Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists Author(S): Thomas F

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Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists Author(s): Thomas F. Gieryn Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 6 (Dec., 1983), pp. 781-795 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095325 . Accessed: 20/10/2014 20:34

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This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOUNDARY-WORK AND THE DEMARCATION OF SCIENCE FROM NON-SCIENCE: STRAINS AND INTERESTS IN PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES OF SCIENTISTS*

THOMAS F. GIERYN Indiana University

The demarcation of science from other intellectual activities-long an analytic problemfor philosophersand sociologists-is here examinedas a practicalproblem for scientists. Construction of a boundary between science and varieties of non-science is useful for scientists' pursuit of professional goals: acquisition of intellectual authority and career opportunities; denial of these resources to "pseudoscientists"; and protection of the autonomy of scientific research from political interference. "Boundary-work"describes an ideological style found in scientists' attempts to create a public imagefor science by contrastingit favorably to non-scientific intellectual or technical activities. Alternativesets of characteristics availablefor ideological attributionto science reflect ambivalences or strains within the institution:science can be made to look empiricalor theoretical,pure or applied. However, selection of one or another descriptiondepends on which characteristics best achieve the demarcationin a way thatjustifies scientists' claims to authorityor resources. Thus, "science" is no single thing: its boundariesare drawnand redrawn inflexible, historicallychanging and sometimesambiguous ways.

Philosophersand sociologists of science have a demarcation between scientific and other long struggled with the "problem of demar- knowledgeis a poor heuristicfor the sociology cation": how to identify unique and essen- of science (Collins, 1982:300).Characteristics tial characteristicsof science that distinguishit once proposed as capable of distinguishingsci- from other kinds of intellectual activities. ence from non-science are found to be common Comte ([1853] 1975:72)distinguished positive among intellectual activities not ordinarily science from theology and metaphysics in his labeled scientific, or they are found not to be evolutionarylaw of three stages, arguingthat typical features of science-in-practice (e.g., only science used "reasoningand observation" Knorret al., 1980;Elkana, 1981:41;Broad and to establish laws of "succession and re- Wade, 1982:8-9). Some dismiss demarcation semblance." Popper (1965:34, 41) proposed as a "pseudo-problem"(Laudan, 1983:29). "falsifiability"as a criterionof demarcation:if Continuing debates over the possibility or a theory cannot, in principle, be falsified (re- desirabilityof demarcatingscience from non- futed) by empirical data, it is not scientific. science are, in one sense, ironic. Even as Merton (1973: Chap. 13) explains the special sociologists and philosophers argue over the abilityof modernscience to extend "certified" uniqueness of science among intellectual ac- knowledge as a result, in part, of the in- tivities, demarcationis routinelyaccomplished stitutionalizationof distinctive social norms in practical, everyday settings: education ad- (communism, universalism, disinterestedness ministrators set up curricula that include and organized skepticism). chemistry but exclude alchemy; the National Recent studies, however, suggest that at- Science Foundationadopts standardsto assure tempts to demarcate science have failed that some physicists but no psychics get (Bohme, 1979:109), and that the assumption of funded; journal editors reject some manu- scriptsas unscientific. How is the demarcation of science accomplishedin these practicalset- *Direct all correspondence to: Thomas F. Gieryn, tings, far removed from apparentlyfutile at- Department of Sociology, Indiana University, tempts by scholars to decide what is essential Bloomington, IN 47405. and unique about science? Demarcationis not Many people provided helpful suggestions, among just an analytical problem: because of consid- them: David Zaret, Robert Althauser, Howard erable materialopportunities and professional Becker, George Bevins, William Corsaro, Elihu Ger- son, Allen Grimshaw, Robert Merton, Nicholas Mul- advantagesavailable only to "scientists," it is fins, Bernice Pescosolido, Whitney Pope, Charles no mere academic matter to decide who is Powers, Sal Restivo, and Stephen Zehr. My devel- doing science and who is not. opment of the concept of "boundary-work" bene- This paper restates the problemof demarca- fited from conversations with Steve Woolgar. tion: characteristics of science are examined American Sociological Review 1983, Vol. 48 (December:781-795) 781

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 782 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW not as inherentor possibly unique, but as part [their]privilege" through "expediential ration- of ideologicalefforts by scientists to distinguish alizations of . . . material interests" (Bendix, their work and its productsfrom non-scientific 1963:xi,449). The two theories are sometimes intellectual activities. The focus is on presented as mutually exclusive and compet- boundary-workof scientists: their attribution ing: Sutton et al. (1956:12)"reject" the theory of selected characteristicsto the institutionof that "ideologies simply reflect . . . economic science (i.e., to its practitioners, methods, self-interest,"while Seider (1974:812)finds the stock of knowledge, values and work organi- "Marx-Mannheimtheory was . . . more useful zation) for purposes of constructing a social than Sutton's role-strain theory in predicting boundarythat distinguishes some intellectual the content of public political ideology" of activities as "non-science." Boundary-workis business leaders. analyzed as a rhetorical style common in The effectiveness of strain and interest "public science" (Turner, 1980:589;cf. Men- theories has been impeded by "theoretical delsohn, 1977:6), in which scientists describe clumsiness" (Geertz, 1973:196) resulting, in science for the public and its political au- part, from an "anarchy of linguistic dif- thorities, sometimes hopingto enlarge the ma- ferences" (Oakeshott, 1980:viii;on the diverse terialand symbolic resourcesof scientists or to definitionsof "ideology," cf. Mannheim,1936; defend professional autonomy. The paper ex- Birnbaum, 1960; Lichtheim, 1967; Gouldner, amines both style and content of professional 1976; Larrain, 1979). The two theories agree ideologies of scientists, as illustratedin three substantially:both see ideologies as symbolic examples: first, public addresses and popular representations(whether sets of ideas, beliefs, writings of John Tyndall, an effective "states- values, wishes, consciousnesses or world- man for science" in late Victorian England; views); both suggest that ideologies selectively second, argumentsover the scientific status of distort social "reality";both assume that ade- phrenology in early 19th-centuryEdinburgh; quate explanationrequires examinationof the third, a 1982 policy report by the National social context of ideological statements, Academy of Sciences on scientific communi- focusing on structuralsources and functional cation and national security. consequences of ideas. To add to the confu- sion, followers of Parsons allow that interests are SOCIOLOGICALTHEORIES OF "certainly an important determinant of IDEOLOGY ideological reaction" (White, 1961:9), while Marx traced the origins of ideology to the de- Two long-standing theoretical orientations sire of rulingclasses to conceal contradictions dominatesociological studies of ideology, and between the means and the social relations of these are especially visible in analyses of occu- production(cf. Larrain, 1979:45-61). pationalor professionalideologies (cf. Carlton, Geertz has taken two steps towardclarifying 1977:24-28;Geertz, 1973:201).Strain theories sociological theories of ideology. First, he are associated with Parsons (1967:139-65, rightlysuggests that strainand interesttheories 1951:331-54): ideologies provide "evaluative need not be incompatible:an ideology can, at integration"in the face of conflictingdemands, once, smooth inconsistencies and advance competing expectations and inevitable am- interests (Geertz, 1973:201). Second, Geertz bivalences of social life. They are symp- recommends that sociologists examine the toms-as well as symbolic resolutions-of rhetorical style of ideological statements (cf. role strain, contradiction, and disequilibrium Dibble, 1973). Both strainand interesttheories (White, 1961; Sutton et al., 1956; Johnson, directattention to social functionsof ideologies 1968). Interest theories are associated with while largely ignoringpatterns in the symbolic Marx(e.g., [1846]1976:28-30; cf. Seliger, 1977) formulations and figurative languages of and Mannheim (1936): ideologies are "social ideologists. Geertz (1973:212-13)proposes the levers"or "weapons"used by groupsto further study of "stylistic resources" used in con- theirpolitical or economic interestsamidst uni- structingideologies: how do ideologists use lit- versal strugglesfor power and advantage.They erary devices of metaphor, hyperbole, irony, are manipulationsof ideas to persuadepeople to and sarcasm, or syntacticaldevices of antithe- think and act in ways benefitingthe ideologist sis, inversion, and repetition? (Birnbaum,1960; Winter, 1974). Thus, Geertz identifies two gaps in our For example, the ideology of business lead- understandingof ideology, one related to its ers has been explained alternativelyas the re- content, the other to its style of presentation. sult of "strains . . . in the business role" such First, if both strains and interests affect the as "conflicts between the demandsof the par- content of ideology, a more encompassing ticularposition and the broadervalues of soci- theory will be required to articulate the in- ety" (Sutton et al., 1956:11, vii), and as "at- teraction between them in the constructionof tempts by leaders of enterprises to justify ideologicalstatements. Do strainsand interests

