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TALKING PONTS TURNING POINTS IN THE VIETNAM WAR Viv Sanders takes issue with some all too common assumptions. Right This Chinese poster depicts the Vietnamese bravely fighting against US imperialism. Its caption insists that the Americans should 'Get Out of South Vietnam!' here are two major issues con- cerning turning points in the TUnited States' involvement in the Vietnam War, both involving chronology. First, when and how did the US become irrevocably committed to large-scale intervention? Second, when did it become obvious that the US would have to de-escalate? In the ever-growing US involvemenl in Vietnam from 1950 until 1968, the turning point is usually considered to be 1965, when President Johnson sent in American ground combat troops. How- ever, it will be argued in this article that decisions taken by the Eisenhower administration during 1954-56 constitut- ed a far more important change. There is less controversy over the 50 SEPTEMBER 2008 HISTORY REVIEW TALKING POINTS main turning point in the US decision Eisenhower continued Truman's policy of munist Vietnam, the US had sponsored to de-escalate. Most historians agree helping the French, hut after the Geneva an artificial political creation, the state that it was the Tet Offensive in 1967. Conference of 1954, the great turning of South Vietnam. However, it will he argued here that the point in the US commitment occurred. Within weeks of Ceneva, Eisenhower Tet Offensive was not a turning point Prior to 1954, US involvement in Viet- arranged to help Diem set up South but a clarification of issues that had nam had consisted of giving materials and Vietnam. He sent General 'Lightning been evident since 1954-56 and had led monetary aid to the French. During 1954 Joe' Collins and created MAAG (the to the resignation of Secretary of tbe Eisenhower administration switched Military Assistance Advisory Croup) to Defence Robert MeNamara in late from a policy of aid to France to an exper- assist in the process. The US also helped 1967. It was with McNamara's resigna- iment In state-building in what hecame and encouraged Diem to squeeye out tion, rather than with Tet, that it known as South Vietnam. Bao Dai. became obvious that the US had to de- By 1954 the war in Vietnam had The French exit meant that Eisenhow- escalate. become increasingly unpopular in er could have dropped Truman's commit- France. The defeat of French troops hy ment in Vietnam. Truman had aided the Communist forces at Dienbienphu left French, and the French bad got out. US Involvement in Vietnam: France exhausted, exasperated and keen American credibility was not at stake, for the first turning point to withdraw. At the international confer- it was the French who had lost the strug- ence convened to discuss French gle. However, the French withdrawal Owing to the fact that it was Johnson Indochina at Ceneva in May 1954, the from Vietnam was seen by Dulles as a who sent in the ground troops in 1965, French exit was formalised. Vietnam was great opportunity for greater US involve- the Vietnam War became known as temporarily divided, with Ho Chi Minh ment. 'We have a clean base there now, 'Johnson's war'. The dubious nature of in control of the north and the Emperor without the faint taint of colonialism,' that attribution is implicitly acknowl- Bao Dai in control of the south. The said Dulles, calling Dienbienphu 'a bless- edged by historians who favour the Geneva Accords declared that there ing in disguise'. When the Eisenhower 'coÊiimitment trap' thesis. According to were to be nationwide elections leading administration created South Vietnam, this interpretation, Johnson of necessity to reunification of Vietnam in 1956. Truman's commitment had not been honoured and then built upon a com- However, US intervention ensured that renewed hut recreated, with a far greater mitment bequeathed to him hy three this 'temporary division' was to last for degree of American responsihility. former presidents, Truman, Eisenhower more than 20 years. American observers and the Eisen- and Kennedy. An exit from that commit- "Hie United States refused to sign the hower administration had great doubts ment would have damaged US credibili- Geneva Accords and moved to defy them about Diem's regime. Viee President ty as an anti-Communist superpower. within weeks. Eisenhower's Secretary of Richard Nixon was convinced the South Was there any point at which any of State, John Foster Dulles, organised Vietnamese lacked the ability to govern Johnson's three predecessors could allies such as Britain in the South-east themselves. Even Dulles admitted that reasonably have ended US involve- Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). The the US supported Diem 'because we ment in Vietnam? SEATO signatories agreed