THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: A THEORETICAL – HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A Ph.D. Dissertation
by
BEHİCE ÖZLEM GÖKAKIN
Department of International Relations Bilkent University Ankara January 2010
To the Memory of Late Professor Stanford Jay Shaw
(1930-2006)
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: A THEORETICAL – HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The Institute of Economics And Social Sciences of Bilkent University
By
BEHİCE ÖZLEM GÖKAKIN
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BİLKENT UNIVERSITY ANKARA
January 2010
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.
Professor Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu Dissertation Supervisor
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.
Professor Meliha Altunışık Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.
Associate Professor Ersel Aydınlı Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.
Assistant Professor Nur Bilge Criss Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.
Assistant Professor Evgeni R. Radushev Examining Committee Member
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
Professor Erdal Erel Director
ABSTRACT
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: A THEORETICAL-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Gökakın, Behice Özlem
Ph.D., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
January 2010
This dissertation analyzes the Ottoman Empire’s relationship with European international society in the nineteenth century through the English School of International Relations Theory. By use of primary and secondary sources, this dissertation attempts to refine some of the historical arguments of the English School in reference to the expansion of European international society and the socialization of non-European states. By focusing on the Ottoman perspective, this dissertation presents a critical understanding of European international society and its expansion from a non-European perspective.
Keywords: The English School of International Relations Theory, The Ottoman Empire, The non-European States, Socialization
iii
ÖZET
OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU VE AVRUPA ULUSLARARASI TOPLUMU: KURAMSAL-TARİHSEL BİR ANALİZ
Gökakın, Behice Özlem
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu
Ocak 2010
Bu tez, on dokuzuncu yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Avrupa uluslararası toplumu ilişkilerini İngiliz Okulu Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi bakış açısıyla analiz etmektedir. Birincil ve ikincil kaynakları kullanarak, İngiliz Okulu teorisinin Avrupa uluslararası toplumunun genişlemesi ve Avrupalı olmayan devletlerle ilişkileri hakkında bazı tarihsel tezlerini toplumsallaşma açısından ele alarak geliştirmeye çalışmıştır. Bu tez Osmanlı bakış açısına odaklanarak Avrupa uluslararası toplumuna ve genişlemesine, Avrupa-dışı bir bakış açısından eleştirel bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: İngilizce Okulu Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Avrupalı Olmayan Devletler, Toplumsallaşma
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my deepest gratitude and heartfelt thanks to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, for his patience, understanding and confidence in me. Without his guidance, invaluable support and encouragement, this dissertation could not have been realized. His immense scope of knowledge, supportive comments and structural recommendations helped me in the theoretical interpretation of the historical facts and final revision of the dissertation. Prof. Karaosmanoğlu’s suggestions on the context and style of writing are beyond appreciation. Words are not adequate to express my gratitude.
I also owe a great debt to the late Prof. Dr. Stanford Jay Shaw, my supervisor from 2001 to 2006. His enormous range of knowledge, along with his winning personality and his dedication to academic life deeply impressed and inspired me to choose my career and area of interest – the History of the Ottoman Empire. Prof. Shaw helped me to develop great insight into Ottoman history and historical methodology and objectivity. His unexpected loss has been a great shock to me and to all of the other members of the Bilkent community. I am grateful to his wife, Prof. Dr. Ezel Kural Shaw, for her continuous support and motivation throughout this study and during the most difficult days of my life. At the end of this long process of Ph.D. study, I am confident that the final version of this dissertation would have made him proud of me.
v I am deeply thankful to Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık (International Relations Department – Middle East Technical University), Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı, (International Relations Department – Bilkent University), Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss (International Relations Department – Bilkent University) and Asst. Prof. Dr. Evgeni Radushev (History Department – Bilkent University), all of whom willingly examined my dissertation and whose constructive comments and recommendations encouraged me to continue with my academic research.
I would like to express my gratitude to all of my professors at Bilkent University who guided me in my undergraduate and graduate studies. I am specifically grateful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı, the Chairman of the Department of International Relations, for his continuous support and encouragement. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Norman Stone and Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss for the insight they helped me to develop into European diplomatic history and Prof. Dr. İlhan Akipek and Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan for the insight they have provided into the area of International Law. I am also indebted to Prof. Dr. Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Serdar Güner, Asst. Prof. Dr. Gülgün Tuna, and Asst. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu, for the insight they have given me into the subject of international relations and international security studies. I am thankful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bilgin and Asst. Prof. Dr. Paul Williams for their guidance in achieving a better and more objective understanding of international relations theories and methods throughout my graduate study at Bilkent University. I also would like to express my thanks to Prof. Hasan Ünal (Gazi University), Prof. Dr. Hasan Köni (Bahçeşehir University), Prof. Dr. Ali Fuat Borovalı (Doğuş University), Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nimet Beriker (Sabancı University), Assoc. Prof. Dr. Selahattin Erhan (Yeditepe University), Assoc. Prof. Dr. Walter Kretchik (Western Illinois University) and Asst. Prof. Dr. Seymen Atasoy (Eastern Mediterranean University).
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioğlu, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mehmet Ali Bayar, a member of the General Administrative Commission of the Democratic Party, and Oğuz Özbilgin, the Asssistant Secretary General of Bilkent University, who had been my superiors at the
vi Office of the President between 1998 and 2000 for their support and encouragement in my transition from bureaucracy to academic life.
I would like to express my special thanks to the administrative staff of the Faculty of Economic, Administrative and Social Sciences, the Department of International Relations and the Department of History and to the staff at Bilkent Library. I specifically would like to thank Kadriye Göksel, Müge Keller, Pınar Kılıçhan Şener, Yasemin Özbek, Sibel Ramazanoğlu, and Funda Yılmaz, for their continuous support and friendship.
I would to like to thank my mother, Inci Gökakın, and father, Oktay Gökakın, without whose great encouragement and support this dissertation would not have been realized. I would also like to express my deepest appreciation to my dearest mother for her courage and strength in the toughest times of her life. Her strength and attachment to life throughout her successive surgeries have been great sources of inspiration for me. They helped me to understand and appreciate the importance of life, family and loved ones. Her strength became my strength and made me stronger, as she never let me give up, no matter what challenges I faced. I would like to express my deepest thanks to my father for his support and guidance in reference to my professional and personal ideals and specifically in terms of my wish to embrace the academic life. I cannot express my appreciation and gratitude to my parents with mere words for their unconditional love and support throughout my life.
I would like to express my thanks to all of my friends and family in Turkey and in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus who, in one way or another, have emotionally supported me throughout my years of study at Bilkent.
Finally, I would like to thank the Bilkent University and the Department of International Relations for giving me this wonderful opportunity.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... iii ÖZET ...... iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... v TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... viii LIST OF TABLES …………………………………………………………… xiii LIST OF FIGURES …………………………………………………………... xiv
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1 Dissertation Argument ………………………………………….... 1 1.2 Literature Review ………………………………………………… 18 1.3 Epistemology ……………………………………………………... 21 1.4 Sources ……………………………………………………………. 28 1.5 Précis of the Chapters ……………………………………………... 28
CHAPTER II: THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY ………………………………………………………. 32 2.1 Historical Evolution of the English School ……………………….. 32 2.2 Conceptual and Methodical Synopsis of the English School ……… 40 2.2.1 International Order through Society of States: The Basis of the “System” and “Society” Distinction ………………………………… 40
viii 2.2.2 International Order and the Primary Institutions of International Society ……………………………………………………………….. 60 2.2.2.1 The Balance of Power ………………………………….. 64 2.2.2.2 International Law ……………………………………….. 66 2.2.2.3 Diplomacy ………………………………………………. 67 2.2.2.4 War ……………………………………………………… 69 2.2.2.5 The Great Powers ………………………………………. 70 2.2.3 Methodological Pluralism and the Epistemological Distinctiveness ………………………………………………………… 71
CHAPTER III: REINTERPRETATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY ...... 80 3.1 International System and Society in Recent ES Scholarship ……….. 80 3.2 From the European International System to International Society ……. 91 3.2.1 The Evolution of Thin European International System: Respublica Christiana to Westphalia ……………………………………. 103 3.2.1.1 Diplomacy ………………………………………………... 105 3.2.1.2 War ……………………………………………………….. 111 3.2.1.3 The Balance of Power ……………………………………. 117 3.2.1.4 International Law ………………………………………… 121 3.2.1.5 The Great Powers ………………………………………… 122 3.2.2 From the Thin to the Thick European International System: From Westphalia to Vienna ……………………………………………… 122 3.2.2.1 Diplomacy ………………………………………………. 126 3.2.2.2 War ……………………………………………………… 128 3.2.2.3 The Balance of Power …………………………………... 131 3.2.2.4 International Law ……………………………………….. 132 3.2.2.5 The Great Powers ………………………………………. 134 3.3.3 The Evolution of the European Pluralist International Society on the Basis of International System ………………………………………….. 137 3.2.3.1 Diplomacy ……………………………………………... 141 3.2.3.2 War ……………………………………………………. 143 3.2.3.3 The Balance of Power ………………………………… 147
ix 3.2.3.4 International Law …………………………………….. 149 3.2.3.5 The Great Powers …………………………………….. 149
CHAPTER IV: A HYBRID INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND EUROPE ……………………………………………………. 152 4.1 The Analytical and Historical Shortcomings of the ES regarding the Expansion of European International Society ………………………… 152 4.2 The Historical and Theoretical Study of the Ottoman Empire and Europe from System to Society ………………………………………. 169 4.3 Hybrid International Society: A Conceptual and Analytical Modification ………………………………………………………….. 179
CHAPTER V: THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: OTTOMAN-EUROPEAN ACCULTURATION ………………… 191 5.1 Ottoman Knowledge, Practice, and Strategic Learning of the Primary International Institutions ……………………………………………….. 191 5.1.1 The Ottoman Empire and War …………………………... 192 5.1.1.1 The Ottoman State: An Institutional Bricolage … 193 5.1.1.2 Overview of the Ottoman Military Structure …… 198 5.1.1.3 Ottoman Weaponry and Military Engineering …… 205 5.1.1.4 The Ottoman Perceptions of War from 1299 to 1789 ………………………………………. 215 5.1.1.5 The Ottoman Military Modernization and Acculturation ……………………………………………. 226 5.1.1.6 The Ottoman Perceptions of War from 1789 to 1856 ……………………………………….. 230 5.1.1.6.1 Avoiding Wars at All Costs: French Occupation of Egypt ……………………………. 232 5.1.1.6.2 Preventing Foreign Interference in Internal Uprisings: Serbia and Greece ………… 236 5.1.1.6.3 Concerted Intervention: The Egyptian, Lebanese and Holy Places Crises ……………… 244
x CHAPTER VI: THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: OTTOMAN – EUROPEAN ACCULTURATION ………………… 266 6.1 Ottoman Perception of Diplomacy …………………………………. 266 6.1.1 Characteristics of Early Ottoman Diplomatic Organization …. .……………………………………………….. 270 6.1.1.1 The Office of Nişancı and Reis ül-Küttab ……… 271 6.1.1.2 Dragomans and the Tercüme Odası (Translation Office) ……………………………………… 273 6.1.2 The Ad Hoc Period of the Ottoman Diplomacy (1299-1793): Characteristics and Practices ………………………276 6.1.2.1 European Permanent Embassies and Diplomatic Corps in Istanbul …………………………… 279 6.1.2.2 The Ottoman Protocol, Ceremonies and Practices: Euro-Ottoman Symbiosis ……………………………… 282 6.1.2.2.1 The Ottoman Protocol ……………… 283 6.1.2.2.2 The Ottoman Ceremonies …………. 284 6.1.2.2.3 The Ottoman Diplomatic Practices …. 286 6.1.2.2.3.1 Marriage Diplomacy: A Common Practice …………………….. 287 6.1.2.2.3.2 The Seven Towers: A Common Practice …………………….. 289 6.1.2.2.3.3 The Capitulations: The Ahdnâmes, Amâns and Protégé System in Commercial, Consular and Diplomatic Relations …………………… 291 6.1.3 The Resident Ottoman Diplomacy (1793-1856): Characteristics, Principles and Practices ………………………… 295 6.1.3.1 Bureaucratic Reform under Selim III and Mahmud II: The Founding of Permanent Embassies And Foreign Ministry ……………………………………. 296 6.1.3.2 Characteristics, Principles and Practices of Tanzimat Diplomacy ……………………………………. 302 6.1.3.3 The Connection between the Tanzimat Reforms
xi and External Crises ……………………………………… 304 6.2 Ottoman Perception of International Law …………………….. 308 6.2.1 The Euro-Ottoman Symbiosis: Dâr al-Harb, Dâr al-Sulh, Dâr al-Islam ………………………………………. 308 6.3 Ottoman Perception of Balance of Power and Great Powers (1299-1856) ………………………………………………. 314
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION ……………………………………………….. 321 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 328
xii
LIST OF TABLES
1. Czaputowitz’s Compilation of International Society ...... 54
2. Transformation of the European International Society to the European Union ...... 94
xiii
LIST OF FIGURES
1. An Economic International System ...... 89
2. Multi-Ordinate International System ...... 92
3. The Transition from the European International System to Society ……………………………………………..... 93
4. Power Exertion of the Nineteenth-Century International Society…………………………………………………………… 151
5. Classical ES View of the Nineteenth-Century International Arena ……………………………………………………………. 162
6. Keene’s View of the Nineteenth-Century International Arena ……………………………………………………………. 163
7. Socialization into European International Society (T. Parson’s The Social System Model, adapted to the classical ES Arguments by Shogo Suzuki) ……………………………………………………………… 165
8. Suzuki’s Stages of Socialization Built on Long and Hadden’s Model ……… 167
9. The Evolution of the Hybrid International Society …………………………. 190
10. Keith Krause’s Model of Military Technological Diffusion ………………. 215
xiv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Dissertation Argument
This dissertation analyzes the Ottoman Empire’s socialization into European international society using the English School of International Relations Theory
(ES),1 which answers the question of: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the
English School approach in analyzing the socialization of the non-European states to the international society? The focus of this dissertation will be on the change in
Ottoman policy against Europe and its view of European standards and institutions.
International society is a socially constructed concept; or rather, an ideal-type2 by which English School scholars analyze the historical development of international relations. It approaches world politics from a different perspective than Realism;
1 In the international relations literature also known as the ‘international society approach’. 2 Ideal type is a concept developed by Max Weber, to describe a pure case. Ideal-types are constructed from comparison of historical and social reality for analysis. See Edward Keene, “International Society as an Ideal Type,” in Theorising International Society – English School Methods, ed. Cornelia Navari, (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009), 104-124. 1
positing an international society where states cooperate and coexist for their basic common goals makes the realist portrayal of international politics as power politics
(put simply, an arena of rivalry for survival and state interests) inadequate. The society of states, on the other hand, enables cooperation for orderly relations; it is viewed as an instrument to promote and preserve the international order and security among its constitutive members. Members of the international society manage their relations through primary institutions such as balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and the great power directive.3 These institutions not only signal the existence of an international society that is established via common rules, but also provide a sense of order by regulating interstate relations. As noted by contemporary post-classical ES scholars, the school’s major contribution to the international relations discipline lies in its concepts, particularly that of “the international society”.4
There are three ways to study international society: structural, functional, and historical. Structural studies focus on the institutional structure of international society, while functional studies analyze how that society functions; historical studies examine the evolution, development, and expansion of international society and is the main occupation of ES scholars.5 The school’s main argument regarding the historical origins of the global international society-based solely on European civilization and Christianity-led to claims of one-sidedness. Apart from the European international system and society, other regional international systems/societies were
3 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Second Edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 101-233. 4 For the ES conceptualization of international system and society see below, Chapter Two, 40-61. 5 Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations- A Contemporary Reassessment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 43-80. 2
built upon elaborate civilizations and conceptions of the world, such as Islam and
Asia.6 The relationships between members of different international systems and societies were not based on the same moral and legal bases as those between members of the same international society.
The post-classical ES scholars Buzan and Little recommend broadening the ES analysis to include both pre-modern and modern regional international systems and societies. Buzan also argues for a revision of the ES levels of analysis, suggesting that the international system be subsumed under the international society..Buzan further argues for the inclusion of international economic systems into the framework of the ES. The major counter-argument raised against the inclusion of international economic systems is that the boundaries of the economic system generally extend beyond existing political systems.7 Although this argument has merit, an international economic system that ties various political systems within a single framework can develop into an international system. The interactions between units over a sustained period of time may extend beyond trade and commerce; intense economic interactions can have a spill-over effect to the other sectors. Units working to regulate economic relations by developing new rules, institutions, and norms may engage in diplomatic-military and socio-cultural relations as well. It should be noted
6 See Hedley Bull and Adam Watson ed., The Expansion of International Society, 1984; Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society, (London: Routledge, 1992). 7 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society-English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Richard Little, “The English School and World History,” in The International Society and its Critics, ed. A.J. Bellamy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 45- 64; Richard Little, “History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism,” in Theorising International Society, ed. Cornelia Navari, 2009, 78-103
3
that an international economic system can move from a system to a societal level, or may remain as it is.
This dissertation and its scheme, which are developed using a combination of classical and post-classical ES studies, argue that European international society was founded on sub-regional thin international systems embedded within an economic international system. Conventionally, the Italian city-states were the forerunners of the European international system and society, and initially built a thin interstate system. The main driving force for the Italian city-states was to balance each other in the Mediterranean economic system; they wanted to ease their economic concerns and regulate their commercial relations within a framework of agreed rules and institutions. This balancing of the economy, along with the addition of political and security concerns, particularly after the fall of Byzantium, turned into a political equilibrium. From a sub-regional thin international system and a regional economic system, a full interstate system extended into a nest of developing sectors. The dispersion of this system and its institutions during the Renaissance led to the transition of the European state system from a thin (sub-regional) to a thick
(regional) international system. It was upon this full regional system that the pluralist
European international society was established.
Economic and commercial considerations also played an important role in the expansion of European international society into non-European territories.
Originally, the European states formed a thin international economic system with the non-European states which then developed into a full international system. The non-
European states were included in other sectors, either through reciprocal relations
4
that were based on equality or through colonization that was based on inequality. As the great European powers’ common interests increased in non-European territories, the normative rules of conduct, called “the standards of civilization”, were used to create unit and value similarity. This led to the development of what is defined as “a hybrid international society” that consists of both systemic and societal elements.
This society was stratified and hierarchical, just like the European one. This argument fits empirically and historically well into Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-
Palaez’s argument of the persistence of regional international systems and societies in contemporary international society.8 The regions that interacted with the European international society-through colonialism or other ways-are, currently a fusion of earlier societies and the European society that preserves their distinctiveness under the universal hybrid international society.
Conversely, classical ES scholars argue that the globalization of the European society of states resulted from both an outward expansion of this society and the functionalist socialization of non-European states. First, this depiction rules out the role of the European and non-European interactions on the society of states. Second, it neglects the importance of economic, imperial, and colonial factors in the expansion of international society. Third, it excludes the effects of the socialization of the non-European states on the constitutive members of the international society9 and omits the process through which a distinct (hybrid) international society is
8 Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds., International Society and the Middle East-English School Theory at the Regional Level (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009). 9 Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society- Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, “The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society,” Review of International Studies, 17 (1991): 26-44; Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire-China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009). 5
formed between Europe and the rest of the world. Additionally, because the school’s major arguments regarding the non-European states are based on biased classical
European writings in lieu of non-European ones, they inevitably make the ES approach appear Eurocentric and ahistorical.
Suzuki, who recently contributed to this debate with his case studies of China and
Japan, argues that the exclusion of non-European perspectives in the ES accounts of the international society’s expansion undermines the school’s interpretive and historical claims10: “conventional studies of the expansion of European international society are characterized by a myopic and normatively driven conceptualization, which is inadequate for understanding the entry of non-European states into
European international society and threatens to undermine the School’s
‘interpretivist’ claims.”11
Additionally, Suzuki notes that the ES scholars’ “normative commitments to demonstrate international society as a ‘normative good’ resulted in empirically impoverished accounts of this complex process”12 of non-European socialization.
Post-classical ES scholars such as Buzan, Suganami, and Linklater, note the need for country-based studies to complement historical accounts of the expansion of the international society. In other words, despite comprehensive studies by the leading scholars of the school and the growing interest in the ES approach in recent years, non-European perceptions are still terra incognita. Additional historical studies from
10Shogo Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society,” European Journal of International Relations, 11 (2005):137-164. 11 Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization into Janus-Faced,” 37. 12 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 12. 6
non-European perspectives and original primary sources are required in order to revise the ES’s historical analysis of the institutionalization of European international society over other societies, as well as its structural and functional understanding of that institutionalization.
This dissertation is therefore organized as an idiographic historical case study of the relations of a non-European state (the Ottoman Empire) with the European international society; the Ottoman Empire’s constitutive role in the European international system and its transition from an international system to a society is presented from the perspective of the Ottoman ruling elite. This dissertation will bring a new vision to the ES’s existing arguments regarding non-European states, thereby contributing to the historical study of the international society and modifying the ES account of European expansion. It also presents a new perspective on the study of nineteenth-century Ottoman diplomatic history from an international relations theoretical viewpoint. There are currently no comprehensive studies combining the ES approach and Ottoman perspective with regard to the Empire’s socialization with European international societal institutions. It should be noted that this dissertation does not intend to clarify structural or functional academic debates within the ES approach, nor is it a chronicle of the history of nineteenth-century
Ottoman-European relations. Comprehensive studies on the diplomatic history of the
Ottoman Empire and on the ES remain unresolved debates. It should, however, also be noted that it is inevitable to address some of the structural and functional points that are essential for this analysis. The uniqueness of this study depends on its ability to present the weaknesses and strengths of the ES approach in analyzing the non-
European states’ socialization, and its suggestions for improving on the theoretical
7
and historical bases. The analytical framework and schemes that are built on the existing ES literature are used to grasp the multifaceted and contextual nature of
Ottoman-European relations within the system and society dichotomy.
Bull’s revolutionary study, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World
Politics became a classic international relations text ever since it was first published in the United Kingdom in 1977. Its title describes Bull's main argument: that the present system of states forms a society in which there are certain common rules, values, and institutions that provide order in international anarchy. From his writings, it becomes clear that his conception of international society is a limited pluralist that revolves around the basic rules of coexistence among sovereign states. After the
Vienna Settlement, nineteenth-century Europe formed a pluralist international society in this sense, which was not perfect and harmonious, but was nonetheless well-regulated through the primary institutions.
The post-Vienna pluralist international order between members of the European international society was maintained as envisioned by Bull. The limitation of violence according to a just war tradition, fulfillment of the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the preservation of the possession of property through mutual recognition of sovereignty were its essential principles. As noted by Jackson, this kind of a society of states requires at least a “minimalist international civility”; civility being defined as the commonly agreed norms, rules, institutions, and practices of courtesy used in all in inter-state relations.13 Additionally, ES scholars
13 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant-Human Conduct in a World of States, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 408. 8
posulate that common culture and civilization facilitated the creation and workings of the primary institutions of the society. Beginning with the Respublica Christiana, the
Europeans constructed a society of states based on diplomatic culture and public law.
European civilization distinguished international society from the broader international system at the time and confined it only to the Continent.
Unlike Hobessian realism, where there is no possibility for progress because of the static structure of international politics, the Grotian understanding of the ES approach makes qualified progress possible through the society of states.14 This progressivism enables passage from an international system to an international society. In the classical ES texts, the relationship between a system and a society is not clear, but functionally, a society presupposes the existence of a system; accordingly, the non-European states, through socialization, can become part of the international society.15 In order to be protected by the norms and institutions of
European international society and to be recognized as legally equal, non-European states were required to adapt to European “standards of civilization-civility”.16 In nineteenth-century Europe, “civilization”, the antonym of barbarity, was the foundation of international legitimacy,17 and formed the basis of the international unwritten constitution-the so-called “global covenant” of European international society.18
14 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 117. 15 Jackson, The Global Covenant. 16 Gerritt W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Jackson, The Global Covenant. 17 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 37. 18 Jackson, The Global Covenant. 9
These “standards” played an important role in determining which states would be included or excluded within the civilized European international society, and the non-European states adjusted and modified their systems according to these standards. As Gong noted, “even those countries most intent on pursuing their individual interests recognized the need for, and thereby usually complied with some degree in, certain collective standards of international conduct.”19 Worldwide enforcement of European international standards was referred to as the “civilizing mission” of the great powers of Europe. The standards provided a legitimate pretext that was, according to Yurdusev, “a normative justification”20 for European imperialist expansion, unequal treatment, and interference in the affairs of the states that were regarded as uncivilized.21
In the ES literature, the Ottoman Empire is placed within the European international system, but not within European international society, until the demise of the Empire, the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, and the 1923 abolition of unequal treaties (the capitulations). It has been suggested that the Ottomans were uninterested in world affairs and constantly contradicted everything for which Europe stood:
Christianity, culture, and civilization. Only because of its weakening power and
19Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization', xi. 20 A. Nuri Yurdusev, International Relations and the Philosophy of History – A Civilizational Approach, (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003), 56-65. For a detailed analysis of the connection between culture and Western imperialism see, Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, (London: Vintage, 1994). 21Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Clark, Legitimacy in International Society; Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization'. Paul Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society; Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations – The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States – Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 10
European imposition did the Empire conform to European diplomacy and international law, and reform its system according to European standards. It is argued, however, that Ottomans were never able to attain the same level of civilization because of their cultural and religious conservatism. These arguments are misleading, as they undermine the Ottoman Empire’s extensive interactions and its role in the European international system and society. These arguments also simplify the motives behind the Ottoman modernization and socialization processes.
Recent research on Ottoman–European relations presents a different perspective: in its establishment and expansion stages, the Ottoman Empire did not differ from
European dynastic states in its view of interstate relations. In one form or another,
Ottoman statesmen achieved their ambitions in Europe through force,22 aiming to strengthen the rule of the House of Osman both within and without the borders of first the emirate (beylik), and then the Empire. The Ottoman Empire, with its distinctive society, was considered to be a serious challenge and threat to Europe.
The Ottomans and Europeans both perceived the other to be conflicting in the areas of religion, identity, and civilization;23 the Ottoman Empire was depicted “as the antithesis of European and Europeanness”.24 However, even in those ages, Ottoman relations with Europe were not always adversarial. The Empire had strong political, military, and economic relations with major European powers based on European
22 Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of Turkey’s Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs, 54 (2000): 199–217. 23 For an in-depth analysis of perceptions in the Ottoman-European relations, see Nancy Bisaha, Creating East and West – Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Aslı Çırakman, From the ‘Terror’ of the World to the ‘Sick Man’ of Europe-European Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth Century, (New York: P. Lang, 2002); Mustafa Soykut ed., Historical Image of the Turk in Europe: 15th Century to the Present – Political and Civilisational Aspects, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2003). 24 Halil İnalcık, Turkey and Europe in History, (Istanbul: Eren Press, 2006). 11
treaty laws, and used diplomacy, international law, and the rules of civility in their dealings with European powers. Depending on circumstances, the Ottomans either terminated alliances or cooperated with various European powers. For example, the
Ottomans supported Protestants, France, the Dutch Republic, and Britain against the
Hapsburg Catholics in Europe, leading to structural changes in the European system and order that later shaped the fundamental basis of the European international society.
The Ottoman Empire was a part of both the thin and thick European international systems. It was also functionally a de facto member of the pluralist European international society. Ottomans and Europeans rivaled each other but, beginning with their first foray into European territories, and especially after the fall of Byzantium, the Ottomans claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the Eastern Roman Empire and regarded themselves as a European state; the recognition of this fact on the European side came later than that of the Ottoman Empire. During this transitory era, the
Ottoman Empire contributed both directly and indirectly to the development of the
European international system and society,25 and to the creation of the hybrid international society that existed beyond the borders of Europe.
The political, military, economic, and socio-cultural exchanges between the
Ottomans and Europeans shaped not only the modern European international system
25 Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman eds., The Early Modern Ottomans – Remapping the Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); İnalcık, Turkey and Europe; İlber Ortaylı, Avrupa ve Biz [Europe and Us], (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2007); Donald Quartaert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 12
and society, but also the Ottoman Empire. There is ample evidence that the Empire and its ruling elite experienced an intellectual and ideational change in order to move from the international system to an international society. The evolving Ottoman perceptions of Europe towards the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries fundamentally modified the Ottoman understanding of security; the Ottomans moved from security through power to security through European international society and order. The Ottoman ruling elite realized that careful exploitation of the European balance of power, international law, and diplomacy would provide the Empire with
European allies and safeguard it against its enemies. Ottoman statesmen were concerned mainly with Russia, which had been a principal enemy of the Empire since the seventeenth century, as well as other European powers’ interests in the
Ottoman territories. Recognition as an equal member of the European international society was seen as a protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Empire.
Although the Empire was capable and equivalent to its enemies until the end of the seventeenth century with regard to its military strength,26 Ottoman statesmen considered war to be a last resort. Ottoman reforms and their adoption of European standards highlight this conspicuous change. The Sublime Porte utilized the primary institutions of European international society as a part of its foreign policy, and the
Empire sought cordial relations with European states by adhering to international law, engaging in European-style diplomacy, and reforming the Ottoman administrative system on the European model. There were differences between the
26 Gábor Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan – Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 13
European and Ottoman interpretation of certain norms, values, laws, and institutions but the Ottoman administration still preferred to resolve crises through European diplomacy and international law, acting in concert with the great powers of Europe, sometimes at the expense of its imperial interests. The Ottomans later agreed voluntarily to be bound by European international society and its institutions. On the side of the Ottomans, despite there being a conscious aspiration to be a part of
European international society, the Empire’s integration was not a simple European imposition.
The Ottoman Empire’s introduction into European international society was non- linear and gradual: in 1606, the Ottoman Empire accepted its sovereign equality with
European powers in the Treaty of Sitvatorok. In this treaty, the Austrian Emperor was referred to as Padişah, a term reserved for the Ottoman sultans themselves until that date; this was a formal recognition of equality. With the Treaty of Carlowitz in
1699, Ottomans and Europeans expected to be bound by common (European) laws, and thereafter, the Empire’s integration into European international society began.
The treaties of Passarowitz (in 1718) and Belgrade (in 1739) regulated Ottoman-
European trade relations, which reached its final stage with the London Treaty of
1841. In this treaty, the great powers of Europe declared the indispensability of
Ottoman sovereignty for the maintenance of European order.
By the early nineteenth century, the European approach to the Ottoman Empire changed tactically: the great powers of Europe, concerned with the preservation of
European international security and order, secured and kept the Empire under control throughout their rule. For security reasons, they also sought to integrate the Ottoman
14
Empire into their international society; finally, the Ottoman Empire became a beneficiary of European public law and the Concert of Europe with the 1856 Treaty of Paris.
However, the Ottoman Empire was still not recognized as a European state, nor was it treated equally. According to Reimer, differential treatment of the Ottomans was related to the non-convergence of Ottoman and European understandings and values.
She reinforces her argument further by saying that “being interlocked is one thing, but being a full-member in Europe is a rather different case. This nexus is also valid for a EU-membership of Turkey.”27 The historical evidence presented in this dissertation indicates that the Ottoman Empire respected the rules, values, norms, and power-political aspects of the European international system and society. On the part of the Ottoman Empire, it was a matter of survival and aspiration to be recognized as an equal member of the society of the great European powers; the
Ottoman elite wanted to regain their lost status as a great power.
After 1856, there was an increase in the level of cooperation between the European powers and the Ottoman Empire. They worked out rules governing bilateral relations, European and minority rights, and reforms. The Ottoman Empire, in its conduct of diplomacy, made additional references to the underlying principles and norms of European international society, such as territorial integrity, legitimate governments (sovereignty), diplomatic resolution of conflicts, and international law.
Historical evidence confirms that the Sublime Porte shared Europe’s interests and
27 Andrea K. Reimer, “Turkey and Europe at a Cross-Road: Drifting Apart or Approaching Each Other,” Milletlerarası Münasebetler Yıllığı [Turkish Yearbook of International Relations], 34 (2003): 137-166. 15
values for the international order. This, in Bullian’s understanding, makes it a part of
European international society. For Europeans, however, Ottomans continued to be the “other” until the twentieth century.28 European perceptions and policies, vis-à-vis non-European states, remained the same on the surface, but. as noted by Linklater and Suganami, problems persisted between the founding members of European international society and the newly admitted members as “perceptions of cultural or racial superiority among the original members of the international society have not entirely disappeared with the admission of new members”.29 This often led to friction and conflict, but the pluralist international society was preserved, according to Bull’s understanding. Between 1856 (Treaty of Paris) and 1876 (Sultan Abdülhamid II’s accession to the Ottoman throne), the ineffectiveness of the primary institutions of
European international society to provide the Empire’s security and its unequal treatment led to significant disappointment and the Empire retreated to its old policy: the balance of power and war. Under Sultan Abdülhamid, it acquired a more introverted outlook and followed Pan-Islamism, Pan-Ottomanism, and Pan-Turkism as alternatives to Europeanization.
This contradiction between the established ES arguments and the historical facts is related to the dualistic conception of international society, which was omitted in the majority of the works by the school. The European international society of the nineteenth century was, in the words of Suzuki, “a janus-faced” society for civilized
European empires.30 As noted by Keene, it had a bifurcated nature with differing
28 Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other–“The East” in European Identity Formation, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999). 29 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, 147. 30 Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialization,”. 16
modes of interaction: one that applied to intra-European relations and another that applied to those outside of it. Different institutions, laws, norms, and practices regulated the relationships between European and non-European powers. Certain forms of behavior were accepted and tolerated among European powers, but similar ones were not tolerated in non-European state relations.31 This dissertation suggests that by developing post-classical ES arguments further, there existed a hybrid international society rather than an international system along with European international society, one that was characterized by imperialism and the inequality of states. The non-European states remained parts of this society, while the European society of states moved into semi-solidarism; in the literature, the Treaty of Paris
(1856) is generally referred to as the Ottoman Empire’s entry into European international society. Depending on contemporary studies and conclusions drawn from historical documents and cases, this dissertation also suggests that, in 1856, the
Ottoman Empire, together with the great European powers, became a constitutive member of this ‘hybrid international society’.
Studies by leading scholars of the ES relegate a substandard role to imperialism, colonialism, and perceptions in the expansion of the European international society.
Recent case studies reveal the importance of these factors, specifically in the analysis of non-European state relations with Europe. In comparison with other non-European states, the position of the Ottoman Empire is unique because of its geographical proximity and its political, economic, and cultural ties to Europe. The Sublime
Porte’s perception and interpretation of the “janus-face” of European international
31 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society. 17
society requires specific emphasis. Suzuki, applying Long and Hadden’s process- based socialization model32 to the case studies of China and Japan, presents an agent- centered analysis.33 In order to move beyond “the conventional thin accounts of the non-European socialization” and to present an “agent-centered analysis" as suggested by Suzuki, this dissertation develops its analytical model with the intent to reinterpret the historical evolution of European international society, and applies the process– based socialization model. A combination of the ES, historical, and sociological approaches provides a better understanding of the non-European states in general, and the Ottoman socialization in particular.
1.2 Literature Review
As mentioned above, Ottoman-European relations are generally defined as adversarial, based on Realist-Hobbessian arguments; there are few studies that apply the English School theoretical framework to the Ottoman-European relations. The leading scholars of the English School make references to the Ottoman Empire and its role in the European international system and society. According to Bull and
Watson, despite there being interactions between the Ottoman Empire and European powers, both denied that they shared any common interests, values, or institutions.
Still, Watson notes that the Ottoman case presented a serious challenge: in terms of religion and civilization, the Empire was categorically placed within the system, but the intensity and variety of interactions between Ottomans and Europeans led to
32 Theodore E. Long and Jeffrey K. Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” Sociological Theory, 3 (1985): 39-49. 33 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 12. 18
confusion.34 Naff, in his analysis of Ottoman relations with the great powers of
Europe, argues that Ottoman statesmen altered their policies and initiated reforms because of European imposition, and concludes that the goal of the Ottomans was to survive, that:
it would be wrong, to suppose that the synthesis of European and Muslim societies was total; it was not. What occurred was an integration of systems and the material and technological accoutrements of modern societies. Values, outlooks on life, behavior patterns, and beliefs remained culturally disparate, and despite the revolution in education and communications of the modern era, imperfectly matched.35
Likewise, Stivachtis refers to Ottoman relations with European international society in his analysis of Greece’s entry into international society, questioning whether states create common rules and establish common institutions because they share a common culture (the logic of culture), or because they are forced by external and internal circumstances (the logic of anarchy). He argues that the entry of the Ottoman
Empire into international society resulted from the logic of anarchy and noted that the Empire’s acceptance into European international society was premature because it had not yet attained the standard of “civilization”. Thus, while being admitted into the European Concert, the Ottoman Empire did not achieve equal legal status until
1923, when the Treaty of Lausanne abolished the unequal treaties that the Europeans had imposed on the Ottoman Empire.36
34 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 14; Adam Watson, “Hedley Bull, State Systems and International Studies,” Review of International Studies, 13 (1987): 147-153; Adam Watson, Hegemony and History, (London: Routledge, 2007), 28. 35 Thomas Naff, “The Ottoman Empire and the European States System,” in The Expansion of International Society, eds. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 169. 36 Yannis A. Stivachtis, The Enlargement of International Society: Culture versus Anarchy and Greece’s Entry into International Society, (London: Macmillan, 1998), 88. 19
Reimer, on the other hand, argues that:
it was the European international society that arrived in the Ottoman Empire and not the other way around. Neither the OE (Ottoman Empire) nor Turkey did so far take steps for the sake of her arrival in the EIS (European international society). The reason for adopting the rules and, finally, playing according to them (sometimes in Ottoman interpretations) were pure survival reasons within the international system, and less within the international society.37
Neumann, analyzing the role of identity in international society, demonstrates the
European view of the Ottoman Empire and explains how European standards of civilization affected the relations between the two entities, concluding that:
with the shift in representations of the Ottoman Turk from being a barbarian to being the sick man of Europe went a toning down of the centrality of this other for the European self. References to ‘the Eastern Question’ suggested that Turkey was the East, but there were also other East’s. There was a certain homogenization of the Ottoman Turk as other, and this trend definitely became even stronger as the Ottoman Empire gave way to a Turkish nation-state.38
Göl, and Yurdusev, and Yurdusev, also apply the ES approach to Turkish and
Ottoman case studies in a number of published and unpublished papers. Göl examines admittance of the Ottoman Empire into European international society, in terms of the requirements and standards of civilization. She argues that the Ottoman
Empire was never accepted as equal, and that its modernization, according to
European standards, led to the emergence of Turkish nationalism.39 Yurdusev and
Yurdusev focus on the role of the Ottoman/Turkish identity within international
37 Andrea K. Reimer, “The Arrival of the International Society to the Ottoman Empire,” submitted to ISA Annual Meeting, 2002, 41-42. 38 Neumann, Uses of the Other, 59. 39Ayla Göl, “The Requirements of European International Society: Modernity and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire.” Working Paper 2003/4 (Canberra: Department of International Relations RSPAS Australian National University, 2003), http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir. Reimer, “Turkey and Europe at a Cross-Road,” 2003, 137-166. 20
society and conclude that the Ottoman Empire adhered to the European international system long before 1856, but because of its identity, it was not considered to be a part of Europe.40 In his recent study, Yurdusev concludes that the Ottomans were definitely a member of the international system and pluralistic–coexistence international society, but not the solidarist-cooperative society. 41
In general, the so-called otherness or distinctiveness of the Ottomans and their non- conformity with European culture, civilization, values, and religion has been presented as the basis of ES arguments regarding the non-inclusion of the Empire.
Original studies by Bull, Buzan, Gong, Gonzalez-Pelaez, Göl, Keene, Little, Naff,
Neumann, Reimer, Stivachtis, Suzuki, Yurdusev and Yurdusev, and Watson have inspired the current study. These works were valuable guides in developing and organizing the questions and the plan of this research, despite the fact the final argument is counter-intuitive to some of the aforementioned studies.
1.3 Epistemology
The English School of International Relations Theory was chosen as the topic of this dissertation because of its historical orientation to the study of international relations and its methodological pluralism. Historical approaches to the study of international
40Nuri Yurdusev and Esin Yurdusev, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Avrupa Devletler Sistemine Girişi ve 1856 Paris Konferansı’ [The Question of the Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the European States System and the Paris Conference of 1856]” in Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç [The Contemporary Turkish Diplomacy in the Process of 200 Years], ed. İsmail Soysal, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 1999), 137-148; Nuri Yurdusev, “Re-visiting the European Identity Formation: The Turkish Other,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 30 (2007): 62-73. 41 A. Nuri Yurdusev, “The Middle East Encounter with the Expansion of European International Society,” in International Society and the Middle East- English School Theory at the Regional Level, eds. Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009) , 70-91.
21
relations have long led to heated debates between historians and theoreticians; a number of dichotomies such as particular and general, explanation and understanding, nomothetic and idiographic, narrative-based and theory-based, and theoretical and empirical, have been enumerated as the reasons for the non- convergence of history and international relations as academic disciplines. 42
Nonetheless, the importance of history and historical study in international politics is unquestionable. The ES, putting its emphasis on history, was, in fact, trying “to warm the coals of an older tradition of historical and political reflection during the long, dark winter of the ‘social scientific’ ascendancy”.43 It should, however, be noted that the ES understanding of historical study differs from the study of historians at the time (1950-1980); British historians were moving toward “new history” under the influence of the French Annales historians44 and scientific and statistical methods. The ES, on the other hand, preferred a classical and narrative study of past political, constitutional, and philosophical events. This preference becomes apparent in ES texts and writings.
The Expansion of International Society and The Evolution of International Society are narrative studies;45 the leading figures of the British Committee and the ES,
Wight and Butterfield, were historians who were skeptical about statistical and
42 Thomas W. Smith, History and International Relations, (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History-A Guide to Method, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 43 Hedley Bull, “The Theory of International Politics, 1919-1969,” in The Abersystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969, ed. Brian Porter, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 48. Also cited in Edward Keene, “The English School and British Historians,” Millenium- Journal of International Studies, 37 (2008): 381-393. 44 To name a few: Fernand Braudel, Emmanuel Le Roy, and Lucien Febvre. 45 Keene, “The English School and British Historians,” 381-393. 22
quantitative methods in the study of both history and international relations.
Nonetheless, the ES created comparative-historical studies that are a blend of analytical and narrative history.46 According to Keene, “the school did make an important move towards a more analytical approach in its decision to pursue a comparative-historical study of the states-systems”.47 The major preoccupation of ES scholars, as mentioned earlier, was international society, and if their approach to the historical method is taken into account, it is natural, then, that they out-produced a narrative history that focuses on the political, legal and diplomatic aspects of the international society and its institutions48 of the evolution, origins, development, and expansion of that method.
Recent years have witnessed a return to both history and historical study in international relations and theory; studies by Fukuyama, Huntington, Gaddis, and the
ES have influenced this move.49 The ES, putting forth the notion of international society as a pre-social condition of world politics, challenged the positivist-scientific understanding of Realism, marking the return of the classical-historical approach
(also called the “old” history) into the study of international relations fifty years ago.50 Historians still continue to question the effectiveness of combining history and
46 Keene, “The English School and British Historians,” 381-393. 47 Keene, “The English School and British Historians,” 386. 48 Keene, “The English School and British Historians,” 381-393. 49 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Penguin Books, 1993); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know – Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War – The Deals, The Spies, The Lies, The Truth, (London: Penguin Books, 2007); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: The Free Press, 2002); Bull, The Anarchical Society; Bull and Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society; Watson, The Evolution of Society. 50 João Marques de Almeida, “Challenging Realism by Returning to History: The British Committee's Contribution to IR Forty Years On,” International Relations, 17 (2003): 273-302; William Bain, “The English School and the Activity of Being a Historian,” in Theorising International Society – English School Methods, ed. Cornelia Navari, (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009), 148-166; Richard Little, 23
theory. For example, Windschuttle argues that theory and history are separate and should not be mixed;51 similarly, Chomsky notes that theories cannot capture the complexity and variety of the historical conditions and cases, yet he favors a detailed study of historical events and personalities in order to understand the working of the world.52
Theories simplify the analytical intelligibility of the outer world, and Burchill believes in “intellectual ordering of the subject matter of international relations”. He further theorizes that it “enables us to conceptualise and contextualize both past and contemporary events”, in addition to providing “a range of ways of interpreting complex issues”.53 Indeed, as Smith points out, international theory and history are inseparable because both the bottom-up and top-down theories cannot be built without history. In the bottom-up theory construction, history provides the building blocks; in the top-down version, it assists in the testing and falsifying of theoretical concepts.54
Theoretical concepts, such as ideal-types of historians, are the building blocks of theory construction; they enable the systematization of facts and analysis. The efficacy of a concept depends on its definitive characteristics: “(a) how precisely they locate it in time and space, (b) how clearly they demarcate it from related
“The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, 6 (2000), 395-422. 51 Keith Windschuttle, The Killing of History – How Literary Critics and Social Theorists are Murdering Our Past, (New York: The Free Press, 1997). 52 Noam Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New, (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 120. 53 Scott Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations, Second Edition, (London: Palgrave, 2001), 13. 54 Smith, History and International Relations, 7. 24
phenomena and (c) how well they specify its nature and distinctive elements.” 55
Notwithstanding its complexity, Bull’s conceptual distinction is necessary for understanding the nature of relations both within the European international society and outside of it, within the broader international system that existed beyond nineteenth century Europe. Bull’s distinction highlights the differences in these relationships over the course of history, and helps in the analysis of the mutual influences of the policies of European and non-European states pursuant to interaction and socialization processes. The core concepts of the ES allows for conceptual explanation and contextual understanding of the specificity of the
Ottoman Empire’s position and relations in the European international system and society.
The ES’s definition of international politics as a society presents an important analytical advantage because societies can be studied at different levels. According to Stern, it is possible to study a society at a psychological level (individual thinking and behavior), a sociological level (group behavior), and a macro or systematic level
(socio-political unit).56 The ES is the only international relations theory that has the potential to bring in various levels of analysis (individual, state, international system, international society, and world society) and disciplines (history, international law, political philosophy, psychology, and sociology) within the same analytical framework.57 It should, however, be noted that the school operates mainly at the international level, as it analyzes international society; its ontological focus is on
55 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 1985, 41. 56 Geoffrey Stern, The Structure of International Society, (London: Pinter, 1995), 9. 57 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations – Theories and Approaches, Second Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 25
states making up that society, and it follows a constructivist epistemology and historical methods.58
Furthermore, the ES views international society as a “second-order” political construction; it is the individuals acting on behalf of states (statesmen, diplomats, and ruling elites), the law makers (legalists and publicists), and philosophers who constructed and entertained the idea of a society of states. This creates the necessity of state and individual levels of analysis in the study of international society. The ES, being interested in meanings that emphasize a human-focused and interpretive approach, aimed to get inside the minds of those involved in international relations.
The interpretation of political thought and actions is the basis of its methodology.59
In fact, as Smith notes in his historical study of international relations:
The path to understanding foreign policymaking almost certainly travels through the minds of foreign policymakers… Diplomatic behavior, where motivations are murky and where perceptions about security, power, prestige, interests, economics, and norms are so important, seems particularly uncongenial to ‘outside’ explanations.60
By applying the ES approach, this dissertation focuses mainly on the inside of the
Ottoman state and statecraft: foreign policy actors and their inter-subjective meanings (interests, concerns, intentions, and beliefs) regarding European international society and socialization. At the international level, the ES approach is involved in the evolution and expansion of European international society and the influence of international values, norms, and laws of non-European state (Ottoman)
58 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? – English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7. 59 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 139-174. 60 Smith, History and International Relations, 188. 26
socialization.61 The ES method, combined with historical and sociological methods, enables the holistic understanding of Ottoman-European relations through the display of international societal constraints on the actors’ choices, and provides an agent- centered analysis. However, clarification of agent-structure debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
The intent here is to present the Ottoman perceptions of European international society and its institutions, and to evaluate the political, cultural, ideological, and structural change in the Ottoman understanding of international relations and statecraft between the years of 1789 and 1856. The epistemological approach of this dissertation is, therefore, narrative and interpretive, and the analysis and arguments are supported historically and empirically by use of primary and secondary sources.
However, not all documents are accessible and some no longer exist, while others are still being archived and collated. To display the ideological and cultural change in
Ottoman foreign and security policy, therefore, cases are compared and interpreted on the basis of past Ottoman behavior in similar events. This dissertation, by providing a new conceptual and analytical framework for the understanding of the evolution and expansion of European international society and non-European state socialization, as in the case studies of Keene, Stivachtis, and Suzuki, aims to strengthen the theoretical and conceptual utility of the ES.
61 Jackson, The Global Covenant. 27
1.4 Sources
Reinterpretation and reconstruction of this highly complicated era in Ottoman-
European relations confronts important problems, one of which is the misrepresentation of the era by some sources. To this end, an extensive literature survey is conducted into published and unpublished primary sources (archives, official documents, agreements, and personal memoirs) and secondary materials
(books, articles and published and unpublished theses and reports) that were not used in the aforementioned studies.
1.5 Précis of the Chapters
This dissertation is organized in order to analyze the Ottoman Empire’s socialization process and its relations with the European great powers within the European international system and society. Ottoman policies are analyzed with regard to the primary institutions of international society as enumerated by Bull (i.e., the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and the great powers). The debate over the primary institutions remains; Bull’s five post-seventeenth century institutions- namely, the balance of power, diplomacy, war, international law, and great power- are taken as the basis of this analysis, therefore. To these, trade is added since it has been a major facet of Ottoman-European relations as well as an important factor in
European expansion. European international society’s rules of conduct-referred to as international civility-are pertinent in respective periods and are used to compare behavioral patterns.
28
The timeframe of Ottoman-European relations is limited between the French
Revolution (1789) and the Treaty of Paris (1856). The main argument of this dissertation takes 1789 as the beginning of Europe’s transition from an international system towards a pluralist international society according to Bull’s understanding.
This point contradicts the conventional ES arguments that international society began as a series of Italian city-states, or with Westphalia; this will be elaborated on further in line with the analytical model that was developed. The year 1856 was chosen as the concluding point because it is referred to in literature as the date of the official entry of the Ottoman Empire into European international society. This argument is also challenged with the introduction of a new concept-the hybrid international society-to the analysis. It is possible to extend the timeframe of inquiry to later periods (until the proclamation of the Turkish Republic), but this limitation is necessary so that we focus exclusively on the socialization and transition of the
Empire from a system to a society. The earlier periods of Ottoman-European relations and the Empire’s constitutive role in the European international system are also touched upon as a prelude to later stages.
This dissertation is divided into seven main chapters; the first chapter is an introduction to the dissertation and its epistemology. The second of which includes a brief synopsis of the birth of the ES as a separate school of thought in the international relations discipline. The theoretical-conceptual understanding of the international society and the structural and functional debates in the ES are reviewed in order to introduce the ideal-types and concepts on which the historical case study is built. The ES’s theoretical, methodological, and epistemological strengths and weaknesses, in comparison with realist understanding of the study of international
29
relations, are also explained in detail. This chapter also provides an overall introduction to the classical ES approach as an analytical framework.
The third chapter is devoted to the reinterpretation of the evolution of European international society based on studies by post-classical ES scholars. The analytical link between system and society is further clarified here, using a scheme developed by a combination of Buzan and Little’s pre-modern regional international system categorization and Buzan’s spectrum of types of international societies that range from pluralist to solidarist; the historical origins and evolution of European international society is reinterpreted based on this newly developed scheme. The crystallization of European international society as the Concert of Europe, as well as its characteristics, is also mentioned in this chapter. The development and progress of the primary institutions from the system to society is given particular attention.
The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters present a historical – theoretical analysis of the expansion of European international society and the Ottoman Empire’s position within the European international system and society. This section consists of a detailed analysis of the Ottoman understanding of the primary institutions from the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries. The Ottoman perspective and practice of the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, trade, and the role of the great powers is presented through original sources and comparative analysis of the
Ottoman practice across centuries. The Ottoman reading of the changes in the
European international system and its implications for the Empire are presented, and are based on the views and writings of the reformist ruling elite. These chapters also address the Empire’s socialization process by use of an agent-centered analytical
30
framework. Here, the European great powers differentiated treatment and interactions with the Ottoman Empire according to the Standards of Civilization will be briefly examined. In order to achieve a better theoretical understanding of
European and non-European relations, the concept of a hybrid international society is introduced and developed to present the different modes of behavior inherent in the dualistic conception of international society.
The concluding seventh chapter summarizes the main argument of the dissertation and is based on the empirical evidence presented earlier. It also examines the shortcomings of the ES approach in analyzing European and non-European states' relations and notes its negligence of their significant roles in the constitution of the hybrid international society. This chapter also offers suggestions for the refinement of the theory.
31
CHAPTER II
THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
2.1 Historical Evolution of the English School
The English School of International Relations Theory (ES)—in other words, the international society (IS) approach—was developed with the establishment of the
British Committee on the Theory of International Politics. The British Committee, led by Butterfield and Wight in the late 1950s, consisted of a group of scholars based in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics
(LSE) investigating the basis of the international theory and international society.
The link between the committee and the school is a contested one because, apart from the international theory and society, the committee dealt with numerous issues concerning international relations. Nevertheless, as suggested by Vigezzi, “every now and then, the founders of the British Committee are seen as the noble fathers of the English School.”62 The historical, social, and political construction of the idea of
62Brunello Vigezzi, The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics (1954-1985)—The Rediscovery of History, trans. Ian Harvey, (Milano: Edizioni Unicopli, 2005), 11. For a detailed 32
international society were derived from the writings of Dutch philosopher and jurist
Hugo Grotius, which date back to the seventeenth century, but the ES perspective was brought into existence by the British Committee exclusively in the twentieth century.
The idea that scholars researching the origins of international society with a collective ontological stance against positivism constituted a distinct school of thought called ‘The English School’ was acknowledged in 1981. Jones’ article “The
English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure,” published in Review of International Studies, called for a closure and had a reverse effect. The debate that followed the publication of Jones’ article led not only to the dispersion of the ES arguments but also its institutionalization as a distinctive school of thought in the international relations literature.63
Having noted the controversy over the origins and foundations of the school,
Linklater and Suganami in their recent assessment of the ES presented the scope of
history of the British Committee and its role on the development of the ES, see also Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society—A History of the English School, (London: Macmillan, 1998), 89- 135; Tim Dunne, “A British School of International Relations” in The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century, ed. Jack Hayward, Brian Barry and Archie Brown, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 54-68; Richard Little, “Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical Reassessment,” European Journal of International Relations, 1 (1995): 9-34. For others who emphasize the role of the LSE, see Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi eds., International Relations at LSE——A History of 75 Years, (London: Millennium Publishing, 2003) and Hidemi Suganami, “The Structure of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations,” International Relations, 7 (1983): 2363-2381. For those who suggest that there is no such school or well-established theory of international society, see Sheila Grader, “The English School of International Relations: Evidence and Evaluation,” Review of International Studies, 14 (1988): 29-44; Dale C. Copeland, “A Realist Critique of the English School,” Review of International Studies, 29 (2003): 427-441. 63 For the debate on the closure of the ES, see R. E. Jones, “The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure,” Review of International Studies, 7 (1981): 1-13; Grader “The English School of International Relations,” 29-44; Peter Wilson, “The English School of International Relations: A Reply to Sheila Grader,” Review of International Studies, 15 (1989): 49-58; Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins eds., International Society after the Cold War, (London: Macmillan, 1996). 33
the ES’s study on the basis of its members and their works.64 The inclusion and exclusion of various scholars in the school is essential for establishing the ES’s major questions and distinctiveness in comparison with other international relations theories.65 In alphabetical order, Bull, Butterfield, James, Northedge, Vincent,
Watson, and Wight can be enumerated as being among the founding members and the inner core of the school, characterizing what Dunne referred to as the classical- evolutionary phase (1950s-1980s).66 This list is neither exhaustive nor definite.67 For example, some argue that Manning68 and even Carr69 should be included in the list because of the indisputable influence of their ideas on the British Committee, while others disagree on their inclusion.70 The leading members of the committee, who are today enumerated as the founders of the ES, were then related to other international relations theories such as realism, idealism, neo-realism, institutionalism, and today to constructivism, critical theory, and post-modernism based on their conceptual
64 Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 12-42. For the debates and further information on the ES, see Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997); Barry Buzan, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School,” International Organization, 47 (1993): 327-352; Roger Epp, “The English School on the Frontiers of International Relations,” Review of International Studies, 24 (1998): 47-63; Tim Dunne, Michael Cox and Ken Booth eds., The Eighty Years Crisis: International Relations 1919-1999, (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 47-64; Robert H. Jackson, “Is There a Classical International Theory?” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 203- 218; Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 139-174; Little, “The English School’s Contribution,” 395-422; Linklater and Suganami, The English School . 65 Linklater and Suganami, The English School, 17-18. 66 Tim Dunne, “The English School,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 267-285. 67 For an extensive and updated bibliography on the ES organized by Barry Buzan, see the ES website at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/. For debates and discussions on the members of the ES, see Dunne, Inventing International Society, 12-14; Linklater and Suganami, The English School, 12- 17; and Vigezzi, The British Committee, 9-14. 68 Buzan, “From International System to International Society,” 327-52. 69 Buzan, “From International System to International Society,”327-52; Dunne, Inventing International Society; Robert H. Jackson, “The Political Theory of International Society,” in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 110-118. 70 Brown, Understanding International Relations; Dunne, Inventing International Society; Epp, “The English School on the Frontiers of International Society,” 47-63; Suganami, “The Structure of Institutionalism,” 2363-2381; Wilson, “The English School of International Relations,” 49-58. 34
frameworks and assumptions.71 Buzan, Hurrell, Jackson, Keene, Linklater, Little,
Mayall, Suganami, and Wheeler form the post-classical reformation phase from the
1990s onwards.72
The clear-cut historical periodization of the development of ES is complicated.
However, as suggested by Buzan (1999) in his proposal to reconvene the ES,
Wæver’s four-phase sketching of the school’s work to date can be used as a starting point.73 The first phase (1959-1966) begins with the foundation of the British
Committee by Butterfield, then Professor of Modern History at Cambridge
University, in cooperation with Wight, then Professor of European History at the
University of Sussex; material support for the committee was provided by the
Rockefeller Foundation. The committee’s aim was to carry out an inter-disciplinary study of diplomacy with the participation of academics (theorists and historians) and practitioners and to develop a distinct approach to international relations. It was agreed that the appropriate approach to interstate relations could be achieved through focusing and theorizing on international society.74
71 Vigezzi, The British Committee, 11. 72 Dunne, “The English School,” 267-285. 73 Barry Buzan, “The English School as a Research Program: An Overview, and a Proposal for Reconvening,” paper presented at the panel titled “A Reconsideration of the English School: Close or Reconvene?,” BISA Conference, Manchester, December 1999, retrieved at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/; Adam Watson, “The Practice Outruns the Theory,” in International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, ed. B. A. Roberson (London: Pinter, 1998), 145-155; Ole Wæver, “Four Meanings of International Society: A Trans- Atlantic Dialogue,” in International Society, ed. Roberson, 1998, 85-88. 74 For the published papers of the British Committee see, Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight eds., Diplomatic Investigations—Essays in the Theory of International Politics, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966). For a historical overview of the British Committee and its works, see Dunne, Inventing International Society, 89-135 and Vigezzi, The British Committee, 15-32. 35
The second phase (1966-1977) is marked by two major works by the two leading scholars published in 1977: Bull’s The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in
World Politics and Wight’s Systems of States. Bull focused on the nature and development of European international society, while Wight analyzed systems of states in a broader historical context. These two works are the most cited and debated ones in the history of the ES. Bull’s study has become classic international relations text since it was first published in 1977.75 As noted by Williams and Little, the growing interest in The Anarchical Society was related to its status as the foundational text for the ES approach to international relations.76 Bull’s main thesis was that the system of states forms a society founded on certain common rules, values, and institutions developed over centuries to provide order and security in international anarchy. The methodological distinction of the international system and the international society is central to Bull’s and the ES’s account of international relations. The critiques and debates on Bull’s conceptualization, in fact, led to the establishment and improvement of the ES approach in international relations academia over the last 30 years. After the passing of Butterfield and Wight in the
1970s, Bull, along with Vincent, known for his study Nonintervention and
International Order (1974), led the school and the committee.77
75 For analyses on The Anarchical Society, see Dunne, Inventing International Society, 136-160; John Williams and Richard Little eds., The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Howard Williams, Moorhead Wright and Tony Evans eds., A Reader in International Relations and Political Theory, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993), 260-274. 76 Williams and Little eds., The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World, 1. 77 See R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974); Martin Wight, Systems of States, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977). 36
The third phase was led by a new generation of scholars who developed, criticized, and, hence, filled up the loops of the foundational works of the first-generation ES scholars. The untimely death of Bull in 1985, followed by that of Vincent in 1989, led to the disappearance of the British Committee. Nevertheless, this era was quite productive. Bull’s co-edited book with Adam Watson (1984) tracing the historical expansion of international society and Watson’s (1992) book on the evolution of international society were the most notable studies. These were followed by other significant studies by Vincent, Donelan, Mayall, Kingsbury, and Suganami.78 The turning point of this phase was Jones’ article and, as noted above, the debate between
Jones, Grader, and Wilson resulted in the institutionalization of the ES in the international relations literature as a separate school of thought and theoretical framework.79
The fourth phase, defined by Dunne as the post-classical ES,80 started in 1992 and has continued to the present day. This phase brought newcomers and regular contributors to the school.81 The major achievement of this phase is the reconvening
78 Bull and Watson eds., The Expansion of International Society; Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts eds., Hugo Grotius and International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); Michael Donelan ed., The Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978); Michael Donelan, The Elements of International Political Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); James Mayall ed., The Community of States: A Study in International Political Theory, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982); James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States, (London: Methuen, 1982); Watson, The Evolution of International Society. These are a few examples of the studies of the mentioned scholars; for further information on the bibliography of the ES and individual listings, see the ES Web site at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/. 79 See footnote 2 on page 2. 80 Dunne, “The English School,” 267-285. Dunne categorizes the first, second, and third phases of the school and its works as the classical ES. Hereafter, Dunne’s categorization will be used to refer the studies before and after the year 1992. 81 See Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History; Buzan, From International to World Society; Dunne, Inventing International Society; Andrew Hurrell and Kai Alderson eds., Hedley Bull on International Society, (London: Macmillan, 2000); Hurrell, On Global Order—Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jackson, The 37
of the school at the British International Studies Association (BISA) meeting in 1999 under the guidance of Buzan and the compilation of the school’s works update.
