Turning Points in the Vietnam War.Pdf

TALKING PONTS TURNING POINTS IN THE VIETNAM WAR

Viv Sanders takes issue with some all too common assumptions.

Right This Chinese poster depicts the Vietnamese bravely fighting against US imperialism. Its caption insists that the Americans should 'Get Out of South Vietnam!'

here are two major issues con- cerning turning points in the TUnited States' involvement in the Vietnam War, both involving chronology. First, when and how did the US become irrevocably committed to large-scale intervention? Second, when did it become obvious that the US would have to de-escalate? In the ever-growing US involvemenl in Vietnam from 1950 until 1968, the turning point is usually considered to be 1965, when President Johnson sent in American ground combat troops. How- ever, it will be argued in this article that decisions taken by the Eisenhower administration during 1954-56 constituted a far more important change. There is less controversy over the

50 SEPTEMBER 2008 HISTORY REVIEW TALKING POINTS main turning point in the US decision Eisenhower continued Truman's policy of munist Vietnam, the US had sponsored to de-escalate. Most historians agree helping the French, hut after the Geneva an artificial political creation, the state that it was the Tet Offensive in 1967. Conference of 1954, the great turning of South Vietnam. However, it will he argued here that the point in the US commitment occurred. Within weeks of Ceneva, Eisenhower Tet Offensive was not a turning point Prior to 1954, US involvement in Viet- arranged to help Diem set up South but a clarification of issues that had nam had consisted of giving materials and Vietnam. He sent General 'Lightning been evident since 1954-56 and had led monetary aid to the French. During 1954 Joe' Collins and created MAAG (the to the resignation of Secretary of tbe Eisenhower administration switched Military Assistance Advisory Croup) to Defence Robert MeNamara in late from a policy of aid to France to an exper- assist in the process. The US also helped 1967. It was with McNamara's resigna- iment In state-building in what hecame and encouraged Diem to squeeye out tion, rather than with Tet, that it known as South Vietnam. Bao Dai. became obvious that the US had to de- By 1954 the war in Vietnam had The French exit meant that Eisenhow- escalate. become increasingly unpopular in er could have dropped Truman's commit- France. The defeat of French troops hy ment in Vietnam. Truman had aided the Communist forces at Dienbienphu left French, and the French bad got out. US Involvement in Vietnam: France exhausted, exasperated and keen American credibility was not at stake, for the first turning point to withdraw. At the international confer- it was the French who had lost the strug- ence convened to discuss French gle. However, the French withdrawal Owing to the fact that it was Johnson Indochina at Ceneva in May 1954, the from Vietnam was seen by Dulles as a who sent in the ground troops in 1965, French exit was formalised. Vietnam was great opportunity for greater US involve- the Vietnam War became known as temporarily divided, with Ho Chi Minh ment. 'We have a clean base there now, 'Johnson's war'. The dubious nature of in control of the north and the Emperor without the faint taint of colonialism,' that attribution is implicitly acknowl- Bao Dai in control of the south. The said Dulles, calling Dienbienphu 'a bless- edged by historians who favour the Geneva Accords declared that there ing in disguise'. When the Eisenhower 'coÊiimitment trap' thesis. According to were to be nationwide elections leading administration created South Vietnam, this interpretation, Johnson of necessity to reunification of Vietnam in 1956. Truman's commitment had not been honoured and then built upon a com- However, US intervention ensured that renewed hut recreated, with a far greater mitment bequeathed to him hy three this 'temporary division' was to last for degree of American responsihility. former presidents, Truman, Eisenhower more than 20 years. American observers and the Eisen- and Kennedy. An exit from that commit- "Hie United States refused to sign the hower administration had great doubts ment would have damaged US credibili- Geneva Accords and moved to defy them about Diem's regime. Viee President ty as an anti-Communist superpower. within weeks. Eisenhower's Secretary of Richard Nixon was convinced the South Was there any point at which any of State, John Foster Dulles, organised Vietnamese lacked the ability to govern Johnson's three predecessors could allies such as Britain in the South-east themselves. Even Dulles admitted that reasonably have ended US involve- Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). The the US supported Diem 'because we ment in Vietnam? SEATO signatories agreed to protect knew of no one better'. Harry Truman initiated the US South Vietnam, in defiance of the Gene- 'Magnificently ignorant of Vietnamese involvement. From 1950 to 1953, he va Accords, which had forbidden the history and culture," according to his gave financial aid to the French colo- Vietnamese from entering into foreign biographer Townsend Hoopes, Dulles nialists as they struggled to re-establish alliances or to allow foreign troops in proceeded to ignore the popularity of Ho control of Indochina in the face of Vietnam. Chi Minh and Viet- opposition from Vietnamese Commu- The Eisenhower • • It was with namese desires, in nists and nationalists. It could be argued administration favour of the unpop- that, up to 1953, the United States' encouraged Bao Dai McNamara's ular Diem, a mem- commitment was simply a financial to appoint Ngo Dinh resignation, rather ber of the Christian commitment to Its French ally. On the Diem as his prime minority in a pre- other hand, as early as November 1950, minister, and then than with Tet, that dominantly Buddhist a Defence Department official warned, proceeded to engage it became obvious country. Back in in 'nation building. 1941. Dulles had we are gradually increasing our Eisenhower and that the US had saitl that 'the great stake in the outcome of the Dulles created a new to de-escalate, f f trouble with the struggle ... we are dangerously state, in defiance world today is that close to the point of being so (yet again) of the Geneva Accords and of there are too few Christians\ In the East deeply committed that we may what was known to be tbe will of the Asian despots (Chiang Kai-shek in Tai- find ourselves completely com- Vietnamese people. Eisenhower record- wan, Syngman Rhee in South Korea, and mitted even to direct interven- ed in his memoirs that he knew that if Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam), all of tion. These situations, unfortu- there had heen genuine democratic elec- whom were Christian, the US had found nately, have a way of snowballing. tions in Vietnam in 1956, Ho Chi Minh men with whom it felt it could work. would have won around 80 per cent of After ¿ill, as Dulles said, the US had In the early months of his presidency. the vote. In order to avoid a wholly Com- Jesus Christ on its side, and needed allies

