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in general was complex and changed rapidly as events Revolutions, Coups, and unfolded. The revolution is perceived in the modern eye Regrets: as simplistic and the motivations obvious. However, that viewpoint reveals a lack of understanding of the Cuban U.S. Intervention in Latin Revolution and the subsequent political quagmire. What follows will display this Cuban quagmire in all of its America during the Cold War. complexities. Paul Edward Fontenot The government of Fulgencio Batista emerged From the Monroe Doctrine to the construction of in Cuba after a coup in 1952. Only seven years later the Panama Canal, the United States has been involved however, revolutionary forces under Fidel Castro in many of the most important events in Latin America, overthrew the authoritarian and oppressive Batista and the history of Latin America is closely tied to that of regime. The insurgency against Batista developed a the United States. With the relation that Latin America reputation inside and outside of Cuba as freedom currently shares with the U.S. in mind, one would not fighters resisted the repressive Batista regime. Batista’s find it shocking that the United States intervened all allies declined as the insurgency gained more ground over Latin America during the Cold War. The United and defeat loomed. Even the United States had all but States rigged the elections in numerous Latin American abandoned him by 1958. The Eisenhower administration countries, assassinated political figures in others, and did not want to openly support Castro nor openly even toppled governments all in the name of preventing condemn Batista, but they knew a losing horse when the spread of Communism or protecting their economic they saw one. As journalist Richard Gott explains, interests. There are many examples of U.S. intercession “The man who once admired Franklin Roosevelt, and in Latin America during this period in history. However, kept a bust of Abraham Lincoln on his desk, had been none provided an opportunity quite like that of Cuba deserted by his American friends.”1 The U.S. continued and Chile. The Cuban Revolution and the Chilean Coup to supply Batista’s regime with armaments but never offer contrasting strategies of U.S. intervention during nearly enough to stop the guerrillas.2 Perhaps this was the Cold War. because Eisenhower saw Batista’s impending defeat, or Certainly not all of these intercessions were because Eisenhower knew the Cuban army would not identical. When one is asked about U.S. intervention in be able to handle an influx of more advanced weaponry. Latin America, one’s mind probably conjures up images Nevertheless, Batista did not receive American help. of the Cuban revolution and the infamous “Bay of Pigs” Batista had flown off of the island of Cuba and into exile. incident. Many Cubans consider April 17, 1961, the It was now Fidel Castro’s turn to govern. Batista’s fall day of the Bay of Pigs invasion, a day of triumph as the did not surprise anyone paying attention to the Cuban Cuban government successfully fended off the attempted Revolutionary War. What was surprising was the way in U.S. overthrow. The Castro Regime took power after a which the Revolutionary forces organized the country. civil war on the island. The United States had initially The Eisenhower Administration thought the country supported the Cuban Rebels as Castro had not yet would descend into chaos as it had done after the made clear his Communist leanings. However, despite Revolution of 1933. With many of the guerrilla factions attempts by the U.S. to prevent it or to sabotage it after disagreeing politically and economically, a fracture the fact, Castro’s revolution in Cuba was successful and in loyalty and a subsequent civil war was not entirely even survives today. unreasonable. Castro, perhaps seeing an event like this In Chile on the other hand, the United States was coming, endorsed Manuel Urrutia Lleo for president more successful. Not only was the United States able to and Jose Miro Cardona as prime minister, both of them look back at its experience with Cuba, but the situation moderate, conservative politicians. This seemed to calm in Chile in the early 1970s was fundamentally different the fears of American politicians and conservative Cuban than Cuba during its revolutionary period as well. The thinkers as it showed that perhaps Castro was willing to U.S. funded opposition parties in Chile to prevent work with people of farther right leaning ideologies. socialist candidate Salvador Allende from winning the It is important to remember that the Cuban presidency. Allende came to power anyway after a free Revolutionaries did not intend to oppose American and fair democratic election. Despite this, opposition interests. International correspondent Julia Sweig from the right in Chile still existed and resented his left- claimed, “Initially, the revolution was not an anti- leaning policies. Allende would be deposed just three American event… Of all the anti-Batista political years after his inauguration through a military coup, parties, insurgent groups, underground militia, middle- supported by Chilean opposition parties and funded by and working class activists, high school and university the United States. students, doctors, lawyers, architects, and other Cuban Revolutions professionals, the only group with an expressively The story of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the Bay 1 of Pigs Operation offer examples where U.S. intervention Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History, (New Haven, NY, Yale University Press, 2004), 164 in Latin American affairs went awry. The whole situation 2 Gott, An New History, 164.