There has been a considerable increase in the number of works and contributors, particularly since the late 1990s. Wæver sees the increasing attraction to the school a direct result of its ability to “combine traditions and theories normally not able to relate to each other,”82 while Buzan attributes it to the nice fit of the constructivist, historical, and normative turns in international relations into the multi-paradigm, or methodologically pluralist approach, of the ES.83 Bellamy, on the other hand, sees the growing interest and number of publications on the ES as “the elevation of the
English School from the margins to the center.”84 The contemporary textbooks introducing international relations as a field of study with its theories and approaches have separate chapters and detailed analyses of the ES.85
Global Covenant; Robert H. Jackson, Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations: From Anarchy to Cosmopolis, (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2005); Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society; Little and Williams, The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World; NJ Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order—Beyond International Relations Theory? (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). The contributors and new generation members of the school is increasing each year and for further information on the bibliography of the ES and individual listings, see the ES Web site at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/. 82 Ole Wæver, “International Society——Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?” Cooperation and Conflict, 27 (1992): 121. 83 See Barry Buzan “The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR,” Review of International Studies, 27 (2001): 471-488; for more, see discussions in the “Forum on the English School,” same issue, 465-513. See also Ian Hall, “Still the English Patient? Closures and Inventions in the English School,” International Affairs, 77 (2001): 931-946 and replies by Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “The ‘English Patient’ Strikes Back: A Response to Hall’s Mis-diagnosis,” International Affairs, 77 (2001): 943-946. 84 Alex Bellamy, “The English School,” in International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century—An Introduction, ed. Martin Griffiths (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 76. 85 See Tim Dunne’s chapter titled “The English School” in International Relations Theories – Discipline and Diversity, eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 127-147. For other examples of recent textbooks with separate chapters on the ES, see “International Society” in Introduction to International Relations, eds. Jackson and Sørensen, 2003, 139-174 and Bellamy, “The English School” in International Relations, ed. Griffiths, 2007, 75-87. 38
The interdisciplinary approach of the school not only helps it to improve and develop itself but also confers on it a methodical distinctiveness and advantage in comparison to other international relations theories. Suganami defines the ES as “a historically constituted and evolving cluster of scholars with a number of plausible and interrelated stories to tell.”86 At present, the school as a scholarly research program is instituting itself among the major international relations theories. Following Buzan,
Dunne also states the importance of the school’s provision of a strong account of the formation of international society in answering why and how questions, as well as clarification of the link between international and world society for its repositioning.87 Accordingly, the conceptualization of the international system and international society, and their analytical distinction from each other; the institutional structure of international society; the definition of the institutions of international society; the role of these institutions, as well as norms and values in the maintenance of international order; the development of modern international society; and the pluralist interdisciplinary methods and the classical approach’s analytical aptness to the study of international relations are still of interest for ES scholars. All those interested in the study of the international society, in one way or another, are reconstructing the basic concepts and refining the major themes of the ES approach in line with the changing context of international relations and global world politics.88
86 Hidemi Suganami, “The English School and International Theory,” in The International Society and its Critics, ed. Bellamy, 2005, 29. 87 Tim Dunne, “The English School,” 2008, 267-285. 88 Emanuel Adler, “Barry Buzan’s Use of Constructivism to Reconstruct the English School: “Not All the Way Down,” Forum on Barry Buzan’s “From International to World Society?” Millennium, 34 (2005): 171-182; for the other articles in the forum, see 186-199. 39
Some of the ES debates and critiques, particularly those related to the international system and society, the historical categorization and conceptualization of international systems and societies (Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft or pluralist and solidarist understandings of society), and the primary institutions of international society will be touched upon briefly in the following sections to elucidate the conceptual framework used for the dissertation. The following section presents the key concepts of the school and Bull’s conceptualization of international society, which is the vital challenge of the ES against Realism and its main contribution to the theory of international relations.
2.2 Conceptual and Methodical Synopsis of the English School
2.2.1 International Order through Society of States: The Basis of the “System” and “Society” Distinction
The ES’s theoretical distinctiveness is based on its key elements and pluralism.89 The conceptual distinction of international system, international society, and world society are central to its account of international relations. The school challenged
Realism and its conception of the international system—particularly its pre-social conditioning of the Hobbesian view of international politics as a state of war and struggle of all against all—by analyzing the historical development of international society and by focusing on its theoretical conceptualization.90
89 Buzan, From International to World Society? 6. 90 João Marques de Almeida, “Challenging Realism by Returning to History: The British Committee's Contribution to IR Forty Years On,” International Relations, 17 (2003): 273-302; Little, “The English School’s Contribution,” 395-422. See also Richard Little, “The English School vs. American Realism: 40
Bull developed his conceptualization of international society on the writings of sixteenth-century natural law thinkers—predominantly Hugo Grotius—which led to the school’s association with the Grotian tradition.91 His understanding of the international system, on the other hand, is based on the writings of nineteenth- century historians—mainly the work of Heeren.92 In his major study, The Anarchical
Society, Bull defines the international system and international society as:
A system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave—or at least in some measure—as parts of a whole.
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.93
In his co-edited work with Watson on the expansion of the international society, Bull clarifies further what he means by international society:
A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent
A Meeting of Minds or Divided by a Common Language?” Review of International Studies, 29 (2003): 443-460; Buzan, “The English School: An Underexploited,”471-488; Epp, “The English School on the Frontiers,”47-63; Andrew Hurrell, “Society and Anarchy in the 1990s,” in International Society, ed. Roberson, 1998, 17-42. 91 Renée Jeffrey, Hugo Grotius in International Thought, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 92 See Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies— From the Discovery of America to the Independence of the American Continent, (translated from German——Ideen über Politik, den Verkehr, und den Handel der vornehmsten Völker der alten Welt) 2 Vols (Northampton: T.W. Shepard, 1829); see also Bull, The Anarchical Society, 1977, 12-13 and 27-28. 93 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 13. 41
common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.94
This sort of distinction does not appear in the earlier works of the ES, and it appears for the first time as a central idea in The Anarchical Society. As noted by Hoffmann, the originality of Bull’s work lies in his emphasis on society rather than system, and that makes him unique among contemporary theorists of international relations.95
The conceptual distinction of “international society” enables us to approach world politics from a different perspective. The argument that there is an international society in which states cooperate and coexist for their basic common goals renders inadequate the Realist portrayal of international politics as “power politics,” simply an arena of conflict between sovereign states for defense of national interests. It demonstrates that states’ major concern is not merely a power struggle but, rather, a common desire for the preservation of international order.
International order and international society are linked closely in Bull’s conception, since the society of states is viewed as an instrument for the promotion and preservation of order and security among its constitutive members. Williams noted that, in Bull’s Anarchical Society, “the idea of society is virtually subsumed into the notion of order; for where there is order there is society, as the distinguishing feature of society is that it generates order.”96 As the title of his book suggests, Bull organized his main theme around the concepts of order in international society.
94 Bull and Watson, eds. The Expansion of International Society, 1. 95 See Coral Bell and Meredith Thatcher eds., Remembering Hedley, (Canberra: Australian National University E-Press, 2008); Stanley Hoffmann, “Hedley Bull and His Contribution to International Relations,” International Affairs, 62 (1986): 179-197; Stanley Hoffmann, “International Society,” in Order and Violence, Hedley Bull and International Relations, eds. J. D. B. Miller and R. J. Vincent (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 13-38. 96 John Williams, “Order and Society,” in The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World, eds. Williams and Little, 2006, 25. 42
These concepts are not only “inextricable” but also “very nearly synonymous” in his understanding.97 Bull’s international society provides minimal order without the existence of a central authority.
It also emphasizes that states do not always abide by laws, rules, and norms because national interest requires them to do so, as claimed by Realists. Bull’s understanding suggests that states act in line with the rules, laws, and norms of the international society because they consider themselves to be the moral and legal bearers of rights and duties under international law. Despite his Grotian inspiration, Bull’s conception of international society is a limited, pluralist one that revolves around the basic rules of coexistence. He defined international society as one in which states can agree on minimum reciprocal rights such as recognition of sovereignty and non-intervention.98
The pluralist conception presupposes that states observe common rules and norms that limit their conflicts with one another in order to preserve international order. The ultimate aim is the preservation of international order through international society.
Although the Grotian approach forming the basis of the ES is based on the natural law tradition, Bull’s pluralist international society is inclined toward legal positivism.
The positivist understanding of law attributes the making of rules, laws, and norms to the actions and experiences of political authorities;99 only those who have political authority can make laws and enforce them. On the contrary, in the natural law understanding, rules, laws, and norms are accepted as divine and inherent in
97 Williams, “Order and Society,” 25. 98Buzan, “From International System to International Society,” 327-352; Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, “Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will,” International Affairs, 72 (1996): 91-107. 99 Terry Nardin, “Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society,” in International Society— Diverse Ethical Perspectives, eds. David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 17-35; Frederick G. Whelan, “Legal Positivism and International Society,” in International Society, eds. Mapel and Nardin, 1998, 36-53. 43
nature.100 From a positivist perspective, at the international level, sovereign states are accepted as the subjects of international law, while other polities are ruled out. Laws, rules, and norms are “rooted in the practices of international society” and in the diplomatic practices of states. As no sovereign is superior to another, it is simply by means of the explicit and tacit consent of states expressed through treaties or customs that laws become legally binding. In a pluralist international society, as states are the essential members and bearers of legal responsibility, rules, and norms, institutions deal with the preservation of states’ sovereignty and international order.
A positivist understanding of Bull is the starting point of his pluralist conception of international society, which is based on member states’ recognition of the binding nature of common rules and norms in their relations with each other, as well as their interest in maintaining these rules and institutions—even if they have different goals and values. A solidarist international society, on the contrary, is based on natural law thinking, where human beings become the subjects of international law and the relationships between constitutive units are regulated by a broader scope of rules, values, and norms such as universal human rights.101
Bull’s conception of international society is close to that of Lassa Oppenheim, a leading figure of the legal positivists of the nineteenth century. Oppenheim’s conceptualization Völkerrechts-gemeninschaft, translated as the “Family of Nations,”
100 Robert P. George, “Natural Law and International Order,” in International Society. eds. Mapel and Nardin, 1998, 54-69; Richard B. Freidman, “Some Thoughts on Natural Law and International Order,” in International Society, eds. Mapel and Nardin, 1998, 70-81. 101Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Pluralist and Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 21 (1992): 463- 489. See also Wheeler and Dunne, “Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect,” 97-107. 44
in definitional terms, is close to Bull’s international society. If carefully analyzed,
Oppenheim’s ideas can be traced in Bull’s conceptualization of international society.
Oppenheim’s conception of international society, to quote Kingsbury, was “narrowly statist with regard to the composition of international society and agency within it; broadly pluralist with regard to the pursuit of diverging state interests and values; and geographically limited but potentially universalizable.”102 Founded upon positivist understanding, Bull’s international society, like that of Oppenheim’s, was also statist, pluralist, and, hence, until the nineteenth century, geographically confined only to
Europe but later expanded globally to form the basis of modern international society and order.103 Sovereignty was not a new concept in the international law and affairs of his time but, as noted by Kingsbury, it was Oppenheim who made it for the first time “a foundation for a universal theory of international law that presupposed both anarchy and society.”104 Oppenheim found the Grotian idea of a society of individuals—“magna communitas humani generis” (a solidarist international society in the ES understanding), unsustainable. In his discussion of the Grotian conception of international society, Bull defended Oppenheim’s pluralist arguments against the
Grotian view of Lauterpacht and argued that a solidarist (Grotian) international society would be unfeasible and potentially destructive for international society and order.105 In the writings of Bull, pluralist thinking on international society prevails.
102Benedict Kingsbury, “Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim's Positive International Law,” European Journal of International Law, 13 (2002): 409. 103 Kingsbury, “Legal Positivism as Normative Politics,” 416-421. 104 Kingsbury, “Legal Positivism as Normative Politics,” 414. 105 Hedley Bull, “The Grotian Conception of International Society,” British Committee Paper (April 1962), published in Diplomatic Investigations, eds. Butterfield and Wight, 1966, 68; Bull, The Anarchical Society, 22. 45
For Bull, the most pre-eminent problem of international politics was the identification of the means for strengthening the foundation of order. He stated that
“order” in social life should be seen as “an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values.”106 Bull’s conception of order denotes a particular kind of social pattern, which is used to achieve certain goals and purposes. These goals, which he described as the primary and universal goals of humanity—such as security against violence, ensuring agreements and maintenance of promises, and the stability of possession—are also the objectives of the social order. Bull differentiated three types of order: national, international, and world. His analysis is interested mainly in international order since he had a pluralist position rather than a solidarist one and was concerned with the society of states.107
According to Bull, international order meant a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains those goals of the society of states that are elementary, primary, or universal.108 The goals of international society are considered to be elementary, as they are constitutive of international society. They are defined to be primary since other social goals cannot be achieved without them, and they are universal because all accept them.109 These goals have both moral and normative aspects, in that they do not arise out of pure self-interest but out of the reciprocal and mutual needs of states. Order has a dual characteristic in Bull’s study both as value and as fact. Bull argued that it is a value of highest interest, which could only be realized through the institutions of the international society, but order becomes a fact when it is
106 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 4. 107 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 153. 108 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 8. 109 R.J. Vincent, “Order in International Politics,” in Order and Violence, eds. Miller and Vincent, 1990, 38-64. 46
maintained through the achievement of these ends in social life. Bull has not clearly defined this point and created confusion about the priority of order as a value in relation to other values.110
For Bull, the goals of international order are: the preservation of the system and society of states itself; the maintenance of external sovereignty and sovereign jurisdiction of individual states; the limitation of war and violence among states; the establishment of peace; and the preservation of the normative foundations of international social life.111 At the international level, order is maintained by the limitation of violence and wars, by the fulfillment of the principle of pacta sunt servanda; and by the preservation of the possession of territory as a result of the states’ mutual recognition of sovereign equality.112 Among these, reciprocal recognition of independence and sovereignty are the principal aims of states and, hence, the major encouraging reason for their full participation in international society. Wight notes that “it would be impossible to a have society of sovereign states unless each state, while claiming sovereignty for itself, recognized that every other state had the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well.”113 Similarly,
Watson argues at length that:
In a system of states where the policy of each affects the others, many states recognize that they have joint interests in maintaining their independence; and they come to see in the independence of their fellow members the means of preserving their own … From the practical and vital involvement in the independence of other states, the concept
110 Ian Harris, “Order and Justice in the Anarchical Society,” International Affairs, 69 (1993): 725- 741. 111 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 4-20. 112 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 19. 113 Wight, Systems of States, 135. 47
develops that states have a general right to be independent, and that those which want to exercise this right have an interest in supporting each other in asserting it. So states in systems come to recognize that the mutual acceptance of the principle of independence is a necessary condition of a society of states.114
Mutual recognition of sovereign and legal equality ensures the validity of agreements, norms, and rules and, hence, de-legitimizes threats of intervention, annexation, secession, and conflict in an anarchic environment through the reduction of security dilemmas.115 In terms of security, it makes a distinction between outsiders and insiders and protects the insiders. As international society gets stronger, it becomes a pluralist security community and develops an international security regime, which protects its members against outsiders. Eventually, with the virtual disappearance of security dilemmas, it transforms into a full-fledged security community, which is basically a security benefit for insiders.116 It is the recognition of each sovereign’s right to survival and independence that is foundational for the
ES. There is an important relation between sovereignty and society, in that without sovereign equality, it would be impossible to ensure order and security through a society of states. Bull’s pluralist conception of international society rests on the claim that it can deliver interstate order and security in conditions of cultural heterogeneity.117
114 Watson, The Evolution of International Society, 36. 115Security dilemma means that, in an anarchic environment, states enhance their military capabilities to feel more secure instead of making themselves less secure, as they will be perceived to be potential threats by other states and be targeted for this reason. 116 Barry Buzan, “International Society and International Security,” in International Society, eds. Fawn and Larkin, 1996, 261-288. 117 Buzan, “International Society and International Security,” 261-288. 48
There are similarities between Bull’s pluralist international society and Deutsch’s conceptualization of a security community. Deutsch described a security community as a group in which there is an agreement between its members regarding the settlement of disputes by means other than fighting.118 A pluralistic security community, in Wæver’s description, is a “non-war community.”119 The difference between the two concepts is that Bull’s international society does not necessarily indicate the non-existence or obsolescence of conflict and war between states. In other words, it is not essentially “a non-war community,” as suggested by Wæver. In international society, conflicts and wars occur within a framework of agreed-upon rules and social norms and to a certain extent are restricted and controlled.
Elsewhere, Bull wrote that:
This society is an imperfect one: its justice is crude and uncertain, as each state is judge of its own cause; and it gives rise to recurrent tragedy in the form of war; but it produces order, regularity, predictability and long periods of peace, without involving the tyranny of a universal state.120
Czaputowicz, in his analysis of the ES, notes that pluralist understanding based on positivist international law (Vattel and Oppenheim) is exclusive and emphasizes the ontological precedence of states. It is more contractual, functional, and narrow in the sense that it aims basically for the maintenance and preservation of order among states in anarchy. To quote Czaputowicz, “International society is treated in an
118Karl W. Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area—International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 3-6. 119 Ole Wæver, “Four Meanings of International Society: A Trans-Atlantic Dialogue,” in International Society, ed. Roberson, 80-144. See also Ole Wæver, “Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the Western European Non-war Community,” in Security Communities, eds. Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 69-118. 120Hedley Bull, “Disarmament and the International System,” Australian Journal of Politics and History, 1 (1959): 41-50. 49
instrumentalist way—as a counterbalance for chaos and disorder.”121 As suggested by O’Hagan, the pragmatic and instrumentalist approach of the pluralists of the ES, though accepting cultural plurality, is more concerned with the management of its effects on international order through institutions and procedures such as diplomacy and international law.122 The pluralism of the ES is, therefore, closer to communitarianism, since states have particular duties and responsibilities in the maintenance of constitutive (the ordering principle being sovereignty) and coexistence principles (minimum conditions for the society to emerge, such as the limitation of violence and pacta sunt servanda) of the international society.
Collective defense (for example, alliances such as NATO) is regarded as the conventional way of providing security among states.123
The solidarist understanding, on the other hand, is more in tune with the natural law approach (Grotius and Lauterpacht) and, accordingly, is more universalist, inclusivist, and cosmopolitan regarding the subjects and scope of international society. The basis and the organizational idea of international society are transnational and expansive.124 Cultural and civilizational homogeneity are deemed essential in the deepening of the society of states and its institutions because it aims to regulate cooperation not only among states but also individuals. International laws
121 Jacek Czaputowicz, “The English School of International Relations and its Approach to European Integration, Studies and Analyses, 3 (2003): 17-20. 122 Jacinta O’Hagan, “The Question of Culture,” in The International Society and its Critics, ed. Bellamy, 2005, 215-216. See also Bull, The Anarchical Society, and Jackson, The Global Covenant. 123 Czaputowicz, “The English School of International Relations,” 17-20. 124 Butterfield and Wight’s religious worldviews influenced the composition of the British Committee; it was formed by a theologian and philosopher, Donald Mackinnon, diplomatic historian Desmond Williams, a military historian, Michael Howard, a number of bureaucrats, such as Adam Watson and Robert Wade-Grey from the British Foreign Office, Noel Dorr from the Irish Foreign Service, and William Armstrong of the Treasury (Adam Watson, “The British Committee for the Theory of International Politics: Some Historical Notes,” The University of Leeds, November 1998, (http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/research/international-relations-security/english-school/watson98.pdf). 50
reflect the will of international community and transnational-universal standards, such as human or minority rights. States are required to observe these in their internal and external conduct. Since it has a broader understanding of sovereignty, convergence, and integration becomes possible. International security is preserved by a universal system of collective security based on the principle of solidarity against aggressors.125
Despite arguments for and against the conceptualization of international society in the IR literature, there seems to be an agreement regarding its nature and its basic elements: power, common interest, and common values. Power and power politics, in general, and balance of power and great power management in particular, as institutions of the international society, are central to Bull’s argument. He found the maintenance of balance of power to be essential, as it enables the functioning of other institutions. Other elements of international order, such as international law and diplomacy, have a secondary role. 126
States’ wish to maintain and preserve order reflects a common interest because it means that states, however different in their structure and values, would cooperate to this end. In fact, as Bull noted, most of the rules, laws, and conventions that could be defined as international law emerged on the basis of shared interests without the existence of a common government above states.127 Bull argued that despite all differences and conflicting objectives, states could unite in their view of these
125 Czaputowicz, “The English School of International Relations,” 21-27. 126 Alderson and Hurrell eds., Hedley Bull on International Society, 3-19. 127Wheeler and Dunne, “Hedley Bull’s pluralism,” 91-107. See also Buzan, “From International System,” 327-352; Stivachtis, The Enlargement of International Society, 53-54. 51
common goals’ crucial role in the maintenance of order, and therefore, they would pursue common interests.128 Indeed, for Bull, the minimum necessary condition for the establishment of an international society is the common desire for order.129 Like
Bull, Buzan also suggests that states realizing the disadvantages of chaos in international relations would search for order and that this desire would lead to common interests and objectives, which, naturally, lead to the creation of an international society.130 Overall, it is the existence of common interests (elementary international goals) that makes cooperation possible in international society.131
Common values and the emphasis on consensus for the establishment of an agreed- upon framework of rules and institutions is another distinctive feature of international society. It is argued that within the framework of dialogue, common consent, and shared values, states could easily reach an understanding on rules and institutions that are considered to be necessary for mitigating clashes of interests and values. 132
Bull did not see the existence of a common culture as a necessary condition for cooperation among states in international society. As mentioned above, the common interests, international goals, and desire for establishment and preservation of international order are the driving forces for international cooperation. In the majority of the works of the ES, however, Western-European Christian culture,
128 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 16-19. 129Wheeler and Dunne, “Hedley Bull’s pluralism,” 91-107. See also Buzan, “From International System,” 327-352; Stivachtis, The Enlargement of International Society, 53-54. 130 Buzan, “From International System,” 327-352. 131 Alderson and Hurrell eds., Hedley Bull on International Society, 3-19. 132 Alderson and Hurrell eds., Hedley Bull on International Society, 3-19. 52
civilization, and values in the formation of the present international society have been emphasized.133
The European state system of the nineteenth century (which this dissertation classifies as a pluralistic international society) is defined in history books mainly as what Raymond Aron calls “the transnational cultural ensemble” of European
Christian sovereigns.134 It was, indeed, the European culture and civilization that differentiated the European international society from the broader international system. Though Bull did not consider culture to be a major factor in the evolution of international society, he defined some of the earlier international systems as international societies because they were based on common culture that is “a basic system of values, the premises from which its actions and thought derive.”135 As noted by Williams, “Society in The Anarchical Society thus appears to be order plus some element of common civilization, even where, as in Bull’s time, this commonality was formally rejected.”136 In the classical ES literature and Bull’s conceptualization, common culture and civilization are considered to be an important factor for deepening the cohesiveness of the society of states, as it makes communication easier, reinforces common interests, values, and institutions, and underpins effective rules and norms.
133 Gong, The Standard of “Civilization”; Ian Hall, “History, Christianity and Diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and International Relations,” Review of International Studies, 28 (2001): 719-736; Jacinta O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West in International Relations—From Spengler to Said (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 108-131; O’Hagan, “The Question of Culture,” 209-228; Martin Wight, “Western Values in International Relations,” British Committee paper, (October 1961) published in Diplomatic Investigations, eds. Butterfield and Wight, 1966, 89-131. 134 Raymond Aron, Peace and War—A Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, (Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1981), 95. 135 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 16. 136 Williams, “Order and Society,” 27. 53
Table 1: Czaputowicz’s Compilation of International Society137
Pluralism Solidarism
Leading authors H. Bull M. Wight
Subjects of international States (exclusivism) States and individuals (inclusivism) relations
Organisational Particularism Universalism idea
Normative Communitarism Cosmopolitanism approach
Concept of international Contractual, functional Cultural, civilisational society
Narrow, maintaining order in Broad, common culture and norms in the Scope of the anarchic order, non- relations state-citizens, human rights, international intervention into internal transnationalism, expansiveness society affairs, instrumentalism
Concept of Cultivation of differences Allowing convergence (European integration) sovereignty
International law Exclusively between states Will of international society
Sources of law Positive law, custom and Natural law, universal norms (H. Lauterpacht) treaties (E. Vattel, L. Oppenheim)
Principles of Constitutive and coexistence Regulating cooperation, promoting a international principles (first and second particular behaviour (third level) society level)
Humanitarian Inadmissible, illegal Admissible, legal Intervention
Basis of Security Collective defence (alliance) Collective security
137 Czaputowicz, “The English School of International Relations,” 21-27. 54
Bull’s emphasis on society over system makes a theory of cultural change in international relations possible. Cultural change is a product of cooperative and co- existential behavior of states with common interests.138 Such a theory of change challenges the Realist skepticism for progress in international politics. It also challenges the claim that Realism should be considered valid at all times because the basic facts of world politics (the state of nature) never change. The structure, in the
ES understanding, is not related to the distribution of power capabilities and polarity in the international system, as suggested by Realists, but to the institutional and normative framework of it, which makes it a society, not a system.139 The ES suggests that states are not inherently aggressive or constantly in search of power in a state of nature where conflict and war are endemic, as argued by Realists. States desire good relations, coexistence, and order in anarchy. According to the ES understanding, they can change and progress to this end, unlike Realism, which emphasizes the rise and fall of hegemonic powers or shifts in the distribution of power between states as a cause of change in international politics.140 Bull, by contrast, sees the possibility of a cultural change through social learning and socialization. As change becomes possible, so does the possibility of transition from disorder to order in international anarchy. However, as noted above, in Bull’s understanding, the existence of an international society did not mean that the relations between its constitutive units would be peaceful and harmonious.
138 See Hoffmann, “Hedley Bull and His Contribution,” 179-197 and Hoffmann, “International Society,” in Order and Violence, eds. Miller and Vincent, 1990, 13-38. 139 Linklater and Suganami, The English School, 44. 140 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954). 55
Bull’s conceptual distinction between an international system and an international society raised debates concerning the nature of the distinction, which still continue today.141 The main critique raised against Bull was that his distinction was not clear because of his synonymous use of the terms “international society” and “states system”142 and the notion that it is “a distinction without a difference.”143 In Bull’s conception, “the term system connotes the term society.” He argued that international society has always been inherent in the modern states system. As he put it:
Between an international system that is clearly also an international society, and a system that is clearly not a society, there exist cases where a sense of common interests is tentative and inchoate; where common rules perceived are vague and ill-informed, and there is doubt as to whether they are worthy of the name of rules; or where common institutions are implicit or embryonic.144
Miller argued that international society, in Bull’s terms, is a misleading term since it did not correspond to the realities of international politics. According to Miller, even before the First World War, when the so-called international society supposedly existed in its ideal form, its rules were broken so frequently that the rights and interests of the small powers were disregarded in the name of protecting those of the great powers. Miller strengthened his argument further by saying that Bull’s
141Buzan, “From International System,” 327-352; Buzan, “The English School: An Underexploited,” 471-488; Epp, “The English School on the Frontiers of International Society: A Hermeneutic Recollection,” 47-64; Carsten Holbraad, “Conclusion: Hedley Bull and International Relations,” in Order and Violence, eds. Miller and Vincent, 1990, 200-201; Robert H. Jackson, “The Political Theory of International Society,” in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 110-118; Jackson, “Boundaries and International Society,” in International Society, ed. Roberson, 1998, 156-172; Alan James, “System or Society?” Review of International Studies, 19 (1993): 269-288; J.D.B. Miller, “Hedley Bull, 1932-1985,” in Order and Violence, eds. Miller and Vincent 1990, 1-13., Andrew Hurrell, “Society and Anarchy in the 1990s,” in International Society, ed. Roberson 1998, 17-42; Martin Shaw, Global Society and International Relations—Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), Online Edition, retrieved at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/hafa3/globalx.htm. 142 F.S. Northedge, The International Political System, (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), 54. 143 James, “System or Society?” 272-276. 144 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 15. 56
conception of international society in support of the rights of the great powers and balance of power makes it a power arrangement, which could be called a system or an order rather than a society like that of Gilpin.145 James has also argued that rules, values, and common interests, which provided the nature of Bull’s distinction, are integral in any international system. 146
Bull’s pluralist conception is not a “disguised form of Realpolitik”; in other words,
“a power arrangement which could be called a system or order rather than a society.”147 The works of Aron and Waltz focused on ensembles of states called systems under anarchy, but Bull’s society of states is more than a simple ensemble; it emphasizes the role of the common interests, values, rules, laws, norms, and institutions in the maintenance of order at the international level. It suggests that states can uphold, in Bull’s words, “purposes beyond” pure national interests and can voluntarily form a society for orderly coexistence. In this society, states recognize each other as equal and thus respect others’ rights. They stand for and act in line with the society’s rules, laws, and norms. Above all, they willingly limit their right to use force against each other.
On the contrary, Realism suggests a self-help anarchic system in which states fight to maximize their national interests and power at the expense of others. Realists are interested in the maintenance of the power arrangements of states in the international system, while Bull’s focal point is on society over system. His theory of cultural
145 Holbraad, “Conclusion: Hedley Bull,” 200-201; J.D.B.Miller, “Hedley Bull, 1932-1985,” in Order and Violence, eds. Miller and Vincent, 1990, 1-13; J.D.B. Miller, “The Third World,” in Order and Violence, eds. Miller and Vincent, 1990, 65-95. 146 James, “System or Society?”, 269-288. 147Holbraad, “Conclusion: Hedley Bull,” 200-201. 57
change provides tolerance of differences and enables the cooperation and coexistence of states under anarchy. Hence, it makes the emergence of an anarchical society possible, as society and anarchy are compatible in Bull’s understanding. Unlike the
ES, anarchy in Realist understanding disables progress, cooperation, and the possibility of inter-states societies. According to Bull, even during the times of crisis and wars, the idea of international society present as shared expectations, norms, and understandings shaped the behavior of states. Bull tried to expose how new ideas and beliefs brought by anarchic events such as revolutions and wars—for example, the
Thirty Years’ War or the French Revolution—changed and reformed the institutional and normative foundations of the international society and how states provided order in these turbulent times. He also questioned how, from a system, states transcended to a society and then from a regional or, in Hoffman’s wording, narrower, society to that of larger, more global one through cultural change.148
The passage from system to society has been one of the fundamental questions of the
ES, regarding which the debate still continues. The system-society distinction and the link between the two concepts set not only the basis for the evolution of European international society but also relations between Europeans and non-Europeans.
Following Bull, Buzan suggested that an understanding of transition from an international system to an international society can be clarified if based on Tönnie’s distinction between Gemeinschaft149 and Geselleschaft150 societies.151 Buzan described how an international society comes into being by use of the Gemeinschaft
148 Hoffmann, “Hedley Bull and His Contribution,” 185-186. 149 This term refers to organic and traditional societies. 150 This term refers to societies constructed on the basis of contractual agreements. 151 Ferdinand Tönnie, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, (Leipzig: Fues’s Verlag, 1887). 58
and Gesellschaft conceptions of society. The Gemeinschaft understanding views society as something resulting from common culture, while the Gesellschaft conception sees society as being constructed, rather than being a mere product of a common culture.152 Buzan concludes his argument by noting the fact that, despite some of the historical international systems and societies evolving as a result of
Gemeischaft understanding, contemporary international society is a product of the
Gesellschaft understanding. He notes that an international society could evolve from the logic of anarchy without the existence of common cultural bonds, religion, or identity.153 Like Buzan, Stivachtis also questions whether states create common rules and establish common institutions because they share a common culture (logic of culture) or because they are forced to do so by external and internal circumstances
(logic of anarchy). What Stivachtis calls “the logic of anarchy” and “the logic of culture” is again based on Tönnie’s model of analysis. According to the logic of anarchy, states are forced to interact and cooperate and, hence, create common rules and institutions. The logic of culture suggests that states define common rules and establish common institutions in the presence of a shared culture.154 As noted above, for Bull, the existence of common interests was enough for a pluralist international society to flourish, whereas Watson and Wight argued that common cultural bonds, religion, or identity are essential for the evolution of an international society.
Unlike Wight, who differentiated international societies according to their organizing principle as imperial based on the principle of political inequality, Westphalian based on the principle of political equality, or mediaeval or neo-mediaeval based on the
152 Buzan, “From International System,” 327-352; Buzan, From International to World Society?. 153 Buzan, “From International System,” 327-352; Buzan, From International to World Society?. 154 Stivachtis, The Enlargement of International Society. 59
principle of functional differentiation, Bull did not differentiate his conception of international society on varying criteria155 and did not focus on the cultural, social, and economic dynamics of international society.156 Later, Watson built upon the work of Wight, and Bull conducted a comparative study on historical international systems/societies, suggesting that the concept of an international system does not encompass all “political authorities.” This enabled him to clarify different types of international systems and societies across time and space. Watson demonstrated the possible international systems/societies on a spectrum formed by five categories of relationships: independence, hegemony, suzerainty, dominion, and empire.157 Bull’s main emphasis was on the contemporary international society and its functioning in the preservation of international order. He focused, therefore, on its conceptual distinction from historical evolution and expansion. The distinction and classification of the international system and societies, based on their nature and evolution, still determines the basis of the ongoing structural, functional, and historical debates within the ES.
2.2.2 International Order and the Primary Institutions of International Society
In the ES perspective and Bull’s study, “institution” is not defined and understood as
“an organization or establishment founded for a specific purpose” like contemporary
155 Wight, Systems of States, 23. 156 Alderson and Hurrell eds., Hedley Bull on International Society; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History—Remaking the Study of International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Linklater and Suganami, The English School; Miller and Vincent eds., Order and Violence; Roberson ed., International Society. 157 Watson, The Evolution of International Society. 60
international organizations.158 It refers, rather, to a broad set of rules, norms, and codes of behavior generally accepted by the states to regulate their relations at the societal level. The primary institutions not only signal the existence of international society by way of the common rules they establish but also provide order by regulating interstate relations. These institutions, based on common customs and treaties, at the same time constitute the normative foundation of international society and form the basis of Bull’s distinction. As noted by Bull in his conceptualizations, the international system operates in a mechanical manner and is born out of necessity based on power politics, whereas international society exists in a normative manner as a result of the conscious efforts of its constitutive units, characterized by the existence of common values, rules, norms, and institutions.159
In Bull’s view, international order is maintained by five distinctive post-seventeenth century institutions that he called “primary institutions of international society.”
These institutions arose long before international organizations were established and never ceased to exist. Bull neither clarified what he meant by institutions nor set out the criteria for classification and inclusion/exclusion. Despite accepting the changeable character of institutions, he did not explain how that would be possible.
According to Buzan, Bull’s understanding of institutions based on his conception of international society developed out of sociological functionalism. Bull’s institutions provide order and coexistence among states at a minimum, as his definition of society is “highly rational, contractual, and rule-based.” 160
158 Patrick Hanks ed., Collins Dictionary of English Language (London: Collins, 1986), cited in Buzan, From International to World Society? 164. 159 Buzan, “From International System to International Society,” 327-352. 160 Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Hedley Bull on the Institutions of International Society,” in The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World, eds. Little and Williams, 2006, 75-96. 61
Rather than explaining and elaborating on their conception of institutions, the ES scholars listed varied institutions according to the nature of the society studied. The primary institutions of international society, however, have some common characteristics. First, they are durable and recognized practices structured around shared values. Second, they play a constitutive role in relation to both the pieces/players and the rules of the game. Third, although durable, primary institutions are neither permanent nor fixed. They undergo a historical pattern of evolution, rise, and decline.161
The ES’s understanding of institutions is close to that of Searle, who also argues that institutions arise out of collective intention and notes that human societies contain large numbers of institutions.162 In fact, from such a perspective, it is highly difficult to make a definitive list of primary institutions that are common for all times and places. At this point, Buzan suggests that it might be easier to think of primary institutions in relation to a general spectrum of Wendt’s “international social orders.”163 The distinction made by Wendt between Hobbesian, Lockean, Kantian, and Grotian international social orders can explain the evolution, rise, and decline of different primary institutions at different times. For example, a Hobbesian international social order, based largely on enmity and the possibility of war, diplomacy, and alliance-making would be the primary institutions because survival
161Buzan, “Rethinking Hedley Bull on the Institutions,” 75-96; Buzan, From International to World Society?, 161-204. 161 Buzan, From International to World Society? 161-204. 162 Cited in Buzan, From International to World Society? 166-168; John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, (London: Penguin, 1995), 2-26. 163 Buzan, From International to World Society? 161-204. See also Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 62
would be the main motive for the states.164 In a Lockean international social order, based on the model of a Westphalian balance of power system, the balance of power, sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, war, and international law are likely to be the core institutions. In a Grotian international social order, based on the rule of law and norms, sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, and international law would likely remain as the primary institutions.165
On the other hand, a Kantian international social order concerned with the development of shared values would likely preserve similar political, legal, and economic primary institutions. However, the major primary institutions of this international society would depend hugely on its model of political economy— whether it is a liberal democracy, Islamic theocracy, absolutist hereditary monarchy, hierarchical empire, or communist totalitarianism.166
The debate on how to conceptualize the primary institutions of international society and the discussions on their respective role and importance in preserving international order and on the categorization of different international social orders still continue, but for the purposes of this study, the following will be limited to
Bull’s conception and understanding. For Bull, international institutions have both
“contractual and regulatory” roles; they ensure the functioning of an international society through laws, rules, norms, regulations, customs, and ethics, which in the end guarantee order and normative behavior of the member states. Even at the early stages of international society, Bull claims, there is an embryonic existence of five
164 Buzan, From International to World Society? 161-204. 165 Buzan, From International to World Society? 161-204. 166 Buzan, From International to World Society? 161-204. 63
distinctive primary institutions of international society: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and the great powers.
2.2.2.1 The Balance of Power
Bull defines balance of power “a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others.”167 Though he accepts the fact that no historical balance of power has ever been perfectly simple
(formed by two equal powers—in Realist terms close to “bipolarity”) or complex
(formed by more than two powers with no equality parity—in Realist terms close to
“multipolarity”), he argues that a complex balance of powers is more stable than the simple ones.168 Bull also differentiates general/local and fortuitous/contrived or objective/subjective balance of power as analytical terms. General balance of power covers the whole international system, whereas local balance of power is confined to a local or regional area defined with borders and boundaries, such as Europe or the
Middle East. The fortuitous balance of power is born without any conscious effort on the part of either party. On the contrary, a contrived balance of power is constructed as a result of conscious political efforts of one or both parties.169 In fact, according to
Jackson and Sørensen, in his distinctions and argument on the balance of power, Bull comes very close to being a moderate Realist in Wight’s terms.170
167 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 101. 168 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 101-127. 169 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 101-127. 170 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 154. 64
For Bull, the presentation of balance of power fulfills three historic functions in an international society and system. It prevents the transformation of the international system into a universal empire through the use of force and conquest. Then the existence of balance of power, especially at the local level, preserves the independence of states and their possible domination by a preponderant regional/local power. Balance of power (general and local) also provides the necessary conditions for other institutions (diplomacy, international law, great power management) of international order to operate. It should be noted that the major function of the balance of power is to preserve the system of states—in other words, the existing status quo—and not peace.171
It favors great powers at the expense of small ones, and the dominant balance
(general) takes precedence over subordinate balance (local). Preponderant powers, to quote Vattel, “lay down the law to others.” Here, the main concern is the preservation and maintenance of order and its requirements. Sometimes, this might require the threat and use of force and breaking of international law. Order is considered to be above law and peace.172 Against all criticism, Bull argued that there is a need for a balance of power if international order is to be preserved, noting the fact that states “may and often do behave in such a way as to disregard the requirements of a balance of power.”173
171 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 101-127. 172 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 101-127. 173 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 12. 65
Bull saw the maintenance of the balance of power a sine qua non of international society and order as well as for the operation of international law.174 For him, states share a sense and understanding of the balance of power as a well-established doctrine, which makes it a continuing practice and an institution of international order. Finally, he added that the balance of power comes naturally into being in power politics and that there is no need for a contrived one.
2.2.2.2 International Law
Bull regards international law as “a body of rules, which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law.”175 These include formal rules and agreements as well as moral principles of custom or established norms and practices.176 Bull saw international law as an important factor that affected the societal life of states. The degree of
“efficacy,” that is, resemblance between the behaviors prescribed by international rules and norms and the actual behavior of states in international politics, is essential.
To quote Bull, “States obey international law in part because of habit or inertia: they are, as it were, programmed to operate within the framework of established principles.”177 However, this does not necessarily mean that the rules of law are not violated or disregarded. In fact, in particular cases, they were and are severely
174 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 101-127. 175 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 127. 176 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 67-71. 177 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 136-140. 66
violated, but these cases do not rule out “the efficacy of international law” in general.178
According to Bull, international law contributes to international order in several ways. First, it makes the idea of an international society possible in the normative sense. Second, it is the constitutive principle of world politics, to quote Bull, that
“order in the great society of all mankind has been attained … through general acceptance of the principle that men and territory are divided into states, each with its own proper sphere of authority, but linked together by a common set of rules.”179
Third, it lays down the basic rules of coexistence among states and other actors in international society and, hence, contributes to compliance to make cooperation among states possible. International law secures compliance through the imposition of restraints on international behavior, great power coercion, reciprocity, and conscious acceptance by states of the ends and values underlying an agreement.180
Finally, Bull states clearly that order cannot exist in the absence of international law.
2.2.2.3 Diplomacy
Bull cites Nicolson’s definition of diplomacy as “the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist,”181 suggesting that
178 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 141-145. 179 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 140. 180 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 141-145. 181 Cited in Bull, The Anarchical Society, 162; Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), 15. 67
the preferred definition should be the conduct of relations in world politics by persons authorized to act in the name of a particular state or other recognized political entity.182
In international society, he sees diplomacy as another primary institution of international order that facilitates communication among states and other entities as well. According to Bull, “without communication there could be no international society nor any international system at all.”183 A second function of diplomacy is its role in the establishment of international agreements, because without diplomatic negotiation, it is not possible to reach to an agreement. A third function is gathering information and intelligence about the internal and external politics of foreign countries. The fourth and most important function is the minimization of the effects of conflict and friction in international politics. Finally, diplomacy, like all other institutions, symbolizes the existence of the society of states.184 Indeed, Bull focuses on the “diplomatic culture,” which he defines as “the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives of states.”185 He sees “diplomatic culture” as a part of the wider political culture that played an important role in the evolution of the international society.
182 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 162-170. 183 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 171. 184Bull, The Anarchical Society, 171-172. For more on diplomacy as an institution of international society, see Alan James, “Diplomacy,” Review of International Studies, 19 (1993): 91-100; Hall, “History, Christianity and Diplomacy,” 719-736; and Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States. 185 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 316. 68
2.2.2.4 War
Bull defines war as “organized violence carried on by political units against each other.” He further clarifies his rationalist conception of war as an institution:
We should distinguish between war in the loose sense of organized violence which may be carried out by any political unit (a tribe, an ancient empire, a feudal principality, a modern civil faction) and war in the strict sense of international or interstate war, organized violence waged by sovereign states. Within the modern states system any war in the strict sense, international war, has been legitimate; sovereign states have sought to preserve for themselves a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence … In any actual hostilities to which we can give the name ‘war’, norms or rules, whether legal or otherwise, invariably play a part.186
Elsewhere, he wrote:
War is not simply a clash of forces; it is a clash between the agents of political groups who are able to recognize one another as such and to direct their force at one another only because of the rules that they understand and apply.187
Bull states that though international society needs to restrict and contain war, sometimes some kinds of war can be assigned a role for the maintenance of international order. The fact that the monopoly to wage war in limited forms (just wars) is delegated only to sovereign states is believed to promote international
186 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 185. 187 Hedley Bull, “Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory,” World Politics, 31 (1979): 595-596. 69
order.188 Preservation of international order depends in particular on the enforcement capacity of war as an institution for application of international law, for the maintenance of the balance of power, and for bringing about just change.189 At this point, Bull notes that this does not necessarily mean that international society lacks mechanisms of peaceful change, and it would be wrong to contrast war with peace since the alternative condition would be “more ubiquitous violence.”
2.2.2.5 The Great Powers
For Bull, “great powers are powers recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties, simply by the nature of inequality of power between states.”190 The role of the great powers is not just defined in terms of their superior power and capacities but, rather, in their perceived legitimacy to act on behalf of others.191 It can be argued, therefore, that the idea of great powers, on its own, presupposes the idea of international society since it represents a body of independent political communities linked by special rules, institutions, contact, and interaction.192
The chief responsibility for the maintenance of international order belongs to great power management. This is a normative statement on the specific duty of great powers resulting from inequality of power in international relations. This inequality
188 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 200-227. 189 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 200-227. 190 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 200-205. 191 Alderson and Hurrell eds., Hedley Bull on International Society, 24. 192 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 205-227. 70
of power between states is assumed to have simplified the outline of international relations because the wishes and interests of some states will prevail, while those of others will fail. It is argued that this could work for the promotion of international order.193 Great powers could improve society and order through policies that support them, such as the management of their relations and interests with each other. This includes: the preservation of general balance of power; avoidance of crisis among themselves; limitation and containment of wars among themselves; unilateral exercise of local preponderance; division of spheres of influence; and possibly through the establishment of a great power concert or condominium.194 Such great power arrangements are believed to promote order and manage international society.
However, Bull also accepts the fact that “great powers, like small powers, frequently behave in such a way as to promote disorder rather than order.”195
2.2.3 Methodological Pluralism and the Epistemological Distinctiveness
The methodological distinctiveness of the ES as an approach to the study of international relations depends on its explicitly pluralist and multi-paradigmatic nature, which also generates its key concepts. Manning, in his studies, defines the
“society of states” (where a plurality of independent sovereign states coexist), alias
“the social cosmos,” just like humanity, arguing that the definition of international relations, as an international society on its own, requires the approach to be pluralistic. To quote Manning:
193 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 205-227. 194 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 205-227. 195 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 207. 71
And no-one can adequately understand that co-existence of sovereign statehoods who does not sufficiently appreciate: (a) the structure of international society as such; (b) the social psychology relevant thereto; (c) the economics; (d) the legalistics; (e) the geographics and strategics; and (g) the semantics relevant thereto.196
The ES’s theoretical framework is divided into three levels of analysis. The international system, international society, and world society reflect Wight’s “three traditions” of IR theory: Realism, Rationalism, and Revolutionism.197 To clarify the usage of these terms:
International system (Hobbes/Machiavelli/Realism) is about power politics among states and puts the structure and process of international anarchy at the center of IR theory. International society (Grotius/Rationalism) is about the institutionalization of shared interest and identity among states and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules, and institutions at the center of IR theory. World society (Kant/Revolutionism) takes individuals, non-state organizations, and, ultimately, the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements and puts the transcendence of the state system at the center of IR theory.198
All three of these elements are accepted to be in continuous coexistence and interplay, and they are different ways of looking at international relations. Realism views “states as power agencies that pursue their own interests,” and from this perspective, international relations become solely instrumental; that is, the Realist view of Hobbes and Machiavelli. It is concerned with the actual, not what ought to
196 C.A.W. Manning, “Out to Grass—and a Lingering Look Behind,” International Relations, 2 (1962): 359-360. For more on Manning’s view on international society, see C.A.W. Manning, The Nature of International Society, (London: Bell, 1962). 197 For a detailed discussion of the three traditions in the English School and the theory of international politics, see Wight, International Theory, 1991. See also Donelan, The Elements of International Political Theory, 1990, especially 22-73. 198 Buzan, From International to World Society? 7-8. 72
be. Power is considered to be a necessary condition of both international politics and international order.199 Classical Realists argue that only the use of force can control international order.
Unlike Realism, Rationalism views states as legal organizations that operate in accordance with international law and diplomatic practice. This conception of international relations as rule-governed activities based on the mutually recognized authority of sovereign states is the Rationalist view of Grotius. Rationalism views humans as reasonable and progressive and, hence, capable of creating a perfect world of mutual respect and cooperation.200 The Rationalist belief in reason makes sociable behavior and “harmony of interests”201 possible in a “society of states.” From this perspective, the existence of international law (a body of binding common rules and norms); diplomatic practices and institutional diplomacy; international trade (based on regular practices and understandings); moral obligations and international justice; international conferences and meetings (on issues of common concern); balance of power and its constraining power; and communication and international intercourse in times of war, conflict, and disputes is evidence of the existence of an international society.202
Revolutionism, on the other hand, downplays the importance of states and places the emphasis on human beings. The so-called primordial “world community” of humans is more fundamental than the “society of states,” which is the Revolutionist view of
199 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 146-152. 200 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 146-152. 201 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Second Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1946). 202 Stern, The Structure of International Society, 14. 73
Kant. It has a missionary aim, as it wishes to change the world for the better.203 In the words of Roberson, “the long-term aim of international society theorizing is to produce a new and better international order and possibly a world order based on societal values.”204 Revolutionists of the ES perceive the possibility of a global or cosmopolitan community where perpetual peace and justice in the Kantian sense would be established despite all cultural, religious, ideological, civilizational, and identity differences among human beings. According to Roberson, it is the element that brings the ethic of tolerance and difference to the approach. 205
According to Wight, international relations cannot be understood adequately through any one of these conceptualizations alone.206 The adoption of only one of these approaches would result in a one-dimensional, and thus partial and incomplete, analysis. In fact, the continuous dialogue between the leading ideas, values, and beliefs that come into play in the conduct of foreign policy and international relations makes a proper academic understanding by adoption of only Realist, Rationalist, or
Revolutionist approaches inadequate. One-dimensional approaches distort our understanding of international relations. Thus, Grotian, Hobbesian, and Kantian streams were considered to be present in the evolution of the international system and international society, and as Buzan puts it, they are accepted to be “in continuous coexistence and interplay.” Indeed, the main strength of the ES comes from its methodology, which is based on a tripartite distinction among the international system, international society, and world society and its in-depth focus on the inter-
203 Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 146-152. 204 Roberson ed., International Society, 5. 205 Stern, The Structure of International Society, 3-19. 206 Martin Wight, “Why is there no International Theory?” 17-34. 74
subjective meanings, primary institutions, and values such as international order and justice. The complexities of historical and international reality can be understood better through a careful combination of various levels of analysis and methods.
Bull and the theorists of international society share the importance of system-level theorizing. However, unlike neo-realists, they do not view the system only in material terms. They define the system normatively as a historically constructed and evolving structure formed of common values, rules, norms, and understandings.
They argue, therefore, that international relations cannot be analyzed separately from its historical and human origins. The system is seen as a historical process of change and development that could be understood in terms of laws and practices and is a realm of human experience with its own distinctive characteristics. Indeed, the school’s concern about understanding inter-subjective meanings behind foreign policy and getting an insight into the world of the practitioners of international relations requires a distinctive methodology.207 The approach presupposes international relations as a value-laden academic field of study. Accordingly, international relations scholars, in order to understand and to grasp the dilemmas faced by decision-makers and to evaluate their decisions in line with the context and values at stake, should rely on judgment. In this sense, ES scholars are traditionalists.208 Bull said that, “above all, explicit reliance upon the existence of judgment summarizes [the] traditional international society approach” and argued that “if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof there is little
207 Little, “The English School’s Contribution,” 395-422. 208 Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach,” British Committee paper, (January 1966), later published in World Politics, 3 (1966): 361-377. See also Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 140. 75
of significance that can be said about international relations.”209 This makes it profoundly interpretive.
The ontological departure of the ES is that states are interrelated through ideas and shared meanings.210 The ES argument that society is an intentional and conscious construction rules out causal propositions, which are defined scientifically as “things that happen irrespective of intentions.”211 The school’s focus on the role and importance of “national and cultural traditions of thought on international relations” is, in fact, a result of its concern about the historical evolution of “system” and
“society,” which requires an interpretive analysis of the historically created common rules, norms, practices, and understandings between states (codes of conduct and collective meanings).212 Apart from tacit declarations of understandings in treaties and various forms such as interstate contracts, understandings, as argued by Bull, can be found in reciprocal declarations of policy and in the conformal acts of states with rules (recognized or not).213 Bull’s conception of international society highlights the role of common norms and understandings against the material forces and structures in international politics. According to Bull, the state system becomes more understandable when the relationships between material forces and non-material forces are clarified in line with their respective roles in shaping how states define their interests and organize their external relations. However, this does not necessarily mean that norms control the behavior of states directly; rather, it means
209 Bull, “International Theory,” 361-377. 210 Little, “History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism,” 92. 211 Cornelia Navari, “What the Classical English School was Trying to Explain,” in Theorising International Society, ed. Cornelia Navari, 2009, 48. 212 Hurrell, “Keeping History, Law and Political Philosophy,” 489. 213 Bull, quoted in Cornelia Navari, “What the Classical English School was Trying to Explain”, 43. 76
that norms and understandings form the game of power politics, the character and characteristics of the actors, and the ways in which the use of force and policies are legitimized and justified by the actors.214
Material (mechanical) factors and hard causes are also included in the ES analysis, but the main interest is in achieving an understanding (Verstehen) of ideological and societal factors; in other words, the ES emphasized a hermeneutic approach over causality. The analysis of the historical evolution of systems and societies inevitably led them into causal theorizing about the causes and conditions that were put into general propositions in line with historical and empirical evidence. The historical dimension of international relations is also considered to be very important and seen as an inseparable aspect of analytical thinking in the ES. Indeed, as Navari notes,
“what they disdained was a-historical causal theorizing—identifying causes that did not respect time and place.”215
The comparative study of the emergence and evolution of an international system and international society requires not only historical depth but also sociological depth in methodology. As Hoffman puts it:
Many different readings of the same reality are possible. Even if all historians agreed on the facts, they would still disagree on the respective weight of those facts. In the act of “imaginative reconstruction” that any casual analysis performs, assessments of motivation and causal efficiency vary considerably.”216
214 Alderson and Hurrell eds., Hedley Bull on International Society, 22-25. 215 Navari, “What the Classical English School was Trying to Explain,” 54. 216 Quoted in Smith, History and International Relations, 2. 77
The intellectual terrain of the school depends not just on its tradition of empirical enquiry but also on its interpretive approach to the study of international relations and on its explicit concern with the normative dimension of international relations theory.217
The ES approach focuses on the use of language, inter-subjective meanings in diplomacy, and historical dimension of events and concepts, leading to critics calling it “historicist, interpretivist, hermeneutic and constructivist” and sometimes
“unscientific” by other theorists. However, an increasing focus on the societal dimension of international relations, such as norms, regimes, institutions, and inter- subjective meanings, as well as greater openness in world history, an essential component in understanding international relations, led to a substantial backlash against neo-realism in recent years.218 This brought the ES back from the periphery of international theory to the center. The ES’s view of international relations as basically a human activity, its distinction between an international system and society, its concern about fundamental values (order and justice), and its willingness to embrace history are distinctive features of the school when compared with most other mainstream international relations theories. The ES provides an ideal stand for interdisciplinary studies in international relations.
217Tim Dunne, “Mythology or Methodology? Traditions in International Theory,” Review of International Studies, 19 (1993): 305-318. 218 Barry Buzan, “The English School,” 471-488; Balkan Devlen, Patrick James and Özgür Özdamar, “The English School, International Relations and Progress,” International Studies Review, 7 (2005): 171-197. See also Oliver Daddow, International Relations Theory, (London: Sage, 2009), 102-111. 78
This, however, does not necessarily mean that the approach of the school is without problems, and it has been challenged greatly in the international relations literature.
Criticisms are still raised against its basic analytical concepts, hypothesis, and arguments. As noted, the aim of this dissertation is to stress the weaknesses of the approach in relation to the socialization process of non-European states through analysis of the Ottoman Empire. The ES’s historical study of international society cannot be separated from its structural and functional study. The problem arises partly because of its exclusion of non-European perspectives and sources in the analysis of the historical expansion of the international society. The major difficulty, however, is related to the vagueness of the system and society distinction and the connection between the two concepts. Further elaboration of these points and a reinterpretation of the overall origins, development, and expansion of the international society definitely will present a new picture. Post-classical ES scholarship, to a certain extent, clarifies the structural and functional points of contention. The following chapter reviews the structural and functional critiques and reinterprets the evolution of the European international society through a scheme developed based on studies by post-classical ES scholars.
79
CHAPTER III
REINTERPRETATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
3.1 International System and Society in Recent ES Scholarship
As noted in Chapter One, system and society distinction establishes the basis of the
ES approach to international relations, but the connection between system and society for has long led to confusion and to critique of the school’s analytical distinction. Recent studies on the nature and expansion of European international society carried out by fourth-generation (post-classical) ES scholars have attempted to refine the international system and society, as well as the European and non-
European distinctions of earlier generations (classical ES).219
Refinement of the conceptualization of the international system – a concept that has been underdeveloped compared to international society in ES – is essential in
219Tim Dunne classifies ES scholars and works before and after the school’s reconvention in the 1990s as classical and post-classical. See Dunne, “The English School,” 267–285. 80
determining the boundaries of the two concepts. Sometimes both concepts are used interchangeably in the literature, including with respect to the Ottoman Empire.
Heeren’s study is an example of this. Heeren’s nineteenth-century conception of a states system led to his placement of the Ottoman Empire within the European state system, though he argued that it was not a part of the European system.220 Heeren defined an international system as “the union of several contiguous states, resembling each other in their manners, religion and degree of social improvement, and cemented together by a reciprocity of interests.”221 In fact, what Heeren seems to describe was an international society, that is, a state system plus common interests and values based upon a common culture and civilization. Similarly, R.B. Mowat also failed to give a detailed account of the relations among the European powers and the nature of relations between Europe and those states outside of it.222
Similarly, Wight’s confusing use of the term “systems of states” instead of
“international society” complicates explanation and understanding of the relations between European powers and non-European states. Ian Hall, in his detailed study of
Wight, notes that achieving a clear-cut understanding of Wight’s conception of a society of states is a challenging and difficult task.223 Hall is cautious about reading
Wight using Bull’s interpretation. The major difference between Wight and Bull, as noted by Hall, is their basic premise of international relations, that is, anarchy.224
Wight accepted anarchy as a condition but did not see it as a determinant factor in
220Heeren, A Manual of the History. 221Heeren, A Manual of the History, vii–vii. 222R.B. Mowat, The European States System, (London: Oxford University Press, 1929). 223Ian Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 111– 112. 224Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight, 111–112. See also Ian Hall, “Challenge and Response: The Lasting Engagement of Arnold J. Toynbee and Martin Wight,” International Relations, 17 (2003): 389–404. 81
state relations. For him, the sovereign state, its interests, and its doctrines were more effective in the periodical changes of the international system. Bull, on the other hand, defined anarchy as “the central fact of international life and the starting-point of theorizing about it.”225 It is because of anarchy’s negative effects that states searched for new ways and institutions to provide order. As noted in Bullian’s understanding, states are seen as rational actors, acting and cooperating under anarchy for a common interest – order through society. The notion of international society is both systematized and improved in The Anarchical Society.
Bull, building on classical nineteenth-century European texts such as that of Heeren and his predecessors’ works, sought to provide a clear explanation for the difference between homogenous relations among the European society of states and the heterogeneous relations of this society with other political entities. When the two terms are used synonymously, it is not viable in making such analytical distinctions.
This distinction was thought to be a convenient analytical method to understand the difference.226
When Bull’s conceptual distinction is applied, one reaches the conclusion that the
Ottoman Empire was a part of the European international system. However, it was not a part of European international society until the Treaty of Paris (1856), when the
Empire was declared a benefiter of European public law and diplomacy. Some have suggested that 1856 does not set the admission date of the Ottoman Empire into
European international society but, rather, its recognition as a member of the
225Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight, 111–112. 226Stivachtis, The Enlargement of International Society, 31. 82
European states system. From this perspective, the Turks became a part of international society only after 1923 with the revocation of capitulations (unequal treaties) and the recognition of the newly established the Republic of Turkey’s sovereign and legal equality.227
The intense and extensive nature of relations starting with the Ottoman arrival into
Europe in the fourteenth century challenges these arguments. The Ottomans’ geographical proximity puts them into a different category. Other geographically distant non-European states (China and Japan) were not in direct contact with the
European international system and society until their imperial and colonial expansion, particularly during the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, had been directly and indirectly involved in European affairs. They had been interlocked with European powers in various sectors and levels, ranging from political-military and economic to socio-cultural. The vagueness of the position of the Ottoman Empire within Europe in ES works is a major challenge to the theoretical and historical assumptions of the school. Watson admitted that, together with Bull, in their study of the expansion of international society, they realized that the most confusing and contradictory case was that of the Ottoman Empire. They were pretty sure that it should be placed within the system, and both were confused about the intensity of relations between the Ottomans and the Europeans. Watson noted that the case of the Ottoman Empire “illustrates the problem in the European states system.”228 Before in-depth analysis and elaboration of this point, it is essential
227Stivachtis, The Enlargement of International Society. 228 Watson, Hegemony and History, 28. 83
to review recent studies by ES scholars illuminating the ES distinction forming the main argument of this dissertation.
