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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. r 11îi ü 77-27,445

WEEKS, Stanley Byron, 1948' UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD SPAIN, 1950-1976,

The American IMiversity, Ri.D,, 1977 Political Science, international law and relations

Xerox University Microfiims,Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

0 1977

STANLEY BYRON WEEKS

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD SPAIN, 1950-1976

by

Stanley Byron Weeks

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy in

International Studies

Signature of Committee Chairman : -J f\<^ / > ^ nSlOal chool

W / y 7 1

1977

The American University Washington, D.C. 20016

THE AMEBICm UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Si-WH Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE

This study evolved from a long personal association

and interest in U.S. policy toward Spain. My fascination

with the subject of U.S.-Spanish relations began when I

lived on the Rota naval base from 1962 to 1965. My

scholarly explorations of the complex U.S. relationship

with Spain began in 1970 when I wrote a study of U.S. pol­

icy toward Spain as a Trident Scholar during my last year

at the U.S. Naval Academy. In 1974 I resumed my writing on

this topic as a M.A. student at the School of International

Service at The American University.

This study is more than just the culmination of

years of personal interest and writing on U.S. policy

toward Spain. It is a tribute to those who through the

years have helped me to understand— and to write about—

U.S. foreign policy. These include Dr. Arnold Spinner— who

opened a high school student's eyes to the world; Dr. Pope

Atkins, of the U.S. Naval Academy— my Trident Scholar

advisor in 1969-1970, and always a friend and academic men­

tor whose sage counsel I value greatly; Dr. William

Cromwell— who has been my academic advisor during both my

M.A. and Ph.D. work at The American University and who

broadened both my knowledge and interest in Western Europe;

and Dr. John Finan— who supervised both my M.A. writing and iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. XV

this dissertation, with patience and sound advice. I am also indebted to four foreign service officers

who shared with me their intimate knowledge and unique

perspective on U.S. relations with Spain— Ambler Moss and

Henry McCown, both former Spanish Desk officers; Art

Briesky, Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Madrid for

Political/Military Affairs since 1975; and Ray Caldwell,

Second Secretary for Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy

in Madrid since 1976.

I also owe a deep debt of gratitude to my Spanish

friends, who have helped me to understand the Spanish per­

spective on U.S.-Spanish relations; Julian and Lidia

Sânchez Garcia, Luis and Cristina de la Rasilla Sânchez-

Arjona, and Manolo AlcSntara.

I am particularly grateful to Dr. William Salisbury

of the University of South Carolina, who made possible my

attendance at the conference on Iberia of the Institute for

the Study of Conflict in London in May 1975. Dr. Salisbury

has also been of great help to me in identifying research

sources. I would also like to thank for their assistance

to me in identifying research sources— Mr. Robert Swetzer,

the Historian of the Sixteenth Air Force in Torrej6n Spain;

Mr. Everette Larson of the Latin American, Portuguese, and

Spanish section of the Library of Congress; and Mr. Arthur

Cogan of the Department of State Freedom of Information

Staff, who helped me to obtain the declassification of an

important policy paper on Spain.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. V

I would like to express my special appreciation to

the U.S. Navy and the George Olmsted Foundation. They supported me under the Olmsted Scholarship Program during

my 1974-1976 stay in Spain as a graduate student at the

Faculty of Political Science of the University of Madrid,

and again during my 1976-1977 Ph.D. studies at The American

University. Of course, neither the U.S. Navy nor the

Olmsted Foundation bear any responsibility for the contents

of this study, nor do they necessarily share the views

expressed in the study.

For direct supervision of this study, I am indebted

to Dr. John Finan and Dr. William C. Cromwell of The

American University and to former Ambassador to Spain

Robert F. Woodward. The final responsibility for what is

written here, of course, remains with the author.

I acknowledge my deepest debt of gratitude and

dedicate this work:

To Charles and Evelyn Weeks, who without benefit of

college stimulated my intellectual curiosities and cimbi-

tions from the earliest days of childhood. To their

efforts I owe my first exposure to Spain. They have been

an unfailing source of support and understanding, and I owe

them a debt of love and gratitude which I cannot begin to

express, much less to repay.

To my beloved wife Kathie, whose love, intellectual

companionship, shared enthusiasm for Spain, and confidence

in me has been my greatest source of comfort and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VI

inspiration. This study could never have been completed

this summer without her patience and incredible efforts in

typing the draft.

And, finally, to our unborn child— whose concern

will be the future, but who may someday glance at his

Dad's musings on the past.

Stanley Byron Weeks

Washington, D. C. July 6, 1977

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

1 INTRODUCTION...... 1

Analytical Framework...... 3 Organization...... 7

2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...... 14

Early Relations...... 14 The Spanish-American War...... 17 The Spanish Civil W a r ...... 19 The Isolation of Spain...... 26

3 ALLIANCE MAKING, 1950-1953...... 39

The Abandonment of Ostracism, 1947-1950 . . . 40 Franco's Washington Lobbyists ...... 40 Congress...... 42 The Military...... 49 The State Department...... 51 President Truman...... 64 Bases in Spain, 1950-1951 ...... 69 Spanish Policy...... 88 U.S. Negotiations with Spain, 1951-1953 . . . 94 The Pact of Madrid...... 104 Reaction to the Pact of Madrid...... 108 Conclusions...... Ill

4 FRIENDSHIP AND RENEWAL, 1963...... 124

The Bases in Spain...... 125 The Strategic Rationale for Spanish Bases . . 129 U.S. Aid to S p a i n ...... 138 The Political Honeymoon ...... 144 Spanish Policy...... 151 The 1963 Renewal Negotiations...... 153 The 1963 Agreements ...... 161 Reaction to the 1963 Renewal...... 163 Conclusions...... 165

5 AN ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS: U.S. POLICY TOWARD SPAIN, 1963-1970 ...... 173

U.S.-Spanish Relations, 1963-1968 ...... 174

vii

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Chapter

The Military Rationale for Spanish Bases, 1968 ...... 178 Negotiations, 1968...... 180 The Executive-Legislative Battle Over Spain— Round 1...... 183 Interim Renewal ...... 190 Spain's New "Flexibility" ...... 198 Negotiations, 1970...... 201 The Executive-Legislative Battle Over Spain— Round I I ...... 204 The Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation...... 208 The Executive-Legislative Battle Over Spain— Round III...... 210 Results of the Congressional Challenge to U.S. Policy Towards Spain...... 220 Conclusions...... 223

6 THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD SPAIN, 1970-1976...... 233

U.S.-Spanish Relations, 1970-1974 ...... 234 Overtaken by E v e n t s ...... 244 Prelude to Negotiations ...... 248 The Spanish View...... 252 Negotiations— Stage One ...... 258 Negotiations— Stage T w o ...... 260 Negotiations— Stage Three ...... 267 The Framework Agreement ...... 269 From "Framework Agreement" to Treaty...... 272 The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. . . 277 Advice and Consent, 1976...... 285 Conclusions...... 292

7 CONCLUSIONS ...... 301

U.S. Policy Toward Spain Since 1950 ...... 301 Spain and NATO...... 311 Policy Recommendations...... 319

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 325

Bibliographic Essay ...... 325 Selected Bibliography ...... 328

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We shall not cease from exploration And the end of all of our exploring Will be to arrive where we started And know the place for the first time,

T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding"

In September 1953 the United States signed an

executive agreement with Spain which allowed the construc­

tion and utilization of four major air and naval bases

in Spain, in exchange for military and economic aid to the

Franco regime. This agreement was renewed for five years

in 1963 and for two years in 1969. In 1970, a five-year

Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between the United

States and Spain was signed. In January 1976 the United

States further formalized its relationship with Spain by

concluding a five-year Treaty of Friendship and Coopera­

tion, which was overwhelmingly approved by the Senate in

June 1976. This treaty entered into effect in September

1976 and is now the basis of relations between the United

States and Spain.

A conservative Congress in the early 1950's played

a major role in pressuring a reluctant Democratic President

to establish a close military relationship with the 1

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dictatorial Franco regime. Specific political goals for a

democratic Spain were abandoned to fulfill the goals of

U.S. military strategy. By the late 1960's, a liberal

Democratic Congress fiercely and unsuccessfully resisted

the attempts of a Republican President to perpetuate close

ties with Spain by another executive agreement. In 1976,

a Republican President and Democratic liberals in Congress

cooperated in support of a new treaty which balanced the

goals of U.S. military strategy with the political goal of

support for Spanish democracy. The fascinating story of

how U.S. policy toward Spain thus came full circle since

1950 is the central theme of this analysis.

This is a case study in U.S. foreign policy toward

Spain since 1950. Spanish foreign policy and internal

politics will be considered only as they affected U.S.

policy. This approach will maintain a clear conceptual

focus on U.S. policy and thereby avoid the diffusion which

would result from incorporating a full study of Spanish

politics and policy. It seems particularly appropriate, as Spain enters

a new democratic era, to begin to place past U.S. policy

toward Spain in historical perspective. In addition to the

historical purpose of this study, there were two additional

objectives. The analysis of past and present U.S. policy

toward Spain provides the necessary background for recom­ mendations for future U.S. policy toward Spain. Also, U.S.

policy toward Spain is viewed throughout this study in the

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overall context of U.S. foreign policy. Certain conclu­

sions emerging from this specific analysis of U.S. policy

have a broader applicability to the better understanding

of U.S. foreign policy in general.

Analytical Framework

In seeking to unravel the various factors influenc­

ing U.S. policy toward Spain since 1950, this study will

primarily employ the bureaucratic politics analytical

approach. This approach, developed in recent years prin­

cipally by Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, provides a

flexible and useful framework for the analysis of U.S.

policy toward Spain.

This framework or "paradigm" does not pretend to be

a formal theory which would enable one to identify all the

variables in the foreign policy process and predict their

outcome.^ But as Allison and Halperin noted, the bureau­

cratic politics approach is more useful than traditional

approaches to foreign policy analysis "where one wishes 2 to treat the details of action." This study of U.S.

policy toward Spain will be very much concerned with "the

details of action."

The traditional or "rational actor" approach to

foreign policy analysis focuses on foreign policy decisions

as the . . . purposive acts of unified national govern­ ments. . . calculating the rational thing to do in a certain situation, given specified objectives.3

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But as Allison and Halperin noted, this traditional

approach

. . . obscures the persistently neglected fact of bureaucracy: the "maker" of government policy is not one calculating decision-maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors who differ substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue and who compete in attempting to affect both government decisions and the actions of their governments.4

The bureaucratic politics approach thus views foreign

policy outcomes as "political resultants"— "political" in

the sense that the policy emerges from bargaining among

government officials, and "resultant" in the sense that

policy "results from compromise, conflict, and confusion

of officials with diverse interests and unequal influ­

ence."^

Policy analysis using the bureaucratic politics

approach thus focuses on the policy "players" or actors.

There has been some confusion in the bureaucratic politics

literature in the delineation of policy actors. Graham

Allison originally conceived of these policy actors as

"... individual leaders of a government."^ This approach 7 considered members of Congress as "ad hoc players." A

separate "organizational process" analytical paradigm dealt

with the influence of organizational actors such as the

State Department on U.S. foreign policy. Subsequently,

Allison and Halperin incorporated these organizational

actors into the bureaucratic politics model by viewing them

as "constraints" which affect "the outcome of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 g bureaucratie politics game."

The bureaucratic politics literature, in short, is

not always clear in its distinction of the individual and organizational levels of analysis. Some critics of the

bureaucratic politics approach, such as Robert Jervis, have

pointed out the need for greater attention to "the percep- q tions and calculations of the top decision-makers."

This study of U.S. policy toward Spain will, when possible,

generalize and speak of organizations (the State Depart­

ment, the Defense Department, and Congress) as policy

actors. But particular attention will be directed to

individuals who played key roles in policy outcomes—

including the President, Congressional leaders, and key

individuals in the State and Defense Departments.

Once the key policy actors have been identified,

the bureaucratic politics approach asks what determines

their stands on policy issues. The bureaucratic politics

paradigm indentifies several elements which may account for

policy stands— "national security interests, organizational

interests, domestic interests, and personal interests.

Perhaps one of the major defects of the bureaucratic poli­

tics approach is this implication that these elements can

be neatly compartmentalized. This study, which seeks when­

ever possible to identify and account for the policy stands

of key individual and organizational actors influencing U.S. policy toward Spain, reveals the motivating elements

accounting for policy stands to be complex and intertwined.

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The final element in the bureaucratic politics

approach is the determination of how the policy stands of

the various actors "aggregate to produce policies and

decisions by senior players. . The influence of the

various actors on the resulting policy depends on "bargain­

ing advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advan­

tages , and other players' perceptions of the first two 12 ingredients." Certain "rules of the game," for example,

the power of the President to conclude binding executive

agreements with foreign nations such as Spain, may give

inherent bargaining advantages to certain policy actors.

This outline of the bureaucratic politics approach indicates the predominant focus on foreign policy influ­

ences from within the U.S. government. Yet the bureau­

cratic politics approach does not neglect the influences of

foreign nations on U.S. foreign policy. Allison and

Halperin noted:

Since actions by other nations can affect the stands players take, and thereby affect decisions and actions, we must consider how actions of other nations enter into the process of decision bargain­ ing and how they affect a c t i o n s . 14

This approach is adopted in this study by considering

Spanish foreign policy and internal politics only as they

affected U.S. policy toward Spain.

The bureaucratic politics approach does, as we have

just noted, incorporate in its analytical framework the policy and events of specific foreign nations which

affect U.S. policy. In a sense, these specific inputs to

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U.S. foreign policy are systemic influences (i.e., influ­

ences that originate in the international system). Thus,

throughout this study the policies and events in Spain

which influenced U.S. policy will be considered as systemic

inputs to the U.S. policy process.

Unfortunately, the bureaucratic politics approach

often neglects broader systemic influences on U.S. foreign

policy. Yet the prevailing state of the international

system (which Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and War

termed the "third image") often has an important effect on

U.S. foreign policy outcomes.It is impossible to assess

U.S. policy toward Spain without considering the influence

of the Korean War atmosphere of extreme anti-communism or

the subsequent atmosphere of executive-legislative con­

flict during the Vietnam War. The bureaucratic politics

approach accounts for the internal forces influencing U.S.

foreign policy, as well as specific foreign influences, but

lacks this broader systemic framework which often accounts

for the timing and nature of the final policy decision.

This study will thus attempt to integrate significant sys­

temic factors into the bureaucratic politics analysis of

U.S. policy toward Spain.

Organization

Although this case study focuses on the past quar­

ter century of U.S. policy toward Spain, a brief overview

of U.S.-Spanish relations until 1950 is provided in

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Chapter 2. The review of U.S. relations with Spain in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provides historical

perspective. It also suggests that U.S. policy toward

Spain has been basically a secondary issue, but neverthe­

less has had a periodic tendency to become a major focus of

attention and debate over U.S. foreign policy. The chapter

also analyzes U.S. relations with Franco during World War

II, as an important factor influencing postwar U.S. policy toward Spain.

Chapter 3 examines the fundamental shifts in U.S.

policy toward Spain which resulted in the normalization of

diplomatic relations with Franco's regime in 1950 and made

Spain a de facto ally by 1953. The detailed bureaucratic

politics analysis of these shifts in U.S. policy is

extremely important, for the general patterns of the U.S.

relationship with Spain until 1976 were established by the

1953 executive agreement with Spain. This analysis will

trace the bureaucratic pressures of Congress and the

military which influenced a reluctant State Department and

President to decide in mid-1951 to establish close military

ties with the Franco regime. The favorable Spanish policy

toward the United States and the general systemic factor

of the Korean War atmosphere of anti-communism were also influential in the shift in U.S. policy toward Spain. The

military rationale for U.S. bases in Spain is examined in

detail. The central importance of these bases in U.S.

policy toward Spain was suggested by the following recent

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observation by Graham Allison and Peter Szanton;

. . . the history of U.S. military bases in Spain shows how military efforts to advance security objec­ tives can shape rather than be shaped by the broader goals of foreign p o l i c y . 16

Chapter 4 examines the relatively uncontroversial

1963 continuation of past U.S. policy toward Spain which

resulted in the renewal for five years of the 1953 agree­

ment. After outlining the development of the U.S. rela­

tionship with Spain from 1953 to 1963, the strategic

rationale for the U.S. bases in Spain is reconsidered in

light of changes in military technology and the global U.S.

strategic posture. There were few bureaucratic struggles

in this period, as most executive branch policy actors

supported the continuation of close military ties with

Spain and an acquiescent Congress did not object to the

renewal of the executive agreement. The relationship

between President Kennedy and Spain's ambassador to Wash­

ington was one of the more interesting factors involved in

the 1963 renewal.

The turbulent course of U.S. relations with Spain

and U.S. policy toward Spain from 1963 to 1970 is examined

in Chapter 5. The bureaucratic politics perspective is

again highly useful in analyzing the intense legislative-

executive clash over U.S. policy toward Spain in 1969 and

1970. The question of U.S. commitment to Spain's defense

and the strategic value of Spanish bases emerge as central

issues in this legislative-executive debate. The debate

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over U.S. policy toward Spain was a test case for the

reassertion of Congressional prerogatives in foreign pol­

icy. Although President Nixon outmaneuvered the Congress

and signed a new agreement with Spain in 1970, the legacy

of Congressional distrust of the executive led to further

attempts to restrict Presidential powers in foreign policy.

The 1969-1970 debate also illustrated the importance of

systemic factors as inputs to U.S. policy toward Spain, for

the high Spanish negotiating demands and the frustrating

experience of the Vietnam War contributed to arousing the

Congressional challenge to the U.S. military presence in

Spain.

Chapter 6 deals with the transformation of U.S.

policy toward Spain from 1970 to 1976. The Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation signed in January 1976 was

supported by the very liberals in Congress who had been

most strongly opposed to the 1970 executive agreement with

Spain. Whereas Spain in 1970 had been a test case for Con­

gressional confrontation with the executive branch over

foreign policy, in 1976 Spain became the focus of construc­

tive legislative-executive cooperation. Systemic inputs

were crucial to U.S. policy as the 1976 treaty was negoti­

ated, and the death of Franco made possible a closer treaty

relationship between the United States and Spain.

Chapter 7 begins with an appraisal of past and

present U.S. policy toward Spain. This policy is seen as

epitomizing an era in U.S. foreign policy— with variations

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in legislative and executive influence on foreign policy,

as well as variations in sensitivity to democratic ideals

in U.S. foreign policy. This appraisal indicates the

political risks that the United States courted by placing

considerations of military strategy above specific politi­

cal ideals when dealing with the dictatorial Franco regime.

Despite this criticism, U.S. policy toward Spain ironically

is seen as having an inadvertent but positive effect in

opening the isolated Franco regime to social and economic

changes which provided the foundations for a modern Western

industrial democracy. When this factor is added to the

positive influence of the explicit U.S. support for Spain's

democratization after Franco's death, the overall effect

of U.S. policy toward Spain since 1950 is judged as posi­

tive for both nations.

Chapter 7 concludes with recommendations for future

U.S. policy toward Spain. In developing these recommenda­

tions, Spain's internal political situation and foreign

policy alternatives are considered, with particular atten­

tion to the question of Spanish membership in NATO. The

lack of any major problems in current U.S.-Spanish rela­

tions is noted, and the 1976 treaty is seen as providing a

firm foundation for future U.S. relations with Spain.

As the quotation at the beginning of this chapter

may suggest, it is the basic premise of this study that a

comprehensive "exploration" of past U.S. policy toward

Spain is the necessary prerequisite to evaluating present

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and future policy. If this analysis contributes to under­

standing "where we started" (and where we've been) in U.S.

policy toward Spain, the prospects for the positive future

evolution of U.S. relations with Spain will be clarified—

and the purpose of this study achieved.

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CHAPTER 1; FOOTNOTES

^Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 4l 2 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, Bureau­ cratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 58. ^Allison, pp. 4-5. 4 Allison and Halperin, p. 48.

^Allison, p. 162.

^Ibid., p. 258.

^Ibid., pp. 164-65. O Allison and Halperin, p. 54. 9 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 24.

^^Allison and Halperin, p. 48.

l^Ibid., p. 50. l^Ibid. ^^Allison, pp. 170-71. 14 Allison and Halperin, p. 59.

^^Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 12.

^^Graham T. Allison and Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 169.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

. . . Spain is a secondary problem to the United States. The United States, however, is a primary problem to Spain. Statement of House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee after December 1949 visit to Madrid.

A brief review of U.S. relations with Spain prior

to 1950 will provide historical perspective, useful as the

background to the more recent period of U.S. relations

with Spain. This review also suggests that U.S. policy

toward Spain has been basically a secondary issue, but

has periodically become a major focus of attention and

debate. This chapter also examines the relations of Franco

with the United States and the Axis powers during World

War II, as an important factor influencing postwar U.S.

policy toward Spain.

Early Relations

The conduct of Spain during the American Revolu­

tionary War was marked by the same mixture of motives that has characterized subsequent relations with the United

States. Spain had no real enthusiasm for the cause of the

American colonists, for it was accurately realized that

14

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successful rebellion in the English colonies might inspire

similar rebellion in Spain's vast new world colonies.^ Yet

the Spanish desire to recover Gibraltar from England, and

Spanish alliance with France in 1779, led to considerable

Spanish aid to the American revolutionaries. In 1779 alone

Spain loaned the equivalent of a million dollars to the

Americans, and indirectly aided them with numerous naval 2 engagements against the British. Yet few Americans have

realized these contributions of Spain to American indepen­

dence. Fewer still are aware of the ironic fact that even

the U.S. dollar sign is taken from a symbol on Spanish 3 coins.

Spain soon had reason to regret its laregly

unappreciated aid to the American cause. Gibraltar

remained British after the peace treaties signed by Brit­

ain, France, Spain, and the United States in September

1783.^ In 1785, diplomatic relations were first estab­

lished between the United States and Spain.^ Continuing disputes between Spain and the United

States over navigation rights on the Mississippi River and

the northern boundary of Spanish Florida marked the first

decade of United States-Spanish relations. In 1795,

Spain's diplomatic weakness in the midst of the European

war precipitated by the French Revolution led her to agree

to most of the U.S. claims. Pinkney's Treaty, signed in

October 1795, provided the United States with free naviga­

tion of the Mississippi River and recognized the United

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States position on the boundary of West Florida.^ This treaty was seen as a great diplomatic victory of the United

States. More important, Pinkney's Treaty marked the begin­

ning of a continuing pattern whereby United States diplo­

macy has turned Spain's diplomatic weakness to its own

advantage.

As Spain's American colonies followed the example

of the former English colonies and revolted in the decade

beginning in 1810, Spain undoubtedly wished she had never

had anything to do with the revolt of the United States.

The United States took advantage of Spain's entanglement in 7 the Napoleonic Wars to seize West Florida in 1810. Then, as Spain's American colonies revolted, the United States

pressured Spain into ceding all of Florida by the Adams- O Onis Treaty of 1819. When President Monroe in 1823 recog­

nized the independent South American states and proclaimed

his doctrine of European non-intervention in the Western

Hemisphere, it was the crowning blow to Spain's unhappy

early relations with the United States.

U.S. relations with Spain from the late 1820's

until the early 1890's were generally quite good. This

period has been referred to as "an era of good feeling" 9 between the two nations. However, agitation in the United

States for intervention in Spanish Cuba, which had surfaced

as early as the 1840's, was to reappear and lead to war between Spain and the United States in 1898.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17

The Spanish-American War

A brief analysis of the Spanish-American War indi­

cates the immediate background influencing U.S. relations

with Spain in the twentieth century. For Spain, the 1898

war was an occasion of national humiliation, and the memory

and resentment of the defeat by the United States persisted

for several decades thereafter. For the United States,

this war signified a new role as a world power. The outbreak of the revolt against the Spanish

government in Cuba in 1895 and yellow journalism in the

American press seriously inflamed the previously dormant

United States-Spanish relationship. An earlier rebellion

in Cuba, from 1868 to 1878, had failed to gain official

American support at a time when the United States was pre­

occupied with reconstruction after the Civil War and con­

quest of the Western frontier.

Spain had the misfortune of being the first country

outside the North American continent to get in the way of

the American expansionists as the United States ended its

continental expansion and assumed a world role. The lead­

ers and apologists of the new "Expansionists of 1898"

included Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, Senator Henry

Cabot Lodge, and Theodore Roosevelt.Since the Cuban

rebellion began in 1895, American public opinion had been

aroused against Spain by the sensational yellow journalism of the Hearst and Pulitzer papers.

In this atmosphere, the sinking of the battleship

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Maine in Havana harbor in February 1898 led to a U.S.

declaration of war against Spain two months later. Within

four months, Spain was totally defeated, with her navy

largely destroyed, her overseas colonial empire virtually

dissolved, and her treasury and national spirit bankrupt.

A perceptive recent analysis of the conflict notes

that the U.S. tendency to overseas expansionism in 1898 was

so strong that "the fact that the enemy was Spain and not

another country mattered little to the American ultra-

nationists.There is much truth in the further observa­

tion that . . . The American of 1898 in fact made war against an enemy of which he was profoundly igno­ rant. . . . Nor did we Spanish, at bottom, have much idea of who were our "Yankee" aggressors.12

But as Brian Crozier noted in his biography of Franco, the

consequences for Spain of the 1898 humiliation were far

more serious. The liberal outrage in the United States

over Spanish repression in Cuba would reappear over forty

years later in the guise of ostracism of Franco Spain. And

Franco, who was raised in the naval port of El Ferrol and

was six years old in 1898, might have remembered this

traumatic event in defying the foreign ostracism of the 1940's.

After the signing of the peace treaty between the

United States and S "lin in December 1898, relations between

the two nations once more resumed an uneventful course.

Spain's neutrality during World War I was well-received by

an American government that itself remained neutral during

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 14 most of the war. A renewed mood of isolationism in the

United States in the 1920's and early 1930's focused U.S.

attentions on its own problems to the exclusion of

considering Spain's developing troubles.

The Spanish Civil War

The July 1936 outbreak of the Spanish Civil War

between the Republican government and Nationalist insur­

gents (led by General Francisco Franco) focused the atten­

tion of the United States— and the entire world— on

S p a i n . 13 An understanding of how Franco came to power is

crucial to the subsequent analysis of U.S. relations with

the Franco regime. Contrary to the Republican legend of

massive democratic sympathy in the United States for the

Spanish Republic, the majority of Americans were indiffer­

ent to the outcome of the conflict. A Gallup poll in

January 1937 found 12 percent of Americans (predominantly

Catholics) in favor of Franco's Nationalists, 22 percent

in favor of the Republic, and 66 percent for neither.1^

The strongest public sentiment in the United States regard­

ing the Spanish Civil War was in fact isolationist in

nature.

This popular sentiment was reinforced in law by the

stringent neutrality legislation passed by Congress in

1936. Thus on 7 August 1936 the State Department declared

that the United States would "refrain from any interference 17 whatsoever in the unfortunate Spanish situation." This

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expression of neutrality was supported by a joint resolu­

tion of Congress of 6 January 1937, forbidding the export

of any weapons "for the use of either of the opposing 18 forces in Spain." Despite the official policy of neu­

trality, the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, composed of United

States sympathizers for the Republican cause fought for the

Republic throughout the Civil War. The consequence of this

strict U.S. neutrality was (paraphrasing a later statement

of President Roosevelt) to allow the Spanish Republican neigh­ bor's house to burn down without lending any garden hose.

Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had no such scruples about

providing Franco with the means to keep the fire going,

while the Soviet Union often seemed more concerned with

ensuring that the Republican firefighters wore red helmets

than whether their efforts were effective. In any case,

immediately after the end of the Civil War on 1 April 1939,

the United States recognized the victorious Franco govern- 19 ment, and sent Alexander Weddell to Madrid as ambassador.

World War II

The relations of Franco with the United States and

the Axis powers during World War II have long been the

subject of controversy. An outline of these relations is

essential to the understanding of the postwar United States

policy of ostracism of the Franco regime.

Spain declared her neutrality at the beginning of

the war in Europe in September 1939. Basically the Franco

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government was sympathetic to the Axis powers which had

aided its victory in the Civil War. But Franco was shocked

by the Nazi pact with the Soviet Union in August 1939, and Spain was in no condition to enter a war so soon after its

own Civil War. Franco was convinced of Axis military

superiority, however, and as Nazi forces rolled to victory

in France Franco officially changed Spain's neutrality 20 status to a status of "non-belligerency." German sub­

marines and aircraft were permitted to operate from Spanish

territory. Yet Franco resisted Nazi pressures to enter the

war by demanding in return most of the French Empire in 21 North Africa. By the time Hitler finally met Franco on

the French border at Hendaye on 23 October 1940, the Nazi

failure to defeat Britain had reinforced Franco's legendary

caution. Franco so frustrated Hitler in resisting his

personal urging to enter the war that Hitler later com­

mented on his talks with Franco by saying "Rather than go

through that again, I would prefer to have three or four teeth yanked out."^^

The Nazi invasion of Franco's bête noire, the

Soviet Union, in June 1941 temporarily rekindled Spanish

war enthusiasm. A legion of fourteen thousand volunteers,

the "Blue Division," was sent to fight with Hitler's

forces against the Russians. But the halting of the

German armies in front of Moscow and the U.S. entry in the

war at the end of 1941 made a favorable outcome of the war

for the Axis appear less assured than at the time of the

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initial German victories.

This new situation profoundly influenced the rela­

tions of the United States with Spain. The neutrality of

Spain became an important objective of U.S. policy after

December 1941. President Roosevelt named Carlton J. H.

Hayes, a respected professor of European history at Colum­

bia University, as ambassador to Spain in March 1942. The

President emphasized to Hayes that Franco's neutrality and

continued non-participation in the war were crucial to 23 Allied strategy in Europe.

Two events in the closing months of 1942 were of

considerable significance for future United States-Spanish

relations. In August 1942 Franco replaced his Foreign

Minister, the pro-Axis Serrano Suher, with the experienced

soldier-diplomat Count Jordana, whom Hayes considered

"sympathetic with Great Britain and the United States.

The Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942 marked

a significant turning point in U.S. relations with Spain

during World War II. President Roosevelt wrote Franco six

days before the Allied landing began on 8 November 1942 to

assure him "your nation and mine are friends in the best

sense of the word." Roosevelt also assured Franco that

Allied moves in North Africa were in no way directed against

Spain or her territories, and concluded with the observa­

tion that "Spain has nothing to fear from the United Nations" and that "I am, my dear General, your sincere 25 friend." This assurance that the United Nations would

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not attempt to overthrow his government was of great

value to Franco. He now had more room to maneuver in main­

taining Spain's neutrality by holding the Axis powers at

arm's length when they pressed for his help, as one of the

consequences of an Allied victory would not necessarily be

the overthrow of his regime.

Spain in no way interfered with the North African

invasion of the Allies. Prime Minister Winston Churchill

subsequently made a frank acknowledgement of Spain's serv­

ice to the Allies at that crucial moment of the war.

Churchill stated during a House of Commons debate in

May 1944:

In the dark days of the war the attitude of the Spanish Government in not giving our enemies passage through Spain was extremely helpful to us. . . I shall always consider a service was rendered. . . by Spain. . . to the cause of the United Nations. I have therefore no sympathy with those who think it clever and even funny to insult and abuse the govern­ ment of Spain whenever occasion a r i s e s . 26

The United States (and Allied) policy of encourag­

ing Franco's neutrality was to continue for the rest of

the war and gradually showed positive results. In October

1943, Franco returned from the status of "non-belligerency"

to "neutrality" and even supported Portugal's concession of

air bases in the Azores to the British. This support by

Franco of Britain's traditional European friend, Portugal,

was too much for Hitler, who temporarily withdrew his

ambassador from Madrid. In response to pressure from the

United States and Britain, Franco, in November 1943, also

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brought back the Blue Division which had been fighting

alongside the Nazis in the Soviet Union since October 1941.27

Carlton J. H. Hayes, who remained U.S. ambassador

to Spain until January 1945, pointed out in his book

Wartime Mission in Spain many actions of Franco which aided

the Allied cause in the latter years of the Second World

War. As noted above, Spain did not interfere with the

Allied North African landings— at a time when the success­

ful outcome of the war for the Allies was much in doubt.

Franco did not let Spanish or Nazi forces attack the

British base at Gibraltar, nor did he impede the wartime

expansion of the British air base on Gibraltar into

Spanish territorial waters. Franco not only refused to

intern the 1200 American airmen who had to make emergency

landings in Spain, but gave them and over 30,000 French,

Polish and Dutch refugees free passage through Spain to

join the Allied armies, Franco turned his face the other

way while American intelligence organized from Spain much

of the espionage in France which was to aid so greatly in 28 the successful Normandy invasion in June 1944. Spanish

diplomats in Nazi Europe also aided during the war in

giving safe passage to Spain, and thus saving the lives of 29 an estimated 60,000 Jews.

The overall verdict on Franco's World War II

diplomacy, which is examined at some length here due to its

influence on the postwar status of Spain in U.S. foreign

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policy, is at best mixed. Franco had not been forgiven by

the Allies for his initial sympathy with the Axis powers

that helped him to power in the Civil War. The Allied

distaste for Franco, which was subordinated to the need to

entice Franco into maintaining his neutrality in the war­

time period, burst forth in the postwar Allied policies of

isolation of Franco Spain.

U.S. policy toward Spain during World War II was

generally coherent and successful. The central goals of

this policy were to maintain Spain's neutrality and cut off

Spanish supplies of strategic materials (especially wol­

fram— used in hardening steel) to Nazi Germany. In addi­

tion to diplomatic blandishments, the United States (and

Britain) used what Hayes termed the "economic weapon,"

especially the denial of petroleum supplies, to attain

their policy g o a l s . Once again, in a pattern observable

since 1776, the United States succeeded in skillfully turn­ ing a weakness of Spain (in this case, economic weakness)

to its own diplomatic advantage.

By the time Ambassador Hayes concluded his "mis­

sion" to Spain in January 1945, the Allied armies were

crushing the Nazis and "Spain's neutrality was unquestion­

ably 'benevolent'."31 Hayes' replacement, Norman Armour,

a career diplomat, arrived in Spain in March 1945. The

crucial days of wartime United States relations with Spain

were past, and diplomatic posturing for the postwar period

had in fact already begun.

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The Isolation of Spain

An understanding of the official U.S. policy of

ostracism of Spain from 1945 to 1950 is essential to the

realization of how great was the shift in U.S. policy

toward Spain from 1950 to 1953. The United States parti­

cipated fully in the isolation of Spain from 1945 to 1950,

and the abandonment by the United States of this policy was

the key to the eventual diplomatic reemergence of Franco

Spain.

Franco's diplomacy toward the United States and its

Allies at the conclusion of World War II was, as we have

seen, marked by increasingly "benevolent" neutrality. The

way that Franco turned his back on his Nazi benefactors in

the closing months of the war supports the pointed observa­

tion that "no one has ever accused Franco of intentionally 32 backing a loser." Franco expressed his desire for post­

war cooperation with the Western democracies in a letter to

Churchill dated 18 October 1944. This letter contained an

appeal to Britain to join with Spain in a new defense of

Western Europe against the Soviet Union. Franco insisted

that "we cannot believe in the good faith of Communist 33 Russia." Churchill would have no part in Franco's scheme of cooperation, insisting that the Soviet Union was, and

would remain, a cooperative ally.

