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Rethinking the Intelligence Cycle for the Private Sector

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Rethinking the Intelligence Cycle for the Private Sector RETHINKING THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR By: Daniil Davydoff Author Bio: Daniil Davydoff is manager of global security in- public sector, the cycle must adapt to private sector realities, telligence at AT-RISK International and director of social media including new consumers, new requirements, limited resourc- for the World Affairs Council of Palm Beach, Florida. Davydoff’s es, and, at the core, a new mission. work has been published by Foreign Policy, Risk Manage- There are many ways to describe the intelligence cycle (or ment, The National Interest, The Carnegie Council for Ethics in “the cycle” as it is sometimes referred to). In short, it is both a International Affairs, and RealClearWorld, among other outlets. theoretical and practical model for conducting the intelligence His views do not necessarily reflect those of his company or of process. Although there are many variations, the cycle usually ASIS International. consists of six steps: planning and direction; collection; process- ing; analysis and production; dissemination; and evaluation and feedback. What is the intelligence cycle and why do we use it? In one imagined scenario, these steps would be implemented in Successful security risk management involves careful plan- the following manner: ning and preparedness rather than ad-hoc crisis response. Successful intelligence analysis requires something similar, The head of corporate security reports from a meeting of and for specialists in this field the intelligence cycle serves as executives that the company is planning to build a facility in a planning and preparedness blueprint. But just as any set another country. Senior leaders need intelligence on security of guidelines must be regularly updated to be effective, the risks around the planned site, and you agree to create a report intelligence cycle needs to be reevaluated for its new life in on crime, terrorism, and natural disaster risks in two weeks corporate security. As a tool that has been perfected in the (planning and direction). As head of the intelligence team, you Figure – Key Steps of the Intelligence Cycle find raw information from local media Much of the criticism has decried the reports, law enforcement records cycle’s oversimplification of the 1. Planning for the area, and credible di- intelligence analysis process & Direction 2. Collection saster risk databases (collec- and its inaccuracy. Are there tion). After considering the enough steps? Who actu- reliability of the sources ally drives the cycle? Is and converting the raw the cycle unidirectional data into easy-to-read or does it really flow graphs (processing), both ways? These and you decide which many other questions information to use. are routinely discussed Now it’s time to write 6. Evaluation 3. Processing regarding the cycle’s the actual report & Feedback usefulness or need for (analysis and produc- revisions. tion), and submit it via email and hardcopy to This begs the question the interested com- of whether a reevalu- pany’s decision makers ation is needed. Some (dissemination). Via the would make the case that rethinking the model is head of corporate security, 4. Analysis 5. Dissemination unnecessary. The intelligence you check in two weeks later & Production to find out how the report was cycle was always meant as a received (evaluation and feedback). rough model with the key being the fluidity of its application to any environ- This approach is useful across most types ment, whether public or private. It is true that of intelligence work, whether protective intel- many of the current challenges facing the traditional ligence or global security intelligence. In recent years, even intelligence cycle model can be resolved by adaptable analysts investigators have adapted the cycle to serve their needs. and good training. Having said that, considering the nature of Of course, the intelligence cycle’s usefulness is not the only these challenges is itself a needed exercise. reason that it is has become both the standard reference point for analysts and a framework for many private-sector analyst Although the cycle has faced myriad criticisms, the premise of training programs. When government employees move into this white paper is that private sector analysts have a special the private sector, they bring the cycle with them. set of obstacles and considerations at each step of the model. This is due to some of the elements that distinguish the pri- At the lower levels of the corporate intelligence ladder, vate sector from the public, including (but not limited to): intelligence analysts come from a diversity of backgrounds. One can find among them English and psychology graduates, • The wider variety of hierarchies and reporting line young regional specialists, data-savvy social media analysts, types and budding think-tankers. The middle and top sections of the • Different rates and priorities concerning technology ladder are starting to diversify, but it is well known that former implementation military and three-letter-agency employees still are hired dis- • Higher variation in workplaces proportionately within corporate security departments. Intelli- gence leaders, therefore, have been raised on the intelligence • Widely different organizational goals cycle, and whether or not they innovate in other areas, many • Potentially faster rates of change, growth, and consider the cycle a fundamental model to follow. organizational restructuring Challenges facing the intelligence cycle model • Limited resources for security in relation to other institutional focus areas There’s a degree of uncertainty regarding the origins of the intelligence cycle. Depending on whom you ask, it was There is an important caveat to these distinguishing charac- conceived around the time of the French Revolution or during teristics, namely that they are trends rather than certainties. World War I. In any case, it seems to have become an intelli- Regarding limited resources, for example, there are many gov- gence community staple in the Cold War period, and during ernment agencies that would dream of having the resources that time, there was no shortage of criticism of the model. commanded by protective intelligence teams for some major companies. 2 Steps of the cycle and the private sector had to explain her role as advisor and inform the individual that To dig deeper into how the intelligence cycle may be affected his primary responsibility was to use the gathered intelligence by these factors, we can consider each phase of the cycle in to inform his decisions. turn. Step: 2 – Collection Step: 1 - Planning and Direction For most intelligence analysts, the collection step will be the Establishing the recipient’s intelligence requirements is one of most obviously different between the public and private sec- the most critical steps, because understanding customer needs tors. In short, the private sector analysts need to be more ver- aids the team in structuring a project and pursuing certain types satile to be effective. Whereas government analysts are often of intelligence. In the public sector, this step is fairly straightfor- hyper-specialized, with some focusing on human intelligence ward. A government institution or senior official has an “ask” on (HUMINT) and others focused on signals intelligence (SIGINT), a security issue, and intelligence personnel pursue the informa- private sector teams are, in some sense, “any source any time.” tion, whether the subject is government instability, terrorism, or This is partially due to raw team size. Even the wealthiest cor- another threat. In the private realm, intelligence consumers may porations do not usually devote enough resources to security have only elementary levels of knowledge on threats, requiring generally, and certainly not to maintaining large intelligence basic research from intelligence teams. Christopher Broomfield, departments. a global security and threat analyst for Carnival Corporation, The leanness confers both advantages and disadvantages and former intelligence officer with the U.S. government, notes onto private sector intelligence gathering. On one hand, small that: teams mean risks on the intelligence continuity front. Should . private sector analysts must uncover security issues and one analyst leave a three-letter agency in Washington, the events which are not necessarily apparent but could impact impact will likely be less severe than the departure of one of business operations, and be able to quickly find and provide four analysts for a large multinational. The latter probably has a relevant findings for decision makers. In addition, they often greater amount of wide-ranging knowledge on critical sources need to address stakeholders who are not familiar with the company needs to follow, as well as a better understanding specific transnational issues and explain how these could of operations at the company. present challenges to the business environment. On the plus side, having fewer resources encourages analysts In some cases, private sector consumers may not have a good to become experts in utilizing open-source intelligence (OSINT) notion of what is needed, so the process should be reversed, to a greater degree than those in the public sector. It is com- with the corporate analysts being more proactive to “push” their monly stated that 90 percent of critical intelligence is open- ideas in creating a research plan. This issue is not unique to the source, so this is a major strength. In fact, it is a strength
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