The state system, as noted by Jackson, “is not ordained by God or determined by
Nature. It has been fashioned by certain people at a certain time: it is a social organization.”229 Bull’s conception of system brought forward the question of “how to determine whether a system between units is formed or not.” According to Buzan and Little, “since the idea of system is an analytical concept, analysts have the right to set the criteria for it with greater or lesser degrees of stringency,” adding that the choice of the constitutive characteristics of systems determine the understanding and interpretation of the historical record.230 Bull’s definition of system becomes clearer when analyzed in connection with society.
Bull, following Waltz, gave primacy to the sovereign state in his conceptualizations.
This led to critiques of his work for being state-centric. Sovereignty and legal equality are foundational in the theoretical conceptions of international systems and societies. According to Phillpott, “The type of polity that makes up an international society is indeed one way in which societies vary. The fact that polities are separated is essential; it is what makes the societies international, rather than unified, like a city, a state, or an empire.”231 He further adds that “a system of sovereign states in its purest form is one that holds that the sovereign state is the sole legitimate form of
229Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 9. See also Robert H. Jackson, “The Evolution of International Society,” in The Globalization of World Politics – An Introduction to International Relations, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 35–50. 230Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 90–101. 231Daniel Phillpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty – How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 13–14. 84
polity within a society.”232 Buzan and Little, on the other hand, suggest that a longer historical approach requires pragmatism and that the unit of analysis needs to be broadened to include all polities, whether they are city-states, empires, or states.233
The unit of analysis in both of Bull’s definitions is “a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities),” leaving a possibility to extend the analysis to include all political polities. In their study, Buzan and Little, therefore, focus on units that are cohesive, sufficiently independent, and superior to others. These units can be tribes, clans, bands, chiefdoms, city-states, empires, sovereigns, and nation-states depending on the typology of the international system and the historical era to be focused on.
The other determinant of the existence of a system is interactions such that these would become essential factors in the behavior and calculations with respect to each other. These interactions include the embryonic form of primary institutions of Bull’s international society such as diplomacy, balance of power, and war, as well as other foundational and derivative institutions such as trade.
The other problem related to Bull’s distinction was the connection between the two concepts. Although Bull argued that societies are preceded by systems, later he contradicted himself and suggested that they coexist,234 making the line between system and system-plus-society unclear.235 The distinctions of “an international society” from “an international system” are: units have a sense of common interest
232Phillpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 30. 233Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 101–103. 234Little, “The English School and World History”, 48. 235Buzan, “From International System to International Society,” 332. 85
and/or values; units are conscious of the fact that they are bound by common values, rules, norms, practices (standards of conduct), and institutions in their relations with each other; units understand that these provide international order and, therefore, must be preserved and hence cooperate in making and preserving these common rules and institutions.
In the classical ES literature, Wight, contrary to what Bull later argued, emphasized the importance of “cultural unity” among the entities of a society as a necessary condition of its being.236 The major clarification on the issue was made by Buzan through the use of Tonnie’s Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft sociological distinction of societies. He argued that a society of states can be both born out of cultural unity or contractually and functionally from the interactions of the units of an international system based on “the logic of anarchy.”237 In definitional terms, systems and societies are established distinctively; though functionally an international system exists without a society, a society cannot exist without a system.238 Watson, questioning the connection of a states system to international societies, also concludes that, despite their differences, states that are interconnected within a systemic framework and are interacting regularly develop rules, norms, and institutions to manage their relations and eventually end up sharing some common interests and values.239 As argued by Watson, “a strong case can be made out, on the evidence of past systems as well as the present one, that regulatory rules and institutions of a system usually, and perhaps inexorably, develop to the point where
236 Wight, Systems of States, 33. 237Buzan, “From International System to International Society,” 333–336. 238Buzan, “From International System to International Society,” 331. 239 Watson, Hegemony and History, 27–34. 86
the members become conscious of common values and the system becomes an international society.”240 It can be said that the transition from system to society results from multifaceted interactions of units over a sustained period of time, resulting in social learning and socialization as well as the development of a common consciousness of belonging. This is valid both for the establishment of European international society as well as for non-European states moving from system to society. It should, however, be noted that non-European states were not regarded as full equals by the members of European international society and did not directly move into the core of it. They were relegated to a different status. This point will be elaborated further in the following chapters.
Bull’s synonymous use of international society and order was another complication.
Order, in fact, has a dual characteristic in Bull’s study as value and fact. Bull argued that it is a value of highest interest that could be realized only through the institutions of international society, but order becomes a fact when it is maintained through the achievement of these ends in social life.241 According to Buzan, Bull’s usage of international society and order stretches the idea of international society along an enormous spectrum, dating back to the time of the establishment of the norms of the inviolability of the emissaries to the present. 242 This highlights the need not only to set boundaries between the international system and society but also to classify their types and phases of development.
240 Watson, Hegemony and History, 32–33. 241IHarris, “Order and Justice,” 726–732. 242Buzan, “From International System to International Society,” 332. 87
Building on Watson’s study by arguing that the earlier (pre-modern) international systems were not only precursors but also foundations of the global international system, Buzan and Little traced the historical origins of states systems back to 3500
BC. Starting their analysis with pre-modern international systems such as the
Sumerian city-states, they reached the conclusion that the international systems should be differentiated on the basis of sectors (military, political, economic, socio- cultural, and environmental) and categorized as “thin” and “thick.”243 A thin international system develops out of political-military interactions of units. A thick international system, on the other hand, is a full-fledged system formed out of continuous and regular interactions of units (states or other polities)244 in various sectors ranging from political, military, economic, and societal or socio-cultural to environmental over a considerable period of time.245 Buzan and Little categorized general types of systems from more comprehensive to less, as follows:
Full international systems: these normally contain the full range of nested sectors, though in principle one might envisage (as in some science fiction space-war scenarios) military-political interaction without economic or socio-cultural exchange; Economic international systems: these lack military-political interaction, but would normally embody both economic and socio- cultural exchange; Pre-international systems: these comprise mainly socio-cultural interactions, though they may also contain elements of non-commercial
243Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations,” in Historical Sociology of International Relations, eds. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 200–222. For a more in-depth analysis, see Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History. 244“Polity” has been chosen particularly, as it is a broader and more appropriate term defining the diversity of political authority in Europe until the Westphalia Settlement of 1648, when sovereign statehood and the sovereign ruler’s sole authority was established and recognized. 245 Buzan and Little, “International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations,”200–222. For a more in-depth analysis, see Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History. 88
trade. They are the main type of large-scale system found amongst non- urban, pre-civilisational peoples.246
Buzan and Little’s differentiation based on sectors also enables the separation and analysis of various regional international systems – societies and their interactions.
Different regional and sub-regional full international systems can be embedded within an economic international system. 247
Figure 1: An Economic International System248
Full International Full System #3 International System #2 Full International System #1
Full International System #4
Additionally, by refining the classical ES and Alexander Wendt’s study of interstate societies, Buzan developed a spectrum of types of international societies from
246Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 96; Buzan and Little, “International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations,” 210–211. 247Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 99–100. 248This figure is developed from Buzan and Little’s Eurasian economic international system, Figure 5.2 in Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 100. 89
pluralist to solidarist: power-political, coexistence, cooperative, and convergence.249
This spectrum also clarifies the phase-by-phase evolution of international societies and their transition from system to society. A power-political interstate society is equated with Hobbesian thinking and is similar to ES’s classical conception of an international system based on enmity and war. In this type of society, value or cultural convergence is not necessary, though there is diplomacy, balance-of-power politics, and trade at a minimum level. The rules of this society (also stated by Bull) are constitutive of the system and limited to war, diplomacy, and recognition.250 A coexistence interstate society, based on Lockean understanding, is Bull’s pluralist international society, exemplified by the existence of sovereign states and the primary institutions of balance of power, diplomacy, international law, great-power management, and war. A cooperative international society is a society in which there is ideational-, value-, and unit-likeness based on a Grotian understanding of the
ES.251 It is a society that is developed beyond coexistence toward solidarism (and can also be called semi-solidarist). A convergence interstate society is one in which there is a high level of value-sharing and common understandings. States have common types of administrations; for example, all are liberal democracies, sharing liberal political and economic principles as well as values such as human rights and democratic peace.252 Recent studies elaborating both conceptual and analytical framework of the ES have made the theoretical analysis of European international society’s origins, development, and expansion beyond its borders easier.
249Buzan’s earlier spectrum includes asocial and confederative types, as well. See Buzan, From International to World Society?, 160. 250Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, International Society and the Middle East – English School Theory at the Regional Level (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 37–38. See also an earlier version of the spectrum in Buzan, From International to World Society?, 160. 251Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, International Society and the Middle East, 37–38. 252Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, International Society and the Middle East, 37–38. 90
3.2 From the European International System to International Society
Founded on classical and post-classical ES literature, this dissertation argues that
European international society is constructed on the European regional international system, which was divided into sub-regions based on levels and sectors of interaction. These European sub-regional international systems all together constituted a thin regional international system, characterized mainly by political and military interactions. As is widely agreed in traditional international relations scholarship, this regional international system was a multi-ordinate one in which units acted on a two-dimensional level, becoming essential factors in one another’s calculations.253
Increasing trade connections and/or socio-cultural exchanges gradually turned these sub-regions into a full-fledged (thick) international system in which interactions broadened over a number of sectors. This transition was completed starting from the
Respublica Christiana to the Congress of Vienna. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, this thick international system transformed into a pluralist (coexistence) international society as a result of the further development and institutionalization of the primary institutions, common interests, and values.
253Bull, The Anarchical Society, 10. See also Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 97. 91
Figure 2: Multi-ordinate International System254
B
A C
D
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, it became a semi-solidarist (cooperation) international society as it developed a common civilizational identity – of being
European vis-à-vis the colonized others. Throughout the twentieth century, European international society continued to become more solidarist (despite the two world wars). After the end of the Second World War, with the division of Europe into two ideological spheres, once again it divided into two sub-regions, and still the basic coexistence international society was preserved. Meanwhile, Western Europe moved toward becoming a sub-regional solidarist international society; the establishment of the European Economic Community was a decisive step towards Buzan’s
“confederative international society.”
254Adopted from Figure 5.1 in Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 97. 92
Figure 3: The Transition from the European International System to Society
Solidarist (Convergence- Confederative) Western European International Society
Semi-Solidarist (Cooperative) European International Society
Pluralist (Coexistence) European International Society
Thick European International System (Power-Political European International Society)
Thin European International System (Power-Polititcal European International Society)
93
Table 2: Transformation of the European International Society to the European
Union
Society/System Period/Region Ordering Ordering Ordering Type of Principle Logic Characteristic Society
Power-Political 1500-1815/ Anarchy Gesellschaft Hobbesian Regional International Europe Society/ (Thin – Thick International System)
Coexistence 1815-1856/ Hierarchy/Anarchy Gesellschaft Lockean and Pluralist/ International Europe Realist Grotian Regional Society
Cooperative 1856-1945/ Hierarchy/Anarchy Gemeinschaft Grotian Semi- International Europe Solidarist/ Society Regional
Convergence 1957–1992/ Constitutional— Gemeinschaft Kantian Solidarist/ International Western Institutional Sub- Society Europe Hierarchy Regional
Confederative 1992 Constitutional— Gemeinschaft Kantian Solidarist/ International to present-day Institutional Regional Society Europe Hierarchy
The ES argument that European international society’s expansion beyond the boundaries of Europe led to the international society of present times is not acceptable. As suggested by Edward Keene and Shogo Suzuki, the international society was inherently dualistic, a characteristic which is neglected in the majority of the works by the ES. Keene noted that the international society had a bifurcated nature with differing modes of interaction: one applied to intra-European relations and the other to those outside it. The relations between European Great Powers and non-European powers were regulated by different institutions, laws, norms and
94
practices. Certain forms of behavior were accepted and tolerated among European powers, but similar ones were not tolerated in European and non-European state relations.255
European international society of the nineteenth century, in the words of Suzuki, was
“a ‘Janus-faced’ society for ‘civilized’ European Empires.”256 Ever since its inception, European international society was stratified in nature, with secondary
European powers (ones that are definitely not categorized as Great Powers), non-
European nations, and colonies (and, as at present, former Warsaw Pact members) treated differently according to the “Standards of Civilization” – the nineteenth century acquis communautaire. As noted above, in its transformation from a pluralist society to a solidarist one, starting from the mid-nineteenth century onwards,
European international society was based on a civilizational ground. Its ‘European’ identity was emphasized as envisioned in the writings of the nineteenth-century
Victorian political thinkers and international lawyers, from John Stuart Mill to
Herbert Spencer.257 The Great Powers of Europe justified their imperialist policies and acts as upholding the moral duty of civilizers.258 Gradually, in its move towards solidarism, the constitutive members of this society included only the European
255 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society. 256Suzuki, Civilization and Empire. 257Duncan S.A. Bell, “Empire and International Relations in Victorian Political Thought,” The Historical Journal 49 (2006): 281–298: Duncan Bell, Victorian Visions of Global Order – Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 258The civilizing mission was a common policy and argument developed in relation to imperialist and colonialist expansion of the European international society. For details, see Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations; Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy – German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2009). 95
states, while another society that could be described as a ‘hybrid-international society’ – a combination of system and society with similar and distinct institutions and understandings – developed out of the relations with non-European states (this point will be elaborated in the following chapters). The contemporary European
Union, in ES literature, is described as the final stage of the development of the
European regional international society that was unique to Europe. Debates and discussions continue over this point.259
The society of European states, as envisioned by Bull and other ES scholars, gradually developed out of the interstate political order. The rules of coexistence, principles of civility and codes of behavior based on interactions among European states, over centuries, became established and crystallized in a number of treaties, which are today enumerated as the foundations of Europe and defined as its constitution – or, in the wording of Jackson, as its covenant.260
Contrary to the arguments of ES scholars, European international society was not politically, economically and socially constructed until the end of the hegemonic rule of Napoleonic France over the rest of the Continent. Napoleonic rule dispersed the
259Mohammed Ayoob, “From Regional International System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 53 (1999): 247–260; Jacek Czaputowitz, “The English School of International Relations and Its Approach to European Integration,” Studies & Analyses 2 (2003): 3–55; Thomas Diez and Robert Whitman, “Analysing European Integration, Reflecting on the English School: Scenarios for an Encounter,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2000): 43–67; Yannis A. Stivachtis, “Understanding the European Union’s Enlargement: The International Society Approach of the English School,” in The United States of Europe, ed. Howard M. Hensel (Aldershot: Ashgate, Global Interdisciplinary Studies Series, 2002), 55–77. 260Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles; Gong, The Standard of “Civilization”; Jackson, The Global Covenant; R.J. Barry Jones, “The English School and the Political Construction of International Society,” 231–245. Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty – How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001); A. Nuri Yurdusev, International Relations and the Philosophy of History – A Civilizational Approach (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 56–65. 96
ideas and values of revolutionary France across Europe. Change from within
European states inevitably led to changes in the understanding and practice of inter- state relations. In fact, post-Vienna international society and order was created to oppose everything that France stood for. Changes in the administrative and socio- economic structures of the European states gradually led to a unit-likeness, as states moved from being state-nations to nation-states.261
The common interests and values of the European Great Powers in the nineteenth century were enshrined in the Final Declaration of Vienna and institutionalized in the
Concert of Europe – a great power management institution – to preserve the Vienna international order on the Continent. Until that time, there was no common understanding that Great Powers should be responsible for international order and stability and thus should act together to uphold this duty. This was complemented by an ideational and societal convergence. The preservation of the status quo/equilibrium among European Great Powers, the prevention of the rise of hegemonic and revolutionary aspirations, the resolution of differences through
Congress diplomacy and European international (public) law, the limitation of wars and the consented use of force were the foundations of post-Vienna international society, order and legitimacy.
This society was “a second-order political construction,” since it was the European state elites and their diplomatic representatives who created the international society of the kind theorized by Bull. As R. J. Barry Jones notes, “‘International Society’
261Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 144–204. 97
thus constitutes a politically constructed ‘social’ facet of a wider, politically constructed international political order.”262 Though the Congress of Vienna, which all the European powers attended, was one of the most important international congresses in European history, the post-Vienna international order was established by a small circle of diplomatic and political elites of the four Great Powers, namely
Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. These powers carried out the negotiations and transacted the Congress with the agreement of the small powers.263 Despite the brilliant diplomatic maneuvers of the French Foreign Minister, Talleyrand, the end result reflected the conservative wishes and interests of these four powers on behalf of all European states; furthermore, had it not been a shared concern for international order and security, France would have been excluded.
The nineteenth-century European ruling and diplomatic elite established and promoted European common values, shared understandings, and values. The common value at the time was international order, and its preservation was deemed the traditional duty of the five major powers: the United Kingdom, France, Austria,
Prussia and Russia. These shared interests and values led to the political and social construction of a hierarchical and pluralist European international society.
262Jones, “The English School and the Political Construction,” 240. 263C.K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815, (London: Humphrey Milford and Oxford University Press, 1919); Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna – A Study of Allied Unity: 1812– 1822, (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1946). For more on the Great Power behavior and the Concert system, see Jack S. Levy, “The Contagion of Great Power War Behavior, 1495–1975,” American Journal of Political Science 26 (1982): 562–584; Branislav L. Slantchev, “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium,” Security Studies 14 (2005): 565–606; Elrod, “The Concert of Europe,” 159–174; Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” World Politics 38 (1985): 58–79; Hudson Meadwell, “The Long Nineteenth Century in Europe,” Review of International Studies 27 (2001): 165–189; Stuart Woolf, “The Construction of a European World-View in the Revolutionary Napoleonic Years,” Past and Present 137 (1992): 72–101; James Joll, “The Ideal and the Real: Changing Concepts of the International System, 1815–1982,” International Affairs 58 (1982): 210–224; James R. Sofka, “Metternich’s Theory of European Order: A Political Agenda for ‘Perpetual Peace,’” The Review of Politics 60 (1998): 115–149. 98
The major result of the Congress was the institutionalization of the Great Power collective–cooperative hegemony under the Concert of Europe. As noted by
Schroeder, although the Concert of Europe was presented as being exemplary of a refined version of the classical balance of power system, “any balance of power interpretation of the Vienna settlement is misleading and wrong.”264 This is related to the fact that, indeed, “its essential power relations were hegemonic, not balanced, and a hegemonic distribution of power, along with other factors, made the system work.”265 He added, “The Vienna Era’s equilibrist rules and practices promoted benign, stabilizing kinds of hegemony.”266 Wolf D. Gruner, on the other hand, suggests that the definition of the post-Vienna international order as a Great Power hegemony would be a simplification, and it should be characterized instead “as a reformed, multipolar, and intertwined balance of power system with built-in checks.”267 He adds that the fact that the Great Powers played a significant role in constructing a coexistent and cooperative international system/society does not mean that it was simply Great Power hegemony.268
A careful analysis of the Concert, on the contrary, suggests that it worked as a cooperative and collective hegemony of the Great Powers of Europe. As argued by
Watson, conflicts and wars were limited, and thus the collective use of force/military
264Paul W. Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?” American Historical Review 57 (1992): 684. Wolf D. Gruner, “Was There a Reformed Balance of Power or Cooperative Great Power Hegemony?” The American Historical Review 97 (1992):725. For more on Schroeder’s argument, see and Paul W. Schroeder, “The 19th Century International System: Changes in the Structure,” World Politics 39 (1986): 1–26. 265Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?” 702. Also cited in Gruner, “Was There a Reformed Balance of Power or Cooperative Great Power Hegemony?” 725. 266Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?” 702. 267See Gruner, “Was There a Reformed Balance of Power or Cooperative Great Power Hegemony?” 725–732. 268Gruner, “Was There a Reformed Balance of Power or Cooperative Great Power Hegemony?” 725– 732. 99
intervention was institutionalized on the basis of a number of agreed principles.269
Watson, however, excludes conflicts between European powers arising from the clash over the Ottoman Empire, which was considered outside of Voltaire’s “grande république”270 or Edmund Burke’s “Commonwealth of Europe.”271 Watson defines nineteenth-century collective hegemonial practice in terms of three characteristics: prudence, moral obligation and the Standards of Civilization. Prudence is described as the powers’ ability “to put expediency above abstract principles,” while moral obligation is expressed in the Concert powers’ willingness ‘to assume collective responsibility, especially for human rights.” The final point was the powers’ imposition of European standards of civilization upon those regarded as non-
European and hence uncivilized.272
Hegemony seems contradictory to the very idea of international society, as the existence of international society is commonly justified on the basis of its being anti- hegemonial.273 The basic constitutive norms of international society like “non- intervention” are designed to protect sovereignty of political communities against hegemonic aspirations of their politically and militarily powerful neighbors. As noted above, sovereign statehood, although not listed among the five primary institutions of
Bull, is accepted in ES theory as the foundational basis and institution of international society. In terms of security, it is thought to be a security provider for
269Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention – Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force, (Ithaca – London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 52–84 and 94–124. See also Michael Cox, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth eds., Empire, Systems and States – Great Transformations in International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 270 Watson, Hegemony and History, 99. 271Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, “The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society,” Review of International Studies 17 (1991): 341. 272Watson, Hegemony and History, 101. 273Tim Dunne, “Society and Hierarchy in International Relations,” International Relations 13 (2003): 306. 100
its members. The general view, therefore, was that hegemony as an expression of hierarchy should be incompatible with international society, the organizing principle of which is anarchy. To quote Dunne, “As far as the moral purpose of international society is concerned, it is worth underlying the fact that, from its inception, it was
‘not just a society of sovereign states but a society for sovereign states.’” 274 Its major aim was to provide “a just equilibrium of power.”275
Still, as Clark puts it, “international society can function as a form of ‘hierarchy under anarchy’, within which hegemony could play its part.”276 Clark furthers his argument on the basis of the Concert of Europe, suggesting that it was “a practical demonstration of how hierarchy and anarchy can be reconciled.” The European Great
Power Concert was dependent on two types of legitimacy. First was legitimacy between the Great Powers (horizontal axis), and then the legitimacy between them and the remainder of the states (vertical axis).277 The Great Powers, by agreeing to be responsible for the preservation of international order and society, also agreed to act in line with the legitimized standards of compliance.278 This prevented the collective hegemony from becoming a system working solely in favor of the strong.
Moreover, if hegemony is regarded as an institution of international society, then a distinction between hegemony and primacy becomes feasible. In ES, indeed,
274Dunne, “Society and Hierarchy in International Relations,” 306. 275Dunne, “Society and Hierarchy in International Relations,” 306. 276Ian Clark,“How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?” International Relations, 23 (2009): 464. See also Ian Clark, “Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony,” European Journal of International Relations, 15 (2009): 203–228; Ian Clark, “Bringing Hegemony Back In: The United States and International Order,” International Affairs, 85 (2009): 23–36. 277Clark,“How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?” 472. 278Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 78–79, cited in Clark, “How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?” 472. 101
hegemony is understood “in a cognate way, as one potential institution of international society, applicable to material conditions of primacy.”279 In Bull’s understanding, the managerial role of the great powers is seen as a simplification of the direction of international politics. The concentration of power and the checks and balances make an achievement of the collective good – security through order – possible. This, however, requires a society of states sharing certain common values and recognizing the specific status of great powers. To quote Hurrell, “Membership of the club of great powers is a social category that depends on recognition by others.”280 Within this framework, hegemony becomes compatible with anarchical society.
Member states were stratified on the basis of the level of prestige and influence they exerted within the society of states. Common perceptions and international legitimacy played an important role in the accordance of special status, rights and obligations to particular states.281 Some states were accepted as politically and legally more equal than others. Indeed, as the main thesis of this dissertation suggests, nineteenth-century European international society and the hybrid international society that existed beyond it were hierarchically organized within anarchy.
279Clark,“How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?” 472. 280Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?” International Affairs, 82 (2006): 4. 281Ian Clark, “Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony,” European Journal of International Relations 15 (2009): 203–228; Clark, “How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?” 464–480; Clark, Legitimacy in International Society and Clark, Hierarchy of States. 102
It should, however, be noted that in the understanding of ES and Bull, international society, its units and institutions are viewed as “evolving.” Neither would they claim that contemporary international society and its units and institutions are the same as the Westphalian or post-Vienna ones. The values, basic norms and principles embodying the normative structure of international order and society do change or develop over time.282
Before analyzing the defining features of nineteenth-century European international society and its relations with non-European states, specifically with the Ottoman
Empire, the next section overviews its gradual development from system to society based on the scheme presented above. The analysis of the evolutionary phases of
European international society is limited in line with the time frame of the dissertation. The progress of Europe from a regional, thin international system to a pluralist (coexistent) international society is presented. Its twentieth-century progress and present form are not included.
3.2.1 The Evolution of the Thin European International System: Respublica
Christiana to Westphalia
The majority of the ES scholars argue from a Gemeinschaft understanding that the modern European international society is formed on the cultural, religious and civilizational basis of the Respublica Christiana (the Christian Republic).
Theoretically, the European medieval order was a Christian order based on the age-
282Keene, “International Society as an Ideal Type,” 116. 103
old idea of a Christian Empire kept alive by the Church and missionaries against
Islam. Randall Lesaffer’s analysis of the peace treaties from 1454 Lodi to 1648
Westphalia shows that the signatories considered themselves belonging to
Christianity, referred to as Orbis Christiana, Christianitas or Regni et Principes
Christiani.283 In those days, these terms were used to connote Respublica Christiana, which as a term did not exist. Richard Tuck notes that Respublica Christiana was formulated by the Renaissance humanists to construct a separate identity for
Christian Europe. After the fall of Constantinople, the term was used for propaganda.284 Walter Bense, similarly, argues that “a Christendom united under cross and the papacy, ideally at peace within and at war only with the infidel” was in reality a dream.285
The medieval Christian world was divided into two imperial cores: the Catholic
Latin Christendom represented by the Pope in Rome, and the Orthodox Christendom headed by the Byzantine Empire at Constantinople. Latin Christians of west and central Europe and those in lands beyond the borders of the continent identified as the Populus Christiannus (the Christian people). The Orthodox Christians of the east were deemed to be outside of the Populus Christiannus.
283Randall Lesaffer, ”Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia,” in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History – From the Late Middle Ages to World War One, ed. Randall Lesaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 9–44. 284Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace – Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2829. 285Walter F. Bense, “Paris Theologians on War and Peace,” Church History, 41 (1972): 168. See also Daniel M. Green, “Canon Law, Dynasticism, and the Origins of International Law: Sources of Order in the Sixteenth Century” (paper presented at the Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations, SGIR-ECPR, Turin, Italy, September 1215, 2007), cited with permission of the author. 104
According to Wight, the origins of the international society lie in this age.286 Others like Bull and F.S. Northedge prefer to base the (European) international society a century later, when sovereign equality and territorial integrity were introduced. All identified with Christianity, its shared values and culture, and yet the diversity of polities, sub-layering of political authority (empires, kingdoms, dukedoms, vassals, papacy or bishoprics), the turbulent political and religious relations between
European powers and the nominal existence of the primary institutions of the international society suggest that there was not yet a society of European states. As noted above, the existence of a common culture is not enough for the formation of international societies. It is, therefore, more proper to define medieval Europe as making up a thin society of European states, divided into sub-regions interacting on developing diplomacy, balance of power politics and trade.
3.2.1.1 Diplomacy
Politics, economy, interstate relations and legitimacy were characterized by the principles of dynasticism and religion.287 The survival and strengthening of the internal rule of the dynastic states was dependent on their exertion of power in the affairs of the continent.288 Medieval Christendom was “a society of diverse and competitive princes.”289 Diplomacy of this era was also based on dynastic and religious principles. What came to be known as “marriage diplomacy,” that is, the
286Stern, The Structure of International Society, 7086. 287 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society. 288Evan Luard, Types of International Society, (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 79-90; Richard Bonney, The European Dynastic States 1494-1660, (OxfordNew York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 289Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 77. 105
conclusion of marriage agreements among the European dynastic houses to strengthen their control over their territories, to extend their rule and to gain allies, was an accepted and common practice.290 Territories were transferred and borders were enlarged as the royal brides’ trousseaus.291
Foreign interference in the internal affairs of rival powers was an accepted practice, as sovereign states were not formed, and the principles of legal equality and non- interference were not established in inter-state relations. This encouraged support of rivals, rebels and co-religionists through bribery, espionage, conspiracy, intrigue, assassination, religious conversion, indoctrination and lying.292 As Nicollò
Machiavelli puts it with his most quoted sentence from The Prince (1513), “the end justifies the means,” meaning that anything from deceit to murder was acceptable for the sake of the continuation of the monarchies and dynastic rule. Machiavellian thinking dominated the inter-European relations.293
The Italian city-states in the south were independent and secular republican states that flourished because of their control of the Mediterranean and Levant trade. The
Stato, independent from the medieval religious authority, strengthened rule of the princes.294 These states formed an economic international system with non-
Europeans and became major sources of goods from the East. Safe from the control
290Luard, Types of International Society, 79-90; Paula Sutter Fichtner, “Dynastic Marriage in Sixteenth-Century Habsburg Diplomacy and Statecraft: An Interdisciplinary Approach,” The American Historical Review, 81 (1976): 243-265. 291Luard, Types of International Society, 79-90; Watson, The Evolution of International Society, 135- 162. 292Luard, Types of International Society, 79-90. 293Nicollò Machiavelli, The Prince (Il Principe), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 294Watson, The Evolution of International Society, 152162; Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 7994; Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 79304; L.S. Stavrianos, The World Since 1500 – A Global History, 8th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1998), 306310. 106
of hegemonic powers, Florence, Milan, Venice, the Papal States and the Kingdom of
Naples (also known as the Kingdom of Two Sicilies), enjoyed great freedom and thus economically highly developed compared to other European states. The most devastating event of this age except for the Thirty Years War was the fall of
Constantinople to the Turkish House of Osman, in 1453. As noted by Thomas
Madden, “News of the fall of Constantinople shook the west in a way that is hard to understand today.”295 The fall of Constantinople had important political consequences for the Italian city-states. The shattering of the walls of the Byzantium believed to be invincible led to an anxiety about the future security of the Italian peninsula.
The princes moved from being princes without defined territories to princely states.
Power was gathered in the hands of the rulers and the boundaries of the city-states were secured through the State. This and the Renaissance led to a revolution in loyalties. There was a transfer of faithfulness from religious to secular authorities and from local to central governments.296 Still, as noted by Bobbitt:
Medieval Christendom was not yet a society of politically distinct states. But at first in Italy, and then throughout the area, the complex horizontal structure of feudal society crystallized into a vertical pattern of territorial states each with increasing authority inside defined geographic borders.297
New mechanisms – like resident diplomacy, balance of power, and professional armed forces called condottiere (mercenaries; i.e., hired armies) – were employed.
295Thomas F. Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, (US: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 201. 296Stern, The Structure of International Society, 7086. 297Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 79. 107
The structure of inter-state relations also changed, following the changes in the polities. Hendrik Spyrut, in his analysis of the historical international systems, noted that “A change in the constitutive elements of the system means a change in the structure of the system.”298 The burgeoning commercial interests of the Italian city- states necessitated resident envoys to regulate inter-state relations within and outside
Italy. Deployment of diplomatic envoys on temporary bases was not an efficient way of gathering information required for protecting complex commercial and political- military interests. This gradually led to a new type of diplomacy – a network of permanent embassies. 299
Permanent diplomacy is rooted in the Venetian bailos, who were sent for permanent tasks to Byzantium and then to the Ottoman Empire for setting commercial contracts, treaties and protecting Venetian interests. As David J. Hill noted, “the system long in use by Venice was now applied by every Italian state … and Venice continued to be
‘the school and touchstone of ambassadors.’”300 Genoa and Venice had established trading colonies or posts all over the Mediterranean and their bailos not only protected the rights of their states but also their people in the host countries. Buzan and Little call these ‘trade diasporas’; that is, “an institution helping to overcome the cultural barriers to long-distance trade, easing the creation of networks of trust, credit, and security.”301 They also note that much of the political diplomacy, which developed out the trading practices of these merchant enclaves and colonies, required
298Hendrik Spyrut, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of System Change, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5. 299S.A. Korff, “An Introduction to the History of International Law,” The American Journal of International Law, 18 (1924): 246–259. 300David J. Hill, A History of European Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, Vol. I. The Struggle for Universal Empire (New York, London, Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans Green, and Co., 1911), 359–361. 301Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 213. 108
new tools for dealing with foreigners.302 This practice led to the development of consular and diplomatic methods.303 The Venetians refined and codified their diplomatic methods through laws and decrees enacted successively in the years 1268,
1288, 1480, and 1481 for diplomatic service and duties.304 According to the Venetian
Code, for example, the diplomats were neither allowed to take their wives abroad for purposes of safety and secrecy nor to accept presents.305
The Papacy and the Catholic Church also had representatives in major cities and kingly courts called curia or nuncias. In majority of the conflicts of the age, the
Papacy acted as an arbitrator – that is, a third party in modern understanding. Despite its decreasing prestige because of the Great Schism in the Catholic Church (1378–
1415)306 and the rise of Protestantism, the Catholic Church was still respected.307 As the interactions among states became more diverse and extended to broader sectors, permanent missions replaced ad hoc diplomacy.308 Machiavelli, writing in Legations
(also known as the ‘Missions’) favored permanent and continuous diplomacy rather than ad hoc and periodic diplomacy. He argued that keeping resident representatives
302Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 214. 303Eric R. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople – Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 23–40; Kate Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State-The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 122–133. 304Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 359–361. 305Korff, “An Introduction to the History of International Law,” 257–258. 306The Great Schism resulted when the rivalry between the French King and the Pope led to the move of the Papal seat from Rome to Avignon. This later caused a serious crisis among European powers as successive Popes were seated in Avignon and aided by France while another was chosen in Rome with the support of England and the German states. 307Thomas E. Woods, Jr., How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization, (Washington D.C.: Regenery Publishing, 2005). 308M.S. Anderson, The Origins of the Modern European State System 1494–1618, (London and New York: Longman 1998), 53; Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy – Its Evolution, Theory and Administration, (London: Routledge, 1995), 29–54; Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 308–330 and 350–364; Temel İskit, Diplomasi Tarihi, Teorisi, Kurumları ve Uygulaması [Diplomacy – History, Theory, Institutions and Practice], (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 87–94. 109
to provide information and to represent state interests in the courts of the major states of the day was one of the virtues of a prince.309 For Machiavelli, diplomacy was a tool of deception used to increase the power of the state. Therefore, in his successive works, Machiavelli emphasized the importance of the information-gathering role of resident diplomats and the secure and expedited transmission of information acquired information to the diplomats’ native countries.310 Francesco Guicciardini, on the other hand, argued that to achieve the ragione di stato (the reason of state) and to secure agreements, negotiations must be carried out step by step on the basis of confidence and at the right moment. 311
Over time, Italian-style diplomacy spread to other parts of Europe. An important problem of the Renaissance diplomacy was the slow evolution of a professional diplomatic corps. The development of a complete diplomatic system and diplomatic culture lasted into the seventeenth century. Still, even then, well-organized foreign ministries and policies were lacking.312 It took time for host states to reciprocate the resident ambassadors. For example, the French under Charles VIII’s reign did not send resident ambassadors abroad until the rise of rivalry and conflict with the
Habsburgs.313 The other problem was that there were few experts on foreign languages, countries, cultures, and traditions. This meant that the same person had to remain accredited for many years. As a majority of these belonged to the nobility, the
309G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T.G. Otte, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, (London: Palgrave, 2001), 21. See also G.R. Berridge, Diplomatic Classics – Selected Texts from Commynes to Vattel, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 310Berridge, Keens-Soper, and Otte, Diplomatic Theory, 7–32. See also Berridge, Diplomatic Classics; F. Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’état and its Place in Modern History, trans. D. Scott, (Epping: Bowker, 1984); G. P. Gooch, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft, (London: Longmans, Green, 1942). 311Berridge, Keens-Soper, and Otte, Diplomatic Theory, 33–49. 312Hamilton and Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 35–40. 313Hamilton and Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 35–40. 110
new diplomacy led to favoritism. Moreover, the diplomatic career was a difficult profession because of the physical and financial inconveniences of these eras.
Diplomatic immunities and were not fully developed, established, or understood.
Diplomats were regarded as spies and, at times, were met with suspicion and ill- treatment.314 Moreover, medieval diplomacy was not developed enough to have the sophisticated diplomatic corps or diplomatic culture necessary to be an institution of international society. It was still an institution in the making.
3.2.1.2 War
Medieval Europe was close to Thomas Hobbes’s ‘state of nature’ in which conflict, war, and bloodshed were endemic. The period from 1300 to 1648 was a combination of progress and violence. Medieval wars were fought for dynastic claims and religious reasons. Among the dynastic wars of this age the most important one was the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453), fought mostly between France and England as a result of the English claim to the throne of France and of the Duchy of Aquitaine after the death of King Charles IV. The French victory not only freed French territories from English control (except Calais) but also led to modernization in the state apparatus of England and France.315 Meanwhile, England entered a political turmoil and civil war known as the War of the Roses (1455–1458). Two noble families, the House of York and the House of Lancaster, fought for the crown. The
314M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919 (London – New York: Longman, 1993), 20–40; Hüner Tuncer, Eski ve Yeni Diplomasi [Old and New Diplomacy], (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2002), 27–29. For more on the rise of modern diplomacy see, J.A.R. Marriott, The European Commonwealth – Problems Historical and Diplomatic, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 18–35. 315 Norman Davies, Europe – A History, Oxford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 383– 468; Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 56–57; Palmer, Colton, and Kramer, A History of the Modern World, 49–98; J.M. Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe, (England: Penguin, 1997), 233– 242. 111
Yorks’ victory led to the Tudor dynasty that ruled until 1603. The French, on the other hand, had dynastic claims over the Italian peninsula along with Spain and the
Holy Roman Empire.316
In 1494 the Duchy of Milan, acting contrary to the Peace of Lodi, called in the
French King Charles VIII against the threat of Naples. Things did not turn out as expected; Charles VIII used the opportunity to invade Italy and thus started the
Italian Wars, which lasted from 1494 to 1559. Charles VIII’s goal was to drive out the Italian states allied with Spain and Holy Roman Empire and altogether bring an end to the Italian system of states. This was the beginning of a series of Habsburg-
Valois wars that lasted until Spanish supremacy was guaranteed at the Treaty of
Cambria of 1529.317 The marriage of the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I of the
Habsburg dynasty of Austria to Mary of Burgundy made the Empire the most powerful state on the continent. Its rule stretched from central Europe to Spain and to the near abroad of France. The threat posed by the Habsburg desire to establish a universal empire instigated the Habsburg-Valois Wars (five successive wars fought from 1521 to 1555).318
The religious wars of Europe, on the other hand, can be divided into three: the wars of Christian states against Muslim states known as the Crusades,319 the civil wars of religion within states, and the inter-state religious wars developing out of the struggle
316Davies, Europe – A History, 383–468; Palmer, Colton, and Kramer, A History of Modern World, 49–98; Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe, 233–242. 317Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 80–87; Heeren, A Manual of the History, 23–34. 318Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 80–87. 319 Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, 1-120; Norman Housley, The Later Crusades – From Lyons to Alcazar 1274–1580 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 49-150. 112
between the Catholics and Protestants – the rising reformist sect of Christianity in the
North (the German states and Scandinavia).
Throughout the medieval age, the defense of religion and Latin Catholicism were used to legitimize the wars against the Muslims and the Protestants, who were seen as heretics. It was also the basis of the dynastic marriages and alliances. Despite Just
War principles, the wars among the sects of Christianity; i.e., Catholics and various versions of Protestantism (Lutheran, Calvinist, Anabaptist, and Huguenot) were devastatingly bloody and tragic. The Swabian Peasant Uprising (1524–1525), the
Tragedy of Münster (1534) and St. Bartholomew Day Massacre (1572) are examples of the political and religious turmoil in Europe. The Peace of Augsburg of 1555 not only ended the long-lasting Habsburg-Valois Wars but also, with its less-valued principle ‘cuius region region eius religio’ (translated as ‘he who rules, his is the religion’), eased the tension for a while. According to Bobbitt, it also “set the constitutional terms of a new society of states” as it confirmed the Holy Roman
Emperor Charles V’s dream of a universal empire a failure by establishing the sovereigns’ dominance over religious affairs of their states.320 This was an initial but an important step toward institutionalization of sovereignty in the European international system.
Two philosophers influenced the war thinking of the time: St. Augustine of Hippo
320Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 487. For Habsburg ascendancy and bid for universal empire, see Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 323–374. 113
and St. Thomas Aquinas.321 The Just War doctrine required wars among Christians to be limited and legitimized based on three principles as suggested by St. Augustine: just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention.322 The aim was to limit war, which was believed to be a type of ‘evil’-doing. Over the centuries, this doctrine developed in line with the changing requirements of European warfare and thus led to the refinement of war as an institution of international society. Aquinas, combining Augustine and Aristotle in his seminal works, Summa Theologica and
Summa Contra Gentiles, further developed Just War while the Crusades were at their height. The Just War became equated with the Crusades, although these principles were not applicable to wars with non-Christians.323 It should be noted, however, that the Crusades were waged not only against Muslims but also against those deemed to be the enemies of Catholicism in Europe. Other groups seen as enemies included the
Wends of Germany; the Albigensians (Cathars) of southern France; the Cumans of
Transylvania; the Livonians, Latgallians, Estonians, Curonians, Semigallains,
Prussians, and Luthanians of the North; and Protestants all over Europe.324
Just War is divided into two categories: Jus ad Bellum (criteria for engaging) and Jus in Bello (criteria for waging). Jus ad bellum principles comprise just cause – right intention, legitimate authority, last resort, proportionality, and probability of success
– while Jus in Bello consists of just authority, non-combatant immunity,
321Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger eds., International Relations in Political Thought – Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 119–135 and 204–212. 322John Mark Mattox, Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War, (London – New York: Continuum, 2008), 44–92. 323For more on medieval attitudes to war and justice see, Watson, The Evolution of International Society, 144–148. 324 Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, 54–56 and 121–142. 114
proportionality, prohibited targets, and weaponry.325 Just cause and right intention meant that war could only be waged for permissible motives like self-defense or redressing a wrong, such as injustice by a legitimate authority (in medieval ages this was the Papacy; without its sanctioning, Emperors, Princes, or Kings could not go to war). For example, all wars of expansion – from the reconquista of the Iberian
Peninsula to the Crusades in Palestine – were sanctioned by the Pope.326 Wars had to be of last resort (ultima ratio); first, other means of peaceful resolution had to be tried. The result of the war should match the destruction (proportionality in ad bello) and wars could only be fought if there was a reasonable prospect of success; otherwise, they were to be avoided. Wars must be carried out by just authority; that is, by standing armies not by mercenaries – condottiere could act beyond the rules of
Christian ethics as suggested by Machiavelli327 and be ended before they turned into a massacre (proportionality in bello). During war, moreover, non-combatant and civilian immunity were to be protected. The prisoners of war were treated well.
Prohibited targets like religious places and civilians were protected from attack and weaponry like the crossbow was forbidden by the Second Lateran Council of 1139, which also stated that wars among Christians were to be avoided.328
The Reformation and Counter Reformation led to another bloody transitory phase in
European history, known as the Thirty Years’ War, which was fought over religion.
Though the Peace of Augsburg eased the tension among European states for some
325Alex Moseley, “Just War Theory,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005,
time, the problem resurfaced in 1618 and 1619 with the Defenestration of Prague and the Bohemian Protestant aristocracy’s rebellion against the new Holy Roman
Emperor, Ferdinand II (successor of Matthias) by electing Frederick V – the
Calvinist Elector of Palatine. The Thirty Years’ War, which lasted from 1618 to
1648, was one of the most epochal, complex, and devastating wars in the history of
Europe. It was a civil war born out of administrative and constitutional issues regarding the election of the Holy Roman Emperor but also a religious civil war that later turned into an interstate war that involved the French, Dutch, and Swedish. The war was made up of a series of interconnected wars and battles that are conventionally divided into four phases: Bohemian, Danish, Swedish, and French.329
The Thirty Years’ War challenged the Just War doctrine and led to a military revolution by transforming limited wars into total war. Throughout thirty years of fighting, the war strategy moved from defensive to offensive with the introduction of new weaponry like firearms and caracole. The costs of war and the size of the armies expanded. The rise in military professionalism led to the transition from princely states to kingly states. These kingly states later became the basis of the territorial modern states of Westphalia.330 McNeill and Black note that innovations and changes in technology and warfare also led to changes in state structure as they required larger, centralized states and powerful monarchs.331 Indeed, the centuries
329Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 109–118; Richard Bonney, The Thirty Years’ War 1618–1648, Essential Histories, (London: Osprey Publishing, 2002); Mowat, The European States System, 59- 122; Derek Murphy, Michael Tillbrook, and Patrick Walsh-Atkins, Europe 1450–1661, (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000), 346–374; Palmer, Colton and Kramer, A History of the Modern World, 137–141. For Europe from Habsburg-Valois Wars to the Thirty Years’ War, see J.M. Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe, (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 272–290. 330Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 95–118. 331Jeremy Black, European Warfare, (New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 1994), 4; William McNeill and David Winfield, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000, (ACLS History E-Book Project, 2008), 117-144; Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 95–118; for Thirty Years’ War see, Hill, A History of European, 569–611. See also Jan Glete, War and the 116
following the signing of the Peace of Westphalia were dominated by monarchs believing in absolute divine rule. These absolutist monarchs established the basis of the Great Powers of nineteenth-century Europe. After Westphalia, the sovereign state became the sole legitimate authority for the declaration of war.
3.2.1.3 The Balance of Power
The other institution that developed out of the rivalry among the Italian city-states is the balance of power. From time to time, five states rivaled and balanced each other.
The natural result of centralization of political power in city-states was the belief that
“it could easily be fortified and perpetuated by compacts and alliances without.” 332
The preservation of equilibrium among the Italian city-states was born out of a need for defense.333 The Peace of Lodi, which was signed in 1454 by the Duchy of Milan
(who had expansionist claims vis-à-vis Lombardy) and the anti-Milanese alliance, which was led by Florence and Venice, was exemplary of the Italian balance-of- power system. Italian states, forming a league, agreed to resolve their problems through peaceful means – consultation and diplomacy – rather than fighting or calling in foreign intervention (just like the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe).334
The Italian equilibrium, in ES and Realist approaches, is typical of a mechanical arrangement that is a “constellation of forces that pushes and shoves states to act in
State in Early Modern Europe – Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States 1500–1660, (London – New York: Routledge, 2006). 332Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 361. 333Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 361. 334 Murphy, Tillbrook, and Walsh-Atkins, Europe 1450–1661, 155. 117
particular ways from outside”335 that is, according to Bull’s definition, a fortuitous balance of power.
Though Jackson defined them to be ‘a small regional international society,’ rather than being a society of states, what the Italian states constituted was a full regional international system based on a developed economic international system, evolving institutions of diplomacy, and balance of power.336 If Bull’s concept of primary institutions of international society is analyzed, a fortuitous balance of power is associated with international systems. The contrived balance of power reached through management of Great Power relations is, on the other hand, assumed to exist in international society. The emergent Renaissance state (princely state) was not yet an independent, cohesive, and dominant force in interstate relations, like the Great
Powers of the nineteenth century that were the foundational forces and guards of
Bullian international society.
A similar economic and balance-of-power system to that of the Italian states, known as the Hanseatic League, was formed in the North of Europe in the twelfth century.337 It was a commercial and mercantile union of North German and Baltic cities, first founded between Hamburg and Luebeck. The Hanseatic League, defined in accordance with Buzan and Little’s concept, is a regional economic system born out of the logic of anarchy. In medieval Europe trade was a dangerous business; the physical and security problems required cooperation and regulation to secure rights
335Andrew Hurrell, ‘Foreword to the Third Edition: The Anarchical Society 25 Years On,’ in Bull, The Anarchical Society, 3rd Edition, cited in Richard Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations – Metaphors, Myths and Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 130. 336Jackson, “The Evolution of International Society,” 37. 337For the Hanseatic League, see Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 46–48. 118
and business. Its Diet, a loose type of parliament, regulated commercial markets and common policies in the region. The Hanseatic League nations did not have maritime or armed forces like the Italians, but they nevertheless grew to be economically and politically influential. The Danish King, Valdemar Atterdag, was not pleased with the growing power of the League and wanted to curb it by attacking and invading its primary trading cities. In the ensuing war, however, the Danes were defeated and forced to recognize the Hanseatic League’s supremacy with the Treaty of Stralsund
(1370). The League gained a trade monopoly in Scandinavia and extended its control from Holland to Poland as well as parts of Russia. Hansa cities were independent from the control of hegemonic powers and thus guarded their autonomy fiercely. The
Hanseatic League lasted until the sixteenth century and had been highly effective in the makeup of the socio-economic structure of North Europe.338 These sub-regions gradually developed a network of interactions starting with commerce and then developing into diplomatic and military interactions. The League had diplomatic and commercial ties with other European states. For example, King Louis XI of France, while strengthening and modernizing his state, formed strong commercial relations with the Hanseatic League. England also continued to send permanent diplomatic representatives accredited to the League and stationed in Hamburg or Saxony until the unification of Germany.339
338David Whitton, “The Society of Northern Europe in the High Middle Ages, 900–1200,” in The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe, ed. George Holmes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 115–174; Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 438–441. See also William Chester Jordan, Europe in the High Middle Ages, (England: Penguin, 2002) and Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization & Capitalism 15th–18th Century, Volume 2 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1979). 339S.T. Bindoff, E.F. Malcolm Smith, and C.K. Webster eds., British Diplomatic Representatives 1789-1852, (London: Offices of the Society, 1934), 65–68. 119
The growing power of the new principalities340 in Scandinavia and other parts of
Europe that followed the Italian model led to a shift of power from the unions and leagues to the states. Moreover, new monarchies centralized their rule by reducing the power of the vassals, nobility, and clergy. The need for more centralized and efficient bureaucracies, armies, and diplomatic corps led to institutionalization of the state. King Louis XI and Francis I of France, King Henry VII, his son Henry VIII and granddaughter Elizabeth I of England, and the Spanish King Ferdinand II of
Aragon and his queen Isabella of Castile strengthened their rule through political, social and economic modernization of their states. In Eastern Europe, though it was not as successful as the western states, Hungary under King Matthias Cornivus and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania united with Poland after the Battle of Tannenberg and followed a similar path to modernization.341
The dynastic struggle among the powerful houses of Europe was considered to be dangerous for the peace of Europe. It was agreed that a balance or – rather – equilibrium had to be kept. In the mid-sixteenth century, English historian William
Camden wrote that “… and true it is, which one hath written, that France and Spain are as it were the scales in the balance of Europe and England the tongue or the holder of the balance.”342 This view was expressed by the royal houses and diplomats of the time. Gradually the balance of power used in reference to the Italian city-states
340 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 75-94. 341 Palmer, Colton, and Kramer, A History of the Modern World, 73–77. 342Quoted from E. Kaeber, Die Idee des europäischen Geichgewichts, in der publizistischen Literatur vom 16. bis zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderrts, Berlin, 1906, in Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, The History of the Idea of Europe, (Milton Keynes and US – Canada: The Open University – Routledge, 2005), 41. 120
broadened to mean a general balance – equilibrium – among the leading princely and kingly states of Europe.343
3.2.1.4 International Law
The supremacy of the Catholic Church over continental affairs also influenced the nature of the medieval law. The ecclesiastical understanding and the canon law (the law of the Church) became dominant. As Europe was united in religion, the ecclesiastical law was applicable to all. The church did not only have a strong place and religious authority in the daily lives of medieval Christians through the sacraments and religious ceremonies. It also had political authority. The Church and the Papacy acted as a unifying force. All Christians from peasants to kings and emperors were subject to canon law. Those who violated the canon law faced excommunication and interdict. Throughout this era the Holy Roman emperors rivaled religious authorities. The papacy had the power to dispose and banish the kings from the Church. Wilhelm G. Grewe defined this power division and struggle as “the diarchy of emperor and pope.”344 The evolution of sovereignty and the idea that the sovereign states of Europe formed a separate international system indeed marks the beginning of international thinking.345
343Wilson and Dussen, The History of the Idea of Europe, 40. 344 Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, trans. Michael Byers, (Berlin – New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 37. 345 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 19–24; Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, 37–50. 121
3.2.1.5 The Great Powers
In this age, the dominant hegemonic power was the Holy Roman Empire; its only rival in terms of political and religious authority was the Papacy. It would be ahistorical to depict a group of great powers roughly equal in capabilities and acting as the chief guarantors of the international system as well as society through balancing each other and managing interstate affairs. As Grewe well noted, “the medieval world has neither States nor a State system in the modern sense of these terms.”346 The majority of the European nations and territories were under imperial control of the Holy Roman Emperors claimed to be a universal Empire. The Thirty
Years’ War ended the Holy Roman Empire and Habsburgs’ bid for hegemony; only after this development did the establishment of sovereignty, statehood, state system, and international law start to develop. 347
3.2.2 From the Thin to the Thick European International System: From
Westphalia to Vienna
There is no doubt that the Peace Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 were turning points in the history of Europe.348 Westphalia brought an epochal change in the practice and understanding of interstate relations with sovereignty as the principal institution and
346 Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, 37. 347 See E. Bever, Holy Roman Empire, (Salem: Salem Press, 2001). 348 For the Treaty of Westphalia, see John Merriman, A History of Modern Europe, Volume One – From the Renaissance to the Present, (London – New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 138– 180. The myth of Westphalia has been challenged by scholars not only from various disciplines, see Derek Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” International History Review, 21 (1999): 569–591; Randall Lesaffer, “The Westphalia Peace Treaties and the Development of the Tradition of Great European Peace Settlements prior to 1648,” Grotiana NS, 18 (1997): 71–95 and Benno Tescke, The Myth of 1648 – Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations, (London- New York: Verso, 2003). 122
foundational basis of the European international legitimacy and order.349 Historians, jurists, and political philosophers claim these treaties concluded one of the bloodiest phases in the history of Europe; these treaties were “the very birth certificates of the modern European states system and the modern law of nations.”350 According to the
English School (ES) scholars like Bull and Northedge, Westphalian order stressing basics of modern international relations like state sovereignty, territoriality, legal equality, non-intervention, diplomacy and international law, also makes up the foundations of the modern international society.351 David Armstrong, along the lines of the classical ES scholars, also argues that it was a decisive turn toward a European society of states.352 Jackson, in his analysis of the evolution of international society, similarly notes that, indeed, Westphalia was “the first completely explicit international society with its own diplomatic institutions, formal body of law, and enunciated practices of prudential statecraft, including the balance of power”.353
The Congress of Westphalia was a comprehensive European event. The major participants were the Holy Roman Empire, France and Sweden and their allies.
Britain (because of the civil war), Poland, and Russia were absent. The two major powers (Britain and Russia)—policies of which shaped the international order and politics on the continent in the following centuries were not signatories of this constitutive treaty—presented as the foundation of the European international
349 William Brown, Simon Bromley and Suma Athreye eds., Ordering the International: History, Change and Transformation, (London-Ann Arbor/Michigan: Open University and Pluto Press, 2004), 21–67. Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 51–70. 350 Lesaffer, “Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia,” 9. 351 For details of the Westphalian settlement and order, Stephen D. Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia,” International Security, 20 (1995-1996), 115–151 and Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,” The American Journal of International Law, 42 (1948), 20–41. David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 33. 352 Armstrong, Revolution and World Order, 33. 353 Jackson, “The evolution of international society,” 2001, 44. 123
society. Negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück resulted with the signing of peace treaties between the Empire and Sweden, and the Empire and France in 1648. These were complemented by a separate peace treaty signed between the Dutch Republic and Spain in 1659 (the Peace of the Pyrenees).354
The major result of Westphalia was that the move toward territorial states as the sovereign territorial rights of rulers was accepted to be most important. It stressed the separateness of European states and rejected a hegemonic universal authority above states. Westphalia also granted religious tolerance to states. Individual states were to have exclusive control over their internal affairs and to be externally sovereign. The religious settlement reached on the foundation of the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, the principle of “cuius region eius religio,” included the territorial superiority in all matters ecclesiastical and political.355 The delegates agreed that the major reason prolonging the Thirty Years’ War was the conviction that each side was fighting for its basic rights. The new treaties corrected the inadequacies of the earlier treaty by recognizing the absolute rights of states to avoid future wars.356 Westphalia renovated the Augsburg Peace; Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism became politically accepted faiths. In the words of Palmer, Colton and Kramer with
Westphalia “plurality of sovereign states and religions was taken for granted within
Europe as a whole.”357
354 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achillies, 501–519; Palmer, Colton and Kramer, A History of Modern World, 501–519. 355 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achillies, 506. 356 Karsten Ruppert, Die Kaiserliche Politik auf dem Westfälischen FriedenskongreB (1643-1648), (Aschendroff, 1979), 229, cited in Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe 1640-1990: Peace Making and the Conditions of International Stability, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 48. 357 Palmer, Colton and Kramer, A History of Modern World, 143. 124
The Dutch Republic, the Republic of Helvetica and the German states became independent from Habsburg rule. These sovereign states had the right to conclude and ratify treaties, to declare wars and to enter in diplomatic relations with other sovereigns. The Westphalia state system also recognized the Pope and the Emperor as legally equal.358 The Pope no longer had the right to intervene in the affairs of the states in line with the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.
Starting from the times of the Greek city-states to this age, internal and external order was the most debated topic in the writings of pre-modern and modern thinkers. The problem of internal order to some extent resolved with the sovereign states. Internal order is regulated within a legal framework, but beyond the borders of the sovereign states the problem remained. In the period after Westphalia to Vienna, political philosophers and jurists were still preoccupied with the question: “What could achieve ‘order’ in the absence of the legitimacy conferred by sovereignty?”359
After Westphalia, the institutionalization of the primary institutions of the international society and sovereignty increased. However, states in the sense known today were not fully developed until the nineteenth century. As noted above, the
“state” in Bull’s writing appears as a fundamental feature. Moreover, according to
Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, it appears as one of the foundational institutions of the international society.360 Despite Westphalian sovereignty, smaller powers were still played against each other by the stronger states; at times, their
358 Stern, The Structure of International Society, 75–76. 359 Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order, 6. 360 Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, “Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations” in Hugo Grotius, eds. Bull, Kingsbury and Roberts, 26. See also, Alan James, Sovereign Statehood – The Basis of International Society, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986). 125
sovereign rights were violated. The other determinant institution of an international society is the balance of power; the foundation of such balance is a rough balance of capabilities of several states (specifically among Great Powers) in anarchy. However, it was not well established either. After Westphalia, the winner of the Thirty Years’
War, France, became the dominant power on the continent. France replaced the
Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs while other new sovereigns more or less equal in capacity rose in various parts of Europe.
The presence of powers with semi-hegemonic aspirations and non-existence of roughly equal modern states and Great Powers, however, rules out the possibility of an international society. Besides these powers, the primary institutions—specifically diplomacy, international law, and balance of power—were at the stage of development. For that reason, it will be more convenient to define Europe from
Westphalia to Vienna as composing a thick international system, but not yet an international society.
3.2.2.1 Diplomacy
European diplomacy became a trusted instrument for controlling international friction and disorder. It became a permanent body in the administrative sense and institutionalized with establishment of foreign ministries. The congresses of
Westphalia and Utrecht led to the emergence of professional diplomats and a
126
European diplomatic corps. The dominance of France and its culture also affected the diplomatic culture of Europe and made French the lingua franca of diplomacy.361
Secret Agreements were the new tools of the Westphalian society. Under the absolute authority of princes, agreements for specific political and economic purposes were easily kept secret. For example, France agreed not to support the
Dutch against England on condition that the English did not prevent the French invasion of the Spanish Netherlands (1667). The political and military power increasingly depended on economic power. Accordingly, economic threats, alliances and blockades were added to the means of statecraft.362 International law and Great
Powers also started to establish themselves as constitutive elements of the European international system.363 From the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) to the Congress of
Vienna (1815), the European-based political order led to the construction of a thick international system. The impact of the French Revolution on the European international system led to its transition from system to society.
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic France with “liberté, égalité et fraternité” broke to pieces the balance of power system in Europe.364 Revolutionary France had achieved political, military and diplomatic supremacy over continental Europe during the years between 1792 and 1812.365 Napoleonic France became an empire,
361 Mai’a K. Davis Cross, The European Diplomatic Corps – Diplomats and International Cooperation From Westphalia to Maastricht, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 13–67. 362 Luard, Types of International Society, 90–95 and 190–193. 363 Scott, The Birth of A Great Power System, 8–170. 364David Thomson, Europe since Napoleon, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 4–58; Derrick Murhpy, Terry Morris, Richard Staton and Sally Waller, Europe 1760-1871, (London: Collins Educational, 2000), 48–142. 365 For more details about Napoleon’s life, see Andrina Stiles, Napoleon, France and Europe (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993). See also, Merriman, A History of Modern Europe, 138–180. 127
extending its rule through conquests and alliances in the greater part of Europe.366
The Austrian foreign minister, Prince Metternich, on one occasion pointedly described the role of France in European affairs in those years with his famous words, “When France sneezes Europe catches cold.”367 In other words, the French
Revolution ended the Westphalia order based on sovereign equality of states against hegemonic domination.