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who believed likewise. • • Eisenhower credibility. On the other hand. Diem had The Eisenhower administration was ignored American warnings to introduce well aware of Ho Chi Minh's popularity. recorded in his reform for almost a decade. Any sudden However, it was not Vietnam itself that memoirs that he knew US rejection of Diem and ending of the mattered, but Vietnam's position as a US commitment in 1963 might have potential domino in the Cold War. In the that if there had been raised questions as to why the US had 1954 speech in which he had introduced genuine democratic supported Diem's unsatisfactory regime his famous "domino theory', Eisenhower for so long. had said that if Vietnam fell to Commu- elections in Vietnam In the context of the Cold War and nism, other nations might follow. in 1956, Ho Chi Minh with 16,000 American "advisers' in Viet- Given that the US came ver)' close to nam at his accession in 1963, it was dumping Diem in 1955-6, it is interest- would have won exceptionally difficult for Johnson to ing to note the important role played by around 80 per cent of repudiate his predecessors' legacy in relatively minor and/or ignorant Ameri- Vietnam, particularly as he had not been can figures in Diem's survival and in this the vote, f > elected president in his own right. The great turning point in US involvement in increasing vulnerability of American per- Vietnam, Influential Senator Mike sonnel to Victcong attack triggered a Mansfield, leader of the Democrats in extricate the US from Vietnam in 1963. unanimous decision within the Johnson the Senate, had been a professor of Johnson felt that when the Kennedy administration to escalate the involve- Japanese and Chinese history. Congress administration colluded in the autumn ment in early 1965. when Rolling Thun- considered "China Mike' to be their 1963 coup against Diem, the United der commenced and the first American expert on Vietnam, although, as he mod- States' moral responsibility in and com- ground troops were sent in. By 1968, estly admitted, "I do not know too much mitment to Vietnam greatly increased. they numbered around half a million. about the Indochina situation. I do not Having helped depose one South Viet- While it could be argued that think that anyone does.' Despite his namese leader, the US had an even Kennedy had the opportunity to leave acknowledged ignorance, the Catholic greater obligation to support his successors. Vietnam in 1963, it is difficult to find a Mansfield had been greatly impressed The US colluded in Diem's overthrow date jt which it could he argued that when he met Diem in the United States because of the unpopularity of his gov- Johnson had a similar opportunity. In in 1950. Mansfield's support was vital ernment and its consequent ineffective- delence of Kennedy, the US had invest- when the Eisenhower administration ness in opposing Communism in South ed nearly a decade oP monetary aid. men considered dropping Diem in 1955. Vietnam. In the spring of 1963, the and materials in the Saigon regime by Eisenhower and Dulles did not want to American media had covered the Bud- 1963, Most importantly of all, the US incur congressional wrath by deserting dhist protests in South Vietnamese cities had invested its credibility in "nation the senator's protégé. such as Saigon. Americans had been buiiding'- something that had not been In A Bright Shining Lie, journalist shocked to see Buddhist monks burning the case under Truman or until Eisen- Neil Sheehan opined: 'South Vietnam, it themselves to death in protest against hower rejected the Geneva Accords in can truly be said, was the creation of the oppressive regime ÍJÍ the Catholic 1954. According to historian David Edward Lansdale.' Dulles sent covert Diem. The US had urged Diem to halt Anderson, writing in 2005, "the Eisen- CIA operative Lansdale to help create the religious persecution. It could be hower administration trapped itself and the South Vietnamese state soon after argued, therefore, that when Diem its successors into a commitment to the the Geneva Conference. Lansdale gave ignored American advice that he should survival of its own counterfeit creation', Diem support and advice, including a reform, the US had a great opportunity the new state' of South Vietnam. to exit Vietnam without losing face or memo headed, 'HOW TO BE A PRIME Thus Eisenhower's rejection of the MINISTER or VIETNAM'. British Geneva Accords and his 'nation building" novelist Graham Greene based a in South Vietnam constituted the great- destructive American do-gooder charac- Eisenhower's est turning point in the US involvement ter in his novel The Quiet American on in Vietnam, the point of no return. This Lansdale. Lansdale, like Mansfield, lacked rejection of the turning point is a microcosm of the rea- any real understanding of Vietnam. sons why the US got involved and why Despite all the doubts, the Eisenhower Geneva Accords and the US was unsuccessful in Vietnam. administration stuck with Diem. By the his'nation building' in That small country was not seen as a end of Eisenhower's presidency, there nation in its own right and with its own were nearly i,ÜÜO US advisers helping South Vietnam aspirations. Instead it was seen, after the Diem and his armed forces. Under Presi- constituted the Korean War, as the place where Com- dent Kennedy, the number of advisers munism had to be stopped. Vietnam was rocketed to around 16,000, which renders greatest turning point a \'ictim of the Gold War. American poli- suspect claims that, had he lived, in the US involvement cy-makers acted with little understand- Kennedy would have got out of Vietnam. in Vietnam, the point ing of the country and forced unpopular Some historians consider that and unimpressive rulers upon half of it Kennedy had a last, great opportunity to of no return, y f for nearly two decades.

