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FEDERAL REPUBLIC of GERMANY 1960–January 1963

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC of GERMANY 1960–January 1963 A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1960–January 1963 Internal Affairs A UPA Collection from Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1960–January 1963 INTERNAL AFFAIRS Decimal Numbers 762A, 862A, and 962A Project Coordinator Robert E. Lester Guide Compiled by Dan Pinchas A UPA Collection from 4520 East-West Highway • Bethesda, MD 20814-3389 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Confidential U.S. State Department central files. Federal Republic of Germany, 1960–January 1963 [microform] : internal affairs / [project coordinator, Robert E. Lester]. microfilm reels. “The documents reproduced in this publication are among the records of the U.S. Department of State in the custody of the National Archives of the United States.” Accompanied by a printed guide entitled: A guide to the microfilm edition of Confidential U.S. State Department central files. Federal Republic of Germany, 1960–January 1963. ISBN 1-55655-752-3 1. Germany—Foreign relations—1945—Sources. 2. United States. Dept. of State—Archives. I. Title: Federal Republic of Germany, 1960–January 1963. II. Lester, Robert. III. United States. Dept. of State. IV. University Publications of America, Inc. V. Title: Guide to the microfilm edition of Confidential U.S. State Department central files. Federal Republic of Germany, 1960–January 1963. DD257.4 943.087'6—dc21 2001026173 CIP The documents reproduced in this publication are among the records of the U.S. Department of State in the custody of the National Archives of the United States. No copyright is claimed in these official records. Copyright © 2004 LexisNexis Academic & Library Solutions, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. ISBN 1-55655-752-3. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .............................................................................................................. vii Scope and Content Note ......................................................................................... ix Source Note .............................................................................................................. xi Organization of the U.S. Department of State Decimal Filing System............... xiii Numerical List of Country Numbers ...................................................................... xvii Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... xxv Reel Index Internal Political and National Defense Affairs—Federal Republic of Germany Reels 1–9 762A.0 Political Affairs .................................................................................. 1 Reel 10 762A.0 Political Affairs cont. ......................................................................... 8 762A.1 Political Affairs: Executive Branch of Government .......................... 8 Reel 11 762A.1 Political Affairs: Executive Branch of Government cont. ................. 11 762A.2 Political Affairs: Legislative Branch of Government ......................... 11 762A.3 Political Affairs: Judicial Branch of Government .............................. 13 Reel 12 762A.3 Political Affairs: Judicial Branch of Government cont. ..................... 14 762A.5 National Defense Affairs .................................................................. 15 Reels 13–15 762A.5 National Defense Affairs cont. .......................................................... 16 Reel 16 762A.5 National Defense Affairs cont. .......................................................... 27 762A.6 National Defense Affairs: Stockpiling ............................................... 27 Internal Economic, Industrial, and Social Affairs—Federal Republic of Germany Reels 17–24 862A.0 Economic Matters ............................................................................ 29 Reel 25 862A.0 Economic Matters cont. ................................................................... 44 862A.1 Financial Matters .............................................................................. 46 Reels 26–30 862A.1 Financial Matters cont. ..................................................................... 46 iii Reel 31 862A.1 Financial Matters cont. ..................................................................... 67 862A.2 Agriculture ........................................................................................ 67 Reel 32 862A.2 Agriculture cont. ............................................................................... 71 862A.25 Mines and Mining.............................................................................. 72 Reel 33 862A.25 Mines and Mining cont. ..................................................................... 73 Reel 34 862A.25 Mines and Mining cont. ..................................................................... 75 862A.26 Engineering and Architecture ........................................................... 76 862A.3 Manufacturers and Manufacturing .................................................... 76 Reels 35–36 862A.3 Manufacturers and Manufacturing cont. ........................................... 78 Reel 37 862A.3 Manufacturers and Manufacturing cont. ........................................... 85 862A.4 Social Matters .................................................................................. 85 Reel 38 862A.4 Social Matters cont. .......................................................................... 89 862A.5 Public Order, Safety and Health ....................................................... 92 Reel 39 862A.5 Public Order, Safety and Health cont............................................... 92 Communications, Transportation, Science—Federal Republic of Germany 962A.0 Communications (General) cont. ..................................................... 94 Reel 40 962A.0 Communications (General) cont. ..................................................... 95 962A.1 Communications: Postal .................................................................. 95 Reel 41 962A.1 Communications: Postal cont........................................................... 96 962A.2 Communications: Telegraph............................................................. 96 962A.3 Communications: Telephone ............................................................ 96 962A.4 Communications: Radio ................................................................... 96 Reel 42 962A.4 Communications: Radio cont. .......................................................... 97 962A.5 Communications: Television ............................................................ 98 962A.6 Communications: Public Press ........................................................ 99 Reel 43 962A.6 Communications: Public Press cont. ............................................... 100 962A.7 Transportation .................................................................................. 103 Reel 44 962A.7 Transportation cont. ......................................................................... 103 iv Reel 45 962A.7 Transportation cont. ......................................................................... 105 962A.8 Science............................................................................................. 110 Reel 46 962A.8 Science cont. ................................................................................... 110 Subject Index............................................................................................................ 115 v INTRODUCTION In 1945 Germany was in ruins, its cities gutted, three-fourths of the homes in its cities destroyed, its industrial plants burned and bombed, and its land divided into four occupation zones by the victorious Allies. Economic chaos, a worthless currency, food and housing scarcities, and shattered morals and morale combined to create a grim picture. Allied authorities administered their respective zones and provided for the social, economic, political, and industrial recovery of a divided Germany—eastern Germany on a Communist path and western (the United States, Britain, and France fused their zones together by 1948) along the “yellow brick road” of capitalism and political democracy. Out of this chaos the Western Allies forged a new nation. Following the establishment of state governments in western Germany in 1948, and with encouragement from the Western Allies, the Federal Republic of Germany was established. The political fortunes of the new republic rested largely in the hands of the Christian Democrats. The dominating personage in postwar Germany was Konrad Adenauer, who took office as chancellor in 1949 and ruled until ousted in1963. Elections held every four years confirmed the Christian Democrats in office, although a reinvigorated and modernized Social Democratic Party provided a strong and energetic opposition. West Germany was headed toward a two-party system. Adenauer realistically relegated to an indefinite future the question of German unification and the “lost eastern territories.” His government strengthened ties with France, cooperated in the movement of European economic integration, won the support and confidence of the Western powers, and provided the domestic stability and continuity that made possible the phenomenal German economic recovery. With assistance provided under the Marshall Plan, careful allocation of resources, planning of capital investments, and cooperation with other European countries in lowering trade barriers,
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