3.2.2.2 War
The major aim of the kingly states was to strengthen the power of the state.
Mercenary troops of princely states were replaced by professionalized standing armies of kingly states while Richelieu’s conception of raison d’état started to dominate all European states.368 War was regarded as a legitimate instrument; yet warfare was limited in purpose and style to avoid catastrophes like the Thirty Years’
War. Until the French Revolutionary wars, wars were limited. The majority of the wars of this age were succession wars: Spanish, Swedish (The Great Northern War),
French, Austrian and Polish.369
366 See, Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics – The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Chiméne J. Keitner, The Paradoxes of Nationalism – The French Revolution and Its Meaning for Contemporary Nation Building, (New York: The State University of New York Press, 2007). 367 Raymond F. Betts, Europe in Retrospect - A Brief History of the Past Two Hundred Years, Part One: The Reordering of Europe: 1789-1871, Online Edition, retrieved at http://www.britannia.com/history/euro/. 368 For France under the reign of Louis XVI, see Tim Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory – Europe 1648- 1815, (London: Alan Lane – Penguin Books, 2007), 531–610; Derrick Murhpy, Michael Tillbrook and Patrick Walsh-Atkins, Europe 1450-1661, (London: Harper Collins, 2000), 311–346. 369J. H. Shennan, International Relations in Europe 1689-1789, (London: Routledge, 1995), 7–50. 128
The dominating position of France under Louis XIV stirred a counter-alliance led by the Dutch Prince William of Orange and brought in the classical balance of power politics with the successive wars of the anti-Louis coalition. The French King Louis
XIV’s claim to the throne of Spain after death of King Carlos II on behalf of his grandson heightened the fear of French hegemony. All rival European powers under the leadership of William the Orange formed an alliance (Britain, the Dutch
Republic, Austria and Germanies). Despite the efforts of European powers to limit wars, it extended beyond the borders of Europe to the colonies. Each power had varying interests for being involved; however, the common cause was to prevent the rise of hegemonic powers and their universal aspirations.370
The Russian, Polish and Danish alliance against the dominance of Sweden in the
Baltic led to the Great Northern War (1700–1721), the end result of which changed the local balance in favor of Russia. Russia came to be regarded as a Great Power with the Treaty of Nystadt (1721). The principal powers of the previous century,
Sweden, Denmark and Poland–Lithuania, lost prestige. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Poland–Lithuanian commonwealth totally disappeared from the map of Europe as a result of the policies of Russia, Prussia and Austria.371
The Austrian Succession War (1740–1748), on the other hand, resulted from the
Prussian violation of the Pragmatic Sanction of the Hapsburg Emperor Charles VI on the succession of his daughter Maria Theresa; like the Spanish War of Succession, it
370 Shennan, International Relations in Europe 1689-1789, 7–50. 371 Shennan, International Relations in Europe 1689-1789, 7–50; Heeren, A Manual of the History,, 26–60; Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3–150. 129
expanded to European colonies world wide. The Seven Years’ War (also known as the French and Indian War) lasting from 1756 to 1763, was pioneered as a result of the Austrian diplomatic revolution that brought European powers into war—a result of tangled alliances.
Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780–1831) understanding of war influenced the strategic thinking of this era. Clausewitz, a Prussian officer, wrote an unfinished work on the theory of war titled On War. According to Bernard Brodie, Clausewitz wrote “not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war.”372 In this treatise
Clausewitz’s pragmatic thinking of war prevailed. He defined war as a political activity by violent means and argued that war is the result of the relations between enmity and passion; chance and creativity; and policy reason. He saw war was a part of man’s social existence and thus embedded in society and history.373 Frederick II’s
Prussia with its well-trained and modernized army was the major military force of the continent.
Armies of this age were the most important machines of the state but war and warfare had limits. During the Napoleonic wars, the theory and practice of European warfare enormously changed. Limited wars between sovereigns were transformed to unlimited total wars between state–nations and their people in arms.374 The change in
372 Bernard Brodie, “The Continuing Relevance of On War” in C. von Clausewitz , On War, ed. and trans. M. Howrad and P. Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 53. 373 Tobjørn L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, 2nd ed. (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 163. Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations – An Introduction to Strategic History, (London – New York: Routledge, 2007), 15–29. See also, W. B. Galle, Philosophers of Peace and War – Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 37–65. 374 For more on the Napoleonic Wars between 1803 and 1815, see David Gates, The Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815, (Great Britain: Arnold, 1997), 1–15 and Gregory Fremont-Barnes and Todd Fisher, The 130
the nature of warfare made the political relations and balance of power so perceptive that as noted by Clausewitz, “no cannon could be fired in Europe without every government feeling its interests affected.”375
2.2.2.3 The Balance of Power
The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) concluded the war of Spanish Succession. It consisted of eleven bilateral treaties such as the Treaty of Rastatt (1714) between the French and Habsburgs; it was the most important treaty after Westphalia. The Congress was divided into two categories: the individual interests of states and the interests of the states of Europe as a whole. Specific reference made to European balance of power as a value to be institutionalized and preserved led to its becoming an essential collective security device rather than being a procedural rule.376 As religious alliances were replaced by those determined on the basis of raison d’état, their stability and durability increased. This was a very important step toward a pluralistic international society of Europe. The Spanish succession was resolved with a French promise of no unification of the two thrones. The French power was balanced although it continued to be a dominant power along with Britain.
The Peace Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) concluded at the end of the War of
Austrian Succession led to Prussian territorial aggrandizement at the expense of
Napoleonic Wars – The Rise and Fall of an Empire, (London: Osprey, 2004). J. Grant and Harold Temperley, Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1789-1950), Sixth Revised Edition (London: Longman, 1952, 59–76) and J. Christopher Herold, The Age of Napoleon, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987), 42–84. 375 Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, 163. 376 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achillies, 522–527. 131
Austria setting the basis for future conflict though making Prussia one of the Great
Powers. The Treaties of Paris (1763) and Hubertusburg ending the Seven Years’ War was the most important treaty after Westphalia along with Utrecht shaping the
European states system. At the end of this treaty, the Great Powers established themselves as a ruling pentarchy until the end of the nineteenth century. 377
3.2.2.4 International Law
Westphalia was an important step taken to codify European public law. This was a consequence of growing complexity of the interstate peace negotiations and interactions. Progress in the field of European international law is linked to diplomatic professionalization. As Kings and Monarchs started to rely on their advisors and representatives to deal with negotiations on their behalf, diplomats needed what can be defined as “standard operating procedures” to negotiate and to conclude treaties.378
The natural law thinking of Hugo Grotius (Hugo de Groot), a Dutch legal scholar and diplomat, dominated the era after Westphalia. Basically, he argued that kingly states are bound by the natural law inherent in human nature. Unlike his contemporaries,
Grotius brought the idea of an emergent international society forward in conjunction with his understanding of the natural law of states. Later legal theoreticians like
377 Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 591–613; Charles W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1815, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 105–177; Murhpy, Morris, Staton, and Waller, Europe 1760-1871, 11-47; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 3–150; H.M. Scott, The Birth of A Great Power System 1740-1815 (London: Pearson Longman, 2006), 39–116. 378 Heinz Duchhardt, “Peace Treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era,” in Peace Treaties and International Law, ed. Lesaffer, 54. 132
Samuel von Pufendorf developed Grotian ideas in support of natural law thinking of the age. To quote G. Mattingly:
…he was the first person to see, or to make clear that he saw, that, to be persuasive, the argument must be couched in the terms not of the interests of a single unitary commonwealth of which the princes and republics of Christendom were subordinate members, but in terms of the interest in their own self-preservation of the independent, ego- centered, absolutely sovereign states whose aggregate composed the heterogeneous, pluralistic international society of western Europe. That was what the future was going to be like.379
The Grotian view includes five major features: natural law is the source of rules regulating inter-state relations; international society is universal; international society is composed of states as well as individuals and non-state groups; solidarism facilitates enforcement of rules and gives rise to justice; and there is no place for institutions in international society.380 Bull writing on Grotius concluded that the
“idea of international society which Grotius propounded was given concrete expression in the Peace of Westphalia, and Grotius may be considered the intellectual father of this first general peace settlement of modern times”.381 Hill noted that Grotius sought the basic principles of interstate relations in human reason and rationality in an era motivated by “dynastic interest, national aggrandizement, and religious bigotry”.382 In his famous treatise, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the
Rights of War and Peace), published in 1625, he systematically assembled the
European practice in relation to war and peace rooted in natural law starting from
379 G. Mattingly, “International Diplomacy and International Law”, in Cambridge New Modern History, Vol. 3, ed. R. B. Wernham, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 169–170. 380 Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations”, in Hugo Grotius, eds. Bull, Kingsbury and Roberts, 78–91 and Bobbitt, The Shield of Achillies, 514. See also, Jeffrey, Hugo Grotius in International Thought, 2006. 381 Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius”, 75. 382 Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 570–571. 133
antiquity to his age. This set the basis of European international law.383 According to the ES scholars, occupying “the middle ground between the Naturalists and the
Positivists,”384 Grotius was not only the father of the idea of a society of states but also the post-Westphalia international order.
3.2.2.5 The Great Powers
During this era, the belief in the divine right of the monarchs emphasized by political philosophers like Jean Bodin and Bishop Jacques-Benigne Bossuet changed the nature of the princely states to that of absolutist kingly (queenly) states. Bodin’s major work, The Six Books of the Commonwealth (Les Six Livres de la République,
1576), represents a synopsis of his absolutist legal and political thought. Writing at the time of the French civil wars, Bodin purported the idea of absolute monarchs whose authority is unquestionable and above their subjects. This, he thought, would force obedience to the state and thus prevent disorder.385 The idea of divinely kings whose authority could not be surrogated was dominant.386
Monarchs of this era established absolutist states where raison d’état (the reason of state) determined inter-state relations. Sovereignty and raison d’état became the basis of international legitimacy. The raison d’état acquired a slightly different meaning in the new French version. In its Italian usage it was equated with self-
383 David J. Bederman, “Grotius and his Followers on Treaty Construction,” Journal of the History of International Law 3 (2001): 18–37. 384 Stern, The Structure of International Society, 76. 385 Brown, Nardin and Rengger eds., International Relations in Political Thought, 2002, 270–276. 386 Raymond Birn, Crisis, Absolutism, Revolution: Europe and the World 1648-1789, 3rd ed. (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2005), 253–254 and 270–271. 134
aggrandizement of princely state. In French understanding it meant the king embodying the state had responsibilities for preservation of general peace and stability.387 Wars, diplomatic contracts, alliances and balance of power politics were all justified on this basis. This transition from princely states where dynastic family interests of princes were secured, to that of kingly states, which “took the Italian constitutional innovation—fundamentally, the objectification of the state—and united this with dynastic legitimacy,” set the basis of territorial states.388 The new
European international order was established and organized by the absolutist monarchs, and their leading advisors.
After the devastation of the Thirty Years’ War, France under King Louis XIV became the rising European power; its politics determined the spirit of the era. Louis
XIV inherited the crown from King Louis XIII; he also inherited a politically, military and economically well-structured kingly state under the guidance of prominent advisors like the Duke of Sully, Cardinal Richelieu and Cardinal Mazarin.
Louis XIV, determined to make his kingdom the most powerful one in Europe, personified the idea of sovereignty with his famous statement ‘L’état, C’est moi’. He continued his reforms aimed to strengthen his power and rule within France. Not only the French ruling system and economy were reorganized but also its army was centralized, equipped with new weapons and professionalized.
The Dutch Republic was recognized as an independent state in Westphalia and became the financial and commercial center of the continent. The Dutch extended
387 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achillies, 97. 388 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achillies, 97. 135
their trading post to overseas from Asia to America. However, the wars with Britain during the rule of Oliver Cromwell led to the loss of Dutch power. Another victorious power rising from the Thirty Years’ War was Sweden.389 Poland–
Lithuanian Commonwealth, on the other hand, lost power under the threat of
Muscovy—the rising power of the East. The electorate of Brandenburg unified with the Duchy of Prussia under the Hohenzollern dynasty not only broadened its borders; it also became the leading military power of Europe. It was recognized as a Great
Power under the reign of King Frederick II.390 Britain during and after the Thirty
Years’ War passed through difficult times because of the Puritan revolution and the ensuing civil war. Out of this bloody turmoil, Britain emerged as a liberal power that became a world empire extending its naval and commercial power overseas. The defeated powers of the war, Austria and Spain, lost not only their territories but also their prestige in the new inter-state relations. Austria now directed its interest from being a universal empire to the Balkans rivaled the Ottoman dominance in the region. Under the rule of Maria Theresa with diplomatic maneuvers designed by her advisor Count Kaunitz, Austria regained its Great Power status.391 Throughout this era, the idea of “great power” was institutionalized; one by one states from west
(France and England) and Central-Eastern Europe (Austria, Prussia and Russia) came to be regarded as having specific status in comparison to other powers. Equilibrium between these powers was deemed to be essential for the international order and system of Europe. The hegemonic establishment of Great Powers started with the
Treaties of Paris (1763) and Hubertusburg ending the Seven Years’ War and
389Palmer, Colton and Kramer, A History of Modern World, 145–188; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 3–150. 390 Palmer, Colton and Kramer, A History of Modern World, 145–188. 391Palmer, Colton and Kramer, A History of Modern World, 145–188 and Shennan, International Relations in Europe 1689-1789, 32–37. 136
officially institutionalized and legalized with the Congress of Vienna and the
Concert. 392
3.2.3 The Evolution of the European Pluralist International Society on the Basis of International System
It took the whole of the nineteenth century for the consequences to work themselves out; the long-term effects of the Napoleonic era were immense. The changes initiated on the map and structure of Europe shaped the politics of Europe thereafter. The wartime alliances and the formation of the anti-French coalition not only brought the defeat of Napoleon, but also laid the foundations of the postwar European state system. European statesmen and diplomats gathered in Vienna (1815) tried to thwart its effects by redrawing European frontiers and reestablishing international order.
This was a highly complex task achieved throughout the nineteenth century starting with the Vienna Congress. Definitely, the Napoleonic era had a significant impact on the rise of conservatism among the leaders of Europe, which continued until the
Bismarkian era. The Vienna Congress is defined as the most extraordinary European congress that brought an extensive change in the structure of the European continent since Westphalia.
The Vienna Congress based on a system-wide consensus, marks the beginning of the era of another change in the international relations of Europe. The states agreed that
392 Hill, A History of European Diplomacy, 591–613; Charles W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1815, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 105–177; Murhpy, Morris, Staton, and Waller, Europe 1760-1871, 11–47; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 3–150; H.M. Scott, The Birth of A Great Power System 1740-1815 (London: Pearson Longman, 2006), 39–116. 137
the new Europe should be based on principles that would maintain public order and security of every throne. Apart from their differences on certain points about the peace with France, the Great Powers established the importance of the preservation of the existing status quo by forming an international system that would limit conflicts, prevent wars and regulate the relations among them based on agreed rules, norms and diplomatic practices. This new system called The Concert of Europe was formed by Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia.393
The first issue on their agenda was the settlement to be reached with France. The allies were divided into two camps as the advocates of a harsh peace (Holland,
Prussia and the German states) and the advocates of a moderate peace (Austria,
Britain and Russia). The states that were exposed to direct aggression by France wanted to render France totally incapable of waging wars. Britain, Russia and
Austria, on the other hand, were aware of the fact that France could not ever be permanently weakened; therefore, they supported re-incorporation of France into the post-Vienna international order for the guarantee of the security and peace.394 The
Vienna Congress enabled the establishment of an international order based on collective hegemony; rules of coexistence crystallized in the Concert as the European
Great Powers, contrary to earlier centuries, were determined to uphold the responsibility of the new order.
393 Murhpy, Morris, Staton, and Waller, Europe 1760-1871, 48–142. 394 René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna, Revised Edition, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973), 3–64. Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, 1– 15; Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992), 1–27. 138
Powers preferred international order and stability on the Continent for different reasons. On its way to be a global power, Britain needed peace and stability in
Europe. Likewise, Russia favored a calm Europe. It desired to expand its sphere of influence to the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, , their agreement that in the long term, it would be impossible to achieve stability without
France, Britain and Russia meant that for a stable Europe, Austria ought to regain its old power vis-à-vis France. Prussia, on the other hand, shared and supported these views. Nevertheless, the European powers shared the view that they had to devise international rules of conduct in order to prevent future hegemonic aspirations. The key principles of new Europe such as balance of power, legitimacy, and anti- revolutionist great power management, according to Bobbitt, set the constitutional convention of the European society of states.395 So, under the management of Great
Powers, Europe moved from an international system to a pluralistic (coexistence) international society with shared interests, values, rules and norms.
The rising nationalism and egalitarianism threatened all major powers. For that reason, they decided to work out a cooperative agreement with France. The allies were convinced that the restoration of the Bourbon Dynasty in France according to the principle of legitimacy would not only be acceptable to the French people, but also be beneficial to the allies. A Bourbon France would be durable, legitimate and cooperative. It was decided that the brother of the former Bourbon King should be proclaimed as the King of France under the title “Louise XVIII.” The signing of the
First Treaty of Paris (1814) led to the withdrawal of the occupation forces beyond the
395 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achillies, 538–569. 139
boundaries of 1792. The Allies did not demand a war reparation and France retained its territories of 1792. France’s overseas colonies were also restored with the exception of the islands of Tobago, Santa Lucia, Mauritius, Rodriguez and the
Seychelles, which were kept by Britain as strategic bases.396
Though the first issue on the agenda of Europe was resolved, the allies still had to deal with the complicated task of reorganization of Europe. In the Final Act of the
Congress of Vienna, they agreed to the European arrangements made in the earlier negotiations and as envisaged in the first Treaty of Paris. The restructuring of governments of Europe was based on the principle of legitimacy, and the restoration of all the ruling dynasties before 1789 was agreed. Small states like Holland and
Piedmont-Sardinia were strengthened by way of enlargement. Sovereignty and independence of the states contiguous to France like Spain, German Confederation,
Confederation of Helvetia and the states of Italy were secured through international guarantees—treaties.397 Meanwhile the escape of Napoleon from exile, and the ensuing period of Hundred Days, once again increased the voices of the advocates of a harsh peace with France arguing that unless France was totally rendered incapable, the peace of Europe would be under continuous threat. Under Austrian leadership, the Allies were able to draw another treaty of moderation. However, this time the treaty was a bit harsher than the first one. The Second Treaty of Paris, signed in
396 Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914, 9–10; Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 33–36. 397 Gregor Dallas, The Final Act - The Roads to Waterloo, (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1997), 257–323; Rory Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); and Charles Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 98–149. 140
1815, forced France to give up some additional territories and to pay an indemnity of
700 million francs.398
The European international politics was transformed in the years 1813 to 1815 in such a way that there was an essential change in the governing rules, norms and practices of international politics.399 According to Paul Schroeder, European leaders learned from their past experiences of wars, conflicts and defeats how to conduct politics effectively. Schroeder’s understanding of systemic change is close to Bull’s formulation of cultural change—a change in the understandings, rules and norms through shared practice and learning. John Ikenberry also argued that there was “a linear systemic institutional change,” which resulted through learning.400 Indeed, there was an ideational change of mindset of the leaders of Europe.
3.2.3.1 Diplomacy
The major contribution of the Concert to European diplomacy is that it prevented unilateralism on issues of common concern. Great Powers of Europe were aware of the fact that they no longer had the liberty to enact individual decisions as it would affect others. As noted by Andreas Osiander, the Vienna peacemakers knew that the destiny of each sovereign rested on the destiny of the others.401 For that reason, they assumed the responsibility to preserve the Vienna settlement to themselves and agreed to resolve crises through consultation and negotiation. This led to transition
398 Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914, 24–25; Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, 221–242. 399 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, xi. 400 John Ikenberry, After Victory- Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 401 Osiander, The States System of Europe 1640-1990, 186. 141
from unilateralism and bilateralism to multilateralism in European affairs as the
Concert officially affirmed the managerial role of the Great Powers. According to R.
B. Elrod, “concert diplomacy actively cultivated the conception of Great Powers as a unique and special peer group.”402 The belief that order of Europe depended on
“those possessed of power” was widely shared.403 Congress and the structure of the
Concert formalized the “hierarchy of states” by according a special role to the five major powers—Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria and France—in determining the conditions and the future of the order in Europe. This very special role of the Great
Powers was further reinforced in the Treaty of Chaumont of 1814. Other European states were delegated a secondary role and status within this Great Power international society. In the case of contradiction of the societal rules with their interests, the Great Powers did not hesitate to violate and act at the expense of smaller states and/or choose among different rules. In Stephen Krasner’s words, this was a typical example of an “organized hypocrisy.”404 Towards the end of the century, the division between these two classes became more evident as the Great
Powers turned into world powers with the advent of imperialism and expansion into foreign lands outside the boundaries of Europe, while the others remained within the confines of European.405
402 R. B. Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System,” World Politics, 28 (1976):167. 403 Abrecht- Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe, 3-64. 404 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 405 F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914 (London: Pearson Longman, 2005), 1–61 and 86–125. See also, C. J. Bartlett, Peace, War and the European Powers 1814-1914 (New York: St. Martins, 1996), 1–23. Ian Clark, Hierarchy of States – Reform and Resistance in the International Order ,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 142
The era following Vienna is characterized by the “congress diplomacy.”406 Until
1884, twenty-five meetings were held among the major powers of Europe. During these meetings unilateral changes that would upset the balance were not permitted.
Changes were initiated upon consent and consensus among the Great Powers.
However, these did not necessarily mean that the relations between powers were peaceful and harmonious. Conservative-autocratic powers (Russia, Prussia and
Austria) and Liberal-constitutional powers (Britain and France) disagreed over sources of threats to international order. For example, the Austrian Chancellor,
Metternich, demanded joint action against internal threats posing serious danger to the European international order/security while Britain believed there should be a strict distinction of internal and external threats. The differences became more apparent in the congresses of Troppau, Laibach and Verona.407 However, the clear- cut division of spheres of influence between Great Powers prevented confrontation among them.
3.2.3.2 War
The revolutionary and Napoleonic military campaigns changed the nature of
European warfare. The French revolutionary wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries led to a re-conceptualization of war, which became a revolting nation’s full–force fight against its enemies. The National Convention on August 23,
1793, officially declared levée en masse:
406 Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1815-1914 , 28–43. 407 Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1815-1914, 28–43. See also Henry Kissinger, A World Restored – Europe after Napoleon, (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), 144–174. 143
From this moment until such time as its enemies shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the services of the armies. The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothes and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old lint into linen; the old men shall betake themselves to the public squares in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.408
From that time, wars extended beyond the battlefields to the cities and peoples. The heroic commander of the revolutionary army, Napoleon, gathered a whole political and military power and then initiated a number of organizational and tactical innovations in the French armed forces. Most notably, he restructured the French military into an army corps (the corps d’avant-garde or corps d’armeé) containing a number of divisions, each under a single command (e.g., the cavalry, the artillery, the infantry, and logistics). Each corps was an exemplary small army, able to fight against the enemy until the arrival of supplementary forces. These corps, consisting of approximately 20,000 to 40,000 troops, were able to fight for at least for a day and sometimes longer. Unlike the armies of the ancien régime, which were formed of nobility, Napoleon’s military comprised conscripts, veterans, and citizens who were promoted based on their merit and talent.409
Napoleon’s army was grand, well-organized, and highly professionalized (Grand
Armeé). The division of command and control was an essential feature of the modernized nineteenth century French army. The army was commanded by the
Emperor Napoleon, but it also had an executive general staff, Marshall Alexandre
Berthier. The army corps system enabled the French to place well-trained and
408 James Maxwell Anderson, Daily Life during the Revolution, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2007), 205. 409 Jean-Paul Bertaud, “Napoleon’s Officers,” Past and Present 112 (1986): 91–111. 144
combined combat arms on the battlefield. The other tactical innovation introduced by
Napoleon was the effective use of offensive warfare, aimed at the destruction of enemy forces through a decisive and climatic battle. Napoleon continued to use the military tactics of the revolutionary period, but in a more organized manner. The strategic combination of battle and maneuver in the field made the French army more flexible and mobile. Napoleonic warfare’s center of gravity was the opponent’s field army. The quick and decisive defeat of the enemy’s field army—through use of offensive action and maneuvers like la maneuver sur les derrieres (indirect approach), central position, and strategic penetration—enabled success on the battlefield.410 La maneuver sur les derrieres included not only attacking the enemy’s rear and flanks by concealed forces but also cutting its lines of communications, as in the Battle of Jena of 1806 (Auerstädt). The central position was used against a number of allied enemy armies. The French forces concentrated on enemy forces separately; once one of the enemy’s armies was decisively defeated, the French would turn to the other army. The military’s strategic penetration included the seizure of cities after the defeat of the enemy’s defense, used as bases of operations to pierce deep into the enemy lines.411 In addition to these changes, the army’s morale and its belief in Napoleon as the hero of the French (both officer corps and citizens) also played important roles in the successes of the Grand Armeé.412
410Peter J. Dean, “Napoleon as a Military Commander: The Limitations of Genius,” retrieved at http://www.napoleon-series.org/; Susan P. Conner, The Age of Napoleon (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 111–146. See also “Napoleonic Warfare,” The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military 2001, Encyclopedia.com, January 31, 2010, retrieved at http://www.encyclopedia.com/. 411 Dean, “Napoleon as a Military Commander: The Limitations of Genius”; William O’Connor Morris, Napoleon: Warrior and Ruler – And the Military Supremacy of France (London: Putnam’s and Sons, 1893), 25–10, 166–249, and 289–322. 412 John A. Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789-1815,” French Historical Studies 16 (1989): 152–173. See also Owen Connelly, “A Critique of John Lynn’s ‘Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 1789-1815,’” French Historical Studies 16 (1989): 174–179. 145
All those factors enabled the French victories against the allied forces at Austerlitz
(1805), Jena, and Friedland (1807). The quick and decisive French victories, achieved by short campaigns, changed the nature of warfare.413 The French army corps system became “the building block of modern military operations.”414
Throughout the nineteenth century, the major concern of the great European powers was to limit wars and military interventions. While the disastrous effects of the
Napoleonic wars were still fresh, European powers agreed in concerted action against conflicts of common interest. Unilateral military interventions were agreed to be prevented; if a requirement for intervention arose, it was to be carried out by all powers.415 In spite of the careful plans of the Congress of Vienna, the early nineteenth century was characterized by a series of revolts inspired by nationalism or liberalism in countries like Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, some German states and
Poland. These revolts began to spread to Austria, the German states and France.
Borrowing their ideas from the Enlightenment, the liberal thinkers of the 1820s and
1830s, many of whom represented the middle class, wanted a government based on a written constitution that guaranteed the natural rights of the people. In 1830, revolutions swept across Europe, beginning with the abdication of Charles X in
France. Another revolutionary tide followed in 1848. But conservative powers
(Austria and Russia) once again crushed most of the revolutions. Between 1815 and
413Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity in the Nineteenth Century Warfare,” 375–388; Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory: Napoleon’s Military Campaigns (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 91–117. For more on the campaigns of Napoleonic France and its military strategies, see David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (London: Macmillan Publishing, 1965) and David Chandler, On the Napoleonic Wars (London: Stackpole Books, 1994). 414 Robert M. Epstein, “Patterns of Change and Continuity in the Nineteenth Century Warfare,” The Journal of Military History 56 (1992): 377. 415 Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 139–174. 146
1914 apart from revolutionaries the concert powers were faced with wars generated by new issues: “national liberation/state creation, maintain integrity of the sates/empire, national unification/consolidation, ethnic unification/irredenta, protect ethnic and religious confreres, government composition, and national/crown honor.”416 However, the nationalist revolutionary uprisings in the Ottoman territories led to serious disagreements and conflicts among the Great power concert.
3.2.3.3 The Balance of Power
As great powers were linked to each other in the management of European affairs through the Concert, alliance politics was rendered ineffective.417 Although the
Vienna settlement is assumed to rest on the old balance of power, in practice it was a political equilibrium, which required “mutual consensus on norms and rules, respect for law and an overall balance among the various actors in terms of rights, security, status, claims, duties, and satisfactions rather than power.”418 According to Edward
Vose Gulick, this political equilibrium was a coalition equilibrium rather than alliance equilibrium of the eighteenth century.419 The growing acceptance of balance of power as a creation of human contrivance at the beginning of the nineteenth century led to its doctrinal modification. The progressive disintegration of the political equilibrium between and of powers started with the rise of nationalism within and outside of Europe. The deepening ideological divide between the Concert
416 Holsti, Peace War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 139–174. 417 Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 3–150. 418 Gruner, “Was There a Reformed Balance of Power or Cooperative Great Power Hegemony?” 725– 732; Schroeder, “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?” 694–695 and Schroeder, “The 19th Century International System: Changes in the Structure,” 1–26. 419 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1955), 95– 296 and Evan Luard, The Balance of Power- The System of International Relations 1648-1815, (London: Macmillan, 1992). 147
powers and the decreasing level of transparency made the Concert almost obsolete on paper and in practice though it lasted until the construction of Bismarkian alliance politics as of the 1870s.
As noted by Bull, the relations in the international society did not necessarily mean that they were harmonious. In fact, the differences between liberal and conservative
European great powers of the nineteenth century post-Vienna international society led to the creation of Entente Cordiale between France and Britain vis-à-vis the Holy
Alliance of Austria, Prussia and Russia. In 1815, the Tsar proposed a new alliance to be formed among the four allied powers based on religious principles. They agreed to apply the main precepts of the Christian religion like justice, charity and peace both in the internal and external affairs of their states. This alliance was called the
Holy Alliance; only Austria, Prussia and Russia adhered to this alliance.420 Britain refused to join because the essence of the alliance was contradictory to the basic premises of the British constitution. It was even argued that the Holy Alliance was another step of the conservative tyrannical governments of Europe to preserve their rule and suppress liberty. Therefore the Quadruple Alliance played a more significant role than the Holy Alliance in the years following the Congress. The Quadruple
Alliance or the Concert of five great powers took joint action to deal with the international crises.421 The major cause of friction between the great powers was not only the establishment and preservation of European (international) order but also the divergences between liberal and conservative powers on the operation of the Concert
420 Rich, Great Power Diploamcy 1815-1914, 25–26; see also Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna,, 242–259. 421 Rich, Great Power Diploamcy 1815-1914, 25–26; for Concert of Europe, see René Albrecht- Carrié, The Concert of Europe 1815-1914,(New York: Harper Torch Books, 1968). 148
of Europe (the Great Power condominium) and European (international) society.
The increasing distrust and differences of opinion between these powers led each power to opt for its own interests particularly in relation to the Eastern Question.422
3.2.3.4 International Law
Positivist international law replaced the natural law theory of the earlier periods. As the positivist understanding attributed law-making authority to the states important steps were taken in the codification of the law of nations starting with the Treaty of
Paris, 1856. The European states became conscious of forming a geographically and culturally bounded community of nations; accordingly, they defined themselves on the basis of common civilization. Under the supervision of the great powers of
Europe, the London Conference of 1871, the Brussels Conference of 1874, the West
Arcane Conference of 1884 to 1885 and finally The Hague Conferences of 1899 and
1904 led to the institutionalization of norms and principles of international law. 423
3.2.3.5 The Great Powers
Post-Vienna European international society (and order) was instituted on a number of ideas. The Great Powers of Europe agreed that they had to work on a system-based consciousness that was defined as the shared awareness that the future of Europe was
422 Stephen Pierce Hayden Duggan, The Eastern Question—A Study in Diplomacy, (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 82. 423 Amos S. Hershey, “History of the International Law since the Peace of Westphalia,” The American Journal of International Law, 6 (1912): 30–69. 149
a common responsibility and a matter of consensus.424 In Bull’s wording, “a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values” and “conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” formally came into existence.
Prince Klemens von Metternich (Austria), Viscount Robert Castlereagh of (Britain),
Czar Alexander I of Russia and Count Karl Nesselrode, Baron von Hardenberg
(Prussia) and Maurice de Talleyrand (France) were the architects of the nineteenth- century European international society that reflected their mindset and the specifics of this age.
424 Osiander, The States System of Europe 1640-1990, 166–247. 150
Figure 4: Power Exertion of Nineteenth Century International Society
Great Power Concert
European Colonies
Secondary E. Powers
Non-European States (OE – JP- CH) Others - Unequals
151
CHAPTER IV
A HYBRID INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND
EUROPE
4.1 The Analytical and Historical Shortcomings of the ES regarding the
Expansion of European International Society
Buzan and Little suggest that the ES “avoids Eurocentrism, ahistoricism, presentism anarchophilia and statecentrism,”425 prevalent in the study of international systems and societies. The use of predominantly Western sources in the ES conception of system and society, as well as the development of the school’s major arguments regarding non-European states based on classical and partial European writings, on the contrary, makes the ES approach both Eurocentric and ahistorical.
425 Eurocentrism, in the study of international systems and societies, refers to international relations scholars’ focus on the European international system and society as they ignore earlier pre-modern international systems and societies, like the Sumerian states system or the Afro-Eurasian system. Ahistoricism refers to the scholars’ preoccupation with finding general laws applicable from the past to the present. It does not mean ignorance of historical study. Presentism, on the other hand, refers to negligence of the past and emphasis on contemporary history and policy. Anarchophilia is the indisputable acceptance of the anarchic structure of the international system and society. Statecentrism or politicophilia is the prioritization of the military-political sector and relations over other sectors in international systems. For more, see Buzan and Little, “International Systems in World History,” 204- 208 and Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 30. 152
In the classical ES studies, Bull was influenced greatly by the ideas of Wight, while
Watson, following Wight and Bull, was inspired and predisposed by both. The result, as noted by Jacinta O’Hagan, “is distinct, but intertwined” studies given that they are derived from “a similar historical and intellectual framework.”426 There is, therefore, a need to analyze not only Bull but also other members of the school and the roots of their theory-building to grasp the ES’s understanding of international society.
O’Hagan emphasizes the role of Arnold J. Toynbee’s conception of civilization in ES thinking. The personal and intellectual relationship between Wight and Toynbee influenced ES theorizing.427 Wight, like Toynbee, shared the view that a historical approach requires high levels of interpretation and intuition and favored a holistic study of the universe.428 Wight was influenced greatly by Toynbee’s understanding of civilization in his much-debated work, Study of History.429 In some of his studies, he employed not only Toynbean thinking but also his “schematization” as his analytical framework.430
Toynbee used “society” synonymously with “civilization.”431 Similarly, Wight’s conception of a system of states (society) emphasizes the importance of civilization such that it becomes almost identical in usage with civilization. Toynbee was interested in all civilizations: Western Christian, Orthodox Christian (divided into
426 O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 108. 427 Ian Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 11-132; Donald M. MacKinnon, “Power Politics and Religious Faith: The Fifth Martin Wight Memorial Lecture,” British Journal of International Studies, 6 (1980), 1-15. 428 Marnie Hughes-Warrington, Fifty Key Thinkers on History, Second Edition, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 360. 429 Ellie Kedourie, “Religion and Politics: Arnold Toynbee and Martin Wight,” British Journal of International Studies, 5 (1979): 6-14. 430 Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight, 11-132. 431 Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight, 111-112. 153
sub-categories such as Byzantine and Russian), Islamic, Far Eastern (divided into sub-categories such as Chinese and Korean-Japanese), and Hindu, as well as ancient and extinct ones.432 Scott M. Thomas notes that, indeed, “the approach of the English
School was from the beginning concerned about the role of different religions, cultures, and civilizations in international society.”433 Despite this, Wight was concerned predominantly with the Western Christian civilization and the society
(system) of states born out of it. He adopted the view of the priority of Western civilization and Christian culture and values in the formation of the international society.
According to Wight, the Respublica Christiana, with its sense of belonging and differentiation and universalism and fragmentation, has opened the possibility for a secular states-system. Wight assumed that “a states-system will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members,”434 and his understanding led to the conceptualization of an excessively Western society of states rather than an inter-civilizational one.435 As Roger Morgan puts it, “this emphasis on ideas, on culture and on values … was quite fundamental to Wight’s interpretation of the academic discipline to which most of his writings was devoted, that of International
Relations (IR).”436 Accordingly, Wight defined international society as:
432Toynbee enumerates the Hittite, Sumeric, Babylonic, Syriac, Indic, Egyptiac, Sinic, Hellenic, Minoan, Mexic, Yucatec, Mayan, and Andean civilizations, along with the five major civilizations that he claimed to have extended to the twentieth century. See Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History—Abridgement of Volumes I-VI by D.C. Somervell, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 1-36. 433 Scott M. Thomas, “Faith, History and Martin Wight: The Role of Religion in the Historical Sociology of the English School of International Relations,” International Affairs, 77 (2001): 906. 434 Wight, Systems of States, 33. 435 O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 108. 436 Roger Morgan, “A European ‘Society of States’—but Only States of Mind?” International Affairs 76 (2000): 559. 154
Habitual intercourse of independent communities, beginning in the Christendom of Western Europe and gradually extending throughout the world. It is manifest in the diplomatic system; in the conscious maintenance of a balance of power to preserve the independence of the member communities; in the regular operations of international law, whose binding force is accepted over a wide though politically unimportant range of subjects; in economic, social and technical interdependence and the functional international institutions established latterly to regulate it. All these presuppose an international social consciousness, a worldwide community sentiment. 437
Successive ES scholars, though agreeing that the global international society is a combination of various civilizations and cultures, still prioritized the European—
Western—civilization over others.438 Watson, building on Wight’s and Bull’s studies, carried out in-depth research into pre-modern international systems and societies. Based on eleven case studies, he also noted the role played by shared culture and civilization in the development of international societies. In the majority of Watson’s case studies, naturally shared or imperially enforced culture appeared to be the stimulating and homogenizing factor among units.439 Hall noted that Bull’s addition of “common values” to his definition of international society points intrinsically to an underlying “common culture or civilization.”440 Despite having an instrumentalist, functional, and pluralist (Gesellschaft) view of international society as a “practical association,” Bull’s emphasis reiterates the role of culture. Cultural and civilizational homogeneity appears to be an important factor in the constitution of international society. It should, however, be noted that, again, the functional character of culture and civilization has been essential in Bull’s theorizing. For Bull, common culture and civilization are important because they enhance the normative
437 Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight, 123. 438 O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 108. 439 Watson, The Evolution of International Society. 440 Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wight, 111-112. 155
cohesion of international society through the facilitation of communication and consensus among member states.441
Culture has three meanings for Bull. First, it is “a society’s basic system of values, the premises from which its thoughts and actions derive,” suggesting, as usually understood in the ES literature, the common codes of behavior, norms, values and understandings.”442 Second, he refers to a broader culture—intellectual and moral values that are shared across societies as a result of common religious and civilizational progress.443 Bull’s third meaning entails a “diplomatic culture,”444 defined as “the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives of states.”445 As noted by James Der Derian and O’Hagan, international political culture is separate from the diplomatic culture.446
International political culture is a synthesis of a common intellectual and moral culture. According to Bull, “common intellectual culture such as a common language, a common philosophical or epistemological outlook, a common literary or artistic tradition” facilitates communication and interaction between the member states. The common moral culture based on “common values—such as a common religion or a common code”—reinforces the sense of common interests, which unites
441 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 3, 16, 317. 442 Hedley Bull, “The European International Order,” in Hedley Bull on International Society, eds. Alderson and Hurrell, 175-200. Also cited in O’Hagan, “The Question of Culture,” 211; James Der Derian, “Hedley Bull and the Idea of Diplomatic Culture,” in International Society After the Cold War, eds. Fawn and Larkins, 1996, 88. 443 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 316. 444 For more, see James Der Derian, On Diplomacy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 30-43. 445 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 316; also cited in O’Hagan, “The Question of Culture,” 211. 446 Bull, “The European International Order,” 175-200; also cited in O’Hagan, “The Question of Culture,” 211. 156
states by a sense of shared responsibility and obligation.447 Diplomatic culture, on the other hand, as fashioned in Bull’s and later in R. J. Vincent’s writings, is simply an
“elitist manifestation of this international political culture.”448 These three meanings of culture are formulated concentrically. The diplomatic culture lies at the inner core, the mid-circle comprises the international political culture, and the outer circle represents the broader cosmopolitan culture shared by all individuals within the world society.449 Further evolution and development of a cosmopolitan culture and consensus between Western and non-Western states is deemed to be essential for the cohesion and continuity of the international society. Otherwise, the threat of decadence and dissolution looms over the international society.450
O’Hagan argues that the ES understanding of culture “implies that the formation of international societies have been intra- rather than inter-civilizational processes, occurring within rather than between civilizations.”451 As noted in Chapter 2, according to the classical ES view, starting with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) until the Congress of Vienna (1815), the European powers constructed an international system and society based on shared diplomatic culture and international law. European international society was formed initially among the European states and their colonies sharing the same culture. This society later became multicultural
447 Bull, “The European International Order,” 175-200; also cited in O’Hagan, “The Question of Culture,” 211. 448 Der Derian, “Hedley Bull and the Idea of Diplomatic Culture,” 91. For R. J. Vincent’s view on culture, see R.J. Vincent, “World Society and World Culture,” Paper presented at the Seminar on World Society, 11 August 1975, ANU, in Hedley Bull’s collected papers at Nuffield College, cited in Der Derian, “Hedley Bull and the Idea of Diplomatic Culture,” 90. 449 Der Derian, “Hedley Bull and the Idea of Diplomatic Culture,” 88. 450 O’Hagan, “The Question of Culture,” 211. 451 O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 114. 157
and inter-civilizational with the admission of non-Christian and non-Western states one after another: the Ottoman Empire, Japan, and China.452
In these studies, the expansion of the international society and diffusion of its values, as noted by Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, presented “as a one-way process whereby the core, i.e. the areas where international society is most strongly embedded (Europe and the West), has influenced the periphery, i.e. the areas where international society is being introduced.”453 The ES scholars assume inherently that the core of the international society formed by the industrialized states of Europe is the most civilized and modernized. They also agree that the export of the European international system and society has led to humankind’s overall progress, as it enabled the construction of contemporary international society on the basis of
Western values.454
Buzan argues that the move from cultural homogeneity to heterogeneity led inevitably to the transition of international society from being “predominantly a
Gemeinschaft to being a Gesellschaft.”455 The inter-civilizational dimension and cultural plurality differentiate the global international society from earlier ones and thus give it a distinction.456 Neumann notes, however, that the ES conception led implicitly to a racially white society of states, though it is not pronounced explicitly
452 O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 114-115. 453 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, “The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society,” Review of International Studies 17 (1991): 26-44. See also Yannis A. Stivachtis, “The Politics of Power and Identity in the European-Turkish Relations”, A Talk Given at the Twomey Auditorium,” University of Central Missouri, April 10, 2008, http://filebox.vt.edu/users/afusilie/Stivac.pdf. 454 O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 117-120. 455 Buzan, cited in O’Hagan, “The Question of Culture,” 215. 456 O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 114-115. 158
in the construction of ES theory.457 Bull’s following analyses prove Neumann’s point:
The old Western-dominated international order was associated with the privileged position of the white race: the international society of states was at first exclusively, and even in its last days principally, one of white states; non-white peoples everywhere, whether as minority communities within these white states, as majority communities ruled by minorities of whites, or as independent peoples dominated by white powers, suffered the stigma of inferior status.458
With the important partial exception of Japan, those racially and culturally non-European states that enjoyed formal independence labored under the stigma of inferior status: unequal treaties, extraterritorial jurisdiction, denial of racial equality.459
O’Hagan suggests that the ES scholars’ emphasis in their conceptions of civilization, race, and religion, in particular, and the West in general, is used to define the boundary of the society of states even after its global expansion.460 Edward Keene challenges this argument. He argues that, on the contrary, the relations between
European and non-European states cannot be clarified on the basis of boundaries even in the nineteenth century, when the distinction between civilized and uncivilized was supposed to be evident. He notes that the non-clarity of the system and society distinction was related to the vagueness of geographical and cultural boundaries existing at the time. As noted above, nineteenth-century international society comprised states differing in size and power—political and economic
457 See Neumann, Uses of the Other; also cited in O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 117-120. 458 Hedley Bull, “The Revolt against the West,” in The Expansion of International Society, eds. Bull and Watson, 1984, 221; also cited in O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 119. 459 Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” in The Expansion of International Society, eds. Bull and Watson, 1984, 125; also cited in O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 119. 460 O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, 108. 159
capacities. European great powers, their colonies, mid- and small-sized European states, and non-European powers formed relatively homogenous sub-groups. This led to the building of a concentrically layered, complex network of relations. Keene notes that non-European states, which for a long time were deemed to be the negative other of Europe, like the Ottomans were, had, at times, a higher standing than that of the middle and small European powers in the practice of the great powers. He argues, therefore, for a stratified analysis of international society.461
He adds further that a dichotomy of insiders and outsiders based on the analytical distinction of system and society focusing on the processes through which non-
European states adapted European standards is not explanatory when it comes to those states that did not have legal personality or rights and were not powerful enough to resist European expansion, such as the smaller states in the Americas,
Africa, or Asia.462 By focusing on the empirical and historical data, Keene argues in favor of the revision and reinterpretation of the nineteenth-century expansion of international society on the basis of the two axes of stratification: material and prestige inequality.463 The need for revision of the ES approach to the expansion of international society is also reiterated by fourth-generation scholars. Buzan and Little are currently reassessing and reconstituting the framework used by Bull and Watson and revising the established classical ES account.464
461 Edward Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society in the Nineteenth Century,,” 2008. Unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2008—cited with special permission of the author, retrieved at http://www.apsanet.org/. 462 Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society in the Nineteenth Century”. 463 Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society in the Nineteenth Century”. 464 See Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “The Historical Expansion of International Society,” Unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA 50th Annual Convention in New York, 2009, cited with special permission of the authors, retrieved at http://www.isanet.org/, forthcoming in the English School section of the ISA compendium. 160
The ES analysis of the expansion of European international society becomes problematic, based on the assumption that the European international society generated the global international society. This kind of argument, according to the critics, ignores three major ongoing processes. First, it rules out the role of imperialism and colonialism in the expansion of international society. Colonialism and the standards of civilization, according to Keene, present a dualistic conception of international society, as they are used to justify a different modus operandi in non-
European territories, such as intervention.465 European expansion (imperialism and later colonialism) made the rules and institutions of Europe known to all regions of the world. Enforcement of European standards worldwide was realized during the expansion of European international society in the late nineteenth century, and the standards were regarded as criteria to be fulfilled. The standards played an important role in determining which state would be included or excluded within the civilized
European international society. They provided the pretext for European imperialist global expansion and interference in non-European states' affairs. Europeans insisted on the maintenance of unequal treaties, capitulations, and extraterritorial provisions until the non-European states conformed to the standards.
Second, it offers a functionalist and determinist conception of socialization. In order to qualify for the protection of the norms and institutions of European international society, non-European states were required to adopt the “standards of civilization.”
Gerritt W. Gong argues that even those states that did not want to be a part of the
465 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society. 161
international society complied with these modes of international conduct and behavior.466
Figure 5: Classical ES View of the Nineteenth-Century International Arena467
European International Society
Global International System
Gong defined these standards based on the writings of leading late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century international lawyers, such as James Lorimer, describing states as civilized and non-civilized.468 Lorimer divided the world into three categories: civilized, barbaric, and savage. These categorizations also led to a corresponding classification of the international recognition of states as plenary political, partial political, and natural. Varied forms of recognition led to the hierarchical stratification within international society, as these correspondingly
466 Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization,’, 3-53. 467 Both Figures 3.1 and 3.2 taken from Figure 4.11—Two contrasting ES views of the nineteenth century international arena, in Little, “History, Theory and Methodological Pluralism,” 96. 468 James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations—A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, (Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2005). 162
determined the states, rights, and duties of states.469 The standards, according to
Gong, were born and reflected in “the liberal European civilization” and “in the mores of Christendom.”470
Figure 6: Keene’s View of the Nineteenth-Century International Arena
European International Order
Non-European International Order
Based on a Judeo-Christian background, Gong enumerates five standards of civilization:
469 Mark Mazower, “An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century,” International Affairs, 82 (2006): 555. See also Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations. 470 Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization,’14-15. 163
A civilized state guarantees basic rights, i.e. life, dignity and property; freedom of travel, commerce and religion, especially that of foreign nationals and minorities. A civilized state exists as an organized political bureaucracy with some efficiency in running the state machinery and with some capacity to organize for self-defense. A civilized state adheres to generally accepted international law, including the laws of war; it also maintains a domestic system of courts, codes, and published laws, which guarantee legal justice for all within its jurisdiction, foreigners and native citizens alike. A civilized state fulfils the obligations of the international system by maintaining adequate and permanent avenues for diplomatic exchange and communication. A civilized state, by and large, conforms to the accepted norms and practices of the civilized international society; e.g. polygamy and slavery were considered uncivilized and, therefore, unacceptable. 471
In a functionalist-determinist socialization process, those states willing to be a part of the society of states are socialized to conform to the normative societal rules and standards. The constitutive members of the society of states setting the standards also acted as role models and took on the role of civilizers. States internalizing the
European ways and sharing common interests in maintaining the primary institutions are deemed to have socialized successfully. Once they are legally recognized as equals by the European powers, they were regarded as members of international society. Such structuralist accounts fail to provide in-depth understanding of the non-
European states’ perspectives and reasons for adapting to these standards, as it gives only the picture from a European perspective.472 Shogo Suzuki argues that the ES scholars influenced by the modernization theory, which was trendy in the 1960s and
1970s, developed this overly structuralist socialization understanding.473
471 Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization,’ 14-15. 472 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 12-14. 473 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 14-17. 164
Figure 7: Socialization into European International Society (T. Parson’s The
Social System model, adapted to the classical ES arguments by Shogo Suzuki)474
The Civilized States Outcome
Role model for Internalization of the emulation; norms of international controller of Socialization The uncivilized society; adoption of deviance; non-European the institutions of distributor of states international society; rewards for membership in compliance international society (i.e., recognition of civilized status) and membership in international society
Suzuki, departing from his case studies of China and Japan, suggests a process and agent-oriented approach to socialization of non-European states to European standards.475 Building on Long and Hadden’s model, he proposes the end result of socialization, described as “the process of creating and incorporating new members of a group from a pool of newcomers, carried out by members and their allies,”476 remains open-ended. This is related to the fact that, though the novice may be deemed to be successful in the socialization process, it may not replicate the accepted forms and patterns of behavior or may interpret these differently.477
474 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 13-15. 475 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 28-32 and Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 39-49. 476 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 42. Also cited in Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 29. 477 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 28-32. See also Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 39-49. 165
As suggested by Long and Hadden, three factors play an important role in the development of common understandings and in the socialization process: knowledge; competence and skill; and commitment. Knowledge is the recognition and awareness of the social world and its social and cultural standards. It is essential for “social reproduction.”478 Self-consciousness enables “mental readiness to use them as needed.”479 Competence and skill is the novice’s ability and skill to reproduce and comply with the standards. This is the stage of practice with the rules and standards, and failure results in sanctions.480 The final stage is the commitment that is the novice’s full recognition and acceptance of these standards as legitimate and acceptance of its moral responsibility to uphold them.481
Three drivers of socialization determine whether a state is socialized or not: adaptation, strategic learning, and emulative learning.482 Adaptation is the level where the ruling elite simply adapt to the changes taking place within its social– political environment. It is a response to ease the external and systemic pressures. To this end, institutional changes and reforms are carried out. There is, however, no change of identity or interest.483 Strategic learning is a deeper and broader level of socialization whereby a state knows about the social rules and standards of the international society and thus puts them into practice in its relations with other states.
478 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 42-43. Also cited in Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 30-31. 479 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 42-43. Also cited in Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 30-31. 480 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 42-43. Also cited in Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 30-31. 481 Long and Hadden, “A Reconception of Socialization,” 42-44. Also cited in Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 30-31. 482 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 31. 483 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 31. 166
It gains skill and competence.484 Emulative learning, on the other hand, is the stage of complete convergence whereby a state’s identity and interests are bound with those of the international society and extensive institutional changes are initiated.
The norms, rules, laws, and codes of behavior are accepted as legitimate and thus internalized.485
Figure 8: Suzuki’s Stages of Socialization Built on Long and Hadden’s Model486
Adaptation
Strategic Learning
Rejection Acceptance
Emulative Learning
Third, as suggested by Neumann and Welsh, the ES omits the influence and effect of the non-European polities’ socialization on the civilizer states and on the structure of the society.487 Neumann and Welsh argue that the European international society was constructed on “a deeper consensus and cultural logic of us and them.” The European powers shared a collective identity, built on the definition of the European other. The conventional and classical ES account neglects this functional role of the other in deepening and homogenizing the European international society.488
484 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 31. 485 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 31-32. 486 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 31. 487 Neumann and Welsh, “The Other in European Self-Definition,” 26-44. 488 Neumann and Welsh, “The Other in European Self-Definition,” 26-44. 167
Indeed, as the main argument of this dissertation suggests that the growing interactions between European and non-European states became more intensive, extensive, and dense, there has been a separation of European international society from the rest. Meanwhile, the deepening of the European sense of common identity and European nationalism led to further homogenization and cohesiveness of
European society.489 Europe came to be viewed as a “society of nations and states, each of which has its laws, its customs, and its maxims, but which it cannot put in execution without observing a great deal of delicacy towards the rest of the society.”490 The inner core of the international society formed by the European states moved toward solidarism and cultural unity within European borders. Beyond the boundaries of Europe, there was a different path of development born out of
European and non-European interactions. It is this outer facet that this study defines as the ‘hybrid international society.’ This society is multicultural and inter- civilizational, as it was built on other regional international systems/societies. There were a number of structures built upon elaborate civilizations, with distinctive religions, different systems of governance, different types of law, and different conceptions of the world and ways of conducting relations, such as Islamic and
Asian, which can be described as regional international systems/societies.491 The relations between the members of these different international systems/societies and those of the European international society led to the construction of the hybrid international society. Europeans in contact with other international systems/societies modified the rules and institutions of the developing European international society.
489 M.S. Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713-1783, Third Edition (London: Longman, 1961), 265; E. Lipson, Europe in the Nineteenth Century, Third Edition (London: Black, 1928), 247. 490 Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, 11. 491See Bull and Watson eds., The Expansion of International Society, and Watson, The Evolution of International Society of International Society. 168
The evolution of European society and its so-called expansion happened simultaneously, affecting each other mutually.
4.2 The Historical and Theoretical Study of the Ottoman Empire and Europe from System to Society
The Ottomans were Turcomans from Central Asia stationed on the northwestern border of the Anatolian Selçuk Empire at Bilecik in Söğüt (Bithynia) in proximity to
Byzantium.492 Compared with the other Anatolian beyliks (principalities), the
Ottomans had certain advantages. According to Rudi Paul Lindner, their geographical proximity to the weakened Byzantine Empire, early move from nomadic to sedentary warfare, and capability of developing resources in Europe led to the quick rise of the Ottomans among the beyliks.493
492 The primary sources and information with regard to early Ottoman history are still debated, since early chroniclers such as Aşıkpaşazade, writing in a romantic folk style, give information with periodic intervals for a newly translated version of the original book. See “Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanoğulları’nın Tarihi [History of Ottomans],” cited in Rudi Paul Lindner, “Anatolia, 1300-1451,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, 1—Byzantium to Turkey 1071-1453, ed. Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 104-106. For the origins and the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, see Carter Vaughn Findley, The Turks in World History, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 56-132; Herbert Adams Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire—A History of the Osmanlis up to the Death of Beyazid I, 1300-1403, (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 11-53, 263-276; Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire 1300-1481, (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1990), 15-18; Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries—The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, (New York: Morrow Quill, 1977), 23-43; Carl Max Kortepeter, The Ottoman Turks: Nomad Kingdom to World Empire, (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1991), 1-40; Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluşu [The Origins of the Ottoman State], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), originally published as Les origines de I'Empire Ottoman, (Paris, 1935); Metin Kunt, Suraiya Faroqhi, Hüseyin G. Yurdaydın and Ayla Ödekan, Türkiye Tarihi 2—Osmanlı Devleti 1300-1600 [The History of Turkey 2—The Ottoman State 1300-1600], ed. Sina Akşin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi 2002), 23-45; Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey—Empire of the Gazis—The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808, 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Andrina Stiles, The Ottoman Empire 1450-1700, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 3-16; Wayne S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its Record and Legacy, (Huntington, New York: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1979), 9-21. 493 Lindner, “Anatolia, 1300-1451,” 107. 169
The Ottoman beylik, by the end of the thirteenth century, had already been “a major imperial power reaching as far as the Danube in the north and Euphrates in the east.”494 After defeating Byzantine forces at the battle of Baphaeon in 1301, Osman
Gazi “the eponymous founder”495 of the House of Osman, from whom the Empire takes the name “Ottoman,” targeted the northwestern cities of Brusa, Nicae, and
Nicomedia. The acquisition of these cities by his son Orhan increased the prestige of the Ottomans among the Anatolian beyliks. The Ottomans not only extended their borders but also increased their population and military power with new territories and allies. Two events played an important role in the beylik’s opening to Europe and its move toward becoming an empire. The first was the acquisition of the Karasi beylik,496 located in Marmara on the Aegean coast of Anatolia. The second was the
Ottoman political support and military aid to Ioannes VI Cantacuzenus—the pretender to the Byzantine Emperor’s throne—against another Byzantine royal house, the Palaeologus (or Palaeologi) in the imperial civil war.497
The Ottoman forces aiding Cantacuzenus established themselves at Gallipoli on the northern coast of the Dardanelles under the command of Orhan’s son, General
Süleyman. This made the Ottoman passage into the Balkans easier. The unexpected death of Süleyman left the command of the Ottoman forces to his brother, Murat I, who established Ottoman rule in Anatolia by defeating the beylik of Karaman and then moved his forces further into Thrace, taking hold of Adrinople. Thereafter, one
494 İnalcık, Turkey and Europe, 43-50. 495 Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 4. 496 Elizabeth A. Zachariadou; “The Emirate of Karasi and that of the Ottomans: Two Rival States,” in The Ottoman Emirate 1300-1389, ed. E.A. Zachariadou (Retymnon, 1993), 225-236, cited in Lindner, “Anatolia, 1300-1451,” 2009, 110. 497 Radi Dikici, Şu Bizim Bizans [Our Byzantium], (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2007), 413-424. 170
by one, major Balkan cities, such as Serres, Sofia, Nish, and Salonika, fell to
Ottoman control. Once it was understood that the Ottoman advance could not be prevented, particularly after the defeat of the Serbian forces in 1371, they were considered to be a serious threat to Christian Europe. Ottoman forces won decisive battles at Nicropolis, Varna, Constantinople, Belgrade, Athens, Morea, Negropont, and Otranto. By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ottomans, unifying the majority of the beyliks under their rule, established themselves firmly in Anatolia.
They also controlled southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, either through conquest/use of force, marriage diplomacy, or alliance-boundary treaties.
The House of Osman was recognized as a rising imperial power and dynasty.
The Ottoman Empire, with its Central Asian roots, Altaic-Uralic language, and
Islamic heritage differed from European states and, thus, were considered to be the principal “other” of Europe.498 This does not, however, mean that the Ottomans were the inferior and/or uncivilized other of Europe, as has often been depicted in Western historical and contemporary studies. Under the influence of Renaissance humanist thinking, the view of the Ottomans was improved slightly, but still they were depicted as the enemies of Christianity.’499 This trend continued in the following centuries.