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOUNDARY-WORK IN PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES OF SCIENTISTS 783 play different roles in the formulation of in society as a preferredtruth in descriptionsof ideologies? Second, what causes stylistic vari- naturaland social reality. Yet none of the per- ation in the rhetoric of ideologists? Can we spectives asks how science acquires that in- identify specific social conditions in which an tellectual authority. Part of an answer to this ideology might be expected to take one or an- largequestion will come from investigationsof other stylistic form? The following analysis of professionalideologies of scientists: What im- professional ideologies of scientists begins to ages of science do scientists present to pro- fill these two theoreticalgaps. mote their authority over designated domains of knowledge? Curiously, ideologies of science have re- Ideology and Science ceived only sporadic sociological attention The relationship between "science" and (Daniels, 1967;Greenberg, 1967; Reagan, 1969; "ideology" has been described in significantly Tobey, 1971). Mulkay offers a promising different ways (cf. Larrain, 1979:13-14). In a agenda: he analyzes Merton's four norms not classic positivist tradition,the "certain"truth as constraints on scientists' behavior, but as of scientific knowledge is the only means to "vocabularies"for ideological descriptions of .detect discrepancies between ideological dis- science (1976, 1979:71-72, 1980:101). Espe- tortion and the way things "really" are (e.g. cially when scientists confront the public or its Comte, [1853]1975:72;Durkheim, 1938:31-33; politicians, they endow science with charac- Parsons, 1967:153). In the short-lived "end- teristics selected for an ability to advance pro- of-ideology" debate (Bell, 1962), science and fessional interests. Scientists have a numberof ideology sometimes assumed a zero-sum re- "culturalrepertoires" available for construct- lationship, so that "increased application of ing ideological self-descriptions, among them scientific criteria for policy determination Merton'snorms, but also claims to the utilityof [comes] at the expense of . .. political criteria science for advancing technology, winning and ideological thinking" (Lane, 1966:649). wars, or deciding policy in an impartialway. Retreatsfrom naive positivismhave taken sev- Mulkay'scontribution is largelyprogrammatic: eral directions. Some suggest that because it remainsto demonstrateempirically how sci- ideology inevitably intrudesinto the construc- entists in public settings move flexibly among tion of scientific knowledge-in social science repertoiresof self-description.In other words, (e.g., Zeitlin, 1968) and natural science (e.g., how do scientists construct ideologies with MacKenzie, 1981)-the line between scientific style and content well suited to the advance- truth and ideological distortion is difficult to ment or protection of their professional au- locate. Others suggest that the languageof sci- thority? ence is used to legitimatepalpably ideological assertions: Braverman (1974:86) describes AND MECHANICS Taylor's SCIENCE, RELIGION "scientific management"as ideology IN VICTORIANENGLAND "masqueradingin the trappings of science." Still others define science as an ideology itself Science is often perceived today as the sole (Marcuse, 1964);for Habermas(1970:115) the occupant of a distinctive niche in the "in- form of scientific knowledgeembodies its own tellectual ecosystem" (Boulding, 1980). Other values of predictionand control, and thus may knowledge-producingactivities, such as reli- substitute for "the demolished bourgeois gion, art, politics, and folklore, are seen as ideology" in legitimatingstructures of domina- complements to science rather than competi- tion and repression. Finally, to come full circle tors. But science has not always had its niche, from Comte's positivist faith in the ability of nor are the boundaries of its present niche science to separate truthfrom politicallymoti- permanent. The intellectual ecosystem has vated distortion, ideology becomes a source of with time been carved up into "separate" in- liberationfromscience: "it is one of ideology's stitutional and professional niches through essential social functions . . . to stand outside continuing processes of boundary-workde- of science, and to reject the idea of science as signed to achieve an apparentdifferentiation of self-sufficient,"and to expose "the egoism, the goals, methods, capabilities and substantive barbarismand the limits of science" (Gould- expertise. ner, 1976:36). Boundarydisputes still occur: the recent liti- A common threadruns through these diverse gation over "creationism" suggests that for descriptions of the relationship between sci- some Christian fundamentalists,religion and ence and ideology:all assume that science car- science continue to battle for the same in- ries its own intellectualauthority. In order for tellectual turf. To the victor go the spoils: op- science to expose ideological distortion, or to portunitiesto teach one's beliefs about the ori- legitimate capitalist structures of domination, gin of life to biology students in Arkansaspub- scientific knowledge must be widely accepted lic schools (Nelkin, 1982).Scientists have often

