The Iran-Contra Affair and the Cold War: A “Neat Idea” and the Reagan Doctrine A thesis submitted by Joseph Andrew Ledford in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History Tufts University May 2016 © 2016, Joseph A. Ledford Advisor: David Ekbladh ii ABSTRACT This thesis analyzes the Iran-Contra affair and the Reagan Doctrine. It moves beyond the trappings of political theater wrought by Oliver North’s “neat idea” of diverting residual funds from arms-for-hostages deals with Iran into the coffers of the Contras. It traces the formation of the Reagan Doctrine and examines the doctrine’s application in Nicaragua, thereby exploring the covert operations producing Iran-Contra. Drawing upon declassified documents, I argue that Iran-Contra was not foreign policy gone awry, but rather the Reagan Doctrine fundamentally in action. The Reagan administration recast containment in confronting the Soviet Union and evaded constraints on executive power to engage the Third World with the Reagan Doctrine, a global counter-revolutionary campaign. The administration privatized foreign policy, used off- the-books covert operations in Iran and Nicaragua, and violated laws to rollback communism. Those within the administration who committed themselves absolutely to defeating the Soviet Union resorted to extralegal methods in achieving their aims. In the process, operations in Iran and Nicaragua intersected and created Iran-Contra, a product of the Reagan Doctrine in harmony with Reagan’s policies. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This scholarship is the culmination of my work at Tufts University. As such, it would have failed to launch without the help of several institutions and many people. I am indebted to David Ekbladh for his superb mentoring and instrumental insights into the study of American foreign relations, a potent combination for which this study and my craft owe their genesis and inspiration, respectively. I am grateful to Peter Winn, whose courses, teaching, and advising provided a formative experience. His advice and guidance has left a lasting impression on me as an historian. I would like to thank Rachel Applebaum, Elizabeth Foster, and Reed Ueda, as well as extend a special thank you to Ina Baghdiantz McCabe for not only teaching me the art of history but for allowing me the opportunity to sharpen my own pedagogy while observing a truly great professor at work. I also appreciate the contributions from my colleagues and friends. Nicholas Scott, Neelum Sohail, Jesse Weinberg, Rodney Lewallen, and Nathan Loggins, in particular, offered helpful comments, suggestions, and motivation along the way. I want to express my gratitude to the Tufts University Department of History and Graduate School of Arts and Sciences for providing funding for my archival work. Likewise, I would like to thank Tisch Library and the Center for the Humanities at Tufts for offering me a fellowship and space to conduct summer research, an important contribution to this project. Connie Reik’s assistance at Tisch was extremely beneficial, and I am grateful for her help. At the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, I was aided by Ray Wilson, whose assistance facilitated my research. It is greatly appreciated. iv I am eternally indebted to Grace Wynn for supporting my endeavors at the great sacrifice of her time and our distance. This study is dedicated to Christopher Schmidt-Nowara. He was a phenomenal historian and, more importantly, a compassionate, witty, and inspiring person, as well as a loving father. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction …………………………………………………………………………….. 1 Chapter 1 The Reagan Doctrine: “We Must Not Break Faith” …………………............................ 12 Chapter 2 The Reagan Doctrine and the Contras: “We can win this one” .……………………….. 36 Chapter 3 The Iran-Contra Affair: “Body and Soul” ……………………………………………... 55 Chapter 4 A Revelation: The Reagan Doctrine and the Iran-Contra Affair ……............................. 80 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………….. 97 Bibliography ………………………………………………………............................. 100 Introduction Day 23 of the Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation commenced at 9:00 a.m. in room 325 of the Russell Senate Office Building on July 7, 1987. Its most highly anticipated witness, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North, a former National Security Council staffer, commenced his testimony. During opening questioning by John W. Nields, the chief counsel for the House Committee, North professed to the committee, “I came here to tell you the truth, the good, the bad and the ugly.”1 North’s declaration about the Iran-Contra affair proved duplicitous—yet, he remained candid in many respects. On the diversion of residual funds from arms sales to Iran into the coffers of the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries, he unequivocally expressed his approval of and encouragement for the covert operations responsible. "I saw that idea of using the Ayatollah Khomeini's money to support the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters as a good one," he proclaimed resolutely, “I think it was a neat idea and I came back and I advocated that and we did it." His unapologetic defense of his actions during six days of questioning and political grandstanding from Congress and their council prominently displayed the underbelly of American foreign policy during the Ronald Reagan administration for all to see.2 Only later did the truth about Oliver North’s activities surface in reports from the Tower Commission, Iran-Contra Congressional Hearings, and the Office of the Independent Council. In sum, these final reports concluded several basic facts about Iran- 1 United States. Congress., Testimony of Oliver L. North (Questioning by Counsels): Joint Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, Vol. 100-7, Part 1, 100th Congress, 1st Sess, July 7, 8, 9, and 10, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 10. 2 Ibid., 109. 2 Contra, which reveal the nature of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy. The scandal known as the Iran-Contra affair birthed from two interconnected covert operations in Nicaragua and Iran orchestrated out of the White House by the National Security Council, with help from the Central Intelligence Agency and private third parties. In Nicaragua, President Reagan committed unwavering support for counter- revolutionary forces, known as the Contras, against the Sandinista government. Congress passed the Boland Amendments, however, ending monetary assistance for the Contras’ mission of overthrowing the Sandinistas, but the White House continued supporting their operations. In Iran, President Reagan authorized selling arms to Iran in an arms-for- hostage deal to have American hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon released. In return for arm shipments, the Iranians pressured Hezbollah for the release of American hostages. These two operations intersected when residual funds from Iranian arms transactions were diverted into the coffers of the Contras to support their war against the Nicaraguan government. Along with funds from the Iranian arm sales, the Reagan administration supplied the Contras with monetary support from third party countries and private donors. The covert actions in Iran and Nicaragua violated an arms embargo against Iran and the Arms Export Control Act, as well as the Boland amendment against providing funds to the Contras.3 3 See Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, August 4, 1993. Vol. I: Investigations and Prosecutions; Vol. II: Indictments, Plea Agreements, Interim Reports to the Congress, and Administrative Matters; Vol. III: Comments and Materials Submitted by Individuals and Their Attorneys Responding to Volume I of the Final Report (Washington, D.C, 1993); U.S. Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, and House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views. 100th Congress, 1st Sess., 1987. Senate Report 100-216, November (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1987); John Tower, Brent Scowcroft, and Edmund S. Muskie, The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President’s Special Review Board (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987). 3 The Iran-Contra affair erupted into what White House Communications Director Pat Buchanan described as "full-blown Watergate-style hearings in both Houses."4 It grabbed the attention of those inside the Beltway and living in Middle America after a plane carrying arms for the Contras was shot down in Nicaragua and a story on the Iranian arms sales published in a Lebanese newspaper. Looming large over the Reagan administration, the scandal had the potential to ruin Reagan’s presidency. The scheme of converting profits from arms-for-hostages deals with Iran into aid for the Nicaraguan Contras resulted in Congressional hearings, independent investigations, and subsequent criminal charges and convictions for numerous participants. As the scandal unfolded in the halls of Congress and the American media, the world indeed became aware of the Reagan administration’s problematic covert operations. And despite the ruckus surrounding the president’s involvement, North’s late night