13 University of Hawai‘i at Hilo HOHONU 2019 Vol. 17 anti-American line was the local communist party.”3 In to be simple reform measures but soon took the form fact, many of the young Cuban revolutionaries looked up of vocal Marxist-Leninist policies. Land began to be to the United States as an example to follow for its low expropriated en masse, and the expropriations were levels of political corruption and prosperous economy. targeted at foreign businesses. The new Agrarian Reform From this perspective, it would seem that the Eisenhower Law stated that no one person or company could own Administration was in the optimum position to have a over 1,000 acres of Cuban land unless they were sugar strong diplomatic relationship with the new Cuban or tobacco planters or cattle ranchers; in those cases the Government. maximum was 3,333 acres.7 With the new Cuban land On the other hand, the assumption that the reforms the United States government started to feel that power would be evenly distributed in the provisional its economic interests were under threat. government may not have been entirely accurate. Latin U.S. companies had been well-established on the American historian Louis A. Perez Jr. believes that the island for a long time previous. With this new restriction, real power lay not in the provisional government, but those companies lost 2.5 million acres of land to the in Castro’s Revolutionary forces. The Cuban lower Cuban government.8 The United States government class had come to think of the Castro brothers and Che began to worry due to the Popular Socialist Party of Guevara (his real name was Ernesto Guevara) as modern- Cuba gaining more traction in Cuban Politics and day heroes. As a result, when push came to shove, the socialists were appointed to more positions in the Cuban majority of the people were more likely to back the government. The U.S. then hinted that it might very Revolutionaries than the politicians of the provisional well reduce sugar imports in retaliation.9 Events began government.4 The support from the people gave the to unfold quite rapidly with the U.S. enacting measures revolutionary forces the ability to leave the message of to halt the influence of the Castro regime in Cuba and “La Revolución” vague and ambiguous, simply saying the Cuban government in turn began expropriating that it would be different from what it was before. American businesses and developing closer ties with the Along with the fervor of the revolution came the zeal Soviet Union and China.10 Eventually, the United States of nationalism. This also increased Castro’s power in the made good on its threats and halted purchases of Cuban realm of Cuban politics. It became increasingly difficult sugar exports. The Soviets were all too happy to fill this to challenge Castro or the ideals of his cohorts. For many, void, which they had never expected that they would be the idea of being Cuban and the revolution were one able to do.11 in the same, and if any dissent were to emerge, as it By the end of 1960, it became increasingly apparent would later do, Castro supporters (known as “Fidelistas”) to the United States that their relationship with Castro would accuse the dissenters of being anti-revolutionary was beyond salvaging and that the U.S. could not accept and therefore treasonous.5 It was not long before Urrutia Castro’s relationship with the Soviet Union. None of and Miro resigned as a result of the restrictive political the political or economic attempts to dislodge Castro’s atmosphere, and Castro’s opposition in Cuba steadily regime had worked, though it was not for lack of trying. shrunk.6 No longer could the United States see the The U.S. conducted small paramilitary operations against possibility of Cuba descending into chaos, and whatever the expropriated industrial areas. The support of rebel plans the Eisenhower Administration were to consider groups against Castro took place, but these groups were concerning Cuba would have to include Fidel Castro. disorganized and weak and found it hard to directly The move toward socialism for Cuba did not happen combat Castro’s militia.12 Internationally the United overnight. At the beginning, Fidel Castro was not a States was successful in discouraging European countries communist or even a vocal socialist. That is not to say from doing business with Cuba. Other measures were that Castro’s ideology was not left leaning. His socialist taken including sabotaging Cuban imports with corrosive beliefs were well known and he surrounded himself with metals and improperly assembled parts. None of these individuals, like his brother Raul and Che Guevara, who operations diminished Fidel Castro’s grip on power in were staunch socialists. Fidel’s policies at first seemed Cuba.13 It was not long before Eisenhower resolved to 3 It should be noted that Sweig’s book does not focus directly on 7 Perez Jr, Reform, 320 the Cuban Revolution. Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: Between Reform and 8 Perez Jr, Reform, 322 Revolution, (New York, NY, Public Affairs, 2006), 10-11. 