to protect knew of no one better'. Harry Truman initiated the US South Vietnam, in defiance of the Gene- 'Magnificently ignorant of Vietnamese involvement. From 1950 to 1953, he va Accords, which had forbidden the history and culture," according to his gave financial aid to the French colo- Vietnamese from entering into foreign biographer Townsend Hoopes, Dulles nialists as they struggled to re-establish alliances or to allow foreign troops in proceeded to ignore the popularity of Ho control of Indochina in the face of Vietnam. Chi Minh and Viet- opposition from Vietnamese Commu- The Eisenhower • • It was with namese desires, in nists and nationalists. It could be argued administration favour of the unpop- that, up to 1953, the United States' encouraged Bao Dai McNamara's ular Diem, a mem- commitment was simply a financial to appoint Ngo Dinh resignation, rather ber of the Christian commitment to Its French ally. On the Diem as his prime minority in a pre- other hand, as early as November 1950, minister, and then than with Tet, that dominantly Buddhist a Defence Department official warned, proceeded to engage it became obvious country. Back in in 'nation building. 1941. Dulles had we are gradually increasing our Eisenhower and that the US had saitl that 'the great stake in the outcome of the Dulles created a new to de-escalate, f f trouble with the struggle ... we are dangerously state, in defiance world today is that close to the point of being so (yet again) of the Geneva Accords and of there are too few Christians\ In the East deeply committed that we may what was known to be tbe will of the Asian despots (Chiang Kai-shek in Tai- find ourselves completely com- Vietnamese people. Eisenhower record- wan, Syngman Rhee in South Korea, and mitted even to direct interven- ed in his memoirs that he knew that if Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam), all of tion. These situations, unfortu- there had heen genuine democratic elec- whom were Christian, the US had found nately, have a way of snowballing. tions in Vietnam in 1956, Ho Chi Minh men with whom it felt it could work. would have won around 80 per cent of After ¿ill, as Dulles said, the US had In the early months of his presidency. the vote. In order to avoid a wholly Com- Jesus Christ on its side, and needed allies HISTORY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2008 51 TALKING POINTS who believed likewise. • • Eisenhower credibility. On the other hand. Diem had The Eisenhower administration was ignored American warnings to introduce well aware of Ho Chi Minh's popularity. recorded in his reform for almost a decade. Any sudden However, it was not Vietnam itself that memoirs that he knew US rejection of Diem and ending of the mattered, but Vietnam's position as a US commitment in 1963 might have potential domino in the Cold War. In the that if there had been raised questions as to why the US had 1954 speech in which he had introduced genuine democratic supported Diem's unsatisfactory regime his famous "domino theory', Eisenhower for so long. had said that if Vietnam fell to Commu- elections in Vietnam In the context of the Cold War and nism, other nations might follow. in 1956, Ho Chi Minh with 16,000 American "advisers' in Viet- Given that the US came ver)' close to nam at his accession in 1963, it was dumping Diem in 1955-6, it is interest- would have won exceptionally difficult for Johnson to ing to note the important role played by around 80 per cent of repudiate his predecessors' legacy in relatively minor and/or ignorant Ameri- Vietnam, particularly as he had not been can figures in Diem's survival and in this the vote, f > elected president in his own right. The great turning point in US involvement in increasing vulnerability of American per- Vietnam, Influential Senator Mike sonnel to Victcong attack triggered a Mansfield, leader of the Democrats in extricate the US from Vietnam in 1963. unanimous decision within the Johnson the Senate, had been a professor of Johnson felt that when the Kennedy administration to escalate the involve- Japanese and Chinese history. Congress administration colluded in the autumn ment in early 1965. when Rolling Thun- considered "China Mike' to be their 1963 coup against Diem, the United der commenced and the first American expert on Vietnam, although, as he mod- States' moral responsibility in and com- ground troops were sent in. By 1968, estly admitted, "I do not know too much mitment to Vietnam greatly increased. they numbered around half a million. about the Indochina situation. I do not Having helped depose one South Viet- While it could be argued that think that anyone does.' Despite his namese leader, the US had an even Kennedy had the opportunity to leave acknowledged ignorance, the Catholic greater obligation to support his successors.