbands represented their wives politically and women "could make no claims of rights against the political community."2 Thus, it was harder for women to demand suffrage, protection, and other rights from the state, when their obligations lay with their husbands. Kerber pointed out, that even while new laws and traditions began to take shape during the late nineteenth century and onward, the old tradition of coverture still encouraged differential treatment between the sexes. Other scholars, such as Paula Baker and Ellen Carol DuBois, showed that while some maintained during the nineteenth century that the public was the purview of men and the private the purview of women, in reality this was not necessarily the case. In "The Domestication of Politics," Baker argued that women of the nineteenth century participated in the public by enforcing their ownership of the “private” through various

1 Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998). 2 Ibid, 305.

2 means such as the creation of organizations that focused upon maintaining standards of morality and the home, which sought to affect the behaviors of others.3 DuBois explained this idea further in relation to suffrage in her book Woman Suffrage and Women's Rights in which she posited that "the significance of the woman suffrage movement rested precisely on the fact that it bypassed woman's oppression within the family, or private sphere, and demanded instead her admission to citizenship, and through it admission to the public arena."4 Both Baker and DuBois noted that though there was segregation between the activities of men and women during the nineteenth century, women were able to "demolish the absolute"5 through organizations and the suffrage movement in order to carve out a place for themselves within political life. The blurring of lines between the public and the private increased in the early to mid-twentieth century. The historians Elisabeth Israels Perry and Susan Ware both showed this shift, but in two very different accounts of women's political participation during the early 1900s. Perry’s account of the life of Belle Moskowitz revealed how Moskowitz used her femininity and the ideal of womanly nuturehood to press her agenda on Al Smith.6 Unafraid to embrace her “softer” side, Moskowitz kept within traditional ideals of womanhood, but according to Perry still broke into the “public” sphere despite her gender. Susan Ware’s depiction of Molly Dewson offered juxtaposition to the life of Moskowitz because Dewson rejected traditional gender roles, and while she did not claim to be a politician, Dewson dedicated her life to advocating for both women’s issues and the ideals of the New Deal.7 Dewson’s lifestyle and partner choices became an important part of Ware’s narrative because they highlighted the choices that were opening up to women in the twentieth century, both politically, economically, and socially.

3 Paula Baker, “The Domestication of Politics: Women and American Political Society, 1780-1920,” The American Historical Review, no. 3 (Jun. 1984), 647. 4 Ellen Carol DuBois, Woman Suffrage and Women's Rights, (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 31. 5 Ibid, 34. 6 Elisabeth Israels Perry, Belle Moskowitz: Feminine Politics and the Exercise of Power in the Age of Alfred E. Smith, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 7 Susan Ware, Partner and I: Molly Dewson, Feminism, and New Deal Politics, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

3 Biography, while a popular method for exploring the lives of women activists, shared the stage with other kinds of investigations of women’s political participation during the early twentieth century. Nancy Cott’s work, The Grounding of Modern Feminism, sought to trace the transition between what some scholars labeled the first (pre-suffrage and suffrage movement) and the second (1960-1970) waves of feminism.8 Instead of making oversweeping analyses about the feminist movement during this period, Cott focused more on showing the divisions within the movement and how women fought for both women as a group and for their own identities. Cott’s study emphasized the differences between women such as Moskowitz and Dewson, and disproved the idea that all women shared interests. Whilst Cott’s study lent new insights into the conflict facing women politically who were coming out of the first wave of the feminist movement, other works such as Leila Rupp and VertaTaylor’s Survival in the Doldrums9 filled in the gap missing on women of the 1940s and 1950s, who had previously been excluded from the scholarship covering women’s political participation. Rupp and Taylor argued that a small group of women were able to help the women’s movement survive and were the impetus for the women’s liberation movement of the 1960s. Though Rupp and Taylor handed the majority of credit to a small group of women, their analysis was no less important given that it showed that even though women might not be out on the forefront of political headlines, that they could still be involved politically. Kathleen Berkeley offered a look at the second wave feminist movement, 1960- 1980, and how it fit within the larger context of feminist history in The Women's Liberation Movement in America.10 Like Cott, Berkeley shied away from making any overarching conclusions about the women’s liberation movement, but saw the second wave as an extension of the first, giving credence to Rupp and Taylor’s argument that ideas taken from the first wave of the women’s movement carried over to second wave feminists through women of the 1940s and 1950s. Berkeley also stressed that second wave feminists had just as many differences as the women’s movement of the early

8 Nancy Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.) 9 Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor, Survival in the Doldrums: the American Women’s Rights Movement, 1945 to the 1960s, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.) 10 Kathleen C. Berkeley, The Women’s Liberation Movement in America, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999.)

4 twentieth century and that these differences in thoughts and ideas about women’s issues and what was important varied among different groups, emphasizing the importance that scholars should not only examine women as a group with the same ideas and beliefs, but should recognize the differences within gender categories.11 Scholars focusing on the women’s movement have not been devoted to exploring women’s political participation by only looking at the movement in pieces. Even though historical scholarship focusing upon specific periods provided new insights into women’s political battles while in the women’s movement, they did not show either a progressive timeline of women’s activities in which change could be seen. Neither have the scholars assessed the role women played in politics outside of the feminist movement. Melanie Gustafson, Kristie Miller, and Elisabeth Israels Perry helped fill this void within the scholarship. In We Have Come to Stay Gustafson, Miller, and Perry devoted their efforts to providing a history of women’s political participation in party politics from the period between 1880, when women “began a systematic effort to find formal places in political parties” and the 1960s, when they saw modern feminism beginning to create new political challenges.12 Jo Freeman’s A Room at a Time built upon Gustafson’s, Miller’s, and Perry’s critique by delving deeper into the material.13 Whereas We Have Come to Stay was a compilation of essays from various voices, Freeman’s account kept a more consistent tone. Freeman proposed that three major types of female political activists emerged at the turn-of-the twentieth century: feminists, reformers, and party women, who “wove together like a somewhat frazzled braid,”14 and even as she pointed out that there were differences between women, she argued that “women” as a whole still shared the common goal of political equality. Claire Goldberg Moses and Heidi Hartmann’s piece on U.S. Women in Struggle15 emphasized this point even more. Moses and Hartmann labeled women’s oppression by men an obstacle to women’s political equality, and though they documented the ways in

11 Ibid. 12 Melanie Gustafson; Miller, Kristie; and Perry, Elisabeth Israels, eds. We Have Come to Stay: American Women and Political Parties, 1880-1960 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999), p. ix. 13 Freeman, Jo, A Room at a Time: How Women Entered Party Politics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). 14 Freeman, 4. 15 Claire Goldberg Moses and Heidi Hartmann, U.S. Women in Struggle: A Feminist Studies Anthology (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995).

5 which women banded together despite their differences to work at gaining equality, they also recognized that women could be equally oppressive to other women, perhaps based on class status, race, or ethnicity. Moses and Hartmann’s work questioned the idea that gender differences were the sole impediment to women’s unequal political participation. This raised the challenge for scholars to not only look at women outside of a unified whole, but also on a multicultural and mixed class basis. In sum, the historical scholarship on the women’s movement demonstrated how women organized themselves both as a unified group and as individuals in order to gain access to political power. Yet, where historians focused primarily on the women’s/feminist movements as a source for exploring women’s political participation, this type of analysis slighted the ways in which the political environment changed and the impact of that change on specific areas within politics, especially within the field of foreign relations. Homer Calkin pioneered a history of women in the Department of State by providing an overview of the history of women within the Foreign Service. Calkin's study, from 1978, argued that though women's participation within the Foreign Service increased after 1945 there were still inequalities and barriers. His study ended with 1970 and did not investigate the reasons behind the continuing inequalities within the field. 16 Calkin's work stood almost alone in terms of scholarship of women in foreign policy until Cynthia Enloe examined the topic in Bananas, Beaches, & Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Enloe did not focus directly on women diplomats, but concentrated on the wider issue of the ways in which women outside of formal “diplomatic” roles impacted foreign policy. She paid special attention to the role of diplomatic wives, arguing that since the early nineteenth century both British and American governments regarded diplomatic wives as an essential, although unofficial, element of the foreign policy apparatus. Enloe stated, “If managed correctly, women as wives help a government achieve its international objectives. If they aren’t controlled effectively, however, they can do serious damage to a government’s global interests.”17

16 Homer L. Calkin, Women in the Department of State: Their Role in American Foreign Affairs (Washington, DC: Department of State 1978), 281. 17 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, & Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley: University of California, 1990), 93.

6 However, Enloe pointed out that the same distinction was not made for women diplomats with male spouses, revealing that up until the 1970s women diplomats who chose to marry were forced to resign.18 Molly M. Wood carried Enloe’s work further in “Diplomatic Wives: The Politics of Domesticity and the ‘Social Game’ in the U.S. Foreign Service, 1905-1941,” in which she argued that the successful transmission of American representation in diplomacy depended on the diplomatic wife’s “smooth management of her traditional domestic and social responsibilities.”19 Hence, Wood revealed that conventional gender roles were reinforced while at the same time defining the conduct of American diplomacy. Both Enloe’s and Wood’s works contributed to the understanding of the gendered ethos of diplomacy; yet, they still dealt little with the actual role of women diplomats. The crossroads of political science and gender studies provided examples for expanding the work of women in politics by exploring the impact of gender upon political participation not only with candidacy, but also with electoral politics. Scholars such as Ruth Mandel and Susan Carroll focused upon the barriers facing women who decided to run for office. In In the Running,20 Mandel argued that women refrain from running or face greater opposition because of gender stereotypes in society since birth, but also because of the added burden of the expectation that they would be responsive to women’s issues. Carroll also approached the candidacy issue from a similar method in Women and American Politics: New Questions, New Directions,21 but added to Mandel’s argument by suggesting that the structure of political opportunity also shaped the outcome of women’s decisions to run for office or to be elected. Despite the fact that Mandel and Carroll’s works sought to offer explanations for and examined changes within the candidacy process, both of them limited their scope to obstacles—a victim perspective—instead of looking at achievements that women made. Linda Witt, Karen M. Paget, and Glenna Matthews, offered a different perspective in

18 Enloe, 116-117. 19 Molly M. Wood, “Diplomatic Wives: The Politics of Domesticity and the ‘Social Game’ in the U.S. Foreign Service, 1905-1941,” 159. 20 Ruth B. Mandel, In the Running: The New Woman Candidate (New Haven: Ticknor & Fields, 1981). 21 Susan J. Carroll, Women and American Politics: New Questions, New Directions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

7 Running as a Woman ,22 contending that the feminist movement of the 1970s helped change the political atmosphere and allowed women to start running as women by not having to stress their similarity to men. Michael Carpini and Ester Fuchs also pursued a similar argument in “The Year of the Woman? Candidates, Voters, and the 1992 Elections.”23 Carpini and Fuchs advanced Witt, Paget, and Matthews’ argument. They highlighted the advantages of using feminist stereotypes in the 1992 election, a new development according to the authors. The scholars following Witt, Paget, and Matthews, and Carpini and Fuchs relegated themselves once again to examining the reasons behind women’s low representation, albeit on a much more in-depth scale. Kim Hoffman, Carrie Palmer, and Ronald Gaddie pursued a quantitative approach to assess the reasons behind women’s low representation in Congress after the 1992 elections.24 They determined that the low numbers reflected candidacy issues, suggesting that conceptions of gender formed one obstacle as did running against an incumbent. Their analysis, however, stopped short of explaining why gender served as an obstacle and left the field open for more investigation. In “Family Structure, Sex-Role Socialization, and the Decision to Run for Office,”25 Richard Fox and Jennifer Lawless challenged the traditional explanation coming out of the field that the low numbers were due to the low numbers of eligible women in the candidacy pool and suggested that traditional sex-role socialization affected the initial decision to seek candidacy, thereby limiting how many women decided to run. Though Fox and Lawless restricted their study to New York State, their research, nonetheless, suggested a new way of assessing how gender stereotypes affected political decision. While the candidacy process constituted a major theme for scholars of women’s political history, there were still unexplored avenues within the candidacy

22 Linda Witt, Karen M. Paget and Glenna Matthews, Running as a Woman: Gender and Power in American Politics (New York: Free Press, 1994). 23 Michael Carpini and Ester Fuchs, “The Year of the Woman? Candidates, Voters, and the 1992 Elections.” Political Science Quarterly, no. 1 (Spring, 1993). 24 Kim Hoffman, Carrie Palmer, and Ronald Gaddie. 2002, “Candidate Sex and Congressional Elections Outcomes: A Longitudinal Look Through the Open Seats.” Women &Politics (1 & 2). 25 Richard Fox and Jennifer Lawless, “Family Structure, Sex-Role Socialization, and the Decision to Run for Office,” Women & Politics, no. 4 (2003). http://www.haworthpress.com/store/product.asp?sku=J014.

8 process, such as the media’s role and the difference in how women belonging to different parties pursued the campaign process. Another major trend in women’s political history was the focus upon electoral representation and electoral experience women. The work of Susan Hartmann From Margin to Mainstream26 reflected the typical view taken by early scholars of women’s political history, stressing the importance of the women’s movement of the 1970s as an impetus for moving women from the margin of politics into the mainstream. Hartmann argued that the involvement of women in grass-root movements gave them the desire and the experience that they needed to achieve electoral success. Though her narrative offered a broad history of the political experience of women from the 1970s through the late 1980s, she wrote little about the experience of the woman once in office. Editors Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox took up this in Women and Elective Office,27 exploring the past, present, and future of women’s elective experience and examining various levels of government. Their work offered a comparative analysis that assessed the similarities and differences of women state legislators and also explored the experiences of African- American women in the South. They contended that parties/society needed to include women as political participants because of the differences they brought to the process: 1) the way in which they pursued policies and made decisions; 2) what they deemed important; and 3) the policies that they put forward. In general the scholarship coming out of the field of gender and political science highlighted the added burdens that women as a group faced because of their gender (particularly family restrictions and the question of supporting “women’s” issues as a source for political inequality), but the scholarship has also stressed the importance of examining women’s differences, not only from men but also from one another, when studying women’s contributions to politics. Many of the earlier scholars examining gender and political science centered their works on the ideas coming out of the feminist movements of the late nineteenth through mid-twentieth century in which the liberal and radical feminist approaches prevailed. However, more recent works steered away from these ideologies. Sandra Whitworth’s

26 Susan M. Hartmann, From Margin to Mainstream (New York: Knopf, 1989). 27 Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox, Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.)

9 Feminism and International Relations followed this trajectory, researching how gender constructs intersected with IR theory.28 Whitworth incorporated a little of each of the liberal feminism, radical feminism, and postmodern feminism approaches into what she terms as “critical/feminist IR theory,” while discarding their limitations, such as the liberal feminists' refusal to theorize about inequalities in power and relations of domination and the postmodernist inability to move beyond the grounding of identities and meanings in “an ambiguous play of power.”29 Instead, Whitworth suggested that critical/feminist IR theory “assess not only the particular institutional and policy biases which affect the lives of women and men, but also the manner in which these biases were created, the effects they have, and the possibilities for change.”30 She recommended that scholars studying international relations examine not only social construction of gender relations, but also the construction of social relations, which she suggested applying to a number of traditional IR concerns.31 Even as Whitworth called for a more critical assessment of IR/feminist theory, much of her work centered upon showing how socially-derived gender constructs gave men a dominant position over women. Whitworth used “woman” or “femininity” as the central focus of her analysis. In contrast, editors Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart sought to put “man” at the center of their analysis by looking at how “masculinistic” practices affected the field.32 In spite of their efforts, Zalewski and Parpart’s examination reflected much of the same thought as did Whitworth’s. Zalewski and Parpart reached similar conclusions about the hierarchy of power due to social constructions of gendered identities. However, where their investigation differed in its assessment was their contention that these hierarchies of power existed within genders as well as along the male/female binary.33 Charlotte Hooper’s later work, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics built upon Zalewski and Parpart’s work by looking at how

28 Sandra Whitworth, Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non-Governmental Institutions (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). 29 Ibid, 30-31. 30 Ibid, 31. 31 Ibid, 56. 32 Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart, The “Man” Question in International Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). 33 Zalewski, 204.