9 Perez Jr, Reform, 325 4 Not long after seizing power in Cuba, Castro utilized the influences 10 For more information on this subject, refer to the Perez Jr. book. of radio and television. He gave speeches with crowds numbering in 11 Before the Cuban Revolution, Latin America was seen as the the hundreds of thousands. He appealed to the Cuban working class backyard of the United States and off-limits for the Soviets or their attacking institutions of the past regime for not helping the people and allies. Yet, evidently, here was the small island nation of Cuba with for invigorating the wealthy at the cost of the laborers. This strategy many U.S. business interests within its borders, standing up to the was certainly effective as most of the institutions Castro was referring United States, or at least seeming to do so. The Soviets stepped in on to were in disarray or outright gone, never really established in the Cuba’s behalf, buying up the sugar that would have gone to the United first place to help the Cuban people. Louis A. Perez Jr, Cuba: Between States, further cementing the friendship of the two nations. Perez Jr., Reform and Revolution, (New York, NY, Oxford University Press, Reforms, 325. 1995), 313. 12 Peter Kornbluh, Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on 5 Perez Jr, Reform, 315 the Invasion of Cuba, (New York, NY, The New Press, 1998), 152. 6 Perez Jr, Reform, 316 13 Perez Jr., Reform, 348

14 University of Hawai‘i at Hilo HOHONU 2019 Vol. 17 try a full military strategy. This operation was a legacy the United States. Its lessons would not go unnoticed that the next U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, would by future administrations contemplating intervention in continue.14 Latin America. The Bay of Pigs Operation is one of the most well- Chilean Coups known events of this period in history, but it never The story of Chile’s coup of 1973 presents a different should have taken place. The operation in general was view of U.S. intervention in Latin America. In some not very well planned and did not take into account ways the situation in Chile leading up to the coup was many factors. Its failure became infamous in the minds more complicated than that in Cuba prior to The Bay of of American policy makers contemplating future Latin Pigs operation. Certainly, the U.S. approach was much American foreign policy decisions. There was precedent more hands-off concerning the socialist government to the Eisenhower Administration’s decision: in 1954, of Salvador Allende than it had been concerning the the CIA engineered a coup in Guatemala overthrowing Castro Regime in Cuba. It is also true however, that the the government of Jacobo Arbenz involving CIA-trained conditions in Chile contrasted greatly from the situation Guatemalan exiles delivered into the country by the in Cuba. Elements not only from the United States, but CIA.15 With that precedent set, a group of CIA-trained from within Chile as well, were instrumental in the coup. Cuban exiles being delivered onto the island to overthrow Some would even say that the domestic elements in the Castro Regime did not seem that extraordinary. Chile had a far greater role in the downfall of Salvador Ironically, one of the places chosen to train the Cuban Allende than did the United States. What follows is not exile forces was Guatemala.16 to say whether or not the U.S. was primarily responsible, The Kennedy Administration was eager to prove that but to simply display the situation clearly so as to see the it would not be soft on communist activity and supported similarities and differences between the U.S. intervention a military intervention as a result of the expropriations in Cuba and Chile. and Cuba’s new-found relationship with the Soviet President Nixon took special lessons from the military Union. Few of Kennedy’s advisors had any reservations. debacle at the Bay of Pigs and both he and his secretary of A commonly claimed mistake was the cancelation of a state, Henry Kissinger were adamant about not repeating second air strike on Cuban airfields after Castro began history. When the Chilean elections took place in 1970, airstrikes on the invasion force. The CIA identified this as the Nixon Administration acted to prevent Allende from one of the crucial moments in the invasion, admitting, winning, supporting Jorge Alessandri instead. However, “Perhaps those airstrikes would have no significant effect when Allende won the election, Nixon and Kissinger but in the view of the essentiality of eliminating Castro’s determined that a different approach would be necessary. air force, it can be asserted that without these airstrikes the Certainly they believed that the government of Salvador plan never had a chance.”17 Indeed one of the main goals Allende was a serious issue. The main concern was that in the planning of the operation was the elimination of a successful Allende government would set a precedent Cuban air power. However, as American historian James for other governments in Latin America to repeat the Patterson explains, “When the first air strike failed to process in their home countries. As Nixon himself stated, knock out his planes, Castro protected them from further “No impression should be permitted in Latin America assaults by dispersing them. It is unlikely, therefore, that they can get away with this, that it’s safe to go this that a second strike would have given the invaders full way.”20 Kissinger made an even sterner point regarding control of the air.”18 Perhaps the estimation of opposition this precedent saying that a peaceful coexistence was to the Castro Regime within Cuba was one of the most completely out of the