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Withdrawal from Vietnam: request for more troops. This seems to Communist forces certainly suffered the second turning point be the conclusive proof that Tet forced greatly during Tet: they lost nearly the Johnson administration into a re- 60.000 men, which was not far off the in Janudry 1968 North Vietnamese regu- evaluation of US policy. total number lost by the Americans dur- lar torces and Communist guerrillas This second great turning point has ing the whole of the war. Communist launched an offensive on the cities of attracted far more interest and controversy credibility took a great blow. The Com- South Vietnam. This attack took place than the first, perhaps because Americans munists claimed to be a liberation force, during the Tet holiday, the most impor- are more interested in why they failed to but there had been no popular uprising tant festival in the Vietnamese calendar. win the war than why they got into it. Yet on their behalf in South Vietnam. Despite clear signs that an offensive was there are several great controversies con- On the other hand, there are those imminent, the Americans were taken hy cerning 'let. The first is whether it was a who claim that Tet demonstrated the surprise. Eventually, after several weeks US military defeat or victory. limits of American military' power. US of bitter fighting, America troops and the After Tet, Johnson began the process militar)' power could reassert the Saigon ARVN (Army of the Republic of Viet- of de-escaiation of the US involvement regime's hold on South Vietnam's cities, nam) regained control ofthe cities hut in Vietnam. This has led many to suggest which the offensive had shown to be found that the Saigon regime had lost that Tet must have been a military defeat tenuous. Yet, after five years of US com- ground in rural areas. for the United States. Some, however, bat, the Communists remained capable Before the Tet Offensive, the number point out that the Communists were of staging a massive offensive, and the of American troops had been rising ever eventually driven back from the cities South Vietnamese population was no since the first 3,500 landed on the and argue that this constituted an Amer- mure inclined to fight for the South Viet- beaches of South Vietnam in spring ican military victory. While disagreeing namese regime. 1965. By late 1967. there were around over their relative importance, they claim On balance, therefore, it would seem half a million American troops in South that a combination of the media, tbe that, militarily, Tet proved tbat the US Vietnam. After Tet. President Johnson public and the politicians 'lost' the victo- could just about maintain the status quo rejected GenerdI Westmoreland's ry and forced the de-escalation. The and that there was militarv stalemate.