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 784 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW come up winners in the long history of such this as a "professional"conflict for "authority boundarydisputes: "in modern societies, sci- and prestige," ratherthan strictly an academic ence is near to being the source of cognitive debate between two "theories" of naturalhis- authority: anyone who would be widely be- tory (cf. Turner, 1974a). The intellectual au- lieved and trusted as an interpreterof nature thority of long-standingreligious beliefs, rein- needs a license from the scientific community" forced every Sunday from the pulpit, created (Barnes and Edge, 1982:2).This authorityhas resistance toward scientific explanations of been cashed in for copious materialresources natural phenomena. For example, Tyndall and power: about $1 billionof tax revenue was found himself embroiledin the "prayergauge" provided last year to support basic scientific debate, which was sparkedby an 1872 article research in American universities; "expert" challengingChristians of the nation to conduct scientists are called before courts and.govern- an experiment to determine the physical effi- ment hearing rooms to provide putatively cacy of prayer. It was then the custom for the truthful and reliable contexts for decision British Prime Ministeror Privy Council to ask making;science educationis an integralpart of a high official of the Anglicanchurch to call for modern curricula, opening employment op- a national day of prayer as a response to na- portunitiesfor scientists at almostevery school tional crises. Public prayers were called as and university. Scientists often win these pro- hoped-forsolutions to cattle plagues in 1865, a fessional advantagesin boundarydisputes that choleraepidemic in 1866,and a case of typhoid result in the loss of authorityand resources by suffered by the young Prince (Edward) of competingnon-scientific intellectual activities. Wales in 1871. Public addresses and popular writings by To Tyndall, public prayers "represented a John Tyndall (1820-1893) are a rich source of concrete form of superstition whereby clergy informationon how this boundary-workwas with the approvalof the state could hinderthe accomplished in Victorian England (for bio- dispersionof scientific explanationsof natural graphicaldetails, cf. Eve and Creasey, 1945; phenomenaor claim credit for the eradication MacLeod, 1976a; Burchfield, 1981). Tyndall of natural problems that were solved by the followed Michael Faraday as Professor and methods of science . . ." (Turner, 1974b:48). then Superintendentat the Royal Institutionin (When the young Prince recovered from London, where he was chargedwith delivering typhoid, clergymen pointed to the effective- lectures demonstratingto lay and scientific ness of the country's prayers.) Tyndall en- audiencesthe progressof scientificknowledge. couraged an experiment in which a selected At that time, career opportunities and re- hospital would be made the focus of national searchfacilities availableto Britishmen of sci- prayer, with a comparison of mortality rates ence were paltry (MacLeod, 1972; Turner, before and after the day of supplication.The 1976;Cardwell, 1972).Thomas Henry Huxley, experimentwas never conducted, but the furi- Tyndall'sfriend and Darwin's"bulldog," com- ous debate provoked by its proposal gives a plainedin 1874that "no amountof proficiency sense of how much "the scientific professions in the biological sciences will 'surely be con- desired the social and cultural prestige and vertibleinto breadand cheese' " (Mendelsohn, recognitionthat had been and to a large degree 1964:32).Tyndall used his visible position at still was accorded the clergy" (Turner, the Royal Institution to promote a variety of 1974b:64). ideological argumentsto justify scientists' re- The Church also held power over educa- quests for greaterpublic support.He faced two tional institutionsand used it to stall introduc- impediments: the intellectual authority of tion of science into the curriculum. During Victorian religion and the practical accom- Tyndall'stenure as Presidentof the BritishAs- plishments of Victorian engineering and me- sociation for the Advancement of Science in chanics. Tyndall's campaignfor science took 1874,the Catholic Churchin his native Ireland the rhetorical style of boundary-work:he at- rejected a request from laymen to include the tributedselected characteristicsto science that physical sciences in the curriculum of the effectively demarcatedit from religion or me- Catholic university. Perhaps as a response to chanics, providinga rationalefor the superior- this, Tyndall's presidentialaddress at Belfast ity of scientists in designated intellectualand was an unequivocal denial of the authorityof technical domains. religious beliefs over naturalphenomena, and he made "so bold a claim for the intellectual imperialismof the modem scientific inquiry" Scientists' Struggle for Authority (Turner, 1981:172)that churchmen and some The endless conflict between religion and sci- scientists were outraged. ence reached a crescendo in the decade fol- Victorian mechanicians and engineers pre- lowing publicationof Darwin's The Origin of sented a differentobstacle to the expansion of Species in 1859. Turner (1978:357)describes scientific authorityand resources. Practicalin-