question because that attitude serious miscalculations. The CIA primarily believed might give the impression that the United States would that there was a willing, able, and large population of tolerate the consolidation of Allende as the president of Castro opponents just waiting for the opportunity to rise Chile.21 up against him.19 As the invasion kicked off and Cuba Nixon and Kissinger’s words made clear that rallied around the Castro regime, this thought proved the United States would seek to disrupt the Chilean fallacious. Whatever the individual miscalculations and government. However, the Nixon Administration had underestimations, The Bay of Pigs operation proved to also done its homework on the Bay of Pigs invasion and be a catastrophic debacle and horribly embarrassing for knew that military intervention or even clear and present 14 Gott, A New History, 191 aggression from the U.S. would help, not hurt Allende, 15 Helen Schooley, Conflict in Central America, (Harlow, Essex, UK, just as it had done for Castro in 1961.22 Publicly, the Longman Group UK), 22. Nixon Administration was to declare that its policy 16 There were several lessons not mentioned that CIA officials had learned from the coup in Guatemala and that influenced their decision- toward the Allende Government would be “Cool but making in the Bay of Pigs Operation. Gott, A New History, 191 Correct” as Nixon was to say himself.23 This is to say that 17 Kornbluh, Declassified, 167 20 Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, (New York, NY, The New Press, 18 James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations, (Oxford, NY, Oxford 2003), 79. University Press, 1996), 495-496 21 Kornbluh, Pinochet, 79. 19 While there was some opposition from rebel groups fighting the 22 Kornbluh, Pinochet, 81. revolutionary militia from the rural areas, the CIA, fearing leaks, failed 23 It was stressed to a great degree by the Nixon Administration that to inform these groups of the coming invasion so as to coordinate any attempt to subvert the Allende government was to stay covert and efforts. Patterson, Grand Expectations, 492-495. not released to the public so as not to damage the U.S. reputation on University of Hawai‘i at Hilo HOHONU 2019 Vol. 17 the goal was to make clear the U.S.’s disapproval of a cases encouraged the enlisted ranks to mutiny against socialist government in Latin America, while remaining the officers. The military responded by cracking down on outwardly neutral in its posture. One of the main efforts opposition forces.27 made by the Nixon Administration concerning Chile was The political atmosphere became tense and the the funding of those parties and media outlets opposing military began to despise the Allende government, Allende. One effort in particular was the “El Mercurio whom many blamed for causing the political turmoil Project” which focused on supporting the newspaper, between the military and the Chilean left. The conflict El Mercurio. This media outlet offered criticism of the resulted in a small coup attempt on June 29, 1973, Allende regime and maintained an atmosphere of when a single armored brigade attempted a move on the opposition to the Unidad Popular, the party then in Chilean capital.28 However, the military as a whole was power. Efforts were focused on funding the newspaper not yet on board with the coup and the rebellion was put and keeping it from going bankrupt as it was at the time down.29 The coup attempt highlighted the destabilization going through tough financial straits.24 This U.S. funding that was occurring within the country and only served ensured that the opposition and criticism to Allende to intensify opposition to Allende. Not long after, the would remain constant. military resolved that to stabilize the country, the Another sector where the Nixon Administration Allende Regime had to go. The military high command focused its effort was with the Chilean military. Since prepared the coup by assuring that the senior officers its creation, the Chilean armed forces had a reputation loyal to Allende would be forced out of office. Namely, for being apolitical and otherwise nonpartisan. the Commanding General of the Army, Carlos Prats, was Nevertheless, there was a noticeable amount of the informed that he no longer had the confidence of the rest Joint Chiefs of Staff in Chile who were not happy with of the military.30 As a result, he resigned his post and was the direction that the government was taking. The replaced by General Augusto Pinochet, a man who was Nixon Administration put much effort into exploiting thought to be a non-partisan constitutionalist.31 this mistrust. The CIA put an emphasis on the idea that The coup took place on the morning of September if there was to be a coup, it cannot be orchestrated 11, 1973, when the military moved tanks and infantry from the United States. As the CIA themselves said in toward La Moneda Palace in Santiago. Amongst a memorandum, “There must be predisposition on the deadly battles in the streets, Allende and his supporters part of the military to take the initiative themselves, that continued to hold out against the rebels. It was not until artificially stimulated or ill-planned precipitous action a Chilean Air Force Jet struck the palace with rockets and would be counterproductive.”25 In contrast to the U.S. the building was aflame, that the president