Rebuffed in his attempt to align Spain with Brit­ ain, Franco's postwar foreign policy alternatives were

indeed limited. France was still prostrate from the war.

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and the mutual hostility of the Franco government and the

Soviet Union was so intense as to preclude any opening to

the East. Spain could count on some support in Latin

America, particularly from Perdn in Argentina. But the

United States was Franco's only real possibility for the support of a major power to prevent the impending postwar isolation of his regime.

Thus the Spanish Foreign Minister, Senor de

Lequerica, approached the wartime U.S. ambassador in

Madrid, Carlton Hayes, on 5 December 1944 as Hayes pre­

pared to return to the United States. Lequerica urged

that the United States "realistically utilize Spain as a

special bulwark in Europe" and establish "special under­

standings . . . economic, political, and military" with 34 Spain. This historic offer was really the first step

which led to the 1953 Pact of Madrid between the United

States and Spain, but Franco's plans for an anti-Communist

alliance would not bear fruit for several years.

The initial U.S. response to Franco's desire for

postwar cooperation was decidedly negative, and presaged

the postwar U.S. policy of ostracism of Franco's regime.

In a letter dated 10 March 1945 to the U.S. ambassador in

Madrid, President Roosevelt stressed that the diplomatic

relations the United States maintained with Spain did not

imply approval of Franco's regime. Roosevelt ominously

noted: "We shall never forget. . . The present Spanish

regime has in the past identified itself with our

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enemies. ..." Finally, Roosevelt concluded that there

would be "no place in the community of nations for govern­

ments founded on fascist principles.

Thus, even before the end of World War II, the

United States had clearly indicated a policy of postwar

ostracism of Franco Spain. Two major reasons seem to have

been behind this policy toward Spain. First, and most

important, this policy reflected genuine U.S. anger ac the

origins, early Axis sympathy, and especially the continuing

dictatorial nature of the Franco regime. During World

War II, U.S. policy toward Spain had been subordinated to

the larger goal of winning the war in Europe. This goal

required the continued neutrality of Franco's Spain, and

therefore the United States pursued the policy of diplo­

matic blandishments of Franco described earlier. With the

Axis defeat ensured by early 1945, U.S. policy had no

further need to avoid antagonizing Franco. Thus the new

policy of ostracism of Franco Spain represented a venting

of previously suppressed resentment of Franco and an ideal­

istic continuation of the anti-Fascist crusade. The second major influence on the postwar U.S. pol­

icy of ostracism of Franco Spain was pressure for ostra­

cism of Franco by the principal wartime Allies of the

United States— the Soviet Union, France and Britain. The

hostility of the Soviet Union to the Franco regime had its

roots in the Civil War but was further exacerbated by the

presence of the Spanish "Blue Division" alongside Hitler's

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armies in the Soviet Union during the war. The postwar Labor government of Britain was headed by Clement Attlee,

who had once inspected the International Brigades fighting

for the Republic in Spain during the Civil War.^^ Postwar

French governments included Socialist and (until 1947)

Communist members whose hostility to Franco also had ori­

gins in his defeat of the Left in the Civil War. Since

the basic premise of United States foreign policy, until

1947, was still close cooperation with its former wartime

Allies, the strong antipathy of these three countries to

Franco's regime gave an added impulse to the postwar U.S.

policy of ostracism of Franco Spain.

Instead of becoming a new partner of the United

States or Britain in the immediate postwar period, then.

Franco Spain was isolated and ostracized from the world

community. The opportunistic shifts in Franco's policy

toward the end of World War II did not erase the memory

of his early Axis support. This memory was refreshed by

the U.S. discovery in 1945 of official documents in

Germany which detailed Franco's relationship with Hitler 37 early in the war. Franco had written "dear Führer" on

26 February 1941 stating that he considered "that the des­

tiny of history has united you with myself and the Duce in 38 an indissoluble way." Postwar events would prove to

Franco just how painfully "indissoluble" was his prior

link with the Axis.

The ostracism of Franco from the world community

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began even before the formal end of World War II. The

San Francisco Conference which adopted the Charter of the

United Nations in June 1945 and the great powers meeting in

Potsdam on 2 August 1945 took the same position regarding

Spain's postwar status. The reasons given at the Potsdam

Conference for excluding Spain from the United Nations are

indicative of the general reasoning behind the United

States and Allied actions during the years of ostracism of

Spain. The Potsdam Declaration noted that the Franco

government "having been founded with the support of the

Axis powers" and "in view of its origins, nature, record and close association with the agressor States" should be 39 excluded from the United Nations.

U.S. policy toward Spain under President Truman

continued to reflect the hostility to the Franco regime

first indicated by President Roosevelt in March of 1945.

Truman, in his characteristically blunt manner, stated at

a press conference on 24 August 1945 that "none of us like 40 Franco or his government." Then Undersecretary of State

Acheson made public the text of Roosevelt's harsh March

1945 letter in September 1945, in order "to emphasize that

satisfactory arrangements could not be worked out with 41 Spain under the present regime. ..." When the U.S.

ambassador in Madrid, Norman Armour, resigned in November

1945, no replacement was sent. Although Ambassador Armour's resignation was for reasons of ill health, the

State Department eagerly took advantage of the resignation

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to farther indicate the Truman Administration's full sup­

port for the policy of ostracism of Franco.

The year 1946 was indeed the darkest year for

Franco and Spain. France, Britain, and the United States

joined in a Tripartite Declaration on 4 March 1946, which

"agreed that so long as General Franco continues in con­

trol of Spain, the Spanish people cannot anticipate full

and cordial association with those nations of the world" 42 who defeated Franco's former Axis supporters. The pur­

pose of this ostracism was, as stated in the Tripartite

Declaration, to bring about "a peaceful withdrawal of

Franco" and the establishment of an interim government

under which the Spanish people might freely choose a new 43 type of government.

Further blows to the Franco regime came throughout

1946. In March of that year France closed her Pyrenees

border with Spain. The strongest condemnation of Franco's

regime came in the United Nations General Assembly on

12 December 1946.^^ A resolution was passed which barred

Spain from all participation in United Nations conferences

and international agencies, and requested that all U.N. 45 members recall their ambassadors from Madrid. The United States supported this resolution and as

noted previously, had already taken the lead in ostracism

of Franco by leaving the Madrid ambassadorship vacant.

Thus the year 1946 closed with Franco Spain isolated—

politically, diplomatically, and physically— from the rest

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of Europe and most of the world. Spain was also isolated

economically by her exclusion from the International Mone­

tary Fund and World Bank. This economic isolation was soon

intensified when Spain was excluded from the European

Recovery Program drawn up by the nations of Europe in

response to the Marshall Plan in mid-1947. Spain's eco­

nomic isolation had an unfavorable impact on U.S. trade

with Spain, which decreased by twenty-five percent between

1946 and 1948. The ostracism of Spain did not result in the

replacement of the Franco government. Franco's opposition,

in Spain and in exile, was hopelessly divided and unable to

organize a credible alternative government. Franco's army

ruthlessly suppressed the sporadic guerilla bands which

operated in northern Spain during the early postwar period.

But, most of all, the attempt at foreign intervention in

Spain's internal affairs,which the policy of ostracism

represented, served to consolidate support for Franco among

the varied groups which had been associated with his victory in the civil war.*^ The policy of ostracism was

bankrupt and, as one observer noted, "Instead of weakening, 4 8 it strengthened Franco's hold on Spain."

There is a general lesson here, it seems, for U.S.

foreign policy. The postwar attempt at isolation of Franco

Spain as a pariah state was, in fact, counterproductive.

Foreign interference and pressure consolidated Franco's

grip on Spain as perhaps nothing else could. More recent

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cases of similar attempts at international ostracism of

pariah states— Rhodesia, South Africa, and Israel— seem to

have had a similar counterproductive effect. The isolated

state develops a siege mentality and its intransigence is

hardened, not eroded. There is no doubt that a U.S. policy

of ostracism of, for instance. South Africa, responds to

the best moral impulses in American foreign policy. But

U.S. policymakers should take care, as Robert Osgood once

advised, to "judge the morality of an action by its conse- 49 guences as well as its motives." If the consequences of

ostracism seem to be (as the case of Franco Spain vividly

illustrates) to consolidate the isolated regime, we may

legitimately question not only the wisdom but also the

morality of such a policy.

Changes in the international system would rapidly

undermine the basis of the U.S. policy of ostracism of

Franco Spain after 1946. This policy was premised on con­

tinuing postwar U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union

against the mutual threat of resurgent or residual fascism.

The famous "Iron Curtain" speech of Winston Churchill in

1946 publicly indicated that the Western democracies were

beginning to realize that the real postwar threat to inter­

national peace was their former ally the Soviet Union. It

is ironic that Churchill reached this conclusion less than

a year and a half after he rejected the similar analysis of

Franco in 1944. The Cold War confrontation between the

West and the Communist bloc received further impulse with

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the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in 1947. By the time

of the Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin block­

ade in 1948, the East-West confrontation had reached a

point of no return.

We have observed in this chapter a certain general

historical trend of U.S. policy toward Spain, involving

periodic intense attention to Spain (often taking advantage

of Spain's weakness to the advantage of broader United

States policy goals), followed by prolonged periods of

maintenance of the new pattern of U.S. relations with

Spain. An understanding of this general aspect of U.S.

policy toward Spain may be useful in keeping the most

recent period of U.S. relations with Spain from 1950 to

1976 in broader perspective.

With this historical background in mind, the fol­

lowing chapter will describe two major changes in U.S.

policy toward Spain from the analytical perspective of

bureaucratic politics. The ending of the questionable and

probably counterproductive policy of ostracism of Franco's

regime occurred in 1950. But the most significant shift in

U.S. policy toward Spain was the subsequent embracing of

Franco as a de facto ally. It is this second policy shift

that set the pattern of U.S. relations with Spain until 1976.

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CHAPTER 2 : FOOTNOTES

^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 7th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, 1964), pp. 32-33. 2 Carlton J. H. Hayes, The United States and Spain (New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1951), p. 15.

3"Spain: Its Role in American History," advertis­ ing supplement to the New York Times, 30 May 1976, p. 15. 4 Bailey, p. 46. ^Hayes, p. 15.

^Bailey, p. 81.

7lbid., p. 165.

®Ibid., pp. 172-73. 9 Hayes, p. 20.

^^George Pope Atkins, "McKinley and Latin America," in Threshold to American Internationalism, ed. Paola E. Coletta (New York: Exposition Press, 1970), p. 319.

^^Josê Manuel Allendesalazar, El 98 de los Ameri­ canos (Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos para el DiSlogo, 1974), p. 8. This recent book by a young Spanish diplomat does an excellent job of placing U.S. relations with Spain from 1840 to 1900 in the broader context of American history. l^ibid. 13*Brian] Crozier, Franco (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967),1! p. 31. 14, Byron E. Blankinship, "Major Twentieth Century Factors in Spanish Foreign Policy Applicable to United States Military Posture," Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 1953, p. 20. (Mimeographed.) l^This analysis is concerned with the Spanish Civil War only as it relates to U.S. policy. The best single book on the Civil War is Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, rev. and enl. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). Also see Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Revolution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36

l^Bailey, p. 702.

^^Blankinship, p. 146.

^®Ibid., p. 147. l^ibid. 20 Max Gallo, Spain Under Franco, trans. Jean Stewart (London; George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1973), p. 94. 21 For an indication of the vast imperial territor­ ial ambitions in the heady days of the early Franco regime, see Fernando Maria de Castiella and José Maria de Areilza, Reivindicaciones de Espana (Madrid: Institute de Estudios Politicos, 1941). This book is of particular interest, since both its authors became Spanish Foreign Ministers. 2^William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1959), p. 1068. 23 Carlton J. H. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. 7.

2^Ibid., p. 57. Suher was Franco's brother-in-law. In a play on Francois Spanish title "Generalissimo" (which loosely translated, means "Top General"), Suher has often been disparagingly referred to as "Cuhadissimo" ("Top brother-in-law")! 25 Arthur P. Whitaker, Spain and Defense of the West (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), pp. 12-13. 26 Hayes, The United States and Spain, pp. 152-53.

27callo, p. 131. 28 The facts in this paragraph are based on the detailed accounts of Franco's aid to the Allies found throughout Ambassador Hayes' book Wartime Mission in Spain. 29 Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1970.

3^Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, p. 301.

3^Ibid., p. 282.

3^Whitaker, p. 3. 33 Crozier, pp. 400-401. For the text of the Franco

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37

letter and Churchill's response, see Samuel Hoare, Compla­ cent Dictator (New York: Knopf, 1947), pp. 305-10. The text of the letters was also published in the New York Times, 19 September 1945, p. 12.

3^Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, p. 287.

33u.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), vol. 5, p. 667.

^^Crozier, p. 406. 37For some of the more important documents, see U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, "Documents Concerning Relations Between the Spanish Govern­ ment and the European Axis," 17 March 1946.

3®Ibid., p. 413. 39 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, vol. 2, p. 1510. ^^Arlene Idol McCown, "Spain and the Spanish Ques­ tion: External/Internal Sources of Foreign Policy,"(Ph.D. dissertation. The American University, 1973), p. 26.

^^Ibid., p. 14.

^^u.s.. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, "Position of France, U.K., and U.S. on Relations with Present Spanish Government," 17 March 1946, p. 412.

^^whitaker, pp. 26-27.

^^The McCown dissertation is the best analysis of the ostracism of Spain from 1945 to 1950. See especially Chapter III, on the December 1946 U.N. Resolution con­ demning Spain. ^^The atmosphere of isolation in Madrid in 1946 is vividly described in Chapter III of Max Gallo's Spain Under Franco. 46 William B. Dunham (Spanish Desk, Department of State) and James Wilson (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), "Paper on Policy Toward Spain," May 1950. Declassified from Top Secret on 23 June 1977 upon my request under the Freedom of Information Act.

^^whitaker, pp. 26-28, rightly emphasizes the

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effect of ostracism in consolidating Franco's previous supporters, but is incorrect in dismissing the increased popular support of Franco as a "myth." Personal observa­ tion of Franco's last public rally on 1 October 1975 (fol­ lowing the execution by Spain of terrorists)— reminiscent of the December 1946 rally in its defiance of foreign intervention— convinces this writer that there is indeed a visceral Spanish reaction to foreign intervention. 48 °Ibid., p. 26. 49 Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 3

ALLIANCE MAKING, 1950-1953

. . . that inordinate fear of Communism . . . once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in our fear.

President Jimmy Carter, Foreign Policy Speech at Notre Dame University 22 May 1977

This chapter will analyze the shift in U.S. policy

toward Spain which culminated in the September 1953 base

agreements, the Pact of Madrid. Following Graham Allison's

bureaucratic politics analytical framework, four key

bureaucratic and individual actors will be examined

regarding their stands on the issue of U.S. policy toward

Franco Spain.^ Their impact on the resulting policy will

be analyzed in the chronological analysis of the shifts in

U.S. policy toward Spain.

This analysis will examine separately the two key

shifts in U.S. policy toward Spain. The first shift was

the abandonment in 1950 of the policy of ostracism o f .

Franco Spain. The second, and closely related, policy shift

was the 1951 decision to seek U.S. bases in Spain. Follow­

ing this analysis, the course of negotiations for the 1953

agreements, the terms of these agreements, and the reaction

39

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to these agreements will be considered.

The Abandonment of Ostracism, 1947-1950

The 1950 change in U.S. policy toward Spain aban­

doned the previous policy of ostracism in favor of a policy

of normalization of diplomatic relations with Spain. An

American ambassador returned to Madrid for the first time

since 1945, a culmination of pressures for normalization of

relations going back to 1946. The eventual normalization

of U.S. relations with Spain in 1950 was indeed significant,

for it was the prerequisite to the policy change in the

following year which led to the 1953 agreements with Spain.

Also, as we shall see in the following analysis, many of

the advocates of the end of the policy of ostracism always

saw this policy change as merely the first step toward an

ultimate goal of de facto alliance with Franco Spain.

Franco's Washington Lobbyists

Prior to the review of the four major policy actors,

the influence of Franco's paid Washington lobby must be 2 noted. Although this lobby was not a direct actor in the

U.S. policy process, it strongly aided and influenced the

Congressional advocates of closer ties with Spain.

The first of the two key individuals in Franco's

Washington lobby was the former Spanish Foreign Minister,

José Felix de Lequerica. As noted earlier, Lequerica had

made the first official Spanish suggestion of close associ­

ation with the United States to then-Ambassador Carlton

Hayes in Madrid in December 1944. As it became clear to

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Franco in 1948 that Spain was to be excluded by her Euro­

pean neighbors from Marshall Plan economic aid, he sent

Lequerica (who had been removed as Foreign Minister in

1945) to Washington as a "roving Ambassador-without-

portfolio."3 Lequerica shrewdly did most of his "roving"

in the halls of Congress in search of powerful Congres­

sional allies to pressure the Truman administration to

change its hostile policy toward Spain.

Lequerica was ably assisted in this task by the

Washington lawyer Charles Patrick Clark, who was hired as

Franco's paid lobbyist in Washington in February 1949.^

For his services, lobbyist Clark received the astounding

fee of $57,750 in 1949 and $121,000 in 1950.^ Drew Pearson

subsequently insinuated that some of Clark's salary found

its way into the pockets of key Congressional figures, but

there is no evidence to prove this allegation and Pearson

was hardly an unbiased o b s e r v e r . ^ in any case Clark was

an excellent choice as the Franco regime's lobbyist, for

he had a close past association with key administration and

Congressional leaders. Clark had been then-Senator Tru­

man's first staff pick for his committee investigating the

national defense program in 1941, a classmate of Lyndon

Johnson at Georgetown Law School, and a friend and fellow

Irishman to John Kennedy.

Two key aspects in bureaucratic politics analysis

are readily apparent in the case of Spain's official Wash­

ington Lobby. The goals of both Lequerica and Clark were

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to gain increased support, in the Congress and the Truman

administration, for a sympathetic U.S. policy toward Spain.

The "stands" of these actors on the issue of U.S. policy

toward Spain are also readily accounted for. Lequerica's

stand was, of course, determined by his official position,

whereas Clark was motivated by the lucrative financial

r- tainer he received as well as by a genuine Catholic

sympathy for Franco's traditional Catholic regime.

It is more difficult to precisely analyze the

effect of these lobbyists on the policy outcome, for in

judging the effectiveness of a lobbyist "there are far too

many intangible factors involved, and no individual is apt

to admit that he has in fact been influenced by a lobby- 7 ist." But we may infer from the facts that "the Spanish

cause began to improve almost immediately after Clark

became a part of it," and that Clark's salary was more

than doubled in 1950, that Clark especially had a consid- O erable influence on U.S. policy toward Spain. This

influence consisted primarily in effectively mobilizing a

"Spanish Lobby" within Congress which could exert direct

pressure on U.S. policy toward Spain.

Congress The role of Congress in the 1950 normalization of

relations with Spain provides an excellent example of how

Congress can exert great influence in the actual formula­

tion of U.S. foreign policy. There were five groups in

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Congress with various primary goals, which coalesced to 9 form the Congressional "Spanish Lobby." A detailed sta­

tistical summary of the members of the Spanish Lobby found

conservative ideology and Catholic religion to be frequent

underlying common characteristics.^^

Although these groups will be outlined separately

here, it should be borne in mind that many Congressmen who

sympathized with the Spanish cause did so for a combination

of reasons, and Congressional motivations often overlapped

the boundaries of any single group. The first group in

Congress, the "Catholics," were motivated primarily by

support for Franco's defense of Spain's traditional Catho­

lic faith. The leader of this first group, and the overall

leading figure of the Spanish Lobby, was Senator Pat

McCarran (D-Nev.), who headed the Senate Appropriations

Subcommittee. Overlapping this group was a second group of

extreme anti-communists such as the notorious Senator

McCarthy, who saw a possible ally in Franco's zealously

anti-communist regime. A third group gradually developed,

motivated by national security interests, whose prime in­

terest was to obtain U.S. military bases in Spain. The

most influential member of this group was Senator Chan

Gurney (R-S.D.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services

Committee. A fourth group, led by Republican Senator Taft

of Ohio, was motivated primarily by partisan hostility to Truman administration policy. The fifth group was economi­

cally motivated (primarily southern cotton interests),

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seeking greater trade with Spain. Senator John Stennis

(D-Miss.) was a leading member of this group.

The bureaucratic politics paradigm indicates that

the bargaining skill and advantages of policy actors and

the rules of the policy game are prime determining factors

regarding the actors' impact on the final policy result.

This should be kept in mind as we examine the way in which

the Spanish Lobby in Congress skillfully exerted pressure

to reverse the Truman administration's policy of ostracism

of Spain. The Spanish Lobby took full advantage of the

constitutional "rules of the game" which gave Congress

authority over appropriations and the prerogative of having

executive branch members testify before Congressional

committees.

The first efforts by the Congressional Spanish

Lobby to overturn the policy of ostracism were related to

the issue of U.S. aid to Western Europe under the Marshall

Plan. Representative James Fulton (R-Pa.) questioned then-

Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman about including

Spain in the Marshall Plan aid program.On 29 March 1948

Representative Alvin O'Konski (R-Wisc.), the leader of the Spanish Lobby in the House, made the first attempt to

legislate inclusion of Spain in the Marshall Plan. He

sponsored an amendment to the 1948 European Recovery Pro­

gram (ERP) appropriations bill to include Spain, emphasiz­ ing the "devious and calculating" Soviet leadership of the

movement to ostracize Franco, and noting Spain's assistance

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to the Allied war effort in its latter days. An excerpt

from O'Konski's remarks is illustrative of the ideological

passion and awe-inspiring level of discourse over the issue

of Spain: By what rule of logic should Spain be excluded? . . . To eliminate Spain from this bill is nothing but shameful and stupid appeasement of the pinkos in Moscow and the pinkos in our State Department and Department of Commerce.12

In fact, the exclusion of Spain from Marshall Plan

aid was the result not of a "rule of logic" but rather a

bureaucratic "rule of the game." The United States had

set up the Marshall Plan aid in such a way that the Euro­

pean nations themselves, through the Organization for

European Economic Cooperation, determined participation

and allocation of the Marshall Plan aid.^^ As noted in the

previous chapter, the postwar hostility of the nations of

Western Europe to Franco Spain was so strong that Spain

had the dubious distinction of being the only nation

excluded from Marshall Plan aid. The "rule of the game"

which allowed the European nations to determine the distri­

bution of Marshall Plan aid proved an insuperable stumbling

block for the Congressional Spanish Lobby.

Despite its open contradiction to this U.S. Mar­

shall Plan aid policy, the House adopted the O'Konski

amendment to include Spain on 31 March 1948. The over­

whelming House vote to include Spain indicated the new strength of the Spanish Lobby in the House, and marked the

beginning of two years of debate over U.S. policy toward

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46 1 4 Spain. President Truman stated that he was "utterly

opposed" to the O'Konski Amendment, and the State Depart­

ment, concerned with European reaction, also opposed the

amendment. The amendment was deleted by the Senate-House

conference committee, which accepted the administration

argument that it was up to the European states themselves

to include Spain in the aid program, and they had refused

to do so. The Spanish, however, were no doubt heartened by

the action of the House, and looked forward to a brighter

future in their relations with the United States.Franco

was further encouraged by Winston Churchill's blunt ques­

tioning in the House of Commons on 10 December 1948, asking

"Why should Spain be treated as outcasts?" and the French

reopening of their border with Spain. After the adjournment of Congress in 1948, many

Senators and Congressmen made visits to Spain. The warm

sun and warm reception that they found in wadrid no doubt

exerted a positive influence on their attitudes regarding

U.S. policy toward Spain. Two visits were of particular

significance. Republican Senator Chan Gurney of South

Dakota, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,

emerged from a meeting with Franco advocating U.S. aid and 17 full diplomatic relations with Spain. Of even greater implication was Gurney's statement a few days later that he

favored a "full" military alliance of the United States

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 18 with Spain. Another important visit took place in Novem­

ber 1948, when seven members of the House Armed Services

Committee went to Madrid. The Chairman of this powerful

House committee commented after his visit: "If the ERP was

created to combat communism, there is no better place to

begin than with Spain. I am going to recommend that the 19 U.S. give immediate aid to Spain."

The Congressional Spanish Lobby in 1949 continued

and intensified its pressure on the Truman administration

to adopt a more sympathetic policy toward Spain, aided

greatly by Franco's paid Washington lobbyist Charles

Patrick Clark. The second annual European Recovery Program

aid appropriations and the hearings on the North Atlantic

Treaty provided the opportunity for the Spanish Lobby in

Congress to advance its case for closer ties with Spain.

Senator McCarran established himself as the leader

of the Spanish Lobby in Congress by his incessant badger­

ing of Secretary of State Acheson during routine hearings

on the State Department's appropriations. The bureaucratic

"rule of the game" enabled McCarran, as Chairman of the

Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, to use the routine

appropriations process as a forum to press for closer

relations with Spain. McCarran indicated how the Congres­

sional "power of the purse" can be used to influence U.S.

foreign policy in his blunt concluding comments to Secretary Acheson:

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Let me say to you, Mr. Secretary, that so far as I am personally concerned as Chairman of this subcommittee, I am not in favor of your policy with reference to Spain and until that policy is changed I am going to examine your appropriations with a fine tooth comb.20

The May 1949 hearings of the Senate Foreign Rela­

tions Committee on the North Atlantic Treaty produced a

result less favorable for the cause of the Spanish Lobby.

Both Senator Connally (D-Tex.), Chairman of the Committee

and Senator Vandenberg (R-Mich.), ranking minority member,

"issued public statements to the effect that Spain was not

wanted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and there 21 was no foreseeable possibility of her admission."

The strongest direct Congressional challenge in

1949 to the Truman administration's policy on Spain came during the Senate's consideration of appropriations for the

second year of Marshall Plan Aid. After the U.S. Export-

Import Bank refused loans to Spain in May 1949 by terming

Spain a "bad credit risk," the Spanish Lobby in the Senate

decided to take matters in its own hands. Senator McCarran

succeeded in July 1949 in having the Senate Appropriations

Committee add an amendment to the ERP bill to earmark

directly to Spain $50 million in Export-Import Bank loans.

President Truman and the State Department immediately

attacked the McCarran amendment, repeating the charges that 22 Spain was a bad credit risk. The August debate in the

Senate on the McCarran amendment featured the proponents of

aid to Spain arguing that Spain's strategic significance.

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anti-communism, and potential value to United States trade

made imperative a shift in official policy toward Spain.

Vice President Barkley, however, ruled that the McCarran

Amendment was out of order in that it constituted legisla­

tion in an appropriations bill. After this ruling was

challenged by Senator McCarran, the Senate upheld the

ruling by a 55-36 vote.^^

Despite efforts in both houses of Congress, Spain

would receive no U.S. aid in 1949. But this marked the

"last hurrah" for the defenders of a U.S. policy of ostracism

of Spain. In December 1949, the very influential Senator

Vandenberg (the Republican on whom the Truman administra­ tion depended for "bipartisan" support in foreign policy)

added his voice to those calling for a restoration of full

U.S. diplomatic ties with Spain. Congressional junkets to

Spain in late 1949 were increasingly frequent and resulted 24 in many new converts to the Spanish Lobby.

Finally, the Truman administration relented and, as

we shall see shortly, indicated in January 1950 the desire

to return to normal relations with Spain. But the Congres­

sional Spanish Lobby was already pressing hard for a U.S.

policy toward Spain that went far beyond mere normaliza­

tion.

The Military

The second major actor in the shift of U.S. policy

on Spain was the military. The military influence on U.S.

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policy toward Spain did not make itself fully felt until

after the January 1950 decision to normalize U.S. relations

with Spain. Therefore the military influence on U.S.

policy toward Spain is treated briefly in this section, but

will be discussed more fully in connection with the 1951

decision to establish bases in Spain. The background role

played by the military until 1950 indicates the constraints

of another American constitutional "rule of the game."

Military leaders do not, quite properly, take the lead in

changing U.S. foreign policy; they may, however, discreetly

press for change from within the government and also

express their views when asked to testify before Congress.

The 1947-1950 period saw the establishment of the

first tentative contacts between the U.S. military and

Spain. In January 1949 Major General William H. Tunner,

USAF, the leader of the Berlin airlift, visited Madrid and

invited the Spanish Under Secretary of Aviation to visit 25 him at his headquarters in Wiesbaden. Admiral Richard

Conolly, Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediter­

ranean, had made repeated requests since 1947 for State

Department permission to have his ships visit Spanish

ports. Finally, he was granted this permission, and Ameri­

can warships entered a Spanish port for the first time 2 6 since the Civil War in September 1949. Franco visited

Admiral Conolly while he was in port, but "no specifics 27 were discussed and no commitments were made."

These preliminary military contacts with Spain were

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indicative of the growing interest of the U.S. Navy and

Air Force in a military relationship with Spain. This

interest was, no doubt, increased by the first explosion of

a Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949. But such a mili­

tary relationship had to be proceeded by normalization of

U.S. relations with Spain. Therefore, the detailed analy­

sis of the military interest in Spanish bases will be re­

served for the next section.

The State Department

The third actor in U.S. policy toward Spain was the

State Department. Unlike the two previous actors— the

Spanish Lobby in Congress and the military— the State

Department was officially opposed to closer ties with

Franco Spain until 1950. The State Department stand on

U.S. policy toward Spain will be analyzed in considerable

detail as State was a strong influence on U.S. policy

toward Spain and its policy stands are well documented.

Yet even within the State Department, opposition to

the U.S. policy of ostracism of Spain surfaced as early as

1946. In February of that year, George Kennan, then

Chargé in the U.S. embassy in Moscow, wrote a memo on the

Soviet Union and Spain which foreshadowed the Cold War

policy of containment and future support for a change in

U.S. policy toward Spain. Kennan noted Spain's geographic

importance and the Soviet defeat in Spain's Civil War as

the reasons for the Soviet policy of seeking to isolate

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 28 Franco Spain from the world community. That same month,

W. Walton Butterworth, former Charge in Madrid, warned that

civil conflict in Spain would play into the hands of the

communists. He strongly opposed the impending participa­

tion of the United States in the Tripartite Declaration,

which he correctly predicted would "only bind our hands 29 tomorrow." Kennan suggested in a 1 March 1946 memo that

U.S. policy toward Spain be "directly opposed by definition

to that of the Soviet Union or those put forward by Soviet

pressure groups everywhere beginning with the French

Communists These diplomatic stirrings had no immediate effect

on U.S. policy toward Spain. Yet they provide interesting

evidence of a Cold War mentality in U.S. diplomacy prior

to the Berlin Blockade, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and

indeed even Churchill's "iron curtain" speech. Spain, in

fact, was beginning to be re-evaluated in a Cold War con­

text even before the term "Cold War" was first used!

Despite these early 1946 dissents. State Department

policy in early 1947 had as its goal the withdrawal of

Franco. Then Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated

in an April 1947 message to Madrid that "as long as Franco

remains in power, the Spanish situation is dangerous.

Secretary of State Marshall's attitude in that period was

exemplified by his proposal that President Truman and

British Prime Minister Attlee both write to Franco urging

him to resign. The British, who already were reaching the

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conclusion that the policy of ostracism of Franco was 32 counterproductive, refused Marshall's suggestion.

The Policy Planning Staff of the State Department,

newly established under George Kennan, attempted to offer

a new direction to U.S. policy toward Spain with an 33 October 1947 study. This study pointed out that Franco

had been strengthened by the ostracism and that United

States policy seemed "to operate against the maintenance

of a friendly atmosphere in Spain in the event of inter­

national conflict.Once again, Kennan's sensitivity to Cold War considerations is revealed to be a prime motivat­

ing factor in his policy recommendations. The Kennan

study disagreed with the previous official State Department

policy of continuing to support the United Nations resolu­

tion on diplomatic ostracism of Spain, writing that this

"should not be done." Secretary of State Marshall penciled

in the margin "I agree, GCM."

The shift of U.S. Spanish policy from ostracism to

a more neutral position may be said to have officially

begun with this October 1947 Policy Planning Staff Study.

This policy shift was initiated by those officials in the

State Department whose postwar views on containing commun­

ism had superceded their wartime goal of eradicating

fascism. This October 1947 study, subsequently approved

by the National Security Council and President Truman recommended that the U.S. "work from now on toward a nor­

malization of U.S.-Spanish relations, both political and

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economic." 36 Despite this apparent shift in U.S. policy

toward Spain, little normalization of relations with Spain

was accomplished prior to 1950. As we shall see, this was

probably due to the replacement of Secretary of State

Marshall by Dean Acheson, the hostility of Acheson and

President Truman to the Franco regime, and the overriding

concern of U.S. foreign policy in the 1948 to 1950 period

with forging closer ties with the Western European nations

hostile to Franco. In any case, the only notable result

of the 1947 study was that the United States voted in

November 1947 against the reaffirming of the 1946 U.N.

resolution of condemnation of Spain.

But the 1947 vote in the United Nations did not

repeal the previous ban on sending of ambassadors to

Madrid— it only failed to reaffirm the ban. The United

States refused to support a repeal of the ban on ambas­

sadors. At the close of 1947, then, there was in practice

only a tentative and still minor degree of backing off

from the past U.S. policy of ostracism of Spain. The

bureaucratic infighting between the Policy Planning Staff

and the Bureau of Western European Affairs in the State

Department was vividly illustrated by the "hopelessly

contradictory" instructions at the end of 1947 from the

State Department to the Madrid embassy to "encourage evolu­

tion" of the Franco regime and also try to "bring about 37 normalization" of relations.

The State Department in 1948 strongly resisted the

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increased pressure of the Congressional Spanish Lobby for

closer ties to Spain. At the same time, there were signs that sympathy for normalization of relations with Spain

continued to gain ground within the State Department.

As noted earlier, the State Department and Presi­

dent Truman vigorously protested the March 1948 O'Konski

amendment to the European Recovery Program (ERP) appropria­

tions which would have included Spain in the Marshall

Plan aid program. The views of the State Department and

President Truman prevailed in conference, and the O'Konski

amendment was defeated. Earlier, in January 1948, Secre­

tary of State Marshall had disavowed Secretary of Defense

Forrestal's statement of agreement with a member of the

Spanish Lobby, Senator Wiley (R-Wisc.) that there could be 38 a connection between ERP aid and overseas bases.

Secretary of State Marshall reaffirmed in both

January and March 1948 that Spain would receive no aid

under the ERP due to the decisions of the nations of

Europe. This statement indicates part of the paradox that

State Department policy on Spain faced in 1948. The

dramatic events of that year in Western Europe— the Czecho­

slovak coup and the Berlin blockade— had a dual effect on

U.S. policy toward Spain. In the long run, these events

enhanced Spain's potential value as a military ally in

Western Europe. But the immediate focus of U.S. policy was

the mobilization of anti-communist strength in Europe

through Marshall Plan aid beginning in 1948 and, eventually.

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a full military alliance with the founding of NATO in 1949.

This primary concern of the United States in 1948

with delicate pre-alliance diplomacy served to restrain any

bold U.S. initiative to change the policy of ostracism of

Spain. Britain was convinced of the counterproductive

effect of the ostracism policy, but unwilling under a Labor

government to support a lifting of the U.N. ban on ambassa- 39 dors, while France remained fully opposed to Franco.