10 international relations shaped, defined, or legitimated modern conceptions of masculinities.34 Instead of confining the construction of gender identities to the “domestic” arena, Hooper suggested that “masculinities” developed through international circuits via colonial pursuits and “foreign adventure.”35 Hooper pointed out that because Anglo-American modern constructions of masculinity are so dominated by the field of international relations, which she says “reproduces all the elitism and internal complexities and rivalries of that hegemonic masculinity”36 that it may be harder for women to reform the field. However, Hooper suggested that with continued marginal attention to the issue of gender within international relations, that over time, a break down in the production of dominant masculine identities may occur making the field more accessible to women. Lastly, J. Ann Tickner in Gendering World Politics did not offer so much as a new approach to exploring gender within the field of IR, so much as she tried to show where feminist perspectives met international relations theory.37 She devoted her chapter on "War, Peace, and Security," fundamental topics of IR scholars and ones that typically overlook gender, to showing how to incorporate and explore gender within these subgroups without challenging some of the more conventional IR methods. For instance, Tickner pointed out that, “the culture and identity of states is important for understanding their security-seeking behavior,” which ties in to feminist perspectives that draws links between security and emancipation, such as the belief that constricting the legitimate ways for a state to act in regards to security issues can contribute to the subordination of women in matters of policy-making.38 Tickner’s work offered a framework for scholars seeking to study feminist/IR theory and pointed to new methods for exploring women’s political participation on an international basis. All of the works within these three areas of study: history, political science, and International Relations, examined women’s political participation. This study combines all three areas. It investigates women within the Foreign Service on not only a historical

34 Charlotte Hooper, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 35 Ibid, 5. 36 Ibid, 226. 37 J. Ann Tickner, Gendering World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 38 Ibid, 63.

11 basis, but also examines the ways in which gender, as well as power constructs contributed to women’s inequality within the Department of State. This study begins by looking at how the end of World War II contributed to gains in women’s employment and politics, and how the ideas that emerged from the end of the war inspired the women’s movement of the late 1960s. Chapter two provides a quantitative analysis of the basic data on women ambassadors and officers over the past sixty years. With these basic statistics on women diplomats in hand, Chapter Three examines the ways in which women diplomats interpreted and carried out foreign policy and suggests how this affected top government officials' decisions about appointing women to certain posts. It also analyzes how other countries' perceptions about female diplomats contributed to the United States' decision to appoint women as diplomats. Finally, the conclusion discusses the future of women within the Foreign Service and the broader implications this study has for the field.

12 CHAPTER 1 ACCOMPLISHED BUT STILL LAGGING BEHIND

Despite early women suffragists and women's rights advocates' fight for greater equality for women in all areas of life, women within the United States made little progress in numbers within the field of diplomacy. Labor market segmentation, the division of labor between men’s work and women’s work, remained commonplace in the United States long after sex restrictions ended. Not only were there men who were reluctant to allow women greater access into male-dominated fields, but there were also a large number of women who were opposed the blending of job spheres even after women gained the vote. Complacency, reflected in the declining number of women in feminist organizations, in the in-between years of the first and second wave feminist movements slowed and sometimes reversed the progress women made. Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor have argued that even though there were fewer women participating in feminist organizations it did not mean that they were less concerned about gaining equality.39 Instead, women’s focus shifted their (top) priorities changed. Women became less concerned with achieving equality and became more concerned with national security with the end of World War I and the threat of a new war. Even women such as Eleanor Roosevelt and Minnie Fisher Cunningham, who were at the forefront of feminist activities, shifted their priorities to preserving national security.40 Eleanor Roosevelt, known as a leading advocate for women's rights, became a spokesperson and role model for knitting socks for soldiers and serving as a “mother” figure to wounded soldiers overseas. Yet, this shifting of priorities did not mean that Eleanor Roosevelt or other women had lost interest in women’s equality. With the dawning of World War II and the shipping out of the massive amount of male soldiers women also had less time to concentrate on feminist activities because many of them had answered the call emanating from the government, as well as private

39 Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor, Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women’s Rights Movement, 1945 to the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 40Blanche Wiesen Cook. Eleanor Roosevelt (New York: Viking, 1992). Judith N. McArthur Minnie Fisher Cunningham: A Suffragist's Life in Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

13 organizations to join the workforce. The “Rosie the Riveter” campaign and others like it helped draw thousands of women into previously all-male or largely male jobs.41 Women experienced a new sense of freedom and accomplishment when they obtained such positions.42 Those who joined the workforce in “male” careers also saw that they could perform just as well men in these positions.43 Women's awareness of their capabilities arose. However, the end of World War II once again changed the dynamic of the situation and posed new challenges to women’s fight for equality. The return of soldiers and the beginning of the Cold War hampered the advancement women had made professionally. Because of these two events, some scholars argue that the second push for women’s equality would not be significantly felt until the mid to late 1960s, and women’s participation in male dominated fields would not increase until new laws went into effect because of the movement. With the end of World War II, thousands of men returned from overseas expecting to return to their previous jobs, and the young men who had grown up through the war came back looking for work. The majority of women who had taken the jobs during the war lost their positions in part from retooling to civilian production, but also to make room for the men; therefore, the women had to either return to the home or look for other jobs that were considered “women’s” work.44 Some women were content to return to their homes, but there were also many women who discovered a new source of accomplishment and purpose in the jobs that they had not found before the war. Many of these women were left feeling displaced and

41 Penny Colman, Rosie the Riveter: Women Working on the Home Front in World War II (New York: Crown Publishers, 1995). 6; Maureen Honey, “The ‘Womanpower’ Campaign: Advertising and Recruitment Propaganda during World War II” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, no. 1/2, NWSA:Selected Conference Proceedings, 1980, (Spring - Summer, 1981). 42 Kaylene Hughes. “Women at War: Redstone’s WWII Female ‘Production Soldiers,” The Women of Redstone Arsenal: A Chronology, 1941-2005, 1992. http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/women/welcome.html. 43 Karen Anderson, Wartime Women: Sex Roles, Family Relations and the Status of Women during World War II (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 62. 44 Maureen Honey, “The ‘Womanpower’ Campaign: Advertising and Recruitment Propaganda during World War II” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, no. 1/2, NWSA:Selected Conference Proceedings, 1980, (Spring - Summer, 1981), 54.

14 angry because they were forced out of their positions. 45 In Rosie the Riveter: Women Working on the Home Front in World War II, Penny Colman stated that 200 women who had been laid off from the Highland Park, Michigan Ford plant conducted a protest with signs that read “How Come No Work for Women” and “Stop Discrimination Because of Sex.”46 Yet, these feelings of injustice would have to wait to be released for several years due to the onset of the Cold War and the efforts of one particular individual. While World War II gave women an opportunity to work in new fields, the onset of the Cold War, which began after WWII, and the efforts of Joseph McCarthy held women back from advocating change. Perhaps Senator Joseph McCarthy did not directly hold back women’s equality, but McCarthyism and the Lavender Scare (the persecution of homosexuals believed to be susceptible to Communism) operated as brakes on women's professional advance. Compared to WWII, the costs of pursuing male- dominated careers and women’s rights in the 1950s were much greater.47 A fear of communism and of the taint that came with the label “communist sympathizer” overtook the country. Anyone who challenged the “status quo” risked the pro-communist red- wash. Some, including women, went on trial for being subversive and pro-communist.48 A conservative wave washed over the country, making people reluctant to pursue avenues in which they could be targeted as being subversive.49 It was not until after McCarthyism waned in the mid 1950s that women en masse showed a renewed interest in pursuing equality on both a social and political front. As with the first wave feminist movement, the feminist movement of the 1960s followed closely on the heels of the civil rights movement.50 While the 1960s women's

45 Mary M. Schweitzer, “World War II and Female Labor Force Participation Rates,” The Journal of Economic History, no. 1, The Tasks of Economic History (Mar., 1980), 91. 46 Colman, 99. 47 Leila J. Rupp, “The Women’s Community in the National Woman’s Party, 1945 to the 1960s,” Signs, no. 4, Communities of Women (Summer, 1985), 718. 48 Executive Sessions of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations (McCarthy Hearings 1953-1954). United States Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; Committee Prints, 107th Congress. S. Prt. 107-84. www.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate12cp107.html. 49 Memorandum, President Eisenhower to Attorney General Herbert Brownell, November 4, 1953. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum. www.eisenhowerarchives.gov/dl/McCarthy/McCartheydocuments.html. 50 Rachel A. Rosenfeld and Kathryn B. Ward, “The Contemporary U.S. Women’s Movement: An Empirical Example of Competition Theory, “ Sociological Forum, no. 3 (Sep., 1991), 492 & 496; Cynthia

15 movement, along with anti-discrimination laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, helped women achieve greater access into male-dominated professions, women faced greater obstacles in entering the political field. “From 1970 to 1980 the representation of women grew from 25% to 38% in accounting, 10% to 27% in business management, and 5% to 14% in law,” while by 2004 only 8% of women achieved chief of mission positions.51 A broad history of women's access into the upper levels of the State Department provides more insight into why women have made fewer gains politically than they have in other male-dominated careers. The State Department gained the reputation of being an "Old Boy's Club," due to the prevalence of men in diplomatic positions and low levels of women and minorities in top level positions. The first woman to achieve diplomatic status was Ruth Bryan Owen in 1933 as Minister to Denmark, which was 157 years after Benjamin Franklin became the first U.S. diplomat.52 It was another sixteen years until Eugenie Moore Anderson became the first woman Ambassador in 194953, and it took another forty-eight years for Madeleine Albright to become the first woman Secretary of State.54 "From 1933, when the first woman was appointed chief of mission, to the end of 2004, 2,450 persons filled chief of mission positions either as minister, ambassador, or charge d'affaires. Of those, 199 (8 percent) were women."55 Since 1945 there have been a number of women diplomats and ambassadors who came to the job with high levels of education, as well as extensive professional backgrounds. Although information on the average educational levels of everyone achieving chief of mission status during the period is unavailable, B. Drummond Ayres Jr. article “A New Breed of Diplomat” from 1983 states: “More than half of F.S.I.’s (Foreign Service Institute) recent graduates have master’s degrees…One of every 20

Deitch, “Gender, Race, and Class Politics and the Inclusion of Women in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” Gender and Society, no. 2 (June, 1993), 188. 51 Corinna A. Ethington, John C. Smart, and Ernest T. Pascarella, “Influences on Women’s Entry into Male-Dominated Occupations,” Higher Education, no. 5, Women (1988), 546; Ann Wright, “For the Record: Breaking Through Diplomacy’s Glass Ceiling,” Foreign Service Journal, no. 10 (Oct., 2005), 58. 52 US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Alphabetical List of Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officials, 1778-2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po/11645.htm. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ann Wright, “For the Record: Breaking Through Diplomacy’s Glass Ceiling,” Foreign Service Journal, no. 10 (Oct., 2005), 58.

16 holds a doctorate. Almost half possess acceptable skills in at least one foreign language.”56 The basic data on the educational levels of the women is consistent with this figure. The majority of the women obtained a college degree and that over half of them went on to pursue graduate degrees. Out of ninety women whose educational levels appear in sources, eighty-five hold Bachelor's degrees and fifty-five of them have graduate degrees. The sources identify only three out of the ninety-six as only holding a high school degree, and the other three do not specify the level of education.

Table 1.157 Degree Type Total # of Women Bachelor's Degree Graduate Degree 90 87 55 Percentage 97% 61%

The biographies record the area of study for forty-six women, of these, fifty-nine percent of them hold degrees in political science and international relations. Thirteen percent of the women gained degrees in economics and law, while seven percent have degrees in history, and four percent have a degree in government. Half of the women have degrees in another field, such as language, sociology, and communications.

Table 1.258 Degree Concentration # of Women Poli-Sci IR History Econ Govt Law Other 46 11 16 3 6 2 6 23 Percentage 24% 35% 7% 13% 4% 13% 50% *Note – these figures take into account both undergraduate and graduate degrees, as well as double majors.

While recent scholars such as Edward Crapol, Cynthia Enloe, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, and Robert Schaffer centered their studies upon revealing the ways in which women affected foreign affairs outside of major political fields, showing that women have been a part of

56 B. Drummond Ayres Jr., “A New Breed of Diplomat,” New York Times (Sep. 11, 1983), 70. 57 Statistical information gathered from interviews taken from the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project and the biographies listed on the State Department website. 58 Ibid.

17 international relations in non-traditional ways of thinking, that type of analysis does not help scholars to understand why women remained a tiny minority for over sixty years within the State Department.59 The basic educational statistics of the women diplomats reveal that women within the Foreign Service apparatus were well educated, knowledgeable, and interested in world affairs during the period. Aside from the degrees that the women hold, many of the women obtaining top level positions within the Foreign Service have also been multilingual, which also is consistent with the figure mentioned in “A New Breed of Diplomat.” Many of the women studied at least one foreign language prior to and during their diplomatic service. Thirty- seven out of forty-four women spoke at least one other language besides English. The majority of the women spoke, or were trained in, two languages other than English. Eleven women have been trained in three other languages, five women trained in four other languages, two trained in five other languages, and one woman trained in six other languages besides English.

Table 1.360 Number of Foreign Languages Spoken Total # of 0 Lang. 1 Lang. 2 Lang. 3 Lang. 4 Lang. 5 Lang. 6 Lang. Women 44 7 3 15 11 5 2 1 Percentage 16% 7% 34% 25% 11% 5% 2%

Of the foreign languages, the two most popular were French and Spanish. Sixty-six percent of the women learned at least basic French and forty-three percent studied at least basic Spanish.61 Fifty-seven percent of the women learned languages less commonly

59 Edward Crapol, ed., Women and American Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (Wilminghton, DE Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1992). Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1917-1994.(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995); Robert Schaffer, “Women and International Relations: Pearl S. Buck’s Critique of the Cold War,” Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 11 No. 3 (Autumn). 60 Statistical information gathered from interviews taken from the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project and the biographies listed on the State Department website. 61 Ibid.

18 offered in the U.S., such as Japanese, Russian, Arabic, Bulgarian, Icelandic, and Urdu.62 Hence, not only did a majority of the women have an understanding of world affairs, but a large percentage of the women could also converse with others of a different language.

