Governance Intervention in Theory and History
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Capabilities, International Order and Risk: State Failure and Governance Intervention in Theory and History Author Halvorson, Daniel Published 2010 Thesis Type Thesis (PhD Doctorate) School Centre for Governance and Public Policy DOI https://doi.org/10.25904/1912/677 Copyright Statement The author owns the copyright in this thesis, unless stated otherwise. Downloaded from http://hdl.handle.net/10072/365882 Griffith Research Online https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au Griffith Business School Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Daniel Scott Halvorson June 2010 Capabilities, International Order and Risk: State Failure and Governance Intervention in Theory and History Daniel Scott Halvorson BA (Hons) School of International Business and Asian Studies Griffith Business School Griffith University Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy June 2010 Abstract This study examines the phenomenon of “failed” states and governance intervention in comparative historical and international systemic context. The dissertation argues that state failure is a condition partly constructed by the leading actors of international society. The study advances a three-part framework for analysis to understand how leading states and their close allies interpret what constitutes a state failure and how an interventionist policy response is formulated. Interpretations of state failure and modes of governance intervention are based on the interplay of transnational disorder with the (1) distribution of capabilities in the international system, the (2) pattern of order in the international society, and the (3) sensitivity of the domestic polities of leading actors to risk. This framework for analysis is applied to three qualitative case studies of state “failure” and “governance” intervention selected on system polarity: the 1882 British occupation of Egypt; the United States combat intervention in South Vietnam, 1965; and Australia’s Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003. The geographical location of state failure is found in each case to be a function of the distribution of capabilities. In heterogenous patterns of international order, thresholds for state failure are found to be high relative to homogenous international orders. The extent of transnational activities viewed as a security risk by leading actors is found to be positively associated with states’ perceived capacity to manage such risks and control future outcomes. The study finds that in multipolar and bipolar structures, strategic competition heavily constrains interventionist responses to state failure. In a unipolar system, the mode of intervention is found to be influenced more by the presence of transnational activities that deviate from the pattern of order valued by the hegemon. The study finds that heterogenous international orders have a high threshold for permissible governance intervention in failed states. The opposite pattern is found in a unipolar system with a homogenous pattern of order. In each case, the governance objectives of the interventions are found to be consistent with the standards of appropriate statehood valued by the intervening power and in conformity with the ordering principles of international society. Intended governance outcomes in the homogenous pattern of order are narrowly circumscribed and technocratic. Those in heterogenous international orders are found to be more political, fluid and reliant on the discretion of representatives on the ground. The study finds in all cases that the iii objectives for governance interventions are oriented to controlling and ameliorating the offending transnational activities rather than addressing the “root causes” of state weakness. Domestic risk sensitivity is found to be a negative constraint on action or inaction in highly publicised cases of transnational disorder. It is also found to act as an enabling factor to allow governments to pursue interventions less tenable under other domestic political conditions. The study finds that the official motives for governance interventions in failed states are security-focused and consistent with permissible reasons for intervention in the international society. The main finding of the study is that prestige-based motives are in all cases stated openly and concurrently along with the more direct and tangible security-based motives. The prestige motive is linked directly to the distribution of capabilities in the international system and the domestic risk sensitivity in leading states. Great powers and their close allies view managing the transnational risks of state failure as an important activity for maintaining or accruing international prestige. It is also found to be an avenue for demonstrating foreign policy “strength” in the