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOUNDARY-WORK IN PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES OF SCIENTISTS 785 ventions of Victorian craftsmen-steam en- drawingthe boundarybetween science and re- gines, telegraphs-did almost as much to stall ligion, Tyndall emphasized the following dis- the entry of science into universities as the tinguishingfeatures: stonewall tactics of the Church.Many Britons (1) Science is practically useful in inspiring believed that technical progress in the Indus- technologicalprogress to improvethe material trial Revolution was not dependent on scien- conditionsof the nation; religionis "useful," if tific research, and some, like William Sewell, at all, for aid and comfort in emotionalmatters. believed that science impeded the floweringof In an 1866 discourse on radiant heat Tyndall practicaltechnology: "deep thinking [is] quite says, "that the knowledge brought to us by out of place in a world of railroadsand steam- those prophets, priests and kings of science is boats, printing presses and spinning-jennies" what the world calls 'useful knowledge,' the (in Houghton, 1957:114). Many would have triumphant application of their discoveries agreed with Victorian writer Samuel Smiles, proves" (Tyndall, 1905a:102, cf. 365). The who wrote in 1874:"One of the most remark- contributions of religion lie elsewhere: reliable things about engineering in England is, gious thought is "capable of adding, in the re- that its principle achievements have been ac- gion of poetry and emotion, inward complete- complished,not by naturalphilosophers nor by ness and dignityto man" (Tyndall, 1905b:209). mathematicians,but by men of humblestation, (2) Science is empirical in that its road to for the most part self-educated . . . The great truth is experimentationwith observable facts mechanics . . . gathered their practicalknowl- of nature; religion is metaphysicalbecause its edge in the workshop, or acquiredit in manual truths depend on spiritual, unseen forces as- labor" (in Robinson and Musson, 1969:1). If sumed without verification.In the midst of the technologicalprogress was detached from sci- Prayer Gauge controversy, Tyndall observed entific research, then the need for greater fi- that in science, "to check the theory we have nancial support of scientists and enlarged sci- simply to compare the deductionsfrom it with entific education would go unappreciatedby the facts of observation . . . But while science the British public and its politicians. cheerfully submits to this ordeal, it seems im- Moreover, as engineers began to "profes- possible to devise a mode of verification of sionalize" by claiming expertise over certain their theories which does not rouse resentment technical issues, they sometimes confronted in theological minds. Is it that, while the plea- scientists who tried to assert their own techni- sure of the scientific man culminates in the cal authority. From 1866 until his 1882 demonstrated harmony between theory and resignation-in-protest,Tyndall served as "sci- fact, the highest pleasure of the religious man entific" adviser to the Board of Trade on the has been already tasted in the very act of question of how best to illuminate Britain's praying,prior to verification,any furthereffort lighthouses. Although the operation of light- in this directionbeing a mere disturbanceof his houses had traditionallybeen an engineering peace?" (Tyndall, 1905b:47-48). matter, Tyndallargued that the engineers who (3) Science is skeptical because it respects advised the Board "had closed their minds to no authority other than the facts of nature; external innovation" and expressed "diffi- religion is dogmatic because it continues to dence toward the encouragementof new sci- respect the authority of worn-out ideas and entific ideas" (MacLeod, 1969:31,15). Tyndall their creators. "The first condition of success believed that informed policy required more [in science] is patient industry, an honest re- fundamental research, while engineers were ceptivity, and a willingnessto abandonall pre- apparentlycontent to reach decisions with ex- conceived notions, however cherished, if they tant knowledge. In the end, Tyndall's recom- be found to contradict the truth" (Tyndall, mendations were ignored in favor of the en- 1905a:307).The dogmatismimputed to theolo- gineers', who "were already in positions of gians is a main theme in Tyndall's diatribe high civil authority . . . Practical men who had against observation of the Sabbath:"the most braved the brute force of nature to fashion fatal errorthat could be committedby the lead- pillars of stone and mortarhad a strong emo- ers of religiousthought is the attempt to force tional case against speculative men of ideas" into their own age conceptions which have (MacLeod, 1969:15). lived their life, and come to their naturalend in preceding ages . . . Foolishness is far too weak a word to apply to any attemptto force upon a Science as Not-Religion scientific age the edicts of a Jewish lawgiver" Because religion and mechanics thwarted (in (Tyndall, 1898:33,36). differentways) Tyndall's effort to expand the (4) Science is objective knowledgefree from authorityand resources of scientists, he often emotions, private interests, bias or prejudice; chose them as "contrast-cases" when con- religion is subjective and emotional. Tyndall structingideologies of science for the public. In observes that the book of Genesis should be

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 786 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW read as "a poem, not [as] a scientific treatise. tion in an 1876 discourse in Glasgow on the In the formeraspect, it is forever beautiful;in science of fermentationand the mechanicalart the later aspect it has been, and it will continue of brewingbeer: "it mightbe said that until the to be, purely obstructive and hurtful. To present year no thorough and scientific ac- knowledge its value has been negative count was ever given of the agencies which (Tyndall, 1905b:224). While considering the come into play in the manufactureof beer ... topic of miracles and special providences, Hitherto the art and practice of the brewer Tyndall (in 1867)writes: "to kindle the fire of have resembled those of the physician, both religion in the soul, let the affections by all being founded on empirical observation. By means be invoked . . . [But] testimony as to this is meant the observation of facts, apart naturalfacts is worthless when wrappedin this from the principles which explain them, and atmosphereof the affections; the most earnest which give the mindan intelligentmastery over subjective truth being thus renderedperfectly them. The brewer learned from long experi- compatiblewith the most astoundingobjective ence the conditions, not the reasons, of suc- error" (Tyndall, 1905b:19-20). A military cess ... Over and over again his care has been metaphorsuggests that this boundary-workfor rendered nugatory; his beer has fallen into Tyndall was more than philosophicalspecula- acidity or rottenness, and disastrous losses tion: "It is against the objective renderingof have been sustained, of which he has been the.emotions-this thrustinginto the region of unable to assign the cause" (Tyndall, fact and positive knowledgeof conceptions es- 1905b:267). sentially ideal and poetic-that science ... (3) Science is theoretical. Mechaniciansare wages war" (Tyndall, 1905b:393). not scientists because they do not go beyond observed facts to discover the causal princi- that Science as Not-Mechanics ples govern underlying unseen processes. "Our science would not be worthy of its name When Tyndall turns to build a boundary be- and fame if it halted at facts, however practi- tween science and mechanics, he attributesto cally useful, and neglected the laws which ac- science a different set of characteristicsin re- company and rule the phenomena"(Tyndall, sponse to the different kind of obstacle pre- 1905a:95-96). "One of the most important sented by the technical achievements and au- functions of physical science . . . is to enable thority of engineers and industrialcraftsmen. us by means of the sensible processes of Na- Significantly,characteristics here attributedto ture to apprehend the insensible" (Tyndall, science are not always consistent with those 1905a:80). Tyndall's choice of words in the attributedto science when Tyndalldemarcated next two passages seems odd for one who it from religion. elsewhere speaks the languageof naive empiri- (1) Scientific inquiry is the fount of knowl- cism: "the visible world [is] converted by sci- edge on which the technological progress of ence into the symbol of an invisible one. We inventorsand engineersdepends. "Before your can have no explanationof the objects of expe- practical men appeared upon the scene, the rience, withoutinvoking the aid and ministryof force had been discovered, its laws investi- objects which lie beyond the pale of experi- gated and made sure, the most complete mas- ence" (Tyndall, 1883:33)."The theory is the tery of its phenomenahad been attained-nay, backward guess from fact to principle; the its applicability to telegraphic purposes conjecture, or divinationregarding something, demonstrated-by men whose sole rewardfor which lies behind the facts, and from which their labours was the noble excitement of re- they flow in necessary sequence" (Tyndall, search, and the joy attendanton the discovery 1894:141-42). of naturaltruth" (Tyndall, 1901:221-22)."The (4) Scientists seek discovery of facts as ends professed utilitarian . . . admires the flower, in themselves; mechaniciansseek inventionsto but is ignorantof the conditions of its growth further personal profit. On the electric light, . . . Let the self-styled practical man look to Tyndall notes: "Two orders of minds have those from the fecundity of whose thoughthe, been implicated in the development of this and thousandslike him, have sprunginto exis- subject: first, the investigatorand discoverer, tence. Werethey inspiredin theirfirst inquiries whose object is purely scientific, and who by the calculationsof utility?Not one of them" cares little for practical ends; secondly, the (Tyndall, 1905a:312). practicalmechanician, whose object is mainly (2) Scientists acquire knowledge through industrial . . . The one wants to gain knowl- systematic experimentation with nature; be- edge, while the other wishes to make money cause mechaniciansand engineersrely on mere ..." (Tyndall, 1905b:472-73). The lust for observation, trial-and-error, and common profit among mechanicians is said to impede sense, they cannot explain their practicalsuc- technological progress: "The slowness with cesses or failures. Tyndall makes this distinc- which improvements make their way among