Table 1.463 Type of Languages Spoken Total # of Women French Spanish German Italian Latin Other 44 29 19 9 4 4 25 Percentage 66% 43% 20% 9% 9% 57%

Along with many of the women's advanced educational levels, the majority of the women also accumulated impressive professional backgrounds. Out of 217 female chiefs of mission between 1933 and 2004, 111 were career Foreign Service officers who worked their way up through the ranks over several years.64 Many these women did so while facing inadvertent and blatant discrimination because they were female. However, these women surmounted the discrimination and advanced professionally, enabling them to achieve top spots within the State Department. What is interesting about the career women diplomats in this period is the diversity of patterns they followed. Each woman worked her way to the top through varying posts. What links them, nevertheless, was the tremendous knowledge and background that each woman brought to the job. An examination of the professional experience of a few women illustrates the knowledge and skills gained by the women who made a career within the State Department. Eileen Donovan was one of several career Foreign Service officers who worked her way up the ranks to become Ambassador to Barbados in 1969. She began her career in the Foreign Service in 1948 after becoming a WAC (Women’s Army Corps) in 1945 and then working for four years after World War II with Japanese women in the Educational Division of the Civil Information and Education Section of the Supreme

62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ambassador Eileen Donovan interview, by Aruthur L. Lowrie, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, Apr. 7, 1989. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000).

19 Commander for the Allied Powers.65 Her knowledge of Japan, at a time when Japan had recently become strategically important to the United States, helped her pass the oral portion of the Foreign Service exam and gain entry into the State Department.66 Shortly after passing the exam Donovan went to work in USPOLAD, the Office of the Political Advisor liaising with the Japanese government. She was then transferred to the office of Japan/Korea Political Public Affairs before being assigned to Manila as a 2nd Secretary and Political Officer.67 Donovan's next assignment was to Milano as Economic officer where she mostly did commercial work. An assignment as a Foreign Service Institute Fellow to Harvard for a year allowed her to pursue her MPA degree. In 1960 Donovan became Principal Officer and Consul to Barbados and eight other islands to do visa work. She worked in Barbados and the other islands for five years. When the ARA (Bureau of Inter-American Affairs) took over this section, Donovan, instead of facing reassignment out of the region, took charge of the division they named the Commonwealth Caribbean, part of the Office of Caribbean Affairs. Donovan remained in charge of the Commonwealth Caribbean until 1969, when she moved up to the post of Ambassador to Barbados and the eight other islands because of her familiarity and knowledge of the islands.68 It took Donovan twenty years and several positions to become an Ambassador. Although statistics are unavailable on the average number of years it took for individuals to become ambassadors during the period, it appeared that Donovan's twenty-year journey to receive a chief of mission position was not atypical for female career Foreign Service officers during the period. Rozanne Ridgway's rise through the ranks of the Foreign Service also took twenty years and several positions. Unlike Donovan, though, Ridgway entered the Foreign Service in 1957 right after college.69 Ridgway's degree in political science helped her pass the FS exam in between her junior and senior years.70

65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway Interview, by Willis Armstrong, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, June 4, 1991. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 70 Ibid.

20 She took the A-100 course and was subsequently placed in the Office of the International Educational Exchange Service, "as far away from the State as you could get,"71 because she placed in the lower third quartile of the class. From there, Ridgway went to the post as the third personnel officer to the Embassy in Manila to do administrative work. There she learned a great deal about regulations.72 Next she served as Vice Consul to Palermo from 1962 to 1964. Her assignment in 1964 as political officer in the Office of NATO Political Affairs allowed her to work with the NATO Parliamentarians Assembly, the American Association of Young Political Leaders, and the day-to-day backstopping of the NATO councils on information and cultural relations. Ridgway also prepared the famous "talking points" for the Secretary while she held this position.73 Her work as political officer in the Office of NATO Political Affairs helped Ridgway gain tremendous experience, which secured her a position as a junior political officer to Ambassador Margaret Tibbetts in Oslo, Norway, where Ridgway kept track of the labor government.74 In 1970 Ridgway took the job of desk officer for Ecuador and helped handle the "Tuna War," which made her an expert on the combination of American interests in fisheries disputes. Ridgway then became the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) to the Bahamas in 1973 before gaining appointment as Ambassador for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs in 1976. It was not until 1977 that Ridgway became an ambassador, to Finland.75 Both Donovan and Ridgway worked their way up through the State Department over a twenty-year period as career Foreign Service officers in order to reach senior level posts. Other women such as Carol Laise had long professional careers in the government prior to turning to Foreign Service positions and reaping the benefits of a senior post. After Laise graduated from American University with an advanced degree in government and public administration, she immediately entered government work by taking a position as an intern for the Department of Agriculture.76 Laise then got a job working for the

71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ambassador Carol Clendening Laise interview, by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassador Series, April 17, 1989. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline

21 Census Bureau helping to code and tabulate the national census. From there she went to work for the Civil Service Commission, helping to develop an interdepartmental placement system for the government and then working her way into organization and management type work.77 Laise then transferred once again within the Civil Service commission into personnel utilization work, which gave her experience developing plans and policies. She received permanent Civil Service status after completing five years within the government.78 In 1946 Laise went to work for the UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation) operations processing American personnel and she subsequently moved up to be the deputy to the director of personnel. This job enabled her to move into the State Department, where she worked for the Bureau of the United Nations Affairs.79 At the Bureau she was an adviser on U.N. delegations, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) and WHO (World Health Organization), spending the equivalent of six months out of the year traveling. As Laise stated in her interview with the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, My experience during those years was having to understand our political purposes in the programs of these international organizations, political purposes or the program objectives of the United States, ranging from peace-keeping in the U.N. to fundamental education in UNESCO and control of disease in WHO,

giving her exposure and training.80 She entered the Foreign Service under the Wriston program and went as first secretary to Delhi, which helped Laise develop her relationship, writing, and analytical skills relating to policy matters affecting US interests.81 After Delhi she entered the Senior Seminar in 1961 and then went on to a post as deputy director of South Asian Affairs. Laise's appointment as Ambassador to Nepal followed in 1966.82 The professional experience of all three of these women is markedly different due to their prior background—the way in which they entered the Foreign Service, and the

Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid.

22 positions that they held while in the FS before they reached a senior level position. Nonetheless, all three of these women had extensive training and exposure prior to gaining appointment to an ambassadorial post. All three of the women also came to be experts on specific topics, such as Donovan's knowledge of Barbados and the surrounding islands, Ridgway's expertise on fishery interests, and Laise's understanding of India and policy making. The women who had achieved chief of mission posts were not all career Foreign Service or governmental officers. Of the 217 women who achieved these posts, 106 of them were non-career, political appointees.83 Although some have contended that those who reach ambassador status without being career FS officers either bought their posts or served as tokens for the administration, many nonetheless had impressive professional backgrounds. As with the career FS officers, it would take too long to explore every political appointee FS woman officer's professional background. Moreover, there is limited information available on some of their backgrounds. Sally Shelton-Colby was a political appointee who achieved chief of mission status without extensive FS experience. After attending college and doing a Fulbright, Shelton-Colby went to live in Mexico where she taught at two universities: the Ibero-Americana University and the National Autonomous University of Mexico.84 Shelton-Colby taught a course on U.S. foreign policy at the Ibero-Americana University and a course on Vietnam at UNAM. While in Mexico she gained insight into the inner workings of the Mexican political system through her marriage to a man who worked for President Lopez Mateos.85 After spending two years in Mexico, Shelton-Colby returned to the United States in 1971 and worked for Senator Lloyd Bentsen. She advised him on issues related to foreign affairs that arose in the Senate and also got to look at the domestic determinants of U.S. foreign policy.86 Shelton-Colby also got involved in the 1974 Trade Act;

83 Wright, 53. 84 Ambassador Sally Shelton-Colby interview, by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, July 22, 1999. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid.

23 campaign finance reform; electoral reform; and consumer issues.87 In 1977 Shelton- Colby was nominated to become Ambassador to El Salvador, but instead she became deputy assistant secretary of state for Latin America, responsible for sixteen to seventeen countries. Then in 1979 she became Ambassador to Barbados, Dominica, and Grenada; Minister to St. Lucia; and Special Representative to Antigua, St. Christopher/Nevis/ Anguilla and St. Vincent.88 Shelton-Colby was not the only woman political appointee between 1945 and 2004 who had extensive professional experience before becoming Ambassador. Patricia Gates Lynch is another example of the non-career FS officer appointee who had considerable professional experience, though she came to the position with a very different background. Lynch did not begin her professional career until later in life. She was married for thirty years and lived in Munich and Paris before coming back to the United States where she did a radio program for three years. Then she did educational television programs with the WETA. 89 Lynch returned to Munich and worked for the NBC Monitor. Between 1960 an 1961 she went to the Soviet Union to do interviews. While in Munich, Lynch also did stories about Radio Free Europe.90 When she returned to the United States she worked for Voice of America. In 1969, Lynch went to the White House to work for first lady Pat Nixon’s press staff and traveled with the Nixons around the world, where she received briefings on the political situation of each country that they visited.91 Lynch then went back to work with Voice of America from 1970 until 1986, which included a trip to China where she did interviews for Radio Beijing. At Voice of America Lynch produced and hosted the "Breakfast Show" which focused on domestic affairs including interviews on civil rights and labor unrest giving her insight into how domestic situations affected

87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Ambassador Patricia Gates Lynch interview, by Charles Stuart Kennedy, ForeignAffairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, Feb. 26, 1992. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid.

24 foreign affairs.92 In 1986 Lynch was appointed Ambassador to Madagascar and the Comoro Islands.93 Mari-Luci Jaramillo was also among the women political appointees who became an ambassador between 1945 and 2004. Jaramillo began her career as a first grade school teacher shortly after finishing her Ph.D.94 After only three months teaching first grade she gained a teaching position at the University of New Mexico. She was also one of the first individuals to take part in a pilot project to learn to teach English as a Second Language (ESL), so she was one of the first specialized in this area in the United States.95 Jaramillo then worked at Highlands University in Las Vegas as a professor of ESL and shuttled back and forth to Latin America because of her expertise.96 She gained promotion along the way from assistant professor to associate professor to full professor, and then became chairperson of the department, associate dean, and then eventually special assistant to the president. It was her work in education and in Latin America with an emphasis on bilingualism and biculturalism that prepared her for her role as Ambassador to Honduras in 1977. 97 As their educational as well as professional backgrounds showed, these women were highly knowledgeable and capable of taking on top level posts. However, without having the educational and professional backgrounds of the other women who achieved top level posts, it cannot be speculated about the other women’s capabilities. Therefore, the limited numbers of women in top posts up to the Clinton Administration cannot be examined solely upon the educational and professional backgrounds. Nor can women’s numbers be explained by one political party’s promotion of women over another's. Both the Democratic and Republican administrations restricted the number of women placed in top level positions.

92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Ambassador Mari-Luci Jaramillo interview, by Ann Miller Morin, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassador Series, Feb. 21, 1987. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid.

25 Between 1945 and 2004, five Democrats and six Republicans served as president. For the majority of the sixty-year period, Democratic administrations promoted fewer women in chief of mission positions and senior posts than did Republican administrations; yet, the Republican promotions were not significantly greater.98 For the first thirty-two years after 1945 Democratic, administrations appointed eight women to chief of mission positions, while the Republican administrations promoted fifteen women.99 During this time there were three Democratic administrations and three Republican administrations. The Carter administration in 1977, however, garnered credit for trying to lead the way in increasing the number of women appointed to senior level posts. During his four- year run as President, Carter appointed eighteen women to chief of mission posts, which was 38 percent more than the Ford administration.100 Both the succeeding Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations followed suit and promoted over twenty women in each of their terms in office.101 It was not until the Clinton administration that there was drastic rise in the number of women appointed to senior posts, along with the appointment of Albright as the first female secretary of state.102 As Ann Wright pointed out in the October 2005 issue of the Foreign Service Journal, "In his eight years as president, Clinton appointed 116 women to senior levels, 87 as chief of mission and 29 to other senior posts,"103 which far surpassed any other presidential administration. Still, the low numbers of women in senior level posts from1945 up to the Clinton administration was not the only way in which women faced marginalization within the Foreign Service. Even those women who reached senior level posts within the Foreign Service within the sixty-year period received chief of mission posts were restricted geographically. Although women served as chief of mission to a total of 115 countries, the countries typically were "small countries in the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia."104 These countries have not been key areas of concentration for the United States and generally registered as less important to the U.S. foreign policy interests. As Wright

98 Wright, 58. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Wright, 53. 103 Ibid. 104 Wright, 54.

26 pointed out in her study, as of October 2005 the United States has never had a female ambassador assigned to key countries such as Germany, Spain, Russia, Poland, China, Japan, South Korea, Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, India or Afghanistan.105

Table 1.5106 Female Chiefs of Mission by Region, 1933-2004 Ambassador Charge d'Affaires/Principal Officer Western Hemisphere 32* 6 Europe and Eurasia 62** 3 South Asia 10 0 Near East 14*** East Asia and Pacific 23 10 Africa 66**** 4 Total 207 23

* Three did not assume the post ** Two did not assume the post *** One did not assume the post **** One did not assume the post

While statistics demonstrated increasing numbers of women gaining senior level positions since the Clinton administration, there was a considerable lag in the number of women appointed to senior level posts between 1945 and 1993. During that sixty-year period, neither the Democratic administrations nor the Republican administrations acted as major promoters of women in senior level positions within the Foreign Service. Both parties were slow to appoint women to top level slots and neither party's administrations were apt to place women into senior level placements in countries critical to the United States' foreign policy objectives. In conclusion, the case studies and statistics of the women who did achieve high level positions demonstrated that the women who reached top level careers within the FS were highly knowledgeable of world affairs and had professional backgrounds that helped prepare them for the posts. Although there was an obvious difference between the

105 Wright, 60. 106 Wright, 58.

27 training that the career FS officers received and the training that the political appointees received, both sets of women came to the job with excellent preparation and an outstanding knowledge base in not only domestic and international political affairs. So, why then was there such a deficit in the numbers of women in top positions within the State Department? Answers to that question may be found by looking at the acceptance levels that other countries had regarding the women diplomats who went overseas as chief of mission between 1945 and 2004, as well as the views that the United States' government took regarding the women diplomats during the period. Chapter two seeks to explore the attitudes and cultural traditions of both the sending and receiving countries.

28 CHAPTER 2 “PERCEPTION” AS THE STANDARD

Educational and professional backgrounds alone do not explain the gap in numbers that exist behind the recruitment, promotion, and success that women had within the State Department. With the continued and increasing access to fields and areas once denied to them, such as accounting, business, and law, the cultural context of women's achievements and success over the past sixty years is also important. The simple explanation that women were "held back" or were denied access on an equal scale to men within the Foreign Service because of chauvinistic practices does not suffice. An awareness of how perceptions, power plays both within and between genders, cultural dynamics, and social structures impact the writing of women’s history in the Foreign Service has grown due to the research and investigations done by scholars of gender within not only a U.S. cultural context but also within the field of IR. Part of writing a history on the role of women in the Foreign Service is looking at the perceptions of those overseas with whom the women are in contact, the perceptions of those within the Foreign Service, as well as the women's own perceptions of themselves as diplomats. These three affected not only the numbers of women achieving high-level jobs within the State Department, but also how women shaped their own role within the State Department. Women’s levels of education, knowledge of languages and world issues, communication skills, and abilities to deal with stress could garner praise or invite discredit depending on the receiving country's view of women. The policy of a receiving country regarding women, to an extent, affects the sending government's decision to appoint a female representative. Studying other countries' policies regarding women helps identify reasons as to why the American government sends a female or a male officer and helps explain the lower numbers of female representatives when studying the role of American women diplomats. A scholar faces limitations in researching the policies of other countries regarding their view of female diplomats. A major obstacle to studying other countries’ policies is

29 that their stated policy may differ from their actions. It is difficult to find sources that reflect a government’s stated unwillingness to accept female diplomats, taking into consideration the move by many countries towards equality of men and women in all areas of life. Even if a government did not want to accept a woman representative, most did not admit to it. Another obstacle to studying this topic is that too many countries block access to material reflecting the attitudes and beliefs of key government officials. And, if there is material available a researcher faces language barriers and travel concerns. Due to these limitations, I explored other countries’ policies towards accepting female diplomats in several ways. First, I looked at the United States’ Department of State’s listing of women ambassadors to see where women served and when. Second, I drew upon primary source material provided in newspapers and journals regarding the view of U.S. women diplomats and female diplomats of other countries. Third, I built upon the information drawn from secondary source material regarding the history of women in politics of other countries. Last, I examined the current research regarding feminine versus masculine states and femininity versus masculinity in international relations. I believe the combination of all these approaches provides insight into when certain countries demonstrated willingness to receive female diplomats and why certain countries remained less receptive to women delegates. The Nordic states were among the leaders in granting women equal political rights with men. By 1906, women in Finland gained suffrage and by 1915 women in Norway and Denmark also achieved the vote. Women in the United States did not achieve national suffrage until 1920. Both Denmark and Finland had a woman in parliament by 1918 and a woman cabinet minister by 1926.107 The other Nordic countries also achieved women's suffrage and women served in their parliaments by the early 1920s. They were not alone. New Zealand had been the first to give women the vote in 1893. 108 In 1918, only three years after Denmark and Norway, women achieved the

107 Bruce O. Solheim, On Top of the World: Women’s Political Leadership in Scandinavia and Beyond (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 37. 108 “Women’s Suffrage: A World Chronology of the recognition of Women’s Rights to Vote and to Stand for Election” Interparliamentary Union. http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm.