domestic political sphere. The study finds that none of the three cases of governance intervention considered are successful according to their own intentions and objectives. I conclude that this is due to the partly constructed nature of the failed state phenomenon. In each case, the external motivating factors for governance interventions are found to be both internally incoherent and inconsistent with the local complexities of the weak state in question. Once committed, however, intervening states are highly resistant to altering their governance objectives, to the point of failure or a semi-permanent presence. The findings of the dissertation hold significant implications for an emerging multipolar international system in the twenty-first century. Statement of Originality This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the dissertation itself. iv Capabilities, International Order and Risk: state failure and governance intervention in theory and history Acknowledgements vii List of abbreviations ix 1. Introduction: the problem of ineffectually governed political spaces 1 1.1 Research problem 3 1.2 Research questions 5 1.3 Research design and chapter overview 5 1.4 Main findings and significance of study 8 Part I: ‘Bringing International Politics Back In’ 11 State failure and governance intervention in theory 11 2. The flawed premises of post-Cold War approaches to state failure, governance, and state-building 13 2.1 Introduction 13 2.2 Empirical definitions of state failure: confusion and conflation 15 2.3 State failure: unique or uniquely threatening? 17 2.4 The poverty of institutional approaches to state failure 22 2.5 The “perverse rationality” of the social contract approach 27 2.6 From weak to “failed”: constructing state failure 31 2.7 Conclusion 34 3. Capabilities, international order and risk: a framework for analysis 36 3.1 Introduction 36 3.2 Framework for analysis 37 3.2.1 Interpretation 38 3.2.2 Response formulation 42 3.2.3 Motive 44 3.2.4 Mode of intervention 44 3.3 Method and sources for case study analysis 45 3.3.1 Method 45 3.3.2 Case selection and sources 46 Part II: Case Studies 49 State failure and governance intervention in history 49 4. ‘To restore the power of the Khedive’: British intervention in Egypt, 1882 51 4.1 Introduction 51 4.2 Historical background and case overview 53 4.3 Domestic context of British decision-making 58 4.4 Interpretation 62 4.4.1 Distribution of capabilities 63 4.4.2 Pattern of order in international society 70 4.4.3 Domestic risk sensitivity 74 4.5 Response formulation 76 4.5.1 Distribution of capabilities 78 4.5.2 Pattern of order in international society 84 4.5.3 Domestic risk sensitivity 87 v 4.6 Motives 91 4.7 Mode of intervention 92 4.8 Conclusion 94 5. ‘To preserve freedom’: US intervention in South Vietnam, 1965 97 5.1 Introduction 97 5.2 Historical background and case overview 100 5.3 Domestic context of US decision-making 104 5.4 Interpretation 109 5.4.1 Distribution of capabilities 109 5.4.2 Pattern of order in international society 117 5.4.3 Domestic risk sensitivity 124 5.5 Response formulation 131 5.5.1 Distribution of capabilities 132 5.5.2 Pattern of order 139 5.5.3 Domestic risk sensitivity 142 5.6 Motives 147 5.7 Mode of intervention 148 5.8 Conclusion 153 6. ‘To restore law and order’: Australia’s Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 2003 156 6.1 Introduction 156 6.2 Historical background and case overview 159 6.3 Domestic context of Australian decision-making 163 6.4 Interpretation 170 6.4.1 Distribution of capabilities 171 6.4.2 Pattern of order in international society 182 6.4.3 Domestic risk sensitivity 191 6.5 Response formulation 197 6.5.1 Distribution of capabilities 198 6.5.2 Pattern of order in international society 207 6.5.3 Domestic risk sensitivity 210 6.6 Motive 211 6.7 Mode of intervention 213 6.8 Conclusion 220 7. Conclusion: summary and implications for the twenty-first century 223 7.1 Summary of main findings 223 7.1.1 Interpretation 223 7.1.2 Response formulation 228 7.1.3 Motives 232 7.1.4 Mode of intervention 232 7.2 Implications of study 234 7.3 Directions for future research 236 References 237 Primary Sources 237 Secondary Sources 245 vi Acknowledgements I would first like to thank Professor Michael Wesley, my principal supervisor throughout most of this project, and then external advisor. His passion for ideas and relentless optimism kept me motivated over the inevitable ups and downs of several years of intense study. His adeptness at suggesting formidable but rewarding intellectual challenges and allowing me the freedom to pursue them with autonomy has not only strengthened this research, but introduced me to literatures that have influenced my thought well beyond these pages. I am also particularly thankful to Professor Jason Sharman for agreeing to take over the principal supervision of this dissertation at a late stage in the project.