shot himself intervention in Cuba a decade earlier, this time the CIA in the head rather than surrender. The presidency of wanted to assure the Chilean military acted more or less Salvador Allende had come to a tragic end.32 autonomously rather than the U.S. actively supporting One of the most disputed concepts concerning an opposition force to the domestic military. One of the the U.S. intervention in Chile is that of the “Invisible main reasons the Bay of Pigs Operation had failed was Blockade,” that is, the idea that the U.S. strangled because the Cuban military had rallied behind Castro to Chile’s economy under the Allende Regime through fend off the invasion. If the military itself was the main international economic influences and withholding actor in the coup, this problem would be avoided. It is credit.33 Allende used the idea of the Invisible Blockade also important to remember that opposition to Allende when the economic situation in Chile started to worsen within the military existed in Chile at the time whereas in late 1972 to early 1973.34 Even sourced authors within opposition to Castro within the Cuban military did this essay disagree on whether the U.S. was the primary not exist during the Cuban revolutionary period. High cause of Chile’s economic downturn and subsequent ranking military officers heavily opposed the school coup, or whether the causes lie with Chilean policymakers reforms Allende undertook. Their children attended of the day. There is merit to both arguments. It cannot be private school and saw the standardization of all schools, debated that the intentions of the Nixon Administration public and private as an attempt by the state to pollute were blatant; they wanted to assure that the Allende the minds of their children with state ideology; some Regime would not survive in Chile. However, due to the even referred to this as “thought control.”26 The civilian administration’s fear of direct public opposition (again population who still supported Allende demonstrated taking lessons from The Bay of Pigs) and the presence vehemently against the military officers and in some of large opposition within Chile (which had not existed in Cuba during its revolutionary period), it could be the world stage, as had been done by the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Kornbluh, Pinochet, 81. argued that the United States was not the only cause 24 The reasons for these financial straits are quite controversial. Sone 27 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 353. say that the newspaper was experiencing difficulties as a result of 28 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 354. its own financial incompetency while others claim that it had been 29 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 354. targeted by the Allende Government because of its vocal opposition. 30 It should be noted that Prats had no knowledge of the coming coup. Kornbluh, Pinochet, 91. 31 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 357. 25 Kornbluh, Pinochet, 94. 32 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 358. 26 Simon Collier and William F Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994. 33 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 355. (New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 352. 34 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 335. 16 University of Hawai‘i at Hilo HOHONU 2019 Vol. 17 of the coup. For example, the U.S. copper companies, stated it fairly when he said: Anaconda and Kennecott, controlled over 70% of the It would be more accurate therefore to describe copper trade in Chile.35 The copper trade represented a the U.S. economic pressure on Chile as a credit large portion of the Chilean economy. Nationalization of squeeze rather than a ‘blockade.’ Chile was not the copper mines by the Chilean government obviously prevented from buying or selling in the United upset Kennecott and Anaconda greatly, and Chile didn’t States as, for instance, has been the case with see the economic benefits that Allende had anticipated.36 Cuba… Chile’s access to credit from the U.S. Proponents of the existence of the Invisible Blockade see and international banks was reduced (although this as a result of the United States freezing commercial by no means eliminated), but substantial credits credits to Chile that the Chilean Government had were secured from European and Latin American previously used to purchase machinery and industrial countries, as well as from Eastern Europe, the parts. While this is true, historians Simon Collier and Soviet Union, and China.42 William F. Sater point out: The coup itself as a result cannot be entirely laid It did become difficult for the mines to obtain at the feet of the United States, although it certainly spare parts [from the United States], although it exacerbated the situation. Perhaps it is fair to assume was often possible to purchase these through third the blame should be spread around. As former Chilean parties. (When, for example, spare tires for Lectra president Patricio Alwyn stated about the coup, “We Haul trucks were no longer available from the were all responsible.”43 United States, they were obtained, more cheaply, American Regrets from Japan.) Replacements for high-ranking During the Cold War, the United States took technicians (including numerous Chileans) who several