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOUNDARY-WORK IN PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES OF SCIENTISTS 787 workmen ... is also due to the greed for cultural and political elite, science was less wealth, the desire for monopoly, the spirit of attractiveas a means to make money and more secret intrigueexhibited amongmanufactures" attractive as the discoverer of truth and as a (Tyndall, 1898:136). These attitudes are not source of intellectual discipline. common to scientists: "The edifice of science Tyndall's choice of religion and mechanics had been raised by men who had unswervingly as contrast-caseswas not an idle one: each was followed the truth as it is in nature; and in an impedimentto public support, funding and doing so had often sacrificed interests which educational opportunities essential for the are usually potent in this world" (Tyndall, growth of science in Victorian England. Tyn- 1905b:403). dall demarcatedscience from these two obsta- (5) Science' need not justify its work by cles, but the characteristicsattributed to sci- pointing to its technological applications, for ence were different for each boundary:scien- science has nobler uses as a means of in- tific knowledge is empirical when contrasted tellectual discipline and as the epitome of with the metaphysical knowledge of religion, humanculture. Tyndall asks: "But is it neces- but theoretical when contrasted with the sary that the studentof science should have his common-sense, hands-on observations of me- labourstested by their possible practicalappli- chanicians;science is justified by its practical cations? Whatis the practicalvalue of Homer's utility when compared to the merely poetic Iliad? You smile, and possibly think that contributions of religion, but science is jus- Homer's Iliad is good as a means of culture. tified by its nobler uses as a means of "pure" There's the rub. The people who demand of culture and discipline when compared to en- science practicaluses forget, or do not know, gineering. Alternative repertoires were avail- that it also is great as a means of culture-that able for Tyndall's ideological self-descriptions the knowledge of this wonderfuluniverse is a of scientists: selection of one repertoire was thingprofitable in itself, and requiringno prac- apparentlyguided by its effectiveness in con- tical applicationto justify its pursuit"(Tyndall, structing a boundary that rationalized scien- 1905a:101).And to an Americanaudience: "it tists' requestsfor enlargedauthority and public is mainlybecause I believe it to be wholesome, support. not only as a source of knowledge but as a Still, Tyndall was not disingenuous in de- means of discipline, that I urge the claims of scribingscience in one context as "practically science upon your attention . . . Not as a ser- useful," and elsewhere as "pure culture." It vant of Mammondo I ask you to take science would be reductionisticto explain these incon- to your hearts, but as the strengthener and sistent parts of a professionalideology merely enlightener of the mind of man" (Tyndall, as fictions conjured up to serve scientists' 1901:217,245). interests. There is, in science, an unyielding This last attributionseems odd. If utilitarian tension between basic and applied research, consequences of science are often mentioned and between the empiricaland theoretical as- to justify increased resources for scientific re- pects of inquiry. Tyndall's "public science" search, why does Tyndall also present an exploits this genuine ambivalenceby selecting imageof "pure"science to be appreciatedas a for attributionto science one or anotherset of means of high culture and intellectual disci- characteristicsmost effective in demarcating pline? For two reasons, Tyndall demarcated science from religionon some occasions, from the merely practical mechanician from the mechanics on others. more-than-practicalscientist. First, if science This ideology, however inconsistent or in- was justified only in terms of potential indus- complete, seems to have improvedthe fortunes trial accomplishments, government officials of science in the decades immediatelyfollow- could argue (as Gladstone-Prime Ministerfor ing Tyndall's death in 1893. Scientists "had much of this period-often did) that profits established themselves firmly throughoutthe from scientifically inspired innovations would educationalsystem and could pursue research repay private industrialists who invested in and teaching free from ecclesiastical interfer- scientific research. By emphasizing that science" (Turner, 1978:376),and by 1914 public ence has cultural virtues beyond practical money for civil scientific research reached 2 utility-virtues not likely to be appreciatedand million pounds, or an unprecedented3.6 per- financially supported by profit-seeking cent of the total civil expenditure (MacLeod, industrialists-Tyndall presented an "alterna- 1976b:161,cf. 1982). tive case" for governmentgrants to scientists. Second, Mendelsohn(1964) has suggested that PHRENOLOGISTSAND ANATOMISTSIN descriptionsof science as industriallypractical EARLY 19TH-CENTURYEDINBURGH might not have persuaded Oxford and Cam- bridge Universities to enlarge their science Boundary-work is also a useful ideological curricula.As part of the education of Britain's style when monopolizing professional au-