30 vote in Great Britain. 109 The UK had its first woman in parliament in 1918, the same year as Denmark and Finland, and the first woman joined the Cabinet in Great Britain in 1929, once again only three years after Denmark and Finland.110 The Nordic countries, the United States, and the United Kingdom were not alone in granting women suffrage by 1920. Russia and Poland granted women suffrage by 1918.111 Other countries soon followed, such as Mongolia, which established woman suffrage in 1923.112 Ecuador granted women political rights in 1929, Brazil in 1932, and Cuba in 1934.113 Yet, France did not allow women suffrage until 1944, 114 and Italy held off until 1945, at least twenty years after the United States and Great Britain. Some Asian countries also lagged in women’s suffrage. Japan and South Korea changed their laws to allow women to vote in the aftermath of WWII.115 Comparing when women achieved the vote versus their development status is revealing because it shows that women’s suffrage does not necessarily coincide with industrialization or other economic indicators. Ecuador, Brazil, and Cuba are all considered developing or "Third World" countries, yet, they granted women the right to vote before more "developed" countries, such as France and Japan.116 Why did the United States appoint the first American woman diplomat to Denmark in 1933 and the first woman ambassador appointed to Denmark in 1949, but wait until 1996 to appoint the first woman Secretary of State? Nordic women achieved more progress than those in other European states in government through mid-century. By 1969, women constituted 15 percent of the parliament in Sweden, nearly 11 percent in Denmark and 9 percent in Norway, yet they had made scarcely any impact in Ireland, with just 2 percent of seats in the Dáil, in Italy with just under 3 percent and in Britain with 4 percent. 117

109 “Women in the House of Commons,” House of Commons Information Factsheet M4, (March , 2004), 3. http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/m04.pdf. 110 “Women in the House of Commons,” 3. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 Ruth and Simon Henig, Women and Political Power: Europe Since 1945 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 2. 115 “Women’s Suffrage.” 116 “First, Second, and Third World,” Nations Online, All Countries of the World, 1998. http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/third_world_countries.htm. 117 Henig, 1.

31 One explanation for why the United States felt secure enough to send a female delegate early on to the Nordic countries is explained by the progress women made in achieving high level political posts within these governments. According to Philosopher Rina Singh: An earlier date of suffrage—a by-product of historical conditions such as patterns of industrialization, political development, and religious persuasion—usually indicates a stronger basis for representation, though the advantages or disadvantages of respectively early or late enfranchisement may sometimes be overridden by developments in national cultural and political ideology. 118

Both the stated policy and the undeclared policy of the Nordic countries, in particular Denmark, were receptive to women as authority figures. Perhaps the US government had fewer qualms in assigning a female diplomat to a country whose own government already consisted of a number of women representatives because women representatives would feel less threatened and appear less threatening in a environment where there were other women political figures. Alternatively, perhaps the United States was reluctant in sending a woman representative to countries that had small numbers of women political figures due to the belief that they would be less likely to accept women delegates or the women delegate would be less effective, as in the case of the United Kingdom. The fact that women gained the right to vote in 1918 and that the first woman won election to Parliament by 1918 in the UK did not herald an ongoing trend. 119 Though Britain had laws in place to promote the equality of women as political actors, by 1969 women held only four percent of Parliamentary seats. 120 Also, it was not until 1998 that a woman, Ann Grant, was promoted as a department head in the British Foreign Office.121 The Financial Times in London England stated: “For Ann Grant, head of its African department (equatorial), defies convention and tradition, and not just because she is that rarity in the British diplomatic service, a woman in a senior position.”122 The small increases in the numbers of women in government positions over a fifty-year period suggested that the British

118 Rina Singh, Gender Autonomy in Western Europe: An Imprecise Revolution (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 30. 119 “Women in the House of Commons,” 3. 120 Ibid. 121 “Diplomat Who Broke the Glass and Class Barriers,” Financial Times (London, England), National News, (May 13, 1998), 9. 122 Ibid.

32 people were still reluctant to have men and women share equal political representation.123 Though the numbers of women being elected did fluctuate during the fifty-year time span, the fluctuations were minimal. Hence, "…The social closure practiced by the male elite as part of British class politics," helps explain the discrepancy between the UK and the Nordic countries, "because class has been so important to British politics, it has been difficult for women to argue successfully the political significance of gender divisions."124 The conjecture that countries that had smaller numbers of women as government representatives were less likely to accept women delegates or that the US government was less likely to send a woman representative to such countries would fit the case of Japan. As of October 2005 the United States has not appointed a woman delegate to Japan.125 Although Japan did grant women suffrage in 1945, the only times that women made significant advances in achieving top government positions prior to 2001 were in 1946 and 1989 due to large constituencies (districts).126 The most significant advances Japanese women have made in obtaining top government positions was the appointment of Makiko Tanaka as prime minister and the appointment of five women to the cabinet in 2001; however, women did not significantly increase their presence in the lower tiers of Japanese government.127 In 2005, women represent only 9 percent of the seats in the Japanese Parliament.128 The statistics on the number of women as political actors in these countries provides one explanation for the view that governments have regarding women in the public arena. Countries with more women holding higher offices, such as Cabinet posts, diplomatic posts, and parliamentary seats hosted a higher number of women representatives from other countries. Denmark and Finland are examples for this theory. Both achieved high numbers of women in their respective governments and both hosted a

123 Ibid. 124 J. Lovenduski, “The Rules of the Political Game: Feminism and Politics in Great Britain’ in Nelson and Chowdhury, 1994, 300. 125 Wright, 55. 126 Tokuko Ogai. “Japanese Women and Political Institutions: Why are Women Politically Underrepresented?,” PS: Political Science and Politics, no. 2. (Jun., 2001), 207 & 209. 127 Howard W. French “Japan’s New Cabinet Breaks Hold of Traditional Political Factions,” The New York Times (Apr. 27, 2001). http://nytimes.com. 128 David Moon, “International Snapshot: Japan, Parliamentary Elections, 2005,” Voting and Democracy Research Center (Sep., 2005), 2. http://www.fairvote.org/reports/researchreports/japan06.pdf.

33 number of US women diplomats since 1933.129 The United States appointed four women diplomats to Denmark since 1933, and three to Finland since 1969.130 Table 2.1, which shows the percent of women in national legislatures by region, and Table 2.2, which provides a breakdown of where most female ambassadors serve, provides some confirmation for this theory.

Table 2.1131 Percent of Women in National Legislatures, by region, 1975-97 1975 1987 1997 Arab States 3.5 2.8 3.3 Asia 8.4 9.7 13.4

(Asia excluding china, Mongolia, N. Korea, Vietnam)┼ (3.8) (6.2) (6.3)

Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union 23.3 23.1 11.5 Developed countries (excluding East Asia) 5.1 9.6 14.7 Latin America and the Caribbean 6.0 6.9 10.5 Nordic Countries 16.1 28.8 36.4 * 1997 statistics for lower houses and single house systems. (Mongolia excluded) ┼ women’s representation under party control Sources: Democracy Still in the Making: A World Comparative Study (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1997) and The World’s Women, 1970-1990: Trends and Statistics (New York: United Nations, 1991).

129 Wright, Ann, "For the Record: Breaking Through Diplomacy's Glass Ceiling," Foreign Service Journal, (October 2005), 60. 130 US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Alphabetical List of Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officials, 1778-2005. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po/11645.htm. 131 Jane S. Jaquette, "Women in Power: From Tokenism to Critical Mass," Foreign Policy, No. 108. (Autumn, 1997), 26.

34 132 Table 2.2 PT WHERE FEMALE AMBASSADORS ARE MOST FREQUENTLY ASSIGNED

Africa 4 (1974-2002) Europe and Central Asia Ghana: 4 (1986-2001) Norway: 5 (1937-2000) Madagascar: 4 (1976-2002) Switzerland: 5 (1953-2003) Mali: 3 (1989-2000) Luxembourg: 5 (1949-1985) Benin: 3 (1980-1999) Malta: 4 (1979-1997) Burundi: 3 (1977-1992) Austria: 3 (1983-1997) Cameroon: 3 (1986-1996) Denmark: 3 (1933-1964) Kenya: 3 (1987-2003) Estonia: 3 (1997-2004) Mozambique: 3 (1991-2002) Moldova: 3 (1992-2003) Niger: 3 (1980-1992)

Sierra Leone: 3 (1974-1997) Female U.S. chiefs of mission have served twice in Bulgaria, Togo: 3 (1974-2002) Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands,

Portugal and Turkmenistan, and only once in Great Britain, France, Women have been appointed chief of mission/ambassador Italy, Albania, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus (as charge d'affaires for six twice to Djibouti, the Central African Republic, Equatorial months), Finland, East Germany, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau (one as chargé d’ affaires), Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Slovenia. Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Lesotho and Zambia. Women have The U.S. has never had a female ambassador assigned to Germany, served as ambassador only once in Angola, Burkina Faso, Cape Spain, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Greece or Turkey, Armenia, Verde, the Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon and Sao Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Tome/Principe, Guinea, Malawi, Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire). Sweden, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.

The first female ambassador was assigned to South Africa in Asia and the Pacific 2004. No woman has served as ambassador to Nigeria, the Micronesia: 5 (1990-2004) most populous country in Africa, nor to Botswana, Chad, Burma: 4 (1979-2002) Eritrea, Liberia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Laos: 5 (1983-2004) Tanzania or Zimbabwe. New Zealand: 4 (1979-1999)

Papua New Guinea: 4 (1975-2000) Near East Area

In the Middle East, women have served as ambassador twice Women have served as ambassador twice in Malaysia, the in Algeria, Tunisia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and Marshall Islands, Brunei and Mongolia, and once in Australia, East once in Iraq, Morocco, Oman, Syria and Yemen. No woman Timor (as chargé d’affaires) and Fiji. Women have never been has served as U.S. ambassador to Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, appointed as ambassador to China, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya or Saudi Arabia. A woman has Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, Cambodia or Vietnam. served twice as consul general in Jeddah, Saudia Arabia, and

once in Jerusalem. Western Hemisphere

Barbados*: 6 (1969-2004) South Asia

Nepal: 4 (1966-1993) In the Western Hemisphere, women have served twice as ambassador to Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El In South Asia, women also have been posted twice as ambas-sador to Salvador, Guatemala and Suriname. Women have served as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. No woman has ambassador only once in the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, served as ambassador to India or Afghanistan Cuba (chief of U.S. Interests Section), Guyana, Haiti (as chargé d’affaires), Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,

Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. No woman has been named U.S. ambassador to Argentina, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Mexico or Uruguay.

* Also accredited to Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Antigua, Barbuda.

132 Wright, 60.

35 Yet, quantitative data can indicate only which countries were more willing to accept women envoys of another country. Statistics cannot show why those countries had policies that reflected a marginalization of women as political actors. The cultural attitudes and traditional behavior of these countries towards gender offers another reason for the basis behind the low numbers of women delegates serving in these countries between 1945 and 2004. Gender beliefs vary from country to country and develop over the centuries. In many "Western" and "European"- centered societies men were, and in some cases still are, portrayed as the more rational autonomous, competitive, powerful, and strong of the two sexes. Conversely, women face the stereotype of being more irrational, dependent, weak, and vulnerable.133 International Relations scholars Marysia Zalewski and Jane Papart pointed this out in The "Man" Question in International Relations where they suggested that governments/societies generally value the masculine attributes over the feminine attributes.134 The research examined for this study suggests that this is not always the case. Zalewski and Parpart indicated that due to this gender stereotype, "men overwhelmingly dominate political, diplomatic, entrepreneurial, advisory, technical, management, and military combat roles, and women provide largely 'invisible' domestic, administrative, and medical support."135 Masculinity is valued as active and femininity is seen as passive; therefore, "the masculine is important because it illuminates the close associations between masculinity and power."136 What Zalewski's and Parpart's argument failed to consider when examining the ideas regarding masculinity and femininity is that in certain cases societies value attributes associated with femininity over those tied to masculinity, and not all countries place the same importance on the same attributes. Some IR scholars believe that the value countries place upon these gendered dichotomies says a lot about the way in which they treat women as political figures. According to Charlotte Hooper, “gender divisions and inequalities depend to a great

133 Charlotte Hooper, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 43; Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart, The 'Man' Question in International Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 31. 134 Zalewski, 31. 135 Ibid, 31. 136 Ibid, 32.

36 extent on the segregation of social life into separate spheres for men and women…,”137 which sometimes results in the public/private spheres, where men reside in the public and women in the private. Ellen Carnaghan and Donna Bahry made the case that since the 1930s the Soviet government stressed the importance of the vitality of woman's role within the nuclear family for the "successful construction of communism" and that many Soviet women embraced the traditional self-concept that the "primary duty of women is to be a mother and wife."138 Kathleen Kuenhast’s and Carol Nechemias’ edited work, Post-Soviet Women Encountering Transition, offered another example of IR theory for understanding how the divisions between the public/private spheres affected women in not only their daily lives, but also as political participants. While the post-Soviet countries began the process of what Kuehnhast and Nechemias labeled “disidentification” with Soviet ideology, they pointed out that women found themselves embracing a subordinated role.139 Linda Racioppi and Katherine O'Sullivan See explained this argument further by indicating that the economic deterioration faced in the Brezhnev-era, 1964-1982, ushered in the belief during the Gorbachev-era, 1985-1991, that the "image of woman as wife, mother, and homemaker" would help solve the Soviet moral and cultural problems, as well as production problems.140 Many of the Soviet countries embraced the idea that gender roles were “natural and immutable,” which led to the belief that women “naturally” possess feminine qualities. 141 Due to this, many post-Soviet women moved from the workforce back to the home, and the women that did work found jobs in the arts, textiles, and services. Therefore, women were not in the professions that usually served as stepping-stones into

137 Hooper, 91. 138 Ellen Carnaghan and Donna Bahry, "Political Attitudes and the Gender Gap in the USSR," Comparative Politics, no. 4 (Jul., 1990), 382. http://www.jstor.org/stable/421970. 139 Kathleen Kuehnast and Carol Nechemias, eds., Post-Soviet Women Encountering Transition: Nation Building, Economic Survival, and Civic Activism (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 4-5. 140 Linda Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See, “Organizing Women Before and After the Fall: Women’s Politics in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia,” Signs, no. 4, Postcolonial, Emergent, and Indigenous Feminisms, (Summer, 1995), 823 & 824. 141 Kuehnast. 4.