Given this attitude of the principal potential partners of

the United States in Western Europe, it is not surprising

that State Department policy in 1948 assigned normaliza­

tion of relations with Spain a lower priority.

But the pressure within the State Department for an

end to the policy of ostracism of Franco combined with the

primary emphasis on alliance diplomacy and, as we shall

see shortly, Truman's hostility to Franco Spain, to yield

a rather schizophrenic State Department policy on Spain in

1948. We have seen how the State Department successfully opposed the efforts of the Congressional Spanish Lobby to

legislate Spain into Marshall Plan aid, as this would have

overruled the procedures whereby Western European nations

were granted the responsibility to determine participation

in the aid program. The State Department was very firm,

and quite correct, in its concern for the potential disrup­

tion of budding relations between the United States and

Western Europe should Spain be unilaterally forced into the

Marshall Plan aid program by the American Congress.

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But on the less extreme policy question of restor­

ing normal relations with Spain, Secretary of State

Marshall had already indicated in his marginal note on the

late 1947 Kennan study that he was skeptical about continu­

ing the policy of ostracism. Marshall denied published

reports that he proposed to Britain and France on 5 October

1948 a lifting of the United Nations ban on ambassadors to

Spain. Official U.S. policy continued to be "guided in its actions by the feeling of the European countries on the

subject.Yet despite this denial of a change in U.S.

policy. Secretary of State Marshall only a few days later

stated in a press conference that the United Nations reso­

lution of 1946 on Spain "had ceased to correspond to the

realities of the new international situation." But he went

on to state that as long as the resolution was in effect

the United States would observe it and make no effort to . ^ 41 change it.

The year 1948 closed, then, with the State Depart­

ment firmly opposed to any legislated changes in U.S.

policy toward Spain, such as inclusion in Marshall Plan

aid, which might trouble the priority relations with the

countries of Western Europe. Yet Secretary of State

Marshall's statements in October 1948 indicate his wavering

support for the policy of ostracism toward Spain. In fact,

these statements and the denied reports of U.S. approaches to Britain and France to end the ostracism of Franco Spain

may have been a trial balloon for a shift in U.S. policy.

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In any case, the end of 1948 saw the State Department and

President Truman still defending the official policy of

ostracism of Spain against increasing Congressional and

incipient Defense Department pressure for change.

The gradual State Department abandonment of the

policy of ostracism of Franco Spain received a temporary

setback with the replacement of Secretary of State Marshall

by Dean Acheson in January 1949. Acheson insisted in

March 1949 upon Spanish exclusion from NATO, as the nature

of the Franco regime was considered incompatible with the

NATO preamble dedication to the defense of "the freedom,

common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded

on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and 42 the rule of law." The real reason for Acheson's insist­

ence on the exclusion of Spain from NATO seems to have been

the opposition of most nations in Europe to Franco Spain.

It is doubtful whether the United States could have

influenced its European allies to include Spain in NATO

on the grounds of strategic necessity, as it did in the case of Portugal. There were three crucial differences

between the Portuguese and Spanish situation with respect

to NATO. First, Congressional and military influences on

behalf of Spain in Washington in early 1949 were yet to

exert sufficient strength to make their views of Spanish

strategic importance official policy. Second, Spain had no advocate among the nations of Western Europe to join the

United States in arguing for its inclusion in NATO, whereas

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Britain served this function for its traditional ally

Portugal. Finally, although Spain and Portugal had equally

dictatorial governments, the intensity of Western European

opposition to Franco's regime was much greater due to

Franco's defeat of socialist forces in the Civil War and

his early association with the Axis powers. In any case,

Spain again fell victim to the priority U.S. policy of

alliance building and cohesion and, with the State Depart­

ment taking the lead, was excluded from NATO.

The words and actions of Secretary of State Acheson

in May 1949 regarding Spain indicate both the impulse to

continue the ostracism policy of the past and the begin­

nings of conversion to a policy of more realistic accept­

ance of Franco Spain. At a press conference on 22 May,

Acheson dealt at length with U.S. policy toward Spain.

By way of clinging to the old policy, he mentioned the lack

of fundamental freedoms in Spain and stated that an ambas­

sador in Spain could not function under such conditions,

which were not conducive to a good working relationship.

Acheson announced that the United States would abstain on

the vote in the United Nations in late May 1949 on a reso­

lution proposing the lifting of the ban on ambassadors to

Madrid. But, revealing the pressure of the Spanish Lobby

in Congress and the beginnings of a conversion in his

personal beliefs, Acheson admitted that the Spanish Repub­

lic had, like Franco, received foreign support during

Spain's Civil War. Acheson noted that the word "fascist,"

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so often applied to Franco Spain, should be used with

caution at a time when the communists were terming the

United States "fascist." Acheson concluded his musings

with the observation that if ambassadors are "symbols of

freedom" it matters whether they are exchanged; but if they

were not symbols, "it doesn't matter if you have one or not."44

The beliefs of Secretary of State Acheson regarding Spain are significant, for along with President Truman he

was instrumental in delaying closer U.S. ties to Spain

prior to 1950. Acheson's idealistic distaste of the Franco

regime is historically interesting, as it tends to belie

some of the more recent revisionist treatments of him as

the archetypal cold warrior. Looking back critically on

his earlier idealism, Acheson wrote in his memoirs (in

respect to Peron in 1946) that at that time he

. . . still had to learn. . . that dictators, in Latin America or elsewhere, are not overthrown by withholding recognition and dollars or even by harsh verbal disapproval. In fact, such treatment may well make them national heroes.45

Acheson's somewhat confused comments on policy toward Spain

in May 1949 indicate that he was probably still midway in

the state of transition to his subsequent realist "enlight­ enment . "

The official State Department policy in 1949 may be

summarized as "maybe ostracism of Franco hasn't worked, but

the United States will do nothing to change this policy."

This policy stance infuriated the Spanish Lobby in Congress.

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As promised in Acheson's May 1949 press conference, the

United States abstained on the United Nations vote to

repeal the ban on ambassadors to Madrid, thereby insuring

that the ban remained in effect. This outraged the Spanish

Lobby leader. Senator McCarran, and precipitated his previ­

ously noted grilling of Secretary Acheson at the State

Department appropriations hearings. The May 1949 denial of

Export-Import Bank loans to Spain then triggered the McCar­

ran Amendment to provide $50 million to Spain. It will be

recalled that Acheson took the lead in his 13 July 1949

press conference in opposing the McCarran Amendment and 46 citing Spain as a "bad credit risk." Although the

McCarran Amendment was narrowly deleted from the ERP appro­

priations bill in August 1949 on the technicality that it

constituted legislation in an appropriations bill, the

fight for closer U.S. relations with Spain, involving aid

and military bases, had just begun in earnest. But the

State Department was already on the verge of endorsing the

first shift in U.S. policy toward Spain, the normalization

of diplomatic relations with the Franco regime.

One of the key aspects of the bureaucratic politics

paradigm is the analysis of a policy actor's influence on

the resulting policy as a function of his bargaining will

and skill. Although the skill of Secretary of State

Acheson and the State Department is not in question, the somewhat contradictory State Department policy stance on

Spain was reflected in the weakening by late 1949 of the

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personal convictions of Acheson and the opposition of

Kennan's Policy Planning Staff to the policy of ostracism

of Spain. This placed the State Department, with its

self-doubts and weakening will regarding the policy of

ostracism of Spain, at a severe disadvantage in the bureau­

cratic politics struggle against the confident and relent­

less attacks of the Congressional Spanish Lobby, aided by

Franco's paid Washington lobbyists and increasing Pentagon

military interest in Spain.

Soon after Congress convened in January 1950,

Senator Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, asked Secretary of State Acheson for a statement

of U.S. policy toward Spain. Acheson's lengthy reply had

the backing of President Truman and indicated the conclu­

sive reversal of U.S. policy toward Franco Spain from

ostracism to acquiescence. The administration cloaked its

policy retreat by saying that "these conclusions by the

United States Government do not imply any change in the

basic attitude of this Government toward Spain.None­

theless, this letter marked the end of the first phase of

the 1947-1953 shift in U.S. policy toward Spain, as it pub­

licly signaled the end of the policy of ostracism.

The Acheson letter indicated that the United

States desired a return to normal diplomatic relations with

Spain and would support a move to repeal the 1946 United

Nations resolution calling for withdrawal of ambassadors

from Madrid. Acheson said that the withdrawal of

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ambassadors was "a mistaken departure from established

principle" that diplomatic relations and moral approval

were not synonymous. In the key policy reversal, Acheson

announced that the United States would "vote for a resolu­

tion in the General Assembly which will leave members free

to send an Ambassador or Minister to Spain if they choose."

The January 1950 shift in United States policy

toward Spain gave the Congressional Spanish Lobby and other

advocates of close ties with Spain only half the policy

loaf that they desired. Acheson's letter contained the

ingenuous promise of Export-Import Bank credits to Spain

"on the same basis as any other country." In fact, this

was no change in U.S. policy at all, and— given Spain's

economic weakness and bad credit rating— was equivalent to

a policy of no aid to Spain. We shall see in the following

section how the Congressional Spanish Lobby finally suc­

ceeded in legislating aid to Spain later in 1950. Another

drawback of the policy shift as announced by Acheson in

January 1950 was that the United States would not send an

ambassador to Spain until the United Nations rescinded its

ban on ambassadors. This did not occur until almost the

end of 1950.

One of the more important elements of bureaucratic

politics analysis involves the indication of what deter­

mined the policy actor's stand on an issue. The systemic factor of State Department deference to Western Eruopean

postwar antipathy to Franco (in order to advance the

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highest priority U.S. policy goal of European recovery and

alliance with the United States in NATO) strongly influ­

enced the maintenance of the postwar policy of ostracism.

But President Truman's strong personal distaste for Franco

Spain was perhaps the key element in stiffening State De­

partment resistance to pressures for closer ties to Spain.

It is in conjunction, then, with the discussion of Truman's

own feelings regarding policy toward Spain that we will also account for the January 1950 State Department Policy

stand abandoning the previous ostracism of Spain.

President Truman A recent criticism of the bureaucratic politics

analytical approach takes it to task for "obscuring the 4 8 power of the President." This suggests that policy

analysis will be improved if the bureaucratic politics

approach is supplemented by a focus on the personalities

and beliefs of key decision makers. Therefore, the impor­

tance of President Truman as the ultimate arbiter of policy

toward Spain will not be denied. However, Truman's indi­

vidual preferences regarding Spain were gradually super-

ceded in importance as determining factors of policy toward

Spain by bureaucratic pressures and changes in the inter­

national political environment.

Truman's personal bias against Franco and his

Catholic regime led to his prolonged resistance to closer

ties to Spain. In a December 1950 private conversation.

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Truman indicated an underlying religious reason for his

personal dislike of Franco Spain, when he observed "I am a

Baptist and I believe that in any country a man should be

permitted to worship his God in his own way. The situation 49 in Spain is intolerable." Dean Acheson, in his memoirs, further supported this analysis of Truman's bias when he

noted, "Mr. Truman held deep-seated convictions on many

subjects, among them, for instance, a dislike of Franco and

Catholic obscurantism in Spain.

These "deep-seated convictions" of President Truman

were a strong barrier to the forces of Franco's Washington

lobbyists, the Congressional Spanish Lobby, the military,

and eventually the State Department as they pushed for

closer ties with Spain. Although in the end bureaucratic

politics prevailed over individual convictions, the long

delaying action fought by Truman seems to give emphasis to

Krasner's critique that bureaucratic politics analysis

must not obscure the great influence of the President.

From 1945 to 1950, Truman consistently indicated

his resistance to closer ties with the Franco regime. As

early as August 1945 Truman set the tone for his adminis­ tration with the public observation (cited in the previous

chapter) that "none of us like Franco or his government."

When the O'Konski amendment in March 1948 proposed the

inclusion of Spain in the Marshall Plan aid program, Truman

stated that he was "utterly opposed" to the amendment.

Even without his personal bias against Spain, Truman could

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hardly have been expected to acquiesce in a policy shift dictated by Republicans such as O'Konski in the "do-

nothing 80th Congress," who referred to Truman's "pinko

State Department."

The Spanish government— like most other observers in early 1948— assumed Truman would not be re-elected and

expressed their view of the President with a newspaper

article that triggered an official U.S. protest. This

article reportedly stated:

It is clear and obvious that Mr. Truman does not enjoy much popularity among his compatriots. What is true is that a President of a republic can die any day and then these things happen which con­ vert a failure as a shirt salesman into a sort of marvel of the world.52

To say the least, such insults in the Spanish press did not

help the Spanish cause with the proud and feisty Mr. Truman.

Truman's re-election in 1948 was a setback for the

cause of closer U.S. ties to Spain. It was immediately

after Truman's re-election that Franco hired Truman's

former Senate Assistant Charles Patrick Clark as Spain's

lobbyist in Washington. When the McCarran amendment to

provide $50 million in aid to Spain was introduced in 1949,

Truman indicated his opposition and made the undiplomatic

statement at a press conference that the United States did 53 "not have friendly relations with Spain." As the trail

of Congressional junketeers to Madrid became crowded in

late 1949, Truman vented his anger at the pressure of the

Spanish Lobby for a change in policy toward Spain by

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lashing out at Senator McCarran's comments following a meeting with Franco. As one account of this Truman press

conference reported;

. . . with increased asperity, the President added that Senator McCarran may talk to Franco or anybody else but he could make no commitments for the United States Government.

Several factors account for the policy shift of

President Truman and his State Department in the January

1950 letter to Senator Connally indicating the desire for

normalization of relations with Spain. On the individual

level of analysis, there had been no change at all in

Truman's dislike of Franco and his regime. Acheson's

memoirs seem to indicate, however, that the Secretary of

State had "learned" by early 1950 that the policy of

ostracism was counterproductive.

Influences on the level of the international system

were also important factors behind the 1950 policy shift.

The United States policy of ostracism toward Spain had been

partially a response to the desires of the principal United

States allies in Europe, Britain and France. By late 1949,

European economic recovery and military alliance with the

United States in NATO lessened U.S. sensitivity to the

wishes of its European allies regarding Spain. The obvious

failure by 1950 of the ostracism of Franco in altering the

Spanish regime seemed to indicate that this ostracism was

an issue which would not cause any great rifts in allied

unity should the United States establish a policy separate

from that in Western Europe. But the most important

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systemic factor influencing the Truman administration pol­

icy shift may have been the communist conquest of China in

late 1949. This event had important consequences for the

bureaucratic struggle over policy toward Spain. The major credit for the January 1950 shift in

policy must go to the Congressional Spanish Lobby (and its

able unofficial assistants, Franco's paid Washington

lobbyists.) Continuing Congressional pressure, from a

Congress that since January 1949 had been controlled by

Truman's own Democratic party, and the December 1949 con­

version of influential Republican Senator Vandenberg to

the Spanish cause, were probably the most important immedi­

ate factors accounting for the change in policy. The

unrelenting pressure of the Spanish Lobby in Congress for

a policy change on Spain combined with the fury of Repub­

lican attacks on the Truman Administration for "losing"

China in the fall of 1949 to produce the reluctant acquies­

cence of Truman and Acheson to a normalization of relations

with Spain. A more general reason that Truman was willing to

retreat on the issue of Spanish policy may be the rela­

tively secondary priority of Spain in U.S. foreign policy,

suggested by the quotation at the beginning of the previous

chapter. In support of this point, Acheson's January 1950

letter to Senator Connally began with the complaint: "The

Spanish question has been magnified by controversy among

our present day foreign policy problems which is

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likely that the secondary priority of Spain in U.S. foreign

policy facilitated the retreat of the normally stubborn

Truman and Acheson from the policy of ostracism. Their

bowing to intense Congressional pressures for a change in

policy toward Spain was a prudent political move to avoid

further erosion of foreign policy support in Congress on

other more critical issues in 1950.

Bases in Spain, 1950-1951

If President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson

believed that their reluctant January 1950 acquiescence to

normal relations with Spain would satisfy the bureaucratic

pressures for closer ties to Spain, they were soon dis­

abused of that notion. Leaving aside Franco's paid

Washington lobbyists, who had made their prime contribu­

tion to closer U.S. ties to Spain by early 1950 through the

mobilization of the Congressional Spanish Lobby, this

section will focus on the role of Congress and especially

the military as policy actors who prevailed on first the

State Department and finally President Truman to establish

a "quasi-alliance" with Franco Spain. The critical influ­

ence of the international political atmosphere as an input

to U.S. foreign policy regarding Spain, and the influence

of President Truman in delaying this policy change, will

also be considered.

The impact of the outbreak of the Korean War in

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June 1950 had a decisive effect on U.S. policy toward

Spain. This vividly illustrates why in foreign policy

analysis the narrower focus of bureaucratic politics must

be supplemented by consideration of systemic level elements

(such as the level of international political tension), as

important inputs to U.S. foreign policy.

The Korean War gave a strong impulse to the rapid

transition of U.S. policy toward Spain from a lukewarm

normalization of diplomatic relations to active pursuit of

military bases in Spain. The Spanish historian Salvador

de Madariaga aptly described the impact of the Korean War

on the American people in this manner;

This was one of Stalin's worst blunders. The citizens of the United States had kept smiling till then, putting all their money into cars and refrig­ erators, and all their confidence in the peace- loving intentions of the Soviet Union. Rudely shaken by the North Korean aggression, they took matters in hand with a determination and a sense of responsibility. . .

The Korean War provided an obvious boost for the

Congressional Spanish Lobby in their efforts to provide aid

and establish a military relationship with Spain. Early in

1950, prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, Senator

McCarran and the Spanish Lobby tried to attach an amendment

to the Economic Cooperation Act to provide $100 million in

Export-Import Bank credits to Spain. The Spanish Lobby in

the Senate was able to muster only 35 votes for this amend- 57 ment, and it was therefore defeated.

One of McCarran's strongest points of emphasis

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during the debate on this amendment was the strategic value

of Spain. McCarran spoke of the "strong military line

formed by the natural barrier of the Pyrenees that, in

spite of its powerful defensive characteristics, permits, 58 at the same time, offensive actions." Senator McCarran

did not enlighten military strategists with this unusual

contention that an army could more readily "attack north 59 through the Pyrenees rather than south through them."

But he did indicate, even before the Korean War, that mili­

tary considerations would be the cutting edge of future

Spanish Lobby attempts to forge closer U.S. ties with

Spain. It was widely feared in Washington at the time of

the outbreak of the Korean War that this was merely a pre­

liminary to a Soviet invasion of Europe. Although this may

seem unlikely in historical retrospect, the immediate

effect of the Korean War on the debate over U.S. policy

toward Spain was to enhance the Spanish Lobby view of Spain

as a potential ally of the United States and a secure

redoubt behind the Pyrenees. As usually happens in time of

war, military considerations suddenly superceded political

considerations.

The effect of this atmosphere of international

tension— coinciding with the initiation of the virulent

domestic anti-communist campaign of Senator McCarthy— was

almost immediately felt in Congressional action regarding

Spain. In July 1950 Senator McCarran attached another

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amendment authorizing $100 million in Export-Import Bank

loans to the 1951 General (Omnibus) Appropriations Bill.

One of the more important aspects for consideration in a

bureaucratic politics analysis is the bargaining skill of

the policy actors. Senator McCarran demonstrated great

bargaining skill in his proposal of this amendment. By

attaching the amendment to the appropriations bill for the

entire government, he effectively insulated it from Presi­

dential veto. By complicated provisions which provided

credits directly from the Export-Import Bank to be adminis­

tered by the Economic Cooperation Administration, the past

argument of Western European Marshall Aid recipients that

aid to Spain would be at their expense was neutralized.^®

The effect of the Korean War atmosphere and the bargaining

skills of the Spanish Lobby were obvious as the July

McCarran amendment was overwhelmingly adopted 65-15, where­

as the similar amendment early in 1950 had garnered only

35 votes.

The debate in Congress over the McCarran amendment

merits review in some detail as it is representative of the

different views within Congress and the country over the

issue of closer relations with Franco Spain. Senator

McCarran expressed the view of the Spanish Lobby when he

said that

. . . we must accept the Franco regime as an existing fact and cooperate to the fullest with it. Our position as leader of the free nations does not establish us as the Conscience of the World, nor as judge and jury of what is best for another.

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Opponents of a closer relationship with Spain, realizing

that this relatively small amount of economic aid was

probably only the foot in the door to a much closer and more costly relationship with Spain, advanced several argu­

ments. Congressman Emmanuel Celler (D-N.Y.), said that

"We cannot subscribe to the non-sequitur that an enemy of

an enemy is a friend.He also saw "very little point in

wooing a bride that is already won. By that I mean that by

no stretch of the imagination would Franco Spain throw its

lot in with the Russian cause.Senator Herbert H.

Lehman (D-N.Y.) contended that "we are saying to the world

that we are willing to support Fascist nations. . . we

are playing into the hands of Russia and the satellite

states, giving them propaganda. . . . Representative

Chet Holifield (D-Calif.) bluntly stated that "Democracy is

not made stronger by seeking allies among those who hate

it" and added that in a strategic sense "nothing would be plainer evidence that we considered western Europe expend­

able than a retreat behind Spanish mountains."^®

Here, plainly stated in Congressional debate, is

the classic clash in American foreign policy between

realism and idealism. But in the superheated atmosphere of

the Korean War, the Spanish Lobby advocates of closer ties

to Franco Spain emerged victorious. The House-Senate

Conference Committee reduced the grant to Spain from $100

million to $62.5 million and the amended bill then passed

both houses. As the skillful policy bargainers in the

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Spanish Lobby had foreseen, President Truman signed the

bill on 6 September 1^50. But, as we shall see shortly.

President Truman also had some bargaining skill and intrin­

sic powers which enabled him to delay granting the loan to

Spain.

Perhaps the most important act of the Congressional

Spanish Lobby in 1950 was not its legislation of aid to

Spain but rather its mobilization of the civilian and mili­

tary leaders in the Pentagon. One of the bureaucratic

"rules of the game" under the U.S. Constitutional system is

that military leaders do not publicly disagree with

policy decisions of the President, as General Singlaub

recently learned. Thus, despite the tentative military

contacts with Spain which were noted earlier, military leaders had been very cautious in their testimony before

Congress regarding Spain. They were obviously eager to

avoid any commitment on closer ties to Spain which their

Commander-in-Chief so strongly opposed. In a remarkable

magazine article in 1951, Senator McCarran told of how he

brought together in his office in July 1950 an undisclosed

group of "lower echelon" military officers and a group of

senators.After announcing his plans to introduce the

$100 million loan, McCarran let the military "make known

its views" to persuade the senators of the military value

of Spain. The most important effect of this meeting, however, may have been in influencing the military to press

harder within the Truman administration for a U.S. military

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relationship with Spain.

As the resistance of Secretary of State Acheson and even President Truman to close military ties with Franco

Spain weakened in early 1951, the Congressional Spanish

Lobby kept up its pressure for a policy change. One vehi­

cle for this pressure was Senate Concurrent Resolution 8 in

early 1951, a resolution to support NATO by stationing U.S.

troops in Europe. The Spanish Lobby succeeded in attaching

a non-binding "sense of the Senate" amendment to this reso­

lution which advocated giving consideration to;

. . . The revision of plans for the defense of Europe as soon as possible so as to provide for the utilization on a voluntary basis of the military and other resources of Western Germany and Spain. . . .68

Even after Truman had reversed his policy toward

Spain in July 1951 and begun negotiations for U.S. military

bases in Spain, the Congressional Spanish Lobby continued

to keep the President's reluctant feet to the fire. An

amendment to the Mutual Security Act appropriations bill

was approved in late 1951 which would provide Spain $100 69 million in military grants and technical assistance. In

1952, this still unused grant was extended for another year

and an additional $25 million grant to Spain was _ 70 approved.

The Congressional Spanish Lobby in the 1950-1952

period certainly had a continuing influence on U.S. policy

toward Spain, but it was hardly the most influential policy

actor that it had been in the phase of normalization of U.S. relations with Spain. Rather, the influence of

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Congress was primarily in the maintenance of a constant

pressure on the Truman administration through its appropri­

ation of funds for Spain— funds that were appropriately 71 termed by one observer "money in search of policy." The

key catalyst for the new policy of bases in Spain, to

which our focus must now be directed, was the military.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force each had different

degrees of interest in Spanish bases and different military

objectives. But a common factor behind their strategic

rationales for Spanish bases (then and today) was Spain's

geopolitical value. Spain's distance from the Warsaw Pact

countries is greater than that of any other European coun­

try except Portugal, and this consideration of defensive

depth seemed particularly important in 1950. The U.S.

military still thought in terms of the recent large-scale

land warfare and strategic bombing of World War II. In

1950, the common fear was that Western Europe might be

overrun by Soviet forces, as West Germany was still dis­

armed and the United States and its NATO allies had yet to

build up their ground forces in Central Europe. For the

U.S. Army, then, Spain seemed to provide a last-ditch bas­

tion across the Pyrenees. But an even more important, and

certainly more lasting, consideration was Spain's position

astride the shipping lanes of the Western Mediterranean and

the Eastern Atlantic. This location had a strong appeal to

the U.S. Navy. Spain's position along the major air routes

between the United States and the southern flank of NATO

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and the Middle East appealed to the Air Force. In broad

geopolitical terms, Spain had something to offer all the

services.

Analysis of the more specific interests of the

three military services regarding Spanish bases illustrates

the truth of the bureaucratic politics adage "where you

stand depends on where you sit." The Army was preoccupied

by late 1950 with fighting the Korean War and trying to

build up the NATO conventional ground defense of Europe.

Although the Army Chief of Staff testified before Congress

in 1951 that Spain could "materially aid" the defense of

Western Europe, he went on to add that an adequate defense

could be built without Spain if Spain's neutrality was 72 assured. The Army therefore had little interest in bases

in Spain but simply gave routine support to the Air Force

and Navy and tried to avoid the controversy over Spanish

Bases. The Air Force and Navy, however, had more compel­

ling interests.

The desire of the Air Force for Spanish bases was

related to the overall U.S. strategic posture, which in

the early 1950's relied solely on Strategic Air Command

bombers to deliver nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union.

The B-47 bombers that were the backbone of this SAC strike

force required permanent basing overseas due to their

limited intermediate range. A wide variety of base loca­ tions was desirable to provide different entrance corridors

to Soviet targets and complicate Soviet defensive planning.

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The United States made a secret agreement with the French

in December 1950 to establish SAC bomber bases in Morocco, 73 still a French protectorate. But uncertainty over the

political future of Morocco impelled the Air Force to seek

similar bases in Spain. Spanish bases were close enough

to the Soviet Union to bring targets within range, but far

enough away that warning time of a Soviet attack (in uhe

pre-missile era of the early 1950*s) would be available.

But the very fact that the Air Force was already embarked

upon the construction of Moroccan bases by early 1951 some­

what lessened the immediate urgency of their desire for Spanish bases.

The Navy was the most eager and determined of the

services wanting bases in Spain. We have already noted

how Navy Admirals made several of the early contacts with

Spanish officials. There was a real desire by the Navy fcr

Spanish bases as a useful logistic base for the Sixth Fleet

in the Mediterranean. Yet the Sixth Fleet had operated for

several years without such bases, so they were not in a

strict sense essential to the Navy's mission. Why, then,

the keen interest of the Navy in Spanish bases? Part of

the answer seems to have been the strategic position of

Spain astride the Eastern Atlantic-Western Mediterranean

sea lanes noted earlier. Another reason, never publicly

stated but suggested in one analysis, is that this reflected a continuation of U.S. Navy rivalry with the

British Navy and the desire of the U.S. Navy to have an

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independent counterpart to British bases at Gibraltar

and Malta.

The real reason for the Navy's forcefulness in

advocating bases in Spain may have been the influence of one man. Admiral Forrest Sherman. This again illustrates

the theoretical point that bureaucratic politics analysis

of policy should be supplemented by detailed attention to

key individuals in the policy process. Admiral Sherman's

son-in-law. Lieutenant Commander John Fitzpatrick, was by

chance appointed Assistant Naval Attaché in Madrid in 75 1947. Admiral Sherman's wife made several visits to her

son-in-law in Madrid, during which she was impressed by

the kindness shown by the Spanish government. She undoubt­

edly conveyed these impressions to her husband. Admiral

Sherman became further convinced of the value of strength­

ening U.S. military ties with Spain as a result of his tour

of duty in 1948 as Commander of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In late 1949, Admiral Sherman returned to

Washington to assume the Navy's top position as Chief of

Naval Operations. From this position, he urged President 7 6 Truman to seek an agreement for bases in Spain.

The role of the Secretary of Defense and the

civilian service secretaries regarding bases in Spain

illustrates a micro-view of bureaucratic politics within

the Pentagon. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson was a

strong advocate of Spanish bases, but his personal rela­

tions with Secretary of State Acheson were extremely bad.

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Although Johnson began the planning for Spanish bases, his

bad relations with Acheson reduced his ability to bring

about a change in State Department opposition to military

ties with Spain. But when Acheson's old friend and former

boss George Marshall became Secretary of Defense in late

1950, policy differences between the State and Defense

Departments over Spain began to be narrowed almost at 77 once. We have already noted how Marshall, as Secretary

of State, had indicated his sympathy for closer ties with

Spain. As Secretary of Defense, Marshall's advocacy of a

United States military relationship with Spain undoubtedly

carried great weight due to his personal prestige and close

friendship with Secretary of State Acheson. One final

example of the internal workings of bureaucratic politics in the Pentagon indicates how bargaining skill of policy

actors can influence a policy outcome. All of the civilian

service secretaries except Secretary of the Air Force

Thomas Finletter were strong advocates of Spanish bases.

Finletter was bitterly opposed to Spanish bases, as he

doubted that the United States would be able to use the 78 bases without restrictions. But Air Force Chief of Staff

Vandenberg bypassed Finletter and continued to push for

Spanish bases directly with the more sympathetic Secretary 79 of Defense.

The military influence on the eventual 1951 policy decision to seek United States military bases in Spain was

clearly predominant. As one popular magazine later ?

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observed, "The most powerful lobby there is in the United

States— the Joint Chiefs of Staff— [was] now pushing for a 8 0 new approach to Spain." Both Secretary of State Acheson

and President Truman, as we shall shortly see, insisted in

their announcement of the policy change that the decision

was in response to military factors. Yet it was the

heightened atmosphere of international tension, which

resulted from the Korean War, which was the key systemic

input to the foreign policy decision on Spanish bases,

magnifying military concerns at the expense of past politi­

cal reservations regarding close ties with Franco Spain.

The State Department and President Truman gradually and reluctantly yielded in 1950 and 1951 to Pentagon and

Congressional pressures for military ties with Spain. But,

the State Department was certainly a more early and enthus­

iastic convert to the Spanish cause than was President

Truman.

William Dunham of the Spanish Desk in the State

Department and James Wilson of the Pentagon's Office of

International Security Affairs began the State-Defense

policy coordination with a May 1950 Spanish policy paper.

This paper concluded that:

In light of the intensification of the "cold war," the potential military importance of Spain . . . [has] increased in importance to such a de­ gree that the security interests of the U.S. and the NAT [North Atlantic Treaty] nations now require that a program. . . should be put into effect, des­ pite political objections, in order to provide at least for indirect Spanish cooperation within the Western European strategic pattern.81

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As we shall soon see, the outbreak of the Korean

War in June 1950 decisively influenced Secretary of State

Acheson to place "security interests" above past "politi­

cal objections" to a U.S. policy of close military ties

with the Franco regime.

While these plans for future close ties with Franco

Spain were being worked out, the policy decision of January 1950 to normalize diplomatic relations with Spain was

finally being implemented. The United States, as pledged,

voted in the United Nations General Assembly on 4 November

1950 to repeal the 1946 resolution banning ambassadors from 82 Madrid, and the ban was lifted.

President Truman throughout 1950 continued to indi­

cate his reluctance for closer ties with Spain and his dis­

like even for normalization of relations. Truman spoke out

in August 1950 against the McCarran amendment to provide 83 aid to Spain. When the McCarran amendment nevertheless

was approved. President Truman had been outmaneuvered by

the inclusion of the amendment in the practically unveto-

able General Appropriations Bill for the government. But

when Truman signed the bill on 6 September 1950, he spe­

cifically noted that he considered the $62.5 million loan

to Spain an "authorization" rather than a "directive," and

stated that he would not loan the money to Spain until

"such loans will serve the interests of the United States 84 in the conduct of foreign relations." At the time of the

lifting of the United Nations ban on ambassadors to Spain,

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Truman stated at a press conference that it would be "a

long, long time" before the United States would send an 85 ambassador to Spain. But the pace of the change in U.S.

policy toward Spain became quite rapid at the end of 1950,

and Truman would soon be eating these words.

It was in December 1950 that Secretary of State

Acheson was finally won over to the cause of close military

ties with Franco Spain. We are left to speculate as to why

Acheson abandoned his opposition to closer ties with Spain,

for he makes no mention of this decision in his memoirs.

Perhaps the major influences on Acheson's policy shift were

the military desire for Spanish bases advocated by Ache­

son's respected friend Secretary of Defense Marshall and

the increasingly hard anti-communist line of the State

Department in the atmosphere of the Korean War and

McCarthyism. December 1950 was something of a watershed

for this hard line, as the Chinese Communists had just

entered the Korean War and the Truman administration de­

cided to aid another "enemy of our enemy," Tito of Yugo­

slavia. In any case, with Acheson's approval, the joint

State-Defense Department policy paper on Spain was for­

warded to the National Security Council. There the final

policy paper was prepared by senior NSC staffers Frank

Nash and Paul Nitze.

Meanwhile, President Truman was in the uncomfort­

able public position of delaying restoration of ambassa­

dorial relations with Spain at a time when the entire

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bureaucratie weight of Congress, the Defense Department,

and the State Department had reached a consensus on closer

ties to Spain. Thus, only seven weeks after saying it

would be "a long, long time" until he named an ambassador

to Spain, Truman announced on 27 December 1950 the appoint­

ment of Stanton Griffis as the first United States ambassa­ dor to Spain since 1945. Even earlier, in mid-November,

Truman allowed the Economic Cooperation Administration to

begin to provide to Spain the $62.5 million aid approved

by the McCarran Amendment.But Truman cloaked these

retreats on policy toward Spain by terming the loan to

Spain only an economic arrangement and stating that the

appointment of an ambassador did not signify a change of 87 policy toward Spain. And Truman still resisted the final

step of approving a military relationship with Spain. When

the Spanish policy paper was presented at a January 1951

NSC meeting, Truman "left the meeting still in substantial

disagreement with the recommendations. ..." 88 The signals of a major policy shift toward close

ties with Spain were in the air by early 1951. Secretary

of State Acheson testified before the Senate Foreign Rela­

tions Committee in February 1951 that

The importance of the association of Spain in the defense of Western Europe I think is clear. I think it is also clear that the relations of this country, and I hope of the other countries, with Spain, are now entering a new phase. . . .°^

Shortly after these hearings, the "sense of the Senate"

amendment advocating the association of Spain with the

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defense of Western Europe was passed. More important, the State Department began to approach our NATO allies, es­

pecially Britian and France, to reassure them that a U.S.

desire for Spanish bases did not mean that the Pyrenees

would become a new line of defense in Western Europe. Our

NATO allies were understandably nervous about this point,

for "they preferred to be defended at the Rhine rather than on liberated from Spain."