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 788 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW thority and resources in the hands of some objectively evaluate knowledge claims (cf. scientists by excluding others as "pseudo- Shapin, 1979:140).Alternatively, Combe pre- scientists" (cf. Mauskopf, 1979; Wallis, 1979; sented an image of science as essentially limit- Collins and Pinch, 1982). The debate over less: phrenological science could provide a phrenologyillustrates how one group of scien- sound foundation for deciding religious or tists draws a boundaryto exclude anotheralso political questions. Early 19th-centuryscien- claimingto be scientific. tists desired a peaceful coexistence with the Phrenology began in the late 18th century Church, to be accomplished by a careful de- with anatomist-and-physicianFranz Joseph marcationof scientific from religiousquestions Gall, who arguedthree essential principles(cf. (cf. DeGiustino, 1975:50,104; Cannon, 1978:2). Cantor, 1975:197):the brainis the organ of the Edinburghanatomists perhaps felt threatened mind;the brainis made up of separateorgans, by presumptionsthat science providedthe one each related to distinct mental faculties; the truth: Combe claimed that "phrenology held size of the organ is a measure of the power of the key to all knowledge and provided the its associated mental faculty. The faculties in- philosophical basis for a true approach to cluded sentiments such as combativeness, Christianity" (Cantor, 1975:204). When self-esteem, benevolence, and veneration, and phrenologistsoffered a "scientific"theory that intellectualfaculties such as imitation, order, religiosity was a function of the size of one's time, number, tune, and wit. An individual organfor "veneration,"the domainof religion with a large organ for "amativeness"was ex- had obviously been encroachedupon (Cooter, pected to have a large appetite for "feelings of 1976:216). Anatomists implied that because physical love." Phrenologists claimed to be Combe placed a quasi-religiousmission ahead able to judge a person's mental character by of the dispassionate search for knowledge examiningthe patternof bumps on the outside about natural phenomena, he was no longer of the skull: a proturberancein the forehead within science. Perhaps they also convinced indicatedintellectual prowess because this-was powerful Scottish churchmenthat intrusionof the regionfor organsof reflection.The journey phrenology into religion was not the work of of phrenology from serious science to bona fide scientists. sideshow legerdemain is a consequence of (2) For Combe, phrenology relied on em- boundary-workby phrenologistsand their sci- piricalmethods like any other science: "Expe- entific adversaries, a debate which peaked in rience alone can decide concerning the accu- Edinburghin the early 1800s. racy or inaccuracy of our observation and in- The Scottish controversy was fueled by an duction" (in Cantor, 1975:211). Criticsargued, 1803 article in the Edinburgh Review which however, that theories of phrenology were so described phrenology as "a mixture of gross vague as to remove them from "adequate"em- errors, extravagant absurdities," "real igno- pirical testing. Francis Jeffrey, adversary of rance, real hypocrisy," "trash, despicable Combe, could find no logical reason why there trumpery" propagated by "two men calling was no organ for "love of horses" to accom- themselves scientific inquirers" (in Davies, pany one proposed to explain "love of chil- 1955:9-10). This opinion was shared by Edin- dren," and concluded that phrenology burgh'sintellectual elite, includinganatomists "abounds in those equivocations, by which it at the City's prestigiousmedical school. How- may often escape from direct refutation . .. [It ever, prominent Edinburgh phrenologistswas] a series of mere evasions and gratuitous Johann Spurzheim (a Gall student) and his assumptions"(in Cantor, 1975:213;cf. Young, most vociferous recruit George Combe- 1970:43). William Hamilton, a philosopher, enjoyed popular reputationsas legitimate sci- conducted experiments apparently con- entists at least until 1820. Anatomists offered tradicting Combe's hypothesis that the cere- public descriptions of science that effectively bellum controlled sexual activity and that it pushed Combe and phrenology outside its was larger in men than women. Hamilton boundaries.Combe in turnoffered a competing found the opposite but Combe did not retreat, descriptionof science, makingit appearthat he instead defending phrenology as an "estima- was unjustlybanished and that he had as much tive," not an "exact" science. Hamilton'scali- claim to the mantle of science as anatomists. brations were irrelevant for Combe because phrenology "concerned approximatedetermi- Alternative Images of Science nation of quantities, in particular,the size of the cranialcontours as gaugedby thefeel of the The repertoires differed on three issues: (1) phrenologist . ." (in Cantor, 1975:214-15). Anatomists tried to discredit the scientific This subjectivismwas enough for Hamiltonto legitimacyof phrenologyby exposing its politi- dismiss phrenology as pseudo-science: "'so cal and especially religious ambitions, which long as phrenology is a comparison of two were said to currupt phrenologists'ability to hypothetical quantities-a science of propor-

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOUNDARY-WORK IN PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES OF SCIENTISTS 789 tion without a determinatestandard and an ac- ascertained by a scientific feel of bumps on knowledged scale- . . . I deem it idle to dis- their heads). pute about the applicationof a law which de- But anatomistswere successful in puttingthe fines no phenomena,and the truthof a hypoth- boundary between their science and phrenol- esis which has no legitimateconstitution" (in ogy: Combe was denied the chair of Logic at Cantor, 1975:215). EdinburghUniversity; phrenologistswere not (3) Anatomists accused phrenologistsof re- allowed to use lecture halls at the Edinburgh lying on popular opinion to validate their School of Arts; phrenological issues were theories while ignoring opinions of scientific rarely admittedto the properforum for scien- "experts." Hamilton asked Combe to "pro- tific debate, the Royal Society of Edinburgh; duce a single practical anatomist who will con- Combe was not allowed to form a "phrenologi- sent to stake his reputation"on the truth of cal section" in the British Association for the phrenology (in Cantor, 1975:216).Combe re- Advancement of Science (Parssinen, 1974:9; plied that "experts" could not serve as dis- Shapin, 1975:229ff). Selected phrenological passionatejudges of phrenologybecause most ideas from Gall were incorporated into the had previouslyexpressed theircontempt for it. legitimatescience of physiologicalpsychology Combe advocated scientific populism, telling (cf. Boring, 1957:13;Smith, 1973:86-87)with- his audiences in 1818: "Observe nature for out admittingCombe to the scientific commu- yourselves and prove by your own repeated nity, thus avoiding threats to professional au- observationsthe truthor falsehood of phrenol- thorityand resourcesof Edinburghanatomists. ogy" (in Shapin, 1975:236). Hamilton coun- Combe's ideology of science (as expandable tered: "no useful purpose would be served by into religious questions, as estimative or sub- submittingthe points at issue to an ignorant jective in methodology,and as capableof being and non-vocal public who could not clearly see evaluatedby non-specialists)instead served as the finer points under discussion" (Cantor, a vehicle for his exclusion from science as al- 1975:216).Both sides claimed that their posi- ternativelydefined by anatomists.The bound- tion was "more scientific." Combeplaced him- ary dispute between anatomists and self with Galileo, Harvey, and Newton, whose phrenologistswas a contest for the authorityto truths were at first denied by established "sci- call oneself a scientist and to claim scientific entific" experts. Anatomists argued that only legitimacy for one's beliefs. Phrenology lost: those with sufficient training and skills could 'science" assumed boundaries that left no evaluate technical claims about the structure room for it within. and function of the brain. did Why anatomists exclude phrenologists AND THE from science? "NATIONAL SECURITY" First, phrenology challenged AUTONOMY OF MODERN SCIENCE orthodox theories and methods, and anatomistsmay have sufferedlosses to profes- Once scientists accumulate abundant in- sional reputations and opportunities had tellectual authority and convert it to public- Combe been successful in his claim to science supported research programs, a different (Shapin, 1979:169). Traditional divisions of problem faces the profession: how to retain labor within the university(anatomists studied controlover the use of these materialresources the structureof the body, moral philosophers by keeping science autonomousfrom controls studied its mental and behavioralfunctioning) by governmentor industry.Public and political were threatened by phrenologists' claim that pleas for regulationof science often resultfrom "theirswas the only complete science of man" dissatisfaction with its practical accom- (Cooter, 1976:214). Second, Combe's demo- plishments:either scientists fail to provide the cratic ideal of certifyingtruth by popularopin- technological fix that the public desires, or ion challenged the authority of scientific ex- they producetechnological capabilities that the perts. Third, as we have seen, phrenologists' public fears or loathes. Boundary-workis an desire to meld science and Christianitycould effective ideological style for protecting pro- have inspireda religiousbacklash against other fessional autonomy:public scientists construct scientists, at a time when religion may have a boundarybetween the productionof scien- had greater hold on public sympathythan sci- tific knowledge and its consumption by non- ence. On the other side, Combe sought scien- scientists (engineers, technicians, people in tific legitimacy in part to advance his business and government). The goal is immu- phrenologically inspired social and political nity from blame for undesirableconsequences reforms(cf. Shapin, 1975:233).He successfully of non-scientists' consumption of scientific lobbied for rehabilitativeprograms in prisons knowledge. (cf. Parssinen, 1974:6) on grounds that pris- An illustrationcomes from a September1982 oners must be preparedfor occupations suited report entitled Scientific Communication and to their innate capacities (which were to be National Security, produced by the Committee