Above: A South Vietnamese general, Nguyen Ngoc Loan, shoots a Vietcong death-squad member on February 1968. Did this image contribute to the'poisonous reporting' of which President Johnson complained?

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Above: A depiction of some of the civilians massacred by US forces in the village of My Lai, 16 March 1968. A total of 347 unarmed civilians were beaten and killed.

The second key controversy is the captive was a VC death-squad mem- hias, because polls showed the puhlic whether the media turned Tet into a psy- ber who had just shot a relation of the responded favourably to the optimistic chological defeat for the United States. general, hut it was the first distasteful reports. However, coverage of the Tet Several journalists believe that 'for the impression that stuck. Often the media Offensive in early 1968 exposed the first time in modern history; the outcome simply showed it as it was, as when pic- credibility gap between what the John- of a war was determined, not on the bat- tures of Vietcong in the grounds of the son administration and the military were tlefield but on the printed page and, US embassy at the start of the Tet saying about winning in Vietnam and above all. on the TV screen.' Offensive were relayed ail over America. what was actually happening there. Johnson had complained ahout If the media were guilty of untruthful Those who believe that there was increasingly 'poisonous reporting' since or inaccurate reporting so were the US 'poisonous reporting' of the war consider 1965. Were the media hiased as he sug- authorities in Saigon. From Saigon, the that the media played a big part in turn- gested? Sometimes the media distorted military, the CIA and Ambassador ing the American public against the war. the truth, but more Bunker all assured Polls showed a steady decline in support often than not this Johnson and the for the war throughout 1967, but John- was due to pres- proved that press that the US son's public relations offensive in the sures of time the US could just was winning the war autumn of that year stabilised the statis- and/or lack of avail- in autumn 1967. tics, suggesting that if there was biased ahle knowledge. about maintain the The Johnson admin- news coverage it had failed to influence For example, one of status quo and that istration therefore all Americans. Support temporarily rose the most famous conducted a public during the initial patriotic fervour when photos of the war there was military relations offensive to Lhe Tet disaster occurred, but the down- showed a South stalemate. ensure that the ward trend began again soon after Tet. Vietnamese general .American puhlic Had the US been winning the war after shooting a bound and very youthful-look- were aware of this. General Westmore- five years of escalation, there is no doubt ing Communist captive in the head dur- land claimed, in convincing fashion, 'We that media coverage would have shown ing Tet. This photo made many Ameri- are winning a war of attrition now.' The it. As it was, the US was not winning cans consider their 'ally' as distasteful as media covered the puhlic relations offen- and this was demonstrated during the their enemy. It was later discovered that sive, apparently without great anti-war Tet Offensive. If there was a psychologi-