After holding out during the first half of 1951

against virtually his entire administration and Congress

advocating U.S. military ties with Spain, Truman finally

relented. On 28 June 1951 he approved the NSC statement on

U.S. policy toward Spain. Under the new policy, the United

States would seek from the Spanish government base facili­ ties for bombers and fighters, and naval facilities. A

United States survey of military requirements and capa­

bilities of Spain would be followed by cooperation in

training and advising the Spanish military.

As the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Sherman,

prepared to leave Washington on 16 July 1951 for a visit to

Europe, President Truman held a meeting with the Admiral.

Truman told Sherman "I don't like Franco and I never will,

but I won't let my personal feelings override the convic- 91 tions of you military men." Admiral Sherman was author­

ized to meet with Franco in Madrid and begin preparatory talks on the implementation of the new U.S. policy of

developing close military ties with Spain.

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It remains only to indicate how the new Spanish

policy was publicly announced. After Admiral Sherman's

visit with Franco, Secretary Acheson issued a press

statement on 18 July 1951. This statement is quoted in

full as it indicates the chief concerns of U.S. foreign

policy regarding Spain:

Admiral Sherman's interview with General Franco on Monday has caused widespread speculation in the press both here and abroad. The facts are as follows : Military authorities are in general agreement that Spain is of strategic importance to the general defense of Western Europe. As a natural corollary to this generally accepted conclusion, tentative and exploratory conversations have been undertaken with the Spanish Government with the sole purpose of as­ certaining what Spain might be willing and able to do which would contribute to the strengthening of the common defense against possible aggression. We have been talking with the British and French Governments for many months about the possible role of Spain in relation to the general defense of West­ ern Europe. We have not been able to find a common position on this subject with these Governments for reasons of which we are aware and understand. How­ ever, for the strategic reasons outlined above, the United States has initiated these exploratory con­ versations. Any understanding which may ultimately be reached will supplement our basic policy of building the defensive strength of the West. It has been and is our firm intention to see to it that if Western Europe is attacked it will be defended— and not liberated. The presence of American armed forces in Western Europe bears witness to this intent as does the appointment, at the request of our NATO allies, of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. We are sending vast amounts of military and other aid to these allies for whom a clear priority has been established. There will be no change in this proce­ dure. In other words, the North Atlantic Treaty is fundamental to our policy in Europe and the closest possible cooperation with our NATO allies will remain the keystone of this policy.^2

The Acheson statement clearly admits the

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predominance of strategic military considerations over

political considerations in the U.S. decision to seek bases

in Spain, although it understates the extent of the planned

U.S. military ties with Spain. One of the most important

of these political considerations was the potential adverse

effect of a U.S. agreement with Spain on relations with

our NATO allies, and much of the Acheson statement is

devoted to reassuring these allies. Acheson disavows any

intention of the United States to forfeit Western Europe

to a Soviet attack and retreat behind the Pyrenees. As

noted earlier, this was a very real concern on the part of

the European NATO allies who were very sensitive to the

U.S. commitment to their defense. Acheson proclaimed aid

to the NATO allies as still the first priority of United

States policy, in order to assure the allies that aid to

Spain would not be at their expense. Overall, Acheson's

statement was clearly sensitive to the danger that if

Spanish military assets "were gained at the expense of a

serious undermining of NATO or the will of its members to

resist Soviet aggression, it would be a costly strategic 93 bargain for the United States." President Truman ate his Spanish policy crow the

day after Acheson's statement. He told a press conference

in his typically blunt manner that U.S. policy toward Spain

had indeed changed, and said that the policy shift "had 94 been the result of advice by the Department of Defense."

The U.S. decision to establish military bases in Spain— a

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decision with strong political implications— thus was made,

and explicitly rationalized at the time, with military con­

siderations as the overriding factor. The bureaucratic politics hypothesis that policy

emerges as a political resultant of the bargaining among

governmental actors certainly seems to be confirmed in the case of the emergence of U.S. policy for bases in Spain.

Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, the influence in the

policy process of a key actor such as President Truman is

still very great and merits individual analysis. In the

case of policy toward Spain, President Truman's personal

bias against Franco largely accounts for years of delay in

establishing a closer U.S. relationship with Spain. The

crucial importance of systemic factors as foreign policy

inputs determining the timing and nature of resulting policy

is particularly evident in the influence of the Korean War

on the 1951 decision to seek U.S. bases in Spain. As the

conclusion to this chapter will emphasize, foreign policy

decisions must be analyzed in their own historical context

and the often strong influences of the then-existing inter­

national political environment taken into account.

Spanish Policy

A brief analysis of the Spanish foreign policy

decision to allow U.S. military bases in Spain is an appro­

priate background to the review of the course of negotia­

tions with Spain. Franco's policy in these base negotia­

tions was an important reason for the delay of over two

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years between the 1951 decision of the United States to

seek bases in Spain and the 1953 agreements with Spain.

Even in a study focusing onU^^ policy toward Spain,

Spanish policy toward the United States must be taken into

account. This Spanish policy has been an important input

to U.S. policy toward Spain throughout the past quarter

century. Without the recurring Spanish willingness to

allow U.S. military bases in Spain, the U.S. policy toward

Spain predicated on these bases would have been impossible.

A brief analysis of Spanish policy toward the

United States is also useful as an illustration of how the

theoretical approach to foreign policy analysis must be

tailored to the country under examination. Differences in

governmental form do influence how foreign policy decisions

are made, and thus may require different theoretical

approaches to the analysis of those decisions.

In analyzing Spain's foreign policy toward the

United States, this study will employ what Graham Allison

termed the "rational actor" analytical approach. As noted

in the first chapter, this traditional approach "reduces

the organizational and political complications of a govern­

ment to the simplication of a single actor," having certain

goals and values to be maximized by rational choice among 95 all possible policy alternatives.

The Spanish policy to allow U.S. bases in Spain

seems particularly amenable to this "rational actor"

analysis treating foreign policy as a clear decision of a

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unitary government actor. Indeed, in the case of Spain,

the dictatorial position of Franco suggests that he alone

can be considered the rational and unitary actor who made

the decision for a close military relationship with the

United States. Franco, unlike Truman, was an absolute

dictator who personally made all major Spanish foreign

policy decisions and who was not subjected to the intense

institutional pressures of interest groups and Congress

faced by a U.S. President. The decision on Spain's foreign

policy toward the United States was a matter of the highest

priority, whereas foreign policy toward Spain was, as we

have seen, a relatively secondary issue for the United

States. This "rational actor" analysis can be usefully

supplemented by analysis on the individual level of

Franco's relevant beliefs and values. As Ole Holsti noted,

this approach is very useful in cases (such as this) where

decisions are made at the top level of government by

leaders relatively free from organizational and other ^ ^ 96 constraints.

Analysis of Franco's policy toward the United

States must begin with an examination of his goals and

values. Franco's most general goal was, like most men in

power, to survive and stay in power. But this is almost

axiomatic, and Franco had already maintained his absolute

power in Spain for fourteen years when the 1953 agreements

with the United States were made. This analysis will

therefore focus on Franco's more specific foreign policy

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goal of ending Spain's isolation. We have seen how the postwar isolation and ostracism of Spain failed to threaten

Franco's survival in power but left him with no external

friends, except for the dictators Salazar in Portugal and

Peron in Argentina. The most important effect of Spain's

continuing international ostracism was the economic isola­

tion which this entailed. Spain's economy by 1950 had

still not "recovered its modest level of the 1920's" and clearly suffered from the exclusion from Marshall Plan 97 aid. All of these factors indicate why the major goal of

Franco's foreign policy was to end Spain's political and

economic isolation. This foreign policy goal of ending Spain's isola­

tion was accompanied by a strong value of Franco— virulent

anti-communism, growing out of his victory over those he

termed "the Reds" in the Civil War. Franco had already

indicated how this value could influence his foreign

policy by sending the Blue Division to fight alongside

Hitler's troops against the Soviet Union. Franco's letter

of October 1944 appealing to Churchill to join Spain in a

new defense of Europe against the Soviet Union further

illustrated Franco's deep distrust and hostility to

communism.

Given Franco's prime foreign policy goal of ending

Spain's isolation, and his strong anti-communist values, the "rational actor" approach posits that Franco would

examine the alternative policies available and choose the

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policy that would maximize his goals and values. In this

case. Franco's alternatives were rather limited. Franco's

anti-communist values would have precluded any association

with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe even in the

absence of their very real mutual hostility. Another

alternative was alliance with Europe's major immediate

post-World War II power, England. But Churchill rejected

Franco's October 1944 appeal for cooperation. After World War II, the prospects of Franco's friendship with any of

the other nations of Western Europe were even less, for

many of the leaders of the socialist and labor governments

then in power in Europe had been idealistic young men dur­

ing the Spanish Civil War who had never forgiven Franco for

overthrowing the Spanish Republic and installing a right-

wing dictatorship and who were opposed to the lack of free

labor unions in Spain. As Franco later noted in justifying

the 1953 agreements with the United States, he had been

forced to rule out "direct military collaboration now with

Britain and France" because "for real collaboration it is

necessary to create a state of cordiality, about which 9 8 nothing so far has been achieved."

Thus, almost by process of elimination, the most

feasible foreign policy alternative for Franco, and the one

he pursued, was to develop a close relationship with the

United States. Even without the defects of the other alternatives, the United States was by far the most power­

ful prospective ally for Spain economically and militarily.

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Franco instructed his Foreign Minister, Lequerica, to make

the December 1944 approach to the U.S. ambassador in

Madrid, Carlton Hayes, which urged the United States to

establish "special understandings. . . economic, political, 99 and military" with Spain. This suggests that Franco had

decided very early to base his postwar foreign policy

hopes on the alternative of close association with the

United States. Although this offer was rejected by the

United States at that time. Franco maintained his legendary

patience in pursuit of his goal.

After weathering the initial postwar ostracism.

Franco was ready to actively pursue his policy goal as the

Cold War heated up in 1948. It was then, as noted earlier,

that he sent his former Foreign Minister Lequerica to

Washington and hired Charles Patrick Clark to influence a

change in U.S. policy. Franco also skillfully repeated his

offer of Spanish bases to important Congressional and military leaders as they began to visit Madrid in the 1948

to 1951 period. Thus, when U.S. policy toward Spain

shifted in 1951, Franco was waiting to negotiate the long-

desired agreement for "special understandings" between

Spain and the United States.

One of the major reasons that over two years passed

between the time the United States decided to seek bases in

Spain and the 1953 agreement with Spain was Franco's

insistence on securing advantageous terms in the agreement.

Franco's policy in his negotiations with the United States

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had three main goals. First, he hoped to obtain as much

military aid for Spain's antiquated Axis-equipped armed

forces as possible. Second, Frar. j o hoped for as much

economic aid from the United States as possible. He argued

(correctly) that assistance to Spain's economy was required

to enable Spain's military, and any U.S. bases in Spain, to

be properly supported. Finally, Franco insisted (and, as

we shall see, obtained) Spanish sovereignty and certain

restrictions on the United States' use of the bases.

Franco revealed the nationalistic sensitivity behind this

policy goal by reportedly commenting, "One Gibraltar is

enough.When the United States began to actively seek

bases in Spain, Franco tactically pursued these policy

goals by "exchanging his own eagerness for a dignified

reserve" regarding military agreements with the United

States. This "reserve" and Franco's patience in pursuit

of his policy goals influenced the two-year delay in U.S.

agreement with Spain.

U.S. Negotiations with Spain, 1951-1953

The basic U.S. policy decision to establish close

military ties with Spain was made by July 1951, but the

specification and negotiation of the new relationship

remained to be done. Admiral Sherman (accompanied by his

son-in-law John Fitzpatrick and Ambassador Griffis) began

the preliminary contacts to implement the new U.S. policy

toward Spain in a meeting with Franco on 16 July 1951.

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Fitzpatrick described the meeting in these words: "They

talked about the need to improve U.S.-Spanish relations in

view of world conditions, and they agreed.Franco

indicated Spain's need for economic as well as military aid

and agreed to allow American economic and military surveys 102 of Spain's needs prior to negotiations. Six days later.

Admiral Sherman died of a heart attack in Naples. Although

Sherman's mission to Madrid had succeeded in beginning the

establishment of a new United States relationship with

Spain, his unexpected death no doubt detracted from the

momentum toward establishment of U.S. bases in Spain.

This was unfortunate because the aftershocks of

the dispute over U.S. policy toward Spain were still being

felt in Washington. Bureaucratic politics can be involved

in the implementation as well as the execution of policy,

and it seems clear that there was a continuing resistance

to the policy of closer ties with Spain among certain

inflential people in Washington. Some of the two year

delay in reaching agreement with Spain must be attributed

to the bureaucratic rearguard action of these individuals.

For example. Assistant Secretary of State for

European Affairs George Perkins testified to the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee in July 1951 that the United

States hoped to obtain from the Spanish only the improve­

ment and use of certain Spanish air and naval bases,

rather than seek the establishment of United States

bases.This seems quite different from what the

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Pentagon advocates of bases in Spain had had in mind, and

probably reflected uncertainty in the State and Defense

Departments over the extent of the new policy of military

cooperation with Spain. After this statement by Perkins,

Congress added the $100 million in Mutual Security Act

grants to Spain as an (unrequested) spur to the Truman ad­

ministration to promptly seek agreements with Spain. Secre­

tary of State Acheson reaffirmed his commitment to the new

policy with a 30 July 1951 statement that "military author­

ities are in general agreement that Spain is of strategic

importance to the general defense of Western Europe," and

added that negotiations would soon begin on Spain's role 104 in European defense.

Two U.S. survey teams went to Spain in late August

1951 to evaluate Spain's economic and military needs. The

military mission, headed by Air Force Major General James

W. Spry and including Army and Navy officers, finished its

survey at the end of October. The conclusions of the mili­

tary team were reportedly rather pessimistic. Although

acknowledging the strategic value of Spanish bases, there

was deep concern that the restrictions upon which Franco

insisted, regarding the sovereignty of Spain over any

bases, would impede their effective use in wartime. Added

to this consideration was the difficulty of supplying air

bases with Spain's archaic communication and transport

system. The mission reportedly concluded that the Air

Force bases then under construction in Morocco "should be

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adequate for strategic bombing in case of war."^^^ But

senior Air Force generals disagreed with this analysis and

felt Spanish bases were an essential supplement to the

politically insecure U.S. presence in Morocco.

The economic mission to Spain was headed by Syra­

cuse University Professor Sidney Sufrin, representing the

Economic Cooperation Administration, and included officials

from the Export-Import Bank. The economic survey, con­

cluded in November 1951, reportedly found that Spain's

economy was "being held together by bailing wire and

hope."^^^ The report also said that if Spain were to play

an increased role in Western defense, the United States

would have to make large loans of up to $450 million over

a three-year period. Yet the report admitted that such

large loans would pose an inflationary danger.

At the beginning of 1952, U.S. policy toward Spain

was in a confused state of limbo. Air Force Secretary

Finletter, with the Spry report supporting his doubts on

the practicality of air bases in Spain, was reasserting his

opposition to Spanish bases, and one report in January 1952

described the attitude of the Air Force on Spanish bases 108 as "bordering on indifference." The Army had always

been rather indifferent to Spanish bases, and was preoccu­

pied with the NATO force buildup. But the Navy continued

to press for the implementation of the policy decision to obtain bases in Spain. On 10 January 1952, the Commander

of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, Admiral Gardner,

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visited Spain and said that the use of Spanish bases would

"undoubtedly facilitate the tasks of NATO in the Mediter- 109 ranean." Navy Vice Admiral Cassady shortly thereafter

praised Spain's potential as "a bastion of defense" in 110 Europe.

While these signs of disarray were appearing in the

Defense Department, U.S. ambassador to Spain Stanton Grif­

fis added to the impression of drift in U.S. policy toward

Spain with his 21 January 1952 resignation. Griffis

announced that his main task, the development of "the

beginning phase of Spanish-American relationships and

understanding" had been completed, and that the future

development of the U.S. relationship with Spain depended

"on the Department of Defense.President Truman also

gave the improving U.S. relations with Spain a setback with

his blunt observation at a 7 February 1952 press conference

that he was "not very fond" of Spain under its present 112 government. President Truman did not, it seems, set out

to undercut the U.S. policy toward Spain that he had,

albeit reluctantly, agreed to earlier. But President

Truman's obvious lack of enthusiasm for the new policy

facilitated the continued bureaucratic opposition in lower

levels of the State and Defense Departments, and thus must

share part of the blame for the long delay in implementing

the policy. It seems appropriate that the early 1952 logjam in

the process of negotiating with Spain was broken by a

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skillful bureaucratic maneuver by the proponents of Spanish

bases. These proponents now included Secretary of State

Acheson as well as Secretary of Defense Marshall and the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Top-ranking Air Force officers had

once again executed an end-run around the opposition of Air

Force Secretary Finletter and the reservations of the Spry

report. Secretary of State Acheson began the relaunching of the policy for bases in Spain by naming Lincoln MacVeagh

as the new ambassador to Spain early in 1952. MacVeagh was

a veteran diplomat who in his previous position as ambassa­

dor to Portugal had secured the 1951 agreement granting 113 the United States the use of bases in the Azores. On

12 March 1952 Secretary of State Acheson announced that

formal negotiations for bases in Spain would soon begin,

with Ambassador MacVeagh being assisted by two special

advisory groups. George Train of the Mutual Security

Agency (who had been with MacVeagh in the Portuguese nego­

tiations) was in charge of a three-man economic advisory

team to negotiate the economic aid aspects of the agree­

ment with Spain.

The most significant move, however, was the

appointment of a group to negotiate the military aspects of

the agreement for bases in Spain, headed by Air Force

Major General August W. Kissner. Although the group in­

cluded Navy and Army officers as well, the Secretary of

State personally chose Major General Kissner and made the

negotiations for Spanish bases primarily the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 115 responsibility of the Air Force. In one sense, this move

was understandable given the difficulties evident in the

negotiations for bomber bases in Spain.

But this maneuver by Acheson had the effect of

lessening the lingering bureaucratic resistance to Spanish

bases. Air Force Secretary Finletter was not even con­

sulted about the appointment of Kissner to head the mili­

tary negotiating team. This move effectively put Air

Force policy on Spanish bases in the hands of the generals

advocating these bases and short-circuited the Air Force

Secretary's opposition. Acheson's delegation of primary

responsibility for Spanish base negotiations to this

military team assisting Ambassador MacVeagh in Madrid also

largely removed the contentious issue of Spanish bases from

the hands of the State Department and thus lessened the

ability of the opponents of Spanish bases in the Western European Bureau to delay agreement.

Formal negotiations with Spain finally got underway

after the arrival of General Kissner's negotiating team in

Madrid in April 1952. Although Spanish Foreign Minister

Martin Artajo and Ambassador MacVeagh were the formal heads

of the negotiations, neither of the two actually did the

negotiating work. General Kissner negotiated the military

terms of the agreement directly with General Jorge Vigôn,

director general of the Spanish High General Staff. The economic aspects of the agreement were negotiated by George

Train and Minister of Commerce Manuel Arburua.

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Even after the formal negotiations began in April

1952, it was over a year until the agreements between the

United States and Spain were finally concluded. One -

account by an American involved in these negotiations

attributes the difficulty in reaching agreement to the fact

that the U.S. negotiating teams lacked full authority to

negotiate and thus had to clear each position with the

State Department. According to this version, the fact that

the military was chosen to negotiate the agreement may have

lessened the capacity for mid-level opponents of Spanish

bases in the State Department to delay agreement, but cer­

tainly did not eliminate their delaying capacity

entirely.

This may have been the case, but perhaps equal

responsibility for the length of the negotiations must be

attributed to Franco's insistence that any U.S. bases in

Spain remain under Spanish command and be jointly used by

both nations. Franco was also no doubt encouraged to hold

out for more economic and military aid from the United

States by the action of Congress in 1952 in adding $25 mil­

lion to the $100 million Mutual Security Act aid previously

appropriated for Spain. Another factor in the delay,

familiar to anyone who has dealt with the Spanish, is that

the Spanish generally do not rush into anything (much less

a major foreign policy agreement). Finally, the fact the 1952 was a Presidential

election year in the United States probably accounts for

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much of the delay. Outgoing President Truman could hardly

be expected to press hard in his closing months in office

to reach an agreement with Spain which he had only reluc­

tantly agreed to pursue.

When President Eisenhower took office in January

1953, both the United States and Spain soon demonstrated a

renewed eagernesss for agreement in the prolonged negotia­

tions. Franco's relief at the final departure of his acknowledged non-admirer Truman was perhaps best indicated

by his reported remark following Eisenhower's election: 117 "At least he's a General."

The only change which President Eisenhower made in

the U.S. mission in Madrid was the appointment of James C.

Dunn as ambassador. With John Foster Dulles as Secretary

of State and former General Walter Bedell Smith as Under­

secretary of State, there was strong support in the highest

levels of the State Department for a bases agreement with 118 Spain. The importance that the new administration in

Washington attached to Spanish bases may be inferred from

the fact that career diplomat Dunn's previous post had been

ambassador to France. Although Dunn, like his predecessor

MacVeagh, did not directly participate in the negotiations,

he was an excellent choice for the Madrid post as he was

highly respected by the Spanish— having been the State

Department architect in 1936 of the policy of non-interven- 11 q tion in the Spanish Civil War.

This second relaunching of U.S. policy toward Spain

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. quickly generated movement toward agreement in the pro­

longed negotiations for bases in Spain. Air Force Chief

of Staff Vandenberg visited Madrid in March 1953 to consult

with his negotiating team. Ambassador Dunn clarified the

new administration's policy toward Spain by stating at a 120 9 April 1953 press conference: "We want the bases."

In May the National Security Council, acting on the recom­

mendation of Vice President Nixon, Secretary of Defense

Wilson, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reaffirmed the decision to obtain bases in Spain. In early

May, Ambassador Dunn, General Kissner, and Train visited

Washington, and after meeting with President Eisenhower

expressed optimism that an agreement with Spain was 121 near. In late August 1953, General Kissner returned to

Washington for final consultations and in early September

Ambassador Dunn saw President Eisenhower in Washington and

obtained his approval of the agreements reached with Spain.

Two events which occurred immediately prior to the

signing of the agreements between the United States and

Spain in September 1953 mark an appropriate finis to the

long bureaucratic politics struggles that led to those

agreements. On the night before the signing of the agree­

ments with Spain, Ambassador Dunn and his negotiating teams

were forced to stay awake until 4 a. m. waiting for the

final State Department authorization to sign the agreements.

The authorization was held up, it seems, by the disagree­

ment of some of the mid-level officials in the State

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Department with some of the final details of the agree- 122 ment. Somewhat earlier, on 25 August 1953, Spain's

ambassador to Washington, the familiar José Lequerica,

presented Senator Pat McCarran with one of Spain's highest awards, the Grand Cross of the Order of Isabella La

Catôlica, "for his efforts to improve Spanish-American 1 21 relations.

The Pact of Madrid

The Pact of Madrid was signed on 26 September 1953

in Madrid by Ambassador Dunn and Foreign Minister Artajo of

Spain. This Pact was composed of three separate agree­

ments— a Defense Agreement, an Economic Aid Agreement, and

a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. For the United

States, these were executive agreements and not treaties,

and thus required no approval by the Senate. It is inter­

esting to note, in light of Congressional opposition in the

late 1960's to the executive agreement format, that Secre­

tary of State Dulles consulted the chairmen of the foreign

relations committees in both houses of Congress in 1953 and

neither offered any objection to concluding the agreements

with Spain as executive agreements instead of treaties.

It is particularly ironic that this Congressional acquies­

cence took place at the same time that moves were underway

in the Senate to restrict the power of the President to

conclude executive agreements, by the Bricker Amendment.

It is no coincidence that many of the conservative

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advocates of the Bricker amendment were also the leading

supporters of close U.S. military ties with Spain, and thus

did not protest this particular executive agreement.

The first parts of the Defense Agreement associate

the United States and Spain in "maintaining international

peace and secruity" and in "strengthening the defenses of

the West" against "the danger that threatens the Western 125 world." Under the terms of the Defense Agreement, the

United States was authorized to develop, maintain, and use

jointly with Spain "such areas and facilities. . . as may

be agreed upon." The bases were to remain under the

"sovereignty" and "flag and command" of Spain, and their

use in time of war was to be "as mutually agreed upon."

The United States also pledged to support Spanish defense

efforts by assisting in air defense and providing arms to

Spain. This Defense Agreement was to remain in effect "for

a period of ten years, automatically extended for two

successive periods of five years" unless a specified ter­

mination procedure was followed.

Two important aspects of this Defense Agreement

should be highlighted as later sources of difficulty in

U.S. relations with Spain. The agreement was a clear

victory for Franco in its restrictions upon the control and

use of the Spanish bases. The vague "mutual agreement"

proviso reagarding the use of the bases by the United

States in wartime was, as we have seen, resisted by the Air

Force during negotiations. More important, these

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restrictions would be embodied in subsequent agreements

with Spain in 1963 and 1970 and remain a continuing bone of

contention between the two nations. Another aspect of the

defense agreement planted a seed of eventual discord

between the legislative and executive branches of govern­

ment in the United States as well as between Spain and the

United States over the degree of commitment of the United

States to Spain's defense. Since the Defense Agreement did

not specify the obligation of the United States to Spain's

defense in case of war, it did not constitute a military

alliance in the sense of, for example, the NATO pact. But

the very fact of the United States military presence in

Spain and the association of the two nations in the defense

of the West implied some form of weak alliance and United

States commitment to Spain's defense. The Spanish would,

in subsequent agreements, seek to make this commitment

explicit, whereas the Congress would resist any notion of

commitment.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the

Economic Aid Agreement specified United States economic,

technical, and military assistance to Spain under the

Mutual Security Act of 1951. After the signing of the

agreements, the State Department disclosed that Spain would

receive $226 million in aid in fiscal year 1954. Of this

total, $125 million consisted of the funds already appro­ priated by Congress in 1951 and 1952 and never spent, and

another $101 million was to come from funds to be

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appropriated by Congress for the Mutual Security Program

for fiscal year 1954. Of the initial $226 million, $85

million was earmarked for "defense support assistance."

This direct aid to Spain's economy was justified on the

ironic premise that Spain's defense, as well as "individual

liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence" (all except the latter conspicuous by their absence in Franco

Spairl) , depended on a sound economy. Of this initial aid

total, $141 million was to go toward "military end-items"

to better equip Spain's antiquated armed forces. Ambassa­

dor Dtinn stated in November 1953 that the Defense Assistance

Agreement with Spain was "a strictly military agreement to

help in development of Spain's defenses should a moment

come when she— and we— are faced with the necessity of 126 defending ourselves from military aggression."

The $226 million in U.S. aid to Spain promised in

the 1953 agreements was only the beginning of the cost to

the United States of the bases in Spain. The Mutual

Defense Agreement was of unlimited duration, and the

Economic Aid Agreement would last until 30 June 1956. The

cost of construction of the U.S. bases in Spain, and subse­

quent military and economic aid agreements, resulted in the

U.S. expense of over a billion dollars by the time of the

1963 renewal of the bases agreements. The costs and bene­

fits of the U.S. policy establishing bases in Spain will

be examined in the next chapter, but brief mention should

be made at this point of the reaction to the Pact of Madrid

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in Spain and the United States.

Reaction to the Pact of Madrid

The official reaction of Franco and his regime to

the Pact of Madrid was one of jubilation. Franco's Foreign

Minister told the tame government-appointed Parliament, the

Cortes, that the Pact of Madrid had "restored our country

to the important international position to which it is 127 entitled. ..." He emphasized the fact that Spain had

not ceded sovereignty or control of the Spanish bases.

Artajo also emphasized Spain's satisfaction with the eco­

nomic aid provided by the agreement as providing "great 12 8 opportunities for Spain." This is important in light

of Spain's subsequent complaint that the economic aid

received was inadequate. Although the Pact was a triumph

for Franco's foreign policy, it hardly established Spain

as "the decisive axis of world politics" as the govern- ;

ment's party newspaper Arriba concluded on 2 October.

In his comments on the Pact of Madrid, Franco

vividly demonstrated a lifelong characteristic— the

inability to be magnanimous at the moment of victory.

Franco was not content with pointing out, correctly, that

the Pact represented a ratification of his own value of

anti-communism and the attainment, largely on his terms, of

his long-pursued foreign policy goal of close association

with the United States. Franco went out of his way to

criticize the European nations that had ostracized him.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109

stating that NATO membership was "out of the question for 129 the time being." The European NATO members had long

since been massaged by the United States to accept quietly

the bilateral U.S. defense agreement with Spain. But

Franco's untoward spitefulness at his moment of triumph no

doubt contributed to the determination of the European

members of NATO to resist any broadening of this bilateral

arrangement into the multilateral NATO context as long as

Franco was in power.

The official reaction to the Pact of Madrid in

the United States was to emphasize its military aspect and

minimize the political commitment which the stationing of

American troops in Spain implied. Secretary of State

Dulles exemplified the official reaction to the Pact in

his statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

in April 1954;

During the past year the NATO defense system has been supplemented, so far as the United States is concerned, by a base agreement with Spain. This will enlarge in an important way the facilities available to the United States air and naval craft in the west­ ern Mediterranean area. This has been desired for a long time. Now, the negotiations have been success­ fully concluded. This represents an addition to our over-all security. The military men who had been a driving force

behind the Pact of Madrid were also pleased with the agree­

ment. Army Information Digest was so ecstatic about the

new Spanish ally that it praised Spain's "mountain divi­ sions" noting that "they are readily mobile, since sturdy 131 mules are used in great numbers." The military did

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express some dissatisfaction over the Spanish restrictions

on the wartime use of the bases, but this aspect is best

considered during subsequent analysis of the role of the

Spanish bases in United States strategy.

Liberal periodicals were predictably upset by the

Pact with Franco Spain. The New York Times, in an editor­

ial on the bases agreement, said that "the highest purpose

of American policies is to defend and propagate democracy

against all totalitarian ideologies" and termed the Pact a 132 "bitter pill" to be swallowed with "profound regret."

The liberal Catholic publication Commonweal and the liberal

Protestant publication Christian Century denounced the

Franco regime and the Pact. Salvador de Madariaga, the

distinguished opponent of Franco, protested in a letter to

the New York Times that the agreement negotiated with the 133 dictator Franco would be renounced when his regime fell.

Many popular periodicals of the time indicated

their support of the Pact. Colliers declared that "As an

investment in our security, the hundreds of millions of

dollars the program costs would seem to be money well

s p e n t . C atholic World emphasized that in view of

Spain's strategic potential and the Russian threat to

Europe, it was "logical that the United States. . . should

make a military agreement with Spain. . . ," and took note

of the millions of dollars that the United States had

already given its former enemies and communist Yugo- 135 slavia. The Saturday Evening Post, while supporting the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ill

Pact, noted that "we're no more misty-eyed about Franco

than we are about another recently acquired buddy. Marshal

Tito."^^^ The conservative magazine National Review

predictably hailed the U.S. association with Spain and even

advanced the questionable proposition that "Spain can. . 137 . hardly be overrated as a political asset."

Much of this official and popular reaction to the

Pact of Madrid sounds like a familiar replay of the old

debate over U.S. policy toward Franco Spain, but one

commentary deserves particular attention. Hanson Baldwin,

the respected writer on military affairs for the New York

Times, wrote that the "greatest disadvantage" of the Pact

of Madrid was that its "exact meaning" was unclear from the

vague terms of the agreement, that the ultimate cost to the

United States was also unknown, and that all of this was 1 og done "without the ratification of the Senate." Baldwin

thus succinctly and perceptively identified all the major

issues which would in the future be the focus of dispute

over the U.S. policy toward Spain predicated on the bases

agreements— the vague terms regarding U.S. use of the

bases, the cost to the United States of the commitment to

Spain, and the executive agreement format.

Conclusions

This analysis of the two major U.S. policy shifts

on Spain— the abandonment of the policy of ostracism in

1950 and the 1951 decision to seek U.S. bases in Spain—

suggests several interesting conclusions. These conclusions

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involve both the substance and timing of the resulting

foreign policy and the use of theoretical approaches in

foreign policy analysis.

Our understanding of both U.S. policy shifts

toward Spain is certainly improved by the use of the

bureaucratic politics analytical framework. The 1950

abandonment of the previous ostracism of Franco Spain is

seen as largely the response to persistent and bipartisan

pressure of the Spanish Lobby in Congress (mobilized by

Franco's paid Washington lobbyists). The subsequent deci­

sion to seek U.S. bases in Spain was aided by Congressional

pressure but was primarily attributable to the desire of

the military for Spanish bases.

Although bureaucratic politics analysis can account

for how these policies toward Spain developed, it is less

useful in explaining why they occurred when they did. For

this reason, our bureaucratic politics analysis must be

supplemented by a consideration of systemic factors such

as the level of international tension and by detailed

analysis of pertinent beliefs and biases of key individuals in the policy-making process.

The human element can never be removed from the

formulation and execution of foreign policy. The 1950

shift in U.S. policy toward Spain may be partially under­

stood as an outgrowth of the change in Secretary of State

Acheson's personal beliefs on diplomatic recognition. The

decision on Spain may have represented the culmination of

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the process of "learning" that diplomatic relations do not

constitute moral approbation, which Acheson described in

his memoirs. Several key individuals greatly influenced

the 1951 shift in U.S. policy toward Spain and the result­

ing Pact of Madrid. Among the more important influences

we have noted in this regard were the role of Secretary of

Defense Marshall and Admiral Sherman. Most importantly.

President Truman's personal dislike of Franco and obvious

distaste for the policy of closer ties with Spain was a

consistent factor delaying the full implementation of

closer ties with Spain. This became particularly obvious

when contrasted with the more friendly attitude of Presi­

dent Eisenhower toward Spain. So individuals do matter in

foreign policy analysis, and while key policy-making

individuals are by no means neglected in the bureaucratic

politics analytical approach, policy analysis is enhanced

by a more probing analysis at the individual level.

Foreign policy decisions are not made in a histori­

cal vacuum. Bureaucratic politics analysis of the 1950 and

1951 shifts in United States policy toward Spain may

explain how these shifts could have occurred, but for a

true understanding of why they occurred at that time the

level of Cold War tension in the international system must

be considered. In the late 1940's, when the first priority

of the United States was to revitalize such key Western

European allies as Britain and France, the strong opposi­

tion of these allies to Franco encouraged the United States

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to continue its policy of ostracism of Spain. Later, the

"loss" of China to the Communists in 1949 subjected the

Truman administration to bitter partisan attacks in Con­

gress. It seems likely that the timing of the January 1950

abandonment of the ostracism of Franco Spain was strongly

influenced by the Truman administration's desire to placate

Congressional opposition on the relatively secondary issue

of Spanish policy in order to avoid further erosion of

bipartisan support for the administration on more important

foreign policy issues. Most important, the 1951 decision to seek United

States bases in Spain cannot be fully understood without a

consideration of the historical context and impact of the

Korean War. By August 1951, a Gallup Poll found that an

all-time high of fifty-eight percent of the American people 139 felt that there would be a major war within five years.

Gallup earlier found in June 1951 that sixty-five percent 140 of informed voters favored aid to Franco. It was in

this atmosphere that the policy to seek military ties with

Franco emerged. When a fight is thought to be imminent,

few people or nations can resist the impulse to enlist a

few heavies on their side. It is also in this wartime

atmosphere that considerations of military strategy may

take precedence over political ideals in foreign policy.