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 790 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW on Science, Engineering and Public Policy of knowledge as its own end, not as a means for the National Academy of Sciences (NAS, material production; open scientific communi- 1982). Some U.S. government officials now cation transmits theoretical and empirical worry that rapid increases in Soviet military knowledge about nature, not "know-how" or strength are due, in part, to their exploitation "recipes" immediately transferable to produc- of American science and technology. Members tion of hardware (NAS, 1982:45, 62). of the Reagan Administration have responded (2) This core of university-housed, "basic" by proposing and, at times, implementing scientific research is not a significant source of stricter controls on the open circulation of sci- "technology transfer" benefiting Soviet mili- entific and technical knowledge.' The restric- tary strength, and thus "no restrictions of any tions elicited outrage from the scientific com- kind limiting access or communication should munity, captured in the title of a Science edito- be applied to any area of university research rial: "Hand-Cuffing Science" (cf. Culliton, ..." (49). "While there has been extensive 1983). transfer of U.S. technology of direct military In response to efforts to expand government relevance to the Soviet Union from a variety of control over the circulation of scientific knowl- sources, there is strong consensus that scien- edge, an NAS Panel on Scientific Communica- tific communication, including that involving tion and National Security was created to ex- the university community, appears to have amine the question "What is the effect on na- been a very small part of this transfer tional security of technology transfer to adver- (13-14). The source of the problem lies sary nations by means of open scientific com- elsewhere: "legal equipment purchases, out- munication, either through scientific literature right espionage, illegal conduct by some indi- or by person-to-person communications?" viduals and corporations in international trade, (NAS, 1982:91). The Panel was made up of and secondary transfers through legal or illegal representatives of organized science, industry, recipients abroad to the hands of U.S. adver- and government. Whether its recom- saries" (41). mendations are in the best interests of national (3) Government controls on open scientific security is a matter for the public and its legis- communication would have deleterious side lators to debate. However, the professional effects. First, scientists would be deterred interests of science seem well served, for the from choosing to do research in militarily "sen- Report recommends, in effect, that the over- sitive" areas, thus hampering American efforts whelming majority of scientific communica- to produce its own innovative military hard- tions should remain free from government re- ware (45). Second, if controls limited interna- straints, and that national security will be more tional exchanges between American and Soviet effectively attained not through controls on scientists, then progress of American science science but through preserved autonomy and might be impeded in those research areas enlarged resources to enable American science where the Soviets are especially strong, for and technology to retain its international example, plasma physics, condensed-matter preeminence. physics and fundamental properties of matter To justify these recommendations, the Panel (25). Third, the progress of American science presents four arguments: in general would suffer: "Free communication (1) The Report isolates a "core" of science among scientists is viewed as an essential fac- by demarcating the production of scientific tor in scientific advance. Such communication knowledge from its consumption. Selected enables critical new findings or new theories to characteristics are attributed to science in be readily and systematically subjected to the order to distinguish it from technological appli- scrutiny of others and thereby verified or de- cations: scientific work is housed mainly in bunked" (24). Fourth, constraints on scientific universities, not in industrial firms or gov- communication would slow the rate of tech- ernmental agencies; the goal of science is the nological innovation, both military and civil- creation, dissemination and evaluation of ian: "The technological leadership of the United States is based in no small part on a scientific foundation whose vitality in turn de- 1 The Department of Defense recently blocked pends on effective communication among sci- presentation of about 150 of the 626 papers to be read entists and between scientists and engineers" at the 26th annual meeting of the Society of Photo- in 1982). They (43). Optical Engineers San Diego (August in an acted on grounds that certain papers (federally sup- (4) American military supremacy, age ported but "unclassified") on optical technologies of high-tech weaponry, is better achieved not used in laser communication had potential military by controls on scientific communication, but applications, and that the meetings were attended by by providing enlarged resources and improved scientists from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe facilities to scientists. "Current proponents of (NAS, 1982:12, note 1). stricter controls advocate a strategy of security

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOUNDARY-WORK IN PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES OF SCIENTISTS 791 throughsecrecy. In the view of the Panel, se- professional goals: autonomy and public sup- curity by accomplishment may have more to port. offer as a general national strategy. The long- The persuasivenessof this Reporthinges on term security of the United States depends in the effectiveness of its boundary-work.If the largepart on its economic, technical, scientific, Panel succeeds in demarcatingthe university- and intellectualvitality, which in turn depends based productionof "basic" scientific knowl- on the vigorous research and development ef- edge from its technological consumption and fort that openness helps to nurture"(45). The application, then legislators may accept its Panel does not miss an opportunityto hint at conclusion and follow its recommendations. the inadequacyof Governmentsupport of sci- Because the responsibilityand blame for leaks ence: "Federal funding at universities, mea- of militarily useful technology to the Soviet sured in constant dollars, leveled off about 15 Union is not to be placed on science but on years ago, and thus recent growth in the sys- individuals or corporations outside the com- tem has been slight, makingit more difficultto munity of American university-based scien- replace obsolete equipment and to undertake tists, the case for increased government con- new, and more expensive, enterprises trols on scientific communicationis less com- (23). pelling. The continued autonomy of scientists The boundary-workhere is subtle and com- may depend on the effectiveness of this ideol- plex: on one hand, the Panel asserts that ogy.2 university-basedscience yields "basic" rather than "applied"knowledge; on the other, they CONCLUSION: THE AMBIGUOUS assert that university-basedscience is essential BOUNDARIES OF "SCIENCE" for technologicalprogress. The two assertions are not necessarily contradictory: "basic" At first glance, Tyndall'sexhortations for pub- knowledge can be transformedinto "applied" lic support of science seem remote from the knowledge and, with time, yield military and Edinburgh phrenology debates or from the industrial products. The sociologically in- militaryexploitation of scientificknowledge, at teresting point is this: a boundary between least until the concept of "boundary-work"is basic and applied science is clearly established introduced. The three examples of ideologies when the Panel wants to cordon "science" of science have a common rhetoricalstyle: at- (i.e., basic research at universities)from gov- tributionsof selected characteristicsto the in- ernment controls on communication;but the stitution of science for purposes of construct- boundaryis obscured, if not dissolved, when ing a social boundarythat distinguishes"non- the Panelwishes to remindlegislators that even scientific" intellectual or professional activi- basic science makes importantcontributions to ties. Geertz's suggestion to examine the technological progress. The Panel notes: "in "stylistic resources" of ideologists has proved many fields, at the cutting edge of science, the fruitful: "boundary-work" is a sociological distinctionbetween basic and appliedresearch parallel to the familiar literary device of the was becoming less relevant" (101-102). But "foil." Just as readers come to know Holmes elsewhere, it is relevant and possible for the better throughcontrasts to his foil Watson, so Panel to distinguish basic research from its does the public better learn about "science" technological potential, and to argue that the throughcontrasts to "non-science." Soviets acquire militarily useful information Moreover,the analysis begins to identifyoc- from non-scientific applications of scientific casions where boundary-work is a likely knowledge. stylistic resourcefor ideologistsof a profession Since Tyndall, the ideology of "the practical or occupation: (a) when the goal is expansion benefits of pure science" has been used to jus- of authorityor expertise into domainsclaimed tify public supportfor scientific research. With by other professions or occupations, the ReaganAdministration proposing cutbacks boundary-workheightens the contrastbetween in the budget of the U.S. National Science Foundation,it may be politically expedient to emphasize once again the utilitarianjustifica- 2 More recent political developments must worry tion of science. But in the context of "national the scientific community: Science (4 February security"it may not help to play that song too 1983:473) reports that the Reagan Administration has loudly, for to avoid governmentrestrictions on "launched a high-level review of ways to control the some distance be- publication of scientific papers that contain certain scientific communication, unclassified but militarily sensitive information . . . tween basic and appliedscience must be estab- The review will be more concerned with how, rather lished. Thus, the boundary between the pro- than whether, publication of such information should duction and consumption of scientific knowl- be controlled." Boundary-work is not always suc- edge remains ambiguous in the Report, but cessful, though this case is far from decided (cf. usefully so for scientists' pursuitof two distinct Chalk, 1983).