37 political leadership.142 Likewise, women who filled positions within the Soviet government suggested that those within parliament equally believed that matters of state should be left to the men.143 Hence, Soviet women tended to lack motivation for political representation, and if they did pursue government positions, they lacked access to resources to help them achieve the positions, or they faced mistrust because of gender stereotypes.144 Japan serves as another example for displaying how gender stereotypes play a part in favoring men as political agents. After a century or more of women’s political activism, Japanese women made little headway in gaining political roles. In certain periods women achieved a significant increase in political posts throughout the century, but as a whole woman’s political opportunities remained low. Scholar Youngtae Shin in Women and Politics in Japan and Korea indicated that from the outset the Japanese feminist movement was “a part of the nationalist movement to modernize Japan, thus it was never fully developed as an entity that was truly concerned with women’s issues only.”145 She pointed out that there were conflicting views about the role of Japanese women in society. Although a large percentage of the Japanese population accepted women having careers, at the same time they also thought the family was the woman’s primary responsibility. Those within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the party that dominated Japanese politics for much of the postwar period, stressed the refrain that women belonged in the private sphere, consequently providing little support to women candidates.146 Hence, Japanese women had a hard time garnering enough support to achieve the vote and establish political identities.

142 Francine D’Amico and Peter R. Beckman, Women in World Politics: An Introduction (Westport: Bergin & Garvey, 1995), 19. “Most men who have become national leaders come from one of several professions; Law, military service, and business backgrounds are most common, as the patrician and entrepreneur categories suggest.” 143 Racioppi, 826-827. 144 D'Amico, 172-173. 145 Youngtae Shin, Women and Politics in Japan and Korea (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), 172. 146 Tokuko Ogai. “Japanese Women and Political Institutions: Why are Women Politically Underrepresented?,” PS: Political Science and Politics, no. 2. (Jun., 2001), 209.

38 The split between the public and the private in the post-Soviet countries was mirrored in Japanese society. 147 Many Japanese women, feminists and conservatives, still defined the adult female role as mothers or future mothers despite the increase in women pursuing careers.148 Given that the Japanese viewed women as mothers or future mothers, once they did have families, people assumed the women would not work full- time. Like the women in the post-Soviet countries, this pulled them out of careers that usually served as springboards into politics. Therefore, women did not have jobs that established the networks that usually helped individuals advance into government. Since networks play a major role in the election of candidates in Japanese government, the majority of women faced disadvantages as candidates.149 The value placed upon these gendered dichotomies could help explain why the United States government failed to send women as chief of missions to these countries for at least part of the period from 1945 and 2004 to Japan and the Soviet countries, taking into consideration their general ideas of masculinity and femininity. Nevertheless, the IR explanation that societies relegated women to the private and men to the public does not provide an adequate reason for the discrepancy in numbers of women diplomats sent to certain countries and does not hold true in every situation. An examination of the experiences of American women diplomats compared with the experiences of women diplomats of other countries offers other explanations. For example, France granted women suffrage in 1944 and made little progress in electing or promoting women to higher level positions in its government. In 1993 Pamela Harriman became the first U.S. woman ambassador to France.150 At the time, the U.S. government presumed that because of the war in Bosnia and the clash in global trade negotiations between the United States and France there would be major tensions between France and the United States. According to the Washington Post, skeptics were sure that "she would fall flat on her face."151 Harriman's position appeared difficult

147 Barbara Molony. “Japan’s 1986 Equal Employment Opportunity Law and the Changing Discourse on Gender.” Signs, no. 2 (Winter, 1995), 272. 148 Ibid. 149 Molony, 208 & 209and Shin, 175-178. 150 William Drozdiak, "From Power Hostess to Effective Envoy: Harriman Wins Wide Praise During Busy Tenure in Paris," Washington Post, Section A, (Apr. 25, 1996): A16. 151 Ibid.

39 because not only were there strained relations between France and the United States, but also because France was less apt to promote its own women as political agents. However, during Harriman's tenure as ambassador she received France's highest cultural award— Commander of the Order of Arts and Letters in the Legion of Honor—and received praise by French officials for her political role. "She has been a great resource for both of our countries,” said a senior advisor to President Jacques Chirac, “We know she can go right to the top at any time. That kind of clout is vital for any good ambassador.”152 Harriman's experience in France challenged the theory of gender constructs as being the sole determinant of women's marginalization as diplomatic agents in specific countries. Elizabeth Jones and Marjorie Marilley Ransom, both retired from the State Department, also had fairly positive experiences while stationed in societies associated with masculine political power. According to an article by Shane Harris, “…women in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs had found an oasis, where discrimination was rare.”153 Jones, who worked in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, indicated that the Bureau was willing to send anyone, male or female, to the Middle East: "There was just an attitude in the leadership at the time…that whoever wanted to do the work, come on. Come on, help us out.”154 She asserted that her gender did not impede her ability to interact with Arab officials because she was seen as an American official and not as male or female: "And that makes you very effective…I actually thought it was an advantage to be a woman, because everybody knew who I was…"155 The fact that she was a high ranking woman in a society that typically subjugated women made her a novelty. Ransom, who was the first female officer in the American embassy in Amman, Jordan in 1963, also gave a positive report on her experience in an Arab country. “Though she was living in a culture that generally subordinates women, Ransom found that having a position of authority and making an effort to learn local customs earned her respect and sometimes special treatment."156

152 Ibid. 153 Shane Harris, "Madam Ambassador," GovExec.com, (Apr. 1, 2005), 4. http://www.govexec.com/fratures/0405-01/0405-01s1.htm. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Maggie Smith, "Cultural Connection: Croghan Native Has Seen the Mideast From Both Sides Through State Dept. Work," Watertown Daily Times (NY), (May 29, 2004).

40 In her interview with the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who was the chief United States representative at the United Nations, too, made note of women being less threatening to male government officials of other countries. "I do believe that there are whole cultures in which men, like ambassadors and foreign ministers, and even heads of state, may find it a little easier to deal with a woman than with another man."157 She pointed to men in Latin and Arab countries as being less likely to regard women as competitors.158 Kirkpatrick offered an example of her relationship with the Iraqi Foreign Minister during her time as ambassador to the U.N. to demonstrate her claims. Hammadi—the Iraqi Foreign Minister, who is thought around the UN to be one of the meanest, sourest people any place—I think this is a man for whom being a woman probably helped me. I think he was a little nicer with me than his reputation led me to believe that he was with anybody.159

According to Jones’, Ransom's, and Kirkpatrick's accounts the way in which Arab officials regarded their own women politically did not necessarily hold true for female delegates from other countries. This model, however, did not apply for all countries. The 1996 ambassador to Kenya, Prudence Bushnell, felt the need to constantly prove herself because she was a woman. Harris’ article mentioned, "In meetings with Kenyan officials and U.S. embassy staff, she instructed male colleagues to look at her when she spoke, never at the Kenyan men who inevitably turned to their male counterparts as if to get the real story. When Bushnell talked, the Kenyans found the only pair of eyes with which they could lock belonged to her."160 Bushnell was not the only US female ambassador who received a less than warm reception from a host country. Anne Martindell’s reception from the New Zealand community during her tenure as ambassador from 1979 to 1981 was also less than welcoming. In her interview with the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Martindell explained, "The New Zealanders had very serious reservations about any woman; the

157 Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick interview, by Ann Miller Morin, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, May 28, 1987. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 158 Ibid 159 Ibid 160 Harris, 5.

41 New Zealanders are very chauvinistic. The business community had no interest in me at all."161 Still, although some countries were wary of receiving a woman, the case of Mary Olmsted who served in Papua New Guinea from 1975 through 1978 reveals that the attitudes of the receiving country can change when influenced by external circumstances. In her interview with the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Olmsted highlighted the fact that the Papua New Guineans were taken aback when she was sent to them, but that they waited to see what kind of person she was before judging her.162 However, she also points out that, "When the Papua New Guineans learned that London had an American ambassador who was a woman and they did, too, they rather felt that put them in the class with London."163 Contradictory images emerged regarding the experiences of American women diplomats in the countries in which they served. How did the experiences of women diplomats from other countries compare? While Bushnell asserted that she had authority problems with the Kenyan male government officials, Madgalene Wambua, Kenyan Ambassador to Uganda in 2000, suggested an explanation why. Wambua indicated that when she first joined the Kenyan Foreign Service in the 1980s, the view that men had towards "well-exposed" women was not very high.164 Although the Kenyan government boasted of having six women ambassadors at that time, by 2000 there were only two. Wambua attributed this to women retiring and the Kenyan government not replacing them.165 In contrast, Victoria Owen's experience was similar to the American women diplomats' experiences who had served in the Middle East. As the Australian ambassador to Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Algeria, and Tunisia in 2001, Owen claimed that she did not have

161Ambassador Anne Martindell interview, by Lillian P. Mullin. Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, January 8, 1991. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 162 Ambassador Mary Olmsted interview, by Ann Miller Morin, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, June 25, 1985. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 163 Ibid 164 “Kenyan Envoy to Boost Rural Women,” The Dominion Post, (Nov. 9, 2004). 165 Ibid.

42 a hard time while in any Islamic countries. Nevertheless, she did specify that she was a novelty because she was only one of five female ambassadors out of 140 at Cairo embassies.166 In this case, it appears that the Middle East accepted more women diplomats than non-Middle Eastern countries because, as Jones’ suggested, many women diplomats were viewed as symbols of the U.S. government and not as women. Barbara Angus was the first woman ambassador from New Zealand in 1978. Although she was assigned to the Philippines and not an Islamic country, she also did not indicate that she faced any undue hardship from the Philippine government because she was a woman. She did specify that the discrimination that she faced came from her own government, remaining at the same pay grade for ten years.167 United States Ambassador Martindell's poor reception in New Zealand was not exclusive when compared with the treatment that Angus received from her own government, supporting the theory that a country was less inclined to host a woman if the country, itself, did not support its own women as political representatives. If the theory held true, then the reason that Angus encountered fewer problems with the Philippine government might lay in the fact that the Philippines made strides in boosting the numbers of women in politics and in the Foreign Service in that period. By 2004, women in the Philippines Foreign Service were 50 percent of the officials.168 Though many of the U.S. women diplomats in this research did not complain about the treatment they received from the countries in which they served, some, such as Jane Abell Coon, Mary Ostrander, and Jean Wilkowski alluded that women were underrepresented.169 Coon said in her interview with the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, “I guess being a woman was an oddity—and I didn’t quite realize what an oddity it was until about 1963.”170 Yet, statistics show that even though women’s gains were

166 "Victoria Owen," Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia), Weekend (Mar. 31, 2001): WO5. 167 Diania Dekker," Glass Ceiling Held Back Diplomat for Many Years," The Dominion Post, 2nd Ed., Features, (Feb. 17, 2005): 7. 168 “Filipino Minister Asks Seoul to Name More Women Envoys,” Korea Times, (May 29, 2004). 169 See Ambassadors’ Jane Abell Coon, Mary Ostrander, and Jean Wilkowski’s interviews, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassador Series. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 170 Ambassador Jane Abell Coon interview, by Ann Miller Morin, Foreign Affairs Oral

43 slight for most of the sixty-year-period, women's numbers in the Foreign Service either stayed the same or grew with each subsequent administration as shown in Chart 3, aside from the Kennedy administration, which was cut short due to the president’s untimely death. In some cases, countries that did not have women diplomats until the late eighties and early nineties made substantial increases in their numbers compared to countries in which women have been representatives for longer periods of time.

TABLE 2.3 APPOINTMENT OF WOMEN AS CHIEFS OF MISSION AND TO OTHER SENIOR POSTS BY

ADMINISTRATION, 1933-2004 President COM Other Roosevelt (1935-1945) 2 -- Truman (1945-1953) 3 -- Eisenhower (1953-1961) 4 -- Kennedy (1961-1963) 2 -- Johnson (1963-1969) 4 1 Nixon (1969-1974) 4 2 Ford (1974-1977) 7 3 Carter (1977-1981) 18 10 Reagan (1981-1989) 22 11 G.H. W. Bush (1989-1993) 28 9 Clinton (1993-2001) 87 29 G.W. Bush (2001-2004)* 50 19 *Statistics taken before G.W. Bush completed 2nd term in office171

The research appears contradictory when comparing the statistics regarding the numbers of women in government positions, beliefs about gender roles, and the experiences of women diplomats. Nonetheless, the data thus far leaves some assumptions: (1) the more masculine-centered,172 or male supremacist, a country or nation-state is, the more stock it places in the separation between the roles of men and women; (2) low numbers of women in top level positions of government represent more masculine or class-divided societies;

History Project, Women Ambassador Series, Nov 4, 1986. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 171 Wright, 58. 172 Ladelle McWhorter, “Culture or Nature? The Function of the term ‘Body’ in the work of Michel Foucault,” The Journal of Philosophy, no. 11, Eighty-Sixth Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Nov., 1989), 610.

44 and (3) although a country may be masculine-centered, that does not mean that it will be unwilling or opposed to accepting women diplomats. Research coming out of the field of

IR explains how the three assumptions work together. According to Jill Steans, the first step in foreign relations is the expression of a country as an autonomous identity.173 In order to do this, the country, or nation-state, has to embody the will of “the people” by organizing the collective identities into one identity. Once the state does so, it can draw distinctions between what lies “inside” and “outside” the state.174 As John Hoffman pointed out, the institutionalizing of the state then can claim “a monopoly of legitimate force for a particular territory,” which acts as a “barrier to freedom and emancipation.”175 The state’s claim to sovereignty allows it to exert control over social relations within its territory; thus, it can dominate, subordinate, and exclude, including those who lie within its border. 176 When viewing the first assumption within this context, if a country is more masculine-centered, it can and will subordinate women. Since women are the reproducers, they are the ones who can keep the country populated. Hence, it is in the masculine state’s interest to develop laws and sanctions over women, albeit as the reproducers (child-bearers), in order to safeguard and to protect the nation, which Katherine Graney says can be “unwelcome and oppressive.”177 Japan provides a prime example. According to Barbara Molony, the majority of employers were against legislating equality in the workplace because “many stated that women were both physically and emotionally different from men…,” and safeguarding motherhood and reproduction roles were at the center of these differences.178 Graney indicates that the “the more ethnic a state’s conception of the nation is, the more patriarchal and intrusive the gender regime of that nation-state will be.”179

173 Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998), 63. 174 Steans, 62 & 63. 175 John Hoffman, Gender and Sovereignty: Feminism, the State and International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 26. 176 Hoffman, 27 & 108. 177 Katherine E. Graney, “The Gender of Sovereignty: Constructing Statehood, Nation, and Gender Regimes in Post-Soviet Tatarstan,” in Post-Soviet Women Encountering Transition, ed. Kathleen Kuehnast and Carol Nechemias (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004),48. 178 Molony, 274. 179 Ibid, 49.