Truman and Acheson were not weak leaders, nor were they

insensitive to the moral considerations involved in a pol­

icy of close ties with Franco Spain. But Spain was a

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relatively secondary issue, and they chose to yield to the

powerful combination of bureaucratic pressures and a war­

time atmosphere. The idealism of opposition to close U.S.

ties with a dictatorial Spain rings as true today,

expressed in President Carter's words which begin this

chapter, as it did over a quarter century ago. But our

judgment of U.S. policy toward Spain will be more under­

standing, if not sympathetic, if we bear in mind Reinhold

Neibuhr's injunction to ". . . understand the moral ambigu­

ities of history. . . and understand them as permanent 141 characteristics of man's historic existence."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116

CHAPTER 3 ; FOOTNOTES

^Allison, pp. 167-68. 2 The official Franco Lobby in Washington should be clearly distinguished from the so-called "Spanish Lobby" of Congressmen and Senators that will be described subse­ quently.

^Theodore J. Lowi, "Bases in Spain," in American Civil-Military Decisions; A Book of Case Studies, ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham; University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 675.

^The best account of lobbyist Clark is in James Deakin, The Lobbyists (Washington; Public Affairs Press, 1966), pp. 156-60. For a more recent account of Spanish lobbyists in Washington, see Russell Warren Howe and Sarah Hays Trott, The Power Peddlers (New York; Doubleday and Co., 1977), pp. 402-04.

^These are the official amounts reported to the Justice Department under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, cited in Brent Scowcroft's "Congress and Foreign Pol­ icy; An Examination of Congressional Attitudes Toward the Foreign Aid Programs to Spain and Yugoslavia" (Ph.D. dis­ sertation, Columbia University, 1967), pp. 29-30. Clark remained Franco's lobbyist in Washington until 1964.

^Clark punched Drew Pearson in the eye in 1952 and paid a $25 fine after Pearson brought charges against him. Deakin, pp. 159-60. 7 Scowcroft, p. 30.

®Lowi, p. 676. 9 ^Ibid.

^^See Scowcroft, Chapter VI.

^^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on Emergency Foreign Aid, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 10-25 November 1947, p. 119. 12 U.S., Congress, House, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 29 March 1948, Congressional Record 94, part 3, p. 3428.

Richard Mayne, The Recovery of Europe, 1945-1973, rev. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.; Anchor Press, 1973), pp. 146- 47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117

^^Lowi, p. 676.

^^Whitaker, p. 34.

^^Salvador de Madariaga, Spain; A Modern History (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 600. 17 New York Times, 1 October 1948, p. 9.

*1 O Ibid., 6 October 1948, p. 5.

^^Ibid., 20 November 1948, p. 17. 20 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropria­ tions , Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary; Appropriations Bill for 1950, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, p. 94. 21 Scowcroft, p. 37.

^^New York Times, 14 July 1949, p. 6. 23 U.S., Congress, Senate, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, Congressional Record 95, part 8, pp. 10743-55. 24 The prize for most exotic Congressional comment in Madrid must go to Representative James Murphy (D-N.Y.), who emerged from a forty minute interview with Franco with the observation that he was a "very, very lovely and lov­ able character." New York Times, 1 October .1949, p. 6. 25 New York Times, 14 January 1949, p. 8.

^^Lowi, p. 678.

^^Ibid. 28 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. 5, p. 1041.

^^Ibid., p. 1042.

3°lbid., p. 1045.

^^U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, p. 1066.

^^Ibid., p. 1082. 33 McCown, p. 81.

^^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 35lbid. ^^Dunham and Wilson. 37 McCown, p. 82. 38 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the European Recovery Program, 80th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 483-84.

^^McCown, p. 83. 40 Ibid., p. 111. For the reported U.S. proposal, see New York Times, 6 October 1948, p. 1. 41 New York Times, 10 October 1948, p. 14. 42 Hayes, The United States and Spain, p. 166. 43 The following information is taken from U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 22 May 1949, pp. 660-61. 44 McCown, pp. 115-16. ^^Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1969), p. 187. âd New York Times, 14 July 1949, p. 6. 47 For the text of the letter from which the follow­ ing quotations are taken, see U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 30 January 1950, pp. 156-59. 48 See Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Impor­ tant? (Or Allison Wonderland)," Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972) : 159-79. 49 Stanton Griffis, Lying in State (Garden City: Doubleday, 1952), p. 269.

^^Acheson, p. 169.

^^McCown, p. 107.

^^New York Times, 17 April 1948, p. 8, cited in Scowcroft, pp. 23-24.

^^New York Times, 15 July 1949, p. 6.

^^Ibid., 16 September 1949, p. 3. 55 U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 30 January 1950, p. 156.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119

^^Madariaga, p. 602. 57 U.S., Congress, Senate, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, Congressional Record 96, part 5, p. 5855.

^®Ibid., p. 5847. 59 Scowcroft, p. 55.

^*^Lowi, p. 681. ^^U.S., Congress, Senate, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, Congressional Record 96, part 9 , p.11469. 62 "Should the United States Strengthen Its Rela­ tions with Spain?" Congressional Digest 32 (March 1953); 82.

G^lbid., p. 83. G^Ibid. G^ibid., p. 81.

G^ibid., p. 87.

^^The following account is from Pat McCarran, "Why Shouldn't the Spanish Fight for Us?" Saturday Evening Post, 28 April 1951, pp. 25, 136-38.

^®U.S., Congress, Senate, Resolution Approving the Action of the President of the United States in Cooperating in the Common Defense Efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty Nations, S. Res. 99, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, p. 5.

^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropria­ tions, Mutual Security Appropriations Bill, 1952, Sen. Rept. 960, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, p. 2.

^^Scowcroft, p. 87.

^^Lowi, p. 683.

^^Ibid., p. 684. 73 For a more thorough discussion of the Moroccan bases, see Albert Joseph Dorley, Jr., "The Role of Congress in the Establishment of Bases in Spain," (Ph.D. disserta­ tion, St. John's University, 1969), ch. III.

^^Lowi, p. 704. ^^The following information is from Benjamin Welles, Spain— The Gentle Anarchy (New York; Frederick A. Praeger,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120

1965), p. 287. 7 6Many Spanish accounts give Sherman primary credit for Truman's change in policy toward Spain. See ABC, 12 June 1975, p. 11.

^^Lowi, p. 690. 78 Ibid. An interview on 22 December 1976 with Mr. Charles D. T. Lennhoff, who was the legal advisor to the United States military negotiator for Spanish bases in 1952, confirms that Air Force Secretary Finletter continued to oppose Spanish bases even after the negotiations for the bases were underway.

^^Ibid., p. 704. O Q Ernest O. Hauser, "What a Bargain Franco Drove With Us!" Saturday Evening Post, 21 February 1953, p. 18. 81 Dunham and Wilson.

82For a detailed history of United Nations action regarding Spain, see the McCown dissertation. 83 New York Times, 4 August 1950, p. 6.

84U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 25 September 1950, p. 517. 8 6 New York Times, 3 November 1950, p. 4.

^^Scowcroft, p. 70. 87 New York Times, 17 November 1950, p. 10; 29 De­ cember 1950, p. 6.

^®Lowi, p. 691. 89 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Re­ lations and Committee on Armed Services, Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area, Hearings, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, p. 87. 90 McCown, p. 124.

^^Welles, p. 287. 92 U.S., Department of State, American Foreign Pol­ icy, 1950-1955; Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 1695-96. 93 Scowcroft, p. 78. 94 New York Times, 20 July 1951, p. 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121 QC: Allison, p. 253.

^^Ole R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Decision-Makers Viewed Psychologically; Cognitive Process Approaches," in Structure of Decision, ed. Robert Axelrod (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 30.

Whitaker, p. 118.

^®Ibid., p. 53. 99 Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, p. 287.

^^^"La Espaha de los Ahos 50-1953," La Actualidad Espahola, no. 1194, 21 November 1974, p. 26.

lO^Welles, p. 287. 102 ^ Lowi, p. 694. ^°^Ibid. 104 U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 30 July 1951, "Spain's Role in European Defense," p. 170.

^^^New York Times, 28 October 1951, pp. 1, 10.

^^^Ibid., 4 January 1952, p. 1.

^^^Lowi, p. 695. 1 no Scowcroft, p. 83. 1 no New York Times, 11 January 1952, p. 4.

^^^Scowcroft, p. 84.

^^^New York Times, 22 January 1952, p. 14. 112 Ibid., 8 February 1952, p. 1. 113 Hauser, p. 18. 114 Lowi, p. 696.

^^^This information is from the Lennhoff interview previously cited.

^^^"La Espana de los Anos 50-1951," La Actualidad Espahola, no. 1194, 31 October 1974, p. 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 118 Whitaker, pp. 42-43. ^^^Ibid. 120 New York Times, 10 April 1952, p. 11. 121 Lowi, p. 696. 122 This information is from the Lennhoff interview. 123 ■^Lowi, p. 669. 124 See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commit­ ments Abroad; Spain and Portugal, Hearings before the Sub­ committee on Unxted States Security Agreements and Commit- ments Abroad, 91st Cong., 2d sess., part II, 11 March 1969, p. "2-344.---- 125 For the text of the agreements, see the Depart­ ment of State Bulletin, 5 October 1953, pp. 435-42. 126 James Clement Dunn, "Mutual Benefits from U.S.- Spanish Security Agreements," Department of State Bulletin, 7 December 1953, p. 793. 127 Whitaker, p. 54.

^^^Ibid., p. 56. 129 New York Times, 5 November 1953. 130 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on The Mutual Security Act of 1954, 83rd Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 1954, p. 3. 131 "The Spanish Army Today," Army Information Di­ gest, July 1958, p. 28. 132 New York Times, 27 September 1953. 133 Whitaker, p. 50. 1 34 Bill Stapleton, "What Are We Doing In Spain?" Colliers, 11 June 1954, p. 89.

^^^J. D. Harbron, "Spain's New Role in Western Europe," Catholic World 178 (March 1954), p. 414.

^^^Hauser, p. 17. 137 J. Dervin, "Spain in the U.S. Balance Sheet," National Review, 13 June 1956, p. 17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123 138 New York Times, 29 September 1953. 139 Dorley, p. 108.

^^^Bailey, p. 812. 141 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944) , p. 187.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 4

FRIENDSHIP AND RENEWAL, 1963

. . . it seems that a marriage of con­ venience can lead to a honeymoon, even though it be delayed. . . .

Arthur Whitaker, commenting on United States relations with Spain after 1953.

The 1963 renewal for a five-year period of the

agreements for United States bases in Spain was a far less

controversial issue in United States foreign policy than

the earlier 1953 agreements. This chapter will therefore

examine the evolution of U.S. policy toward Spain through 1963 considering how previously established policy was

developed and renewed by the 1963 agreements. The role of

such key policy actors in the 1963 renewal as President

Kennedy and Spain's ambassador to Washington Antonio

Garrigues will also be examined.

The 1963 renewal may present the simple facade of

continuance of previous United States policy toward Spain.

Yet real underlying changes since 1953 in the tone, if not

the substance, of United States relations with Spain are

evident in a more detailed analysis. Following a brief

description of the construction of the United States bases

124

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125

in Spain, an evaluation of the strategic rationale for

these bases reveals considerable changes since 1953. A

brief analysis of the effect of United States economic aid

to Spain over this period indicates that its significance

lay not so much in its size but rather in the timing and

long-range effects of the aid. The 1953 agreements,

although based on military considerations, are also seen to

have fostered a closer U.S. political embrace of the Franco

regime by 1963, and also to have paved the way for a par­

tial political reintegration of Franco Spain in the inter­

national community. All of these factors will be a prelude

to the actual historical analysis of the 1963 negotiations

and the resulting bases renewal agreement.

The Bases in Spain

Once the Pact of Madrid was signed, and while pub­

lic reaction to the Pact was continuing, the work of

implementing the new U.S.-Spanish relationship began. For

the United States, the chief benefit and focus of the Pact

was its provision for the construction of U.S. air and

naval bases in Spain.

Four basic construction policies were adopted at

the outset of the U.S. base development in Spain which were

to make the base construction program a model of efficiency

compared to some other more wasteful projects, such as the

Moroccan air bases constructed in the 1951-1952 period.

First, the program was not on a crash basis— indeed, one is

struck by the gradual and even casual manner in which

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126

construction proceeded, especially in light of the argu­

ments advanced prior to the signing of the Pact about the

compelling need for the bases. Second, an attempt was

made to use Spanish contractors working under the prime

United States contractor. Third, the United States used

as much as possible existing equipment, materials, and

supplies (valued at $30 to $40 million) left from the air

base construction program in Morocco.^ Fourth, an attempt

was made to make maximum use of the Spanish construction

industry and labor. In practice, the second and fourth

policies did not work out as well as hoped, since the

Spanish construction industry and labor force often lacked

the skills to meet the needs of such a vast construction

program. Yet, as Benjamin Welles noted, the direct employ­

ment of 5,000 Spaniards and the indirect employment of

15,000 others through Spanish subcontractors, was of some

importance in providing Spain's construction industry with 2 equipment and training.

Four U.S. bases were the keystones of the American

military presence in Spain. Three air bases, completed in

1957, were Strategic Air Command bases for bombers and

their support and fighter squadrons. They were located at

Zaragoza (200 miles northeast of Madrid), at Torrejôn (15

miles northeast of Madrid), and at Morôn (27 miles south­

east of Seville). The original purpose of these air bases was the maintenance of B-47 medium-range bombers, which

could respond to Soviet aggression with retaliatory strikes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127

The Navy constructed a base at Rota (opposite the Spanish

port of Cadiz in southern Spain), which has been referred

to as "the mightiest American naval installation in

Europe." The purpose of this base, by official description,

was to operate fleet reconnaissance aircraft, support

fleet communications, and occasionally act as a base for 4 carrier aircraft and replacement units. With dredging and

the construction of breakwaters and piers. Rota was opera­

tional by 1958 and, by the end of the Pact's first ten-

year period in 1963, able to function in virtually any

capacity to support the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

The base at Rota also was the starting point for a 485-

mile oil pipeline that runs through Morôn and Torrejôn to

Zaragoza, and supplies all the air force bases with their

petroleum products. The need for this pipeline was em­

phasized by the statement of a SAC source that "a wing of

B-47's consumes in an afternoon more fuel than the entire

Spanish railroad tanker fleet can transport in a month.

The four major bases were supplemented by several

minor ones, which were later turned over to the Spanish.

The Air Force originally prepared a fighter base at Reus

(southwest of Barcelona) and a supply and communications

center at San Pablo (near Seville). The Air Force also

maintained seven radar aircraft and warning sites, one on

the island of Mallorca and six on the Spanish mainland.

Although they were originally manned by joint Spanish and

American crews, they have been entirely manned by Spanish

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128

Air Force personnel since the mid-1960's. The U.S. Navy

established an oil storage and supply center in Franco's

native town of El Ferrol (in northwestern Spain), and an

ammunition storage depot at Cartagena (on the Mediter­

ranean coast). Both facilities are now primarily utilized

by the Spanish Navy.

The cost of the construction of the American bases

rose considerably above original estimates, largely because

of rising wages and contracting costs. The cost of basic

construction until late 1957 was $225 million for the

Air Force and $113 million for the Navy.® The New York

Times estimated that a total of $420 million had been spent 7 by early 1960. All the major air bases were built on the

site of existing Spanish commerical or military installa­

tions. The new naval base at Rota was adjacent to a quiet

Spanish fishing village, isolated by a land distance of

twenty miles from the Spanish port of Cadiz across the bay. The number of U.S. military personnel in Spain expanded to

7,000-8,000 in 1959, with their dependents increasing the

Q combined total to about double this number.

American officials, in response to the demands of

a proud Spanish people who do not like the presence of

foreign forces on their soil, and in order to prevent anti-

American sentiment which has often been fostered by Ameri­

can bases in foreign nations, followed from the beginning

a "low profile" policy. Off-base wearing of uniforms, even

by enlisted men, was prohibited, and the strict requirement

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of coat-and-tie dress for all Americans leaving the bases

was enforced. As on-base housing for American families

became increasingly available by 1960, the bases became

more and more independent facilities, with a dignified and

formal, but nevertheless friendly, relationship with neigh­

boring Spanish towns. The American policy was appreciated

by the Spanish (who value dignity and formality), and as a

result the number of incidents between Spanish people and

the American servicemen has been held to a gratifying Q minimum. As one writer commented, "the combination of)f

U.S. discipline and Spanish friendliness began to work. ..10

One can only speculate about the long-term impact on Spain

of this large number of Americans, but it seems likely that

their presence in Spain served to diminish traditional

Spanish xenophobia and favorably represent an open and

democratic society.

The Strategic Rationale for Spanish Bases

By the time the U.S. bases in Spain became opera­

tional in 1957-1958, much of the original strategic justi­

fication for the air bases was already obsolete. The 1953

rationale behind the construction of air bases in Spain

was to provide permanent basing for the intermediate range

B-47 bombers that formed the backbone of the U.S. nuclear

strike force in the early 1950's. T h e original decision

for Spanish bases was influenced by the overall U.S. stra­

tegic posture of the early 1950's. In 1953, when the deal

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for Spanish bases was almost consummated, the Soviet Union

"had not yet tested a thermonuclear device nor flown a ' 12 long-range jet bomber." The official enunciation by

Secretary of State Dulles of the "massive retaliation" doc­

trine in January 1954 would seem to lend additional valid­

ity to the original rationale for the Spanish air bases in

a nuclear deterrent role.

Yet a closer analysis of the strategic value of

these bases reveals that, even by the end of 1953, their

value as permanent bases for elements of the U.S. nuclear

deterrent could have been foreseen to be of limited dura­

tion. Only months after the signing of the Pact of Madrid,

Albert Wohlstetter and his Rand associates completed R-266,

an analysis for the Air Force of the best way to select and

use strategic bomber bases in the period up to 1961.^^

This Rand analysis pointed out the coming vulnerability to

a Soviet first strike of the then-programmed system of

bombers permanently based on advanced overseas bases, and

emphasized the need for a second-strike U.S. retaliatory

capability. The Spanish bases type system of intermediate

overseas operating bases was the worst of the four alterna­

tive basing systems considered, from perspectives of both

cost and vulnerability. The Rand study concluded by recom­

mending that bombers be based in the United States and

rely on overseas bases for staging and refueling purposes only.T 14

The meaning of R-266 for the strategic deterrent

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rationale of the Spanish air bases was clear— they would be

obsolete almost before they became operational in 1957. By

late 1957 Soviet rocket gains, emphasized by Sputnik, had

removed any doubts about the vulnerability of the Spanish

air bases heralded in R-266. Meanwhile, the development by

the United States of the intercontinental B-52 jet bomber

and air refueling techniques, and the deployment in 1960 of

nuclear submarines carrying Polaris missiles further

reduced the need for the Spanish air bases in their original

role. There is some evidence that the Air Force did

acknowledge the change in the international strategic environment by beginning in 1958 the rotation of smaller

groups of B-47 bombers from the United States to the Span­

ish bases for three-week deployments.^® Yet, in spite of

R-266, the Spanish air bases were constructed as permanent

bomber bases at the cost of over a quarter billion dollars,

and B-47's were not withdrawn from these bases until

1965.^® The Spanish air bases, in their deterrent role,

thus illustrate the cost of delay between recognition of

changes in the overall strategic environment and altera­

tion of military basing and deployment plans.

The role of the U.S. Navy base at Rota, as a

supporting element of conventional U.S. strategy in the

Mediterranean, developed prior to 1963 much as originally

planned. When Rota became operational in early 1958, it

was the only U.S. base in Europe capable of major servic­

ing, supply, and overhaul of U.S. ships. Its overhaul

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facilities saved these ships the need for a two week tran­

sit to the United States for repairs, and thus allowed the

U.S. Navy to maintain more time at sea in the Mediterranean 17 with less ships. The naval air station at Rota was the

only facility in the Mediterranean capable of ground serv­

icing of carrier aircraft and replacement units, and also provided a base for anti-submarine warfare aircraft and

surveillance aircraft to patrol the Western Mediterranean.

Despite the change of U.S. strategic posture from

the dominant strategic bombing-massive retaliation posture

of 1953 to the 1963 deterrent force "triad" of interconti­

nental ballistic missiles, Polaris submarines, and long- range B-52 bombers requiring no forward bases, the U.S.

military clearly desired to retain the Spanish bases when 18 the agreements came up for renewal in 1963. A perceptive

article by Townsend Hoppes on the role of overseas bases

in U.S. strategy was published in Foreign Affairs in Octo­

ber 1958. This article is of interest not only because

Hoopes shortly thereafter became a Pentagon official during

the Kennedy administration, but also because the article

took account of changes in the strategic environment and

heralded the arguments that the military would make in 1963.

to retain and adapt the Spanish bases to these strategic

changes. Hoopes saw a residual value for overseas bases in

their original strategic deterrent role for several years

to come as the United States completed its buildup of the

ICBM and Polaris deterrent forces. But he emphasized that

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the United States should dispense with the "atomic" aspect

of these bases (often so unpopular with local populations)

as soon as possible and shift the emphasis of the bases to

the conventional force support role of maintaining a 19 "favorable local power balance in selected areas." The military rationale for Spanish air bases in

1963 followed the strategic prescriptions of the Hoopes

article rather closely. The residual 1953 rationale of

bomber basing was considered a useful function of the

Spanish bases for a few more years. As noted before, the

Spanish-based B-47's were not phased out until 1965, and

they were then replaced by a large proportion of the simi­

larly "short-legged" U.S. B-58 bomber inventory until they, 20 in turn, were phased out in 1968. More important, these

bases were now justified in the strategic deterrent role

suggested by R-266 ten years earlier, as staging and

refueling bases for B-52 bombers permanently based in the

United States. Even before the 1963 agreement, a squadron

of KC-135 tankers, used for B-52 refueling, was based at

Torrejôn. The Spanish bases were the only bases outside of

England in Europe whose runway length and weight capability

could handle fully-loaded B-52's.The withdrawal by 1963

of the United States from the three Strategic Air Command

bomber bases in Morocco added to the value of the Spanish

air bases in their residual strategic deterrent role.

It was in the conventional role of maintaining "a

favorable local power balance" in the Southern

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Europe-Western Mediterranean area that the Spanish air

bases were newly justified in 1963 and most clearly

adapted to the changing strategic environment in the fol­

lowing years. Tactical aircraft for possible NATO air

support were first based in Spain as early as the 1961 Ber- 22 lin crisis. When the B-47 bombers were removed from

Spain in 1965, a Tactical Air Command wing of 54 F-lOO air­

craft was permanently stationed at Torrejôn as "the only

land-based U.S. tactical aircraft immediately ready to 23 support NATO's southern flank." These aircraft were

later replaced by F-4 fighter-bombers, and now routinely

deploy to NATO bases in Italy and Turkey as nuclear-capable quick-reaction alert (QRA) aircraft. Another increasingly

important conventional role for the Spanish air bases has

been as transport aircraft bases and in-transit stopover

points. After the United States was forced to withdraw

from France in 1966, Torrejôn became the major air terminal

for southern Europe, where C-141 and C-5A transport air­

craft enroute to the southern NATO area (Italy, Greece, and

Turkey) could refuel. All of these new conventional mis­

sions and residual strategic functions of the 1960's were

concentrated at the Torrejôn air base near Madrid. As the

B-47's were gradually withdrawn in 1963 and 1964, the air

bases at Morôn and Zaragoza were reduced to standby status,

with only a small complement of U.S. personnel and no

aircraft permanently based at the facilities.

The military justification in 19 63 for the Rota

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naval base provides an ironie contrast to the rationale for

the maintenance of Spanish air bases. At the very time

that the Air Force was beginning to justify its Spanish air

bases in a conventional role, the Navy developed a strate­

gic role and rationale for the Rota base. The Navy felt

that there was a need "on a cost-benefit basis for a

logistics, servicing, and repair base in the Mediterranean 25 area" for Polaris nuclear submarines. As with conven­

tional ships in the Sixth fleet, a forward replenishment

and supply base at Rota would eliminate the need for the

nine Polaris subs in the area to return to the United States 2 6 after each two-month patrol. The result would be more

time on station, and therefore more target coverage, with­

out building more Polaris subs. Rota was preferable to the

three other alternatives for this mission— the advent of a

Center-Left government in Italy in 1963 made difficult any

base expansion there, an Azores base would have required

new construction, and expanded usage of the Polaris base at

Holy Loch would have increased the concentration and vul- 27 nerability of the U.S. Polaris fleet.

Even before the 1963 bases renewal agreements, the

United States tried to obtain Spanish permission for the

use of Rota as a Polaris base. In a routine request in

early 1962 from the chief of the U.S. military group in

Madrid to Spain's Vice President Munoz Grandes, asking permission to dredge Rota harbor to accommodate Forrestal-

class aircraft carriers, mention was made that the United

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 28 States might eventually send Polaris subs to Rota. Munoz

Grandes answered with an authorization for the dredging and

the statement that he saw no objection in principle to the Polaris subs but that when the time came the matter would 29 require consultation. U.S. ambassador to Spain Robert F.

Woodward also notified Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando

Maria Castiella of the U.S. desire for Polaris basing at

Rota. Castiella succeeded in having this issue made his

responsibility instead of simply a matter for the Spanish

military to approve.®® Castiella thus succeeded in with­

holding permission for Polaris basing at Rota to use as a

"bargaining chip" in the 1963 negotiations for renewal of

the bases agreements. The 1963 renewal did not explicitly

mention the Polaris basing, but early in 1964 Rota joined

Holy Loch and Guam as overseas bases for a squadron of

Polaris subs. It is ironic that Admiral Rickover had

originally given as a major rationale for nuclear subma­

rines their independence of foreign bases, while the Navy

was now using the existence of these subs to justify its

Spanish base in a strategic deterrent role.

This review of the rationale for Spanish bases in

U.S. military strategy at the time of the 1963 renewal in­

dicates that, despite changes in the actual and foreseen

role of these bases, a major aim of the United States in

the 1963 negotiations was to obtain the continued use of the bases. Permission to base Polaris submarines at Rota

was also strongly desired.

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But the problem, noted in the previous chapter,

of the ability of the United States to use the Spanish bases as desired was never explicitly clarified in the

1953-1963 period. Benjamin Welles states that "Spain had

never. . . objected to the stationing of U.S. nuclear

weapons on her soil. . . . This is probably true, in

a formal sense, but the extreme sensitivity of the Spanish

government to any public mention of atomic weapons in

Spain was indicated very early. In November 1953 Air Force

Secretary Talbott remarked to the press during a visit to

Spain that the United States would have atomic bombs on its 32 bases in Spain. The Spanish reaction was immediate and

furious, and after a meeting in Washington of President

Eisenhower and the Secretaries of State and Defense, the

United States announced it had no plans to store atomic 33 bombs in Spain. Talbott later lamely explained that the

United States might eventually "have atomic bombs in Spain

. . . subject to the approval of the Spanish government."

Welles made another statement which perhaps best describes

the eventual Spanish attitude on this matter; "No ques- 35 tions about nuclear arms were asked."

The question of wartime use of the Spanish bases

was another touchy issue that was not clarified in the 1953

agreements. Air Force Secretary Talbott probably accu­

rately (and certainly indiscretely) expressed the military view on this matter when he stated at a 1954 press confer­

ence "Well, who's going to stop us? There are certain

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agreements on the use of the bases, but when the balloon 3 6 goes up, we are going to use them." Within hours.

Secretary Talbott was again apologizing for his undiplo­

matic statements. Fortunately, no real controversy between

the United States and Spain over the use of the bases

arose in the period up to 1963. During the U.S. landings

in Lebanon in 1958, Spain even allowed troop transport

planes to refuel at the Cpanish bases while France and 37 Italy were denying similar use of their bases.

U.S. Aid to Spain

The previous chapter noted how the U.S. military

and economic aid programs to Spain were the price paid for

Spanish bases. In 1956, an Assistant Secretary of State

reiterated that even U.S. economic aid to Spain "was

designed only to make viable the construction and opera- 38 tion of the United States bases." Since Spanish com­

plaints of inadequacy of the aid received in return for

United States use of the bases were frequently heard prior

to the 1963 renewal negotiations, a brief analysis of the

development of the U.S. aid program to Spain in the 1953-

1963 period seems in order.

As early as February 1955, the Madrid newspaper ABC 39 complained of the inadequacy of the U.S. aid to Spain.

Spanish Foreign Minister Artajo, during a visit to the

United States in early 1956, indicated Spain's dissatisfac- 40 tion with the amount of U.S. aid it was receiving. These

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complaints during the early years of the Pact of Madrid

seem to have been partly designed to prompt the remnants of the Spanish Lobby in Congress to appropriate more money

for Spain. They were partly successful in this aim, as

Congress until 1960 continued to earmark Mutual Security 41 Act funds for Spain.

But the Spanish complaints had a certain validity

when measuring U.S. aid to Spain from 1953 to 1963 against

postwar U.S. Marshall Plan aid to Europe. Although the

circumstances of the Marshall Plan aid were quite distinct,

this was the context in which Spain evaluated U.S. aid— a

context illustrated by the 1953 Spanish film Bienvenida

Mr. Marshall!. This film showed how the Spanish, repre­

sented by a poor village in Castille, expected an immediate

economic transformation to result from U.S. aid— yet saw

only Marshall's car as he "sped past in a cloud of dust

without stopping, leaving the village and its peasants as 42 poor as before."

The total U.S. economic aid to Spain prior to 1963

amounted to $986.4 million, of which $644 million was in

grant form.^® Grant economic aid to Spain virtually

ceased after 1963, so a general evaluation of the value of

U.S. economic aid to Spain may be made from the figures

prior to 1963. One of Spain's leading economists, Ramôn

Tamames, analyzed Spanish use of this aid and found that

thirty-two percent of this aid went to purchase foodstuffs

and thirty-three percent for raw materials— leaving only

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thirty-five percent for capital goods and equipment essen- 44 tial to a country's economic development. The conclusion

that Tamames drew from these figures was that American economic aid had provided very little of the equipment 45 necessary for Spanish economic development.

The real contribution of United States economic aid

to Spain prior to 1963 was not so much its amount but its

important role in the Stabilization Plan of 1959 and the

implications of this 1959 plan. Although the Economic Aid

Agreement with the United States in 1953 contained a

pledge by Spain to stabilize its currency and encourage

competition, Spanish economic policy prior to 1959 was

still shackled by residual elements of the former fascist 46 economic policies of self-sufficiency or autarchy. By

1957, Spain was beginning to make rapid gains in industrial

production, but the combination of autarchic restrictions

on exports and increased imports to fuel industrial expan­

sion produced a gap in Spain's international balance of

trade and balance of payments. At the same time inflation,

stimulated by the large influx of American dollars, con­

tinued to worsen and the real exchange value of Spanish

currency declined far below its official value. By early

1959, the combination of the inflation and the balance of

trade and payments problems had brought the Spanish govern- 47 ment to the brink of bankruptcy. Franco, realizing that his talents as a general

did not qualify him for economic tactics, had already made

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perhaps the wisest single move of his long career as leader of Spain. In February 1957, he appointed a new cabinet

including two economic experts as Ministers of Commerce and

Treasury. These two men were both associated with Opus

Dei, a Catholic lay association which paradoxically advo­

cated a sort of Calvinist work ethic. In 1958, these two

cabinet members began to junk some of the regime's autar­

chic economic policies and, most importantly, began to move

Spain toward the integration in the Western capitalist

economic sphere which fascist economics and postwar isola­

tion had earlier precluded. In January 1958 Spain became

an associate member of the Organization for European Eco­

nomic Cooperation (GEEC) and in May 1958 Spain was admitted 48 to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The real turnabout in the Spanish economy, however,

began with the Stabilization Plan of 1959, in which the

United States (both directly and through its influence in

the IMF) played the key role. After an IMF team visited

Spain in February 1959, it recommended a reduction in Span­

ish barriers to foreign trade and investment, and closer 49 economic ties with Western Europe. Franco deferred to

his economic experts, who made the final break with Spain's

autarchic past. The Stabilization Plan of Spanish economic

liberalization was announced on 20 July 1959. In exchange

for Spain's opening its economy to the capitalist world economy, a $420 million "package loan" to Spain and full

membership in the GEEC was provided. The United States was

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the key participant in the package loan, as it contributed

$200 million in various official and commercial loans and

grants. The Stabilization Plan was very successful, and

Spain's per capita income grew at the annual rate of nine

percent from 1959 to 1967— one of the highest growth rates

in the world.Spain's membership in the world economy

was fully consummated by its adherence to the GATT in

June 1963.51

The real importance of U.S. economic aid to Spain,

then, is not to be found in the figures for total aid which

are— as the Spanish have often pointed out— less than the

United States gave to its former enemies Germany and Italy

under the Marshall Plan. The real importance of this aid

was as a lever to gradually integrate Spain in the Western

economic system. The economic prosperity which resulted

from Spain's economic liberalization transformed Spain from

an underdeveloped nation in the early 1950's to a modern

industrial nation by the early 1970's. More important, it

can be plausibly maintained that this economic liberaliza­

tion created the preconditions in Spain for an eventual

political liberalization after the death of Franco. With

this in mind, it seems fair to conclude that the timing and

the impulse given by U.S. economic aid to Spain have been

far more important to Spain's eventual economic and even

political development than a simple recitation of the aid totals indicates.

The U.S. military aid provided Spain prior to 1963

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was, in conjunction with economic aid, the price paid for

Spanish bases. U.S. military assistance included grants

under the Mutual Security Act and ship loans. The total of

U.S. military aid to Spain prior to 1963 under these pro- 52 grams was $477 million dollars.

By agreement with the Spanish, approximately forty

percent of this aid went to the Spanish Air Force and 53 thirty percent to both the Navy and the Army. The Span-

is Air Force received the largest percentage of U.S. aid

because of Spain's need for a defense from air attack (in

light of the presence of U.S. bases), and because of the

high cost of jet fighters. The Spanish Air Force received

over 400 F-86 Saberjet fighters and training aircraft, and 54 communications and electronic equipment. The Spanish

Army during this period received tanks, anti-aircraft

weapons, field artillery, engineering and transport equip­

ment and communications equipment. In May 1955 an agree­

ment was announced whereby the United States would modern- 55 ize the antiquated Spanish fleet. Many Spanish vessels

received new weapons, sonar, and radar systems. The United

States "loaned" Spain several former U.S. destroyers, mine­

sweepers, and submarines. The Spanish Marine Corps was

provided with new transport, weapons and communications

systems. In addition to this direct U.S. military aid,

over five thousand Spanish officers and enlisted men re­ ceived advanced training in the United States prior to 1963.57

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There are two obvious ironies in the program of

U.S. military aid to Spain. The United States has consis­

tently justified its military aid as necessary to enable

the armed forces of Spain to defend Spain from attack. Yet

any reasonable analysis of international political reali­

ties leads to the conclusion that the only reason Spain

was in any danger of attack was the fact that it harbored

U.S. bases on its soil. A second irony is less easily

proven but of potentially greater long-term importance for

Spain. United States military aid, training, and associa­

tion with Spain has exposed the Spanish officer corps

(particularly the Air Force and Navy) to the Western demo­

cratic norms of a professional military force which does

not directly interfere in the nation's politics. Although

it is impossible to conclusively demonstrate the influence of this American example, it seems plausible that it is one

of the reasons underlying the increasingly professional

and de-politicized attitude of the Spanish military in the

post-Franco era. The irony, of course, is that a military

relationship between Spain and the United States, origin­

ally undertaken for purely military reasons, may have

influenced changes in the attitudes of the Spanish military

with profound political implications.