legally compromised and contentious actions left the mines after nationalization were more in Latin America. The Bay of Pigs Operation in Cuba difficult to find than spare parts.37 and the Chilean coup d’état are but two examples. Technicians left the mines for a number of reasons These examples do contrast how the U.S. went about but a common one was the fact that the Allende intervening in these countries. government paid them in Chilean Escudos and not U.S. In Cuba, a more direct militaristic strategy was Dollars which had more value.38 taken, mainly because Castro had cemented himself Another point often referred to is the international pretty firmly into a position of power. The United States aid delivered to Chile. Proponents of the existence of saw a militaristic strategy as the only option. Paramilitary the Invisible Blockade point out that the Inter-American groups were funded and sabotage operations took place Development Bank ceased sending loans to the Allende in order to damage the Cuban government. After these government. This action further cut-off the Chilean endeavors failed, a full-scale military operation took economy from money that it had been relying on due to place and it is well-known how that turned out. The pressure from the United States to do so.39 However, this Nixon Administration was able to take lessons from the would have been contrary to the Nixon Administration’s Bay of Pigs operation. They understood that a blatant and policy of keeping the operations against the Allende direct military approach to the Allende Regime would government covert. On top of that, historian Paul E. most likely only serve to consolidate its power, just as it Sigmund identifies that the Inter-American Development had done for Castro. As a result, the Nixon Administration Bank halted loans to the Chilean government as a result chose a more covert approach: the support of opposition of the organization’s policy against the expropriations parties and right leaning media outlets in Chile. It is also of the Kennecott and Anaconda mines, claiming it as true that the political situation inside Chile was different expropriation without proper compensation.40 However, from how it had been in Cuba and internal meddling the policy itself also could be seen as malicious influence from parties inside Chile itself also contributed greatly to from the U.S. seeing as how the U.S. voted that the the eventual coup. Inter-American Development Bank would be needed to Although these events are well-documented, they approve loans to Chile.41 Sigmund may very well have are certainly not ancient history. The Chilean coup and 35 Kornbluh, Pinochet, 83. the Cuban Revolution both affected their respective 36 The nationalization of Anaconda and Kennecott’s mines was not countries’ relationship with the United States in ways exactly an expropriation. Allende delivered to both companies 30 that are still visible today. It is important for the United year bonds where the Chilean government would slowly purchase States and the world to understand how the actions taken their holdings within Chile with an added interest of no less than three percent. Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 334. evolved and the reasons behind said evolution in order 37 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 335. to ensure that they are not repeated. This understanding 38 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 335. is necessary if the United States is to have a friendly 39 Kornbluh, Pinochet, 83. 40 Paul E. Sigmund. The Overthrow of Allende and the politics of Chile, see how this back and forth gets more and more complicated. Collier 1964-1976. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 175. and Sater, A History of Chile, 335. 41 When considering that the interest rates on the 30 year bonds given 42 Sigmund, Overthrow, 175. to Kennecott and Anaconda were at the discretion of Allende himself 43 Alwyn was referring to all Chileans, but it is fair to give U.S. policy and opponents of the Allende government claim that he intentionally makers some of the responsibility as well. Collier and Sater, A History manipulated the interest rates in order to seize more money, one can of Chile, 355. 17 University of Hawai‘i at Hilo HOHONU 2019 Vol. 17 and productive relationship with Latin America moving Sigmund, Paul E. The Overthrow of Allende and the forward. politics of Chile, 1964-1976. Pittsburgh, PA: University Bibliography of Pittsburgh Press, 1977. Collier, Simon and William F. Sater. A History of Sweig, Julia. Friendly Fire: Losing Friends and Chile, 1808-1994. New York: Cambridge University Making Enemies in the Anti-American Century. New Press, 1996. York: Public Affairs, 2006. Gott, Richard. Cuba: A New History. New Haven, NY, Yale University Press, 2004. Kornbluh, Peter. Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. New York: The New Press, 1998. Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File. New York: The New Press, 2003. Perez Jr., Louis A. Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution. New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1995 Schooley, Helen. Conflicts in Central America. Harlow, Essex, UK: Longman Group UK, 1987.

Fig. 1 - Salvador Allende (left) and Fidel Castro (right) in Castro’s visit to Chile in 1971.

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