498 Neumann, Uses of the Other; Bisaha, Creating East and West; Çırakman, From the ‘Terror’ of the World to the ‘Sick Man’ of Europe; Soykut ed., Historical Image of the Turk in Europe. 499 Bisaha, Creating East and West, 175. For more on the role of the image of the Turk in Ottoman- European relations, see Çırakman, From the ‘Terror of the World to the ‘Sick Man of Europe’; Neumann, Uses of the Other; Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, “Contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the Construction of Modern Europe” (Master’s diss., Middle East Technical University, 2005). 171
The majority of the studies analyzing Ottoman policies against the non-Muslim world are based on two interrelated definitions regarding the nature of the Ottoman state: the Islamic (or the shari-a) state and the ghazi state.500 The factors that led to the transformation of a small principality on the peripheral borders of an empire to a significant great power and world empire threatening Europe naturally led to heated and stimulating scholarly debates. The debate on the origins, nature, and institutional formation of the Ottoman state still continues. Some, following Herbert A. Gibbons, argue that it was a continuation of the Byzantine Empire. Gibbons, writing at the beginning of the twenty-first century during the turbulent days of the World War I found it unlikely that Turks who for a long time had been depicted as the exact opposite of Europe and uncivilized could have established such a complex and efficient state. He posited the idea that the Ottoman state was built on the foundation of Byzantine Empire was reinforced and developed further as a result of the creative force of Christian and European converts both in the army and the state apparatus.501
Others, based on Mehmed Fuad Köprülü’s study, argue that it was a completely
Turkic structure. Writing in the early Republican era, Köprülü argued that the
500 The Ghazi thesis was propounded by Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1965). Studies by J.C. Hurewitz, Bernard Lewis, M.S. Anderson, and Thomas Naff basically support the view of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic state. See J.C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System,” Middle East Journal 15 (1961): 145-146; Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), 30-32; M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919, (London and New York: Longman, 1993), 71; Thomas Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789- 1809,” Journal of American Oriental Society, 83 (1963): 314; Thomas Naff, “Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns and Trends,” in Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, eds. T. Naff and R. Owen (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977) 93, 97. Studies by some Turkish authors also have adopted this view; see, for example, Ercüment Kuran, Avrupa’da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri, 1793-1821 [The Establishment of the Ottoman Resident Embassies in Europe and the Political Activities of the First Ambassadors, 1793-1821], (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1988), 10-11; Halil İnalcık, “The Rise of the Ottoman Empire,” in A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730, ed. M.A. Cook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 10-53. 501 Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, 11-53, and 263-276. 172
Ottoman state should be studied with respect to “the social morphology, cultural traditions, and institutional structures of Anatolian Turks in general and of the late- thirteenth-century frontiers in particular.”502
The most common and accepted thesis is that of Paul Wittek, whose ghazi/Islamic thesis suggests that the Ottoman State had a strong Islamic ideological basis.503
Wittek, on the other hand, though critical of Gibbons, like Köprülü, argued that it was not the Central Asian–Turkic “tribal factor,” as suggested by Köprülü but, rather, the ghazi mentality that was the driving force behind the Ottomans’ successful rise.504 The argument that the Ottoman state was an exclusively Islamic state established by the warriors of the faith (ghazis) presents only one aspect of the
Empire. It suggests that the Ottomans divided the world into realms of dâr al-
Islam505 and dâr al-harb506 and, hence, designed its policies accordingly. It is often claimed that the imperial policy of the ghazis was to spread and expand the lands of
Islam through jihad/ghaza (gaza)—conquest in the abode of those deemed to be infidels—such as Christendom.507 These Hobbesian arguments508 make war an
502 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), 36. 503 Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire; Köprülü, Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluşu. 504 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 29-59. For original argument, see Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire; Colin Heywood, “A Subterranean History: Paul Wittek (1894-1978) and the Early Ottoman State,” Die Welt des Islams, 38 (1998): 386-405. 505 Dâr al-Islam means the abode of Islam. 506 Dâr al-Harb means the abode of the infidels. 507 Jihad is a war waged by Muslim warriors against the infidels and non-believers in the name of protecting and spread the Islamic faith. 508 English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes defined individuals as living in a state of nature such that each individual is in a fight against the other. Hobbes had a pessimistic view of human nature and believed that individuals are interest-seeking, egoistic creatures who are in conflict with each other almost all the time because of their lust for power and interest. Realists such as Hans Morgenthau applied Hobbes’ views about human nature to their analysis of world politics and argued that international anarchy and war are inevitable in international politics because states are power- and interest-seekers, like individuals are. Neo-realists also defended this analogy between the international system and the Hobbesian state of war. 173
indispensable part of Ottoman policy and present the Ottoman-European relationship as one of perpetual conflict and warfare. In such analyses, there is no room for peaceful relations, diplomatic contacts, or cooperation between the Ottomans and
Europeans.509
In the last decade, Wittek’s thesis received strong criticism. The critics of the ghaza thesis, led by Lindner, argued that a superficial understanding of the Islamic basis of the Empire rules out pragmatism, which is evident in Ottoman statecraft.510
Similarly, Lowry, questioning Wittek’s reading of the early Ottoman sources on ghaza, concludes that the Empire used religion to legitimize booty. He also emphasizes the role of Byzantine and Balkan Christian converts in the expansion and consolidation of Ottoman power.511 Cemal Kafadar, pointing to the problematic nature of such a critique, brings a new dimension to the debate by arguing that the
Ottomans were devout and sincere Muslim ghazis but, at the same time, they were pragmatic rulers. Their religious values did not prevent them from being tolerant toward non-Muslim communities within the Empire’s borders and conciliatory toward those outside of it. They were able to achieve a balance between the contradictory norms of faith and materialism, pragmatism and idealism. The institutionalization and centralization of Ottoman rule was well-thought-out and planned in line with short-, mid-, and long-term targets and interests. The Empire’s
509 Yurdusev ed., Ottoman Diplomacy, 1-2. 510 Rudi Paul Lindner, Ortaçağ Anadolu’sunda Göçebeler ve Osmanlılar [Nomads and Ottomans in the Medieval Anatolia], (Istanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2001). 511 Heath W. Lowry, The Nature of the Early Otoman State, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). The debate on the early Ottoman state and its origins still continues; for a more detailed study, see Oktay Özel and Mehmet Öz, Söğüt’ten Istanbul’a—Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kuruluşu Üzerine Çalışmalar [Söğüt to İstanbul -Studies on the Establishment of the Ottoman State], (Istanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2005) and Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj, Modern Devletin Doğası——16. Yüzyıldan 18. Yüzyıla Osmanlı İmparatorluğu [The Nature of the Modern State—Ottoman Empire in the 16th-18th Centuies], trans. Oktay Özel and Canan Şahin, (Istanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2000). 174
identity was inclusive and based on heterodox features. To quote Kafadar, the
Ottoman state-building was “experimental in reshaping it to the need, much more creative in their bricolage of different traditions, be they Turkic, Islamic, or
Byzantine.”512 Thus, the Ottoman worldview and imperial organization is much more complex than is generally presented or thought.
Similarly, Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman note that “it is a common misconception that the Ottomans were fanatical, both in their religious beliefs and in the sense that they based their decisions upon ideology rather than expediency.”513
Historical and archival sources suggest that the Ottomans were not outsiders or strangers to Europe but were active participants in the European international system and society. Starting from its early days and onward, the Ottomans, in many respects, were not that different from the early modern European dynastic states. Recent studies have confirmed that “the early modern Ottomans and the rest of Europe also shared much—such as the Mediterranean Sea—as seaborne and land-based commercial network, peoples who moved back and forth across the continent and similar visions of their roles in the world.”514 The ambiguity of the borders and frontiers in early modern Europe influenced the relations between states and peoples.
The Ottoman expansion in southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean made contact between civilizations and cultures inevitable. The Ottoman Empire and the European powers “developed new rights and obligations in their dealings with each other, such
512 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 121. 513 Aksan and Goffman eds., The Early Modern Ottomans, 6. For similar arguments in recent studies raised by renowned Ottoman historians, see Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World around It; Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe; İnalcık, Turkey and Europe; Ortaylı, Avrupa ve Biz. 514 Aksan and Goffman eds., The Early Modern Ottomans, 5. 175
as the establishment of permanent ambassadorships and consulships, extraterritoriality, and the so-called capitulatory regime.”515 If interpreted from the
ES approach, the Ottomans moved from beyond having sufficient contact with
Europeans to being placed within the European (thin and thick) international system and engaged at a societal level, and this, moreover, led to the construction of
European international society. Goffman and Aksan, supporting this argument, note that the early modern Ottomans were not “the static and enervated entity often portrayed in western narratives, sluggishly reacting to vigorous European states and societies” but, rather, an energetic and innovative power when compared with fixed and listless Europeans.516 Accordingly, the main thesis of the dissertation suggests that the Ottoman Empire was not only a part of the European international system, with its political, economic, and ideational contribution, but also a constitutive member of a distinct and unique society within the European states.
The Ottomans had an important place in European power politics and, in the majority of historical studies; they were enumerated along with the principal European powers, such as the Hapsburgs and the French. To give an example, Heeren (upon whose study the ES built its analyses) divided the European international system into two sub-regional systems: southern European and northern European. He included the Porte (Ottoman Empire) in the southern European international system, along with the Papacy, France, Spain, England, Austria, and the German Empire, while the
515 Aksan and Goffman eds., The Early Modern Ottomans, 7; Daniel Goffman, “Negotiating with the Renaissance State: The Ottoman Empire and the New Diplomacy,” in The Early Modern Ottomans, eds. Aksan and Goffman, 2007, 59-60; Molly Greene, “The Ottomans in the Mediterranean,” in The Early Modern Ottomans, eds. Aksan and Goffman, 2007, 75-103. See also Palabıyık, “Contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the Construction of Modern Europe” and Yasemin Saner Gönen, “The Integration of the Ottoman Empire into the European States System during the Reign of Sultan Selim III” (Master’s diss., Boğaziçi University, 1991). 516 Aksan and Goffman eds., The Early Modern Ottomans, 7. 176
northern European international system comprised Denmark, Sweden, Poland,
Prussia, and Russia as the principal states.517 The basis of his arguments and geopolitical distinction can be debated, but that is beyond the scope of this study.
What is of particular importance is that the Ottomans were considered to be a participant, and to put it precisely, they were a part of the existing structure in
Europe, whether it is named and conceptualized as a balance of power system, (thin or thick) international system/power political international society, or simply a society of states. This does not necessarily mean that the Ottomans were completely identical in their world outlook or that they converged in all aspects with Europe.
Nonetheless, it does not mean that they were eternal enemies and the diabolical other that had nothing in common, either. Despite its historically and culturally oriented interpretive approach, the ES also neglected the complexity of Ottoman-European relations. By relying on classical and modern Western historiography emphasizing the orthodox Islamic character of the Ottomans, the ES places the Empire within the system and argues that the Ottomans could not achieve the requirements of the
European international society because of Islamic conservatism.
Empirically and historically speaking, the so-called boundary that is argued to have existed between the society and system beyond it is imprecise. Keene, pointing out the non-clarity of the boundaries of international society, suggests that, in practice, some non-European states that were excluded at the ideological level should have been placed within the society of European states. For that reason, he argues that only with a stratified understanding of international society can this ambiguity be
517 Heeren, A Manual of the History. 177
explained.518 Yurdusev, likewise, pointing out the vagueness of the empirical and theoretical contradiction with regard to the status of the Ottoman Empire within international society, argues that “the empire was, I suggest, inside European international society in its coexistence version and outside in the cooperative version.”519 This ambiguity in the ES results from a number of factors.
First, it is related to the structural and functional study of international society: the conceptualization of the system-society distinction, the identification of the system- society relationship, and the definition of the primary institutions. Second, it is a direct result of the ES’s reliance on Western documents and views while neglecting the non-Western ones, particularly with respect to the evolution and expansion of international society. Third, the ES’s historical prioritization of the West and its persistent inclination to equate the idea of international society with the European international society led, inevitably, to the school’s critique for what can be defined in the words of Goffman as “Eurocentric mythologizing.” This, as Goffman puts it, is
“almost axiomatic” in the literature, particularly with respect to Ottoman history.520
According to Goffman, for generations, the understanding of Ottoman-European relations has suffered from an “irresistible temptation to view the globe ‘downward’ from Paris and London.”521 Naturally, the Empire “joins the ranks of the ‘others’— exotic, inexplicable, unchanging and acted upon by the powers of ruling authorities
518 Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society in the Nineteenth Century”. 519 Yurdusev, “The Middle East Encounter with the Expansion of European International Society,” 71. 520 Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, 4. 521 Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, 4-5. Also cited in Little, “The English School and World History,” 58. 178
in Europe.”522 As noted by Little, “it would be surprising if the founding fathers of the English School managed to avoid criticism of this kind.”523 Watson, indeed, accepts the fact that, in the ES literature, the Ottomans were being excluded from the international society based on religious differences; that is, because they were not
Christian.524 It is, therefore, not possible to analyze the wide-ranging, complex, and multilevel interactions between the Ottomans and Europeans spanning from the thirteenth to the twentieth centuries with reductionist systemic approaches or monistic assumptions while neglecting the intersubjective meanings, culture, and societal features. Recent studies based on non-Western archival documents and primary sources enable us to construct a more attuned analysis.525
4.3 Hybrid International Society: A Conceptual and Analytical Modification
New country-based and agent-centered studies to be carried out through the use of a process-based socialization model, as suggested by Suzuki, will definitely complete the incomplete parts of the ES’s historical account of the expansion of international society. It is an important modification of the ES’s functionalist-determinist model of socialization. The socialization of non-European states was a two-way process resulting from both the external pressure of the civilizer states and the internal pressure of the Westernized ruling elites. In essence, the overall ES understanding is based on the “transmission of a common elite culture that provides the adhesive and
522 Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, 4-5. Also cited in Little, “The English School and World History,” 58. 523 Little, “The English School and World History,” 60. 524 Watson, The Evolution of International Society, 216-218. 525 Onuma Yasuaki, “When Was the Law of International Society Born?—An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective,” Journal of the History of International Law, 2 (2000):1-66. 179
lubricant for the establishment of a functioning of international order.”526 However, it leaves out one important point. The expansion of the European international society was not an easy process, and it led to a gradual and mutual transformation of both the
European and non-European states and societies throughout this process. In this way, it is possible to demonstrate different stages and levels of socialization and its varying outcomes.
This modification brings in the agent-structure and meta-theoretical debates to the
ES. As pointed out by Wendt, in order to construct system-level theories, it is essential to analyze actors’ self-constitution in interaction.527 Walter Carlsnaes, likewise, departing from Wendt’s point, argues in favor of a combination of inside
(understanding) and outside (explanation) in analyzing the dynamics of policy change.528 Carlsnaes, opposing the positivist either/or approach, aims “to integrate the explanatory and understanding traditions within social science and to resolve the agency-structure problem tout court.”529 Heiki Patomäki argues that Carlsnaes’s main contribution to the metatheoretical IR debate is his distinction of three explanatory levels:
526 O’Hagan, “The Question of Culture,” 216. 527 Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization, 41 (1987): 335-370. See also Heikki Patomäki, After International Relations—Critical Realism and the (Re)construction of World Politics, (London: Routledge, 2002), 72-78. 528 Walter Carlsnaes, “The Agency Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly, 36 (1992): 245-270; “On Analysing the Dynamics of Foreign Policy Change,” Cooperation and Conflict, 28 (1993): 5-30; “In Lieu of a Conclusion: Compatibility and the Agency- Structure Issue in Foreign Policy Analysis,” in W. Carlsnaes and S. Smith eds. European Foreign Policy—The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe, (London: Sage, 1994), 274-287. See also Patomäki, After International Relations, 72-78. 529 Carlsnaes and Smith eds., European Foreign Policy, 282. 180
Accounts of the “in-order-to” intentions of foreign policy actions; Explanations of why actors have these particular purposes (in terms of “because-of” accounts of the dispositions of actors); and Explanations of the structural environment of actors (both domestic and international) affect the two levels.530
Wendt and Carlsnaes argue that explanation and understanding are not distinct and contradictory modes of inquiry but rather complementary and interdependent.
Indeed, as Patomäki puts it, “explanation presupposes holistic in-depth analysis” while it is “a mode of interpretation and aims at (better) understanding, among many other things.”531 The historical expansion of the European international society requires a holistic analysis combining explanation and understanding. The non-
European primary sources and views are, therefore, essential. Further elaboration of a stratified analysis of international society on Keene’s arguments will enable explanation and understanding of the position and socialization of states and groups that did not have legal personality, such as the indigenous groups in the Americas,
Africa, and Asia Keene’s analysis also displays the dualistic nature of the European international society.
These modifications, however, do not resolve the vagueness of the position of the
Ottoman Empire within the ES understanding or explain the distinctive nature of the
500 years of relationship and encounters between Europeans and Ottomans, who are connected in an outstanding relationship. They both admired and disliked each other.
Their identities are fused with the negative and positive connotations of the other.
530 Heiki Patomäki, “How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations, 2 (1996), 107. 531 Patomäki, After International Relations, 72-78. 181
The military, political, economic, and socio-cultural acculturation of Ottomans and
Europeans, which started in the fourteenth century, continued well into the twentieth century. This inevitably led to move of the relations beyond the system level toward the society level long before 1856 and 1923. In their analyses of the interaction capacity and process in the pre-modern and modern international systems, Buzan and
Little found that military interaction has a high level of interaction capacity. If the operational and technological considerations of wars are taken into account, this is natural. Logistical and geographical limitations imposed on states become determining factors. Long-distance transportation of big armies and providing them with supplies and equipment is not an easy task, even in the twenty-first century, though technological advancement has enabled the long-distance (interregional and global) transportation of forces.532 This is followed by political and economic interactions. The same logic applies to the political sector. Unless states fall into each other’s military sphere, political interactions do not develop, though there are historical exceptions to this rule. In the economic sector, the transportation limits again play an important role.533 The movement of goods, particularly in pre-modern and pre-industrial times, was much more difficult. It should, however, be noted that the economic sector and trade is independent of political or military relations. Long- distance trade was possible even in ancient times among regions that had no political or military contact. The socio-cultural sector has the lowest interaction capacity; transmission of ideas among people is not limited by distance or boundaries.
532 Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 91-96. 533 Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 91-96. 182
Technological innovations in the communication networks naturally increased and accelerated the development of this sector.534
The Ottomans, within this framework, were definitely a part of the European international system. The Ottoman-European military interactions extended over centuries. The Empire fought numerous wars with European powers, transferred
European military industrial innovations, and incorporated them into its warfare.
Between 1532 and 1791, the Ottomans fought thirty-three wars with the Austrian
Hapsburgs, while the Ottoman-Russian wars extended over a period of 47 years, from 1677 to 1918.535 At the political level, it engaged in European balance-of-power politics through a number of alliance treaties and played a role in the development of
European diplomatic practice and consular institutions by receiving European resident missions and recognizing their extraterritorial rights through capitulations.
Though the Empire did not have a resident mission stationed abroad, it continually exchanged representatives with European powers. Between 1384 and 1600, 145
Ottoman envoys were sent to the Republic of Venice for various diplomatic reasons and occasions.536 The Empire was an essential factor in the strategic and political calculations of the major European powers. Trade and commercial relations was another sector in which the Empire was interlocked with Europe. These also led to the development of socio-cultural relations from the very early days of the Empire.
Renowned artists were invited and commissioned by the Sultans. For example,
Gentile Bellini was invited to paint a portrait of Mehmed II. The further expansion of
534 Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, 91-96. 535 M. Orhan Bayrak, Türk Savaş ve Barışları [Turkish Wars and Peace], (Istanbul: Kastaş, 1990), 250. 536 Philip Mansel, Constantinople—City of the World’s Desire, 1453-1924, (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 193. 183
the Ottomans and their greater involvement in European affairs led to a great interest in and anxiety regarding the Turks, who were both appreciated and degraded. Jean
Bodin, writing on the Turks in 1576, says:
The king of the Turks, who rules over a great part of Europe, safeguards the rites of religion as well as any prince in the world. Yet, he constrains no one, but on the contrary permits everyone to live as his conscience dictates. What is more, even in his seraglio at Pera he permits the practice of four diverse religions, that of the Jews, the Christians according to the Roman rite, and according to the Greek rite, and that of Islam. 537
Anthony Nixon, writing on the Turks in 1602, on the other hand, presents a completely different picture:
They are, and have been ever, the most inhumane of all other barbarians. Their manner of living is for the most part uncivil and vicious. For their vices they are all pagans and infidels, sodomites and liars. They are a very scornful people and their pride is so great as it is not possible to be described.538
These controversial views of the Ottomans are expressed in the books, pamphlets, and theoretical plays of these ages. Historical writings dating back to the Middle
Ages, starting with the first study of the Ottoman Empire in the English language, by
Richard Knolles, The Generall Historie of the Turkes (1603),539 were written for
Christian readers presenting Turks as the common, diabolical enemy of Christendom
537 D. Blanks and M. Frassetto eds., Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe,: Perception of Other, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 226, quoted in Jonathan Wright, The Ambassadors—From Ancient Greece to Renaissance Europe, The Men who Introduced the World to Itself ,(Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Inc., 2006), 235. 538 Anthony Nixon, The Three English Brothers, (1602), cited in Wright, The Ambassadors, 235. 539 Richard Knolles, The Generall Historie of the Turkes—From the First Beginning of That Nation to the Rising of the Othoman Familie with All the Notable Expeditions of the Christian Princes against Them, Fifth Edition (London: A. Islip, 1638). Knolles’ chronicle of the Ottomans was reprinted in 1610, 1621, 1631, 1638, 1679, 1687, 1700 (3 vols.), and 1701 (abridged) with additional documents and information. V.J. Parry, Richard Knolles’ History of the Turks, Salih Özbaran ed. (Istanbul: The Economic and Social Foundation of Turkey, 2003). 184
with biblical images and mythical archetypes. As noted by Sıla Şenlen, these writings represent the Christian historiography dominant at the time.540 Knolles’ illustration of the Turks as uncivilized barbarians influenced not only generations of scholars but also the view of the Ottomans among the ruling elites and the public.
The Ottoman military superiority and the helplessness of the Christian European in preventing the Turkish advance in Europe led to the psychological and sociological othering of the Ottomans.
The trade privileges granted by the sultans increased the intensity of the sectoral interactions. The increasing level of military, political, and economic interactions, however, changed the socio-cultural understandings of the other and thus led to a process of acculturation. European diplomats and tradesmen stationed in the Empire acted as agents of mutual acculturation. Starting from the seventeenth century onward, exchanges of diplomats and envoys increased. There was a growing interest on the side of the Ottomans as well. The delegations began to be sent for longer periods of time. Seyahatnâmes (travelogues) written by the Ottoman envoys were highly appreciated by the Sultans. Their views of the European ways, from society to culture and military to technology, increased Ottoman knowledge of Europe. The increasing acculturation between Europeans and Ottomans were fashioned not only
540Sıla Şenlen, “Richard Knolles’ The Generall Historie of the Turkes as a Reflection of Christian Historiography,” OTAM (Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi), 18 (2005): 379-393. See also studies by the same author on representations of the Turk in English drama, “Ottoman Sultans in English Drama Between 1580—1660,” OTAM, 19 (2006): 399- 405 and “Rönesans Dönemi İngiliz Tiyatrosunda Osmanlı Türkleri—Ottoman Turks in the Renaissance English Theatre,” Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, 47 (2007): 131-139. 185
in the field of military or diplomacy but also on more societal and cultural levels such as the Tulip Age (1718-1730).541
The Ottomans, through their part in the balance of power politics, not only influenced the shaping of the European international system but also acted as a part of the pluralist European international society. Despite all negative representations of the Empire, it was considered an actor in the European system and society. The
Empire actively participated in European diplomacy by attending congresses and becoming signatory to important international treaties regulating intra- and extra-
European affairs. The Empire also observed European practices, laws, and standards in its relations and embarked on an extensive modernization program. The Empire, however, was not regarded and treated as an equal by European great powers. To quote Bridge and Bullen:
The only state which did not know its place in the hierarchy of power was the Ottoman Empire. Although it had extensive possessions in the Balkans and although the Treaty of Paris of 1856 formally admitted it to the Concert of Europe, it was never regarded as a European state. There was a general assumption that only Christian states could properly be regarded as members of the European community of nations.542
541 İnalcık, Turkey and Europe, 141-195; Can Erimtan, Ottomans Looking West? The Origins of the Tulip Age and its Development in Modern Turkey, (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008); Dana Saidi ed., Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century, (New York: Tauris, 2008); Fatma Müge Göcek, East Encounters West—France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbır eds., Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World—A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Itzkowitz, (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin, 2007); Günsel Renda, “Europe and the Ottomans,” in Ottoman Civilization, 2 vols., eds. Halil İnalcık and G. Renda (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2002), 1090-1121; Günsel Renda, “The Ottoman Empire and Europe: Cultural Encounters,” in Cultural Contacts in Building a Universal Civilisation: Islamic Contributions, ed. Ekmelledin İhsanoğlu (Istanbul: O.I.C. Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture [IRCICA], 2005), 277-303. 542 Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States System, 3. 186
After 1856, the decreasing control of the Empire both in external and internal affairs and the European perceptional othering made them a de-facto participant of the semi- solidarist international society. The ES’s placement of the Ottoman Empire in the same category with China and Japan, which were geographically and culturally distant and, unlike the Ottomans, unreceptive to the West, leaves out the historical and empirical fact that the relations between the Ottomans and Europeans went well beyond the system level. For centuries, China and Japan strongly resisted Western penetration through denying the right to establish embassies or refusing to grant extraterritorial rights in the conduct of commerce and other affairs until the mid- nineteenth century. They also did not have a condensed and complicated relationship with the Europeans like the Ottomans or play a role in the shaping of the European inter-state system and order. Factually speaking of a complete fusion of the two is not possible, either. Thus, where do the Ottomans stand? Was the Ottoman Empire a member of the European international society? These questions still await a clear answer because the answer is both yes and no. Similar questions can be asked about the position of other non-colonized and non-European states such as China and
Japan.
The other problematic point is the ES argument that the worldwide internalization of
European values and practices forms the basis of contemporary international society.
The worldwide expansion of European international society from the Atlantic to Asia between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries does not necessarily mean that it is globalized. Its norms, values, and laws were translated, adapted, and emulated in
187
different local contexts; in other words, it is “glocalized.”543 Accordingly, European primary institutions acquired new meanings and characteristics. The contemporary international society is a fusion of regional systems and societies, a bricolage built upon the existing structures and civilizations in various parts of the globe. At present, is linked by interactions in the military, political, economic, socio-cultural, and environmental sectors at various levels. Regional international societies and systems continue to exist under it. Despite sharing common interests, values, and institutions, they have different cultural understandings and interpretations. Contemporary studies by ES scholars also have suggested that there are sub-global and sub-regional societies that have distinct and unique institutions not found at the global level.
Taking this and the historical evolution of European-Ottoman relations from fifteenth to twentieth century into consideration, this dissertation suggests the development of a new concept of a ‘hybrid international society,’ an amalgam of civilizations and a symbiosis of systemic and societal features. It evolved simultaneously with the
European international system and society. To define it precisely:
A hybrid international society grows out of the multi-sectoral (military, political, economic, and socio-cultural) interactions of a group of political communities—polities belonging to different regional international systems and societies over a sustained period of time, which do not merely form a system but also, through dialogue, establish common codes of behavior, rules, values, interests, and institutions and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements while retaining and/or modifying their distinctive institutions and practices.
543 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Peter Mandaville, “Glocal Hero: Harry Potter Abroda,” in Harry Potter and International Relations, eds. Daniel H. Nexon and Iver B. Neumann , (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 45-60. 188
In this dissertation, the concept of a hybrid international society is developed to explain the uniqueness of the Ottoman-European relations between 1789 and 1856.
The concept can be elaborated to explain the relations between non-European states and European states in general. To that end, further research is required, specifically in the cases of Japan and China. The international society has evolved empirically throughout the ages. At present, it is still evolving and changing according to the necessities of our time and to the transformations within the states. It is, therefore, essential to revise and reinterpret the basic concepts and premises of the English
School of international relations theory, in line with new empirical and historical information and changes.
189
Figure 9: The Evolution of the Hybrid International Society
European Colonies in Africa and America
Japan China Int. System
Solidarist (Confederative) European International Society (The EU)
Solidarist (Convergence) European International Society
Hybrid International Society Semi-Solidarist European (Cooperative) International Society
Pluralist European (Coexistence) International The Ottoman Society Empire
Power Political European International Society
(Thin Thick European Int. System)
190
CHAPTER V
THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY:
OTTOMAN–EUROPEAN ACCULTURATION
5.1 Ottoman Knowledge, Practice, and Strategic Learning of Primary
International Institutions
Contrary to arguments claiming that the Ottomans disdained European interests, values, and methods of inter-state relations, the historical record reveals that the
Ottomans played a significant role in the formation of the European system and shared European powers’ understandings of those institutions’ operations. The
Ottomans used the concepts of war, balance of power, diplomacy, trade, and treaties
(i.e., international law) as effective policy tools.
191
5.1.1 The Ottoman Empire and War
The Ottoman Empire has been defined by Peter Sugar as “the Near-Perfect Military
Society.”544 The Ottomans were known for being powerful warriors; therefore, their rivals (e.g., the Byzantine rulers or European powers such as France) often joined forces with the Turks. War was an essential feature of the Ottoman rise and expansion. As noted previously, the Ottoman approach to war and the nature of the
Empire were aligned with an Islamic worldview. However, Jihad/ghaza has strong and deep religious connotations, such as the crusades. Hence, basing an analysis of the Ottoman approach to war on the Islamic understanding of Jihad/ghaza is a historical and empirical simplification. The Ottoman wars had deeper causes and more pragmatic purposes. John F. Guilmartin, Jr., notes that “the causes of wars cannot be understood without an appreciation of the institutional context within which they were conceived and waged.”545 Before analyzing the Ottoman conception of war, an overview of the basic institutional and technological aspects of the
Ottoman military power must be provided; this will facilitate a deeper understanding of the Ottoman worldview.
An institutional and ideational analysis of Ottoman military history can be divided into two main periods of study. First is the period, starting with the establishment of the Ottoman beylik in 1299 and finishing with the reforms of the early nineteenth century, known as Nizam-ı Cedid (the New Army). Second is the period covering the
544Peter F. Sugar, “A Near-Perfect Military Society,” in War: A Historical, Political and Social Study, ed. L. L. Farrar (Santa Barbara, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 104. 545John F. Guilmartin, Jr., “Ideology and Conflict: The Wars of the Ottoman Empire, 1453–1606,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18 (1988):721–747. 192
era from 1829 to the dissolution of the Empire at the end of the First World War in
1918. For the purposes of this study, the analysis of the Modern period ends with the
Crimean War of 1853.
5.1.1.1 The Ottoman State: An Institutional Bricolage
The Ottomans claimed to be a World Empire. Accordingly, they did not define their ruling system based on territoriality, nationality, religion, or centrality.546 The
Empire was, as Norman Itkowitz explains, a “multi-ethnic, multi-national, multi- religious, multi-lingual”547 imperial system.548 Despite its pluralistic nature, however, the Ottoman Empire utilized a sophisticated ruling system. Like all imperial structures, the Ottoman system was “a large composite and differentiated polity linked to a central power by a variety of direct and indirect relations, where the center exercises political control through hierarchical and quasi-monopolistic relations over groups ethnically different from itself.”549 Karen Barkey defines the
Ottoman governance as “a uniquely crafted hybrid civilization” that comprised various traditions.550
546A. Nuri Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” in Ottoman Diplomacy, ed. Yurdusev, 2004, 10–13. 547Norman Itzkowitz, “The Problem of Perceptions,” in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and Middle East, ed. L. C. Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 35. 548Itzkowitz, “The Problem of Perceptions,” 35. 549Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference—The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 9. For more detailed analysis of the basis of the Ottoman state see, Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire – The Classical Age 1300-1600, (London A. Phoenix, 1997). 550 Barkey, Empire of Difference, 7–8. For more on the nature of the Early Ottoman State, see Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 112–168; Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, 55–94, 114–143; and Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks- An Introductory History to 1923, (London and New York: Longman, 1997), 101–144. 193
The Ottoman administration was an “institutional bricolage,” which Barkey explains according to Stark and Bruszt’s definition;551 the Ottomans did not build their system of governance “from scratch but through reworking of the institutional materials at hand.”552 The Empire was constructed pragmatically, in line with the existing structures, environments, territories, and circumstances. The ruling élite built a
“distinctly productive, and purposefully diverse but nevertheless homogeneous and unifying culture. That is, while accepting difference, they built their governance over similarities based on institutional structures and the shared understanding these generated.”553 The Ottoman state was based on Turkic (Anatolian Seljuk and
Central-Asian), Islamic, and European (Byzantine/Southeastern) structures.
According to Goffman, the Empire was a “Euro-Ottoman symbiosis.”554 Despite the
Empire’s pluralist nature, however, the Empire’s imperial system was also based on
Islamic and Ghazi features. According to İnalcık and Itkowitz, those features were the “foundation stones of the Empire.”555 The Sultans created an ideal type of centralist monarchy, based on a cultural and religious plurality.
Barkey enumerates three conditions that maintain the longevity of imperial structures: legitimization through a supranational (i.e., religious) ideology or lineage; application of several policies, ranging from toleration to assimilation; and utilization of “divide and conquer” strategies that keep the peripheral élite fragmented horizontally at the social and societal level, while maintaining their vertical
551Barkey, Empire of Difference, 7–8. 552 Barkey, Empire of Difference, 7–8. 553Barkey, Empire of Difference, 7–8. 554Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, 9. 555See İnalcık, “The Rise of the Ottoman Empire,” 31; and Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, 6 and 11. 194
integration with the center.556 In order to establish and legitimize their rule over multiethnic and multireligious groups and in order to maximize the longevity of their
Empire, the Sultans and the imperial ruling élite simultaneously implemented these conditions in their administrations.
Islam, both in the early days of the beylik and later in the Empire, was used as the major ideological legitimizing force in the Empire. In this sense, the Empire was no different from the Byzantine, Hapsburg, or Romanov empires. To quote Barkey,
“There is no doubt that Islam was important in the ‘identity’ of empire, but more as a self-consciously constructed and strategically displayed one, rather than an overriding distinctiveness that made the Ottomans clearly different than others.”557
Further, Barkey argues, it would be incorrect to define the identity or institutionalization of the Empire as Islamic. Islam was neither ideologically nor institutionally dominant within the structure of the Empire, as suggested by
Eurocentric-Orientalist accounts. Ottomans separated “religion as an institution and religion as a faith”;558 as an institution, it was considered to be supportive of the administration and as a faith, it regulated the people’s everyday practice. Islam acted as a unifying and legitimizing force for the Empire and the dynastic rule of the House of Osman, but still, “it was subordinated to the raison d’état.”559 Islamic Shari-a rules were applied effectively throughout the Empire. The Empire’s Islamic and
556Barkey, Empire of Difference, 13. 557Barkey, Empire of Difference, 104-108. 558Barkey, Empire of Difference, 105. 559Barkey, Empire of Difference, 105. See also Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in Ataturk: Founder of a Modern State, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1981), 192 –195; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Islam in the Ottoman Empire: A Sociological Framework for a New Interpretation,” International Journal of Turkish Studies, 8 (2003):183–197. 195
Ghazi bases and, later, the Caliphate560 were used by Ottoman statesmen as tools of both internal and external policy.
The Empire did not apply a policy of forceful conversion or Islamization in the conquered lands. Quite the opposite; Ottoman Sultans let their local subjects freely practice their own religions and maintain their national identities, cultures, languages, and traditions. The Ottoman “policy of accommodation” (known as istimalet), which started as early as the inception of the beylik under Osman I, was an important factor in providing the Ottomans with loyal and trustworthy Christian allies. To quote Lowry, the Ottomans’ “latitudinarian attitude vis-à-vis Islam worked well for the state in its formative period because it allowed the incorporation of both unconverted Balkan Christians of varying backgrounds, as well as converts from
Orthodox Christianity to Islam, into the emerging Ottoman hierarchy.”561 In conquered lands, local Christians were given statuses and rights that had not been granted by previous Byzantine or local rulers.562 İstimalet was basically the integration of the local élites into the Ottoman ruling system. For example, in return for some autonomy, intermediaries such as the Emirs of Hijaz and Yemen and the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia complied and collaborated with the center.
This enabled the growth of Ottoman power.563
560For use of the Caliphate as a special tool of Ottoman diplomacy, see Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700–1922, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81–85; For a detailed analysis of the politicization of Islam in the late Ottoman State and Pan-Islam policy of the Abdülhamid II, see Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam – Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 208–223 and 241–276. 561Heath W. Lowry, The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans 1350–1550— The Conquest, Settlement and Infrastructural Development of Northern Greece, (Istanbul: Bahçeşehir University Publications, 2008), 7. 562Barkey, Empire of Difference, 51. 563Barkey, Empire of Difference, 51. 196
İstimalet was supported by the millet system, which was an indirect administrative formation through which the population was separated according to their religious affiliations, called millets.564 Ottomans did not differentiate people according to their races, languages, or ethnic origins; instead, people were primarily differentiated by their faiths. There were four main religious communities within the Empire: the
Greek Orthodox millet, the Armenian millet, the Jewish millet, and the Muslims. The
Empire respected the autonomy of those communities under their respective highest- ranking religious authorities, called Milletbaşı. Each Milletbaşı was responsible both to the state and to his community. He represented the state within his community, and he represented his community within the overall Ottoman administrative structure. In a sense, it can be said that religious communities composed the Ottoman community. The Ottoman tolerance toward non-Muslims, according to Dominic
Lieven, made the Empire “a haven of relative peace, security and tolerance which the
Ottomans offered not just to Muslims but also to Christian and Jewish subjects of their would-be universal empire.”565 Basically, Ottoman imperial rule was maintained through separate contracts for governing separate segments. This pragmatic understanding and institutionalization were apparent in Ottoman administrative and military structures.
564Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire—The Functioning of a Plural Society, 2 vols. (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982). 565Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 13. 197
5.1.1.2 Overview of the Ottoman Military Structure
The Ottoman military organization reflected the “institutional bricolage” upon which the Empire was built; it was a fusion of “Turcoman nomadic, Seljuk Ilkhanid and
Byzantine elements.”566 The Ottoman forces in the early years of the beylik mainly consisted of armed free men who served voluntarily in return for their livelihoods.
The Ottoman armed forces began to institutionalize under the rule of Osman I. The
Ottoman army of the Classical period was formed by the Turcomans, who settled in western Anatolia, as well as by Byzantines and Catalans. Even in its emergent structure, the Ottoman military was well organized and well trained.567 These forces were divided into two groups: yürüks, Turcoman nomad groups who settled in the frontal areas and formed tribal contingents, and akıncılar (raiders; later referred as the gazi), who served in campaigns voluntarily, in exchange for material gains.568
Akincis consisted of fast-moving raiders and auxiliary cavalries, and they moved ahead of the army. Through surprise attacks and ambushes, they diminished the enemy’s will to fight and cut off its communication lines and battle array.
Additionally, the akincis were used to overpower rebellious and dissident groups through guerilla warfare. The akincis were placed under the rule of frontier governors, known as uç beys. Akincis who served well were rewarded for their bravery and participation (yoldaşlık) in campaigns with lands (fiefs; dirlik–tımar) in the conquered territories, particularly in the frontier regions. The marcher districts
566Pál Fodor, “Ottoman Warfare, 1300–1453,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 1, Byzantium to Turkey 1071–1453, ed. Kate Fleet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 192–226; Pál Fodor, In Quest of the Golden Apple. Imperial Ideology, Politics and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2000). 566 İnalcık, Turkey and Europe. 567Fodor, “Ottoman Warfare,” 192–226. 568David Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks 1300–1774, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 8–9. 198
under the hereditary control of uç beys provided private troops. Uç beys were like vassals, and their familial reigns over large estates were hereditary.569
The Ottoman forces were mixed and irregular, consisting primarily of cavalry
(müsellems – exempted or tax-free men) and infantry (yayas – footmen). Generally, yayas were free Turcoman farmers and peasants. During the rule of Orhan I, the yayas were organized into a disciplined professional army (i.e., a standing army) that was paid by salaries rather than materials or timar. Orhan I assigned his vizier, Allah al Din, to form an Ottoman army. Müsellems and yayas became paid soldiers under the rule of Murat I (1359); before that time, they had been paid with lands or fiefs.570
The Ottoman’s standing army was created much earlier than those of the European powers. The Ottoman military structure was highly complex and was organized hierarchically. It evolved according to the needs of the Empire and the changes that occurred in internal and external realms. This hinders any clear-cut categorization of the imperial forces through the Empire’s centuries. Nevertheless, the Ottoman military structure (seyfiye) can be accurately divided into three main branches: the
Kapikulu Askerleri (Sultan’s Army, or the salaried troops of the Ottoman Court), the
Eyâlet Askerleri (Provincial Forces), and the Bahriye (Navy).571 The Ordu-u
Hümayun (Land Forces) consisted of the infantry and cavalry divisions of the Eyâlet and Kapikulu forces.
569Fodor, “Ottoman Warfare,”192–226; Mark L. Stein, Guarding the Frontier – Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe, (London - New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), 13 –28, 63– 104, and 123–152. 570 Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It. 571David Nicolle, The Jannisaries, Elite 58 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1995), 14 –20; Arthur Leon Horniker, “The Corps of Janizaries,” Military Affairs, 8 (1944):177–204; and Godfrey Goodwin, Yeniçeriler [The Janissaries], trans. Derin Türkömer, (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2001). 199
The backbone of the Ottoman Army was the Kapikulu corps, which comprised war captives, prisoners, and slaves who had been captured in the ghazi raids. The majority of Kapikulu were from Southeastern Europe, such as Greeks, Albanians,
Serbs, Bosnians, and members of other Balkan nations who converted to Islam and became known as devshirmehs (devşirme).572 The Kapikulu infantry were institutionally divided into a number of corps: the Janissaries (yeniçeri - new troops), the Acemis (trainees), the Cebecis (corps of armorers), the Saka (water carriers), the
Humbaracis (bombardiers) and Topçus (gunners), the Lağimcilar (sappers and combat engineers), and the Toparabacis (the cart or gun-carriage artillery).573 The most famous of these corps were the Janissaries (who also acted as the Sultan’s bodyguards and companions). They were slightly different from the other corps; the
Janissaries were trained regularly, and the army was their family and home. They wore unique uniforms, earned special salaries, and formed a marching band, known as a mehter. The Kapikulu Sipahis (armored cavalry) were also salaried.574
The Eyâlet Askerleri, on the other hand, was organized into the following groups:
Yerlikulu Piyadesi (local infantry – generally consisting of müsellem), İcârelis
(mercenaries), Azaps (irregular infantry conscripts), Levents (field soldiers), and
Timarli Sipahis (timariot provincial cavalry). Added to these primary groups was a number of provincial guards and subsidiary corps. Among these, the most important was the Timarli Sipahis. The timar system was the main source of Ottoman cavalrymen. Those who served the state in the military were given the right to collect taxes from designated lands (dirlik). A dirlik was akin to a salary given to an officer
572Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 18–20; Guilmartin, Jr., “Ideology and Conflict,” 731. 573Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 18–20. 574Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, 98-118. 200
or soldier of the army. The holder of the timar, in return, provided a cavalry man, armed retainers (known as cebelü), horses, arms, and other supplies, in line with the tax revenues he received. The timarli siphahis’ major duty was to go to war whenever summoned.575
The Ottoman military consisted not only of Muslim forces but also of Christian mercenaries. These vassals played an important role in the initial successes of the
Empire and thus formed the bulk of the Ottoman army. All nations that accepted
Ottoman suzerainty fought alongside Turkish forces. Among these, Bulgaria,
Albania, Serbia, Hungary, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania were of significant importance for the Sultans. Virginia H. Aksan, in her comparative study of the Ottoman, Hapsburg, and Romanov empires, emphasizes the role of “the relationship between ruler and ruled.”576 More precisely, Aksan argues that the success of military operations and wars depended on the ruling dynasty’s external and internal control of violence and its dominance over the distinct multiethnic groups under its rule.577 The relationship between the ruler and the ruled formed the foundational basis of the Ottoman governance. Once this relationship was disrupted as a result of the nationalist awakening (particularly after the French Revolution and the imperial center’s decrease in control over frontal and peripheral areas), the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable.
575Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 124–127; McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, 123–125; Fodor, “Ottoman Warfare,” 192–226. 576Virginia H. Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empires,” Journal of Early Modern History, 3 (1991):105. 577Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans,” 105. 201
The Ottoman Empire was mainly a land power. The Ottoman navy developed in the fourteenth century, starting with the conquest of Imarli Island in 1308. The Ottoman navy and its organization were highly influenced by Mediterranean and Byzantine traditions. The Ottoman fleets were commanded by kapudan (admirals). The naval forces were formed of marines known as Levents. Nicolle argues that the “European influence on the Ottoman navy was of longer standing, but this is hardly surprising as the Ottomans were a major European power.”578 The Ottomans inherited the strategies of naval accumulation, bases, port facilities, and shipyards that had been used by the earlier Anatolian beyliks, which were incorporated into the Empire like the Karesioğulları, Aydınoğulları, Saruhanoğulları, Mentesoğulları, and
Çandaroğulları. The Ottomans also used the Byzantine facilities they seized around the Gulf of İzmit (the ancient Gulf of Astacus) in Marmara. The first Anatolian
Turkish naval fleet was established by Çaka Bey (Tzachas) in İzmir (Smyrna) in
1081. The beyliks’ increasing control over the Aegean coast of Anatolia and its adjacent seas led to the decrease of Byzantine control.579 The Ottomans’ acquisition of the strategically important port and gulf of Edremit (Adramyttium) and the possession of other important locations in the Dardanelles area limited Byzantine control of the seas. Anatolian Seljuks also gained control of the Mediterranean coast, starting with the conquest of Alanya (the Byzantine city known as Calonoros;
578Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 24–25. 579Halil İnalcık, “The Rise of Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and the Crusades,” in The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society, (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993), 309–341; Idris Bostan, “Ottoman Maritime Arsenals and Shipbuilding Technology in the 16th and 17th Centuries,” in The Great Otoman-Turkish Civilization,Vol III: Philosophy, Science and Institutions, ed. Kemal Çiçek, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2000), 735 –744; Idris Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire [Ottoman Naval Organization: The Main Maritime Arsenal in the Seventeenth Century], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu,1992), 1–14; and Svat Soucek, Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime Geography, (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2008). 202
renamed Alaiye after Alaeddin Keykubad, the Anatolian Seljuk Emperor), and built their naval arsenals in that area.580
As noted earlier, the occupation of the Karesi beylik was of great significance in the
Ottoman expansion. It also transformed the Ottomans into a naval power because they gained control over a small fleet manned by an ex-Byzantine crew. The
Ottomans built their naval force during the rule of Murad II, and the first Ottoman shipyard was constructed in Karamürsel after its capture in 1323. The Ottoman fleet was first used in the acquisition of Selanik (Thessaloniki) from the Venetian
Republic in 1430. The Ottomans used their naval fleet for landings (simply as transport vehicles for the army) in Thrace and in Southeastern Europe. During sieges and landings, coastal bombardment was used to support the army’s attack. The
Ottoman naval force contributed to the expansion of the Empire beyond the borders of Anatolia from the Aegean to the Black Sea and from the Adriatic to the
Mediterranean.581
After the effective use of the navy in the Ottomans’ siege and conquest of Istanbul,
Mehmed II (1452-1481) and his successors established maritime arsenals and shipbuilding yards, not only in various parts of Istanbul but also throughout the
Empire, in Gelibolu, Sinop, Izmit, Suez, Birecik, Samsun, Basra, Kefken, Ruscuk,
Mohac, Sakarya, Budin, Ineada, Varna, Inebahtı, Preveze, Avlonya, Nova, Antalya,
580İnalcık, “The Rise of Maritime Principalities in Anatolia,” 309-341; Bostan, “Ottoman Maritime Arsenals,” 735–744; Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı; Soucek, Studies in Ottoman Naval History; Özlem Kumrular ed., Türkler ve Deniz [Turks and the Sea], (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007). 581Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 24–25; Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest,” Studia Islamica, 2 (1954):103–129. 203
Alanya, Trabzon, Vize, Nigbolu, and Biga.582 During the reign of Mehmed II and his successor Bayezid II (1481-1512), the imperial navy was equipped with firearms and cannons, and it became a strategic force. Moreover, the recruitment of Muslim sailors and corsairs who were highly experienced and skilled in sea combat, such as
Kemal Reis, Piri Reis, Burak Reis, and Hızır Reis (known as Barbaros Hayreddin), increased the technical capability of the Ottoman fleet.583 During the rule of Selim I, the main maritime arsenal at Istanbul was expanded to form a grandiose imperial fleet. The naval wars between the Ottomans and Europeans marked the affairs of the
Mediterranean in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, especially during the rule of
Süleyman I.584 The Ottomans’ major naval rivals in the Mediterranean were Venice and Genoa. Eventually, major strategic ports and islands in the Black Sea, Aegean, and Mediterranean fell under Ottoman control. In the words of Stvatopluk Soucke, the acquisition of Kırım (Crimea), Rodos (Rhodes), Kıbrıs (Cyprus), and Girit
(Crete) “transformed the Ottoman Empire from a chiefly continental power into one that was also a naval and maritime-commercial one.”585 The local balance of power in the seas shifted in favor of the Ottomans. The expulsion of the Italians from their
582Bostan, “Ottoman Maritime Arsenals,” 735–744; Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı, 1-29. 583Franz Babinger, Mehmed the Conquerer and His Time, ed. William C. Hickman and trans. Ralph Manheim, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 129–172, 215–302, 341–351, and 369–408; Bostan, “Ottoman Maritime Arsenals,” 735–744; Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı, 1-29. 584İdris Bostan, “Kanuni ve Osmanlıların Akdeniz Siyaseti [Suleiman II and the Ottoman’s Mediterranean Policy]” in Türkler ve Deniz, ed. Kumrular 2007, 13–18; Alain Servante and Giovani- Francesco Giustinian, “Osmanlı Donanmasına Venedik Teknik Yardımı (1531–1534) [Venetian Technical Assistance to Ottoman Navy (1531–1534)],” in Türkler ve Deniz, ed. Kumrular, 2007, 147– 162; Giovanni Ricci, “Türkler ve Deniz: İtalya’dan bir Bakış 15.-18. Yüzyıllar [Turks and the Sea: A Perspective from Italy 15th–18th Centuries],” in Türkler ve Deniz, ed. Kumrular, 2007, 163–174; Tülay Duran, ed., The Ottoman Empire in the Reign of Süleyman the Magnificent I – II, (Istanbul: The Historical Research Foundation Center—Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Turkish Republic, 1988); Antony Bridge, Suleiman the Magnificent—Scourge of Heaven, (London: Granada, 1983). 585Svatopluk Soucke, “Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete,” Studia Islamica, 98/99 (2004):219–261. See also Palmira Brumett, “The Overrated Adversary: Rhodes and Ottoman Naval Power,” The Historical Journal, 36 (1993): 517–541; Susan Rose, “Islam versus Christendom: The Naval Dimension, 1000-1600,” The Journal of Military History, 63 (1999):561– 578; J. F. Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). 204
trade routes and strategic locations in the Mediterranean was a direct result of
Ottoman pragmatism.
The Ottoman fleet, composed of galleys like the Venetians’, was formidable in the
Mediterranean but not in the open seas. The Ottoman Empire was merely a regional seaborne state in the eastern Mediterranean, and it could not rival oceanic maritime empires like the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British.586
5.1.1.3 Ottoman Weaponry and Military Engineering
Ottoman weaponry, industrial capacity, and engineering skills in the production of weapons, artillery, and ammunitions developed in line with the requirements of ever- changing warfare, strategy, and technology. At first, Ottoman forces used traditional
Turcoman arms that originated in Central Asia, but over time, their weaponry and warfare were modernized. Weapons used by the Ottoman forces included külünk
(war-hammer), gönder (javelin), yayın (bow), bilik (quiver), çark yayi (crossbow), tığ
(sword blade), topuz (mace), kılıç (sabre), ok (arrow), nacak (war-axe), and nize
(light spears).587 The introduction of gunpowder to the battlefield and to naval warfare vastly altered organized violence between states and empires,588 and the
Ottomans began to use firearms. The exact date of firearms’ introduction to the
586Andrew G. Hess, “The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth- Century World War,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 4 (1973):55–76; Andrew C. Hess, “The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of the Oceanic Discoveries, 1453– 1525,” The American Historical Review, 75 (1970):1892-1919; Archibald R. Lewis, “The Islamic World and the Latin West, 1350–1500,” Speculum, 65 (1990):833-844; Charles Tilly, “The Europe of Columbus and Bayazid,” Middle East Report, 178 (1992):2-5. 587Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 18–20. 588Gábor Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan—Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 205
Empire is not clear, but references mention Turkish rifles known as tüfek in the mid- fourteenth century.589
The Balkans was the main source of Ottoman weaponry and artillery. All gun- makers in the region were given timar fiefs and thus were converted to Islam. Later, the Spanish Jews taking refuge in Ottoman territories brought with them information regarding the latest techniques of gun-making. Additionally, Ottomans bought weaponry from foreign powers. Orhan I struck a deal with the Genoese, buying arms in return for the Empire’s aid in the Genoese war with the Byzantines.590 The Italian city-states, despite their numerous conflicts and wars with the Ottomans, were the
Empire’s main trade partners, and they provided arms and weaponry. Despite the
Hapsburg and the Papal attempts to ban the trade of firearms and war materials, commercial relations between Europeans and Ottomans in the Levant and the Eastern
Mediterranean continued.591 The colonies of Venice and Genoa also traded with the
Ottomans.592 Because their relations with Venice were highly turbulent and involved long wars, the Sultans maintained alternative sources of weaponry through granting commercial privileges to other states.
589Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 18–20. 590Ernst Werner, Büyük bir Devletin Doğuşu [The Birth of a Great State], trans. Orhan Esen and Yılmaz Öner, (Istanbul: Alan Yayınları, 1986), 184 –187. 591Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlılarda Ateşli Silahlar [Ottoman Firearms],” Belleten, 83, 21 (1957): 509; Djurdjica Petroviċ, “Fire-arms in the Balkans on the Eve of and after the Ottoman Conquests of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” in War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, eds. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, (New York-London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 176; V. J. Parry, “Materials of War in the Ottoman Empire,” in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day, ed. M. A. Cook, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 220–227; Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State. 592Louis Mitler, “The Genoese in Galata: 1453–1682,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10 (1979): 71–91; F. W. Carter, “The Commerce of the Dubrovnik Republic, 1500-1700,” The Economic History Review, New Series, 24 (1971):370–394; Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy,” in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. Cook 1970, 207–218. 206
The Balkans, specifically the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and Bosnia, provided the Ottomans’ weapons and gunpowder. The Republic of Ragusa was the only
Adriatic rival of the Italians in maritime trade. For example, in the Ottoman-Venetian war from 1463 to 1479, the Empire’s trade with Venice was cut off for a while.
Mehmed II, through granting capitulations, continued to trade with Florence. The acquisition of Bosnia by the Ottoman forces, in 1463, led to the development of the
Empire’s commercial relations. By the fifteenth century, the Republic of Ragusa was predominantly under the Ottoman sphere of economic influence.593 Later, these states were replaced by English, French, and Dutch traders in the Levant trade.
England, France and The Dutch Reopublic became the main sources of Ottoman arms.594
Gabor Ágoston argues that sufficient evidence in the Ottoman archives challenges the Eurocentric and Orientalist views, which claim that the Ottomans’ Islamic conservatism prevented the Empire from borrowing Western military inventions and technologies.595 On the contrary, the Empire was very receptive to new military technologies and innovations. The dispersion of the production and use of gunpowder in the realm of Islamic states led to “gunpowder empires,” and the
Ottomans were no exception.596 Learning from their wars with Europeans, the
Ottomans continuously revised and renewed their weapons technology and tactics.597
İnalcık noted that the process of acculturation with Europe was based on and justified
593Carter, “The Commerce of the Dubrovnik Republic, 1500–1700,” 370–394. 594Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 18–20. 595Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan. 596Janet Lippman Abu-Lughad, “The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450–1800,” in Islamic and European Expansion—The Forging of a Global Order, ed. Michael Ados (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 103–140. 597Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan. 207
by Islam and thus supported by the ulema. The necessity of borrowing and transferring technological and industrial knowledge from Europe, in order to strengthen the rule of Islam, was understood and supported by Islamic circles in the
Empire.
This acculturation in the military started at the inception of the Empire. For example, in 1444, the Ottomans learned from an adversary and adopted the Hussites’
Wagenburg war tactic, which had been used in Bohemia during the Hussite Wars
(1419-1436). The Wagenburg tactic, founded by the Bohemian commander Jan
Zizka, effectively used war wagons or carts in the battlefield. The war wagons and carts, equipped with armed crews, were attached to each other to form a square or circular fortification, depending on the landscape of the battlefield. This strategy was implemented in two stages: defense and an offensive counterattack. In the first stage, the crews stationed on the war wagons or carts used artillery fire to provoke the adversary to attack. Once the enemy attack started, the forces hidden behind the wagons defended their position with firearms and crossbows, inflicting heavy casualties on the adversary. In the second stage, the demoralized enemy was counter- attacked with heavy shelling from the carts. The infantry and cavalry hidden behind the carts attacked the enemy from the flanks, thereby concluding the battle with a decisive victory.598 As noted by Ágoston, the Ottomans’ quick adaption of this tactic was related to its similarity to Central-Asian war tactics. The Ottomans formed a new corps called tabur cengi (the camp battle), composed of wagons called darbuzen, and they effectively used this strategy in battles. The Ottoman experts modified this system and introduced it to the Safavids and Mughals. The Wagenburg tactic came to
598Stephen Turnbull, The Hussite Wars (1419–36), (London: Osprey Publishing, 2004), 23 –40. 208
be known in the Islamic world as the destur-i Rumi (the Ottoman order of battle).599
Additionally, Mehmed II, in his siege of Constantinople, used large cannons made by a Hungarian engineer named Urban, a specialist in the construction of cannons. This innovation in warfare spread throughout Europe. 600
In the fifteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was clearly superior to its European rivals, especially the Hapsburgs and Venetians, in terms of firepower and logistics.601
Ottoman artillery and engineering were highly developed between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries; hence, Turkish gunpowder and firearms were of much higher quality than those of Europe.602 Despite the inconveniences of using technology in warfare, due to physical and human constraints,603 the Ottoman weapons industry was centralized, unlike European ones. Tophane-i Amire (the Imperial Cannon
Foundry) was established by Mehmed II in 1453, after the first successful use of cannons, and it was the world’s first centralized cannons production facility. Later,
Tophane-i Amire was extended to produce armory, gunpowder, and naval yards.
Ágoston describes it as the largest military industrial complex existing in Europe at that time.604
599Halil İnalcık and Mevlud Oğuz eds., Gazavât-I Sultan Murâd b. Mehemmed Hân [The Military Expeditions of Sultan Murâd b. Mehemmed Hân], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1978), 59 –60, 68; İnalcık, Turkey and Europe, 143; Halil İnalcık, “The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire- arms in the Middle East,” in War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, eds. Parry and Yapp, 1975, 204; Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, 19. 600İnalcık, Turkey and Europe, 166. 601Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, 1-15. 602 İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest,” 104–129; Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 18–20; Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan; Alan R. Williams, “Ottoman Military Technology: The Metallurgy of Turkish Armour,” War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th Century, ed. Yaacov Lev (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 363–397. 603Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare 1500–1700, (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 13–34. 604Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, 1-15. 209
The Ottomans employed European military experts well before the modernization that occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Military experts of Italy,
France, the Dutch Republic, and England were organized into a separate corps within the Ottoman army, known as tayfa-i efrenciye (corps of Europeans).605 Ágoston notes that this military acculturation between the Empire and Europeans continued until the end of the eighteenth century; this declaration challenges the traditional argument that the acculturation ended in the sixteenth century.606 The Ottomans’ acculturation policy enabled the Empire to maintain military technology and knowledge that was equal to the Europeans’ until the end of the seventeenth century.607
Some scholars have argued that after the Empire reached its peak in the sixteenth century, it entered an era of stagnation and decline following its naval defeat at
İnebahtı (Lepanto - 1571) and the failure of its second siege of Viyana (Vienna -
1683).608 Contrarily, Jonathan Grant argues that in the realm of arms production, transfer, and technological diffusion, the Empire’s “‘decline’ was certainly not inexorable.”609 Grant also notes that comparison of the Ottoman military conditions to those of Western Europe by considering “civilization” to be the basic of unit of evaluation leads to a moral judgment, which distorts the historical conditions. To quote Grant:
605Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 20–21. 606Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, 1-15. 607Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan, 1-15. 608Andrew C. Hess, “The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History,” Past & Present, 57 (1972): 53–73; Edwarde Barton and Edwin Pears, “The Spanish Armada and the Ottoman Porte,” The English Historical Review, 8 (1893):439–466; Roger Crowley, Empires of the Sea - The Final Battle for the Mediterranean, 1521–1580 (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), 199–299; Andrew Wheatcroft, The Enemy at the Gate—Habsburgs, Ottomans and the Battle for Europe, (London: The Bodley Head, 2008). 609Jonathan Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline’: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries,” Journal of World History, 10 (1999):181. 210
In its broadest application, Ottoman ‘decline’ has served as a negative judgment on Islamic society as a whole and its inability to match the march of progress and rising power of Western society since the seventeenth century. In this instance the unit of comparison is the civilization. Such a basis for comparison is ill-chosen because the notion that the strength of a civilization can be measured in military success is an obviously dubious proposition, as examples of Renaissance Italy or the thirteenth-century Mongols make clear.610
Grant adds:
Besides selecting a vague unit of measure, proponents of the decline thesis tend to be rather imprecise about the scale by which they measure the Ottoman “decline”… Most often scholars have used the term the West or Europe generically, when they actually meant England, France and Holland. The use of these western European states as the basis for measuring Ottoman military decline has obscured the actual Ottoman conditions by placing them in the wrong context. The Ottomans did not operate in western Europe, but rather in eastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. In fact decline is not a useful term at all, because it reflects more a moral judgment passed by Europeans convinced of their own superiority than an accurate assessment of Ottoman capabilities after 1571 or 1683.611
After placing the Ottoman military technology and armaments industry in Keith
Krause’s model, which was developed for analyzing the diffusion of military technology, Grant concludes that from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth century, the Ottomans remained at the third tier of the international military production hierarchy (i.e., it remained merely an importer, copier, and reproducer of military technologies).612 The first tier is formed of the innovator and producer states (e.g.,
England, the low countries, and Sweden); the second tier is formed of adapter and exporter states (e.g., Italian city-states); and the third tier comprises states that import, copy, and reproduce technologies to create or develop their arms industries
610Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline’,”180. 611Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline’,”180. (italics in original). 612Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline’,”179–201. 211
(e.g., the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Poland, Hungary, and—from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century— China and Japan).613
One point of Grant’s argument requires clarification. The Ottoman Empire mainly operated in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, but it also belonged to the
Western European international system and balance-of-power politics since 1525.