The Political Honeymoon

Official U.S. policy at the time of the signing of the 1953 agreements with Spain sought to portray the new

relationship as simply a pragmatic agreement for military

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cooperation. But the United States gradually became less

careful in distinguishing military cooperation with Spain

from political support of the Franco regime. The "honey­

moon" alluded to at the beginning of this chapter had

blossomed by the end of the 1950's, and the political rela­

tionship between the United States and Spain appeared to

be increasingly close. The following analysis will

examine the development of this relationship and consider

the benefits that the Franco regime obtained as a result.

Both of these factors indicate how the tone of the U.S.

relationship with Spain had changed by the time of the 1963

renewal negotiations.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made a brief

visit to Madrid to meet with General Franco on 1 November

1955. On 20 December 1957 Dulles began something of a

tradition for American Secretaries of State by making a

special trip to Madrid to inform Franco of the results of

C Q the most recent NATO Council meeting in Paris. Comments

Dulles made following his visit to Franco are indicative

of the change in tone of the U.S. relationship with Spain:

I told him. . . of the basic policies and the strategies that were being followed. I felt that General Franco, by the contribution that his Govern­ ment was making to the defense of Europe, had eg clearly entitled himself to that kind of information.

As Arthur Whitaker later noted, these meetings signified

"something more than a cooly correct attitude towards a

militarily useful but politically uncongenial ally."^®

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the meetings

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between Dulles and Franco was their suggestion of a shift

in U.S. policy regarding Spanish membership in NATO. This

issue of U.S. support for Spain's entrance in NATO merits

review, for it has since become an increasingly salient

issue in U.S. policy toward Spain. It seems that when the

Pact of Madrid was signed in 1953, both the United States

and Spain viewed their bilateral agreements "not as a

prelude but as an alternative to Spain's joining NATO.

By 1956, Spain reportedly desired to join NATO, but wanted

the United States to take the lead in pressing for her , . . 62 admission.

Once again, it was the Congress that successfully

exerted pressure on the executive branch to change its

policy regarding Spain and NATO. In 1955 several concur­

rent resolutions were presented in the Congress expressing

the sense of Congress that Spain should be admitted to

NATO. None of these resolutions passed in 1955, but it is

worthy of note that one of the sponsors of the Senate reso­

lution was Senator John F. K e n n e d y . Secretary of State

Dulles responded to this pressure by telling a House com­

mittee that "the State Department would be sympathetic" to 64 Spain's admission to NATO. In 1956, Dulles indicated a

further evolution of the U.S. attitude toward Spain's

membership in NATO when he stated that the United States

would like to have Spain in NATO but would not pressure its

European allies on this m a t t e r . In 1957, both houses of

Congress finally passed a sense of the Congress resolution

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urging Spain’s admission to NATO. The executive branch

then indicated its willingness to use its "influence" with

the European allies to secure Spain's membership in NATO .^7

This "influence" of the United States was, over the next

two decades, always insufficient to overcome the hostility

of its European allies to the Franco regime.

Despite the failure of the United States to secure

NATO admission for Spain, Franco's regime gained much

international acceptance from its increasingly close sup­

port by what one critical Spanish journal later referred to g O as the "American political godfather." With strong

United States support, Spain was finally admitted to the

United Nations in December 1955 as part of the "package

proposal" admitting the satellite states of Eastern Europe.59 As previously noted, by 1963 Spain (again with

the strong support of the United States) had gained admis­

sion to the various world economic institutions— the IMF,

the World Bank, the OEEC, and the GATT. But the limits of

the influence of the "American political godfather" were

revealed when it came to Spanish membership in NATO and the

EEC. In February 1962, Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella

sent a letter to the President of the EEC Council of Minis­

ters requesting that negotiations begin for association of

Spain with the EEC, looking toward eventual full member­

s h i p . The EEC did not even reply to the Spanish letter

for over two years, demonstrating (as in the case of NATO)

that European hostility to the Franco regime precluded any

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granting of these organizational badges of European

respectability to Franco.

The height of the U.S. political honeymoon with

Spain was reached when President Eisenhower visited Madrid

on 21 and 22 December 1959. The story behind this trip is

interesting in itself. The Madrid visit was not listed in

Eisenhower's original schedule for the trip to Europe, but

was included several days later.A recent book by Fran­

co's cousin and personal aide credits the former Spanish

lobbyist in Washington, Lequerica (who in 1959 was serving

as Spain's U.N. ambassador), with convincing Eisenhower to 72 make the Madrid visit. In any case, Eisenhower received

a warm welcome from Franco and the people of Madrid.

Franco's remarks at the banquet for the visiting American

President indicate tlie increased political closeness of the

two nations:

It is the first time that a President of the United States has come to Spain, and Providence has chosen this to occur at a time when our relations are reaching a point of maturity and understanding. . . . It is a motive of satisfaction for us, who see in the Agreements of 1953 not only a circumstan­ tial instrument of limited political cooperation, but a step further along the road of friendship for the two nations. . . .73

At the departure ceremony for General Eisenhower on

22 December 1959, Eisenhower gave two abrazos (formal em- 74 braces) to Franco. This gesture revealed better than

anything else the increased warmth in the United States

attitude toward Spain. It was also rather embarrassing to

many Americans who had trusted in Vice President Nixon's

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declarations in 1958 that the United States would reserve

its abrazos for democratic leaders and give dictators a 75 cool handshake. The joint communique issued on Eisen­

hower's departure spoke of the "gratifying progress" that

had been made in the "implementation of the economic and 76 defense agreements of 1953." Franco was, of course,

jubilant at the recognition and respect he received from

the Eisenhower visit. But the election of John Kennedy as President in

November 1960 led Franco to wonder if such warm relations

with the United States would continue. Franco's private

comments to his cousin regarding Kennedy's election clearly

reveal his preference for Republicans in the White House:

It would have been better if Nixon had won. We have many more friends among the Republicans and they understand us better. President Eisenhower is very loyal to Spanish friendship and has favorably resolved any difficulties which have arisen. Among the Democrats there are quite a few enemies of our regime.77 Despite Franco's worries. Secretary of State Dean Rusk soon

visited Franco in Madrid on 16 December 1961. The recent

memoirs of Franco's cousin reveal that a familiar figure.

Franco's lobbyist Charles Patrick Clark, convinced Rusk to

make the trip to Madrid, citing the Dulles precedent of 7 8 informing Franco after NATO Council meetings.

The belief that the United States could implement

the 1953 policy of close military ties with Spain without creating the appearance of political support for Franco's

dictatorial regime was probably illusory from the

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beginning. Yet one can only conclude that the United

States, under the Eisenhower administration, went much fur­

ther than was necessary in the warmth of its support for

Spain. It is one thing to support the entry of a quasi-

ally in international organizations, and quite another for

the President of the United States to travel to a dicta­

tor's capital and publicly embrace him. But such consider­

ations were obviously less important in U.S. foreign policy

during that period. The best evidence that there was no

U.S. urging for Franco to moderate his domestic dictator­

ship comes from Franco's own private comment in 1961 on

the United States; "They have requested nothing of us in relation with our politics and have aided us economi- 79 cally." Although private U.S. diplomatic approaches

urging Franco to move toward a more democratic form of

government might well have had little immediate effect on

Spain's dictator, such approaches might have precluded

some of the public political embrace of the Franco regime

after 1953 which prejudiced the United States in the eyes 80 of democratic elements in Spain. It is ironic that the

only pressure that anyone in the executive or legislative

branch sought to exert on Spain in this period came from

a young Congressman who introduced an amendment to the

1961 foreign aid bill proposing that "countries receiving

assistance under this act shall guarantee to their people freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of the 81 press." The author of the amendment was Representative

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Robert Dole of Kansas.

Spanish Policy

An understanding of Spanish policy toward the

United States is essential to the analysis of the 1963

negotiations for renewal of the agreements between the

United States and Spain. It is clear from the previous

analysis of the military rationale for Spanish bases that

U.S. policy in the 1963 negotiations had as its goal the

maintenance of the existing U.S. bases in Spain. But

Spanish policy toward the United States must be analyzed as

an important systemic input to U.S. policy.

In an important speech in Burgos on 1 October 1961

Franco publicly addressed the problem of Spain's relations

with the United States. Franco spoke of the "steadfastness

of our policy in the agreement with America," but warned

that his military needed new equipment to "correspond to 82 the new situation." The "new situation" to which Franco

seems to have been referring was the danger to Spanish

cities of Soviet nuclear attack. The Spanish government

in 1953 had made no objection to the location of the four

major U.S. military bases close to some of Spain's largest

cities. But, in the aftermath of Sputnik, the Spanish

began to realize the danger to these cities of a Soviet

strike against American bases— a danger which the Soviets,

in those years of boisterous Khrushchev rocket-rattling,

did not hesitate to point out. 83 In private comments to

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his cousin in November 1961, Franco said that the Torrejôn

base near Madrid might have to be relocated after 1963; Franco indicated tha^ Madrid would probably be a Soviet

target in the event of nuclear war in any case, but felt

that the relocation would avoid giving the Soviets an ex­

cuse to strike Madrid and would increase the public peace 84 of mind. Franco went on to note that he had accepted the

Torrejdn base "when it was the general belief that the USSR 85 had no nuclear arms; now the situation has changed."

In addition to the increased U.S. military aid and

possible relocation of the Torrej6n air base. Franco's

policy goals in the 1963 renewal negotiations included

increased recognition of Spain's role. By the early 1960's

Spain was no longer an outcast, isolated from international

organizations as in 1953. Franco wanted increased recog­

nition from the United States as a cooperative partner in

defense instead of simply a landlord for U.S. bases. In

short. Franco wanted the 1963 agreement to acknowledge the

mutual cooperation of Spain and the United States that had

been proclaimed by Dulles and Eisenhower in their visits

to Madrid. In what was really Spain's opening gambit in the

1963 negotiations. Franco acceded to the wishes of his

military and as early as June 1961 forwarded a request for

new military assistance to the United States. This

"grossly inflated" request for $250 million in U.S. mili­

tary equipment was predictably filed away without any U.S.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153 pg action. As we shall shortly see. Franco wisely changed

his negotiating tactics following this rebuff and appointed

an ambassador to Washington who, like the paid lobbyists

prior to 1953, would be able to influence U.S. policy

toward Spain at the source— which in 1963 meant directly

with President Kennedy.

The 1963 Renewal Negotiations

The 1963 negotiations for renewal of the U.S. bases

agreements with Spain illustrate how personal influences of

key individuals can be important in the determination of

U.S. foreign policy. There were never any real bureau­

cratic struggles within the Kennedy administration over

the key U.S. policy goal of retaining bases in Spain. But

the manner in which this policy goal could be implemented

depended very much on the Spanish negotiating demands upon

the United States. As we shall see, the negotiating dead­

lock was eventually broken largely due to the sensitivity

of Spain's ambassador to the United States to the U.S.

political scene.

The 1963 renewal negotiations began against a back­

ground of mutual irritation between the United States and

Spain. Foreign Minister Castiella gave formal notice on

14 January 1963 to the U.S. ambassador in Madrid, Robert

Woodward, that Spain wanted a renegotiation of the 1953

agreements instead of the automatic extension of the agree- 87 ments. The United States soon became irritated at Spain

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because of its failure to agree to an offset arrangement.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs William P. Bundy (the older brother of

President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs), visited Spain on 11 January 1963 seeking Spanish agreement to purchase $85 million worth of U.S. weapons

for each of the following three years in order to offset

the gold drain on the United States. These offset arrange­

ments were negotiated with a number of America's allies,

but the mission to Spain was "poorly timed and poorly go prepared." The Spanish told Bundy that they had no

intention of providing U.S. bases for free and then spend­

ing a quarter billion of their scarce currency reserves on

U.S. arms at a time when Spanish economic development was 8 9 just beginning to blossom. The United States decided, after this January off­

set rebuff from the Spanish, to up the ante and send

Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric to Madrid. The

Spanish ambassador in Washington publicly warned Gilpatric

before his departure that Spain no longer would accept

being "regarded and treated as a second-class associate 90 from whom. . . one takes what one needs. ..." When

the Pentagon cabled Madrid that Gilpatric would arrive in

late February "to sign" the offset agreement, the Spanish

government informed him that the cabinet ministers con- 91 cerned would be out of town on a hunting trip with Franco.

Gilpatric's trip had to be cancelled.

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Thus by March 1963 the United States and Spain were

at a deadlock over the future course of their relationship. The Pentagon, with William Bundy taking the lead, had

already determined that the retention of the Spanish bases 92 was desirable for the strategic reasons outlined earlier.

But, as the offset flap had demonstrated, the problem was

to find a way to satisfy the Spanish desire for recognition

and military aid within the economic constraints imposed

by the gold drain and increasing popular and Congressional

resistance to foreign aid. This latter fact was emphasized

when the House Foreign Affairs Committee issued the Clay

Report on Foreign Aid on 20 March 1963, which criticized 93 U.S. aid to Spain in exchange for bases as "excessive."

Although this complaint in Congress was of no major impor­

tance to the 1963 negotiations, it was the thunder on the

horizon of future Congressional resistance to aid to Spain

in the 1968-1970 period. In any case, it clearly indi­

cated that Spain could no longer, as in the 1950-1953

period, expect the Congress to press the executive branch

for more funds for Spain.

Nor could Spain expect much sympathy from the State

Department. The Assistant Secretary of State for Europe,

William Tyler, "seemed to stress the disadvantages" of the

U.S. ties with Spain, continuing a long tradition of

State's European section in being concerned primarily with

NATO alliance solidarity and the dislike of the European 94 allies for Franco Spain. The U.S. ambassador in Spain,

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career diplomat Robert Woodward, doubted whether the United States needed the Spanish bases and maintained a reserved

attitude toward renewal negotiations, implying that the

U.S. presence was more important to Spain than to the United States.Ambassador Woodward suggested to Spanish

Foreign Minister Castiella that an automatic five-year

extension of the agreements would be the best manner to

proceed. Ambassador Woodward hoped that by avoiding seem­

ing anxious over the bases renewal, Spanish demands on the

United States could be held to a m i n i m u m . But the Secre­

tary of State, Dean Rusk, was considerably more anxious

than his subordinates for the United States to maintain its 97 military presence in Spain. This outline of the attitudes of the Pentagon, the

State Department, and the Congress indicates that there

was at least a begrudging acceptance of the central U.S.

policy goal toward Spain of retaining existing U.S. base

facilities. The problem was not any great bureaucratic

politics struggle over U.S. policy toward Spain, but rather

the fact that neither the Pentagon, the State Department,

nor the Congress seemed to have a clear idea as the dead­

line for the 1963 renewal of the agreements approached of

how to satisfy the Spanish desires and to obtain U.S.

policy goals. It is at this point that the personal influ­

ences of the Spanish ambassador to the United States and President Kennedy played an important role.

Antonio Garrigues was appointed by Franco as

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ambassador to the United States in July 1962. The appoint­

ment was a surprise to many in Spain, for Garrigues had

served the Spanish Republic as an official in the Ministry 98 of Justice and was a liberal Monarchist. At the time of

his appointment. Garrigues was one of Spain's leading

lawyers. It was an excellent choice on Franco's part— Gar­

rigues had had an American wife, recently deceased, and

many contacts among American businessmen. More important.

Garrigues had a unique personal bond with President

Kennedy.

The story of Garrigues' bond with the Kennedy fam­

ily is fascinating in itself, and may have enhanced Presi­

dent Kennedy's personal support for the 1963 renewal of the

United States agreements with Spain. In 1939, Garrigues was a young lawyer, married to the daughter of a United

States general. He and his wife were both devout Catholics

and part of the Franco underground in beseiged Republican

Madrid in the spring of 1939. Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., was

a young man of twenty-four in 1939, working at the American

Embassy in London where his father was the Ambassador.

Young Kennedy's undergraduate honors thesis at Harvard the

previous year had been entitled "Intervention in Spain,"

and in it he had expressed the view that Franco was no

worse than the Republican government which by that time

had fallen under Soviet domination. Kennedy, who had long had an interest in Spain, thus traveled to Republican

Madrid in the spring of 1939 as the city was surrounded by

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Franco's forces, under seige, and on the verge of final

defeat. A bloodbath was underway in Madrid as Republicans

and the Communists who had tried to manipulate them turned

on each other, and both these groups hunted Franco sym­

pathizers. Kennedy learned of Garrigues and his wife, and

searched for them to discuss the situation in Madrid from

their unique point of view. One day, Kennedy, Garrigues,

and two Spanish friends were driving in Madrid when an

armed patrol stopped their car. They were all lined up

against a wall at gunpoint and asked for identification

papers. Kennedy produced his American passport which, as

almost no Americans were in Madrid during those perilous

days, impressed the militiamen, who let all four men , 99 proceed.

Although Garrigues never saw Joseph Kennedy again

before his death in World War II, the story of this inci­

dent became well known in the Kennedy family. Garrigues

reminded President Kennedy of this when he presented his

ambassadorial credentials in 1962— a reminder which could

do no harm to his relationship with the President who

revered his older b r o t h e r . Thus President Kennedy knew

that the Spanish ambassador during the renewal negotiations in 1963 was the man who had stood beside his late brother

against a stone wall in Madrid on that day in 1939 when

Joseph Kennedy, Jr., became the first of the Kennedy

brothers to face violent death. It is not unreasonable to

conclude that the action of President Kennedy in 1963 in

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supporting a renewal and upgrading of the U.S. agreements

with Spain was favorably influenced by his personal bond

with Spain's ambassador. With the U.S. bureaucracy stalling in hopes of a

simple extension of the 1953 agreements, and Spanish

demands making the renewal more difficult, Garrigues in

March 1963 decided to use his own personal influence to break the deadlock. First, Garrigues held a meeting with

President Kennedy, who assured him that the United States

wanted to maintain its close ties to Spain and that he, as

President, would try "to help meet Spain's needs" if Spain

would "recognize the political facts of life.on the

strength of his meeting with President Kennedy, Garrigues

then returned to Madrid and convinced Franco and Foreign

Minister Castiella to grant him full negotiating authority.

Realizing the "political facts of life," Garrigues

set out to obtain a political upgrading of the U.S. rela­

tionship with Spain to compensate for the unobtainable

sums of military aid originally sought. After analyzing the texts of all U.S. treaty commitments around the world.

Garrigues chose the U.S. treaty with Japan which provided 102 for periodic military "consultation" as his model. On

22 July 1963 Garrigues presented Spain's position to Deputy

Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis

Johnson— a position that requested consultation commitments

and whatever ^id to Spain the United States could

obtain.

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On 30 August Undersecretary Johnson gave Garrigues

the U.S. counteroffer. In return for continued use of the

bases in Spain, Johnson offered to make a joint declara­

tion on U.S.-Spanish defense cooperation and set up a com­

mittee for both nations to regularly discuss mutual defense

problems. If the Spanish would accept this as the basis

for negotiation, the United States would also try to pro­

vide some military and economic aid to Spain. With the

26 September 1963 renewal deadline less than a month

away. Garrigues flew home to Spain and helped convince 104 Franco to accept the U.S. offer. When Foreign Minister Castiella came to New York in

September for the U.N. General Assembly meeting, he met

with Secretary of State Rusk and Ambassador Garrigues to

negotiate the final details of the agreement. Agreement

was reached on the amount of U.S. military and economic aid

to Spain, and the agreement was signed by Rusk and Cas­

tiella on 26 September 1963. After shaking hands with

Castiella, Rusk turned to Air Force Chief of Staff General

Curtis LeMay and, in a revealing aside, told him "Your col­

leagues have helped to no small degree to make this agree­

ment a r e a l i t y . "^95

There is considerable truth in Rusk's statement, as

the previous chapter has already revealed. Yet Benjamin

Welles is nearer the point when he ascribes the success of

the 1963 renewal negotiations to the advocacy of Garrigues

and the good will of President Kennedy toward this Spanish

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ambassador who served the cause of U.S.-Spanish relations

so w e l l . It is no accident that Franco awarded Gar­

rigues the Grand Cross of Carlos III for his role in the

1963 negotiations.^^7

The 1963 Agreements

The 1963 agreement extended the terms of the 1953

Defense Agreement for five years. At the same time. Secre­

tary of State Rusk and Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella

issued a Joint Declaration regarding cooperation between 108 the two nations. Two aspects of this declaration are

particularly important. The United States recognized

Spain's contribution to European defense (and sought to

compensate Spain for her continuing exclusion from NATO) by stating in the declaration that the defense agreements of

Spain and the United States "form a part of the security

arrangements for the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas."

More important, the Joint Declaration stated that a "threat

to either country. . . would be a matter of common concern

to both countries, and each country would take such action

as it may consider appropriate within the framework of its

constitutional processes." It is important to examine the degree of commitment

by the United States to Spain's defense which this pro­

vision implied, for this issue of U.S. commitment in later

years became a focus of attack by opponents in the press

and Congress of U.S. policy toward Spain. Perhaps the best

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benchmark for comparing the U.S. defense commitment to

Spain in the 1963 Joint Declaration is Article 5 of the

North Atlantic Treaty. This Article states that:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them. . . shall be considered an attack against them all, and. . . if such an armed attack occurs, each of them. . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith . . . such action as it deems necessary. . . .109

Obviously, the 1963 agreement with Spain does not contain

such explicit commitment of the United States to Spain's

defense as Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. But

the 1963 Joint Declaration clearly marked an upgrading of

the U.S. commitment to Spain, for the 1953 agreements made no mention of a "threat" to Spain being a "common concern"

of both countries. At the same time, attempts in both

Spain and the U.S. press to claim that the 1963 Joint

Declaration meant a full alliance of the two nations, or an

entangling commitment of the United States to Spain, appear

on closer analysis as undue exaggerations.

In addition to the Joint Declaration, the United

States and Spain exchanged diplomatic notes establishing a

Joint Consultative Committee on Defense Matters in Madrid.

This committee provided for monthly meetings of the head of

the U.S. military mission in Spain and Spanish officers to

consider matters concerning the military cooperation of the

two countries. The United States agreed to grant Spain $100 million in military aid, and Spain agreed to purchase

$50 million worth of U.S. arms as a sort of unacknowledged

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offset arrangement. Spain gained no economic grant aid by

the renewal, but was promised $100 million in Export-Import

Bank Loans. In another informal arrangement, the United

States was separately granted permission to base a squadron

of Polaris subs in Rota late in 1963. Overall, the agree­

ment was a pragmatic solution in which both sides compro­

mised to gain their essential policy goals— in the case of

the United States, continued access to Spanish bases; in

the case of Spain, enhanced recognition of her defense

contribution and military aid.

Reaction to the 1963 Renewal Reaction in the United States to the 1963 renewal

was somewhat mixed. Most official opinion in Washington

echoed the editorial sentiment of the New York Times, which

was of the opinion that in real terms Franco had gotten

"nothing" by the r e n e w a l . The Washington Post, on the

other hand, insisted that the "shrewd" Franco had gotten

what he wanted— "a new status as a partner" and "virtual

ally" of the United States, as well as a "new degree of

international prestige.One of the more humorous

descriptions of the 1963 negotiations and renewal came

from our British cousins. An article in the Economist of

London compared the negotiations to an American soap opera

where "the principals hurl cornflakes at one another in the opening sequence, but are safely back in each other's 112 arms in time for the last commercial."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164

The Spanish press (still under tight government

control) hailed the 1963 renewal as an "alliance" with the

United S t a t e s . Franco's private comments to his cousin

are the best indication of his real view of the renewal

agreement. Franco reportedly said,

I am satisfied, because the changes in the renewal have improved the agreements. America has promised to provide modern equipment to our mili­ tary forces. . . and above all will give us infor­ mation and will consult with us on matters relating to an international c o n f l i c t . 114

This comment by Franco suggests that he was under no illu­

sion that he had obtained a formal alliance with the United

States, but was pleased to have obtained his basic policy

goals of increased recognition and military aid. Franco's

further comment to his cousin leaves no doubt about the

important role of Garrigues in the 1963 renewal negotia­

tions ;

I am very satisfied with the competence and diplomatic preparation of our ambassador. Garrigues, who in these negotiations. . . acted in a brilliant fashion and with great ability.115 The most interesting reaction to the 1963 renewal

was that of the U.S. Congress, which did not react at all.

As in 1953, there were no complaints about the executive

agreement format of the U.S. agreements with Spain. No

problems arose in funding the aid pledged to Spain under

the agreements. To what, then, may we attribute the

strange quiescence of Congress regarding U.S. policy toward

Spain in 1963? Only five years later Congress would

strongly resist a similar continuation of U.S. policy

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toward Spain. The answer may be found in both the inter­

national and domestic systemic environments of 1963.

Questions regarding the wisdom of U.S. political

commitments and military strategy overseas were seldom

asked by Congress at a time when Vietnam was just becoming

a focus of concern. In the international arena, the United

States was still basking in the afterglow of the Cuban

Missile Crisis and committed to "pay any price" (much less

a paltry $100 million to Spain) for the defense of freedom

around the world. On the domestic scene. Congress in 1963

was lulled by over a decade of "bipartisan" foreign policy

into a general acquiescence to the President in foreign

policy, especially on "routine" issues such as a renewal of

the agreements with Spain. The next chapter will demon­

strate how the Vietnam War later aroused Congress and

created a new atmosphere of challenge to U.S. policy toward

Spain. But in 1963 Congress, on Spain as on many other

foreign policy issues, was neither the creative advocate

of the late 1940's nor the angry challenger of the late

1960's— Congress was on the sidelines of the foreign policy

game.

Conclusions

Former Ambassador to Spain Robert F. Woodward indi­

cated that the 1963 renewal of the U.S. agreements with

Spain occurred in an "amorphous" m a n n e r . indeed they

did. There were no great bureaucratic struggles over U.S.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166

policy toward Spain, and the pattern of previous policy was

maintained. The importance of personal influences of key

foreign policy officials was vividly demonstrated by the

role of Ambassador Garrigues in warning Castiella and

Franco of the political limits to U.S. support for Spain

and working to break the negotiating deadlock. Congres­

sional acquiescence to U.S. policy toward Spain was as

indicative of the environment at that time in the U.S.

domestic political system as U.S. willingness to mildly

upgrade its commitment to Spain was indicative of the

international political environment. But a keen observer,

looking under the facade of tranquility in U.S. policy

toward Spain in 1963, might well have detected some of the issues— Spanish demands for more recognition and more aid,

incipient Congressional opposition to large amounts of aid,

and the question of U.S. commitment to Spain— which were

to figure so prominently in the 1968-1970 controversy over

U.S. policy toward Spain discussed in the following

chapter.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167

CHAPTER 4 ; FOOTNOTES

^Stapleton, p. 89.

^Welles, p. 291.

^New York Times, 17 January 1960. 4 Whitaker, p. 63. ^Ibid., p. 66.

^"Background of the Spain Program," JUSMG-MAAG, Madrid, Spain, 1957. (Mimeographed.)

^New York Times, 17 January 1960. ^Whitaker, p. 59. 9 For a critical, anti-American, view of the social impact of the bases, see Chapter IV of the book by Chamorro and Fontes. Even these writers find some good things to say about American behavior in Spain (see p. 97).

l°Welles, p. 291.

^^The Military Balance, 1964-1965 (London: Inter­ national Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964) discusses on p. 37 the payload capacity and value of the B-47 and B-58. 12 Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington: Brookings, 1975), p. 10.

^^The best summary of R-266 is Bruce L. R. Smith's article "Rand Case Study: Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases,*î in American Defense Policy, 3d ed., eds. Rich­ ard G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 446-65. For a Spanish inter­ pretation, see the book by Chamorro and Fontes, pp. 84-90. ^^Smith, p. 455.

^^New York Times, 9 September 1958.

^^Stephen S. Kaplan, "American Military Bases in Spain: Missions, Alternatives, and Spillovers," Public Policy 22 (Winter 1974), p. 92. This article is the best single analysis of the military rationale for U.S. bases in Spain.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168

l^Ibid., p. 94.

l^welles, p. 292. 19 Townsend Hoopes, "Overseas Bases in American Strategy," Foreign Affairs (October 1958), p. 69-82. 20 Kaplan, p. 96. Z^lbid.

^^Ibid., p. 98. ^^Ibid. 24ibid., p. 96.

^^Ibid., p. 97. ^^Ibid.

2?lbid., p. 98. op °Welles, p. 298.

^^Ibid.

^^Interview on 27 April 1977 with Robert F. Wood­ ward, United States ambassador in Madrid from 1962 to 1965.

^^Welles, p. 299. 32 New York Times, 3 November 1953, p. 1.

^^Lowi, p. 698. 34 New York Times, 4 November 1953, p. 4.

^^welles, p. 299.

^^Lowi, pp. 698-99. 3?Welles, p. 299. 3 8 Scowcroft, p. 264.

^^ABC, [Madrid], 17 February 1955, p. 7. 40 New York Times, 17 April 1956, p. 7. 41 See Scowcroft, Chapter V, for a detailed account of these residual actions of the Congressional Spanish Lobby.

^^Gallo, p. 224.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169 43 William Braasch Watson, "25 Years of U.S. Mili­ tary Involvement in Spain, 1951-1975," in Spain: Implica­ tions for United States Foreign Policy, eds. Samuel Chavkin, Jack Sangster, and William Susman (Stamford, Conn.: Grey- lock Publishers, 1976), p. 45. ^^Ibid. 45 Ibid. Tamames is now a member of the Central Committee of Spain's Communist Party.

Whitaker, p. 46. 47 Stanley G. Payne, Franco's Spain (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), p. 62. 48 Ramôn Tamames, La Republica-La Era de Franco (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1973), p. 568. 49 Whitaker, p. 200.

^^Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970) p. 5. This book is the best study of Spain's economy and economic policy-making under the Franco regime.

^^Tamames, p. 568. 52 Watson, pp. 35, 37. 53 Stanley G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967) , p. 438.

S^Welles, p. 50.

^^Madariaga, p. 620.

^^Welles, pp. 52-53. 57 Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain, p. 440, 5 8 Scowcroft, p. 275. 59 U.S., Department of State, American Foreign Pol­ icy: Current Documents, 1957 (Washington: Government Print­ ing Office, 1961), pp. 617-18, cited by Scowcroft, p. 276.

^^Whitaker, p. 80.

G^Ibid., p. 79. 62 New York Times, 8 April 1956, p. 28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 go See Scowcroft, pp. 255-56. 64 U.S., Congress, House, Mutual Security Act of 1955, Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Af­ fairs, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 25 May 1955, p. 17.

^^New York Times, 25 April 1956, p. 10.

^^U.S., Congress, House, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, Congressional Record 103, part 4, p. 5580. g n Scowcroft, p. 272.

^®M. Vazquez MontalbSn, "El Padrino Politico," Triunfo 679 (31 January 1976): 7. ^^McCown, pp. 129-30. 70 Antonio Sânchez-Gij6n, El Camino Hacia Europa (Madrid: Ediciones del Centro, 1973), pp. 187-88. This is the best book in Spanish on Spain and the EEC. 71 New York Times, 12 November 1959, p. 1. 72 Lt. Gen. Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis Conversaciones Privadas con Franco (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1976), p. 273. Although highly anecdotal, this book offers virtually the only insights into the private thoughts of the laconic General Franco. 73 Pensamiento de Franco (Madrid: Servicio Infor- mativo Espanol, 1964), p. 434. 74 New York Times, 23 December 1959, p. 1.

^^Ibid., 18 May 1958, p. 1.

^^Ibid., 23 December 1959, p. 1. 77 Salgado-Araujo, p. 301. 78 Ibid, pp. 328-29.

^^Ibid., p. 328. 80 Felipe Miera, "La Politica Exterior Franquista y Sus Relaciones con los Estados Unidos de Amêrica," in Horizonte Espanol 1966, vol. 1 (Paris: Ediciones Ruedo Iberico, 1966), pp. 177-206, is a good example of the op­ position criticism of the role of the United States in sup­ per :ing the Franco regime. 81 U.S. Congress, House, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, Congressional Record 108, part 12, p. 16216.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171 82 ABC,[Madrid], 2 October 1961. 83 La Prensa [New York], 28 January 1963. 84 Salgado-Araujo, p. 328. 85 Ibid. Perhaps this is an imprecise quote by Franco's cousin, for it was very well known in 1953 that the USSR possessed "nuclear arms."

®®Ibid., p. 294. 87 Welles, p. 300. This book has the best account of the 1963 renewal negotiations, pp. 292-308.

G^Ibid., p. 299. 89 °=Ibid., p. 300.

9°Ibid., p. 301.

^^Ibid. 92 ^ Ibid., p. 304.

^^Ibid., p. 302. 94 ^*Ibid., p. 303. 95 Interview in Washington, D.C., with former ambas­ sador to Spain (1962-1965) Robert F. Woodward, 27 April 1977.

^®Ibid.

^^Ibid.

S^Welles, p. 295. 99 The full story of this incident is told on pp. 293 and 294 of the Welles book and at greater length on pp, 108 to 138 of Hank Searls, The Lost Prince (New York; World Publishing Company, 1969).

l°°Welles , p- 297.

^°^Ibid., p- 304.

^°^Ibid., p. 305. lOSlbid.

p. 307.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 172

lO^Gallo, p. 311.

^^^Garrigues became Spain's ambassador to the Vatican from May 1964 until 1972. After Franco's death, he was named Justice Minister in the first government of King Juan Carlos, from December 1975 to July 1976. One of his sons was elected a representative from Madrid to the lower house of Spain's new Parliament on Prime Minister Suârez's ticket in June 1977. 107 ^^'Gallo, p. 311. 108 The text of the Joint Declaration from which the following quotations are taken may be found in the Depart­ ment of State Bulletin, 26 September 1963, pp. 1-2. 109 NATO Handbook (Brussels; NATO Information Serv­ ice, February 1976), p. 10.

^^^New York Times, 27 September 1963.

^^^Welles, p. 308. 112 "Lease Extended," Economist [London], 5 October 1963, p. 33. 113 Washington Post, 6 October 1963. 114 Salgado-Araujo, p. 395. ll^ibid.

^^^Interview with Ambassador Robert F. Woodward.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 5

AN ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS; U.S. POLICY

TOWARD SPAIN, 1963-1970

Far more than base rights in Spain are involved. And it is no answer for any Senator to give that a reassessment of commitments should take place, but that it should start with some other country than Spain. Spain is where it should start.

Senator J. W. Fulbright 6 August 1970

United States policy toward Spain emerged from -

years as a secondary issue to become a major focus of

foreign policy debate in the United States during the 1968-

1970 period. Following a brief analysis of the development

and frictions in U.S. relations with Spain prior to 1968,

this chapter will analyze the U.S. debate over policy

toward Spain. Although this analysis is undertaken from

the perspective of bureaucratic politics, the Spanish

policy debate appears as a classic clash of the executive

and legislative branches over foreign policy prerogatives.