45 The assumed separation between the public and the private relegated women to the home and to the domestic spheres. When a country supported this division, then women rarely went into the public sphere or did so in small amounts, which explained the lower numbers of women in government positions, seen in the cases of the Soviet countries and Japan in which women’s role was defined to the private sphere. More masculine-centered countries typically viewed women who entered the public realm with mistrust for going against the state designation of them as mothers and nurturers. The research suggested that internal gender roles affected the reception of women diplomats. On the one hand, if a country is less masculine-centered in which there is not a strong division between men and women, then they are more willing to accept women envoys because they do not perceive women as a threat but rather as legitimate actors. On the other hand, if a country is centered strongly on masculine authority, then it has the option of one of two roads: either the country will view all women as subordinate and, therefore will be mistrustful of all women in politics whether inside or outside the country’s boundaries; or the country will look at a woman delegate from another country as gender neutral—only a symbol of the other country’s policy. However, when applying these conclusions to the cases of the US female diplomats who were ambassadors between 1945 and 2004, in many cases, the geographic assignments of the women did not match the receiving country's perceived acceptance of a female diplomat. Instead they reflected how the American government projected its image. While some assumed Europe as the most likely region for women to achieve the highest quantity of chief of mission appointments, between 1933 and 2004 Africa was the highest ranking region for the posting of U.S. women chief of missions. And, even as many of the American women diplomats drew attention to the fact that the Arab countries to which they were posted were actually more accepting of them as political agents, the Near East was second to last in the ranking for female chief of missions. In other words, the United States did not post women as chief of missions to certain geographic locations based exclusively on the gender and cultural traditions of a receiving country. The limited geographical placement of the women chiefs of missions between 1945 and 2004 by the American government sprang from factors outside of the gender stereotypes of the other countries towards women diplomats. Chapter Three explores

46 further the possible reasons for the limitation of women both in numbers and in their geographic location by examining the policies that the women pursued when serving and how they not only perceived their success, but also how the American government and the receiving countries judged their success.

47 CHAPTER 3

STRATEGICAL GATEKEEPERS

Part of exploring the role of U.S. women diplomats is understanding how they conducted foreign policy and carried out the goals of the administrations in which they worked. Essential questions to ask are: Did the women strictly follow the foreign policy objectives that the administration defined for them? Did the women deviate from the policies of the administrations by pursuing their own policies? (How were the women perceived in both the other countries and in the host country in carrying out the goals of the U.S.?) Answering these questions in light of the scholarship about women in diplomacy highlights perceived gender styles in conducting foreign policy and how these styles affected women's numbers or narrowed their geographic placement within the Foreign Service. The challenge to writing this chapter stems from the limited sources available for exploring the specific ways women diplomats carried out policy matters. State Department records were available only through a certain period and those records did not provide an in-depth critique of the women's activities. Therefore, this analysis takes into consideration the available State Department records, but also interviews with women diplomats to supplement those records. Comparing these sources against literature on foreign policy matters during the periods in which the women worked demonstrated the relationship of policy and practice. This chapter uses case studies to represent women diplomats in key periods. Due to source constraints on the recent past, it investigates only the policies of women who served from the Eisenhower through the Reagan presidencies. An important aspect of understanding how women diplomats carried out policy is the political environment within which they worked. From the Truman presidency through the Reagan presidency, the foreign policy of all administrations centered around Cold War ideology, which was to prevent WWIII. After the Cold War ended during the Reagan administration, the succeeding administrations had to recenter their policies away from an East vs. West mentality—figuring out new ways to view world relations.

48 Although the presidents from Truman to Reagan all focused on the Cold War, the way in which they pursued foreign policy differed. With the ending of World War II and the “subsequent difficulties in reaching a satisfactory postwar settlement with the Soviet Union,” according to scholar Raymond P. Ojserkis, “the American public became convinced that peacetime participation in European power politics, in the form of containment of Soviet power, was a necessary precaution.”180 During the 1945 Truman administration, scholars Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter argue, the joint chiefs in Washington had come to the conclusion that the United States should stop the expansion of “Russian influence in Europe and in the Far East” and not compromise on principle with the Soviet Union.181 This view was expounded even further in George Kennan’s “long telegram” that outlined the policy of containment and set the standard for the majority of the Cold War. John Arquilla argued in The Reagan Imprint, Truman chose to take a defensive stance against Communism using both economic and military means to oppose Communism wherever it arose.182 Origins of the Cold War: An International History explains this further by indicating that the Truman administration took initiatives such as providing “military assistance to Greece and Turkey, allocating massive economic aid to Western Europe, and reassessing economic policy toward Japan,” which aimed at the root of Communist unrest. The goals of the Eisenhower administration were not vastly different than those of the Truman White House. Yet Eisenhower sought to maintain peace through a policy of containment, stressing nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, as an “effective resistance” to Communism.183 Eisenhower also stressed the importance of a Western alliance to help curtail Communism: “The policy we pursue will recognize the truth that no single country…can alone defend the liberty of all nations threatened by Communist aggression from without and subversion within. Mutual security means effective mutual

180 Raymond P. Ojserkis, Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race: The Truman Administration and the U.S. Arms Build-Up (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 19. 181 Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War: An International History (New York: Routledge, 2002), 32. 182 John Arquilla, The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of Communism to the War on Terror (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 18. 183 Martin J. Medhurst, ed., Eisenhower’s War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 9.

49 cooperation.”184 The “Statement of Policy” (NSC 162/2) on October 20, 1953 outlined the Eisenhower administration’s main objectives: a strong military posture; U.S. and allied alliance against Soviet aggression; a strong and growing economy; and the support of the U.S. people for national security measures.185 By the time that Kennedy came to office, events of the 1950s had left a deep imprint on not only Kennedy and his administration, but on the American public as well. McCarthyism and the Red Scare left many people skeptical of those who were deemed “subversive.” The “Lavender Inquisition” caused many to become distrustful of the State Department because of the allegations that it harbored many homosexuals and communist sympathizers.186 Hence, as K.A. Cuordileone pointed out, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations sought to set themselves apart from previous administrations by appearing tough.187 Another factor that drove Kennedy and Johnson’s foreign policies was the question of American dominance. In Strategies of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis asserted that both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations focused on the idea of power and making sure that the United States did not lose it, or the illusion of it. Gaddis stated that they believed that, “Power…was as much a function of perceptions as of hardware, position, or will: minute shifts in its distribution—or even the appearance of such shifts— could cause chain reactions of panic to sweep the world.”188 Gaddis and other prominent Cold War scholars asserted that in order to keep this power the Kennedy administration operated under the defense strategy of “flexible response,” 189 the assumption that the U.S. could minimize its risks by responding with the appropriate levels of response, without either escalation or humiliation, in order to gain back the balance of power. However, recent scholars such as Francis J. Gavin disputed this argument, stressing that the strategy of “flexible response” was a myth, and that top officials “did not buy into

184 Ibid, 10. 185 Ibid, 37. 186 K.A. Cuordileone, “Politics in an Age of Anxiety: Cold War Political Culture and the Crisis American Masculinity, 1949-1960,” The Journal of American History, (Sep., 2000), 4, 13 & 14. 187 Cuordileone, 21. 188 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 200. 189 Gaddis, 213.

50 many of the core strategic arguments surrounding the flexible response doctrine….”190 Instead, Gavin asserted that geo-political concerns, such as a strong military presence in Germany, as opposed to “narrow military considerations”, such as rebuffing a Soviet attack, were the main focus of American policymakers.191 At the same time the Kennedy and Johnson administrations focused on maintaining American dominance and geo-political concerns, they also faced a challenge in maintaining the balance of power as Third World nationalist movements arose. Although the United States espoused a policy of defending countries wanting to liberate themselves from colonial powers or corrupt dictators, the Kennedy administration also wanted to maintain stability within those countries. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw the disruption of the stability of the Third World countries as threatening their capacity to “control and profit from complementary economic activity,” which they considered vital to maintaining the balance of power.192 The Soviets, however, also championed the rights of the Third World countries to liberate themselves in this period. Thus, both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations found themselves committed to fighting communism in the Third World, “where the battle was characterized by subversion, guerilla warfare, and clientelism.”193 The United States stood alone in much of this battle. Many of the United States’ allies opposed the war in Vietnam and hence did not send aid to help the U.S. in its fight.194 This relative isolation contributed to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ desire to appear that much tougher. A different policy developed once the Nixon administration came to power. As McCormick pointed out, the final emergence of Russia as a global power and the decline of American economic supremacy enabled the spirit of détente to take place.195 The Bretton Woods system, developed in 1944 as an international monetary agreement designed to stimulate world trade after World War II in which the dollar was used isntead

190 Francis J. Gavin, “The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 1960s,” The International History Review, vol. 23, no. 4 (2001), 847. 191 Ibid. 192 Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 136. 193 Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, US Foreign Policy Since 1945 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 32. 194 Dobson, 61. 195 McCormick, 155.

51 of gold to settle international transactions, had been faltering for years.196 Every president from Eisenhower through the Johnson administration had been faced with the balance of payment issue.197 The situation worsened due to the costs of Vietnam, resulting in the demise of the Bretton Woods system.198 For the first time in thirty years, America’s hegemony faltered as the Bretton Woods system failed and the U.S. economy stagnated, caught in increasing investments abroad and heavy reliance on imports. With the pressure from the Eastern bloc to promote its own economic progress, Russia became less hostile to Western capital and technology thus enabling Nixon and Brezhnev to declare an easing of tensions. This easing of tensions did not mean that the Nixon administration was willing to accept Soviet threats to American national security. “…Détente was to persuade Russia that operating inside the world-system and playing by its internationalist rules was both safer and more profitable than staying outside that system and confronting it across a Cold War chasm.”199 Therefore, as long as Russia operated under the rules that the United States set forth, America maintained a sense of dominance in world affairs. Yet, as Gaddis indicated, the Nixon administration hesitated to jeopardize the spirit of détente in all areas that threatened U.S. interests if direct aid was not sufficient enough to reverse outcomes.200Gerald E. Ford took over as president following Nixon’s impeachment and pursued many of the same foreign policies as Nixon, relying on several of the same ideas and objectives put forth by Henry Kissinger (both Nixon's and Ford's Head of the National Security Council.) Jimmy Carter at the beginning of his presidency decided to make human rights the focal point of his foreign policy. This partially emanated from the call from Congress for the U.S. to be a global leader in human rights: “this was deliberately intended to be a moral intervention in a foreign policy that, according to many representatives and senators, was driven too much by Machiavellian realpolitik.”201 According to scholar

196 Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars & Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 11, 17, & 18. 197 Ibid, 4. 198 Ibid, 11. 199 McCormick, 182. 200 Gaddis, 314. 201 Hauke Hartmann, “US Human Rights Policy Under Carter and Reagan, 1977-1981,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 2 (May, 2001), 404.

52 Hauke Hartmann the human rights initiative was also pursued as a way to “revive détente with the Soviet Union.”202 Scholar David Skidmore indicated that Carter’s foreign policy also rested on “sharing burdens more evenly with friends and allies and seeking accommodation with adversaries.”203 He chose “to downplay U.S.-Soviet relations while devoting greater attention to preventive diplomacy in the Third World.”204 However, with the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration faced not only a “decline in public support for its policies,” but also feared the “erosion of Washington’s strategic position.”205 Hence, human rights and détente took a backseat to previous Cold War policy. Consequently, Carter realigned his strategy with those of the previous administrations by announcing the Carter Doctrine: “Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vial interest of the United States” and “will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”206 Despite the change in tactics, Carter did not get to implement a more forceful foreign policy due to the impending Reagan presidency. Arquilla argued that from the outset of Reagan's administration he took the offensive against Communism rather than the defensive, even as he continued to support the idea of containment generally.207 This Cold War policy not only affected how the administration dealt with the Soviet Union, but also affected relations with other countries. Andrew Marshall, who ran the Office of Net Assessment, developed one of the key offensive strategies that Reagan implemented. Marshall's “cost-imposing strategy” centered on making Russian commitments costly to uphold through "winning by means of attrition, bankrupting and bleeding the ever more vulnerable Soviet Union to death."208 John Arquilla also pointed out that Reagan had another offensive strategy, which was two-fold: 1) halt and then reverse the arms race; and 2) create viable defenses against

202 Ibid, 409. 203 David Skidmore, “Carter and the Failure of Foreign Policy Reform,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 108, no. 4 (Winter, 1993-1994),705. 204 Ibid. 205 Hartmann, 418 & 419. 206 Skidmore, 723. 207 Arquilla, 22. 208 Arquilla, 38-39.

53 nuclear attack.209 One other important aspect to Reagan's offensive foreign policy was an information strategy that focused upon spreading American ideas through the media. Even though previous presidents also did this, Arquilla suggested that it was central to Reagan's policy because it "consisted of steadily increasing pressure on our adversaries by communicating directly with those peoples they were oppressing."210 Although Reagan’s foreign policy differed than the other administrations, overall his main goal was suppressing the spread of Communism. From Truman to Reagan all of the presidents were concerned with preserving the balance of power by not letting the Soviets surpass the United States either economically, geographically, or militarily. Even as the Cold War presidents’ foreign policies shared a common goal, the way in which the women diplomats serving under these administrations pursued and implemented foreign policy differed depending on the advice, strategy, and authority given to them. There is little information provided by State Department records on the few women who achieved Chief of Mission status during the period 1945 to 1961. One exception is Clare Boothe Luce’s account with the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project of how she managed foreign policy during her tenure as ambassador to Italy in 1953. Although Luce cannot represent women pursuing foreign policy during the period, she does offer an example of one strategy that women pursued. In a portion of Luce's interview where she explained her actions and the events of the Treiste affair, Luce noted the advice the State Department gave her on how to handle the situation, "When it boils up, calm it down; when it calms down, forget it."211 Although this advice came from the administration, not from Eisenhower himself, the message still represented the President's policy at the time: to achieve peace. Luce conveyed ways in which she handled American goals. First of all, she pointed out that she disagreed with the strategy given by the State Department: "…and that struck me as a recipe for constant conflict."212 Her approach remained two-fold. In certain respects,

209 Arquilla, 46. 210 Arquilla, 219. 211 Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce interview, by Ann Miller Morin, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, June 19, 1986. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 212 Ibid.