54 SiiPrLMSER 2008 HISTORY REVIEW TALKING POINTS cal defeat, ft was more likely due to tiie cease. Yet probably, like McNamara, Conclusion fact that the war looked unwinnable. not they would have come to that conclusion to media bias. eventually, even without Tet. Whereas the Tet Offensive merely clari- The third key issue is whether Tet Tbe Tel Offensive brougbt together fied and accelerated existing trends, the made the Johnson administration decide and exacerbated several trends that were other turning point that we have consid- to get out. evident in the American conduct of the ered was far more dramatic. While the Before Tet, the Johnson administra- war and in the response of politicians, Tet Offensive showed up existing trends, tion had been escalating the US involve- the media and the public. It showed tbat Eisenhower's creation of a South Viet- ment. After Tet, the esca]ation halted after three years of Johnson pouring in namese state constituted a dramatic iind Johnson declared that he would not US troops and aid to South Vietnam, the hreak with the past. The US heeame stand lor re-election but would concen- Communists still had the power to deeply involved in the war because the trate upon bringing peace to a divided launch a massive offensive tbat sent the Eisenhower administration set up South United States and to Vietnam. These Americans and Vietnam during basic facts suggest that it was Tet that ARVN reeling for The US became 1954-5. Problems made Johnson change course. On the several weeks. It [hat were evident other hand, it can be argued that there showed that t he- deeply involved in then (stemming were signs of this change of course Saigon government the war because from an unpopular before Tet. The great architect of did not have popular South Vietnamese increased US involvement under support and could the Eisenhower regime created, Kennedy and Johnson, Secretary of only maintain control administration set dominated and sus- Defence Robert McNamara. had decid- of its own cities and tained by the US) ed to leave the administration in Novem- even its own capital up South Vietnam were still evident ber 1967, tearfully cussing 'the god- with massive US during 1954-5. | y during the Tet damned Air Force and its goddamned assistance. The Tet Offensive. In that bombing campaign that had dropped Offensive accelerated the decline in sup- sense, the main responsibility for US more bombs on Vietnam than on Europe port tor the war amongst the American involvement and failure to win the war in the whole of World War II and we people, the media and administration lay not vntb Johnson but with Eisenhow- hadn't gotten a goddamned thing for it.' officials. In all these ways, it could be er. This was not 'Johnson's war'. It was In lale 1967. Johnson's advisers. argued that Tet was a turning point in 'Eisenhower's war', and Eisenhower's Including the group of military and ci\'il- American policy in Vietnam, although it actions and assumptions had ensured ian experts known as the 'Wise Men". is perhaps far more persuasive to con- that it would never be a successful one. disagreed witb McNamara's advice that tend that Tet simply clarified and con- escalation should cease. Tet convinced lirmed ideas that had been increasingly tbe Wise Men tbat the war was evident beforehand. Issues to Debate unwinnable and that escalation should • Was Eisenhower or Johnson more responsible for producing the Vietnam War? • What evidence is there that biased reporting hastened the US withdrawal from Vietnam? • What was the significance of the Tet offensive?

Dr Viv Sanders is Head of History at Dame Alice Harper School in Bedford. She has written The USA and Vietnam, Race Relations in the USA: 1860-1980. and American History 1860-1990 (with Alan Farmer). She is currently working on a new volume in Hodder's Access series, on the USA 1968-2004.