Also, systemic inputs to U.S. Spanish policy— increased

Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean, Spanish pol­

icy toward the United States, and the frustrating situation

in Vietnam— had great influence on the debate and the

173

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174

policy toward Spain that finally emerged. After two years

of negotiations, the United States and Spain were able to

retain their close ties with a new agreement in August

1970. But the final result of the long debate over U.S.

policy toward Spain was to mark the reassertion of the role

of Congress in foreign policy.

U.S.-Spanish Relations, 1963-1968

The first years after the 1963 renewal of the

agreements with Spain were marked by a broadening of U.S.

cooperation with Spain. In the strictly military area,

Spain received the $100 million in military aid promised

under the terms of the 1963 renewal. The United States,

as noted earlier, obtained permission to base Polaris sub­

marines in Rota and largely deactivated the Morôn and

Zaragoza air bases after the B-47 bombers finally departed

in 1965.^ Foreign Minister Castiella visited the United

States in February 1964 and was given a briefing at Stra- 2 tegic Air Command headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. U.S.

cooperation with Spain was not limited to military matters,

however. By 1964, the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration had concluded an agreement for tracking

stations in Spain which gave Spain a role in the U.S. space

program.^ In February 1965, the Export-Import bank loaned

Spain $24 million to purchase from American companies her

first nuclear power plant.^

Despite these advances in U.S.-Spanish cooperation,

serious problems were to arise between the two nations and

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complicate the projected 1968 renewal of the bases agree­

ments. The first major problem arose over Spain's refusal

to cease trade with Castro's Cuba. The United States

pressed Spain to join its embargo on trade with Cuba, cit­

ing Article 6 of the 1953 Mutual Defense Agreement, which

pledged the Spanish government's cooperation with the

United States "in taking measures designed to control trade

with nations which threaten the maintenance of world

peace.In the spring of 1964, the new Johnson adminis­

tration, in a characteristically ham-handed manner,

announced that U.S. aid to certain nations trading with

Cuba would be suspended.^ Although Spain's trade with Cuba

amounted only to $12 million yearly, it was one of the 7 nations cited. Fortunately, the Johnson administration

heeded protests in the United States and abroad and can- O celled its planned punative measures. The Spanish,

needless to say, came away from this incident with their

honor offended and a residue of bitterness. However, the

greatest cause of problems in U.S. relations with Spain

during the 1963-1968 period was the 1966 Palomares disaster.

The Palomares disaster of 1966 sensitized the Span­

ish government and public to the nuclear risks from the

American presence in Spain— a matter which both nations had

discreetly avoided mentioning since Air Force Secretary

Talbott's ill-considered remark of 1953. On 17 January 1966 a Strategic Air Command B-52 bomber collided over

southeastern Spain with a KC-135 refueling plane, releasing

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four unarmed hydrogen bombs. Three of these bombs landed

near the small Spanish fishing village of Palomares and

were recovered within twenty-four hours after the acci- 9 dent. The fourth H-bomb was recovered from the ocean off

the Spanish coast on 7 April 1966— eighty days after its

loss.^^ Although none of the people of Palomares were

hurt by the crash or contaminated by radioactivity, the

Spanish government demanded that all American planes bear­

ing nuclear bombs be barred from flying over Spain. The

United States agreed to the Spanish demand and indicated

in 1970 that overflights of Spain with nuclear weapons had

never been resumed.The most serious result of this

incident was that it placed the Spanish government in a

defensive position before its own angry public regarding

the U.S. bases in Spain. In combination with the danger of

a Soviet attack on U.S. bases, this concern over dangers

from the U.S. military presence in Spain itself no doubt

contributed to the large Spanish asking price for renewal 12 of the bases agreements in 1968.

As negotiations for the 1968 renewal were about to

begin in 1968, other actions by the United States angered

the Spanish. In January of 1968, eighteen ships of the

U.S. Sixth fleet, including the flagship, paid a visit to

Gibraltar. Virtually every Spaniard, from General Franco

to the far left opposition, agreed that Gibraltar should

be returned to Spain by the British. The Spanish govern­

ment was therefore furious at this ostentatious U.S. naval

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visit to Gibraltar, which occurred at the very time that Spain's demand for the return of Gibraltar (unsupported by

the United States) was being considered in the United

Nations. A Spanish protest note to the United States even

insinuated that Spanish ports might in the future be

closed to U.S. ships, and even the Spanish military pub­

licly attacked the United States. President Johnson's 1 January 1968 measures to

restrict American investment overseas had already extended

Spain's disillusion with the United States to the economic

field. Spain was classified with the industrialized

nations of Western Europe to which U.S. direct investment

was restricted.This was an unwelcome blow to Spain's

development plans, for the United States was the largest

foreign investor in Spain in the 1960-1970 period,

accounting for 33.7 percent of total foreign investment.

All of the above issues— military, diplomatic, and

economic— account for Spain's disillusion with the United

States as the time for renewal negotiations neared i n '

early 1968. Spain was thus determined to ask a high price

for the renewal of the bases agreements in 1968. The price

would include upgrading the agreements to a treaty, greatly

increased military aid, a reduction of the American pres­

ence in Spain, Spanish exemption from overseas investment

restrictions and even support on the Gibraltar issue.

These high demands were a further provocation to those in

the United States who, during the 1968-1970 debate over

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U.S. policy toward Spain, opposed the policy of close ties

with Spain.

The Military Rationale for Spanish Bases, 1968

Since the retention of U.S. military bases in Spain

was the prime policy goal of the United States in the

negotiations with Spain which began in 1968, it is impor­

tant to review the military rationale for these bases.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler

publicly outlined this rationale at the April 1969 hearings

by Senator Fulbright's Foreign Relations Subcommittee on

U.S. Security Commitments and Agreements Abroad.

General Wheeler's testimony makes clear that U.S.

policy toward Spain in 1968 was, as in previous years,

predicated on military strategy. In late 1967 the Joint

Chiefs of Staff "studied the functions and roles of the 17 joint-use bases and facilities in Spain." They concluded

that the maintenance of the bases was important to the

United States and recommended in January 1968 to the Secre­

tary of Defense that the U.S.-Spanish Defense Agreement of 18 1953 be extended for another five years.

The military rationale for retaining Spanish bases

emphasized the value of the bases in maintaining the con­

ventional force presence of the United States in the south­

ern Europe-Mediterranean area. Although this strategic

rationale was already evident in 1963 (as discussed in the

previous chapter), it was given added force by the Soviet

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naval buildup in the Mediterranean. A joint State-Defense

Department document submitted to the Foreign Relations

Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments

Abroad clearly indicated this concern when it noted:

The Soviet Mediterranean Naval Squadron, which first began operations in 1963, has been expanding steadily over the past several years. . . it could threaten the strategic balance upon which countries on the littoral, such as Spain, have relied. . . . The support which the Spanish bases supply to the American presence in the Western Mediterranean area, however, adds to the strength of our forces. . . .1^

General Wheeler's testimony also pointed out other

changes in the international strategic environment since

1963 which enhanced the value to the United States of the Spanish bases in their conventional role. General Wheeler

cited "the French military withdrawal from NATO" and noted

that with "the restriction on overflights of France and

Morocco, our current overflight rights in Spain take on 20 added value." He stated that Spanish airbases were used

in peacetime "principally for airlift of personnel and

materiel into the southern Europe/Mediterranean area," and

cited the forward-deployment role of the tactical fighter 21 wing at Torrejôn. Rota was justified primarily in its

strategic deterrent role, as a base for nine Polaris sub- 22 marines and their supporting tender. General Wheeler's

conclusion regarding U.S. bases in Spain was very clear:

It is the judgement of the Department of Defense that the availability of the Spanish base complex and operating rights will continue to be militarily of great importance to the United States during the next five y e a r s . 23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 180

Negotiations, 1968

In March of 1968 the Spanish formally requested

negotiations on the future of U.S. bases in Spain, indicat­

ing that an automatic five-year extension of the existing 24 agreements was out of the question. In accordance with the Johnson administration's foreign policy procedures, the

Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) for Europe "was

assigned the task of developing the U.S. position for the 25 forthcoming negotiations." The IRG was chaired by the

Assistant Secretary of State for Western European affairs,

and included representatives of the Secretary of Defense,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, AID, USIA and the National

Security Council staff. This IRG had the general responsi­

bility for the intragovernmental coordination of foreign

policy, and reported to a similarly composed Senior Inter­

departmental Group (SIG). The SIG was responsible for the

top-level coordination of foreign policy and was chaired by

the Under Secretary of State. Even before the IRG had reached a decision on U.S.

policy in the negotiations, a Spanish general Manuel Dlez

Alegrîa, visited Washington in June 1968 and met with a

U.S. military team headed by a general who acted on behalf

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 26 Security Affairs. The Spanish general presented a list

of military equipment which Spain requested "as quid pro

quo in connection with the extension of the defense agree- 27 ment." The Spanish military aid requests added up to the

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astounding sum of $1 billion over the five-year period of 2 8 the proposed renewal. According to General Wheeler, the military team

analyzed the Spanish military aid request and reported its

cost to the IRG for Europe. Between June and September,

the U.S. position for the negotiations "was developed

through the IRG/Europe and Senior Interdepartmental Group

mechanisms and approved by the President following Congres-

sional consultations." 29 Interestingly, the man appointed

as negotiator for the U.S. military aid offer was the very

Townsend Hoopes, then Under Secretary of the Air Force, who

had written the perceptive 1958 article on overseas bases

in U.S. military strategy.

The United States proposal finally presented to the

Spanish shortly before the previous agreements were due to

terminate in September 1968 offered Spain $140 million in 31 military grant aid. The final Spanish request was for

$700 million in military aid "plus a defense agreement

guaranteeing American assistance in case of foreign ..32 aggression." With the United States and Spain thus a half bil­

lion dollars apart on terms for renewal of the bases agree­

ments, at the 26 September 1968 renewal deadline Spanish

Foreign Minister Castiella formally invoked the complicated

termination procedure of the 1953 Defense Agreement. This

procedure gave an additional six months "consultative

period" (until 26 March 1969) to the two nations to reach

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agreement and then, failing such agreement, gave the United

States one year in which to withdraw its forces from Spain.

On the same day that the termination procedure was invoked,

an "official Spanish Government declaration" stated that

"the Spanish Government would welcome the removal" of the 33 Torrejôn air base situated close to the capital of Madrid.

The failure of the United States and Spain to reach

agreement in the 1968 negotiations was due to several fac­

tors. U.S. policy toward Spain in 1968 suffered not from

bureaucratic politics— the executive branch was in agree­

ment on the need to retain Spanish bases and the fierce

Congressional attack on U.S. policy toward Spain did not

begin until 1969— but from bureaucratic paralysis. The

escalating war in Vietnam and domestic turbulence evidenced

in the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert

Kennedy, were serious distractions to Washington policy­

makers. But the most paralyzing effect probably resulted

from President Johnson's announcement that he would not

seek re-election and the quadrennial Presidential election

scramble which had its usual effect of distracting public

and official attention from U.S. foreign policy initiative. In any case, the U.S. policy apparatus with respect to

Spain was so slow in developing a negotiating offer that

failure to reach agreement with Spain by the normal 26 Sep­

tember 1968 deadline was made almost inevitable. The Spanish, of course, made an already difficult Spanish pol­

icy decision in Washington almost impossible with their

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exorbitant demands for aid. The Spanish seriously misread

the mood in Washington in 1968 toward reassessment and re­

duction of U.S. foreign commitments. By asking an inflated

price for renewal of the bases agreements, the Spanish

eliminated the possibility for a rather routine renewal of

the agreements with the Johnson administration and thus

left the door open to the buildup of fierce Congressional

opposition to U.S. policy toward Spain in 1969 and 1970.

The Executive-Legislative Battle Over Spain— Round I

The first round of what was to develop into a pro­

longed debate between the legislative and executive

branches over U.S. policy toward Spain had its genesis in

an agreement reached between Secretary of State Rusk and

Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella on 17 October 1968.

Rusk proposed that the United States and Spain hold

. . .a high level military meeting to come up with common strategic concepts, which would consti­ tute the framework for continued United States- Spanish military cooperation. . . to be followed by a related program of military assistance and. . . political conversations to clear up any remaining bilateral military and political m a t t e r s . ^4

Foreign Minister Castiella agreed to this proposal, and

General Dlez Alegrîa and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman

Wheeler were designated to conduct the military negotia- 35 tions.

In November 1968 a large number of American offi­

cials visited Madrid to try to get the stalled negotiations

moving again. Air Force Secretary Harold Brown made a

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personal survey of the Spanish bases, and Secretary of

State Rusk visited Madrid after the NATO ministerial meet­ ing in November and saw both Franco and Foreign Minister

Castiella. But by now Rusk was a lame duck after the

early November election of Richard Nixon, and Castiella

refused Rusk's request to extend the negotiating period

another six months beyond the March 1969 deadline to

allow the new administration time to develop its policy 3 6 toward Spain.

The key role in continuing the negotiations with

Spain thus fell to General Wheeler, who arrived in Madrid

shortly after Secretary Rusk and began talks with the

Spanish military on 18-20 November 1968. In a memorandum

to General Dlez Alegrîa, General Wheeler wrote: "By the

presence of U.S. forces in Spain, the U.S. gives Spain a

far more visible and credible security guarantee than any 37 written document." In the Vietnam atmosphere of public

and Congressional wariness of foreign commitments, such a

statement was political dynamite when it shortly became

public knowledge.

To compound problems. General Wheeler delegated

General David Burchinal, Deputy Commander of NATO forces

and of U.S. forces in Europe, to head subsequent negotia­

tions with the Spanish. On 6 December 1968, Burchinal

signed a note of "agreed views" with the Spanish military

leaders, which a prefatory note stated "must constitute" 38 the basis for future negotiations. He acknowledged that

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Spain might face "a threat from North Africa." This vague

reference to Spanish concern over the radical leftist

regime in Algeria was an acknowledgement which the Spanish

could use to justify their exorbitant demands for military

aid. Burchinal also agreed to the statement that the U.S.

was obligated to defend Western Europe "of which Spain is

an integral part." This terminology could be— and was—

interpreted as an extension of the NATO defense guarantee 39 to Spain without Senatorial approval.

Newsday columnist Flora Lewis made all of these

facts public in a 25 February 1969 newspaper article. This

raised the issue of U.S. policy toward Spain from an

obscure secondary issue to front-page news— and marked the

beginning of a two-year debate over U.S. policy toward

Spain. Initial press and Congressional blame of the mili­

tary in this matter was proven by subsequent testimony

before the Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements

and Commitments Abroad to be incorrect. The real blame for

this situation must first be placed on Secretary of State

Rusk, who assigned military negotiators to discuss matters

which inevitably had political implications of U.S. commit­

ment to Spain. This role of the military in negotiating

agreements with Spain was politically acceptable in the

United States when General Kissner was assigned a similar

task in 1951. But in the superheated Vietnam atmosphere

of late 1968— with the press and Congress wary of foreign

commitments and distrustful of the military inclination in

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such matters— Rusk's designation of military negotiators

to work out the basic terms of a new agreement with Spain

was asking for trouble.

This trouble was compounded by poor bureaucratic

coordination between the Defense Department and the State

Department during this period of a change of administra­

tions . General Wheeler submitted his November memorandum

containing the "commitment" comment to the Assistant Secre­

tary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Paul

Warnke, but neither Warnke nor the people in the State

Department with whom he reportedly consulted caught the

potential problem with the Wheeler "commitment" pledge to

Spain.Moreover, General Burchinal signed the December

1968 "agreed views" before they were forwarded to the State

and Defense Departments, due to "some misunderstanding."^^

By the time that these problems caused by Secretary

of State Rusk's decision to turn over a sensitive negotia­

ting task to the military were revealed to the public in February 1969, Spanish policy in the negotiations had al­

ready set the stage for U.S. opposition to further close

ties with Spain. It was widely reported in the press that

Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella proposed to Secretary of

State Rusk during his November 1968 visit to Madrid that

both American and Soviet naval forces withdraw from the 42 Mediterranean. Castiella's reported threats to close

the U.S. bases in Spain and reorient Spain's foreign policy

to a neutralist position upset not only Americans who felt

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they were being blackmailed but even, reportedly, irritated 43 the Spanish military high command.

Spain's own version of ostpolitik included the

opening of commercial relations with several of the Eastern

European countries and allowing the Soviet Union to provi­

sion its fishing boats from a port in the Canary Islands.

Although the Spanish ostpolitik seems to have been moti­

vated primarily by commercial considerations, it provided

Spain with some additional leverage in its negotiations

with the United States. But the mutual antipathy of Franco

and the Communists was still too strong to allow the estab­

lishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and the

Soviet bloc countries.

It is unclear whether Castiella really perceived

neutrality as a viable option for Spain, or merely intended

to use this threat as a negotiating ploy with the United States. In any case, the final decisions in foreign policy

were made by Franco, and there is no evidence that he ever

considered Spanish neutrality to be a feasible option.

In January 1969, Franco brought back to the fore­

front of attention in the United States the dictatorial

nature of his regime. He reversed the previous trend of

relaxation and gradual liberalization in Spain by the

declaration of a state of emergency giving the police

special powers against the Basque terrorist organization, ETA. These various Spanish actions were all complicating

inputs to the reconsideration of U.S. policy toward Spain,

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and may have influenced the United States to drag its feet

in dealings with Spain in early 1969.

The publication of the Flora Lewis article on

25 February 1969 ignited the first round of the debate

over U.S. policy toward Spain. Reaction in the press and

Congress was immediate and angry. Here, it seemed, was an

exemplary case of serious U.S. commitments being made by

military officials without the approval of the Congress or

public discussion. Here, also, was a chance for the Demo­

cratic Congress to embarrass the new Republican adminis­

tration on the sensitive matter of U.S. commitments abroad.

Press and Congressional attention, as a result of

the Wheeler-Burchinal controversy and the Spanish negotia­

ting demands, focused a harsh light on U.S. policy toward

Spain as the new Nixon administration faced the 26 March

1969 deadline for agreement. One of the main points of

press and Congressional criticism concerned the need and

military rationale for Spanish bases. On 12 March 1969,

the New York Times in an editorial noted how the importance

of the Spanish air bases in their nuclear deterrent mission

had fallen off sharply "with the coming into service of

B-52 bombers and intercontinental missiles based in the

United States" and noted that the Polaris submarines at

Rota could be based on the U.S. east coast "at only 44 slightly greater cost." Senator Stuart Symington, a

member of both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations

Committees in the Senate (and formerly President Truman's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 189

first Secretary of the Air Force), stated in late March that the Spanish bases were built "under defense policies

that now appear obsolescent to the point of being obso- 45 lete." An editorial in the Washington Post on 17 March

1969 also attacked the military need for Spanish bases,

maintaining that

No one, not even the Air Force, contends that the three air bases in Spain— in this, the age of the ICBM— are essential to American defense. . . . The naval base, useful for the servicing of Polaris submarines, is not essential either. . .

The atmosphere in the United States had clearly changed

since 1951, when even President Truman would not "override

the convictions of . . . military men" regarding Spain.

Obviously, changes in various systemic inputs to U.S.

foreign policy— the international military environment, the Vietnam war, and Spanish policy demands— account for much

of the skepticism and challenge beginning in 1969 to past

U.S. policy toward Spain.

Another argument advanced in press editorials as

the Nixon administration considered its policy toward

Spain in March 1969 was the political risk of the U.S.

presence in Spain. The political goals of the United

States regarding Spain had since 1951 been subordinated to

military strategy, but the press comment in early 1969

tried to force a reappraisal of these priorities. The New

York Times editorial bluntly noted that "the Franco regime has reverted to type with a 'state of exception'" and con­

tended that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 190

The bases would almost certainly become a focus for anti-American sentiment if Spanish students and workers gained greater freedom of action after the death or retirement of Generalissimo F r a n c o . 47

The Washington Post asked "Which comes first: politics or 48 military security. ..." Unfortunately, this question

was never explicitly addressed in the legislative-executive

policy debate over Spain.

Interim Renewal— 1969

While the press and the Congress were challenging

past U.S. policy toward Spain, the Nixon administration

began to develop its own policy toward Spain. The first

problem for the new administration was to contain the

damage to U.S.-Spanish relations caused by the Flora Lewis

revelations. The Spanish ambassador in Washington formally

protested to Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson

over the Lewis story, which the Spanish regarded "as a 49 deliberate leak, aimed at sabotaging the talks." After

assuring the Spanish that this was not the case, the Nixon

administration had General Burchinal sign a new statement

with the Spanish military, leleting the controversial pro­

visions noted earlier. Meanwhile, in early March, the

Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on U.S. Security

Agreements and Commitments Abroad temporarily closed the

Burchinal controversy— with some embarrassment at the dis­

covery that Secretary of State Rusk had precipated the

military role in the negotiations. Nevertheless, the Sub­

committee rebuked General Wheeler for his statement

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regarding a U.S. "commitment" to Spain.President Nixon

attempted to put the Burchinal controversy to rest at a

press conference on 4 March, when he stated regarding Spain:

"No commitment has been made. My view is that none should

be made.

Thus, by the end of February 1969 the military role

in the renewal negotiations was terminated. At this point,

the new Kissinger National Security Council machinery took 52 charge of the review of U.S. policy toward Spain. The

conclusions of this policy review may be deduced from the

14 April 1969 testimony of General Wheeler cited earlier in

the discussion of the military rationale for U.S. bases in

Spain. In brief, the military judgment that Spanish bases

remained "of great importance to the United States" was 53 accepted as the basis for future U.S. policy toward Spain.

The negotiations on renewal of the agreements

finally resumed when Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella

visited Secretary of State Rogers in Washington on

25 March 1969, one day before the expiration of the six-

month consultative period. The details of the negotia­

tions were handled by Under Secretary of State for Politi­

cal Affairs U. Alexis Johnson and Nuho Aguirre de Career,

chief of the American section of the Spanish Foreign Minis- 54 try. On the 26 March deadline, following a visit by

Castiella with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger,

the United States and Spain announced "agreement in 55 principle," on a five-year renewal. This "agreement

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 192

in principle," lacking in specific provisions, was primarily

a device to keep the negotiations going without the added

complication of Spain having to give the United States its

one-year base eviction notice on the 26 March deadline.

Both countries were still in disagreement over the amount

of U.S. military aid to Spain— the United States offered

$175 million over the five-year period, while Spain de­

manded $300 million. The attack of the Congress and the press upon the

apparent decision of the Nixon administration to continue

the U.S. policy of close military ties with the Franco

regime briefly went into high gear again. The policy stand

of both the influential liberal press (primarily the New

York Times, Washington Post, and Christian Science Monitor)

and the liberals in the Democratic majority in Congress was

largely due to a wariness of possibly entangling foreign

commitments in reaction to Vietnam. As one article on the

Spanish bases noted "the malaise over the seemingly unend­

ing war in Vietnam has produced a distinct distaste for 57 taking on any more obligations."

Congressional opposition to continuing the bases

agreements with Spain was also influenced, especially in

the Senate, by the desire to reassert the Constitutional

prerogatives of the legislative branch in foreign policy.

This precipitated a bureaucratic politics struggle, with

the policy positions of both the legislative and executive

branches resulting from attempts to safeguard or expand

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 193

their institutional role in foreign policy. The key figure in this struggle on the Congress ■>

sional side was Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas. Sena­ tor Fulbright, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, was in a position where (according to the Con­

stitutional "rules of the game") he and his committee were

responsible for recommending approval of ambassadors and foreign aid programs. These powers— along with the Con-

gresional prerogative of questioning executive branch

officials— gave Senator Fulbright and his committee consid­

erable power to press their foreign policy views on the

new Republican administration.

Soon after the 26 March 1969 "agreement in princi­

ple" between the United States and Spain, Senator Fulbright

began to use his institutional leverage to rekindle the

public debate on U.S. policy toward Spain that had begun a

few weeks earlier with publicity about the "commitment"

statement of General Wheeler and General Burchinal's agree­

ments with the Spanish. Secretary of State William Rogers

was called before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

28 March 1969 and "assured the senators that there would be

no upgrading of the U.S. commitment to Spain over the

previous agreementsThe Nixon administration thus

maintained that "since there is nothing new in the agree­

ment, it is not subject to the Senate's action.

But Senator Fulbright and several other members of

the Foreign Relations Committee such as Senators Frank

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Church and Jacob Javits were unwilling to accept the bland

assurances of the executive branch on this point. The

Senate Foreign Relations Committee called Under Secretary

of State Elliot Richardson and chief negotiator with the

Spanish U. Alexis Johnson to testify in early April.

The committee concluded (in an echo of General Wheeler's

statement to the Spanish) that "in practice the very fact

of our physical presence in Spain constitutes a quasi-

commitment to the defense of the Franco regime.The

military rationale for the Spanish bases was questioned by 62 Senator Church. But the real broader implications of

the debate over Spanish policy became clear when Senator

Fulbright questioned President Nixon's new appointee as

ambassador to Spain, Robert Hill, on 22 April 1969. Ful­

bright indicated that he would demand that the executive

branch present any new bases agreement with Spain to the

Senate for approval as a treaty.

This attempt to have the Senate pass judgement on

U.S. policy toward Spain by forcing the executive branch

to submit new agreements as treaties instead of executive

agreements was the central position of Senator Fulbright

and many members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

for the next year and a half. It is interesting to note

that Senator Fulbright had also been Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time of the 1963

renewal and at that time made no objections to the renewal

of the bases agreements with Spain as executive agreements.

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As a perceptive article in April 1969 noted: "The real

puzzle in all this is why the Committee has never prev­

iously felt the necessity of examining this agree- 64 ment. . . ." While the bureaucratic politics of reasser­

tion of the Senate's foreign policy prerogatives account

for much of this challenge to the executive's policy toward

Spain, the role of broader systemic influences must also

be noted in accounting for a challenge in 1969 instead of

1963. In brief, the disillusion with the Vietnam War in

the late 1960's generated an atmosphere in much of the

press and Congress of distrust of executive branch assur­

ances on foreign commitments and skepticism regarding

military justifications for overseas bases.

Press comment on the executive-legislative clash

over U.S. policy toward Spain in the spring of 1969 make

clear the broader institutional implications of this issue.

As one article noted: "The reaction of the Senate to this

situation will thus give the first indication of how it 65 intends to deal with future executive commitments." A

Washington Post editorial on "Untangling Our Commitments to

Spain" in late April 1969 outlined U.S. policy alterna­

tives— and indicated the convenient way in which the con­

tention that the agreements with Spain should be submitted

to the Senate in treaty form dovetailed with the long-held

desire of much of the liberal press in the United States to

end the close U.S. ties with Franco's dictatorial regime:

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Secretary Rogers. . .could reaffirm the security commitment and send a treaty embodying it to the Senate, where it would have precious little chance of surviving. Or he could proceed with the negotia­ tions with a flat statement that the presence of American forces at the Spanish bases does not con­ stitute any kind of security guarantee to Franco's Spain. Such a statement would probably be unaccept­ able to Madrid, which would be fine with us. . .

The climax of the debate over U.S. policy toward

Spain was not, however, to occur in 1969 in the clear manner

outlined by the Washington Post. Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella returned to Washington in May 1969 with a Spanish

offer to extend the agreement with the United States on an

interim basis until 1970. This shift in Spanish policy was

probably designed to allow time for negotiation of an

entirely new agreement which would, hopefully, be more

favorable to Spain. As the Washington Post noted at the

time, the effect of this offer was to undo the "agreement

in principle" for a five-year extension reached in March.

The Nixon administration, facing more pressing foreign

policy problems in Vietnam, accepted the Spanish proposal

for an interim agreement. On 20 June 1969 the United

States and Spain extended the former agreements two years

from their original 26 September 1968 expiration date. The joint statement issued at that time noted that "the two

Governments will use this period to determine the new rela­

tionship of cooperation between the two countries that 6 7 would follow the present Agreement." This interim re­ newal specified that the defense agreement would, "in the

absence of further agreement, terminate one year after the

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conclusion of the extension period, that is, 26 September

1971."^® The United States agreed to give $50 million in

military aid to Spain, plus an additional $25 million in

Export-Import bank credits for arms purchases.

This surprising short-term renewal provided leaders

in both the United States and Spain time to calm domestic

opposition to the agreements and time to work out a new

relationship. The interim agreement came at a time when Foreign Minister Castiella was under attack from powerful

military and business leaders in Spain for pushing his

demands on the United States too far.^^ The interim agree­

ment with the United States allowed Castiella to rebut

charges of anti-Americanism from his domestic opponents,

yet at the same time (due to the simultaneous announcement

of the final deactivation of the Mordn air base) make the 71 claim that he had reduced the American presence in Spain.

The interim renewal had a similar dual virtue for the

Nixon administration. The executive branch was pleased,

since the primary policy goal of retention of the military

bases had been achieved for the short-term. At the same

time, the provisional nature of the agreement was inter­ preted by opponents of further close ties with the Franco

regime as heralding the end of the long military relation­

ship with Spain. Senator Fulbright expressed his satisfac­

tion with the agreement, since he hoped that it was "a step 72 toward liquidation of the military bases. ..." The

Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the $50 million

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in military aid to Spain in October 1969 without serious

objection.w 73

Although there is no evidence that the Nixon admin­

istration tried to mislead the Congress regarding its

desire for continued close military ties with Spain, the administration was no doubt pleased by the Congressional

willingness to see in the interim agreement with Spain what

they wanted to see. The executive-legislative policy

debate over Spain was not over in June 1969, but merely

entered a year of hibernation. The climax of the struggle

would occur in the following year.

Spain's New "Flexibility"

With the temporary renewal of the bases agreements

secured in July 1969, the Nixon administration set out to

repair its strained relationship with Spain. Actually,

President Nixon had begun to move in this direction by his

April appointment of his close political ally and personal 74 friend Robert Hill as ambassador to Spain. When Ambassa­

dor Hill arrived in Spain, reportedly he was "determined

to try to bypass" the obdurate Spanish Foreign Minister 75 Castiella. Hill began to discuss the future U.S. rela­

tionship with Spain directly with Franco's closest advisor,

the Vice President of the Spanish Government Admiral Luis

Carrero Blanco. This reportedly angered Castiella and

further weakened his position in the government, which was

already "shaky" due to the anger of the Spanish military

at his "obduracy" in dealing with the United States.

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Franco finally decided to end the bickering within

his government— and between Spain and the United States—

by the appointment of a new cabinet on 29 October 1969.

Franco's cabinet changes seem to have been motivated pri­

marily by domestic scandal involving some previous minis­

ters. But the removal of Castiella as Foreign Minister was

clearly motivated by his hard line in negotiations with the

United States and the resulting difficulties in Spain's relations with the United States. The clear ascendancy of

the Opus Dei technocratic faction, headed by Admiral Car­

rero Blanco, was revealed from the composition of the new 77 cabinet. This cabinet composition was important, for

although the 77-year old Franco still made the final deci­

sions on all important domestic and foreign policy issues,

the cabinet was increasingly taking the initiative on

policy details. In the summer of 1969, Franco had already

named Bourbon Prince Juan Carlos, the grandson of Spain's

last King, as his eventual successor as head of state.

A basic guideline of Franco's new government was

that Spain should be more flexible in the conduct of its 78 foreign policy. The new Spanish Foreign Minister,

Gregorio L6pez Bravo, stated in an interview that he hoped

to make Spanish relations with the United States "closer, 79 with loyalty and dignity." Richard Mowrer of the Chris­

tian Science Monitor commented: "Mr. Lôpez Bravo, the new Foreign Minister, appears to be better informed and less

rigid on the question of finding a formula for a continuing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 200 80 American military toehold here."

The new Spanish Foreign Minister quickly demon­

strated that "flexibility" in Spain's foreign policy could

also be used to strengthen Spain's bargaining position with

the United States. On 2 January 1970 Lôpez Bravo, return­

ing from a trip to the Philippines, stopped for several

hours in Moscow and spoke to various high Soviet officials

in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about establishing con­

sular and commercial agreements between Spain and its for- 81 mer arch-enemy, the Soviet Union. As a journalist com­

mented at the time,

Spain. . . has not been averse to using the development of East-bloc contacts as a factor in its negotiations with the United States for the new agree­ ment— due in September— on American bases in S p a i n . 82

But Spain's relations with the Soviet bloc countries still

stopped short of full diplomatic relations. In another

independent move, Spain signed a $90 million agreement with

France in February 1970 for the purchase of thirty Mirage 83 3-E jets. As the New York Times noted.

The effect of the sale, from the Spanish point of view, is to lessen Spain's dependence on the United States for military supplies. . . to put Spain in a stronger position to bargain on the future of American air and naval bases in S p a i n . 84

Spain's new foreign policy "flexibility" was thus

a double-edged sword. Although the new policy allowed

Spain to exert some pressure on the United States, the

overall effect of the new government's foreign policy posi­

tion was positive from the point of view of those in the

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United States who wanted to continue close military ties

with Spain. Spanish policy toward the United States,

important as an input to U.S. policy toward Spain, would

not in 1970 be the obstructive factor on reaching a new

bases agreement that it had been in the two previous years. The Spanish correctly concluded that the angry mood of

Congress in early 1970 made impossible the approval of even

a guarded form of U.S. defense commitment to Spain. Accept­

ing this reality, the Spanish would bargain with realism

and creative initiative for the best aid quid pro quo

for the bases that they could obtain.

Negotiations, 1970

After another thorough review of the need for the

bases in Spain, President Nixon decided in February 1970

that the retention of the bases would continue to be the Q C main goal of U.S. policy toward Spain. The military

rationale for Spanish bases was bolstered by the obvious

deterioration of the U.S. strategic position in the Mediter­

ranean area. The Soviet Mediterranean naval presence con­

tinued to grow, and a buildup of Soviet base facilities in

Egypt had been underway since the June 1967 Arab-Israeli 8 6 War. In January 1970, as a result of the expulsion of

the United States from the Wheelus air base in Libya, the

United States had asked for and received permission from 8 7 Spain to reactivate the Zaragoza base in Spain. This

base substituted for Wheelus as a weapons training range

for U.S. fighter pilots in Europe.

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As always, there were some doubters in the State

Department in early 1970 regarding the wisdom of continuing 88 close ties to Franco Spain. These few individuals were

primarily concerned with the political risks to the United

States of continuing close military ties with an aging dic­

tator. But these few officials were on the lower policy­

making levels, and in any case Henry Kissinger was in control of the Spanish policy review through his NSC

National Security Study Memorandum procedure. The result

was, once again, a U.S. policy toward Spain based primarily

on military, instead of political goals.

With both the United States and Spain favorably

disposed in early 1970 to reach a new bases agreement, it

remained necessary to find a mutually satisfactory arrange­

ment. Spanish Foreign Minister Lôpez Bravo paid an

official visit to Washington in mid-March 1970 and met with

President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of

Defense Laird and Treasury Secretary David Kennedy. The

young Spanish Foreign Minister astonished the American

officials by switching Spain's aid requests from large

scale military aid "to the field of scientific, educational, 89 social and economic aid." This shift of emphasis held

political advantages for both the United States and Spain.

It provided the Spanish a graceful retreat from their pre­

viously much-publicized high asking price for renewal of

the bases agreement. The shift of emphasis would help the

Nixon administration defend the agreement against press and

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Congressional opposition, by emphasizing U.S. assistance in

bringing Spain into the economic and social mainstream of western industrial nations instead of simply supporting an

authoritarian regime with military aid. Thus, the United

States readily accepted the new Spanish proposal as the basis for future negotiations.

