02 Lynch (jr/d) 9/5/00 1:44 pm Page 26
Against Reflexivity as an Academic Virtue and Source of Privileged Knowledge
Michael Lynch
EFLEXIVITY IS a central and yet confusing topic. In some social theories it is an essential human capacity, in others it is a system prop- Rerty and in still others it is a critical, or self-critical, act. Reflexivity, or being reflexive, is often claimed as a methodological virtue and source of superior insight, perspicacity or awareness, but it can be difficult to estab- lish just what is being claimed. Some research programmes treat reflexivity as a methodological basis for enhancing objectivity, whereas others treat it as a critical weapon for undermining objectivism and exposing methodo- logical ‘god tricks’. In this article, I question a widespread tendency to identify reflexivity with ‘radical’ theoretical and critical programmes. By doing so, I do not intend to aid the cause of an ‘unreflexive’ objectivism, thus marking myself as an old, orthodox, crypto-positivist fuddy-duddy. Instead, I shall argue that the meaning and epistemic virtues ascribed to reflexivity are relative to particular conceptions of human nature and social reality. I shall recommend an alternative, ethnomethodological conception of reflex- ivity that does not privilege a theoretical or methodological standpoint by contrasting it to an unreflexive counterpart. Like the other versions discussed in the article, the ethnomethodo- logical version of reflexivity is associated with a particular research pro- gramme that appeals to some social scientists and not others. According to this version, investigations of reflexive organizations of practical actions can lead to deep sociological insight, but ‘reflexivity’ is not an epistemological, moral or political virtue. It is an unavoidable feature of the way actions (including actions performed, and expressions written, by academic researchers) are performed, made sense of and incorporated into social