54 Luce followed the strategy given to her by the government: in others, she pursued her own strategy. The Trieste affair provided a prime example of this two-fold approach. At first she allowed things to play out between the Italians and Yugoslavs, letting them handle their own situation and allowing things calm down in hopes that the disagreements between the two would be forgotten.213 However, once Luce saw that the parties would not forget their disagreements and tensions began to reappear, Luce took her own action. One key point is that when Luce did pursue her own strategy, her overall goal did not waver from Eisenhower's main objective—peace. Luce also included the President in her plans by going to him directly. Luce was advised by an individual within the embassy (whose name she could not recall) that the National Security Council could help resolve the issue, so she sent a letter to Eisenhower outlining reasons as to why the United States should get involved to help solve the Trieste affair. Once Eisenhower was on board, Luce worked with him directly to coordinate plans on sending another envoy from the United States, whom she selected, to help mediate the situation.214 According to Luce, she was instrumental in solving the disagreement, "First, the Italians knew I did it, and everybody in the embassy knew."215 The case of Luce offers only one example of how a woman ambassador pursued strategy; yet, her example does not serve for women of succeeding administrations. The strategies of the women of the Kennedy and Johnson are of equal importance to understanding how women carried out policy. As current literature indicated, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations pursued policies and strategies deeply rooted in public displays of strength portraying the United States as a dominant world power.216 Policy makers within both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were wary of losing ground to the Soviets because of the threat of the Soviet's gain of nuclear weapons and the recent loss of Cuba to communist factions; therefore, they felt the need to demonstrate the United States' credibility to its allies. According to scholar Robert Dean, the men who made up the foreign policy apparatus of these two presidencies

213 Ibid. 214 Ibid. 215 Ibid. 216 Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 102.

55 "legitimized" their claims to power because of their glorified military backgrounds and the "ideology of masculinity" to which they adhered.217 At the same time, the decision makers of the foreign policy apparatus during this period were also influenced by the RAND Corporation (the think tank run by the air force) and the foreign policy academics coming out of the Ivy League and elite universities.218 In Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger, Bruce Kuklick asserted that Kennedy placed these experts into policymaking positions, which he thought would “benefit from skilled management and creative thinking,” as well as “legitimate political decisions that were made about pressing policy matters.”219 It was these “intellectuals” who oftentimes were the driving force behind the foreign policy strategies that Kennedy and Johnson pursued.220 This challenged the women diplomats serving during these two administrations on at least three grounds: (1) how could women achieve positions of power within the Foreign Service when they lacked military prowess; (2) how could women display U.S. claims to hegemony and appear "powerful" when society considered them subordinate, and (3) how could women have a say in decision making when they were not part of the foreign policy “academics?” The personnel documents coming from State Department records and the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project revealed that a large majority of the women were of high social standing, had excellent education, and came from fields that were not stereotypically female. The majority of them were career FSOs and possessed knowledge of world affairs. Despite their credentials, many of the women never reached the highest levels of the administration where the actual policy making took place. Hence, the women found positions under the top level men, taking away their ability to threaten a carefully cultivated male patriarchy. This supports the claim by feminist interpretations of

217 Robert Dean, Imperial Brotherhood (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), p. 35. "The term 'ideology of masculinity' refers to the cultural system of prescription and proscription that organizes the 'performance' of an individual's role in society, that draws boundaries around the social category of manhood, and that can be used to legitimate power and privilege," 5. 218 Kuklick, 6-7. 219 Ibid, 97 & 103. 220 Kuklik, 128-151.

56 IR such as Charlotte Hooper’s that women are put into lower level positions in order to preserve male superiority.221 Once the women did achieve upper level positions, such as ambassador or chief of mission, they primarily enacted policy by acting as a go-between between the United States and the host country, instead of participating in forming the actual policy. Women, thus, asserted their claims to authority first by being the mediator between the president or secretary of state of the United States and those in positions of authority in the host country. In effect, this put many of the women into positions where they were gatekeepers for the host country—access points to the United States. Such was the case of Carol Laise, ambassador to Nepal in 1966.222 She maintained power while in the political section of the Bureau of East Indian Affairs through her extensive networking skills and the control she had over the interpretation of actions and objectives of India.223 Those in the top tiers of power relied on her for her information, giving her authority not only as a guardian of information but also as a link to inside sources. While the government placed women into subordinate positions under the top level men, the women at the same time gained positions of authority over those below them. What is evident from looking at how the women who served under the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies went about carrying out foreign policy is that almost all of them tended to take a middle-of-the-road approach when it came to dealing with (issues of) conflict. Papers from Katherine White's and Patricia Roberts Harris' personnel files reveal that these women did not hesitate to deal with individuals and issues that challenged U.S. interests within the area.224 Yet, they actively engaged in policies that were moderate— not overly tough, not overly soft. When both women faced dissidence within the countries where they served, instead of avoiding the conflict altogether or applying

221 Hooper, 91. 222 Ambassador Carol Clendening Laise interview, by Ann Miller Morin, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassador Series, May 8, 1985. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 223 Ibid. 224 Information taken from Airgrams of Katherine E. White and Patricia Roberts Harris’ personnel records in the Department of State Central Files, RG 59. National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

57 needless pressure, they confronted dissenters head on. Each of them did so in ways that placed them in positions of command, but were not excessively confrontational. An example of this is a trip to Jutland that White took in December of 1964. In order to deal with concerns arising from the Danish public regarding U.S. foreign policy objectives, White entertained an audience of about 250 individuals from the Worker’s Education Association. During her speech, White discussed the United States’ views on the UN financial crisis, the Congo rescue mission, and Vietnam.225 Prior to her trip, White had also addressed U.S. foreign policy objectives to the Danish-British Club of Aalborg.226 The Aalborg Antstidende, which reported on White’s speech, quoted her as saying Overall our goal is in a spirit of tolerance and understanding, to achieve a peaceful world community of free and independent states. My country has documented the purpose of its foreign policy in areas which were threatened by aggression. . . . It is also one of our goals to work for a stronger and more independent Europe.227

White’s speech came at a time when French President Charles de Gaulle challenged U.S. dominance and the United States’ allies were beginning to question U.S. goals in Vietnam. Although White did not take an aggressive stance against the opposition by appearing “tough” and unyielding, neither did she back down. Instead, she chose to address the issues in the manner of her choosing, allowing her to control the situation. Likewise, the public perception of the United States started deteriorating in Luxembourg because of the escalation of the Vietnam War and the Common Market crisis. Members of the Young Socialist group held street demonstrations and handed out anti-American pamphlets in protest of the war.228 In an effort to ease the tensions and to explain America’s goals and objectives regarding Vietnam and the Common Market crisis, Patricia Roberts Harris took it upon herself to invite members of the Young

225 Airgram from the American Embassy in Copenhagen to the Department of State, Dec. 9, 1964. Department of State Central Files, RG59, Personnel Records of Katharine E. White, ORG7 Copenhagen, XR Per White, Katharine E. National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. 226 Airgram from the American Embassy in Copenhagen to the Department of State, Nov 27, 1965. Department of State Central Files, RG59, Personnel Records of Katharine E. White, ORG7 Copenhagen, XR Per White, Katharine E. National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. 227 Ibid. 228 Airgram from American Embassy, Luxembourg to the Department of State, Nov. 8, 1965. Department of State Central Files, RG 59, Stack 250, Personnel Records of Harris, Patricia Roberts. National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

58 Socialist group, as well as members of the Young Democrats and the Young American’s Club, to a question-and-answer session that dealt with these issues.229 In what became an unprecedented event because of the length of the meeting, the participation levels of those involved, and the calls by other groups for more meetings, Harris placed herself in a position of power that allowed her to control the situation.230 As a result of White and Harris’ moderate approaches, the two women represented the United States’ goals in an authoritative way, maintaining their credibility as representatives of the U.S., and not as “feminine” gender bodies, through their effective discussion of world issues and foreign affairs. Yet, the women did so in ways that were not overtly tough, but were assertive and maintained temperate relations between the two countries. Though the majority of the women under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations did take a more moderate stance when carrying out issues of foreign policy, this does not mean that they did not appear “tough” in the face of opposition. While McGlen and Sarkees asserted that women were left out of foreign relations because of the cultural stereotype that women lacked an “aggressive demeanor” and therefore were unable to stand up to or negotiate with an enemy,231 the case of Eugenie Anderson promptly dispelled this notion. Anderson’s appointment to Bulgaria was perhaps the toughest assignment of Eastern Europe, because of the cool view the Bulgarian Communist government took towards the United States. 232 Even though Anderson took several modest approaches to re-establishing the American presence in Bulgaria by way of cultural and diplomatic exchanges and several radio and television appearances, Anderson also remained committed to taking an aggressive stance against communistic practices. In an article from the New York Times, Anderson pointed out that she “resisted police interference at the United States exhibition at the Plovdiv Fair…she also refused to close the display windows of the legation…and insisted on flying the American flag on her automobile and at the legations, which had not been done

229 Ibid. 230 Ibid. 231 McGlen, 39. 232 David Binder, “Proud of Own Record,” The New York Times, Dec. 6, 1964, ProQuest Historial Newspapers, 9.

59 before.”233 So, even though some women were more inclined to approach relations with their respective host countries on more restrained terms, they were not all “soft” when it came to actually facing the United States’ enemies head on. Because of détente, the women diplomats serving under the Nixon and Ford administrations did not have the same pressure to portray the United States as an overly powerful country as did the women serving under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The women still had to uphold the image of the United States as a dominant power, but they had more freedom to show the United States' friendlier side due to the negative images resulting from the Vietnam War. Jean Wilkowski, who served as ambassador to Zambia in 1972, handled relations at a time when political unrest engulfed many of the southern African states. While Henry Kissinger, who played an important part in creating and implementing some of the foreign policies coming out of Washington at the time, did not think that the U.S. ambassadors stationed in Africa needed to keep up relations with the leaders of the liberation movements coming out of Southern Africa, Wilkowski did.234 She, along with Bev Carter, who was stationed in Tanzania, "kept up a steady drumbeat, recommending to the Department that early contacts were important."235 According to Wilkowski, Kissinger finally accepted their recommendation and gave them the authority to pursue contacts with the liberationists.236 Despite the fact that some in Africa viewed the United States as a political moderator in the region, there were areas where the U.S. government was less than diligent. Wilkowski used her authority as ambassador to step up initiatives in such areas. Wilkowski pointed out in her interview with the Foreign Affairs Oral History project that the Kissinger initiative and the Lancaster House agreements helped the United States play the part of political intermediary, but she implemented her enterprises such as having the Agricultural Attache out of Kenya visit with private Zambian farmers and negotiated the

233 Binder, 9. 234 Ambassador Jean Wilkowski interview, by Willis Armstrong, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, August 23, 1989. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 235 Ibid. 236 Ibid.

60 first PL 480 loan to "endear" the United States to the Africans. She believed that the U.S. needed to "relate practically." 237 Wilkowski was not the only woman during the Nixon and Ford presidencies who faced the task of showing the United States’ more positive side. Mary Olmsted's mission as Ambassador to Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands in 1975 focused on demonstrating "a friendly interest in a new independent country."238 However, unlike Wilkowski's experience in Zambia where the United States sought to play political moderator, the Ford administration had little interest in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands at the time. Therefore, Olmsted mostly acted as a PR person and made sure that difficulties did not arise between the Papua New Guineans and the Indonesians.239 Sally Shelton's ambassadorship to Barbados, Dominica, and Grenada during the Carter presidency served as an example of how Carter had other areas of interest outside of U.S.-Soviet relations. Carter's other objectives included improving U.S. relations with its Caribbean neighbors in order to spread the ideals of democracy while maintaining U.S. security. According to Shelton, the newly-leftist government in Grenada, as well as Cuba's provocative initiatives, started to worry the U.S. government.240 Therefore, Shelton's responsibilities consisted of maintaining positive relations with the Caribbean countries, and she had specific instructions to repair the relationship between the United States and Grenada, "The one objective that I would ask you to establish is to somehow put this behind us. He said. I don't know how you're going to do it, because real bad blood had been created, but, somehow put this behind us."241 In order to improve relations and keep up friendly ties, Shelton made sure that someone from her political and economic sections visited each country at least once a month for purposes of reporting

237 Ibid. 238 Ambassador Mary Olmsted interview, by Ann Miller Morin, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, June 25, 1985. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 239 Ibid. 240 Ambassador Sally Shelton-Colby interview, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, by Charles Stuart Kennedy, July 22,1991. 241 Ibid.

61 and building up the neighboring countries to Grenada to show what countries could accomplish when they worked with the United States.242 Shelton's ambassadorship was also tense at times, and her strategy for pursuing American objectives did not always coincide with the strategy coming out of Washington. Because the U.S.-Grenadian relationship became strained immediately prior to Shelton receiving her assignment, Shelton worked diligently at trying to convince the Grenadians that the U.S. wanted friendly relations. Yet, the decision coming from the administration to disengage from Grenada—against her recommendation—thwarted Shelton's efforts.243 The 1977 appointment of Mari-Luci Jaramillo to Honduras provides another example of how Carter's foreign policy goals did not strictly relate to Cold War issues. Like Shelton, the foreign policy objectives provided to Jaramillo by the Carter administration revolved around the issue of human rights and encouraging democracy. Honduras was not a democracy when Jaramillo first took up appointment there in 1977, so a major part of her job was persuading the Hondurans that free elections were in their best interest: "Yes, that was one of my goals; to encourage them to have free elections-- really free elections. That meant encouraging them to release power."244 The strategy that Jaramillo took to accomplish her goal bypassed formal methods and instead targeted informal networks. Though Jaramillo played the part of a PR person like Shelton, she chose to remain behind the scenes, spreading word and dropping hints to people while at parties and other opportune places.245 And you can't do it in formal ways; you can't do it in lectures. You have to take advantage of every opportune moment; sometimes together, sometimes separately. At cocktail parties, you would drop a hint to one and you drop something else to another; and then you pray like hell that those two talk to each other and they form a kernel of an idea. So that it's not obvious. I know that, certainly, I could have chosen to be very obvious so I'd get a lot of public credit

242 Ibid. 243 Ibid. 244 Ambassador Mari-Luci Jaramillo interview, by Ann Miller Morin. Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassador Series, Feb. 21, 1987. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000). 245 Ibid.

62 for it. I chose not to. I played a role behind the scenes that only a few Americans know my role.246

Unlike many of the other women ambassadors, Jaramillo did not focus most of her energy on formal connections, such as government officials and important businessmen and women, but pursued a strategy that centered on the ordinary Honduran citizen. In her interview with the Foreign Affairs Oral History project, Jaramillo stated that the biggest problem in the Honduras at the time was poverty.247 Jaramillo kept with the Carter administration objective of improving human rights by going out into the rural areas where the poorest people lived and teaching them how to use their education and skills to improve their situation, instead of relying on the Honduran government to do it for them. As a way to build faith in the Honduran state, she also encouraged the wealthy to keep their money invested in their own country instead of investing it in the United States. Jaramillo not only used informal networks to keep in line with Carter's foreign policy goals of ensuring American security by promoting friendly relations with the United States' Caribbean neighbors, but also used her informal networks to spread the ideals of democracy and ensuring basic human rights for all individuals. Though Arquilla purported that the Reagan administration's major foreign policy hinged on the offensive through a cost-imposing strategy for the Soviet Union, as well as a halt and reversal of the arms race built upon viable nuclear offenses, Jane Coon's policy objectives while stationed in Bangladesh in 1981 were more flexible.248 Coon received broad policy instructions on how to handle U.S.-Bangladeshi relations and was able to make her own decisions on how to conduct policy.249 In her interview with the Foreign Affairs Oral History project, Coon identified the AID (American International Development) relationship between the United States' and Bangladesh as the most important aspect of her job while serving in Bangladesh.

246 Ibid. 247 Ibid. 248 Arquilla, 38-39. 249 Ambassador Jane Abell Coon interview, by Ann Miller Morin, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassador Series, Nov 4, 1986. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000).