The Empire formed alliances with France and the Protestant powers of Europe.
Moreover, the Ottomans fought many wars on the European continent that changed the socio-political structure of the European international system (for example, the
Great Northern War over the Baltic question, 1700-1722, which shaped the political equilibrium in the North).614 The Ottoman Empire rivaled Austria, Spain, Portugal, and Russia. Its policies and administration shaped the Southeastern European sub- regional international system. The Ottoman imprint and legacy are visible in the
Balkans’ political, economic, and social structures even to this day. Still, considering the Ottomans’ military production capabilities (but not their geographical position or area of engagement), the Empire belongs in the third tier as an importer and reproducer state.
613 For more information, see Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), cited in Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline,’” 181. 614Because of the Swedish forces’ failure under the command of Swedish King Charles XII at the Battle of Poltava in 1709 (against Russia), the king took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire, an ally of Sweden (along with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), fought against Russia at Prut (Pruth) (1711). The Ottomans, under the command of Grand Vizier Baltacı Mehmet Pasha, defeated Peter the Great’s Russian forces under the command of Boris Sheremtev. At the end of a series of battles, the Peace Treaty of Nystadt, in 1721, led to Russia’s assertion of itself as a new Eastern Imperial Great Power in the European state system. Prussia was another rising power at that time. The older eastern and northern powers (e.g., Gustavus Adolphus’s powerful Swedish Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) were replaced by these two new powers. After that, the five members of the nineteenth-century Concert were positioned as the Great Powers of Europe. Meanwhile, Russia and the Ottoman Empire became eternal rivals, and the Ottomans began to lose power in European affairs. 212
In comparison with the states in its tier, the Ottoman Empire was able to provide its artillery and firearms domestically. In the eighteenth century, Russia, the Empire’s major regional rival, improved its capability by acquiring flintlock firearms. Russia also built a navy of galleons rather than galleys. The Ottoman administrators realized this after several wars that ended with the Ottoman defeat against Russia
(specifically after the loss of Crimea), and consequently set about reforming their industry and military. They once again became equals with Russia in military production levels.615 Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottoman arms industry was able to catch up with the high quality of the earlier period. The military reforms and recruitment of foreign military and technical experts led to reversal of the downward trend and preserved the Empire’s self-sufficiency until the early nineteenth century.616
This trend, however, did not extend to the later nineteenth century; the Empire after the Crimean War became financially and militarily more dependent on Europe. The
Empire’s ruling élite were well aware of the need to modernize and reform their defense industry; however, arms importation was the most workable option.
Importing and choosing from among the best European innovators and producers’ was, therefore, the policy the Ottomans adopted.617 Over time, however, this policy became unfeasible and inefficient. The increasing borrowing by the state from
European banks (specifically French and British ones) at high interest rates strained the weakened Ottoman economy. Renovation of the Ottoman defense and armament
615Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline’,” 179–201; David B. Rolston, Importing the European Army, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 43–78. 616Jonathan Grant, “The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914,” The Journal of Military History, 66 (2002):9–36. 617Grant, “The Sword of the Sultan,” 9–36. 213
sectors was not easy, since it required not only great finance but also foreign technical knowledge.618
From 1854 to 1914, the imperial (external and internal) gross borrowing reached around 399.5 million Turkish liras. The declining economy, the state borrowing, and the trade and production capacity of the Empire took their toll; the Ottomans were under the threat of bankruptcy by 1880.619 The fiscal difficulties of the Empire, the apparent need of military, political, and socio-economic reforms, the changing mindset, and the conscious realization of the changes in the post-Vienna international order led to a radical change in war as an institution of Ottoman statecraft. Before analyzing and presenting this perceptional change, the next section reviews the basis of early Ottoman view of wars and the Euro-Ottoman military acculturation that expanded over centuries.
618Grant, “The Sword of the Sultan,” 9–36; Rolston, Importing the European Army, 43–78. 619Christopher Clay, Gold for the Sultan—Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance 1856-1881, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000); Şevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914, (London: Methuen and Co., 1987). 214
Figure 10: Keith Krause’s Model of Military Technological Diffusion
1. Innovators 2. Adapter Exporters
3. Importer Reproducers
5.1.1.4 The Ottoman Perceptions of War from 1299 to 1789
The Ottoman wars of the early modern era were explained in the context of
Jihad/ghaza. The Ottomans fought not only against Christendom, but also against
Muslims—the Turcoman beyliks and other regional Islamic powers rivaling and challenging the Ottoman rule as did the Persian Safavids—to protect the Ottoman sovereignty and control in Anatolia; that is, to secure the integrity of their realm.
There were also wars against rival Sunni states, internal dissidents, and dynastic rivals. The Jihad and ghaza were used to justify and legitimize the wars in the eyes
215
of the Turcoman-Muslim population and warriors.620 The Ottoman–European wars, on the other hand, were not only wars fought to expand and defend the dâr-al-Islam; their causes were more complex and pragmatic. For that reason, crediting the
Ottoman wars solely to Islam is not correct.621 To quote Guilmartin:
Religion, which was a causal mechanism in the Ottoman wars, is of limited value in explaining underlying motivation….Religion was a causal factor in the wars of the Ottomans, but we cannot be certain of what degree it acted in its own right rather than simply as a means of legitimizing preexisting conflicts. Although the wars of the Ottoman Empire cannot be understood without understanding the religious factors involved, their influence must be examined within the total cultural, economic, social and political context, not in isolation.622
To be able to analyze the Ottoman approach to war and to what extent Ottoman wars can be categorized as Jihad or Ghaza, an in-depth understanding of the Jihad and its doctrinal Islamic conceptualization over time is required. The primary reason for
Jihad was similar to the Christian understanding of Just War, that is, prohibition and limitation of wars among Muslims. Jihad is divided into two main categories according to Islamic jurisprudence. Al-Jihad al-Akbar (greater Jihad) is the moral struggle carried out by peaceful means like preaching and calling to the way of Allāh.
Al-Jihad al-Akbar is permissible against the al–Mushrikûn (infidels and polytheists).
Al-Jihad bil Saif (lesser Jihad), on the other hand, refers to the armed struggle
620For more on the discussion of Jihad as an Islamic version Just War see, Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 55–82; R. Joseph Hoffmann ed., The Just War and Jihad—Violence in Judaism, Christianity, & Islam, (Amherst-New York: Prometheus Books, 2006); Fred M. Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War”, in Just War and Jihad- Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, eds. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, (Westport- Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1991), 31-70; Ann Elizabeth Mayer , “War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International Law”, in Just War and Jihad- Historical and Theoretical Perspectives, eds. Kelsay and Turner Johnson, 195-226; Hilmi M. Zawati, Is Jihād a Just War? War, Peace and Human Rights under Islamic and Public International Law (Lewiston and New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), 9–48. 621Guilmartin, Jr. “Ideology and Conflict,” 737–738. 622Guilmartin, Jr. “Ideology and Conflict,” 742–743. 216
against non-believers. The doctrinal development of Al-Jihad bil Saif and its interpretation on the verses of Holy Qur’an progressed in four phases. The first phase justified the fight against the non-believers of Mecca who treated Muslims unjustly.
Later, the neighboring cities and countries that treated Muslims unjustly were added.
In the third phase, there is direct and explicit order to wage war against all al–
Mushrikûn. In the fourth and last phase, the doctrine was developed to include non- believers and believers who did not hold their pledges to Muslims. The verses of the
Holy Qur’an on Jihad are:
To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight) because they are wronged and verily, Allāh is Most Powerful for their aid. [they are] those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right [for no cause] except that they say: our Lord is Allāh. 623
Fight in the cause of Allāh those who fight you, but do not transgress limits, for Allāh. loveth not transgressors. 624
Fight those who believe not in Allāh nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allāh. and His Prophet, nor acknowledge the religion of truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book; until they pay the jizya with willing submission and feel themselves subdued.625
In essence, Jihad doctrine first requires the use of all peaceful means, including an invitation to embrace Islam. Secondly, it requires that the enemy attack first. Only then is waging of a war of self-defense permitted (jus ad bellum). The sparing of combatants and civilians and civilian and military objects is also essential in the
Islamic understanding of war. During the war (jus in bello), torture, treachery, perfidy, or killings of an enemy hors de combat are prohibited. The decent treatment
623The Holy Qur’an, XXII: 39–40, quoted in Zawati, Is Jihād a Just War? 40. 624The Holy Qur’an, II: 190, quoted in Zawati, Is Jihād a Just War? 40. 625The Holy Qur’an, IX: 29, quoted in Zawati, Is Jihād a Just War? 40. 217
of prisoners of war and the wounded is another principle to be followed during the war.626 These principles form the basis of Al-Jihad bil Saif.
The misconception of Jihad as religious wars for expanding the abode of Islam also leads to incorrect categorization of the Ottoman wars. As noted, forcible conversion to Islam is contrary to the notion of the Jihad. For that reason, in the lands they conquered, Ottomans tolerated free exercise of the local faiths and religions. The
Ottomans, however, practiced Jihad al-Akbar by setting up Bektashi Sufi zâviyyes/tekkes (dervish convents) and settling the Turcomans in southeastern
Europe. There were also zâviyyes/tekkes belonging to the Sunni order like Mevlevis,
Naksibendis, and Kadiris. Among these, Bektashi orders contributed most to spread of Islam in the region. To this day, these orders are preserved in Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, and
Serbia, which have significant Muslim populations.
In the early days of the Ottoman beylik and empire, the wars against the Christians were justified on the basis of Islam. The first series of wars were fought against the
Byzantine Empire. The aim of these was to pressure weakening Byzantium by controlling its peripheral areas, which stretched from Anatolia to the Balkans.627 In these wars, the Christian mercenaries and auxiliary troops played an important role.
Ever since the Ottomans stepped into the Balkans, they had attracted important
Christian support, as the Balkan saying reveals: “better the turban of the Turk than
626Zawati, Is Jihād a Just War? 40; James T. Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Edward J. Jurji, “The Islamic Theory of War,” Moslem World, 30 (1940):332–342. 627Guilmartin, Jr. “Ideology and Conflict,” 737–738; Lowry, The Nature of the Early, 45–54. 218
the tiara of the pope.”628 Imber, in his analysis of Ottoman texts on Ghaza, argues that the words gaza/gazi were used for akın/akıncı, signifying a raid rather than a holy war. As noted by Imber and Lowry, the Ottoman akincis were more concerned with material achievements than converting Christians to Islam.629 War was seen more in material terms: It was a source of wealth and income.630
In written Ottoman sources of this period, ghaza was stipulated as “a way of acquiring proper livelihood.”631 Acquisition of new territories and populations meant not only power, but also arable rich lands, timars, and taxes. The Ottoman economy was predominantly agrarian. The Empire lacked strong industry (except military) and labor forces. Lands and taxes were important sources of income for the imperial treasury. Non-agricultural sectors like trade, finance, arts, and crafts were in the hands of the non-Muslims, though some Muslims and Turks were engaged in trade relations. War was therefore a tool of territorial and economic expansion. It was also a projection of the power and strength of the Ottomans. It was the way they were able to bring together and unite various Muslim and non-Muslim and Turkic and non-Turkic groups in their border regions. As noted in Chapter Two, in the early modern age, wars were fought for chivalry, dynasticism, religion, and material gains.
An in-depth study of the crusades from early on also suggests that these wars cannot
628 Wright, The Ambassadors, 237. See also Günter Endruweit, “Turkey and European Union: A Question of Cultural Difference?” Perceptions—Journal of International Affairs, 3 (1998):54–72, retrieved at http://www.sam.gov.tr/. 629Colin Imber, “The Legend of Osman Gazi,” in The Ottoman Emirate, 1300-1389, ed. E. Zachariadou (Crete: Rethymnon, 1993), 67–76, cited in Lowry, The Nature of the Early? 45. See also, Linda T. Darling, “Contested Territory: Ottoman Holy War in Comparative Context,” Studia Islamica, 91 (2000):133–163. 630Lowry, The Nature of the Early, 45–54. 631Cemal Kafadar, “Gaza (Ghaza),” İslam Ansiklopedisi—Encyclopedia of Islam, (Istanbul: Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1996), 428, quoted and cited in Serdar Palabıyık, “Türkiye’de Savaş Düşüncesi [The Idea of War in Turkey],” Uluslararası İlişkiler/International Relations, 14 (2007):188. 219
be categorized as purely holy wars, since the crusaders’ forces were made up of poorer segments of Christian societies hoping to achieve wealth and prestige by fighting in the East. In this sense, the Ottoman understanding of war was not very different from that of the other early modern European states.
It should, however, be noted that the Europeans also justified their major wars with the Ottomans on the basis of religion as crusades. When the Ottoman power was rising, the Europeans were religiously and politically divided and thus were not able to prevent Ottoman expansion.632 The crusades were used to unify the divided
Europe within a common cause, value, and identity. The perceived Ottoman threat led to a new type of crusades, which in definition is closer to the Islamic understanding of Jihad. Crusades were no longer regarded as wars to extend the realm of Christendom to the distant lands of the East, but as wars to defend
Christianity against advance of Islam to the borders of Europe. Still, some European powers, doubting the sincerity of the Papacy and their allies, hesitated to join the crusades.633 The two battles of Kosovo (1389 and 1448),634 and the battle of
Nicopolis (1396) and Varna (1444) were presented as the defense of Christendom against Islam. The Papacy either called for formation of combined Christian forces or coordinated these forces. The Ottoman conception of these wars as Jihad/Ghaza was, therefore, natural.635
632Norman Housley, The Later Crusades—From Lyons to Alcazar 1274–1580, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 80–150; Thomas F. Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006), 194–212; Peter Partner, God of Battles— Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 633Housley, The Later Crusades, 80–150; Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, 194– 212. 634Thomas A. Emmert, Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo 1389, (New York: Columbia University Pres, 1990). 635Palabıyık, “Türkiye’de Savaş Düşüncesi,” 188. 220
The first formally organized crusade against the Ottomans was the Battle of
Nicopolis. The largest crusader force, combined under the command of the
Hungarian King Sigismund, French King Charles VI and Burgundian and German barons, was defeated. Nicopolis was counted among the most shocking and demoralizing defeats in European history. The next crusade organized against the
Ottomans was gathered on the Byzantine call of aid.636 The Ottoman capture of
Thessalonica in 1430 and the ensuing naval blockade of Constantinople by Murad II alarmed Byzantium. Despite these, the Byzantine call was not that well received in
Western Europe. France and England were still involved in the Hundred Years war.
Central Europe and Germany had internal issues.637 The Eastern European forces
(Poland, Hungary and Wallachia), gathered at Pope Eugenius IV’s call and led by
John Hunyadi of Transylvania and King Ladislas of Hungary were also defeated.638
The following fall of Constantinople and Byzantium to the Ottoman assault639 resulted with new calls for crusades against the Ottoman Empire. The small successes on the side of the European powers, such as the saving of Belgrade in 1456 or the papal occupation of the Greek islands, could not prevent consolidation of
Ottoman power and rule in the Balkans. The Ottomans now directed their attention to the major Christian strongholds in the Mediterranean and southern Italy.640 The
Ottoman attack on Rhodes met with the strong defense by the Knights Hospitallers
636Housley, The Later Crusades, 80–150; Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, 194– 212. 637Housley, The Later Crusades, 80–150; Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, 194– 212. 638Housley, The Later Crusades, 80–150; Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, 194– 212. 639H. P. Collins, “The Assault on Constantinople,” Army Quarterly, 67 (1954):218–228; Steven Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople, 1453, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965). 640Housley, The Later Crusades, 80–150; Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, 194– 212; Virginia Aksan, “Ottoman War and Warfare 1453–1812,” in War in Early Modern World, ed. Jeremy Black, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 147–176. 221
belonging to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem stationed on the island.641 The southern Italian city of Otranto, however, fell under Ottoman control. The panic spreading throughout Italy and Europe led to an immediate call for crusades.
The death of the Mehmed II and the ensuing internal power struggle between his sons provided the Europeans a chance to regain Otranto. Francis I of France, Henry
VIII of England, Maximilian I of German Empire, Charles I of Spain and the
Netherlands, and Manuel I of Portugal accepted the call of Pope Leo X. The death of
Emperor Maximilian I, however, disrupted European unity, as European powers were plunged into a war of succession.642 During this era, the Ottoman understanding of war continued to be legitimized by religion not only against the Christians, but also against the rival Shii and Sunni states to protect the unity of the abode of Islam.
After defeating the Safavids of Iran, Selim I (1512-1520) directed his attention to
Syria and Egypt. The Ottoman conquest of Egypt brought the empire in conflict with the Portuguese, since Egypt had a significant place in Portuguese plans for expansion into the Indian Ocean.643 Thereafter, the Ottoman fleet and armed forces engaged in rivalry with the Portuguese in India and Arabia.
The Ottomans under Süleyman I (1520-1566) continued to take over European strongholds. Many campaigns were conducted in the Balkans and Mediterranean.
641Eric Brockman, The Two Sieges of Rhodes, 1480-1522, (London: John Murray, 1969); A. D. Lacy, “The Siege of Rhodes, 1406,” History Today, 18 (1968):53–60. 642Housley, The Later Crusades, 80–150; Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, 194– 212. 643Palmira Brumett, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 89–122; İdris Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı; McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, 123–125; Salih Özbaran, The Ottoman Response to European Expansion. Studies on Ottoman-Portuguese Relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration in the Arab Lands during the Sixteenth Century, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1994). 222
Belgrade was taken in 1521. The Hospitallers were defeated in Rhodes in 1522. The wars with the Spanish Hapsburgs concluded with Ottoman victory. The Hapsburg-
Venetian crusader fleet under the command of Andrea Doria was defeated at the
Preveze (Prevesa) Naval Battle in 1538. Then in Mohács in 1526, the Christian armies once again were decisively defeated. Having failed in three successive crusades, the European states realized that the Ottomans were institutionalizing in
Europe and that they needed to search for new alternatives for dealing with the
Ottoman threat.644 Two options arose: conversion or coexistence.645 Coexistence and conciliation with the Turks had a better chance of succeeding than did conversion, based on the favorable trade and alliance relations Europeans had with the
Ottomans.646 The Ottomans while continuing their wars against the European powers started to infiltrate the European balance of power, politics, and diplomacy by concluding military alliances with Christian powers in their fight against other
Christian powers.
The Empire became formally allied with France in its struggle against the Habsburg bid for dominance on the continent. Ottoman forces carried out joint campaigns with the French against the Habsburg forces. For example, in 1541, Süleyman I was on a campaign against Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in Hungary. Meanwhile, the famous Ottoman admiral Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa was on a joint naval campaign with the French fleet in the Mediterranean (1543–1544). After the joint operations,
644McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, 40–43. 645Robert Schwoebel, “Changing Ideas and Ideals in the Sixteenth Century,” Studies in Renaissance, 12 (1965):164–187. See also Bisaha, Creating East and West. 646Schwoebel, “Changing Ideas and Ideals,” 166–177. 223
the Ottoman fleet wintered in Toulon.647 In the literature, this has been presented as an exceptional deviation from the general norms and principles of the European international system and Christian ethics. Christine Isom-Verhaaren, however, argues that such a representation is a distortion of history. She notes that, “the alliance was neither an aberration nor regarded as particularly sensational in the sixteenth century.”648 The Empire was regarded by its contemporaries as an important actor and thus part of the fifteenth and sixteenth century European and Mediterranean international system. From the mid-fifteenth to late sixteenth centuries, the Ottoman wars were conducted on the basis of raison d’état and political pragmatism, though they were still legitimized on the basis of Islam. The wars under the reign of
Süleyman I were great successes except for the failed sieges of Vienna in 1529 and
Malta in 1552. Under Selim II (1566-1575), Murad III (1575-1595), Mehmed III
(1595-1604), and Ahmed I (1604-1618), the Ottoman power on the battlefield started to decline despite a number of successes like the seizure of Chios in 1566 and of
Cyprus after the defeat at Lepanto in 1571.649
Amira K. Bennison suggests that the Ottoman “championing of faith cannot therefore be seen as qualitatively different to Russian support for Orthodox
Christianity or the Hapsburgs’ leadership of the Holy Roman Empire.”650 Serdar
Palabıyık, in his analysis of the early wars of the Empire, similarly notes that ghaza
647İnalcık, Turkey and Europe, 155–164; Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “‘Barbarossa and His Army Who Came to Succor All of Us’: Ottoman and French Views of Their Joint Campaign of 1543-1544,” French Historical Studies, 30 (2007):395–425; Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar, eds., Süleymân the Second and His Time, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1993). 648Isom-Verhaaren, “Barbarossa and His Army Who Came to Succor All of Us,” 396. 649Palabıyık, “Türkiye’de Savaş Düşüncesi,” 192–196. 650Amira K. Bennison, “The Ottoman Empire and its Precedents from the Perspective of the English School Theory,” in International Society and the Middle East, eds. Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2009, 55. 224
“was widely used for the legitimization of mundane wars fought for the establishment and consolidation of the Ottoman state.”651 As Lowry noted, the
Ottomans’ materialistic understanding of war was not one of short-term booty and plundering like that of Attila the Hun or the Moguls. The Ottomans established imârets (soup kitchens), bridges, mosques, zâviyyes, hans, kervansarays, and hammâms in the conquered territories. Hacı Evrenos, the leader of the Ottoman akıncı forces that conquered northern Greece, is a good example of this. He was, in
Lowry’s words, “an accomplished state builder rather than a simple semi-nomadic leader intent on the short-term acquisition of slaves and booty.”652 Ottoman history is full of similar examples, including Gazi Süleyman Paşa, Gazi Burak, Gazi Mihal, and Gazi İsa Bey.
By the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman engagement in wars on two fronts, with the Hapsburgs in the West and the Safavids in the East, led to serious defeats.
The rise of the Duchy of Muscovy as a strong rival in the European international system was another complication. Continuous defeats in the long wars of the seventeenth century not only led to materials losses, but also to losses of morale and prestige. During these years, Ottoman reformist intellectuals like Katip Çelebi,
İbrahim Müteferrika, Defterdar Sarı Mehmet Paşa, and Giritli Ahmed Resmi Efendi all searched for ways to reclaim the glorious days of the Empire. 653 During this era,
651Palabıyık, “Türkiye’de Savaş Düşüncesi”, 187. 652Lowry, The Shaping of the Ottoman, 258–260. 653Stephen Turnbull, The Ottoman Empire 1326-1699, (London: Osprey Publishing, 2003); Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, 98–118; Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire—A Short History, trans. Shelley Frisch, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2009), 83–108; Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream—The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1800-1923, (London: John Murray, 2005), 1–328; Martin Sicker, The Islamic World in Decline—From the Treaty of Karlowitz to the Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 1–88; Virginia Aksan, “War and Peace” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. 3, The Later Ottoman Empire 1603–1839, ed. 225
there was also growing desire for peace—sulhiyye. In the poems and writings of the age, as Palabıyık argues, there was constant praise of peace. From the Treaty of
Zitvatorok (Zsitvatorok) of 1606, which ended the long-lasting war with the
Hapsburgs, to the French Revolution, Ottomans retreated from the idea of war.
5.1.1.5 The Ottoman Military Modernization and Acculturation
The first series of reforms began in the military. These reforms were caused by internal and external factors. The defeat of Ottoman forces in successive wars against
European powers and the loss of important territories coupled with internal political and social decentralization led to restorative and radical reformist thinking in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Avigdor Levy notes that the early military reformist thinking was essentially restorative; that is, they were proposed to strengthen the imperial central administration through reformed armed forces to reestablish order and to safeguard the sovereignty of the Empire against its enemies.654 The most famous these were
Koçu Bey, Kâtib Çelebi, and Nâima. Pointing out the inefficiency in the military and administration, these Ottoman writers argued in favor of restoring the central power and military discipline to re-gain the power and prestige of the Empire among great powers.
Suraiya N. Faroqhi, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 81–117; Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1–12; and Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700-1870- An Empire Besieged, (London: Pearson-Longman, 2007). 654Avigdor Levy, “Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century,” Middle Eastern Studies, 18 (1982): 227–231. 226
As noted, the backbone of the Ottoman military organization was the Janissaries and the Timarli Sipahis. Over time, corps lost their ordering principles and became corrupt. The Janissary corps, which mainly had been made up of devshirme converts who were subjected to strict training, were highly disciplined and admirably devoted to the absolute rule of the Sultans, eventually was filled with ordinary jobless
Muslim civilians and peasants. Since they were not professional soldiers, these civilians were more concerned with their privileges. Because of administrative laxity,
Timariots, on the other hand, were given to non-military purposes. Moreover, the timar holders and sipahis, who were supposed to be ready for war, became involved in trade and other businesses rather than military training and preparation. The two main corps of the army, which had brought it so many successes, were undisciplined and disintegrated. Coupled with the burden on the treasury, the Ottoman military capability was in decline.
The first reforms began under the reign of Sultan Murad IV (1623-1649), followed by those of the grand viziers—the Köprülü family (1656-1702)—were effective.
Central administrative control over the frontal and peripheral areas was re- established, while the military was brought under strict discipline and training. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the Ottoman loss of territories to the north of the Danube to Austria and then the loss of its control of the Black Sea to
Russia made it clear that reactionary restorative reforms were not enough.
Carl Max Kortepeter notes that the years between the Peace Treaty of Belgrade in
1739 and the Ottoman Russian war of 1768 was “the real test of whether or not the
227
Ottoman state would respond to the Age of Reason in the military field.”655 During the Ottoman military modernization, technological and tactical acculturation with
Europe increased. The first European expert serving in the Empire was Comte
Claude Alexander de Bonneval. Bonneval was able to modernize the Humbaraci corps into modern artillery corps. He came to be known as Humbaraci Ahmet Paşa.
Bonneval also established engineering and gunnery schools. He was followed by
Baron de Tott, who formed an artillery regiment know as Süratçi. The continuing
Ottoman defeats required more extensive and radical reforms.656
Inspired by Koca Yusuf Paşa’s guard of captives in the Russian campaign of 1791,
Selim III decided to establish a new corps trained along western lines. Nizam-ı Cedid and (new army – order) were based on completely new thinking, despite their failure as a reform process; they represented a departure from the conservative reformist thinking of earlier times, which revolved around reviving the classical institutions.
Nizam-ı Cedid army was a “nucleus” of a larger project. This new corps was recruited from unemployed Turks and German and Russian renegades. The major problem was the antagonistic reaction to the corps of the conservative forces of the army—janissaries and the society—the ulema. Despite plans for forming a completely separate force under separate command, the Nizam-ı Cedid corps was put under the Bostanniyan-ı Hassa corps, the élite infantry guard. A separate treasury to support equipment and training of the corps was founded under the name Irad-ı
655Carl Max Kortepeter, “Did the Turks Attain Enlightenment Through Defeat in Warfare?” Balkan Studies, 40 (1999): 137. 656Rolston, Importing the European Army, 43–78; Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 20–21; Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans—From Osman to Atatürk (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009), 81–128. 228
Cedid. The new corps started training in Levend Çiftlik.657 Its first test came with the
French invasion of Egypt in 1798; the success of these forces of Selim III enlarged the forces. The overthrow of the Sultan in 1807 by conservatives led to the dissolution of the corps.
Mahmut II attempted a more radical and controversial remodeling of the army modeled on the Prussian and Russian systems, but he met with violent opposition by the janissary corps. He forcibly suppressed the janissaries; this event is known as the
Vaka-i Hayriye. Once the major obstacle to reforms was cleared, he continued to reform of the army along Prussian lines. The ultimate aim of these reforms was to strengthen the central state by building of a modern army and modern governance.658
These radical reforms required financing well beyond the limits of the Ottoman treasury. Since the imperial economy depended on taxation, money could only be generated by reforming the taxation system and the central and provincial bureaucracy. Additionally, improved communications and transportation networks were required to extend government control. Educated and professionalized civil and army personnel were other important aspects of the reforms.659 Military hierarchy was also reorganized. The Sultan assumed full power to appoint the head of the new
657Stanford J. Shaw, “The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III,” The Journal of Modern History, 37 (1965):291–306; Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 20–21; Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün Hattı Hümayunları—Nizam-ı Cedit—1789-1807 [Selim III Hattı Humayuns - Nizam-ı Cedit - 1789-1807], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), 43–94; Sipahi Çataltepe, 19. Yüzyıl Başlarında Avrupa Dengesi ve Nizam-ı Cedit Ordusu [European Balance and the Nizam-ı Cedit at the Beginning of the 19th Century], (Istanbul: Göçebe Yayınları, 1997), 73–94.; Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 81–128; Christopher Tuck, “All Innovation Leads to Hellfire: Military Reforms and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 31 (2008):467–502. 658M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, (Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 55–108; Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 81–128. 659Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 55–108; Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 81–128. 229
Mansure troops Serasker (the commander in chief). This transformation terminated the traditional autonomy of the different corps in the Ottoman army and assured the political power of the Sultan. In a way, the Nizam-i Cedid army was revived under a new name, Sekban-ı Cedid, and then by Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-i
Muhammediye.660 The changing international system and the European powers’ move toward society proved that reform in the military was not enough to protect the
Empire against new threats. It was evident that the Empire needed to adapt itself to the changes in Europe.
5.1.1.6 The Ottoman Perceptions of War from 1789 to 1856
During 1600s and 1700s, Ottomans, exhausted due to wars, visualized war negatively. War was no longer seen as a viable option or tool to achieve the Imperial interests. In the 1800s, the Porte carefully followed the change in the European inter- state system into a society of states under the supervision of the Great Powers. They realized that they had to be a part of this change, and to do that they had to change as well. There was a considerable change in the Ottoman understanding – a move from security through power to security through order. This shift becomes clear in the writings of the reformist élite and specifically in those of the Mehmed Sadık Rıfat
Paşa.
Mehmed Sadık Rifat Paşa held important positions in the Tanzimat era such as the
Undersecretary of the State for Foreign Affairs (Amedi Vekili). In his draft of
660Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 55–108; Uyar and Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans, 81–128. 230
reforms, he noted that European-style reforms were essential for the Empire since the
European system had been altered. In his analysis, the newly enforced European inter-state system after the Congress of Vienna was defined as a “civilization”
(sivilizasyon). According to Mehmed Sadık Rifat Paşa, this new conception directed by the Great Powers was not only aimed at preserving peaceful and orderly relations between European powers, but also at limiting the destruction of wars.661 The
Ottoman Turkish translation of sivilizasyon, if interpreted in terms of the ES theoretical understanding, gets close to Bull’s conception of an international society.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottomans tried to resolve internal and external conflicts by peaceful means and to avoid wars at all costs. When wars proved to be inevitable, the Ottoman ruling élite either tried to assure support of one or more powers through concluding short-term flexible military alliances, acted in concert, or used strategic retreat. The protection of its sovereignty and the prevention of foreign intervention on behalf of its Christian community were the major concerns of the Empire. The reformist élites’ strong belief in the reform process and its smooth progress without interruption can be counted as other reasons for the Ottoman preference of peaceful means over war. Another important departure from the earlier periods was the legitimization of wars on European public law.
661Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought—A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, (Syracuse: Princeton University Press, 2000), 179–180. For original source as cited Mehmed Sadık Rifat Paşa, Muntahabat-ı Âsar, vol. 2, vol. 7, vol. 8, 3–4, 67, and 35, respectively, in Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700–1870—An Empire Besieged, (London: Pearson Longman, 2007), 83–179. See also, Mehmed Sadık Rifat Paşa, Müntahabât-ı Âsar - Ahvaline Dair Takvimhane- i, (İstanbul: Âmire Matbaası, 1859).
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5.1.1.6.1 Avoiding Wars at All Costs: French Occupation of Egypt
The Ottoman policy of avoiding wars becomes evident in the French occupation of
Egypt. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, contrary to Ottoman expectations, the major threat to the integrity of the Empire came from the Empire’s old esteemed ally – France and not from Russia.662 The Ottoman élite used all possible diplomatic means to resolve the conflict without use of force, but the deliberate
French act of aggression made war unavoidable.
The Ottoman administration, alarmed by the rumors of the French involvement in the
Balkans and settlement in the Ionian Islands, tried to find out the truth about the
French naval preparations at Toulon through use of its intelligence networks and diplomats abroad.663 Despite assurances given by the representative of Russia on the reliability of the information, the Ottoman administration preferred to wait until the
French acted. The Ottomans were expecting the French to occupy Albania, while the
British were expecting an attack on the British Isles.664
On 21 July 1798, Seyyid Âli Efendi, Ottoman Ambassador in Paris, met with the
French Foreign Minister Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord. He informed
662Adriana Stiles, Napoleon, France and Europe, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993), 1–7. 663 Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New—The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789– 1807, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 250–256; Leften Stavro Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966); A. L. Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774–1923, (Seminar Studies in History), Revised Edition (London: Longman, 1996), 10–11; Christopher Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt, (New York: Harper Row, 1962); İsmail Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri (1789–1802) [The French Revolution and Franco-Turkish Diplomatic Relations 1789–1802], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 205; Wajda Sendesni, Regard de L’Historiographie Ottomane sur la Révolution Française et L’Expédition d’Egypte – Tarih-i Cevdet, Les Cahiers du Bosphore XXVII (Istanbul: Les Editions Isis, 2003), 77–130. 664 Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri, 188. 232
Talleyrand that the Empire could not remain indifferent to any act of aggression within its borders. Talleyrand assured Seyyid Âli Efendi that as long-time allies they would not act against the Porte. He also told Seyyid Âli Efendi that the French navy was prepared to occupy the island of Malta, which had become a pirate base in the
Mediterranean.665 In his conversations with Talleyrand, Âli Efendi was convinced that the French were speaking the truth.666
Meanwhile, the French chargé d’affairs in Istanbul was invited to the house of Âtıf
Efendi, the Reis-ül Küttab, on receipt of the information that the Directory was recruiting personnel with knowledge of Arabic in the French force in Toulon. The
French chargé d’affairs affirmed Ottoman suspicions about the recruitment of Arabic speakers in the French force in Toulon. By referring to the complaints made by
French merchants against the Memlük Beys and the commercial importance of Egypt for France, he personally noted that there was a likelihood that the French navy might be heading to Egypt. The Reis Efendi, in response, reminded him that the international code of conduct and respect between states required the State of France to direct its complaints to the Porte. He added that had this been done, Porte would have punished those who were guilty. While these conversations were going on, the
French expeditionary force under the direction of Napoleon Bonaparte was already on its way to Egypt.
In 1798, the French force consisting of 35,000 men seized the control of Egypt. This deliberate act of aggression in violation of international law and conduct needed a
665Kuran, Avrupa’da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu, 30. 666Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri, 204–205. 233
strong response. The Porte, however, postponed the declaration of war until it had secured strong European allies and prepared its military. 667 Selim III negotiated with
Britain and Russia. Even after the deliberate act of aggression, some members of the
Ottoman ruling élite favored a peaceful diplomatic arrangement over war.
Particularly, the Vezir-i Âzam and Seyh-ül İslam supported this view.668 The representatives of Prussia, Russia, Austria and Britain were informed of the situation.
Austria, despite its peace with France, guaranteed its neutrality. The British urged the
Porte to cut off its diplomatic ties with France and its Embassy in Istanbul. The relations between the two states were frozen, and the French citizens were confined to their homes until events calmed. 669 After the British fleet, under the command of
Admiral Nelson, defeated the French fleet stationed in the Bay of Aboukir, the Porte decided to officially declare war. The involvement of envoys from Holland, Spain,
Austria and Sweden led to its delay.670 This time, Russia, intending to force the Porte to declare war, anchored its navy in Istanbul. The Ottoman declaration (beyanname) of war against France written by Reis-ül Küttab, Âtıf Efendi was justified on the basis of European norms and international law.671 This was a serious deviation from the
667 Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri, 204–205. 668Shaw, Between Old and New, 263. 669Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet, vol. 3, 1698–1702, (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1966), 1674- 1702; Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri, 240–241. 670Shaw, Between Old and New, 263. 671“Turkish-French friendship is long-lasting. During the French Revolution, while all European powers were enemies of France, the Porte, against the exhortations of other states to act otherwise, declared its neutrality. Ottoman neutrality had been beneficial to France. But later, the Empire was informed of the French army’s provocation of the Ottoman Christians (particularly the Greeks) in the Balkans after it took over Italy. On this occasion, the Porte, through use of the French Embassy in Istanbul, made its complaints. In response, the Directory claimed that this behavior of Bonaparte was not appreciated. However, the sudden pirate-like attack of France on Egypt proves that this had been a lie and a trick. Though the occupiers said that they had no claim over the territories of others, it is known that they made enormous annexations. On the other hand, the explanation of the charge d’affairés of the French Embassy, Monsieur Ruffin, that the objective of the French seizure of Egypt was basically to take revenge upon Memlük Kölemen Beys (against their ill-treatment of the French merchants and subjects residing in Egypt) and to cut off British trade with India was considered to be a pretext. The punishment of Beys is our job and right, not theirs. Britain, on the other side, is our ally 234
Ottoman classical tradition of legitimization on the basis of Jihad. The Porte also demanded the support of other states by proclaiming that this kind of an act of aggression should be considered not only contrary to the established inter-state law, but also a violation of the general (international) peace and order.672 In 1801, combined Ottoman (Nizam-ı Cedid) and British forces defeated the French in Egypt.
Throughout the crisis, Selim III tried to thwart the French occupation through use of diplomacy and negotiation. The French seizure of Egypt, however, once again caused the Porte to take refugee in balance of power politics and Great Power alliances. Despite the fact that there was a deliberate act of aggression violation of international law and infringement of the rights of the Ottoman State highest- ranking officials at the Porte favored resolution of the conflict through diplomatic means. As pointed out by Finkel, during these years peace gained popularity and acceptance over war in the Porte.673 It was likely that the Porte would have opted for conciliation if there had not been strong British and Russian pressure.
and friend. Alhough, at the beginning, Monsieur Ruffin refused to have any information on the issue, later he accepted that he had known the intentions of his country and gave us a copy of the original instruction he received from his government. Monsieur Talleyrand, (the French foreign minister) deceived our Ambassador in Paris, Âli Efendi. In advance, the Porte informed the French that if they attacked Egypt, this would be considered an unfriendly act and a reason to go to war (casus belli) by our side. Under these conditions, the Porte declared war and all French diplomatic personnel unless otherwise stated will reside in the Seven Towers.” See Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri, 244–245 (translation from Turkish to English is mine). 672Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri, 245. 673Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 425. 235
5.1.1.6.2 Preventing Foreign Interference in Internal Uprisings: Serbia and
Greece
The 1804 local insurrection broke out among the Serbs of Belgrade under Ottoman rule. In the nineteenth century, Ottoman central control over peripheral and frontal areas decreased immensely. The unlawful janissary corps called yamaks and dayıs acted autonomously. At the beginning of the Serbian uprisings, the Porte followed a conciliatory approach. The peaceful resolution of the conflict was more favorable to the Empire. The Sultan, accepting the complaints of his Serbian subjects, tried to ameliorate the situation through use of classical methods like changing the administrators, declaring amnesty, increasing the subjects’ rights or forbidding the entry of the yamaks to Belgrade. When these did not work out, the Sultan applied a different policy. The international context and balance of power politics toughened the position of the Empire. The Ottomans regarded the Serbian uprising as an internal matter and were very sensitive about any kind of foreign intervention in their affairs. Selim III did not want to count on any foreign power. For example, in 1806 he refused the Austrian proposal of mediation by Archduke Karl.674 Meanwhile, the
Tsar demanded that the Sultan conclude a strict military alliance with Russia and place his Orthodox–Christian subjects under his formal protection.675 This was also refused. Thereafter, “the non-interference in internal affairs” as a principle of
674Harvey L. Dyck, “New Serbia and the Origins of the Eastern Question, 1751–55: A Habsburg Perspective,” Russian Review, 40 (1981):1–19; Lawrence P. Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813) and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Eastern Question,” Slavic Review, 37 (1978):422–423; Stanford Shaw, “The Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Uprising 1804–1807,” in The First Serbian Uprising, 1804–1813, ed. W. S. Vucinich, (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), 71–94. 675J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question—An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 4th ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940), 181; Barbara Jelavich, History of The Balkans Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 236
international law was highly pronounced by the Ottoman élite. The Sultan, by taking into consideration the general balance of power between the Great Powers of Europe and the local (regional) balance of power in Serbia (between the Serbian militia and ayan – yamak forces), decided to arm Serbs and allied his forces with those of the local Serbian militia against unlawful janissaries. In other words, he carefully exploited the rivalries between internal and external dynamics to achieve his ends.
His aim was to restore order and suppress the powerful opposition of his internal and external rivals, the janissaries and Russia, respectively.
The localized movement transformed into general uprising against the regime of the
Sultan.676 The Serbs, inspired by Franco-Russian provocation, turned against the
Porte. As the Serbs gained success in their fight, Djordje Petrovic (Karageorge), as the leader of the revolt, desired to safeguard Serbian autonomy with foreign support.
Serbian leadership appealed to St. Petersburg and Vienna.677 The Serbian appeal was not welcomed by the two powers that had particular interests at stake.678 In 1801, the
Ottoman Nizam-ı Cedid forces’ victory against the French in Egypt enabled concentration on Serbia. The Sultan, concerned about foreign involvement, decided
676Shaw, “The Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Uprising 1804-1807,” 78; Branimir M. Janković, The Balkans in International Relations, trans. Margot and Boško Milosavljević, (London: Macmillan Press, 1988); Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813),” 422–423. 677Jelavich, History of The Balkans, 197 678A Septinsular Republic under joint Russian-Turkish control was established in the Ionian Islands. Russia was in an advantageous position as it was given important concessions in the Danubian Principalities by Selim III, in line with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774). Tsar Alexander I neither desired to be in conflict with the Ottomans nor lose the confidence of its co-religionist Serbs. So, they refused to assist Serbs in their war against the Sultan. A peaceful resolution of the issue was also more favorable to Austria. Hapsburgs preferred the continuance of the Ottoman rule rather than the establishment of a semi-autonomous or independent Serbia. Emperor Francis I refused Serb appeals for military-political aid and declared neutrality. See Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 246; Janković, The Balkans in International Relations, 60–61; and Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813)”, 422 –423. 237
to resolve the issue tout court, through use of force.679 Meanwhile, all powers having interest in the matter played it out in line with their interests. The French, trying to draw the Porte on its side, provoked the Sultan against Russia.680 Among European powers, only Britain did not have direct interest in the Serbian question; the British
Ambassador at the Porte, Sir Charles Arbuthnot, supported peaceful resolution of the conflict.681 This was the preferable solution on the Ottoman side as well. The Porte tried to reach an agreement with the Serbs. On the negotiations held at Zemun in
May 1804, the Ottomans accepted the majority of the Serbian demands.682 Selim II preferred to resolve the issue before it attracted more foreign intervention. The increasing demands of the Serbs, however, prevented the possibility of peace. The
Serbian demand of a foreign power guarantee for the fulfillment of Ottoman promises was unacceptable for the Porte as it would be infringing Ottoman sovereignty. In the first phase of the uprisings, the order could not be restored.
By 1806, the international context and balance of power started to be shaped in favor of the Serbs. Having no other option, the Porte once again allied with Napoleonic
France. The new sultan succeeding Selim III, Mustafa IV, stood firm on the issue and refused any conciliatory move towards Serbs. While the Napoleonic France’s bid for
679 Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 198. 680 Paul F. Shupp, The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question, 1806–1807, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), 73–74. 681Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813),” 423. 682Serbs demanded: “the dayis to be deprived of power; the yamaks to be forbidden to hold any property outside the cities; the Sultan to officially pardon the Serbs for all their acts and to issue fermans forbidding Ottoman officials from punishing them once order was restored; the Ottoman governors to accept elected knezes as leaders of the rayas and an elected chief knez to represent the Serbs to the Ottoman authorities; the knezes to collect taxes only and the Sultan to avoid arbitrary taxes; the Sultan to guarantee the free exercise of religion and the right to repair all churches and monasteries; the Sultan to abolish taxes and other artificial barriers to free trade and communication within Serbia.” Shaw, “The Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Uprising 1804–1807,” 78–79. 682Shaw, “The Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Uprising 1804-1807,” 78–84. 238
hegemony kept European Great Powers occupied, Mahmud II replaced Mustafa IV in 1809, and the Porte negotiated with the Serbian leadership. Restoration of peace in the region was one of the priorities of the new Sultan. An amnesty was declared and those Serb leaders who returned were appointed as knezes. For a while, events were pacified. Miloš Obrenović rivaled Karageorge and became the oborknez
(administrator) of three major districts. The Ottoman forces left in the region were less than those of the Serbs who were still armed. The reign of terror that continued for years broke the bonds and trust between Muslims and Christians living in
Serbia.683 The second revolt, led by Milos, took place in 1815. The changing conditions and balance of power favored the Serbs. The defeat of Napoleon in 1815 enforced Sultan Mahmud II to declare Serbia autonomous. Maraşlı Ali Paşa, the vali of Rumeli (the governor of Rumelia), negotiated with the Serbs. The settlement resolved a number of problems dating since 1804. Serbs were granted full amnesty, as well as the right to collect their taxes, to bear arms, to travel and trade. A Serbian national skupstina was established, and Milos became the supreme knez (prince) of
Serbia. On Milos’s demand, the Sultan reestablished the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian bishopric, which had been integrated into the Greek Church. A semiautonomous Serbia was recognized.684
Throughout the Serbian uprisings, the Porte, at intervals, applied a conciliatory approach. At the beginning of the first Serbian uprising, the major concern for the
Sultan was the immediate suppression of disobedient yamaks and ayans. As it was considered an internal problem, the direct response was the use of force. The Sultan
683Jelavich, History of The Balkans, 202. 684Jelavich, History of The Balkans, 203. 239
used the local balance of power and allied his forces with those of the Serbs. Then when the Serbs attacked the Porte, while it was busy with France in Egypt, the Sultan pacified his relations with the yamaks-ayans and used them against the rebellious
Serbs. The internationalization of the issue left the Empire with no option other than returning to the general balance of power between Great Powers, given that those powers had started to play off Serbs according to their interests at the Porte. The
Ottoman success together with its allies, Russia and Britain, over France in Egypt was a major relief for the Empire. The Sultan searched for a European ally. As a result of the pacification of its relations with France, the Sultan allied his Empire with that of Napoleon. This alliance and conflicting interests over Serbia brought the
Porte on opposite camps with its former allies, Russia and Britain. The Sultan offered resolution of the conflict through negotiations and diplomacy, to avoid further internationalization of the issue. The Serbs refused all. No option was left then but the use of military power. Over the years, the question of the Serbian uprising remained on the agenda of the Great Powers. Owing to the significantly altered international system and order, the Empire agreed first on a semi-autonomous Serbia and then on an autonomous Serbia. The Ottomans combined use of the institutions was remarkable (the balance between local and general power, diplomacy and war), although, in the end, the Porte lost its complete control over Serbia. At least these primary institutions enabled the Porte to prolong the loss of Serbia and to re-establish order for a while. The Porte now had to deal with a more urgent and complicated issue, the Greek Question.
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The Greek insurgence of 1821 was a more organized movement. A Greek aristocrat called Hypsilanti who was the Russian Tsar’s aide-de-camp and the head of a secret society of the Greeks named Filike Eteria (or Philike Hetairia, the Society of
Friends) started it. According to the plan of the Philike Hetairia, the uprisings were to take place in three different regions: Moldavia and Wallachia (in Romania), the
Morea, and finally in Istanbul.685 The European Great Powers intervention on the side of the revolutionaries led to the internationalization of the Greek issue.686
Like the Serbian uprisings, the Porte viewed the Greek insurgence as an internal matter and sought to resolve it on its own. This was a classical approach, but from the Ottoman point of view, all revolts among its non-Muslim subjects were considered to be internal affairs. To restore order, the Porte changed administrators and decreased taxes. When these measures were not effective, to re-establish order and security in the region, the Porte tried to suppress the revolutionaries through use of force. The Ottoman Empire was acting in line with the common and consented law of the nations and principles of the Concert that stipulated the right of legitimate governments to suppress revolutions. This time, the Great Powers of Europe, to protect their interests, intervened. Having recently resolved the issue of Napoleon and reestablished the international order that had been overthrown by France, they desired to preserve the status quo. Throughout the crisis, the European powers
685For the details of the Greek rebellion and the Eastern Question in general, see Douglas Dankin, The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821–1833, (California: University of California Press, 1973); W. Alison Phillips, The War of Greek Independence, 1821 to 1833, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1897); Harry J. Psomiades, The Eastern Question: The Last Phase, (Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II, Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 686See Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile—The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922, (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1995).
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followed a delicate “balance of diplomacy” along with “balance of power.” Greece and the Ottoman Empire were strategically important for the preservation of the
European international society and order. Any kind of change in this region could challenge and threaten the political and economic interests of the Concert Powers.
As the fighting intensified between the Turks and Greeks, the Russian Tsar,
Alexander I, demanded that he be allowed to intervene for the protection of his
Orthodox Christian fellows. As pointed out by Erik J. Zürcher, “Tsar Alexander, one of the principal architects of the international order established in 1815, set too much store by the international ‘system’ to intervene unilaterally against the wishes of the other powers.”687 The Greek crisis posed a serious threat to the general peace of
Europe. Metternich worked to prevent any power, especially Russia, from unilaterally interfering on behalf of the Greeks. The British had commercial and strategic interests involved. They convinced the Tsar that his interests would be best served if the Ottoman Empire and the existing system were preserved. The Tsar agreed with them and did not interfere. The new Tsar, Nicholas I, the brother of
Alexander I, initiated a change in the Russian foreign policy. At this time, the
Ottoman Sultan asked for the help of his nominal vassal, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, the governor of Egypt.688 Mehmet Ali Paşa had a strong army and navy. The Sultan was aware of Mehmet Ali Paşa’s desire for autonomy, but, for the time being, he needed his help, and he was the strongest among the Sultan’s local powers. In this way, the Sultan hoped not only to appease him, but also to control him for a while.
Mehmet Ali Paşa sent his son İbrahim Paşa to suppress the Greek revolt in Morea,
687Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey—A Modern History, (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1993), 36. 688Gilbert Sinoue, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa – Son Firavun [Le Dernier Pharaon—The Last Pharaoh], trans. A. C. Akkoyunlu, (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 1997). 242
for which he was promised by the Sultan the island of Crete. İbrahim Paşa successfully put down the revolt. Once more, Russia was prevented from interfering unilaterally.689 The British called for a concerted act against the Ottomans.690
Austria, suspicious of both Russia and Britain, remained opposed to any intervention in Ottoman internal affairs. The French, on the other hand, also wanted to play a role in the Near East to protect its financial and strategic interests. It formally joined the
Anglo-Russian partnership in 1827. The three powers sent an ultimatum to the Porte.
The Ottomans’ refusal resulted in the European blockade of the Morea peninsula and burning of the Egyptian-Ottoman fleet at Navarino.691
The Ottoman government, in response, repudiated the Convention of Akkerman
(1826) with Russia. The last phase of the revolt was characterized by the Russo-
Turkish War of 18281830. The war lasted until the Ottomans were obliged to sign peace in 1829.692 The Treaty of Edirne (Adrinople) reaffirmed the provisions of the
Convention of Akkerman,693 and the Porte was forced to recognize Greek autonomy.
Finally, in 1830 the New London Protocol provided the establishment of a totally independent Greek state, and two years later the allies brought Prince Otto of Bavaria to the throne of Greece.694
689 Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1815–1914, 44–57. 690Rich, Great Power Diplomayc 1815-1914, 44–57. 691Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1815-1914, 44–57. 692Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1815-1914, 44–57. See also J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question—A Historical Study in European Diplomacy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969). 693 The Convention of Akkerman concluded on October 7, 1826. It resulted in a reiteration of the conditions of the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) concerning the privileged status of the Danubian principalities and the autonomy of Serbia. Russian influence over the Caucasus and the free passage of Russian commercial vessels in Ottoman territorial waters and waterways, including the Straits, were added as new conditions. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 29. 694Rich, Great Power Diplomacy 1815-1914, 44–57. 243
During the Greek revolution, all the Great Powers except Prussia in one way or another had rivaling and conflicting geo-strategic interests in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans. The major source of contention among these powers was the question of Russia. They mitigated the conflict by use of multilateral diplomacy and joint use of force (collective security).695 In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman
Empire, like Austria, continued to be an ardent supporter of the principle of non- interference. In this case, the role played by the Great Powers, the multilateral diplomacy, and their joint use of force against another sovereign Great Power
(though declining) is exemplary because, according to Nicholas Onuf, this “repeated intervention in Turkey had produced a ‘special custom’ as an exception to the general rule of non-intervention.”696 The European powers’ political or military intervention in Ottoman territories was regarded as deliberate violation of international law and infringement of the Porte’s sovereign rights.
5.1.1.6.3 Concerted Intervention: The Egyptian, Lebanese and Holy Places
Crises
The first and second Egyptian crises between 1831 and 1841 were, in the modern sense, civil wars resulting from the claims of Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa against his nominal ruler, Mahmud II. In the words of Schroeder, “The Near Eastern crises of
695Benjamin Miller and Karina Kagan, “The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era,” International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1997):66 –68. 696 Nicholas Onuf, “Humanitarian Intervention: The Early Years” (paper presented at the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies Symposium on the Norms and Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, University of California, Irvine, California, May 5, 2000), www.socsci.uc.edu/qpacs/onufhumanitarain.pdf. 244
the 1830s seemed like those in Spain and Portugal: the product of a civil war within the Ottoman Empire complicated by great-power contests for influence in it.”697 He also added that the Eastern one differed on one major point as it “put both the
Ottoman Empire and the European equilibrium at risk.”698 Encouraged by the weakness of the Ottoman Empire during the Greek Revolution and disappointed by his gains in support of the Empire, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa decided to overthrow the Sultan. In 1831, Mehmet Ali699 attacked Syria. The French, with the Drovetti
Project,700 supported Mehmet Ali. The Drovetti Project was a plan drafted by the
French in cooperation with Mehmet Ali aimed at establishment of a joint rule over
Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli.701 The French, on the other hand, being afraid of unilateral Russian intervention, urged the British to save the Ottoman Empire.702 The
French played a double-sided policy.703 Mehmet Ali’s forces under the command of his son Ibrahim Paşa were successful. Mahmud II’s forces were defeated at Nizip on
June 24, 1839. The rising Egypt was a threat to Ottoman and European integrity. As discussed in Chapter Two, the European international society of the nineteenth century was established to preserve the common interests of the five Great Powers and the status quo and to prevent self aggrandizement by one power at the expense of others. The European balance of power was the fundamental primary institution upon
697Schroeder, The Tranformation of European Politics, 726. 698Schroeder, The Tranformation of European Politics, 726. 699Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali, (Australia: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 36–73. 700This plan took its name from Monsieur Drovetti, the French Consul in Egypt. 701Al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign, 219–220; M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774- 1923—A Study in International Relations, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966), 77; Stuart T. Miller, Mastering Modern European History, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave, 1997), 136. 702Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 727. 703Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 32; Stephen Pierce Hayden Duggan, The Eastern Question—A Study in Diplomacy, (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002); Şinasi Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı Mısır Meselesi 1831-1841; I. Kısım [Mehmed Ali Pasha of Kavala, The Egyptian Issue 1831-1841, Part One], Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), 31; Abl El Satar El Badri, The European System and the Egyptian Question 1827–1841: A Study in the Theory of Balance of Power, (Ph.D. diss., Bilkent University, 1996), 141. 245
which the other four primary institutions were built.704 This delicate balance was achieved by combined mechanics of alliances, diplomacy, arbitration, military intervention and reciprocal compensation (or “proportional aggrandizement” in the words of Gulick)705. In one way or another, all of these were closely tied to the protection of the Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
The Sublime Porte made use of the primary institutions of the European international society simultaneously rather than searching for a unilateral or diplomatic bilateral solution. It acted in concert with the interested Great Powers. The Sultan, on the one hand, approached Britain, France and Russia to resolve the issue through diplomacy with bilateral alliances or arbitration. The Ottomans also requested a concerted diplomacy or military action to reestablish law and order. On the other hand, the
Porte was prepared for a unilateral military intervention. This was a diversion from the Ottoman attachment to the principle of “non-intervention in its internal affairs.”
The Porte and the Sultan preferred and requested European involvement in the approaching crisis by putting aside their concerns about foreign interference in the
Empire’s internal affairs. Mahmud II tried to exploit the European local balance of power as much as he could. From the Ottoman viewpoint, Prussia was considered to be too disinterested and militarily weak to influence the course of the events. Austria seemed agreeable, but did not have a strong navy and fleet. France was among the preferable choices, but its well-known connections to and diplomatic support of
Mehmet Ali drew it out of consideration. The only options left to the Porte were two diplomatically and politically influential European states with strong military and
704Bull, The Anarchical Society, 101–127. 705 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1955). 246
naval power: Britain and Russia. First Britain was to be called; in case the British refused to be intermingled in the Egyptian affair, then the Porte would appeal to
Russia.706 The Ottoman appeal conveyed by its Ambassador in London, Namık Paşa, was declined.707 Still Namık Paşa tried to draw the British to the side of the Empire over the French occupation of Algiers. The British Foreign Minister and Prime
Minister responded that it was not the right time to discuss the matter as they were occupied with insurrections in Portugal and Belgium. The British King in his response reiterated his concerns over growing relations between the Porte and
Russia. Namık Paşa responded by saying that the Porte was also aware of the danger posed by Russia to its territorial integrity and sovereignty, but under the circumstances the Russian offer of help could not be overlooked by either the Sultan or by the Porte.708 The issue of Algiers was also brought to the attention of the
French by Mustafa Reşit Paşa, the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris; however, this effort was met with disinterest.709
Mahmud II, informed of the result of his negotiations in London, decided to play off the European powers against each other.710 The Sultan’s intention was not to accept the Russian help but to change the international circumstances to his favor and to bring the Egyptian case to the European agenda. Namık Paşa visited France and
706 Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, 80–81. 707Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 727–728; Duggan, The Eastern Question, 83– 84. 708Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, 93–94. 709Bayram Kodaman, Les Ambassades de Moustapha Réchid Pacha á Paris, (Ankara: TTK, 1991), 37–45. 710As noted by Şinasi Altundağ, although there are references to the reports sent by Namık Paşa from London, the originals could not be found in the archives, Hattı Hümayun, Sandık No. 220, date 10 Zilka’de (11th of the Arab months), 1248. Therefore this information is based on observation of Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, 91. 247
continued his search for an ally there.711 Ibrahim’s forces advanced toward Anatolia and occupied Kütahya in 1833. The Porte continued with its overtures to curb the
French support to Egypt. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured the Porte that they would intervene if İbrahim did not stop at Adana. The French navy was already dispatched to the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the Ottoman forces under
Reşit Mehmet Paşa were almost destroyed by those of İbrahim.712 The French offered their unilateral mediation to the Porte via their chargé d’affaires in Istanbul,
Monsieur de Varennes. The Sultan welcomed this offer, and the French intervened diplomatically on behalf of the Ottomans, but Mehmet Ali refused to collaborate.713
Russia, informed of the result of the Ottoman approaches in London, renewed its offer this time officially through the Tsar’s envoy General Muraviev. The Tsar declared the Viceroy of Egypt a rebel against his ruler and offered his help and full support to the Sultan in this matter. Mahmud II was concerned over the real Russian intentions and rejected the Russian offer. However, he kept the rejection secret since the French, concerned about growing Russian influence over the Porte, were trying to resolve the issue through the arbitration of the French emissary, Vice Admiral
Baron de Roussin.714
The Sultan also preferred resolution of the conflict through third-party mediation and negotiation, but the third-party efforts of the French, the Russian and the Porte’s
711Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, 93–94. 712Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, 93–94. 713Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 727. 714Duggan, The Eastern Question, 84–85. Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, 122. 248
envoys (Halil Rıfat Paşa and Reşit Bey) failed.715 Mehmet Ali refused to concede and threatened the Porte with marching his forces to Istanbul if his wishes were not accepted. Mahmud II appealed to Russia, and on February 20, 1833 the Russian fleet anchored in the Bosporus. The Russian troops also moved into the Danubian principalities. On July 8, 1833 the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi was concluded between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire. It was a defensive alliance but
“practically made [the Porte] a feudatory of the Czar.”716 The majority of the
European Great Powers saw the OttomanRussian treaty as a threatening advance on the side of Russia. The rumors that the Ottoman Empire had become a protégé of St.