This content downloaded from 128.173.127.127 on Mon, 20 Oct 2014 20:34:19 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 792 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW rivals in ways flattering to the ideologists' side; cal fruits are placed "inside" science when the (b) when the goal is monopolization of profes- goal is justification of public support for sci- sional authority and resources, boundary-work ence, but they are excluded when the goal is excludes rivals from within by defining them as protection of the autonomy of scientists from outsiders with labels such as "pseudo," "de- governmentregulation. viant," or "amateur"; (c) when the goal is pro- Both "strains" and "interests" help to ex- tection of autonomy over professional activi- plain the ambiguous content of scientists' ties, boundary-work exempts members from ideologies. Merton([1963] 1976:33)argues that responsibility for consequences of their work science, like any social institution, is "pat- by putting the blame on scapegoats from out- terned in terms of potentially conflicting pairs side. Because expansion, monopolization and of norms"(cf. Mitroff, 1974).Scientists cannot protection of autonomy are generic features of avoid ambivalence: for example, they should "professionalization," it is not surprising to be "original" (by striving to be first to an- find the boundary-work style in ideologies of nounce a significantdiscovery) but "humble" artists and craftsmen (Becker, 1978) and physi- (by not fighting for one's priority if the dis- cians (Freidson, 1970; Starr, 1982). The utility covery is announced by multiple inves- of boundary-work is not limited to demarca- tigators). These juxtapositions of norm and tions of science from non-science. The same counter-normdo more than create "innercon- rhetorical style is no doubt useful for ideologi- flict among scientists who have internalized cal demarcations of disciplines, specialties or both of them" (Merton, [1963] 1976:36):they theoretical orientations within science. also provide ideologists with alternative re- Kohler's recent study of biochemistry notes: pertoires for public descriptions of science. "Disciplines are political institutions that de- Internal inconsistencies in what scientists are marcate areas of academic territory, allocate expected to be provide diverse ideological re- the privileges and responsibilities of expertise, sources for use in boundary-work.The three and structure claims on resources" (1982:1). examples illustrate several antinomies in the Analysis of the content of these ideologies institutionof science: scientific knowledgeis at suggests that ""science" is no single thing: once theoretical and empirical, pure and characteristics attributed to science vary applied, objective and subjective, exact and widely depending upon the specific intellectual estimative, democratic(open for all to confirm) or professional activity designated as "non- and elitist (experts alone confirm), limitless science," and upon particular goals of the and limited(to certaindomains of knowledge). boundary-work. The boundaries of science are If "strains" enable alternative repertoires, ambiguous, flexible, historically changing, "interests" guide the selection of one or an- contextually variable, internally inconsistent, other repertoire for public presentation. and sometimes disputed. These ambiguities Ideologists are able to endow science withjust have several structural sources. First, charac- those characteristicsneeded to achieve profes- teristics attributed to science are sometimes sional and institutional goals, and to change inconsistent with each other because of scien- these attributed characteristics as circum- tists' need to erect separate boundaries in re- stances warrant.Still, no one can accuse Tyn- sponse to challenges from different obstacles dall, Edinburghanatomists, or the NAS Panel to their pursuit of authority and resources. For of "bad faith": science is both pure and Tyndall, the empirical and usefulfact was the applied, theoretical and empirical. To reduce keystone of science as not-religion, but the ab- ideologies of science to illusions concocted stract and pure theory was the keystone of sci- only to serve professionalinterests assumes an ence as not-mechanics. Second, the bound- unrealisticallygullible public and a cynical and aries are sometimes contested by scientists merely instrumentalist scientific community. with different professional ambitions. Edin- But to reduce the ideologies to reflections or burgh anatomists protected their claim to ex- resolutionsof strainsforgets that scientists too pertise and authority by arguing that only spe- struggle for authority, power, and resources. cialists could evaluate claims to scientific Neither strains nor interests are themselves knowledge; Combe argued that scientific sufficient to explain the successful ideologies claims were open to confirmation by anybody, of science. an attempt to sell phrenology as "science" and This paperoffers one escape from seemingly thus to surround his quasi-religious and politi- interminabledebates over the uniqueness and cal reforms with "scientific" legitimacy. Third, superiority of science among knowledge- ambiguity results from the simultaneous pur- producingactivities. Demarcationis as much a suit of separate professional goals, each re- practicalproblem for scientists as an analytical quiring a boundary to be built in different problemfor sociologists and philosophers.De- ways. For the NAS Panel on scientific com- scriptions of science as distinctively truthful, munication and national security, technologi- useful, objective or rational may best be ana-

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