63 The totality of our aid ran to perhaps a hundred and eighty million dollars a year, about half of it development assistance and about half food aid…Our objectives included an interest in stability in Bangladesh. It was certainly not in our interest to have a breakdown, for either political or economic reasons.250

Another part of Coon's policy objectives centered on friendly relations between the United States and Bangladesh, but also between Bangladesh and India. Because the Indians planted their flag on Talliputti after ten thousand people drowned due to storms in the Bay of Bengal relations between the Bangladesh and India were strained.251 Coon wanted to appear neutral; yet, at the same time, she needed strong connections with those in the Bangladeshi government in order to stress that not reaching an "amicable" solution with the Indians would be a bad move for Bangladesh.252 Throughout all of these examples, whether the women agreed or disagreed with the goals of the administration under which they worked and despite the strategies that each used to reach those goals, the one constant theme remained women’s adherence to policy objectives that came out of the top tiers of the bureaucracy. In some cases, such as Jean Wilkowski’s, when the women challenged the strategies coming from Washington they were able to persuade the administration to take a different track. However, in other cases, such as Sally Shelton-Colby’s, the women were resigned to the strategy coming out of Washington regardless of their recommendation. Still, others had more flexibility to pursue goals they deemed important, such as Jane Abell Coon. Yet, these women remained committed to maintaining the foreign policy of the president whom they served. The experience of Carol Laise, ambassador to Nepal, perhaps, demonstrated this best. With the failure of Afghanistan to act as a buffer state between U.S. interests in the Middle East and communist expansion during the late 1960s, the Johnson administration did not want Nepal to suffer the same fate.253 So, the Johnson administration centered its efforts in Nepal on contributing to its economic autonomy in order to sustain its independence and remain a buffer between the democratic country of India and communist China.254

250 Ibid. 251 Ibid. 252 Ibid. 253 Laise interview. 254 Ibid.

64 Laise took on the great task of reassuring the Nepalese that the United States was “the only non-aligned country and, therefore, U.S. interests totally coincided with Nepal’s interest in Nepal.”255 Her efforts became especially prickly due to the fact that the AID program by which the United States sustained Nepal, came from Indian money. Since the Nepalese knew it was important for the United States to remain on good terms with the Indians, they did not want America to be colored by the Indians’ view of Nepal.256 Because U.S. policy committed to maintaining the stability in the area at that time, as well as preserving India’s democracy, Laise carried out a policy centered on making sure that the Nepalese knew that their interests coincided with the best interests of the United States, which in turn coincided with the interests of the Indians. In order to ensure that not only her credibility remained in tact, but also the credibility of the United States as an ally, Laise took on the responsibility of making sure that the U.S. actions matched her words. The women who did not always agree with the strategy for initiating policy they received, such as Clare Boothe Luce, Jean Wilkowski, and Sally Shelton, did not let this conflict with the task that was given to them.257 Instead, as in the case of Luce, some of the women took it upon themselves to find other strategies for carrying out the purposes of the U.S. government. And while some managed to gain flexibility in how they ran their operations and in determining the level of importance they placed on certain issues, like Jaramillo, they all appear to have remained true to American objectives. If, as Hooper argued, international relations reflected the interests and activities of men,258 the women’s appointments, alone, served to break down gender constructs by opening the field up to women and allowing them access to decision-making on a lower level. At the same time, however, women’s gains were limited by how far up the ladder they could climb. Denial of women’s entry into the uppermost level of the decision- making process still placed them in positions lower than the men who made up the top tier, helping to reinforce the masculine hierarchy of power within the State.

255 Ibid. 256 Ibid. 257 See Luce, Wilkowski, and Shelton interviews. 258 Hooper, 13.

65 Nevertheless, women exerted their influence by acting not as “women,” but as representatives of the United States. Perhaps, Margaret Tibbetts, who served in Norway in 1964, summed this up best. I never found anyone--if they didn't like to deal with a woman--you see, you're representing the United States; the country is so important. They don't care about you one way or the other, but they feel about the United States. Maybe they grumbled to themselves, but they're going to grumble to themselves one way or the other.259

Women’s ability to deal with issues and conflicts in moderate ways helped them solidify their power within the organization at the same time breaking down traditional stereotypes that women were “irrational” and “complacent” bodies who were unable to stand-up to the enemy. The fact that the women adhered to the policies coming out of the administration helped to reaffirm their identities as symbols of U.S. objectives instead of as individuals. As in many of the cases, women mostly faced contention from other U.S. diplomats and not from within the country they were serving. Wilkowski made note of this fact in her interview with the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. But negotiations within the Foreign Service were usually far and away more difficult than on the outside with foreigners. I was accepted on the outside as a representative of the U.S. Government (sex was ignored). If I was assigned to work with this ministry or that, the people there knew they had to do business with me and they did. Whereas within the Service, there was this terrible competition for promotion. Obviously men preferred to compete with their own. There was no open jealousy; it was always subtle and unspoken, but felt.

Despite the fact that none of the women made it to the top level of the State Department, all of them who made it to the ambassador and chief of mission level were able to move beyond the gender constructs proscribed to them. Many current scholars of gender and International Relations focused less upon women as the center of study and more upon gender constructs and relations of power; however, this study placed women at the core of investigation. The reasons for doing this

259Ambassador Margaret Tibbetts interview, by Ann Miller Morin, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, May 28, 1985. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds.,Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000).

66 had less to do with demonstrating women’s competence as legitimate actors in foreign affairs and more to do with examining specific ways in which those within the peripheries of international relations broke into and functioned within a masculinized hegemonic bureaucracy, not only reinforcing Western masculinic power hierarchies, but also destabilizing traditional gender constructs thereby opening the field up for more women.

67 CONCLUSION

The year 1933 may have been a watershed year for women in the State Department with the appointment of the first woman diplomat, but like the women’s movement as a whole, one gain did not mean that the doors of opportunity for women were suddenly wide open. For the remainder of the twentieth century, women within the Foreign Service still played a marginal role. World War II may have acted as an early springboard for the gains women made in other male-dominated careers, but it did little to open the doors for women to serve in the upper levels of the State Department. In many respects, women were still marginalized within the Foreign Service: low numbers, geographic placement, and decision-making power. However, women did make advances within the field of diplomacy. While their numbers did not increase substantially, and though they were not often placed in significant geographic areas, women were able to show that they could handle a career that was often thought to be the purview of men helping break down traditional gender stereotypes within politics. The backgrounds of the women ambassadors who served between 1945 and 2004 were all different, though they all revealed knowledgeable and interested in world affairs. The education levels, foreign language proficiencies, and career backgrounds of the women were diverse, with each advancing in a different way. Between 1933 and 2004, 111 of the women were career Foreign Service officers and 106 were political appointees. Yet, what remained similar for all the women diplomats in this study was that all of them had long career paths prior to becoming ambassadors, whether they advanced within or outside the State Department. For some women, such as career FS officers Eileen Donovan and Rozanne Ridgway, they spent twenty years working their way up through the State Department. Despite their credentials, neither political party took a strong interest in promoting or nominating women as ambassadors during the period. Between 1945 and 1972, Democratic administrations appointed eight women to chief of mission positions and Republican administrations appointed fifteen. President Carter had initiatives in place to

68 boost the numbers of women ambassadors, but the increases were not significant.260 It was not until the Clinton administration that there was a substantial rise in the numbers of women ambassadors.261 Also, assignments of women ambassadors were limited geographically, with women serving in countries that were neither key political or economic posts. As Ann Wright had pointed out, of the total 115 countries that women were placed most were “small countries in the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.”262 Nevertheless, it was not purely chauvinistic practices in the Unites States that “held back” women within the Foreign Service. Women had to contend with not only traditional practices in the United States, but also with the social structures of other cultures. Anne Martindell’s experience in New Zealand offered an example of this: “The New Zealanders had very serious reservations about any woman, the New Zealanders are very chauvinistic. The business community had no interest in me at all.”263 Also, there were some countries that never hosted a U.S. female ambassador, such as the former Soviet Union, which limited the political advances for their own women due to gender beliefs. Even though women faced discrimination by both those within the State Department and by other countries, many were still able to function at a high level, acting as gatekeepers between the United States and the host country. The women may not have been participating in the policy making as those within the top level of the State Department did, but they were responsible for not only enforcing U.S. policies, but were also given authority to make foreign policy decisions that affected U.S. foreign relations. Some of the women who disagreed with the strategy coming out of Washington for pursuing policy objectives were able to change the government’s mind; yet, others who disagreed with the administration’s strategy had to concede to Washington. Nevertheless,

260 Wright, 58. 261 Ibid. 262 Wright, 54. 263Ambassador Anne Martindell, by Lillian P. Mullin, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, January 8, 1991. Marilyn Bentley and Marie Warner, eds., Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (Arlington: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2000).

69 the women remained committed to the policy objectives of the government whether they agreed or disagreed with the goals of the administration. It was their ability to capably handle the tasks set before them that helped ensure the opportunities for future women, not only within the United States but elsewhere. Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s experience helped illustrate this: I had no notion what a shock my gender would be. Let me tell you how much the first woman I was. I was not only the first woman to head the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. I was the first woman to ever represent a major power at the U.N. I was the first woman to ever represent a western government at the United Nations. Western--broadly interpreted, that means a European government; Eastern Europe or Western Europe. . . . I didn't really know the extent to which the diplomatic corps of the world and the diplomatic profession are an exclusive male preserve. . . . But I have no doubt that my appointment and survival of those first two years, which was very tough, in fact opened doors for women in career foreign service positions in those two countries [Belgium and Switzerland].264

This study showed that both gender and power constructs contributed to women’s inequality within the Department of State; yet, it also revealed that despite the gender inequity that existed throughout the sixty year period, women were able to secure a place for themselves within the upper levels of the Foreign Service. While both Cynthia Enloe and Molly M. Wood indicated that the gendered ethos of diplomacy was reinforced by the role of the diplomatic wife through traditional domestic and social responsibilities, this paper points out that within the Foreign Service women diplomats were able to deconstruct conventional thoughts about gender, but also use gender stereotypes to their advantage. In some cases, women were viewed as gender neutral by the host country, neither male nor female, only symbols of U.S. enterprise. How do these findings relate and what do they suggest for women’s access in fields both within and outside of politics? The findings of this study both support and differ from the analyses covering gender inequity in nonpolitical careers. Some scholars who studied gender in the workplace, such as Barbara F. Reskin, asserted that men hold women back in order to retain their dominance in the workplace. 265 In an article written in 1988, Reskin referred to the works of Carol Hymowitz and Timothy D. Schellhardt, as

264 Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Women Ambassadors Series, by Ann Miller Morin, May 28, 1987. 265 Barbara F. Reskin, “Bringing the Men Back in: Sex Differentiation and the Devaluation of Women’s Work,” Gender and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Mar., 1988), 58-81.

70 well as Rosabeth Moss Kanter who claimed that “organizations are changing the rules of what one must do to reach the top in order to make it more difficult for women to succeed.”266 Catherine M. Daily, S. Trevis Certo, and Dan R. Dalton examined the role of women in the corporate office in “A Decade of Corporate Women: Some Progress in the Boardroom, None in the Executive Suite,”267 in which they had similar conclusions. They backed author D. Bilmoria’s claim that “even when women do all the right things and have all the right stuff, they continue to be blocked from the innermost circles of power.”268 Daily, Certo, and Dalton argued that women’s participation on corporate boards has significantly increased, but the glass ceiling would not be broken as long women were not promoted to the executive suite.269 The findings of this study showed that despite the fact that women had a slow start in gaining top level posts and though their numbers did not increase at a substantial pace, there was a considerable increase the number of women ambassadors during the 1993-2001 Clinton administration. Hence, women had more opportunity for advancement with their continued insertion into the field, and not less as Reskin illustrated of women within nonpolitical fields. Conversely, women who achieved ambassador and chief of mission status were held back from the uppermost level of the decision making apparatus, proving similar to women within the corporate world who were denied access to the executive suite. Nevertheless, Clinton’s appointment of Madeleine Albright as secretary of state may have been the impetus for women gaining access to the uppermost level as President George W. Bush followed suit with the appointment of Condoleeza Rice as Secretary of State. These findings are in line with other research coming out of the gender political field. Angela M. Bullard and Deils S. Wright’s article “Circumventing the Glass Ceiling: Women Executives in American State Governments” also revealed that within the American government women made significant “inroads in securing top administrative

266 Reskin, 68. 267 Catherine M. Daily, S. Trevis Certo, and Dan R. Dalton, “A Decade of Corporate Women: Some Progress in the Boardroom, None in the Executive Suite,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 20, no. 1 (Jan. , 1999), 93-99. 268 Daily, 98. 269 Daily, 98.

71 posts.”270 Similar to this paper, Bullard and Wright pointed out that a large percentage of women who achieved executive posts within the government were highly educated, but neither political party was quick to accept them as equals.271 They concluded that by 1993 while the proportion of women as agency heads within the government was higher than other public sectors, there was still gender inequity in state governments, with women lagging behind.272 Gregory B. Lewis’ article “Gender Integration of Occupations in the Federal Civil Service: Extent and Effects on Male-Female Earnings,” noted the substantial advances towards gender integration in the government between 1967 and 1993.273 He stated, “In 1967, 42% of the women and 49% of the men held positions in occupational series in which at least 95% of their co-workers were of their same sex. By 1993, those percentages had dropped to 12 and 3, respectively.”274 Like Bullard and Wright’s article, Lewis saw little difference for education and experience as a distinctive factor in the gap between male and female occupations within the government.275 Likewise, Lewis also concluded that the gender integration within the federal civil service “proceeded more rapidly and steadily” than in the general economy.276 Thus, the findings of this examination do not completely differ from investigations researching women in other political occupations. The gains women made in achieving upper levels posts within the Department of State tended to copy the increases women made in achieving other executive spots within the government. However, the advancements women made within the Foreign Service happened at a later time. While women in other government areas had made substantial increases by 1993, it wasn’t until 1993 that women with the Department of State achieve the same momentum. If the current trend that the Clinton administration stimulated and succeeding George W. Bush administration followed, with the placement of women in the uppermost decision

270 Angela M. Bullard and Deil S. Wright, “Circumventing the Glass Ceiling: Women Executives in American State Governments,” Public Administration Review, no 3 (May-Jun., 1993), 189. 271 Bullard, 193 & 194. 272 Bullard, 199. 273 Gregory B. Lewis, “Gender Integration of Occupations in the Federal Civil Service: Extend and Effects on Male-Female Earnings,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, no. 3 (Apr., 1996). 274 Lewis, 475. 275 Bullard, 193; Lewis, 476. 276 Lewis, 481.

72 making level continues, then there is hope that women within the Department of State will shatter the glass ceiling, which offers hope to women in other fields. This study of women within the Foreign Service still leaves the field open for further research. A comparative study between male and female officers would provide a more in-depth analysis between the two genders and possibly answer some questions that were left unexplained by this study. Without having statistics on male Ambassadors, it was hard to properly gauge the level of discrimination women faced. Were women as well educated and knowledgeable as men? Were there geographic areas where women excelled over men? How fast were men promoted within the field versus women? Not only would the field of women in diplomacy benefit from a comparative study between men and women, but an exploration into the role ethnicity and gender plays within the Foreign Service would also add to the field. Some questions future studies could pursue include: (1) is there a historical discrepancy between the role white women played within the Foreign Service and those of other ethnicities; and (2) Were other countries more receptive to U.S. women of the same ethnic background or as open to accepting U.S. women of other ethnic backgrounds? Another area open for future study is a comparison between the role of women diplomats of other countries and the role of U.S. women diplomats. A more thorough investigation into the role women play in diplomacy in other countries compared with the role American women play in diplomacy would help clear-up any ambiguities left by this research and would provide a more thorough understanding of how cultural differences impact international relations.

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82 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Rachel Beckett was born and raised in Melbourne, Florida. She completed her Bachelors degree in the Spring of 2001 in Business Communication at the Florida Institute of Technology in Melbourne, Florida, graduating Magna Cum Laude. Rachel Beckett then worked for over two years as a Buyer’s Assistant before deciding to pursue a graduate degree. Under the advisement of Dr. Suzanne Sinke, she obtained her Master’s in History in Spring 2009 at the Florida State University.

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