Petersburg alarmed all powers.717
Britain and France718 were anxious over the freedom of passage of the Russian warships through the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean at all times, making Russia
715Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa, 100–101. 716Duggan, The Eastern Question, 85 (parenthesis added and mine). 717The most contested articles of this treaty were Article 3 and its separate article. “Article 3: In consequence of the principle of conservation and mutual defense, which is the basis of the present Treaty of Alliance, and by reason of a most sincere desire of securing the permanence, maintenance and entire independence of the Sublime Porte, his majesty the Emperor of all Russians, in the event of circumstances occurring which should again determine the Sublime Porte to call for the naval and military assistance of Russia… engages to furnish, by land and by sea, as many troops and forces as the two high contracting parties may deem necessary. It is accordingly agreed, that in this case the land and sea forces, whose aid the Sublime Porte may call for, shall be held at its disposal. Separate Article: In virtue of one of the clauses of the first Article of the Patent Treaty of Defensive Alliance concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two high contracting parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, as his majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, wishing to spare the sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it, by affording substantial aid , will not ask for that aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it, the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in the place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the patent Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever. The present Separate and Secret article shall have the same force and value as if it was inserted word for word in the Treaty of Alliance of this day.” See M. S. Anderson. ed., The Great Powers and the Near East 1774-1922 - Documents of Modern History, (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), 42–44. 718See Duggan, The Eastern Question, 85; Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 34–35. 249
invincible at war. Further explanations were demanded by London and Paris of the secret clause of the alliance treaty. Another Great Power mediation attempt was carried out by Austrian, British and French ambassadors. The Sultan accepted a settlement over Syria but refused to give Kilikya (Cilicia) to Mehmet Ali. The Porte accepted to act in cooperation with the Concert Powers and requested them to negotiate a peace treaty with Mehmet Ali on its behalf. This was a remarkable move for the Porte, which signaled a greater convergence of the European and Ottoman interests. A Convention was signed in 1840 which offered international guarantees for the Ottoman integrity. The peace proposals of the allies were rejected by Egypt, and combined Ottoman and British forces landed in Syria. İbrahim’s forces were defeated and forced to retreat. Mehmet Ali accepted giving up the conquered lands and his claims over Ottoman territories. In return, the Porte declared him as the hereditary ruler of Egypt.719 The Egyptian crises were turning points in the European realization that the Porte should be an insider of the Concert and the European international society for the sake of European order. In fact, the 1840 Convention materialized this change of understanding on paper.
The Lebanese crisis (18401845) was an extension of Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa’s revolt against the Porte. The two cases are intertwined. The ruling family of Mount
Lebanon was chosen among the Christians. For years, local rivalry and hatred revolved around two major groups: the Maronites and the Druzes. By the end of the eighteenth century, the local balance of power was in favor of the Druzes and the region came under the control of emirs (princes) of the Şihabi (Shibâb Shebab)
719Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1815-1914, 72–74. 250
family, a tribe claimed to be descendants of the Prophet Mohammed.720 Emir Başir II of the Şihabis was a man of politics and diplomacy who cleverly exploited every possible opportunity. In the words of Temperley, “He was indeed Christian, Druse or
Turk as it suited his purpose.”721 When İbrahim Paşa occupied Syria, the local balance of power in the region toppled down and Bashir II sided with Mehmet Ali
Paşa and the French. The gap between Druzes and Maronites enlarged. The majority of the Druzes moved into the Ottoman camp. The Syrian Serasker (commander in chief of the Ottoman forces) declared Emir a rebel and replaced him with Numan
Canbulat (Janblat).722 Başir had to rely on the support of the Maronites and İbrahim.
Staring from the late 1830s onwards, the European Great Powers’ interest in the affairs of Syria and Lebanon revived. The rivalry between France and Britain in the
Levant was not something new. The French were involved in the region long before the British and were widely established with their clergy, missionaries, merchants and consulates. The changing British perception of the 1840s was briefly expressed by the following statement: “Syria is the key of the Levant and the Lebanon is the key of Syria.”723 The British, in order to get a stronghold in the region, decided to use religion as a vehicle. Britain, concerned about putting an end to the rule of İbrahim, armed and provoked the Druzes while the French armed the Maronites. The first
720Caesar E. Farah, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830–1861, (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), 4; Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 133; Harold Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea, (London: Longmans Green, 1936), 177–178. 721 Temperley, England and the Near East, 177. 722Farah, The Politics of Interventionism, 14. 723According to Harold Temperley, these were the words of Lord Palmerston. See Temperley, England and the Near East, 70. The same statement is found in the London Morning Chronicle, August 9, 1845. The same expression can be found in Colonel Rose’s dispatch to the British Foreign Service, No.73, 23 July 1841, FO 78/456. Whether it is the words of Lord Palmerston or Colonel Rose or a comment in the London Morning Chronicle, it represents very well the British view with regard to Lebanon and Syria. 251
disturbances started in 1834 and later led to the insurgencies of the 1840s against
Bashir II and Mehmed Ali’s forces.724 The Sultan, who desired to reestablish his control over Syria, once again requested the support of the Great Powers through his diplomatic networks in European capitals.725 The Druzes, who had been unhappy with Başir’s rule and the occupation of the Egyptians, started the uprising in Dayr al-
Qamar.
The Porte, through an order of the Sultan (buyrultu), tried to re-establish control and end cleavages in the area. The buyrultu dated June 23, 1840 assured the communities that the Porte would respect all previous privileges and rights if they supported the
European allies’ efforts to drive out the Egyptians.726 The Sultan acted together with the Quadruple Alliance of Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia on the pacification of the Levant. The Porte’s move was directed by its fears of the spread and transition of the uprisings into an organized movement to oust the Porte. The Sultan needed the support of the Quadruple Alliance to end the bloodshed, to defeat the Egyptians and to reinstate his rule. The introduction of the convention signed in London on July 15,
1840 by Plenipotentiaries of the Porte and the four powers formally expressed the importance of the territorial integrity and safety of the throne of the House of Osman for European international order and peace.727
724Farah, The Politics of Interventionism, 22–24. 725Farah, The Politics of Interventionism, 23–32. 726Farah, The Politics of Interventionism, 37. 727“In the Name of the Most Merciful God, His Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, to ask their support and assistance in the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reason of hostile proceedings of Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt, - difficulties which threaten with danger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Sultan’s throne,- Their said Majesties, moved by the sincere friendship which subsists between them and the Sultan; animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe; faithful 252
The use of force by the Quintuple Alliance of Britain, Ottoman Empire, Russia,
Austria and Prussia was justified on the ground that it aimed to preserve the local
(the Levant) and general (international) balance of power, the international order and thus the existence of the international society.728 In this case, the Porte, by acting together with the European powers, showed that it shared the interests of the four
European powers, that is, the preservation of the status quo and order. The Porte also desired to survive, and likewise the European powers preferred the survival of the
Ottoman Empire. The convergence of their interests made cooperation in this case possible.
The concerted intervention reinstalled the Ottoman regime and the balance of power in the region. The protégé system used by the Great Powers to control the local groups placed the Orthodoxies under Russian, the Druzes and Protestants under
British and the Maronites and other Catholic groups under Austrian and French de facto protection.729 The Muslim population of the area was left to the possession of the Porte. In a small region like Lebanon, the areas of influence blurred and the Great
Power interests clashed. The British and the French continued to rival each other for mastery in the Levant. All of these led to confrontations and proxy wars among the local groups and protégées. These strained relations between the Porte and the Great
Powers, particularly in relation to Ottoman sovereignty.
to the engagement which they contracted by the Collective Note presented to the Porte by their Representatives at Constantinople, on the 27th of July, 1839; and desirous, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which would be occasioned by a continuance of the hostilities which have recently broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pacha of Egypt and the subjects of the Sultan; Their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have resolved, for the aforesaid purpose, to conclude together a Convention.” See Albrecht-Carrié, The Concert of Europe, 134. 728Bull, The Anarchical Society, 200–227. 729Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire, (London: John Murray, 1995), 113. 253
After the defeat of the Egyptian forces in Lebanon in 1840, Bashir III replaced
Bashir II. Another fight broke out between the Maronites and the Druzes. The
Druzes wanted to regain their lost political influence in Lebanon. The Porte intervened to depose Bashir III and assert their political rule. A viable solution had to be found that would satisfy all concerned: the locals, the Great Powers and the
Ottomans. Otherwise, the Porte would have to deal with increasing foreign intervention. After exchanging views with the European powers, long meetings
(Sahilhane, meeting) and negotiations, the Porte accepted a plan for bi-communal autonomy. Mount Lebanon was divided into a northern district administered by a
Maronite governor (kaymakam) and a southern district administered by a Druze
(1842). The tensions between the communities erupted in 1845. The Porte imposed a general disarmament with the Règlement of Shekib Efendi. However, violent disturbances continued in the region.730
The ensuing crises over the Holy Places and the Crimean War of 1853–1856 reflected the deeper tensions and diplomatic problems of the European order. The historical debate over the origins and details of the war still continues. The arguments as to the causes are varied. Some blame French and Russian expansionism
(specifically pan-Orthodoxy and pan-Slavism); others blame overall Great Power politics. The dominance of Russophobes in the British and French government circles, the clashes of personalities, the inability of the statesmen in conflict management and resolution, the Ottoman diplomatic incapability, the clash of liberalism with conservatism and the preservation of the European balance of power
730 Farah, The Politics of Interventionism, 1–30; Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 133–134; Temperley, England and the Near East, 169–198. 254
are counted among the causes of the war. 731 To quote Harold Temperley, a century later “the origins of the Crimean War are not even yet wholly revealed.”732 Although the war is depicted as an unnecessary or accidental conflict, underneath the Holy
Sites dispute, deeper issues were at stake. This conflict was a part of the European concern over control of the Ottoman territories and straits. To quote Henry Kissinger,
“The real causes of the war were deeper, however. Religious claims were in fact pretexts for political and strategic designs.”733 M. S. Anderson, more or less in a similar manner, argued that it was the outcome of “a series of struggles between the great powers” of Europe for ascendancy.734 Winifred Baumgart, on the other hand, defined it as “a direct outgrowth of the so-called Eastern Question,” 735 although “in itself this was a petty and absurd affair of only local relevance.”736 Similarly, Shaw noted that it was a part of the greater struggle for mastery in the Middle East.737 It was the involvement of the Great Powers on behalf of the religious communities that led to its internationalization and intensification.
731 Merriman, A History of Modern Europe, 794; Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East, Seventh Edition, (Colorado: Westview, 2002), 152; Grant and Temperley, Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 269–270; Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. 118–123; Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1815-1914, 101–106. See also Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale, (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1991), 1–17; Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 319; A. J. P. Taylor, From Napoleon to the Second International Essays on Nineteenth-Century Europe, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993), 216–220; Vernon J. Puryear, “New Light on the Origins of the Crimean War,” The Journal of Modern History, 3 (1931): 220; Gavin Burns Henderson, Crimean Diplomacy and Other Historical Essays, (Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Company, 1947); Zürcher, Turkey—A Modern History, 55–57; Camile Rousset, Histoire de la Guerre de Crimee, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1887), vol. 1, 1–82 ; Vicomte de Guichen, La Guerre de Crimee (1854–1856) et l’attitude des puissances européennes (Paris: Pedone, 1936), 1–128 ; Adolphe Granier de Cassagnac, Souvenirs du Second Empire, 3 vols. (Paris, 1879–82), vol. 2, 226–227 ; Taxile Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, 6 vols. (Paris : Germer Baillière, 1868-75), Vol. 1, 522-530 ; Pierre de La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, 7 vols., 4th ed. (Paris : E. Pion, 1896–1905), Vol. 1. 732HTemperley, England and the Near East, ix. 733 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 93. 734M. S. Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe—Aspects of European History 1815–1914, (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971), 243. 735Winifred Baumgart, The Crimean War 1853-1856, (London: Arnold, 1999), 3. 736Baumgart, The Crimean War, 10. 737Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 134. 255
The Holy Sites problem arose from a minor and local religious issue, over the division of the rights between the Orthodox and Latin Christian subjects of the
Ottoman Empire in the Holy Lands. Napoleon III argued for their rights to custody of holy sites on behalf of the Latin Christians of the Ottoman Empire – the Great
Church of Bethlehem, the Sanctuary of the Church of the Nativity, the tomb of the
Virgin (St. Mary) in Gethsemane, the Grotto of the Holy Manger, the tombs of
Christian crusaders of the Kingdom of Jerusalem like Baldwin and Godfrey, and the
Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. This led to a crisis with Russia claiming the status of defender of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman realm since the 1774
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.738 The French presented their demands in a diplomatic note.739 The language used in the French note not only indicates the French
738“VII. Though Russia claimed that it was the legitimate protector of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Sultan, in legal terms, there was no written declaration of such a right even in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca as argued by the Tsar. The two articles of the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in question were as follows: The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches, and it also allows the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in favour of the new church at Constantinople, of which mention will be made in Article XIV, as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such representations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly power. XIV. After the manner of the other Powers, permission is given to the High Court of Russia, in addition to the chapel built in the Minister’s residence, to erect in one of the quarters of Galata, in the street called Bey Oglu, a public church of the Greek ritual, which shall always be under the protection of the Ministers of that Empire, and secure from all coercion and outrage.” Thomas Erskine Holland, The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey 1774 to 1853, (London: MacMillan, 1877), 41 and 44. 739Remise par le ministre de France à la Sublime-Porte le 28 mai 1850 (16 redjeb 1266) - Le général de division, ministre de France près la Sublime-Porte, a eu l’honneur de donner lecture a S. E . Aali- pacha, ministre des affaires étrangers de Sa Majesté le sultan, d’une dépêche pêche par laquelle le gouvernement de la République le charge de revendiquer efficacement, en faveur des religieux latins, la possession des lieux saints que l’article 33 des capitulations de 1740 leur a garantie. Ces lieux sont : La grande église de Bethléem, le sanctuaire de la Nativité avec le droit d’y placer une nouvelle étoile, de changer la tapisserie de la grotte, d’y agir, enfin, comme les possesseurs exclusifs. Le tombeau de la sainte Vierge, la pierre de l’onction, les sept arceaux de la sainte Vierge dans l’église du Saint- Sépulcre.Le gouvernement français réclame encore, pour les religieux francs, le droit de réparer la coupole de l’église du Saint-Sépulcre ; et enfin, il demande que dans cette dernière église toutes choses soient remises en l’état ou elles étaient avant l’incendie de 1848. Il prouvera surabondamment que les sanctuaires et les droits ci-dessus énumères appartenaient aux religieux latins en 1740.La franchise et le courage avec lesquels la Sublime-Porte est entrée dans des voies d’améliorations morales et de civilisation, l’adhésion qu’elle a donnée par sa conduit sage et mesure aux grands principes du droit public européen, laissent, au gouvernement français la ferme conviction que, dans cette circonstance, il ne fera pas inutilement appel á la bonne foi et a l’esprit d’équité du 256
upholding of the role of a protector of the Latin Christians in the name of all
European Latin Catholic states, but also supports the changing European perception of the Porte in the mid-nineteenth century. In this sense, paragraph three of the note is essential. In this paragraph, the French Minister reiterated their trust that the
Ottoman Empire as a moral and civilized state would adhere to and respect the major principles of the European public law on the basis of equality. The way the diplomatic language is used in the note indicates the European Great Powers’ growing acceptance of the Ottoman Empire into the European public law and its obedience to the general principles of the laws of the international society. Although the Great Powers of Europe still regarded the Ottoman administration as different, there was a shared understanding of the necessity to bring the Porte into the
European Concert and the international society.
Initially, the Porte was not receptive to the French demands. The Porte replied by saying that in order not to infringe upon the rights of any group, a neutral commission would consider the demands in line with previous international agreements, capitulations and firmans. The Sultan was concerned about the Russian reaction and thus, did not want to enter into another unnecessary war. The Porte sent a note to the French Foreign Minister on December 22, 1850.740 The Ottoman
gouvernement de S.M. impériale, et que celui-ci en fournira une nouvelle preuve par son respect pour les engagements dont la France réclame l’exécution.II mettra de la sorte, et pour toujours un terme a des difficultés sans cesse renaissantes, et à d’interminables récriminations qu’il n’entre certainement pas dans sa pensée de vouloir perpétuer. Note Remise par le ministre de France à la Sublime-Porte le 28 mai 1850 (16 redjeb 1266) in Baron Ignace de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane, avec les puissances étrangères depuis 1536, Tome Troisième—Première Partie (Paris: Amyot, 1868), 229–230. 740Il est certain que la Sublime-Porte a constamment, et de tout temps été dans l’habitude d’exécuter avec droiture et de la meilleure foi du monde ses traites avec les puissances amies, et il n’est pas moins vrai de dire qu’un traite qui n’a subi, a une époque quelconque, aucun changement, aucune modification du consentement des deux parties contractantes, conserve toute sa vigueur dans toutes 257
response presents the Ottoman inclination for the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the issue in line with European public law. The reference to European public law and its application within the Ottoman territories has become an established practice from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Porte became an ardent supporter of diplomacy and European public law in regulating its inter-state relations, specifically those with European powers. This point becomes more evident in the practice and diplomatic correspondence of the Porte in this epoch.
The French, concerned over the possibility that the commission’s decision would confer rights according to treaties and firmans dating earlier than those of 1740, refused the Ottoman proposal with a diplomatic note on January 6, 1851.741 The
French insistence on the reinstitution of the rights of Latins in line with the 1740 capitulatory treaty continued. This time, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Âli, stated that the Porte wished to evaluate the matter impartially on the principles of European public law and the rights of all concerned parties in a mixed commission
ses dispositions. Seulement, et il superflu de le dire, comme tous les Chrétiens des diverses croyances ont part aux saints lieux chrétiens, qui existent a Jérusalem, et qui sont visites par eux, chaque partie est en possession de plusieurs anciens firmans et titres. Cela étant, la Sublime-Porte ne peut naturellement pas prononcer sur cette question qu’au préalable une commission mixte n’ait vu et médite profondément les firmans et autres pièces authentiques et valables qui ont été donnes, soit avant, soit après le traité précité ; et nul doute que le gouvernement français, qui a déjà donne tant de preuves de son amour pour l’équité et la justice, n’apprécie cette excuse bine fondée et ne l’accepte. Note de la Sublime-Porte au ministre de France, en date du 22 décembre 1850 (17 sáfer 1267) in de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane, Tome Troisième—Première Partie, 247. 741Aussi, tout en considérant comme équitable la proposition de S. Exc. Aali-pacha, en tant qu’elle ne concerne que les titres antérieurs a 1740, le ministre de France se voit avec un profond regret, oblige de protester formellement contre l’examen dont il est question de toutes pièces ou actes postérieurs a cette époque. En agissant ainsi, il éprouve le besoin de déclarer qu’il cède a l’accomplissement d’un devoir rigoureux et pénible. En conséquence, et tout renouvelant a S. Exc. Sa protestation formelle, tant au nom de France qu’au nom de la catholicité tout entière, le ministre de al République a l’honneur de lui faire savoir que, ne pouvant accepter en aucune façon la discussion des documents postérieurs aux traités qui lient la France á la Sublime-Porte, il va communiquer a son gouvernement le mémorandum de M. le ministre des affaires étrangères et demander de nouvelles instructions 258
of experts.742 The commission was formed to negotiate the claims, but this strained the relations between the Porte, France and Russia. Under the political pressures of
France and Russia, it was extremely difficult for the Sultan to make an impartial judgment and decision on the issue. The diplomatic activity in Istanbul was intense and diverse. Monsieur Titov, the Russian ambassador, threatened to leave Istanbul with his delegation unless the Tsar’s wishes were accepted. The French Ambassador,
Monsieur de Lavallette, on the other hand, threatened a French naval blockade of the
Dardanelles if the Porte preserved the status quo favoring the Orthodox Christians.
Fuad Efendi, the Reis ül-Küttab, requested the arbitration of Britain in reaching an arrangement that would be agreeable to both states on behalf of Colonel Rose, the chargé d’affaires of the British Embassy. Upon French insistence, a committee consisting of Ottoman diplomats and bureaucrats, the French, and the Greek
Orthodox Christians, assembled to discuss the issue of rights. In the end, the Sultan declared a new firman. Instead of directly agreeing and accepting the Latin claims, the Porte refused these claims over the Holy Places on the ground that these places belonged to all Christians. According to the firman, the common use and reparation of the big dome of the Great Church of Bethlehem was declared to be the responsibility of all Christians, with no differentiation of sects. The use and control of the small dome remained with the Orthodox Christians as it was before; as to the
742La Sublime-Porte, dont l’une des anciennes et constants habitudes est aussi d’observer avec la plus grande loyauté et franchise les traits avec les puissances amies, n’hésite nullement a déclarer de nouvenu que tous les articles du traite conclu l’année 1740 de l’ère chrétienne, les quels n’ont pas été modifies par un autre traite, conservent leur force et vigueur.…, il y a tout lieu d’espérer qu’en se concernant ensemble on pourra aviser aux moyens de résoudre cette question d’une manière conforme a la dignité et aux droits fondes de toutes les parties. Note de la Sublime- Porte au ministre de France (marquis de Lavalette), en date du 29 juin 1851 (29 châban 1267) in de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane, Tome Troisième – Première Partie, 250–251.
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rest of the Holy Places like the tomb of St. Mary, the Grotto of the Holy Manger, the
Church and the Grotto of the Nativity in Bethlehem and that of the Church of the
Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, the Catholic and Orthodox Christians would have equal rights of control and usage.743 Even after this declaration, the details of the issue continued to be a problem between the sides. The Porte assured the French of acceptance of almost all of their demands with a note. Russia, on the other hand, with the Sultan’s firman dated February 9, 1852, was guaranteed of the preservation of the status quo favorable to the Orthodox community. The Orthodoxy, mainly the Greeks of the Empire, celebrated the firman as the “Charter of their Liberties.”744 This contradiction on the Ottoman side was related to the Empire’s wish to resolve the issue without war and without infringing its relations with the European Great
Powers. The other concern of the Porte was the resolution of the local conflict in accordance with the demands of its local subjects. The Porte’s stakes were higher than all of the great powers – its control or loss of control over the region was on the negotiation table, and neither Britain nor Austria was willing to support the Empire.
The French refused the Sultan’s firman on the grounds that it was not binding. From the Ottoman’s point of view, it was unjust to exclude one of the sects from the places respected by all Christians. The Sultan declared that his firman would be put into force. This created further resentment on the side of the European powers since this meant that the Sultan’s firmans would be treated as being above the laws of
743Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi – Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri (1789-1856) [The Ottoman History – The New Order and the Tanzimat Eras (1789-1856)], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 226. 744Macfie, The Eastern Question, 28. 260
Europe.745 Additions made to the firman by the Porte upon French and Russian arguments further exacerbated the situation.
In 1853, Tsar Nicholas I sent his special envoy Prince Menshikov to Istanbul.
Menshikov’s mission was based on outright hostility rather than conciliation. It was not a diplomatic mission; the Russian aim was to deliver an ultimatum to the Turks and use the threat of force to coerce the Porte to its acceptance. To quote Temperley, the mission was simply a “show of force.”746 First of all, the Prince arrived in a
Russian warship together with a delegation consisting of military and naval officers.747 Menshikov’s diplomatic protocol mistakes were humiliating, according to the protocol principles of the European international society. One of the general rules for foreign delegations was to announce their arrival to the hosting state’s prime minister and foreign minister in charge. Menshikov was supposed to present his letter of credentials from the Tsar to the Porte’s highest-ranking officials. However,
Menshikov failed to do this and sent his letter with a messenger. As described by
Temperley in detail, then Menshikov asked the Ottoman Grand Vizier to leave his office and meet him at the entrance of the Sublime Porte. This was contrary to the protocol rules and was declined by Mehmet Ali Paşa.748 In his reception ceremony by the Grand Vizier, Menshikov, instead of wearing his uniform, wore civilian attire.749 As noted by Richardson, this was another violation of the “convention.”750
745Temperley, England and the Near East, 291-292. 746Temperley, England and the Near East, 308. 747Fletcher and Ishchenko, The Crimean War, 12; Trevor Royle, Crimea – The Great Crimean War 1854-1856, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 36–38; Rich, Why the Crimean War, 34; Temperley, England and the Near East, 304–306. 748Temperley, England and the Near East, 308. 749Temperley, England and the Near East, 308; James L. Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy – The Great Powers since Mid-Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 72. 750Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy, 72. 261
Finally, he refused to pay an official visit to the Ottoman Foreign Minister in his office even though he had been expected for hours by Fuad Efendi. This was, indeed, an intentional and planned act to humiliate Fuad Efendi, who was held responsible for giving concessions to the French in Jerusalem.751 In the wording of Temperley, this was disrespectful of the “invariable custom.”752 This behavior was not welcomed by the Sultan and regarded as an insult to the Sultan himself, as “… in the
East an affront to the servant is always an affront to the master.”753 Such rudeness was not acceptable in the Western norms as well. The European corps diplomatique at the Porte criticized the Russian’s arrogance and behavior. To quote Trevor Royle, events developed, “much to the horror of the diplomatic community.”754
Regardless of the Ottoman desire for diplomatic negotiations, Menshikov’s orders were “clear-cut and brooked no possibility of negotiation.”755 Menshikov was to ensure the reinstitution of the traditional Orthodox rights with a sened (that carries the force of a treaty), the Russian right of representation on behalf of all Orthodox churches and subjects of the Empire. The major aim of the Russian delegation was to extend the interpretation of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and to officially guarantee a Russian protectorate over the Porte on paper.756 Finally, he was charged with the conclusion of a defensive alliance between the two Empires. On March 16, 1853,
Menshikov delivered a note to the Porte stating the Russian wishes and desires with
751Temperley, England and the Near East, 309; Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy, 72. 752Temperley, England and the Near East, 309. 753Temperley, England and the Near East, 309. 754Royle, Crimea – The Great Crimean War 1854-1856, 38. 755Royle, Crimea – The Great Crimean War 1854-1856, 37. 756Baumgart, The Crimean War, 13–14; John Lowe, The Concert of Europe – International Relations 1814-70, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), 94-98; Ponting, The Crimean War, 2005, 8-9; Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy, 71–72. 262
regard to the Holy Places. The Ottoman side requested time for thinking and informed the Prince that they would declare their decision later. 757
The Ottoman ruling élite was conscious of the fact that they had to take into account the positions of other states and their interests (international responsibility) while making decisions about their internal and external affairs, specifically on those issues which had the likelihood to affect the European balance of power and their respective position. Therefore, when required, they did not hesitate to take the view of respected members of the corps diplomatique and inquired into the position of their home states. Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe (Canning), the British Ambassador, was an esteemed diplomat. When his views were asked, he advised the Sultan to resist
Russia’s demands. The Ottomans refused the Russian draft treaty. Russia, in response, occupied the Danubian Principalities in July 1853. The Porte did not declare war as soon as the news of the Russian occupation of its Danubian
Principalities arrived. In fact, the Porte prolonged its declaration of war until it felt ready for war. The European powers also remained reluctant to act immediately. The
British were still indecisive. On the side of the European powers, the Russian
757Article 1 of the Secret Treaty proposed to the Porte by Prince Menshikov is as follows: “The Imperial Court of Russia and the Ottoman Sublime Porte, desiring to prevent and to remove forever any reason for disagreement, for doubt, or for misunderstanding on the subject of the immunities, rights and liberties accorded and assured ab antiquo by the Ottoman emperors in their states to the Greek-Russian-Orthodox religion, professed by all Russia, as by all the inhabitants of the Principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia and by various other Christian population of Turkey of different provinces, agree and stipulate by the present Convention that the Christian Orthodox religion will be constantly protected in all its churches, and that the ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia will have, as in the past, the right to make representations on behalf of the Churches of Constantinople and of other places and cities, as also on behalf of the clergy, and that the three remonstrances will be received as coming in the name of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly power.” Ann Pottinger Saab, The Origins of the Crimean Alliance, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), 27. The same quote can also be found in Royle, Crimea – The Great Crimean War 1854-1856, 35–36. See also A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Vostochnaia Voina, (St. Petersburg, 1903–13) vol. 1, no. 110, 382-385, cited in Rich, Why the Crimean War, 37.
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occupation was not interpreted as a declaration of war.758 This was related to the fact that the Russian occupation was based on a treaty right that enabled it to occupy the principalities when deemed necessary for the internal order.759 There was no internal disturbance in the principalities. The aim of the Russian occupation was to force the
Porte to retreat and accept the Russian virtual protectorate. 760
At the end of a conference gathered in Vienna, the four powers (Britain, Austria,
France and Prussia) issued a note known as the “Vienna Note” without consulting the
Porte and tried to dictate it as the basis of negotiations with Russia.761 The Porte refused the note, which was identical to Menshikov’s draft treaty. The Russian side, concerned about the involvement of the Concert powers, made one last attempt at a diplomatic resolution of the issue (the Olmütz mediation), but it was too late. The
British and French navies were already ordered to the support of the Porte. On
September 26, 1853, after the arrival of the British and French fleets to the
Dardanelles, the Ottoman cabinet voted for war; the official declaration came eight days later. The Porte demanded immediate Russian evacuation of the Principalities within two weeks’ time and declared that if at the end of two weeks the Russians did not leave Moldavia and Walachia, the Ottoman forces would move into the region.
The Ottoman army was mobilized for war.762
To sum up, throughout the crisis over the protection of its sovereignty and independence, the Porte tried to exploit every possibility to resolve the issue through
758Ponting, The Crimean War, 11. Royle, Crimea – The Great Crimean War 1854-1856, 61–66. 759Fletcher and Ishchenko, The Crimean War, 14. 760Royle, Crimea – The Great Crimean War 1854-1856, 34-115. 761Rich, Why the Crimean War, 74. 762Rich, Why the Crimean War, 84–88. 264
diplomacy, negotiation, arbitration and international law. The Porte tried to resolve the issue by satisfying the demands of France and Russia, but this led to further complications. The Porte, realizing that the demands surpassed religious and moral considerations, upheld its sovereign rights. The Ottoman security was at stake and, if required, it had to be secured through war. From the perspective of the international society, this war was a just war for a just cause. The Ottomans fought a defensive war against a virtual attack on their sovereignty and territorial unity, while the
European powers fought for preserving the European equilibrium and international order of the European society of states. In a Bullian understanding, the Crimean War was the kind of war that can be “assigned a role for the maintenance of international order.”763 The Crimean War, in the words of J.A.S. Grenville, was a “point of transition in the history of Europe,”764 while Alan Palmer argued that it marked the birth of modern Europe as it led to changes in the European great power equilbrium.765
763Bull, The Anarchical Society, 200–227. 764J. A. S. Grenville, Europe Reshaped 1848-1878, (Oxford - Massachussets: Blackwell, 2000), 199. See also Stephen J. Lee, Aspects of European History, (New York: Routledge, 1987), 67-74. 765Alan Palmer, 1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı ve Modern Avrupa’nın Doğuşu [1853-1856 The Crimean War and the Birth of Modern Europe – original title The Banner of Battle], trans. Meral Gaspıralı, (Istanbul: Sabah Kitapçılık San. ve Tic. A.Ş., 1999). 265
CHAPTER VI
THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY:
OTTOMAN-EUROPEAN ACCULTURATION
6.1 Ottoman Perception of Diplomacy
As noted, the Empire’s representation as the Islamic other led to the argument that the Ottomans had an unfavorable attitude toward diplomacy.766 Based on the orthodox Islamic understanding of the Ottoman state, it is argued that only after the
Empire’s military superiority against Europe had declined did the Ottomans accept adopting and being bound by European institutions (specifically diplomacy and international law).767 In his analysis of the Ottoman Empire’s diplomatic practice,
Naff also bases his argument on Islamic conservatism:
Ottoman thinking in diplomacy, as in all matters of government derived from the Muslim concept of state, . . . was rooted in the Shari’a (Holy Law); traditionally, the Shari’a provided for all the
766 Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” 6–10; Yurdusev, “The Middle East Encounter,” 71. 767 Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” 6–10; Yurdusev, “The Middle East Encounter,” 71. 266
exigencies of life and government, thus making the Muslim state, in theory, self-sufficient. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire was pre- eminently a Shari’a state. The Ottomans clung stubbornly to the illusion of Islam’s innate moral and cultural superiority over Christian Europe. They expressed this belief in their ideas of self- sufficiency and in their practice of non-reciprocal diplomacy. The Muslim prejudice that whatever was western was tainted prevented the Ottomans from wholly accepting or imitating western ways.768
The arguments not only of ES theoreticians but also of eminent scholars in the fields of history, political science, and international relations are founded on this misconception of the Ottoman state. Ottoman historians also diverge over conceptualization of Ottoman–European interactions until the end of the eighteenth century, regarding both diplomacy and foreign policy. Some argue that it would be misleading because the Empire did not consider Europeans to be equals and/or acted on the basis of reciprocity.769 This is an open debate; however, as the departing point of this dissertation is the ES approach, Bull’s conceptual understanding of diplomacy will be taken into account. One point needs clarification here: all habits and practices used in conducting relations and communication between political entities by authorized and professional agents to minimize friction and establish peace and coexistence will be referred to as diplomacy or a diplomatic method. These terms are also used to define external relations of the Ottomans before the establishment of permanent embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Contemporary studies suggest that enough evidence has accumulated to support the argument that the Ottomans, from the inception of the beylik, had developed an
768 Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 296. See also Naff, “Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe,” 97, and Naff, “The Ottoman Empire and the European States System,” 152. 769 Oral Sander, Anka’nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü- Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi üzerine bir Deneme [Anka's Rise and Fall of an experiment on Ottoman Diplomatic History], (Ankara: İmge, 1993):14-16. 267
understanding of foreign policy and diplomatic methods. In some respects, Ottoman diplomatic methods were similar to those of the European states but differed in some ways.770 Contrary to the general view, diplomacy was one of the classic tools of the
Ottoman Empire’s foreign policy. It had diplomatic relations with European and
Islamic states. Ottoman diplomacy, however, had some different characteristics.
Yurdusev notes that “when we refrain from the sweeping conceptual and historical generalizations and do justice to the complexity of the Empire and its historical practice,” then it will be possible to identify and present the uniqueness, subtlety, and finesse of the Ottoman style of diplomacy.771
It should be noted that studies excluding the Empire from early modern and modern
European diplomacy ignore the fact that diplomacy as an institution of international society was not fully developed at the time, even among the European powers. To give an example, the Ottoman Empire is criticized for failing to enter into reciprocal relations with the European powers or to send permanent diplomatic missions. Two factors should be noted. First, it should be remembered that it took time for European great powers and courts to reciprocate Italian-style resident diplomacy. The majority of diplomatic activity in the second half of the fifteenth century continued on an ad hoc basis. The usefulness and functionality of resident diplomacy led to its acceptance as a desirable practice, but financial and physical difficulties still
770 Ali İbrahim Savaş, Osmanlı Diplomasisi – Ottoman Diplomacy (Istanbul: 3F Yayınevi, 2007), 10. Aksan and Goffman, eds., The Early Modern Ottomans, 2007; Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe; Yurdusev, ed., Ottoman Diplomacy; Gül Akyılmaz, Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi ve Teşkilatı [Ottoman Diplomatic History and Institution], (Konya: Tablet Basım Yayın, 2000). 771 Yurdusev, ed., Ottoman Diplomacy, 3. 268
prevented it from being common.772 It was not viable to open resident embassies all over Europe. Up until the mid-nineteenth century, England, for instance, had no resident embassies in the German Confederation or in Italian states. France was no exception. Similarly, the practice of resident diplomacy was not very common among smaller European powers.773 The preferred method was to send permanent diplomatic missions to large courts and simultaneously assign the ambassador to smaller nearby states. British Ambassador John Fane (Lord Burhersh, later the Earl of Westmorland) is an example of this practice. He was ambassador to Prussia between 1841 and 1851, but his mission included the smaller North German duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and Anhalt-Dessau.774
The other point is that existing regular European missions in some European and non-European territories remained generally at the level of consulates, and higher- level diplomatic missions were seldom in practice. To quote Keene, “non-European states were thus by no means alone in lacking regular and permanent postings of accredited diplomats from the major European states or in their failure to establish their own diplomatic missions on any substantial scale.”775 The fact that consular systems were more common suggests that, even in the nineteenth century, when diplomacy was accepted as the master, distinctive institution of European international relations, a network of permanent diplomatic missions, corps
772 Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy; Hamilton and Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy; İskit, Diplomasi Tarihi, Teorisi, Kurumları ve Uygulaması; Mattingly, “The First Resident Embassies”; Mallett, “Italian Renaissance Diplomacy.” 773 Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society,” 30. 774 S. T. Bindoff, E. F. Malcolm Smith, and C. K. Webster, eds., British Diplomatic Representatives 1789-1852, (London: Royal Historical Society, 1934), cited in Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society”; Jeremy Black, British Diplomats and Diplomacy 1688-1800, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2001). 775 Keene, “Mapping the Boundaries of International Society,” 30. 269
diplomatique,776 and diplomatic culture among all the European states was progressing. Diplomacy in theory and practice developed and became more sophisticated over centuries.
6.1.1 Characteristics of the Early Ottoman Diplomatic Organization
Yurdusev classifies Ottoman diplomatic methods as conventional and unconventional. Conventional diplomacy is the generally agreed conduct of interstate relations, starting in the Renaissance. It includes reciprocal exchange of resident ambassadors, meetings and negotiations, multilateral conferences and congresses. A diplomatic corps sharing common training, style, manners, protocol, immunities, and language is another distinctive feature of conventional diplomacy.777 Unconventional diplomacy is defined as all those habits and practices that are not conventional, for example, the Ottoman practice of sending envoys on an ad hoc basis, or the unilateral granting of Capitulations.778
The Empire, as Yurdusev argues, had a pragmatic interpretation of the Islamic division of the world into three realms: dâr-al harb, dâr-al Islam and dâr-al Sulh.779
Ottoman pragmatism enabled the establishment of commercial and diplomatic interactions with the Christian powers within the dâr-al Sulh (the realm of peace).
The Empire, as noted in chapters 3 and 4, was not in continuous war with European powers, though warfare made up a significant part of Ottoman relations. From the
776 Cross, The European Diplomatic Corps, 35–68. 777 Yurdusev, ed., Ottoman Diplomacy, 2. 778 Yurdusev, ed., Ottoman Diplomacy, 2–3. 779 Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” 13–16. 270
early days of the beylik, the Ottomans concluded treaties and truces with Christian states (from Byzantine to the Republic of Venice). The majority of early modern diplomatic and consular practices and institutions were formulated from Ottoman-
Italian interactions and acculturation. Ottoman diplomacy was formulated from
Ottoman threat perceptions, interests, and raison d’état.
6.1.1.1 The Office of Nişancı and Reis ül-Küttab
The Ottoman administrative structure was formed under the rule of Orhan I. All internal and external formal correspondence of the Empire was carried out by officials and secretaries called nişancı (also known as tuğraî, tevkiî, or muvakkî).
Nişancı also had other diplomatic functions and duties until the institutionalization of the office of Reis ül-Küttab.780 The major diplomatic and foreign policy decisions were, however, decided by the Sultans and Vezir-i Âzams (Grand Viziers). The Veziri
Âzam was responsible not only for execution of the decisions but also for carrying out meetings and negotiations with foreign representatives.
The exact date of the institutionalization of the office of the Reis ül-Küttab (or Reis
Efendi, chief of secretaries) is not clear. There are two main theories. One holds that it is an institutional formation dating back to Seljuks, which passed into the
Ottomans in the early days of the beylik. The other view holds that it came into existence during the rule of Süleyman I.781 The conduct and organization of imperial
780 Akyılmaz, Osmanlı Diplomasi, 28–34; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı [The Ottoman Empire’s Central and Naval Organization], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1984), 214–215. 781 Akyılmaz, Osmanlı Diplomasi, 35–42. 271
foreign relations was supervised by the Reis ül-Küttab. Still, in a modern sense, this officer acted as an undersecretary of foreign affairs. Reis were responsible for secretarial duties, including diplomatic correspondence. Vezir-i Âzams formed the backbone of state affairs, dealing with major internal and external affairs. Beginning in the seventeenth century, Reis assumed greater responsibilities in the conduct of imperial foreign affairs.782
With the increasing complexity of Ottoman interactions in military, political, economic, and sociocultural sectors with the great powers of Europe, the office of the
Reis ül-Küttab became predominantly occupied with foreign affairs. This officer, however, was not the sole decision-maker in the foreign policy of the Empire and was hierarchically under the Vezir-i Âzam. As Naff puts it, “a Grand Vizir was something more than a prime minister and the Reis ül-Küttab something less than a foreign minister”; hence it cannot be compared with European counterparts.783 In the words of Shaw, it was still “the closest thing the Ottomans had to a foreign office.”784
Gradually, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with reforms of Selim III and
Mahmud II, the office became institutionalized, in line with the modern European ministerial system. The Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs became the leading institution in the Tanzimat era and in reforms.
782 Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 296–98. 783 Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 297. 784 Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 119. 272
6.1.1.2 Dragomans and the Tercüme Odası (Translation Office)
Dragomans (translators, tercümans)785 were used by European envoys and the
Ottoman administration to carry out daily diplomatic correspondence and communications. Among the Muslim and Turkic population of the Empire, few people had knowledge of foreign languages and countries. The dragomans were chosen mostly from the minorities of the Empire. Greeks, Levantines, Jews, and
Armenians were employed both by the embassies and by the Sublime Porte. They were well educated and Europeanized and had good knowledge of Europe. The dragomans were the main sources of Ottoman intelligence and information.
Dragomans of the embassies were sent to the Porte on a daily basis to follow and translate all Ottoman Turkish and foreign correspondence.
The Chief Dragoman (Grand Dragoman, Divan-ı Hümayun Tercümanı) acted as the righthand man of the Reis ül-Küttab, and together they influenced the conduct of
Ottoman diplomacy and, at times, the course of events. All important and confidential information passed through their hands. To give an example, during the
French invasion of Egypt, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris wanted to visit Toulon to learn the destination of the French naval fleet and reasons for military preparations.
He was prevented by his dragoman, named Cordica, on the grounds that such behavior would be inappropriate. Indeed, Cordica was subverted by Talleyrand, as was all important information and correspondence between the Sublime Porte and
Paris. Had it not been for Cordica’s interference, Seyyid Ali Efendi might have
785 Bernard Lewis, From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East, (Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 2004); Vesna Mıovıċ-Periċ, “Drogamans of the Dubrovnik Republic: Their Training and Career,” Dubrovnik Annals 5 (2001): 81–94. 273
learned that the French were heading to Egypt, and the French navy could have been intercepted by the British navy.786 During the Greek revolution, the Greek dragomans gave false reports to the Porte on the course of developments. They were replaced by educated Turks and other nationalities.
Being a dragoman in Istanbul was a prestigious position. The dragomans were exempted from taxes and enjoyed certain privileges, including immunities like those of the foreign diplomats for whom they worked, known as berâts/berâtlis.787 Those who excelled in Foreign Service were rewarded. After his skillful performance in the
Karlofça (Karlowitz) negotiations, Alexander Mavrocordato was assigned as the hospodar (bey) of the Danubian Principalities.788 The superiority of the dragomans in Ottoman diplomacy is well expressed in the following words of Mavrocordato to
Austrian Consul Stefano (November 30, 1784):
If Prince Kaunitz is prince of the Holy Roman Empire, I am prince of the very holy Ottoman Empire…. I am the master; I am a prince of a family which has reigned for two hundred years, a reigning sovereign, I will say what I please; I fear neither the Emperor nor Prince Kaunitz.789
The European powers interested in developing relations with the Ottoman Empire gave importance to their dragomans and diplomats, training them in Oriental-Eastern languages and cultures. They were carefully chosen. The republics of Venice, Genoa, and Ragusa chose their dragomans from among professional merchants with
786 Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 297; Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk- Fransız Diplomasi, 204–205. 787 Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 301. 788 Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 297. 789 Alexander Mavrocordato, Prince of Moldavia, to the Austrian Consul Stefano, Raicevich, November 30, 1784, quoted in Mansel, Constantinople – City of the World’s Desire, 133. 274
expertise in language, business, and cultural dealings with the Ottomans. They were headquartered in Istanbul but operated all around the Empire, specifically in the
Balkans and the Levant. To this end, for example, in 1754, Austrian Empress Maria
Theresa established the Imperial Oriental Academy (Kaiserliche und Königliche) in
Vienna to improve trade and cultural relations with the East, particularly the Ottoman
Empire. At the academy, prospective diplomats studied Turkish and Persian languages and cultures.790 Similarly, a school was run by Capuchin friars in Istanbul named École de Péra where teenagers from France were educated in the Turkish language to be dragomans. Later, in Paris, under Louis XIV, a school of Oriental languages was founded to educate professional interpreters and, given the commercial and political relations between the Ottoman Empire and France, Turkish was the first language taught.791 Though the Empire had no resident embassies in the
European capitals, these were an essential factor in European diplomacy. The Empire was considered important in European diplomatic protocol and corps. The establishment of the Tercüme Odası (Translation Office) after the diplomatic and bureaucratic reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II as part of the ministerial diplomatic system and the roles played by diplomats like Âli Paşa, and Fuad Paşa in the
Tanzimat reforms increased the institutional credibility of the office.
790 James van Horn Melton, Absolutism and the Eighteenth Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 204. See also, G. R. Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865-1939), Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007). 791 Nur Deris Otoman, “From Dragomans to Interpreters: A Brief Overview of the Profession in Turkey,” Association Internationale des Interpétes de Conference –AIIC, retrieved at http://www.aiic.net/ ; Mansel, Constantinople – City of the World’s Desire, 133–162. 275
6.1.2 The Ad Hoc Period of the Ottoman Diplomacy (1299-1793):
Characteristics and Practices
The use of ad hoc diplomacy was common among European powers until theemergence of the permanent diplomacy considered to be the Renaissance innovation. Still, as noted, ad hoc and resident diplomacy coexisted in the early- modern Europe. Until the establishment of permanent embassies, the Ottoman
Empire conducted its diplomatic relations on an ad hoc basis. The Empire sent envoys and ambassadors abroad for different purposes starting in the era of Sultan
Mehmet I. Envoys were sent to deliver ratified treaties and peace and truce agreements; to present sultans’ personal letters to European monarchs; to inform and greet accessions to the throne; to be present at peace talks; to discuss truces, frontier demarcations and changes, especially after wars; and to set up friendly diplomatic relations.792 For example, according to the list found in the Topkapı Palace archives, in 1417 Mehmet I sent an envoy to Venice to present the ratified version of an agreement dated 1416.793 Envoys were exchanged frequently. The Ottoman diplomatic activity was sporadic, lasting from a few weeks to months, depending on the nature of the mission and the progress of negotiations between the sides. From the seventeenth century onwards, there was a change in the duration of the envoys’ visits. In the 1790s onward, the envoys were sent for longer periods ranging from a year to three years.794 It can even be said that the Ottoman diplomacy was becoming
792Bülent Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period”, in Ottoman Diplomacy, ed. Yurdusev,, 2004, 48. 793 For a full list of Ottoman envoys and ambassadors sent abroad on an ad hoc basis, see Faik Reşit Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri [Ambassadors of the Ottoman State and Their Sefaretnames], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), 221-235. 794 Ali İbrahim Savaş, Osmanlı Diplomasisi – Ottoman Diplomacy (Istanbul: 3F Yayınevi, 2007), 15. 276
permanent before the official establishment of the embassies under Selim III and
Mahmud II.
The Ottoman preference for ad hoc diplomacy was related to the fact that the
Ottomans had enough sources of information on European affairs. Ottomans did not feel the need to establish regular missions to collect information on military, political and socio-economic developments. The hospadars (beys) of the Danube (Wallachia, and Moldavia), non-Muslim and Muslim merchants, and the Dragomans of the Porte provided the Empire with necessary information about European advancements.795
The Ottoman archives are proving this point. The Ottoman Empire was informed about the military preparations of its enemies and potential threats. It had agents all over Europe. Foreign missions furnished the Empire with valuable information on
European affairs.796 The Imperial Chancery transmitted essential information obtained from resident foreign missions of European powers. The Sultans’ welcoming of the foreign missions is further evidence of Ottoman pragmatism.
Therefore, the fact that the Empire did not have permanent missions and diplomacy did not render it incapable of gathering information. The Empire was informed and involved in European affairs through its information network.797 Most scholars agree that the Ottoman sultans as an imperial power considered themselves to be superior and therefore preferred not to send permanent and resident missions to Europe. The fact that Ottomans established a cosmopolitan world empire led to their self-
795 Naff, “Reforms and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 302-303. See also G. R. Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” in Ottoman Diplomacy, ed. Yurdusev, 2004, 114-130; Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period,” 36-65. 796 Savaş, Osmanlı Diplomasisi, 10-18. Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III”, 115-117. 797 Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III”, 114-130. 277
perceived superiority, but this did not prevent them from having diplomatic and commercial relationships. Most of the Capitulations – though they were granted unilaterally and were not technically bilateral treaties according to the European understating - in essence contained reciprocal articles for regulating commercial and diplomatic relations. The argument that because of its Islamic nature the Empire did not enter into reciprocal relations is, again, a partial claim. Muslims living permanently in non-Muslims lands found that it was inconvenient to properly practice their religion according to Islamic law. As Wright noted, “It was impossible for a Muslim traveler to properly observe his faith in the West ― there were no mosques, no dispensers of Halal meat―and if he tried to do so the ecclesiastical authorities were very likely to pounce.”798 It should be noted that Ottomans did not send permanent missions to other Muslim states either. Indeed, as Mansel argues:
In practice, whatever zealots on both sides might claim, there was no holy war between Islam and Christianity. The theory existed; hatred for ‘infidels’ was frequently expressed in Constantinople and Paris. Yet such hate was applied with even greater force to heretics within Christianity or Islam - whether Protestants or
Persian believers in the Shii form of Islam.799
As Berridge concluded, while Ottomans considered unilateral/ad hoc diplomacy a political and diplomatic advantage, this type of diplomacy suited European interests as well. First, European powers did not have to grant diplomatic immunities and
798 Wright, The Ambassadors, 2006, 234. 799 Mansel, Constantinople – City of the World’s Desire, 189. 278
privileges to Ottomans as they did not have resident missions.800 Secondly,
Ottomans’ reliance on European missions in Istanbul for contacts and communications led to the interception of important information and increased the advantageous position of the European powers in negotiations. Resident missions were used chiefly “for spying and making mischief for their governments.”
Therefore, it was considered “to be better to send than to receive.”801 For that reason,
European powers also preferred this unilateral and ad hoc diplomacy of the
Ottomans. European powers did not have permanent resident missions in the other
Islamic states either. They only sent permanent missions to the Ottoman Empire because it was considered to be the center of East. 802
6.1.2.1 European Permanent Embassies and Diplomatic Corps in Istanbul
The Empire received permanent diplomatic missions and hence encouraged establishment of commercial and diplomatic relations by granting trade privileges and extra-territorial rights. Ottomans regarded the resident ambassadors of European powers to be guests of the Sultan rather than representatives of their states. Their expenses were therefore met by the Sultan. The empire continued to subsidize foreign missions and assume their expenses even after the Empire‘s economy was weakened.803
800 Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” 122. 801 Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” 123. 802 Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” 27. See also G.R. Berridge, Notes on the Origins of the Diplomatic Corps: Constantinople in the 1620s, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael,’ No. 92, 2004, retrieved from http://www.clingendael.nl. 803 Naff, “Reforms and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 307. 279
Ottomans recognized the international rights and extraterritorial rights of the foreign representatives, nationals and tradesmen residing in the Empire through the use of
âmans and ahdnâmes, in line with the Islamic Law of Nations. The Venetian bailos, consuls and dragomans of European powers were considered to be exempt from taxes and customs duties through berâts, and extraterritorial rights were granted to nationals of capitulary states in lawsuits that did not include Ottoman citizens.
Details regarding the conduct and status of foreigners were pointed out in
Capitulations.804 To assure their freedom of commerce and navigation, the non- capitulary states were granted a right called cottimo (elçilik ve konsolosluk hakkı) that enabled commercial vessels to sail under the flag of a capitulary state after paying a consulate fee.805 The Ottomans had a very favorable approach to diplomacy and diplomatic relations when compared to China or Japan. Both states refused the stationing of European resident embassies and their extraterritorial rights. The
Chinese and Japanese resented European infiltration while the Ottomans invited them. The Ottomans’ worldview and tolerance enabled diplomacy to flourish and a diplomatic corps in Istanbul. Geoff R. Berridge notes that Constantinople after 1453, like Rome, should be counted as “the chief center for the diffusion of Italian practice to the rest of the world.”806 Similarly, Philip Mansel suggests that the mere presence of permanent embassies in Istanbul from the mid-sixteenth century onwards makes the Ottoman Empire diplomatically a part of Europe. To quote Mansel:
804 Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period”, 36-65; Antonio Fabris, “From Adrinople to Constantinople: Venetian-Ottoman Diplomatic Mission 1360-1453,” Mediterranean Historical Review, 7 (1992): 154-200. 805 Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period,” 41. 806 Berridge, Notes on the Origins of the Diplomatic Corps, 3. 280
No other capital welcomed so many embassies. Ambassadors came to
Constantinople from London and Paris, Stockholm and Samarkand, Goa and Fez…..
The Ottoman Empire was at once a European, Middle Eastern, African, Black Sea,
Mediterranean and Indian Ocean power. It stretched from Morocco to Mesopotamia and Poland to Yemen. It had more neighbors - more matters for dispute or negotiation - than any other state.807
The first residential embassy was established by the Venetian bailo Bartelemi
Marcello in 1454. In 1535, after the conclusion of France’s alliance with the Empire in 1534, the French Ambassador Jean de la Forét arrived in Istanbul. This was followed by the arrival of William Halborne of England in 1538 and Cornelis Haga of the United Provinces (Netherlands) in 1612. The European diplomatic and commercial corps established in Pera and Galata were in close contact with each other. Over centuries, this enabled the development of a unique diplomatic culture made up of European and Ottoman elements and a diplomatic life of intense rivalry and cooperation. Colonel Rottiers, a nineteenth century visitor to Istanbul, wrote:
The society of Pera is as brilliant as that of which I have just written [Pera low life] is hideous. In no place in the world, except Paris, are so many savants, artists, travelers and men of taste of every kind found together… The larger receptions offer a charming mixture of the most diverse national qualities, blended with an exquisite taste and amiability. The soirées of the Palais de Russie were above all magnificent, those of the ambassadors of France and England were distinguished by more taste and less richness; but the formal dinners at the Austrian embassy effaced all else.808
807Mansel, Constantinople – City of the World’s Desire, 189. 808 Colonel Rottiers, Itineraire de Tiflis a Constantinople, Brussels, 1829, 345, quoted in Mansel, Constantinople – City of the World’s Desire, 207-208. 281
The fact that the Ottoman Sultans did not have courts like those of the European monarchs led to the diplomatic corps and the embassies established in the Istanbul as the center of all activities.809 Another district of Istanbul having a cosmopolitan culture was Galata, the trade centre of the city, where foreign merchants – the
Venetians, Genoese, French, Dutch, English and Muslims (including Turks) – did business and engaged in socio-cultural interactions.810 Mansel argues that in the
Ottoman Empire, the foreign representatives were treated better than they were in
Russia, so they were able become a part of the Ottoman internal and external life.811
From the Ottoman viewpoint, receiving and sending envoys was highly esteemed.
The fact that the Chinese did not send a permanent envoy to Istanbul even in the nineteenth century was considered to be strange, and the Ottomans wondered how
China could be considered to be an empire.812
6.1.2.2 The Ottoman Protocol, Ceremonies and Practices: Euro-Ottoman
Symbiosis
The heterogeneous and cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman diplomatic methods was different from those of Europe. The Ottoman diplomacy was based on
Islamic/Ottoman, pre-Islamic and universal principles. The institutional bricolage upon which the empire was built also influenced Ottoman diplomacy. Costas M.
Constantinou suggests that an approach differentiating the Ottoman, Islamic and
809 Mansel, Constantinople – City of the World’s Desire, 207-208. 810Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 23-40; Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State, 122-133. 811 Mansel, Constantinople – City of the World’s Desire, 189. 812 Mansel, Constantinople – City of the World’s Desire, 80. 282
universal features of the Ottoman diplomacy to compare it with the “European- turned-universal” would be misleading. Constantinou also notes that “to seek
‘Muslim’ features in the diplomacy of the Ottoman empire, an empire that incorporated other religions too, and where Christians, e.g., Greeks, Armenians, and many other Europeans, participated in the formulation and execution of imperial diplomacy” is wrong. 813
6.1.2.2.1 The Ottoman Protocol
Ottomans also practiced European diplomatic protocol, but sometimes the issues of precedence and equality created problems among the diplomatic corps. The rank of the ambassadors in the Ottomans’ protocol list and the Empire’s designation of the most favored nation changed, based on the relations and personal contacts of the ambassadors with the Ottoman élite.814 This at times led to frictions and rivalry among the diplomatic corps. The British, French and the Dutch rivaled each other.
When the British obtained special trading privileges in 1583 and then the Dutch in
1612, the French were concerned that they lost their prestige at the Porte.815 The
French and English tried to prevent the Dutch Ambassador Cornelis Haga’s reception by the Sultan. The European rivalry on the continent and overseas was also reflected
813Costas M. Constantinou, “Diplomacy, Grotesque Realism, and Ottoman Historiography,” Postcolonial Studies, 3 (2000): 213-226. 814Bülent Arı, “Istanbul’da Corps Diplomatique ve Azîz Mahmud Hüdâyî,” in Uluslararası Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî Sempozyumu I-II Bildirileri [Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî International Symposium Papers], ed. Hasan Kamil Yılmaz, (Istanbul: Üsküdar Belediye Başkanlığı, 2005), 39-50; Bülent Arı, “Early Ottoman-Dutch Relations,” in The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilization, vol. 1, ed. Güler Eren (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2000), 317324; Bülent Arı, “Osmanlı Kapitülasyonlarının Tarihçesi ve Mahiyeti,” Yeni Türkiye, Osmanlı Özel Sayısı 701 (2000): 242251; Bülent Arı, “Early Ottoman–Dutch Political and Commercial Relations after 1612 Capitulations,” Bulgarian Historical Review 34 (2004), 116144. 815Mehmet Bulut, Ottoman-Dutch Economic Relations in the Early Modern Period 15711699, (Utrecht: Utrecht University Press, 2000), 116117. 283
at the Porte.816 For centuries, however, France ranked first in the Ottoman protocol list as the esteemed ally of the Empire.
6.1.2.2.2 The Ottoman Ceremonies
The majority of the ambassadors of the European monarchs did not experience any problem in direct contacts with the ruling élite of the state to which they were assigned. In the Ottoman Empire, this was not the case. The complicated, hierarchical bureaucracy of the Empire prevented the direct and private meeting of the representatives of European powers with the Sultan. This practice, defined as one of the unconventionalities of Ottoman diplomacy, is offered as an evidence of
Ottomans’ unequal treatment of Europeans. However, it should be noted that few of the high-ranking officers within the Ottoman bureaucratic organization could meet directly and privately with the Sultan. As noted above, even the Reis ül-Küttab first reported to the Vezir-i Âzam, and if the Vezir-i Âzam considered it an issue worthy of the Sultan’s attention, only then the matter was presented directly to the Sultan.
Therefore, European representatives were generally accepted by the Grand Vizier or by one of the ministers in the Ottoman Court.817 Although the Europeans considered this an unusual practice, Constantinou notes that it was another Byzantine legacy to
816Alastair Hamilton, Alexander H. de Groot and Maurits H. van den Boogert eds., Friends and Rivals in the East – Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations from the Seventieth to the Early Nineteenth Century, (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, Majestelerinin Konsolosları – İngiliz Belgeleriyle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndaki İngiliz Konsosloslukları (15801900) [Her Majesty’s Consuls – The English Consulates in the Ottoman Empire with British Documents 15801900], (Istanbul: Iletiim, 2004), 179212; Michael Strachan, Sir Thomas Roe 15811644 A Life, (Hampshire: Michael Russell, 1991), 134179. 817Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” 114130; Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period,” 3665; Savaş, Osmanlı Diplomasisi, 7078. 284
the Ottomans. The Byzantine emperors also used intermediaries called logothetes to communicate with the foreign delegates.818
Ceremonies and receptions were considered to be of utmost importance and thus were magnificent. Preparations lasted for days for these colorful events. In the receptions of foreign delegations, the envoys were first welcomed by the Mirahur
(the master of the horses) at the outer gate of the Topkapı Palace with dozens of decorated horses and janissaries. The envoy was first met by the Vezir-i Âzam and then the Sultan at the Imperial Chancery. This was followed by the exchange of letters of goodwill and presents. The letter of goodwill and friendship and the gifts to be presented to the Sultan were all indicated and agreed upon in the capitulations.
These ceremonies, which lasted for hours, were considered long and arduous by the foreign envoys. However, according to the Turkic and Islamic traditions, they were signs of hospitality and honor given to the person of the envoy and the state he represented. The Ottoman exchanges of ambassadors at the frontiers, called mubadele, were also extremely ceremonial events.819 Ottomans attached great importance to protocol and etiquette. These also applied to the Ottoman delegations sent abroad. It took months for an Ottoman delegation to be prepared; the gifts to be presented were selected with great attention and care. Generally, delegations consisted of many people. To give an example, İbrahim Paşa’s delegation sent to
Vienna consisted of 763 accompanying persons. As of the mid-eighteenth century,
818Constantinou, “Diplomacy, Grotesque Realism, and Ottoman Historiography,”217. See also Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, (London: Cassell, 1954), 26. 819 Constantinou, “Diplomacy, Grotesque Realism, and Ottoman Historiography,” 217218. 285
the Empire even had a separate treasury named elçi hazinesi (envoy treasury) to meet the expenses of its delegations abroad.820
Indeed, the grandeur of the Ottoman delegations fascinated the Europeans. For example, the delegation of Mehmed Çelebi aroused great interest in Paris. The
Ottoman delegation’s attire and presents led to a new trend all over Europe known as
Turquerie. Ottoman style clothing, decorations, and motifs were imitated.821
6.1.2.2.3 The Ottoman Diplomatic Practices
The Ottoman diplomatic practices were also of a heterodox nature. The fact that the
Empire was predominantly an Islamic state did not preclude the conduct of its relations with the outside world on the basis of both Islamic and universal practices.
Three practices dominated the early Ottoman diplomacy: the use of dynastic marriages to conclude alliances and treaties, the threatening use of the Seven Towers, and the use of capitulations to regulate commercial and diplomatic relations.
820Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri, 24. 821İnalcık, Turkey and Europe, 141195; Göcek, East Encounters West; Renda, “Europe and the Ottomans,” 10901121; Renda, “The Ottoman Empire and Europe: Cultural Encounters,” 277303. For details of the Ottoman delegations to European states, see Şevket Rado, Paris’te bir Osmanlı Sefiri – Yirmizsekiz Mehmet Çelebi’nin Fransa Seyahatnamesi [An Ottoman Ambassador in Paris – 28 Mehmet Çelebi’s Travelogue of France], (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008); Gilles Veinstein, İlk Osmanlı Sefiri 28 Mehmet Çelebi’nin Fransa Anıları – Kafirleirn Cenneti [ The First Ottoman Ambassador 28 Mehmet Çelebi’s Travelogue – Memoirs of Fransa – The Heaven of Infidels], trans. Murat Aykaç Erginöz, (Istanbul: Özgü Yayınları, 2002); Enver Ziya Karal, Halet Efendinin Paris Büyükelçiliği (18021806) [Halet Effendi’s Embassy to Paris], Istanbul Universitesi Yayınları, 102 (Istanbul: Kenan Basımevi, 1940); Maurice Herbette, Fransa’da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi “Moralı Esseyit Ali Efendi”’ (17971802) [The First Ottoman Resident Ambassador in France – Esseyit Ali Effendi of Morea (17971802)], trans. Erol Üyepazarcı, (Istanbul: Pera,1997); Ali İbrahim Savaş, Mustafa Hatti Efendi – Viyana Seyahatnamesi [Mustafa Hatti Effendi’s Vienna Travelogue], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999); Hadiye Tuncer and Hüner Tuncer, Osmanlı Diplomasisi ve Sefaretnameler [Ottoman Diplomacy and Sefaretnames], (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1998). 286
6.1.2.2.3.1 Marriage Diplomacy: A Common Practice
The Ottomans, starting from the early days of the beylik, concluded alliances and practiced diplomacy with the Byzantine Empire, Anatolian beyliks and southeastern
European powers. The House of Osman was not different in its foreign and domestic policy orientations from the European dynastic states. The highest concerns of the succeeding rulers and sultans were the maintenance of internal peace and order; the preservation of the dynastic rule of the House of Osman within the expanding boundaries of the beylik and then the Empire; and the securing of allies against enemies.
Just like its European counterparts, the early Ottoman Empire’s policies were also characterized by the principles of dynasticism. The Ottomans extended their power and rule over new territories through use of military power and/or boundary and alliance treaties. Marriage diplomacy, which was a common practice among dynastic
European powers from medieval to Napoleonic times, was also considered an effective tool of Ottoman external relations. The Ottomans used dynastic marriages with the Byzantine, East European and Balkan royal houses as well as Turcoman beyliks for increasing their territories, extending their rule and gaining allies and mercenary troops. To give a few examples, it is known that Orhan I’s first wife
Nilüfer Hatun was the daughter of a Byzantine feudal lord. His second wife was the
Byzantine Emperor Andronicus III Palaeologus’s (also written as Andronikos III
Palaiologos) daughter, Asporsha.822 Later, when Cantacuzenus requested Ottoman military support and aid in 1346, he offered marriage of his daughter Theodora Maria
822M. Çağatay Uluçay, Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları [Wives and Daughters of the Sultans/Padishahs], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2001), 35. 287
to Orhan. An Ottoman force of 20,000 men under the command of Süleyman Paşa
(son of Orhan) was sent to fight against the Serbs, and in return, the Ottomans further reinforced their alliance with Byzantium by conclusion of a dynastic marriage agreement of the Emperor’s daughter to Orhan I. By this marriage, Orhan I also received the privilege to conduct military operations and incursions into Thrace under Byzantine rule.823
Succeeding Ottoman sultans continued with this policy. Sultan Murad I married the sister of the Bulgarian King Ivan Shishman, Maria Tahamara, to secure the territories gained and to conclude peace. He also married Pasha Melek, daughter of Kızıl
Murad Bey, in order to secure their rule in Anatolia.824 Bayezid I (also known as
Yıldırım – the Thunderbolt) was married to Olivera Despina (or Mileva), the daughter of Lazar of Serbia. It is known that his brother in law, Stefan Lazarević, fought along with Bayezid I in a number of battles, the most famous of which was the Battle of Ankara in 1402 against the forces of the Timurid Empire.825 This was a tradition of the Anatolian Seljuks continued by the Ottomans; there were marriages between high- ranking Seljuk aristocrats with those of the beyliks and Byzantium.
Marriage diplomacy, however, did not prevent future conflicts or wars between the
Ottomans and their allies. Diplomacy and alliances were highly fragile. As noted in
Chapter Two, Machiavellian thinking dominated medieval politics; for the sake of dynasties, lies were told, rivals were supported, and alliances and trusts were often broken. Therefore, in the practice of marriage diplomacy the Ottoman Empire was no different from the early modern European states. This common practice continued
823Uluçay, Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları, 35. 824Uluçay, Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları, 67. 825Uluçay, Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları, 710. 288
well into the nineteenth century. Napoleon Bonaparte’s divorce from Josephine, who had borne him no heir, and his marriage to Austrian Princess Marie-Louise to seal the alliance between France and Austria, is exemplary of the continuation of the practice.
6.1.2.2.3.2 The Seven Towers: A Common Practice
Most of the time these representatives were treated well, but under conditions of war they were held in the Seven Towers as “prisoners of war,” in today’s terms. The captive foreign representatives were used for trading of information, as leverage for influence, or as mediators.826 The threat of the Seven Towers was an effective instrument of Ottoman diplomacy. It was also a factor in the Ottoman preference of non-resident diplomacy, by means of which the possibility of Ottoman hostages in the hands of rival powers in times of conflict was ruled out.827
This was not an unusual practice for Europeans, although it is generally referred to as one of the unconventionalities of Ottoman diplomacy. During the VenetianOttoman wars, the Muslim and Turkish merchants residing in Venice at the Fondaco dei
Turchi (Turkish Trade Office) were held captive by the Venetian authorities. During the Battle of Lepanto (1571), the Turkish merchants residing in the Fondaco dei
Turchi took refuge in their residence at Cannaregio. Even in peace time, the Turkish merchants residing in the Republic of Venice were restricted in their daily life, and
826Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” 114130. 827Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” 114130. Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period,” 3665. 289
the area they lived was kept guarded like a ghetto.828 Another example was the arrest of the Ottoman envoy, Zülfikâr Paşa, and his delegation sent to Vienna to inform the
Austrian Emperor Leopold I of the succession of Süleyman II to the throne. The hidden aim of the mission was to achieve a conciliation, and, if possible, a conclusion of peace. Having fought Austria, Poland and Venice on separate fronts for years after the failure of the Second Siege of Vienna (1683), the Ottomans were exhausted and wanted peace. The timing of the diplomatic mission was unfortunate
(corresponding to the ongoing war). The Ottoman delegation was kept under arrest in unpleasant conditions from 1688 to 1692. In his sefaratnâme, Zülfikâr Paşa expressed his feelings of disappointment and degradation caused by the ill treatment of the Austrian authorities.829 Indeed, the imprisonment of foreign representatives during war time was a common Byzantine practice known as Xenodochium
Romanorum. In Nicolson’s words, Seven Towers was a prison for the esteemed where the visitors watched.830 Similar practices were also common in Moscow and
Peking.831
828Şeraffetin Turan, “Venedikte Türk Ticaret Merkezi, Fondaco dei Turchi,” Belleten 32 (1969): 247- 283. 829Songül Çolak, Viyana’da Osmanlı Diplomasisi Zülfikâr Paşa’nın Mükâleme Takrîri [Ottoman Diplomacy in Vienna – Intrepretation of Zülfikâr Paşa’s Memoir], (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2007). 830 Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, 26.Constantinou, “Diplomacy, Grotesque Realism, and Ottoman Historiography,” 213226. 831Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy,” 28. 290
6.1.2.2.3.3 The Capitulations: The Ahdnâmes, Amâns and Protégé System in
Commercial, Consular and Diplomatic Relations
The commercial and diplomatic relations of the Empire832 were organized through use of capitulations (Ahdnâmes – covenant letters) and Amâns (guarantees). The capitulations were decrees that unilaterally granted privileges and extraterritorial rights to resident Europeans in the Ottoman Empire by the Sultans. The capitulations conferred a privileged status upon foreigners residing in Ottoman territories, particularly those dealing with trade. In general terms, capitulations included the following rights: liberty of travel and worship, safe conduct, tax exemption, and criminal and commercial extraterritorial jurisdiction.833 The foreigners thus exempted from Islamic law and taxes enjoyed extraterritorial rights and the rule of their countries. Nasim Sousa defined this practice as an example of “the personality of the law,” meaning that the law of a country followed its citizen everywhere he/she went.834 The first capitulations were granted unilaterally and non-reciprocally to enable safe conduct. They were valid for the life of the grantor Sultan. The successor
Sultans retained the right to review, modify, renew or abolish the capitulations. As
832For Ottoman commercial relations, see A. H. Lybyer, “The Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Oriental Trade,” The English Historical Review, 30 (1915): 577588; Philip McCluskey, “Commerce before Crusade? France, The Ottoman Empire and the Barbary Pirates (16611669),” French History, 23 (2009): 1-21; Mehmet Bulut, “The Role of the Ottomans and Dutch in the Commercial Integration between the Levant and Atlantic in the Seventeeth Century,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 45 (2002): 197230; Hans Theunissen, “Four Ottoman Documents Pertinent to the Ottoman-Venetian Treaty 1517,” De Turcicis Aliisque Rebus Commentarii Henry Hofman Dedicati, Utrecht Turcological Series III (1992): 79104; Hans Peter Alexander Theunissen, OttomanVenetian Diplomatics: The ‘Ahd-names – The Historical Background and Development of a Category of PoliticalCommercial Instruments Together with an Annotated Edition of Corpus Relevant Documents, EJOS, Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies, I (1998): 1689. 833James B. Angell, “The Turkish Capitulations,” The American Historical Review, 6 (1901): 256. 834Ruud Peters and Bernard Weiss eds., The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Perception, Theory and Practice in the 18th Century, (Boston: Brill, 2005), 1961. See also Shih Shun Liu, Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Its Decline, (New York: Columbia University, 1925), 6175. 291
Naff puts it, capitulations were mere reflections of the Ottoman view of “the inferiority of the Christian West,” since the Sultan did not accept the sovereign equality of his European counterparts and unilaterally granted the capitulations with the right to declare them void whenever he decided.835 The unilateral granting of capitulations did not preclude these treaties from having both commercial and political reciprocal clauses. To give an example, the Ottoman and Venetian
Ahdnâmes of 1430 recognized the same rights granted to Ottoman merchants in
Venetian territories and dominions.836
The fact that the Ottoman Empire did not have resident embassies abroad and that it was predominantly an Islamic state did not preclude conduct of its relations with the outside world on the basis of equality (taken as reciprocity within the context of the capitulations),837 universal practices and rules. To give another example, the Peace
Treaty between Mehmed II and the Doge of Venice dated 1446 was written in Greek.
The Doge and the Sultan are referred to as authentic (Highness), which is a Greek expression to designate sovereignty. In the early days of the beylik, the Ottomans used the Greek language in conducting their external affairs and treaties. The other striking feature of this treaty was the reiteration of equal rights granted to Venetian and Ottoman merchants.838
835Naff, “Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in the Eighteenth Century,” 98. 836Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The ‘Ahd-names, 195196. 837Reşat Arım, Foreign Policy Concepts, Conjecture, Freedom of Action, Equaliy, (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitütüsü, 2001), 45. 838Karl-Heinz Ziegler, “The Peace Treaties of the Ottoman Empire with European Christian Powers,” in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History, ed. Lesaffer, 338364. For the original text, see Theunissen, OttomanVenetian Diplomatics: The ‘Ahd-names, 197. 292
It is known that extraterritorial rights similar to Ottoman capitulations were exercised by earlier civilizations. The Anatolian Seljuks and the Byzantine Empire also granted trade privileges and safeguarded the conduct of Levantine trade with the Italian city- states through capitulations. The Ottomans after the conquest of Istanbul continued with this and granted capitulations to Italian city-states (Genoa, Venice, Florence and
Naples), France, Britain, and the Dutch Republic.839
The development of capitulary regimes between Muslim and non-Muslims is generally attributed to the differences of religious understandings of trade. It is argued that the Muslims, reluctant to trade and travel in foreign lands, used capitulations to attract foreigners to trade in their lands and ports.840 In the Ottoman understanding, the capitulations were, indeed, more than simple commercial dealings.841 The Empire’s political considerations and balance of power politics played an important factor in the granting of the capitulations. Even the first set of capitulations had a political side. They were used as tools for concluding an alliance with France against their common enemy, the Hapsburgs. Later capitulations granted to Holland and Britain were also seen as ways to deal with common enemies and used for establishing friendly/cooperative relations. Thus, these measures determined the basis of Ottoman political relations with these states in the following centuries.842
The capitulations were considered important tools for establishing good and friendly
839Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlı’nın Avrupa ile Barışıklığıı: Kapitülasyonlar ve Ticaret,” Doğu Batı 6 (2003): 5581. 840Paul Pradier-Fodéré, Revue de Droit International, (Paris, 1869), 119, cited in Angell, “The Turkish Capitulations,” 255. 841Nasim Sousa, The Capitulary Regime of Turkey, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), 15. 842A. H. De Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations, 16101630, (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut Leiden/Istanbul, 1978). 293
relations. In the introductory and body parts of the capitulations, the mutual promises to keep good and friendly relations were repeated.843 The Ottoman recognition of capitulations to France in 1535 as well as to Britain in 1579 and the Dutch Republic in 1615 had pragmatic reasons. France was the Catholic rival and Britain and the
Dutch Republic the Protestant rivals of the Hapsburgs – the major enemy of the
Ottomans.
As noted above, over time, capitulary rights were extended to include the berats
(protégés) – which conferred the right of protection recognized as being given to foreign powers. This right has been abused and used for political reasons. Berats were sold to local traders – Greeks and Armenians under the protégés of these powers conducted trade with tax exemptions.844 As the Empire lost its advantageous position in international relations, particularly after the Treaty of Passarowitz, the capitulatory states started to dictate the terms of the capitulations. The European powers and the Ottoman Empire’s Christian subjects gained private rights for buying and selling all kinds of goods. Broader treaty privileges and standards of justice turned in favor of the Europeans. The capitulations extended guarantees and the principle of reciprocity to the high seas, particularly to the western Mediterranean region.845
Capitulations soon became tools in the hands of the powerful against the weak
Ottomans. They became reciprocal and continuously binding. The fact that the
843Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The ‘Ahd-names, 195196. 844Salahi Sonyel, “The Protege System in the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Islamic Studies, 2 (1991): 56-66. Peters and Weiss eds., The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System, 61115. 845Naff, “Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in the Eighteenth Century,” 99. 294
Sultans no longer had the right to declare them null and void, in line with the political context, destroyed the reciprocity. In other words, capitulations became a type of “unequal treaties,” like the Treaty of Nanking concluded between China and the Western Powers (1842) after the Opium War, used for Western penetration of the
Empire. The Ottoman administration tried to annul the capitulations, working against its interests in the Paris Congress of 1856, and then in 1862. The European powers opposed any change in the system that would favor the Ottomans. Eventually, this practice led to the Empire’s economic decline.
6.1.3 The Resident Ottoman Diplomacy (1793-1856): Characteristics, Principles and Practices
By the late eighteenth century, the European powers had trained diplomats, as well as a network of permanent missions and foreign ministries. Still, the control of foreign policy was executed by few, and foreign ministries, as small establishments, performed basic clerical tasks. The actual separation of diplomacy from politics as a profession came later with the further bureaucratic institutionalization and renovations in communications technology. These led to changes in the conduct of diplomacy. Until the nineteenth century, the major task of diplomats was the settlement of disputes and arrangement of peace treaties.
Studies by Roderic Davison and Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj revealed that though the
Ottoman Empire did not have an established foreign ministry and a network of trained diplomats, the Ottoman negotiators carried out principled and skillful
295
negotiations in the Karlofça (1699) and Küçük Kaynarca (1774).846 It can be argued that from 1699 onwards, as a notable end result of the Treaty of Karlofça, Ottoman relations with the outside world changed radically.847 The loss of important territories and changing balance in favor the Ottomans’ two major enemies – Austria and
Russia – brought a transformation in the Ottoman mindset. The fact that the Empire was the defeated party at the negotiation table with no capability to dictate led to the
Ottoman realization that they were no longer a great power and that if extensive reforms were not carried out, they would face the fate reserved for weak powers like
Poland – partition at the hands of the strong. Under the reigns of Selim III and
Mahmud II, a series of radical military and administrative reforms were carried out.
The most important of these was the bureaucratization of Ottoman diplomacy with the establishment of permanent embassies and the foundation of a foreign ministry.
6.1.3.1 Bureaucratic Reform under Selim III and Mahmud II: The Founding of
Permanent Embassies and Foreign Ministry
The Ottoman reform process corresponds to the French Revolution. In the majority of the studies concerned with the subject, the Ottoman policy regarding the intra-
European affairs is described as distant and disinterested. It is, therefore, common to find arguments that the Ottomans took little interest in the events taking place in
France until Napoleon and the French forces under his command occupied Egypt.
846Roderic H. Davison, “Russian Skill and Turkish Imbellicity: The Tteaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered,” Slavic Review, 35 (1976):463–483; Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz,” in Yurdusev, ed. Ottoman Diplomacy, 2004, 89-113. 847See Virginia H. Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace – Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700- 1783, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 18–19; Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream – The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1800-1923, (Great Britain: John Murray, 2005), 333; Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response , (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 17; Quartaert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, 78–80. 296
The Empire, on the contrary, since its inception was interested and connected in one way or another to Europe since they were a part of the intra-European balance of power politics. Changes within the European interstate system were, therefore, of great significance for the Ottoman Sultans in safeguarding the territorial integrity and security of the Empire.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, both the Ottoman Empire and European powers, conscious of the decreasing military power of the Turks, knew that their futures were tied to each other. France had long been a traditional ally of the Empire, and the French had been aiding the Empire in its military and technological reforms ever since the Tulip Era. The continuation of good and friendly relations with France was deemed essential for the modernization and westernization of the Empire. The
French Revolution, along with the pressure of the Allies on the Ottomans, however, made relations difficult. The Revolution corresponded to a period when the Empire was preoccupied with a two-front war against Austria-Russia (1787-1792) and internal reactions against reforms within the army and administration. The Empire was relieved by the Revolution. It diverted attention from the Ottoman territories to
France. The conclusion of the Peace Treaties of Ziştovi (1791) and Jassy (1792)848 led to six years of peace with Europe and enabled Selim III to concentrate on reforms and the internal problems of the Empire without fear of an imminent attack. 849
848For details of the negotiations of the Ziştovi and Yaş peace treaties, see Câbî Ömer Efendi, Câbî Târihi – Târîhi Sultân Selim-i Sâlis ve Mahmûd-ı Sânî – Tahlîl ve Tenkidli Metin I [Câbî History – History of Sultan Selim II and Sultan Mahmut II – Analytical and Critical Text Vol. I], prepared by Mehmet Ali Beyan, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), 28-31. 849Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New – The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 247. 297
The French Revolution increased the need to gather first-hand information on Europe and speeded up the establishment of permanent and resident embassies. This led to the transition of Ottoman diplomacy from unconventional to conventional methods.850 The Empire started sending its envoys for longer periods, and during the
Revolution, a number of Ottoman diplomats were in Europe. Throughout the course of the Revolution, the Empire received direct and indirect intelligence through the dispatches and reports of the Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna, Ebubekir Ratib
Efendi851 as well as from the French Embassy, which was still open, and other foreign embassies in Istanbul. Ebubekir Ratıb Efendi, through the use of his diplomatic contacts not just in Vienna but all over Europe, was sending dispatches and reports about the developments within and outside of France. He was in contact not just with the Austrians but also with the French émigrés and Jacobins. Ebubekir Ratıb Efendi, who later became the Reisül-kȗttab, was highly trusted and respected by the Sultan, having previously served as his tutor while he was prince.852 In his dispatches, Ratıb
Efendi noted that France was a dynamic millet (unlike the Habsburgs – a state with a single religion, nation, and language) and a non-dismissible European power, and would sooner or later regain its status. Therefore, he advised the Sultan to wait before acting.853 He also warned Istanbul that the time was ripe for concentrating on the reform process, as the Revolution would have a spill-over effect all over Europe and last for many years.854
850For detailed analyses of Ottoman diplomacy with its unconventional and conventional features, see Yurdusev ed., Ottoman Diplomacy, 2004. See also Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System,” 141-152. 851Fatih Yeşil, “Looking at the French Revolution through Otoman Eyes: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi’s Observations,” Bullation of SOAS, 70 (2007): 283–304; Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, (London: Norton, 1982). 852Yeşil, “Looking at the French Revolution through Otoman Eyes,” 283–304. 853Yeşil, “Looking at the French Revolution through Otoman Eyes,” 283–304. 854Yeşil, “Looking at the French Revolution through Otoman Eyes,” 283–304. 298
Until the political scene in Europe calmed down, Ottoman relations with the new regime in France were put on hold. Selim III hesitated in his diplomatic moves and initiatives toward France; the Empire preferred to wait for the European great powers to act first. Meanwhile, it also stayed away from European alignments. Naturally,
Selim III wanted to ally his weakening Empire with the strong, victorious powers and, therefore, waited until the strong side was determined at the end of the wars.855
The major concern of the Sublime Porte was to find itself a new powerful ally. Under the circumstances, securing British foreign support for the reform initiatives seemed to be a viable and pragmatic solution.856 The Ottoman elite highly appreciated the
William Pitt government’s reaction to Russian expansion and fortification in the
Black Sea region at the expense of the Ottomans. This event elevated Britain to the status of a potential ally, while the future of France was uncertain. Sultan Selim III decided to send the first Ottoman resident mission to London rather than to Paris.857
Later, between 1793 and 1796, the Empire sent permanent missions to Vienna,
Berlin, and Paris.
The first ambassadors, however, proved to be mostly ineffective and unsuccessful.
Though they were chosen from highly respected members of the Ottoman ruling elite, the bureaucracy, or the ulema, the Ottoman envoys were not trained as professional, career diplomats. They were not experts in conducting European diplomacy and protocol. Moreover, some of the ambassadors did not speak foreign languages and, thus, they were dependent on the dragomans chosen from Ottoman
855 Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi. Wajda Sendesni, Regard de L’Historiographie Ottomane sur la Révolution Française et L’Expédition d’Egypte – Tarih-i Cevdet, Les Cahiers du Bosphore XXVII, (Istanbul: Les Editions Isis, 2003), 59–75. 856Shaw, Between Old and New, 248. 857Shaw, Between Old and New, 248. 299
minorities with perfect knowledge of foreign languages. There was a need to develop the communications system and technology. It took days and months to send information to the Porte and receive instructions from Istanbul. Furthermore, resident embassies added to the increasing costs of the Empire. Consequently, by the 1820s, the Ottoman state suspended this system, called back its ambassadors, and left the dragomans as chargé d’affaires and consuls for organizing commercial links with
European powers.858
The westernization and bureaucratization attempts of the Ottoman Empire gathered momentum in the second half of the nineteenth century during the last years of
Sultan Mahmut II. In 1833 and 1836, respectively, the new Tercüme Odası
(Translation Bureau/Department) and the Umur-u Hariciye Nezareti (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs) were founded. The Reis-ül-küttab, responsible for foreign affairs, was now called the Nazır (Minister of Foreign Affairs). Tercüme Odası gained more importance, and in 1859, Mülkiye (the Imperial School) was established to train civil bureaucrats and diplomats.859 The inventions in the field of telecommunications, particularly the use of the telegraph, accelerated the communications network between the Empire and its missions abroad. In addition to the four existing embassies (London, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris), new embassies were opened in
858 Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy,” 303-315; Carter V. Findley, “The Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 4 (1970): 334–357; Carter V. Findley, “The Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: The Beginnings of Bureaucratic Reform under Selim III and Mahmud II,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3 (1972): 388–416; Gül Akyılmaz, “Reis-ül Küttaplık Müessesesinin Önem Kazanmasına Yol Açan Gelişmeler ve Osmanlı Hariciye Nezareti’nin Doğuşu [The Developments Leading to the Institutionalization of Reis-ül Küttabs and the Foundation of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs],” XII. Türk Tarih Kongresi Bildiriler – Ankara 4-6 Ekim 1999, III Cilt I. Kısım, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2002), 279-312; J.C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System,” The Middle East Journal, 15 (1961): 141–152. 859Erik J. Zücher, Turkey – A Modern History (London – New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993). 300
Teheran, Athens, Stockholm, St. Petersburg, Turin, Brussels, and Washington respectively. During the Tanzimat era, within this new administrative structure, the role and importance of the European model-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs was outstanding.860
Apart from the conduct of foreign affairs, the Ministry was involved in the formulation and initiation of internal reforms. Its leading role in the reform movement resulted from the fact that the personnel required for the initiation of the reforms with the knowledge and expertise of Europe were concentrated mainly at the
Ministry.861 Under the Nazır’s direction, a European-style ministry gradually developed. Similarly, professional diplomats and bureaucrats with European outlooks and methods were trained. These men were conversant in French and sometimes were more European in their manners than some European bureaucrats.
For example, Keçecizâde Fuad Paşa, Mehmet Emin Âli Paşa, Halil Şerif Paşa, and
Mehmet Reşit Paşa were all diplomats and reformers who later became Foreign
Ministers and Vezir-i Âzams. 862
860Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). Zücher, Turkey – A Modern History, 45–48. Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 253–289; Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire – A Short History, 109–136; Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 72–109. See also Carter V. Findley, Osmanlı Devletinde Bürokratik Reform – Bâbıâli (1789- 1922) [Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottman Empire – Sublime Porte (1789-1922)], (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1994); Ali Akyıldız, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatında Reform [Tanzimat Era Reform in the Ottoman Central Administration], (Istanbul: Eren, 1993); İlber Ortaylı, Batılılaşma Yolunda [On the Way to Westernization], (Istanbul: MK – Merkez Kitapları, 2007). 861Zücher, Turkey – A Modern History, 45–48. See also Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire—A Short History, 109–136; Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 72–109. 862Roderic H. Davison, Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms, Analect Isisiana 34,(Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1999), 13–149; Yılmaz Öztuna, Âli Paşa [Âli Pahsa], (Ankara: Kültür Turizm Balkanlığı, 1988); Fuat Andıç and Süphan Andıç, Sadrazam Âli Paşa – Hayatı, Zamanı ve Siyasi Vasiyetnamesi [Grand Vizier Aali Pasha – Life, Time and Political Testament], (Istanbul: Eren, 2000); Fuat Andıc and Suphan Andıc, The Last of the Ottoman Grandees – The Life and the Political Testament of Âli Paşa, (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 1996); Engin Deniz Akarlı, Belgelerle Tanzimat – Osmanlı Sadrazamlarından Âli ve Fuad Paşaların Siyasi Vasiyetnameleri [Tanzimat with Documents – The Political Testaments of Ottoman Grand Vizier Âli ve Fuad Pashas], (Istanbul: Boğaziçi 301
6.1.3.2 Characteristics, Principles and Practices of the Tanzimat Diplomacy
In the nineteenth century, there was a convergence of Ottoman interests with those of the major European great powers. The British were concerned about securing their trade route to India – which was the jewel of the British crown colonies. The
Austrians’ policies and interests in southeastern Europe were challenged by those of
Russia. Russian Slavic expansionism in the region at the expense of Austria was not desirable, and the safety of weaker Ottoman control was to the benefit of the
Austrian Empire. The French, on the other hand, being isolated, desired to reverse the increasing British influence both on the continent and in the Near East. The
Ottomans, pressured by the direct Russian threat, wanted to keep their borders intact and territories under control through European alignments. There was a convergence of national interests: a common interest in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire at least for the sake of the local European balance of power (equilibrium for the preservation of the European Great Power collective hegemony) and worldwide equilibrium.
The bureaucratic reforms of the Tanzimat era led to a complete break from the ad hoc diplomacy of the earlier period. The Tanzimat diplomacy became reciprocal, continuous and westernized. The establishment of Ottoman embassies in major
European cities enabled the Porte to be more actively involved in Europe. The developments in Europe were considered essential for the Empire’s future survival.
The Ottoman ruling élite, however, did not desire to be a part of the European
Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1978); Reşat Kaynar, Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat [Mustafa Reşit Pahsa and Tanzimat], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991); Mustafa Kemal İnal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar [The Last Grand Viziers of Ottoman Times], (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940). 302
pluralistic international society crystallized in the Concert of Europe for security and survival reasons alone. The centuries-long political, military, economic and socio- cultural encounters and acculturation also led to an ideational change ‘from security through power to security through order’ at the intellectual level. They were aware of the fact that the European interstate relations had been fundamentally altered with the
French Revolution and that in the post-Vienna international order; the Empire could only regain its great power status by the Great Powers’ recognition of it as a
European power. As noted by Lewis, the Porte was aware of the fact that the Empire was no longer recognized as a great power, “but one state among several, among whom there might be allies as well as enemies.”863 War as an institution of statecraft was regarded as a waste of resources and power, while diplomacy and international law were regarded as safer and reliable institutions. To control the threat posed by
European powers and to direct the Empire’s sources to reforms, the Porte interchangeably and simultaneously used the primary international institutions in
Ottoman foreign policy. Throughout this adaptation and strategic learning period, the
Empire formulated its foreign policy on the basis of a number of principles which were deemed to be essential for the Ottoman survival: preserving the sovereignty of the empire, securing the Great Powers’ guaranty and support of Ottoman integrity, achieving recognition as an equal member of the Concert of Europe, supporting legitimate governments and international law, and avoiding war through support of another power and strategic retreat.864
863 Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, 45. 864Davison, Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy, 321325 and 334343. 303
The utmost importance was placed on the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Empire. To this end, the Ottoman ruling élite tried to thwart wars and used every opportunity to achieve official declaration of the Great Powers’ guaranty of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman representatives abroad were instructed to uphold this principle above all. 865
Prevention of foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Empire, recognition of its territorial unity with its population, and sovereign control over imperial territories determined the basis of Ottoman diplomacy. To quote Roderic H. Davison, “For the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, diplomacy became more important than ever.
To survive in a Europe ordered by five, then six, great powers, the empire needed all the diplomatic defence it could master.”866 The weakness of the Empire in comparison to European powers was unquestionable, neither on the side of the
Europeans nor on the side of the Ottomans. However, to assume that it was only as a result of its weakening power that the Empire applied diplomacy or international law in its relations with the outside world would be an incomplete analysis, as it overlooks the change that had been going on within the Ottoman political thinking for quite a long time.
6.1.3.3 The Connection between the Tanzimat Reforms and External Crises
The major administrative and political trends of the Tanzimat included the abolishment of the patrimonial system of governance, which maintained the functional differentiation of governmental branches; an increasing division of
865 Davison, Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy, 321. 866Davison, Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy, 319. 304
governmental powers, leading to the establishment of an Ottoman parliament and an
Ottoman constitution; a differentiation of the means of physical force, according to the separate realms of internal and external security; and the introduction of a new system of provincial administration. All of those trends indicated a transformation from a traditional imperial system toward a legal nation-state.867
From the 1830s onwards, Sultan Abdülmecit, who succeeded Mahmut II, embarked upon an extensive and intensive program of reforms known as the Tanzimat reforms.
In the Tanzimat era, the center of power shifted from the palace to the Porte (i.e., the bureaucracy). Though carried out independently, these reforms had an important connection with the Empire’s foreign policy and international situation. Ottoman leaders acknowledged that it was vital for them to convince their European counterparts that the Empire could reform along Western lines, adapt to the modern world, and join the European civilization and system; that the Empire could be a valuable economic and commercial partner to Europe; and that the good treatment of its non-Muslim subjects, which was of utmost concern for Europeans, could be guaranteed.
The beginning of the Tanzimat era coincided with the Ottomans’ attempts to solve a number of international crises, and the Empire needed the support of its European allies, who were great powers. An imperial edict was written by the leading reformer of the time, Foreign Minister Reşit Paşa, who promulgated reforms in the name of
867 Zücher, Turkey – A Modern History, 45–48. 305
the Sultan. This edict, called Gülhane Hatt-i Şerifi,868 promised four basic Ottoman reforms: “The establishment of guarantees of life, honor and property of the Sultan’s subjects; an orderly system of taxation to replace the system of tax farming; a system of conscription for the army; and equality before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion.”869 Reforms were either reckoned necessary by the major Ottoman bureaucrats or enforced by the great European powers. This top-down character also applied to the reforms under Selim III and Mahmud II and to the reform edicts of the
Tanzimat period. Both the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane and the subsequent Hatt-ı
Hümayun of 1840 and 1856 aimed at the complete reconstruction of the Ottoman state along Western lines.
However, it would be wrong to attribute the reforms to foreign pressure alone. These reforms and edicts were used to gain foreign support, but they were also the result of the Ottoman leaders’ valid belief that the only way to save the Empire was to introduce Westernization and European-style reforms. Yet, the Tanzimat edicts must be analyzed against the background of both the inter-state competition of the
European states system and the power struggle within the Ottoman Empire.
Ottoman statesmen dealt with a multiplicity of relatively autonomous actors on the inter-state and intra-state levels. As mentioned above, from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, the Empire gradually became a “zone of conflict.”
868 Zücher, Turkey – A Modern History, 45–48; Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 72-109. 869 Zücher, Turkey – A Modern History, 52; Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 72-109.
306
Numerous crises and wars erupted, one after another, in the Ottoman territories.
Traditional Ottoman methods proved to be inadequate. Ottoman leaders recognized that the Empire could not win a war with a major European power unless one or more strong powers supported it. The Empire’s apparently weakening status in international politics, its ineffectiveness in resolving its problems with traditional methods, and its inability to prevent the internationalization of its internal crises led to a great change in the Ottoman approach to security. These problems revealed the need for fundamental changes in the political, administrative, military, diplomatic, and socio-economic structures of the Ottoman imperial rule. The Hatt-ı Serif of
Gülhane belonged to an era in which the Empire’s territorial integrity was threatened by Serbian revolts, the Greek War of Independence, the rise of Muhammed Ali, and the Egyptian crisis. The Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 was designed to facilitate the admittance of the Empire to the “Concert of Europe” at the Paris Conference, which terminated the Crimean War.
The Tanzimat era’s reforms (as foreseen in both edicts) were more radical and extensive in scope than earlier ones. However, all of these reforms enhanced state authority, undermined the role of the ulema and the janissary, and increased foreign interference in Ottoman affairs in all realms. The Ottomans needed greater independence and space, along with sufficient external stability and security. The reforms gave the Ottomans the time and space they needed. Eventually, however, the reforms’ failure to provide security and order gave rise to fundamentalist and nationalist opposition, providing an opportunity for the Young Turk Revolution.
307
6.2 Ottoman Perception of International Law
The Ottoman conception of the law of nations was based on the Islamic and pragmatic nature of the state. As noted above, the Ottomans entered into alliances, concluded peace treaties, and established diplomatic, commercial and dynastic relations with the non-Muslim states. The Ottomans’ pragmatic interpretation and understanding of the world and Islam enabled interlocution and acculturation of the two worlds separated by religion. The Ottoman perception and practice of international law can be divided into two eras. The first era, from 1299 to 1839, was dominated by Islamic law. The second era, from 1839 to the demise of the Empire in
1923, was characterized by the joint application and practice of Islamic and
European-style secular and modern laws.
6.2.1 The Euro-OttomanSymbiosis: Dâr-al Harb, Dâr-al Sulh and Dâr-al Islam
The Siyar – the Islamic law of nations – is not a coherent system of laws separate from the law of Islam. Its main preoccupation is the conception and practice of Jihad and its raison d’être. Over time, it has broadened to include rules regulating relations with other states and nations like treaty-making. As noted by Majid Khadduri, “Just as the ius gentium, an extension of the jus civile, was designed by the Romans to regulate their relations with the non-Romans, so was the siyar, an extension of the sharî’a, designed to govern the relationship of Muslims with non-Muslims at a time when Islam came into contact with them.”870 The Islamic law was the law of all
870Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations – Shaybānī’s Siyar, (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 118; Yasuaki, “When was the Law of International Society Born?” 1822. 308
mankind. It was founded during the expansion of Islam after the Prophet
Muhammad, and for that reason it was meant to be universal.
Siyar’s binding force was not based on reciprocity or mutual consent. In other words, it was not binding on non-Muslims unless they so desired. It was binding on Muslim states. Nevertheless, certain rules required reciprocity, such as diplomatic immunity or exchange of prisoners. This is also related to the fact that at the initial stages of the
Islamic expansion, it was believed that the whole world would convert to Islam.
This, however, was not realized, and the Muslim states had established relations with non-Muslim states. As noted above, the Islamic law of nations centered on the concept of umma – meaning Islamic community – divides the world into mainly two realms: dâr al-Islam and dâr- al-harb.871 All those territories left beyond the borders of Islam were considered to be the “abode of war.” Dâr al-sulh, on the other hand, is a contribution of the Shafi school of law whereby the Muslims and non-Muslims can peacefully coexist. Islamic states and rulers can enter into treaty relations with the non-Christians on the condition that these treatises will not be permanent. The alliances and the commercial relations between the Ottoman Empire and the
European powers are examples of this rule. Permanent and long-lasting treaty relations with non-Muslims are not restricted to preclude integration of the non-
Muslims with the Islamic world. The major duty of all Islamic states is jihad. Siyar, therefore, mainly dealt with jihad. 872
871Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, 118; Yasuaki, “When was the Law of International Society Born?” 1822. 872Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, 118. 309
The Ottoman sultan was considered to be above all. The sultan was the sole authority and ruler within the borders of the Empire. In the modern understanding, the sultan was the head of the executive and legislative branches. Still, his rule was not absolute. His legislative power was limited. In Shariah, the Sheikhuislam was the highest authority. Sultans’ statutes needed approval and ratification by the
Sheikhuislam.873 Despite being defined as a state governed by religion (din-ü-devlet), the Ottoman administration separated religion and the state interest.874 As noted above in Chapters Three and Four, religion was subordinated to Otttoman pragmatism and raison d’étre. This enabled the Empire to act beyond the limitation of the Islamic law of nations.
From the early days of the beylik, the Ottomans entered into alliances and treaty relations with non-Muslim states. Although the capitulations were unilateral non- reciprocal grants made by the Ottoman sultans, they were in many respects contrary to the classical Islamic practice. According to the Islamic law of nations, peaceful treaty relations with non-Muslim states could only be concluded for ten years.
According to the Ottoman practice, capitulations were declared valid for the lifetime of the sultan. Consequently, the majority of the capitulations contradicted the siyar.
Additionally, as noted above, Ottoman capitulations include reciprocal and equal rights. To give an example, the preamble of the 1535 treaty concluding the Ottoman-
French alliance treated the sultan and the king equally. It was considered valid during their lives. It also contained mutual reciprocal rights recognized as having been given
873Berdal Aral, “The Idea of Human Rights as Perceived in the Ottoman Empire,” Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004), 464. 874Şerif Mardin, Türk Modernleşmesi Makaleler 4 [Turkish Modernization Articles 4], (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 1991), 111. 310
to the citizens of both states.875 As Khadduri argued, the Ottomans, by making long- term peace with the dâr-al harb, changed the Islamic law of nations in a non- alterable way. The idea of Jihad, which defined the basis of the relations between the
Islamic and non-Islamic world as a continuous state of war, became thereafter inefficient.876
It is also known that the empire had practiced and observed application of the two customary principles of international law: uti possidetis (as you possess) and pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept).877 In Article 1 of the Treaty of Passarowitz
(1718) between the Ottoman Empire, Venice and the Holy Roman Empire, a reference was made to uti possidetis regarding the freedom of commerce.878
References to common principles and norms of European international law can be found in the dealings of the Ottoman representatives with the Europeans. Particularly in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman ruling élite, in order to safeguard the territorial integrity and independence of the Empire, used the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Ottoman diplomacy and international behavior were legitimized on the basis of European international law long before 1856.
At times, the Ottomans’ applications of ‘European international laws and norms led to misunderstandings and friction in the relations of the Empire with European
875For the text of the treaty, see de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane, 1521. 876 Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations – Shaybānī’s Siyar, 6667. 877Yurdusev, “The Middle East Encounter,” 76. 878Ziegler, “The Peace Treaties of the Ottoman Empire with European Christian Powers,” 355. 311
powers. To give an example, during the French Revolution, Austria, Russia and
Prussia diplomatically pressured the sultan to take a stance against the French officials and citizens residing in Ottoman lands with the claim that they were
Jacobins, wearing the cockades symbolizing the revolution, and that this was an outright infringement of Ottoman neutrality.879 The Reis Efendi (Re’isül-kȗttab), referring to Ottoman neutrality (bîtaraflık) in his conversations with the ambassadors of these states, reminded them that France had long been an ally of the Empire and
“the most favored European nation” in the Ottoman capitulations. He added that, in line with the European international law, the Ottoman Empire could not interfere with private dressings of the French citizens residing in Ottoman territories.880 To quote Rashid Efendi’s response to the chief dragoman of the Austrian Embassy on the issue:
My friend we have told you several times that the Ottoman Empire is a Muslim state. No one among us pays any attention to these badges of theirs. We recognize the merchants of friendly states as guest. They wear what headgear they wish on their heads and attach what badges they please. And if they put baskets of grapes on their heads, it is not the business of the Sublime Porte to ask them why they do so. You are troubling yourself for nothing.881
Reis Efendi’s reference to both the Islamic nature of the state and his legitimization of the Ottoman diplomatic behavior on the basis of common concepts of European international law, like the most favored nation – pacta sunt servanda – are remarkable.882 The Ottoman position with regard to the binding character of the
French capitulations on both states and its careful observance of these under all
879Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet [History of Cevdet], (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1966), 15591560; Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi, 115116. 880See Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet, 15591560. 881Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, 52. 882Laurd, Types of International Society, 297. 312
conditions clearly presents the change in Ottoman understanding of reciprocity and diplomacy.
The other contentious issue between the Empire and the Allies was the status of the
French ambassador at Istanbul. The French ambassador at the Porte, Choiseul-
Gouffier, resigned because of the revolution. Contrary to the general practice, upon the request of the Ottoman administration, he continued with his duties for awhile and waited for events in France to calm down. In 1793, he left for St. Petersburg.883
When the new French ambassador arrived on July 17, 1792, Austria, Prussia, and
Russia asked the sultan not to give accreditation to the revolutionary regime’s ambassador.884 Reis Efendi, on behalf of Selim III, refused all of these demands in line with diplomatic protocol and international conduct. Official Ottoman statements
(hatt-ı hümayuns) and correspondence of this era emphasized the fact that the relationship of the Porte was with the State of France and its people, and that the changing form of government did not require any modification in Ottoman position.
France was referred to as the State of France, regardless of its regime, until the Porte officially recognized the Republic in 1795. 885 The Ottoman insistence on protecting
French rights strained its relations with the Allies.
Another example that can be given of the Ottomans’ unorthodox legal practice is the declaration of wars. These required approval (fetva) of Şeyhülislam (Sheikh al-Islam
the highest Islamic religious authority). This practice continued until the dissolution of the Empire. As noted in Chapter Four, the fundamental change in the
883Mansel, Constantinople, 207. 884Tarih-i Cevdet, 15581576. Soysal, Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi, 115118. 885Shaw, Between Old and New, 250. 313
Ottoman understanding of war led to its legitimization on the basis of European international law, but wars continued to be declared with the fetva of Şeyhülislam.
The Tanzimat reforms led to the secularization and westernization of the Ottoman understanding of law. After the introduction of Western style laws between 1839 and
1923, Islamic and secular laws were jointly applied within the Empire. Ottoman diplomats and statesmen continued to view European international law and its foundational principles – sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and pacta sunt servanda – as security providers. Particularly after the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the Empire had taken part in unions, congresses and conferences gathered for the codification of international law, like the Universal Telegraph Union of 1856, the
Universal Postal Union of 1874 and The Hague conferences. The Porte carefully adhered to the principles of international law, but these did not prevent the dissolution of the Empire or European interventions.
6.3 Ottoman Perception of Balance of Power and Great Powers (12991856)
The Ottoman Empire was militarily and economically a strong power made it an active part of the European balance of power system. The European powers, despite religious and civilization differences, recognized the Empire as a great power and took the Ottoman factor into account in formulation of their intra- and extra-
European policies. Ottoman support to France and the Protestant powers led to the restructuring of European power politics.
From the inception of the beylik, the Ottomans were an effective part of the
Byzantine and later European balance of power system. Ever since the move of the 314
Turcoman beyliks to the region, this became a sort of tradition among the Byzantine rulers. Against their internal rivals, they did not hesitate to join forces with the Turks, who were good warriors. Ottomans were actively involved in the internal politics and conflicts of the decaying Byzantine Empire. They also used alliance politics among the Turcoman beylik of Anatolia in order to exert their power and used the rivalries to their advantage. Strategically and commercially, the Ottoman Empire was a very important part of Mediterranean political and socio-economic life. Ottomans played a major role in the first and second stages of the Italian Wars.886 The Ottomans were not newcomers to balance of power politics when they started to play a role in the
Mediterranean and Italian system in the sixteenth century. During the powerful years of the Empire, the Ottomans pragmatically joined their forces with the enemies of their major enemies. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the major rivals of the
Ottomans were the Austrian Habsburgs. After the failure of Pope Leo X’s crusade against the Ottomans with the death of the German emperor, Francois I of France and
Charles I of Spain and the Netherlands rivaled for the crown. The Ottomans used the succession wars to extend their influence and control over European affairs. The
FrancoOttoman relations led to the Empire’s intervention into the European balance of power system. In this way, the Empire was able to disrupt the unity of the Catholic powers – the Papal States, France and the Holy Roman Empire.887
Later, against Habsburg Catholicism, the Ottoman Empire supported Protestantism
(basically Calvinists) in Europe. For example, Ottoman alliances were significant
886Yurdusev, “The Middle East Encounter,” 71; Dorothy M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1954), 104204. 887İnalcık, Turkey and Europe, 141195; Gülru Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Otoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry,” The Art Bulletin, 71 (1989): 401427. 315
aspects of the foreign policies of the Dutch and English monarchies in their struggle against the Habsburg supremacy in Europe.888 Ottoman power and diplomacy was significant in the preservation of the freedom of the system of states since it prevented the Habsburgs’ hegemony over Europe and enabled its safe and gradual transformation into a society of states.889 According to Watson, the FrancoOttoman alliance and Ottoman power not only prevented the establishment of a Habsburg hegemonial system in Europe, but also led to the formation of an anti-hegemonial
(Westphalian) European international society. Even after its decline, the Empire continued to be an important factor in European affairs.890
At different times, the Empire joined anti-hegemonic forces, concluded alliances with the European powers and consequently shaped the continental politics.
Ottomans were not outside the European international system; they were actively involved in the European balance of power system and, hence, had an impact on the shaping of the European international system/society.891 To quote Watson, “The
Ottomans played a major part in the European states system from its sixteenth century beginnings down to its merger into the present global system.”892 The
Ottomans, also through alliances, supported the dissident groups within the Habsburg
Empire. The Ottomans also supported the Moriscos community of Spain.893
888 Franklin L. Baumer, “England, the Turk and the Common Corps of Christendom,” The American Historical Review, 50 (1944): 2648; Bulut, “The Role of the Ottomans and Dutch in the Commercial Integration between the Levant and Atlantic in the Seventeeth Century,” 197230. 889W. Miller, “Europe and the Ottoman Power before the Nineteenth Century,” The English Historical Review, 63 (1901): 452471. 890Watson, The Evolution of International Society, 177-178 and 216. 891 For more on the Ottoman undestanding of balance of power see above Chapter Five, 233-267. 892Watson, The Evolution of International Society, 177-178 and 216. 893Andrew C. Hess, “The Moriscos: An Otoman Fifth Column in the Sixteeenth Century Spain”, The American Historical Review, 74 (1968):1-25. Palabıyık, “Contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the Construction of Modern Europe,” 81-100. 316
In 1790, Selim III concluded an alliance with Prussia. This was a remarkable move because for the first time in Ottoman history, an Ottoman sultan officially signed an alliance treaty with a European great power. Other defensive treaties and alliances followed this. For example, in 1798, Ottoman forces joined the anti-French alliance of Russia and Britain against Napoleonic forces, and another defensive alliance was made with Britain and France in 1799. Contrary to its traditions, the Empire also sought great power (third-party) mediation in resolving several cases regarding its foreign affairs. In this period, unilateral ad hoc diplomacy practice in the Empire was replaced by resident embassies.894 Balance of power politics was an important aspect of OttomanEuropean relations.
Starting from the partition of Poland by the Great Powers in the 1790s, Ottomans realized that the Empire could receive similar treatment. The French occupation of
Egypt, the Serbian uprising, and the Greek revolution led to the Ottoman realization that the Empire had become an object of the European balance of power. For its security and survival, the Empire had to achieve recognition as a great power and an official guarantee of its territorial integrity by the Great Powers. The Congress of
Paris (1856) provided the Porte an opportunity to achieve these. The Paris
Conference began on February 25, 1856. It took a month to settle all the major issues between parties. The Ottoman Empire was represented by the Grand Vizier, Âli Paşa, and Mehmet Cemil Bey, the Porte’s Ambassador in Paris and Turin. There were a number of critical issues for the Ottomans: the recognition of Ottoman territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence; its recognition as a member of the European
894Palabıyık, “Contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the Construction of Modern Europe,” 81100. 317
Concert; the position of the Christians and the foreign interference; the capitulations; the neutralization of the Black Sea; the passage through the Straits; the administration of the Danubian principalities and the navigation on the Danube; and the rectification of the OttomanRussian frontier in Asia, specifically the question of
Kars. At times, the Ottoman interests conflicted with those of its allies. 895
The protection and preservation of the territorial integrity and independence of the
Sublime Porte was agreed and accepted by all.896 A guarantee of its independence meant nothing unless it was put as a guarantee of the existing borders of the Empire.
Ali Paşa did not desire to leave any vague point in the treaty that could be used against the unity and order of the Porte or be a pretext for intervention. The Ottoman government was suspicious of all European powers.897 Accordingly, Article 7 of the
Treaty of Paris was worded as follows:
ART.VII. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russia, and His Majesty the King of Sardinia, declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (concert) of Europe. Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending its violation as a question of general interest.898
895Fuat Andıç and Süphan Andıç, Kırım Savaşı Âli Paşa ve Paris Antlaşması [Crimean War, Âli Paşa and the Treaty of Paris], (Istanbul: Eren, 2002), 45 and 69. 896Rich, Why the Crimean War, 193. 897Ponting, The Crimean War, 327. 898For the original text of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, as modified by the Treaty of London 1871, see Thomas Erskine Holland, The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey 1774 to 1853, (London: Macmillan & Co., 1877), 5772, and Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, Recueil d’actes Internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman Traites, Conventions, Arrangements, Déclarations, Protocoles, Procès- Verbaux, Firmans, Bérats, Lettres Patentes Et Autres Documents Relatifs au Droit Public Extérieur de la Turquie, Tome Troisieme, 1856-1878, (Paris : Libaririe Cotillon, F. Pichon, Successeur, 1902), 7080 and 8889. 318
This was a great achievement. Later, Âli Paşa in his political Testament to Sultan
Abdülaziz stated that:
Foreign affairs required immediate recognition. Our efforts were directed toward attaining the recognition of our right to exist and be admitted to the Concert of Europe.
We become a member of the family of great nations who respect each other’s rights.
We did succeed in having Europe recognize our borders and incontestable rights over the people of Your Empire.899
On the Ottoman side, this article was interpreted as the Porte’s entry into the
European Concert and recognition of its legal equality by great powers. Another concern of the Porte at the Peace Conference was the abrogation of the capitulations.
Ali Paşa claimed that the capitulations became obstacles to the initiation of the reforms requested by Europe and demanded their abrogation. The French and British supported Ali Paşa, but Russia refused the Ottoman view.900 Accordingly, Article 32 of the Final Treaty stipulated that:
ART.XXXII Until the Treaties or Conventions which existed before the war between the belligerent Powers have been either renewed or replaced by new Acts, commerce of importation or of exportation shall take place reciprocally on the footing of the regulations in force before the war; and in all other matters their subjects shall be respectively treated upon the footing of the most favoured nation.901
899Fuat Andıç and Süphan Andıç, The Last of the Ottoman Grandees – The Life and the Political Testament of Âli Paşa (Istanbul: the ISIS Press, 1996), 35 (italics added). In the literature there are arguments against the authenticity of this testament. It is claimed that it was written by somebody else. For these arguments and detailed examination of the existing documents in the archives, see Roderic H. Davison, “The Question of Ali Paşa’s Political Testament,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 2 (1980): 209225. 900Andıç and Andıç, Kırım Savaşı, Âli Paşa, 7879. 901 Holland, The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey 1774 to 1853, 5772. 319
Before commencement of the conference, Sultan Abdülmecid issued a new Hatt-ı
Hümayun (February 18, 1856) on the rights and privileges of the Christians within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. This document was written to prevent foreign pressures, specifically by Russia, during the conference.902 Despite Ottoman initiative, the issue of the rights and privileges of the Christians was brought forward by Russia, but Article 9 of the Final Treaty assured and relieved Ottoman worries with regard to foreign interference and Christian rights.
ART. IX. His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, having, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a Firman which, while ameliorating their condition without distinction o religion or of race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing to give a further proof of his sentiments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting parties the said Firman emanating spontaneously form his sovereign will.
The Contracting Powers recognise the high value of this communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot, in any case, give the said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in relation of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his Empire. 903
In the years following the conference, European interference in the affairs of the
Porte continued and increased. The Ottomans’ differentiated treatment by the Great
Powers continued. The Treaty of Paris made the Porte just another unequal sovereign within the European international society.
902Andıç and Andıç, Kırım Savaşı, Ali Paşa, 7981; Ponting, The Crimean War, 327328; and Rich, Why the Crimean War, 193195. 903For the original text of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and articles related to the Principalities (Articles 2227), see Thomas Erskine Holland, The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey 1774 to 1853 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1877), 5772, and Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East 154157. 320
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The historical evidence and cases presented in this dissertation prove that from the fourteenth century onward, the Ottoman Empire engaged with European powers at various sectors and levels and was a part of the European international system and society. The Empire’s role in the shaping and later shoving of European international system and society is indisputable. Ottoman practice of the primary institutions, however, increased, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. War was regarded as a dangerous threat for the future stability and order of the Empire. There was greater reliance on the resolution of conflicts through diplomatic negotiations and/or international law. The Ottomans’ ruling elite interchangeably or simultaneously used the balance of power, diplomacy, and international law to prevent wars. Even if they were forced to enter into war, they did so after ensuring the official support of one or more of the great powers, either through military alliances or formal declarations of the neutrality of the states. Knowing that they needed to adapt themselves to the requirements of the age, the Sultans and ruling
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elite embarked upon a deliberate and conscious modernization and reformation process.
Starting from the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683, which was considered the gravest strategic mistake on the part of the Turks, the Ottomans were defeated time and time again on the battlefield and at the negotiation table. The disadvantageous peace treaties and loss of important territories to Austria and Russia, led the Empire to more conciliatory and reciprocal diplomatic relations with European powers.
Ottoman-European relations entered into a new phase of military retreat and political convergence. Between 1789 and 1856, the Empire and its reformist elite acknowledged the changes in Europe and in the status of the Empire and embarked upon a series of reforms that ranged from military to diplomacy and from center to periphery.
Pressured by internal and external security threats, the Ottomans needed “peace and order,” both to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the imperial borders and to further their knowledge, adaptation, and strategic learning of
European (i.e., international) society and its institutions. The ruling elite believed that only through modernization, i.e., Westernization or Europeanization, could the
Empire regain its lost power and achieve stability and order. They were also aware of the specific status the great powers held within the newly established international order and knew that only through international recognition of their legal equality would they be regarded as a great power. The Empire had already been part of the
European international system and a participant of its major institutions (diplomacy, international law, balance of power, war, and great power), albeit with some
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misunderstandings and differences in application. The Ottomans had even cooperated with European powers in the development and institutionalization of diplomatic and consular practices, the balance of power, and extraterritoriality by allowing the presence of European resident missions, supporting them financially, and encouraging interactions and contact through unilateral grants and special rights.
Unlike China or Japan, which were geographically distant and closed to European political, economic, and socio-cultural interaction and infiltration until the mid- eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was interlocked with Europe.
It should, however, be noted that Ottoman interpretational differences of the basic principles, norms, and practices of the European international system and society at times led to friction. Ottoman-European interests converged during two periods.
First, in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries, the common enemy—the Habsburgs— brought together the Ottomans, French, British, Dutch, and other Protestants.
Second, in the nineteenth century, the threat posed by Russia to European international order and the Ottoman Empire once again brought the Empire closer to
European states that shared a common interest in preserving the European great power equilibrium.
Throughout this adaptation and strategic learning period, Ottoman attempts at socialization can be divided into two phases as both European and Ottoman perceptions of the other changed from marginal to liminal: early (1789–1832) and deepening (1832–1856). Between 1789 and 1832, Ottoman interests in European affairs rose. Beginning with the Polish question of 1795, the Ottomans realized that they could be subject to similar treatment by the great powers. They knew that they
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would be an issue in the European balance of power. This led to a fundamental change in the Ottoman understanding of diplomacy from unconventional to a more conventional, European-style approach. The growing need to justify and legitimize international behavior resulted in incorporation of European international law and principles with the Islamic law of nations and thus a heterodox practice. Throughout this phase, the Empire combined its traditional policies with new ones. Old policies persisted, including the balance of power and war, as reforms in line with European standards began and Ottoman adaptation to European codes of conduct increased.
From 1832 to 1856, the changing Ottoman understanding of war as an institution coupled with the ruling elite’s realization that the Empire had become a player in the
European balance of power led the Ottomans to search for security by becoming a member of European international society and Concert. In this phase, Ottoman reformation and bureaucratization accelerated with the inclusion and adaptation of
European ways of conduct into Ottoman practice. The Ottomans shared European concerns over the expansion of Russian power and the threat it posed to the
European balance of power. This led to cooperation and concerted action with the great powers of Europe on issues of common concern. Ottoman demands for international guarantees of its sovereignty and recognition as a European great power gained momentum. In other words, Ottoman survival was dependent on cultivating a relationship with Europe.
Based on these observations about Ottoman policy between 1789 and 1856, it can be concluded that the Porte, like other European great powers, used the primary institutions of European international society efficiently. For example, in situations in which an internal solution was not possible, as in the cases of the Egyptian crisis,
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the Lebanon uprisings of 1840s, or the dispute over the Holy Places, the Empire asked the European great powers for unilateral, bilateral, or concerted intervention of a diplomatic, mediatory, or military nature. The Porte acted in concert with them, although, for the Empire, “non-interference in its internal affairs” remained utmost importance. On the other hand, there was also a changed in the European perspective. Since the end of the Greek War of Independence, the European powers had recognized the importance of the Ottoman Empire to European safety and stability; consequently, they started to view the Porte as a de facto member of
European international society. The primary documents and historical evidence from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries document the Empire’s unique position within the European international system and society.
The Ottoman Empire had strong political, military, and economic relations with major European powers based on European international law and diplomacy. As noted above, contrary to the arguments of the ES, the Ottoman Empire was a part of both the thin and thick European international systems. It was also functionally a de facto member of the pluralist European international society. Ottomans and
Europeans rivaled each other, but the Ottoman Empire contributed both directly and indirectly to the development of the European international system and society, and to the creation of the hybrid international society that existed beyond the borders of
Europe.
This necessitates a revision of the ES’s structural, functional, and historical study of the international society. The major structural and functional problem in the ES’s theoretical framework is the conception of the international system and society. The
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link between the system and society is another point that needs clarification. On the historical side, the major complication is the ES’s hypothesis of the evolution and expansion of the international society from European international society, from the
Middle Ages to the present. The ES’s assumption that the European states from
Respublica Christiana to Vienna formed an international society based on common culture and society is factually misleading and thus ahistorical. The nascent existence of the primary international institutions and the sovereignty suggests that Europe was a regional international system in the making. Only after the French Revolution did the European states, under supervision of the Great Powers, start to construct a society of states.
Related to this misconception, the ES’s perspective places all those states that are not deemed European on a cultural and civilization basis in the international system.
Specifically, the placement of the Ottoman Empire within the international system despite the 500 years of relationship and encounters is an analytical failure. Taking the historical evolution of EuropeanOttoman relations into consideration, this dissertation suggested the development of a new concept of a “hybrid international society,” an amalgam of civilizations and a symbiosis of systemic and societal features. The concept can be elaborated to explain the relations between non-
European states and European states in general. To that end, further research is required, specifically in the cases of Japan and China.
The international society has evolved empirically throughout the ages. At present, international society is still evolving and changing according to the necessities of our time and to the transformations within the states. The active participation of non- 326
governmental organizations in internal and external relations requires states and international and regional organizations to take them into account. The internal changes within the units, the primary international institutions, and legitimacy also change the composition of the society of states. Neither the society of states nor its primary institutions are static. It is, therefore, essential to revise and reinterpret the basic concepts and premises of the English School of international relations theory, in line with new empirical and historical information and changes. This present dissertation sets out the basic facts and makes initial analysis, which, I would hope, would help lead to further research.
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