Lôpez Bravo visited Washington again on 13 and 14

April, and gave evidence of the broader scope of the pro­

posed new agreement between the United States and Spain by

conferring with HEW Secretary Robert Finch and Commerce

Secretary Maurice Stans in addition to State and Defense

Department officials. At the conclusion of Lôpéz Bravo's

visit, both nations announced "substantial progress" toward

the conclusion of a new five-year agreement "of general

cooperation. . . in such areas as education, agriculture,

environment, space and science, etc., as well as defense.

At the same time. Commerce Secretary Stans announced the

easing of the balance of payments restrictions on U.S.

investment in Spain which had been in effect since 1 Janu-' ary 1968.^^

By early May 1970 the outlines of a new agreement between the United States and Spain were clear. The new

agreement would be in the form of an executive agreement,

but the Nixon administration expected to coat this bitter

pill for the Senate by avoiding any commitment to Spanish

defense and also by including

. . .provisions for financing wider education in Spain. . . expected to please Senator J. W.

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Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and father of the Fulbright scholarships. 82

Although the exact amount of U.S. military aid to Spain was

not yet agreed upon, in late April 1970 it was assumed

that Secretary of State Rogers would iron out the final

details and sign the new agreement during a visit to Madrid after the NATO Council meeting in late May. But these

plans were upset by a new wave of legislative-executive dispute over U.S. foreign policy.

The Executive-Legislative Battle Over Spain— Round II

The fate of the proposed U.S. agreement with Spain

in May 1970 vividly illustrates how broader systemic fac­

tors, by precipitating a general foreign policy clash

between the legislative and executive branches, affected

the implementation of U.S. policy toward Spain. The U.S.-

South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in early May 1970

brought the Congressional struggle with President Nixon

over foreign policy to a new peak. As a recent popular history of this period noted;

The greatest damage wrought by the Cambodian adventure was its impact on the home front. So great was the public outcry against this new in­ volvement that the Senate, stirring at last to invoke the Congressional right to declare war, passed a measure demanding an evacuation of Ameri­ can troops from Cambodia and an end to air support there by July.83

As a result of the Cambodian invasion, the previous dis­

agreement of the Congress and the President over foreign

policy was now compounded with distrust— for Nixon had led

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the legislative branch and the country to believe that U.S.

policy in southeast Asia was designed to withdraw the

United States from the conflict rather than become involved

in additional countries.

In this atmosphere in Washington in May 1970, it

was reported that the

. . .State and Defense Departments. . . concluded that it would be a tactical error to present a new military agreement to the Senate when it is engaged in debates over the relationship between the President and the Congress on the formulation of foreign and defense policies.84

In the existing atmosphere of legislative distrust, the

Nixon administration correctly realized that its claim

that the new agreements with Spain implied no U.S. commit­

ment to Spain's defense would not be believed by many in

the Senate. This was a serious matter, for even if the

agreements were concluded in executive agreement form, the

Senate in its aroused mood could refuse to vote the neces- 95 sary aid funds for Spain. Thus when Secretary of State

Rogers visited General Franco and Foreign Minister Lôpez

Bravo in Madrid on 29 May 1970 no new agreement was signed

and the two nations simply noted "substantial progress"

toward new agreements.

Nonetheless, the pressure of public and Senatorial

opinion against the expected renewal of the Spanish bases

agreement in the form of an executive agreement continued

to rise in the summer of 1970. The Washington Post

editorialized following Secretary Rogers' visit to Madrid

that "this is no time to be extending our commitments

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abroad in any area," and summed up by noting

In no circumstances should the military argu­ ment for clinging on be allowed to overshadow the general necessity for redefining our global respon­ sibilities in terms less grandiose than those which prevailed in the s i x t i e s . 87

In late June, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird paid a

five-day visit to Spain and confirmed that the talks were

in a "final" phase. While Laird was in Madrid, French

Defense Minister Debré arrived suddenly and signed a

limited military agreement with Spain providing for joint

maneuvers and arms manufacture. This cleverly orches­

trated Spanish maneuver clearly made its point that Spain 9 8 was not soxely dependent on the United States. Final agreement between the United States and Spain

on a five-year "Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation"

was reached in mid-July. The chief negotiator of this

agreement. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

U. Alexis Johnson, along with Deputy Secretary of Defense

David Packard, briefed a closed session of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee on the outlines of the new

agreement on 24 July. Two related aspects of the agreement incurred the

immediate wrath of Senator J. W. Fulbright, the committee

chairman. He again made clear his view that an agreement

of "such great potential importance" should take the form

of a treaty requiring Senatorial approval rather than the 99 planned executive agreement requiring no Senate approval.

Fulbright and other committee members were also unsure as

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to the degree of commitment of the United States to the

defense of Spain implied in the treaty. As the outline of

the new agreement became publicly known in late July 1970,

the New York Times printed an editorial on 28 July

entitled "Vague Pledge to Franco." This editorial echoed Senator Fulbright's doubts over the extent of the U.S.

commitment to Spain and also seconded his anger over refus­

al of the executive branch to submit the planned new

agreement in treaty form. The editorial went on to note

the internal Spanish opposition to the Franco regime and

expressed the view that In fact. Congress should go further and raise the question whether the long-run interests of the United States are served by any renewal of military arrangements with the regime of Generalissimo

That same day. Senator Fulbright demanded on the Senate

floor the submission of the planned agreements to the Sen­

ate in treaty form, and publicly enlisted the support of

his colleague on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Stuart Symington.

Senator Fulbright revealed on 3 August that he

would seek to block the proposed new agreement unless it was submitted to the Senate as a treaty. Claiming that

"the process of orderly constitutional government" required

Senate approval in treaty form, Fulbright threatened to

offer an amendment to the military procurement authoriza­ tion bill then before the Senate forbidding spending of

funds for American bases in Spain unless authorized by the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 208 102 Senate in a treaty. The way in which the Spanish bases

issue had become a focus of Senatorial discontent with exe­

cutive commitments in Southeast Asia was clearly exempli­

fied by Fulbright's disingenuous remark that the issue to

him was not Franco, as he felt "Spain is a more civilized

and liberal dictatorship than the one in South Vietnam.

The State Department issued a statement on 4 August accus­

ing Senator Fulbright, without naming him, of revealing

confidential information from the 24 July briefing about

the proposed new agreement with Spain, to which the Sena­

tor replied by accusing the administration of a policy of 104 selective leaking of information to support its own case.

This exchange clearly revealed how legislative-executive

disagreement was compounded in the aftermath of Cambodia

by open distrust. Senator Fulbright's 3 August speech,

signaling the Nixon administration that he intended to make

a new agreement with Spain the test case in the constitu­

tional dispute between the executive and legislative

branches of government over powers to enter into foreign

commitments, precipitated a decision by President Nixon to

sign the new agreement with Spain before Fulbright could

employ his legislative checkmate.

The Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation

In a hastily arranged ceremony at the State Depart­

ment in Washington on 6 August 1970 Secretary of State

William Rogers and Foreign Minister Lôpez Bravo signed the

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"Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United

States of America and Spain.The agreement contained

nine chapters on such varied topics as general cooperation,

educational and cultural cooperation, scientific and tech­

nical cooperation, cooperation on environmental and urban

development problems, agricultural cooperation, economic

cooperation, and cooperation with respect to public infor­ mation .

The heart of the new agreement, however, was the

chapter on "Cooperation for Defense" and an annex consist­

ing of an exchange of letters between Secretary Rogers and

Foreign Minister Lôpez Bravo specifying planned United States military assistance to Spain. The defense coopera­

tion chapter stated that the United States and Spain

. . .within the framework of their constitutional processes, and to the extent feasible and appropriate, will make compatible their respective defense policies in areas of mutual interest and will grant each other reciprocal defense support.

The chapter also provided that "each Government will sup­

port the defense system of the other," and that the United

States would contribute to modernizing Spanish defense

industries and obtain from the Congress funds for $60 mil­

lion in military grants to Spain. Of this amount, $35 mil­

lion was slated to be combined with $15 million in Spanish

funds to modernize a joint aircraft warning network. The

remaining $25 million in grants was earmarked for providing the Spanish Army various equipment such as tanks, heli­

copters, and artillery. The United States also pledged

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$120 million in Export-Import Bank credits to the purchase of 36 F-4C Phantom jets being phased out by the U.S. Air

Force, and various other aircraft. The United States

promised to loan Spain indefinitely sixteen naval vessels scheduled for deactivation hy the U.S. Navy.

Significantly for the Spanish, the bases were now

considered "Spanish military installations" instead of

joint U.S.-Spanish bases. The United States also relin­

quished to Spain its control of the petroleum pipeline

between Rota and Zaragoza which had cost $25 million to

construct in the 1950's, as well as all claims to the

residual value of the bases in Spain. The total cost of

the new agreement to the United States, in terms of these

military grants, loans and relinquished claims, as well as

$3 million a year pledged to Spain's educational reform

program, added up to approximately $300 million over the

five-year period of the agreements.

The Executive-Legislative Battle Over Spain— Round III

The final round of the legislative-executive strug­

gle over U.S. policy toward Spain began with the 6 August

1970 signing of the new executive agreement with Spain. But

the fact that the new agreement had already been signed

meant that Senator Fulbright and other Congressional oppo­

nents of a new executive agreement with Spain had already

suffered a technical knockout before the final round of

debate even began. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield

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bluntly confessed the hopeless position of the Congres­ sional opponents following the hasty signing of the new

executive agreement when he noted that "once an agreement

is signed, it goes into effect— I don't know how we can 107 recall it as an amendment to a bill." Even Senator

Fulbright admitted that the administration had gained

. . . a tactical advantage on the Senate floor in debate over the Spanish agreement by having already signed it and thus committed the prestige of this Nation toward fulfillment of its t e r m s . In short, by taking advantage of a legal "rule of the game"

— that executive agreements, once signed, take effect

without Congressional action— the Nixon administration had

outmaneuvered the Congressional opponents of continuing

close ties with Spain. Although this administration outmaneuvering of the

Congress on the issue of U.S. policy toward Spain rendered

anti-climactic the ensuing Congressional debate, the execu­

tive action in ramming through the new agreement with

Spain in spite of Congressional opposition had broader

implications for U.S. foreign policy in the 1970's. As one

perceptive analysis of the event noted;

With considerable support from within the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Fulbright had made the new Spanish agreement into a test case in the consti­ tutional struggle between the Executive branch and the Senate over their respective foreign policy-making powers. . . aside from upstaging Senator Fulbright, which more and more seems to be the deliberate intent of the White House, the Administration also may have established an important constitutional point. . . the Spanish agreement demonstrates that the initiative and thus the power still rests with the Executive branch. Now that the Executive agreement is signed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 212

the Senate has been confronted with a fait accompli. . . .109

As will be noted subsequently, the Senate took

several actions to remedy the institutional weakness of

Congress vis-à-vis the executive which was revealed in this

clash over U.S. policy toward Spain.

Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson provided

a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

the day of the signing of the new agreement attempting to

respond to their objections. Johnson's statement revealed

that President Nixon had personally decided to maintain

military ties with Spain.Once again, the individual beliefs of the President were crucial factors in determin­

ing the direction and timing of U.S. policy toward Spain.

President Nixon's low regard for Congressional "meddling"

in foreign policy has been frequently noted— and Nixon's

August 1970 determination to override Congressional objec­

tions on the Spanish policy issue had no doubt been

strengthened by the fierce Congressional attacks on his

Vietnam policy earlier in 1970.

Despite Johnson's statement to the Foreign Rela­

tions Committee, Senator Fulbright announced on the day of

the signing of the agreement that he would demand full and

prompt public hearings before his committee on the new agreement.Even then, the Nixon administration ignored

Senator Fulbright's call for public hearings on the new

agreement until Senator Fulbright threatened to do "no

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 213

business" in his committee on pending administration ambas- 112 sadorial appointments. The administration finally

agreed on 19 August to the appearance of Under Secretary

of State U. Alexis Johnson and Deputy Defense Secretary

Packard before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

26 August.

Prior to the 26 August hearings, there was a flurry

of press reports and editorials on the new agreement. Edi­

torial comment was predictably split along liberal-conserv­

ative lines, with significant emphasis given to the under­

lying constitutional issue of legislative-executive powers

over foreign policy. The Washington Post characterized the administration's hasty signature of the new agreement

as "trickery," and termed the agreement itself a challenge

to the Senate.The editorial also expressed the views

of many who opposed not only the form but also the sub­

stance of the U.S. military ties with Spain. Suspicion was

expressed that "some kind of security guarantee" to Spain

was involved "in order to gain continued use of military 114 bases of questionable worth." The Christian Science

Monitor, concerned with the political implications of U.S.

support for the Franco regime, cautioned that "bolstering

the Franco regime by what is tantamount to a military

pact. . . could flare up in a backlash of anti-Americanism

once the Caudillo leaves the scene. Press supporters of U.S. policy toward Spain echoed

the Nixon adminstration's arguments in favor of the new

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 214

agreement. The Washington Star contended that the new

agreement did not imply any U.S. commitment to Spain's de­

fense. It also said that Senator Fulbright's desire for

a treaty made "little sense," and would in fact imply the

very increased commitment to Spain that the Senator criti- 117 cized. The Washington News emphasized the strategic

rationale for Spanish bases, noting that "People who are upset by the agreement's 'commitment' to Spain ought to

study a map. They'll soon see that we are committed not 118 to Franco, but to geography." The Baltimore Sun also

stressed the strategic value of the Spanish bases, which it

found ". . .more important than ever since France's with­

drawal from NATO, the more recent closing of African bases, 119 and Russia's increasing activities in the sea."

Press reports regarding the new agreement also

highlighted two issues which had long been associated with

U.S. policy toward Spain— the relation of the bilateral

U.S.-Spanish accords to NATO, and restrictions on U.S. use

of the Spanish bases. The Washington Post titled its

report on the new agreement "New Pact With U.S. Gives Spain

Indirect NATO Tie," and emphasized that two provisions of 120 the new agreement gave Spain "a back-door link" to NATO.

This report stressed the pledge of Spain and the United

States to cooperate on "security arrangements for the

Atlantic and Mediterranean areas" and "endeavor to work 121 out. . . the liaison" necessary for this cooperation.

In fact, a provision in the new agreement established a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 215

joint U.S.-Spanish defense committee whose military advisor

would be the commander of U.S. forces in Europe— who was 122 also the Supreme Commander of NATO. Spanish Foreign

Minister Lopêz Bravo gave credence to this interpretation of the new agreement with a comment to the press that the

new air alert system for Spain provided by the agreement

would be tied in with the NATO air alert system. He stated

that this fact, together with the presence of the NATO

Commander on the new joint defense committee, implied a 123 link with NATO. But the sensitivity of the NATO allies

to the U.S. agreements with Franco Spain had lessened over

the past two decades, and another report soon made clear

that not only had the United States consulted its NATO

allies regarding the new agreement, but that they had 1 24 agreed to this "back-door" link to NATO.

The second issue regarding the new agreement which

became a focus of press attention prior to the Senate For­

eign Relations Committee's 26 August hearings involved

Spanish restrictions on U.S. use of the bases. An article

by Neil Sheehan in the 14 August New York Times sought to

determine the meaning of the language in Article 34 of the

agreement;

In the case of external threat or attack against the security of the West, the time and manner of the use by the United States of the facilities. . . will be the subject of urgent consultations between the two Governments, and will be resolved by mutual agree­ ment. . . .Each Government retains, however, the inherent right of self-defense. 125

Sheehan uncovered the fact that during the 1967 Arab-Israeli

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war the United States had been denied use of the bases for air support, reconnaissance, or other military operations

except evacuation of American dependents from the Middle 126 East. The article quoted "informed military sources"

as saying that the Spanish government had made clear that

the bases in Spain could not in the future be used in any

U.S. military actions growing out of an Arab-Israeli con- 127 flict. In response to this article, the State Depart­

ment denied that there were any "secret agreements" on U.S.

use of the bases but admitted that the Spanish had what 128 was in effect a "veto right" over U.S. use of the bases.

This fact in itself was not as unusual as might seem— for

the U.S. NATO allies Greece and Turkey had also forbidden 12 9 the use of U.S. bases in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The interesting aspect of this revelation was that it was

only in 1970— in the Vietnam atmosphere of close press

scrutiny of military matters— that the vague terms and pos­

sible restrictions regarding U.S. use of the bases in Spain

which had also been a feature of the 1953 agreements came

under examination and were somewhat officially clarified by

the executive branch.

The denouement of the long clash between the legis­

lative and executive branches over U.S. policy toward

Spain was the public hearing of the Senate Foreign Rela­

tions Committee on 26 August 1970. In many ways, the hear­

ings were a rather subdued anti-climax to the spirited

clash over Spanish policy. Although Under Secretary of

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State U. Alexis Johnson and Deputy Defense Secretary

Packard were once again the representatives of the Nixon

administration, the leading challenger Senator Fulbright

was absent due to the death of his brother-in-law.Most

of the issues raised with Johnson and Packard had already

been aired for months in public statements, through the

press, and in previous Foreign Relations Committee meetings

in closed session.

A brief outline of the 26 August hearings nonethe­

less provides a convenient summary of the debate over U.S.

policy toward Spain. Addressing the central issue regard­

ing the form of the agreement. Under Secretary of State Johnson said that a treaty was "not appropriate," since the

new agreement contained no commitment to Spain's de- 131 fense. Some Senators contended that a U.S. commitment

was involved in the agreement's pledge that the United

States and Spain "make compatible their respective defense

policies. . . and grant each other reciprocal defense 132 support. . . ." Johnson dismissed this criticism by

pointing out that this language applied only to areas of

mutual interest and was applicable only where "feasible and

appropriate," and in any case was expressly limited by the

constitutional processes of both countries. 133 Johnson

denied the existence of any "secret annex" to the agreement 134 committing the United States to Spain's defense. One of the more interesting comments of Under Secre­

tary of State Johnson dealt with the difference between the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 218

1970 and 1953 agreements with Spain. Despite the emphasis

of the Nixon administration and the Spanish on the "new

dimensions" of cooperation in fields such as education

embodied in the 1970 agreement, Johnson admitted; "As far

as the military aspects of the agreement are concerned, it

is substantially a continuation of the arrangements that

existed since 1953." Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho, Republi­

can Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey, and Democratic

Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri were the most skepti­

cal questioners of the Nixon administration witnesses.

Senator Case questioned the very meaning of the term

"commitment" and indicated his wariness of unfettered

Presidential action in making commitments to foreign T36 nations. Senator Symington questioned Johnson and

Packard on the Spanish links with NATO implied by the new

agreement, but Johnson said that the agreement contained 137 no Spanish link to NATO "in any formal sense." Johnson

reiterated the longstanding official U.S. policy regarding

Spain and NATO: . . . we have always viewed Spanish entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, when that should prove possible, as the preferred solution for the de­ fense of all of Western Europe, including S p a i n . 138

Johnson also confirmed reports that the NATO allies had

been consulted and were "very pleased" with the new U.S. 139 agreement with Spain.

Senator Church expressed his doubts over the

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military rationale for retaining the Spanish bases. After

citing the changes in the nature of the U.S. nuclear deter­

rent from B-47's in 1953 to long-range bombers, ICBM's, and

Polaris submarines in 1970, Senator Church summed up his

challenge; I am wondering why these bases remain so impor­ tant to us in view of the vast fortune we have spent to equip ourselves with the technology that was to liberate us from the need for maintaining vulnerable forward bases in foreign c o u n t r i e s . 140 Senator Church did not neglect the more persuasive conven­

tional role of the Spanish bases, but expressed doubt that

the United States would be able to use the bases as it

desired. Under Secretary of State Johnson replied that the

United States had held "no discussion with the Spanish

Government" regarding U.S. use of the bases "in the event 141 of an Arab-Israeli war." Johnson cryptically added that

in the event of a general war the United States "would hope

to have their consent and their agreement and we would

expect to have it. . . I cannot go beyond that."^^^

Democratic Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming expressed

a general criticism of the Senate Foreign Relations Com­ mittee actions regarding Spain when he stated; ". . . we

are straining the daylights out of this issue on this com­ mittee. . . this was said months ago, a year ago. . . ."143

Although the reader may share Senator McGee's weariness at

the repetition involved in the debate over Spanish policy,

the following section reveals that what Senator McGee

termed a ". . . perpetual fishing expedition in Spanish

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waters. ..." held broader implications for U.S. foreign

policy.

Results of the Congressional Challenge to U.S. Policy Toward Spain

Although the 1969-1970 legislative-executive clash

over U.S. policy toward Spain may at first glance appear to

have been a clear victory for President Nixon's broad view

of executive prerogatives in foreign policy, a more lasting

effect may have been to spur the reassertion of the role of

Congress in foreign policy. Another effect was noted at

the time by the Washington Post— the "impairment of Senate-

administration trust." This "impairment" of executive-

legislative trust had its origins, of course, in the Viet­

nam War— but Spain became the first "test case" of the

intention of an aroused Congress to demand a global foreign

policy role. The most immediate effect of the legislative

challenge to U.S. policy toward Spain was reflected in the

terms of the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation.

Senator Fulbright himself, despite his anger and chagrin

at the way he was outmaneuvered by the executive in signing

the 1970 agreement, claimed credit for the "far more modest 144 terms" in the 1970 agreement. There were two aspects of

these terms that Congressional resistance seems to have

made more modest. As one analysis of the August 1970

agreement concluded, ". . . b y its resistance, the commit­

tee undoubtedly helped the administration to reduce the

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leasing price from the original $1 billion figure set by

the Spanish Government.Another, more direct, result

of the legislative resistance concerned the question of

U.S. commitment to Spain's defense. Under Secretary of

State Johnson publicly acknowledged that the United States

insisted in its negotiations with the Spanish that the

language of the 1963 Joint Declaration ("a threat to either

country. . . would be a matter of common concern. . . .")

be deleted from the new agreement "in recognition of the

concern expressed by some members. . . " of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee.

There were several indirect results of the legis­ lative-executive clash over U.S. policy toward Spain that

had broad implications for U.S. foreign policy. After the

spring 1969 Congressional uproar at the revelation of

General Wheeler's "commitment" pledge to Spain, the Senate

on 25 June 196 9 adopted by a vote of 70 to 16 the National

Commitments Resolution. This resolution, sponsored by

Senator Fulbright, affirmed the sense of the Senate that:

. . . a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment. 147

Even after the conclusion of the 1970 agreement,

the Senate revealed its distrust of Nixon administration

assurances that no commitment to Spain's defense was im­ plied by the new agreement. A sense of the Senate

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resolution introduced by Senator Frank Church and passed in

December 1970 stated that since the 1970 agreement did not

result

. . . from affirmative action taken by the execu­ tive and legislative branches. . . by means of a treaty. . . nothing in the said agreement shall be construed as a national commitment by the United States to the defense of S p a i n . 148

The Nixon administration may have had its way on policy

toward Spain, but the Senate by this December 1970 resolu­ tion had the final word in the long debate.

Another result of the legislative struggle with the

executive over Spanish policy was the Case Act of 1972.

This act (originally introduced in 1971) required the

Secretary of State to submit all executive agreements to 149 Congress. Unfortunately for the Congress, this assured

only that Congress would be informed of executive agree­

ments, for such agreements still legally required no

Congressional approval.

The timing of the introduction and passage of the

National Commitments Resolution and the Case Act strongly

suggest, that Spain was the "test case" which spurred these

first Congressional actions to redefine and reassert the role of Congress in foreign policy. This is not to deny the overarching influence of Congressional disagreement and

distrust of executive branch policy in Southeast Asia—

which created the atmosphere for the debate over U.S. policy toward Spain. But by its very nature and timing,

the whole question of renewal of the U.S. agreements with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 223

Spain became a specific focus of the Congressional malaise

in 1969 and 1970.

Conclusions

There is much irony in the legislative challenge

to the executive over U.S. policy toward Spain in 1969 and

1970. In the early 1950's, certain powerful conservative

members of Congress pressed a policy of close military

ties with Spain on a reluctant President, and by their

persistence and skillful maneuvers eroded his resistance

and paved the way for the 1953 agreements with Spain. The

timing of this policy shift, as we have seen, was strongly

influenced by broader systemic factors affecting U.S.

foreign policy in the early 1950's— most notably the Cold

War atmosphere which reached its height during the Korean

War. In the 1969-1970 debate over U.S. policy toward Spain,

certain influential liberal members of Congress ironically

challenged the continuation of a policy toward Spain that

the Congress had been so influential in originally

determining almost two decades earlier. Once again,

broader systemic factors— especially the Vietnam War—

influenced the atmosphere of the debate and the timing of

the resulting policy. In 1970, however, it was the Con­

gress which was outmaneuvered by a conservative President

determined to continue the U.S. policy of close ties with

Spain, but even more determined to maintain executive con­

trol of foreign policy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 224

The 1970 "victory" of the President in the struggle

over U.S. policy toward Spain was not without its costs.

The atmosphere of mutual disagreement, and, even more, dis­

trust between the legislative and executive branches of government was intensified by President Nixon's defiant

maneuver in hastily signing an executive agreement with

Spain. The legacy of Congressional distrust of the execu­

tive in foreign policy, precipitated by the Vietnam War but

broadened in scope by the 1970 Spanish "test case," out­

lasted both President Nixon and Senator Fulbright— and may

have been the greatest price the United States paid for the

1970 agreement with Spain.

The 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation

provided a new bottle for old wine. Despite the agree- :

ment's window dressing of broad cooperation in many fields.

United States policy toward Spain was still predicated on

the retention of Spanish bases to serve the goals of mili­

tary strategy. But thanks to the Congressional challenge to this policy, the military rationale for Spanish bases

had finally been closely and publicly scrutinized. In this

process, certain issues such as the restrictions on the

U.S. nuclear presence in Spain and restrictions on the use

of the bases were at last examined and some (but not all)

of the ambiguity which had surrounded these issues since

1953 was removed. The most serious implication of the 1970 agreement

was hardly addressed at all, at least explicitly, in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 225

Congressional questioning of U.S. policy toward Spain,

although it was not overlooked by the press. The United

States had committed itself to close military ties for the

next five years with the regime of a 78-year old dictator.

As noted in the discussion of previous agreements, these

military ties unavoidably carried the implication of U.S.

political support for the Franco regime. As a result,

there was serious political risk that the United States

would become the target of anti-Americanism in the event of

a Spanish political upheaval after Franco's death. Thus

the U.S. decision in 1970 to maintain its military presence

in Spain constituted an implicit wager that either the 78-

year old dictator would live five more years (a wager that

few insurance company actuarial agents would have made) or

that there would be no violent political upheaval after Franco's death (a wager that few students of Spanish his­

tory would have made in 1970). As the next chapter will

reveal, neither of these dire happenings occurred in the

five years after the 1970 agreement with Spain. Yet des­

pite the fact that the United States escaped having to pay

the high political price of its implicit wager in 1970, it

is disturbing to note that U.S. policy toward Spain was

once again characterized by the failure to explicitly

balance the goals of military strategy against the politi­

cal risks.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 226

CHAPTER 5 ; FOOTNOTES

^Kaplan, p. 91. 2 Eduardo Chamorro and Ignacio Fontes, Las Bases Norteamericanas en Espana (Barcelona; Editorial Euros, 1976), p. 143.

^Ibid. ^M. Vâzquez Montalbân, La Penetracion Americana en Espana (Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos para el DiSlogo, 1974), p. 125.

^U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 5 October 1953, p. 441.

^Welles, p. 280.

^Ibid.

®Ibid., p. 281. Q Palomares means, ironically, "the place of the doves."

^^Ogden R. Reid, "Terror in a Place of Doves," Saturday Review, 28 January 1967, p. 39.

^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Spanish Base Agreement, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 6 and 26 August 1970, p. 47. 12 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 145.

^^Ibid., pp. 156-57.

l^ibid., p. 157. ^^Montalbân, p. 222. Switzerland was the second largest foreign investment source for Spain, with 23 percent. ^^See Hearings, U.S. Security Agreements and Com­ mitments Abroad, pp. 2303-2414. 17 Ibid., p^ 2350. l^ibid.

l^ibid., p. 2400.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 227

20lbid., p. 2353. Z^lbid. Z^Ibid. Z^lbid. Z^Ibid., p. 2350.

^^Ibid,

^^Ibid.

Z^lbid. o p Washington Post, 17 March 1969, p. A22. 29 Hearings, U.S. Security Agreements and Commit­ ments Abroad, p. 2350.

^°Ibid.

^^Ibid. 32 Christian Science Monitor, 20 November 1968, p. 4.

^^Ibid. 34 Hearings, U.S. Security Agreements and Commit­ ments Abroad, p. 2350-51.

^^Ibid., p. 2351. ^^Washington Post, 25 February 1969. 37 Hearings, U.S. Security Agreements and Commit­ ments Abroad, p. 2356. 3 8 Washington Post, 25 February 1969. ^^Ibid.

^^Hearings, U.S. Security Agreements and Commit­ ments Abroad, p. 2357. Paul Warnke is now head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the chief U.S. SALT negotiator. This incident in late 1968 does not exactly lead one to respect his attention to negotiating details.

^^Ibid., p. 2310. 42 Washington Post, 22 November 1968. 43 New York Times, 21 November 1968.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 228 44 Ibid., 12 March 1969. 45 Washington Post, 25 March 1969.

^^Ibid., 17 March 1969, p. A22.

^^New York Times, 12 March 1969. 48 Washington Post, 17 March 1969, p. A22. 49 New York Times, 1 March 1969.

^^Washington Post, 22 April 1969, p. A16. S^lbid., 18 March 1969. S^ibid.

^^Hearings, U.S. Security Agreements and Commit­ ments Abroad, p. 2353. 54 New York Times, 26 March 1969. 55 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 167.

^^Christian Science Monitor, 27 May 1969. ^^Ibid., 30 April 1969. S^ibid.

S^ibid.

^^Washington Post, 5 April 1969.

^^Christian Science Monitor, 30 April 1969. 6 2 Washington Post, 5 April 1969.

G^Ibid., 22 April 1969. G^Ibid.

G^ibid.

G^ibid., 23 April 1969, p. A16. 6 7 U.S., Department of States, Department of State Bulletin, "U.S. and Spain Defense Agreement; Joint State- ment," 7 July 1969, p. 15.

®®Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 229

^^Washington Post, 6 June 1969.

^^Chamorro and Fontes, p. 173.

^^Ibid. 72 Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), 6 June 1969. 73 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 172. 74 New York Times, 2 November 1969, p. 26.

^^Ibid.

^®Ibid. 77 New York Times, 29 October 1969, p. 8. 78 Ibid., 2 November 1969, p. 26. 79 Washington Post, 20 December 1969. 80 Christian Science Monitor, 18 November 1969. 81 Washington Post, 11 January 1970. 82 Christian Science Monitor, 31 March 1970. 83 Washington Post, 11 February 1970. 84 New York Times, 11 February 1970. p C ^Ibid., 12 April 1970.

®®Ibid., 27 May 1970, p. 38. 87 Hearings, U.S. Security Agreements and Commit­ ments Abroad, p. 2398. 8 8 This analysis is based upon my conversations with officials in the State Department during the summer of 1970. 89 New York Times, 15 April 1970. 90 Washington Post, 16 April 1970. ^^Ibid. 92 New York Times, 30 May 1970, p. 1. 93 William Manchester, The Glory and The Dream, vol. 2 (Boston; Little, Brown, and Company, 1973), pp. 1483-84. 94 New York Times, 25 May 1970, p. 15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 230

*Gibid., 30 May 1970, p. 1. 97 Washington Post, 2 June 1970, p. A18. 9 8 Christian Science Monitor, 26 June 1970, p. 5. 99 New York Times, 25 July 1970, p. 2.

^°°Ibid., 28 July 1970.

^^^U.S., Congress, Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 28 July 1970, Congressional Record, pp. 12259-60. 102 Hearings on Spanish Base Agreement, pp. 54-58. ^^^Ibid., p. 53. Senator Fulbright5s public posi­ tion that his concern with the agreements had to do only with their executive agreement format was not fully reflec­ tive of his concern with the substance of U.S. policy toward Spain. I interviewed Senator Fulbright on 20 Janu­ ary 1970, and he clearly indicated his doubts regarding the necessity for U.S. bases in Spain. 104 New York Times, 4 August 1970, p. 1.

^^^The text of this agreement, from which the fol­ lowing quotations are taken,,is contained in Hearings on Spanish Base Agreement, pp. 1-9.

^^^New York Times, 7 August 1970, p. 1.

^°’^Ibid., p. 12. 10 8 Hearings on Spanish Base Agreement, p. 59. 109 New York Times, 9 August 1970, P. E5.

^^^Hearings on Spanish Base Agreement, p. 11. ll^Ibid., p. 59. 112 Washington Post, 20 August 1970, p. A26. 113 ^Ibid., 12 August 1970, p. A14. ll^Ibid.

^^^Christian Science Monitor, 12 August 1970.

^^^Washington Star, 6 August 1970.

^^^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 231

118Washington News, 7 August 1970. 119 Baltimore Sun, 8 August 1970. 120 Washington Post, 7 August 1970, p. 1. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Hearings on Spanish Base Agreement, p. 30 124 Ibid., p. 39. 125 Hearings on Spanish Base Agreement, p. 6. 126 'New York Times, 14 August 1970, p. 8. 127 Ibid. 128 ^Washington Post, 15 August 1970, p. A6. 129 New York Times, 14 August 1970, p. 8. 130 Washington Post, 27 August 1970, p. A8. 131 Hearings on Spanish Base Agreement, p. 13,

^^^Ibid., p. 14. ^^^Ibid.

^^^Ibid., p. 16.

^^^Ibid., P- 18.

^^®Ibid., PP . 25-

^^^Ibid., p. 31.

^^®Ibid., P- 13.

l^^ibid., p. 39.

^^°Ibid., p. 44.

^^^Ibid., p. 46.

^^^Ibid., p. 47.

^^^Ibid., p. 37.

^^^Ibid., p. III.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232 14*5 New York Times, 9 August 1970, p. E5. 146 Hearings on Spanish Base Agreement, p. 12. ^^^Senator J. W. Fulbright, "Congress and Foreign Policy," in Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Appendix L: "Congress and Executive-Legislative Relations," app. vol. 5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 60.

■^^®Ibid., p. 61.

l^^Ibid., p. 60. 15°Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 6

THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD

SPAIN, 1970-1976

. . . at such time as this treaty is approved, the American concern for Spanish democracy, and not just for Spanish bases, should be read throughout Spain.

Senator Dick Clark Statement regarding 1976 Treaty with Spain

U.S. policy toward Spain underwent a significant

transformation in the period between the signature of the

Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation in August 1970 and

the signature of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

in January 1976. U.S. policy toward Spain gradually became

more concerned with specific political goals regarding

Spain's future political evolution. This transformation

of policy premises was less apparent than it might have

been, for the U.S. military presence in Spain— grounded in

the rationale of military strategy and serving the broader

U.S. political goal of maintaining a strong presence in the

Mediterranean— was retained. Yet the transformation in

U.S. policy toward Spain was nonetheless real and signifi­

cant, for this policy no longer solely viewed Spain as a

pawn in the service of U.S. military strategy or broader

European/Mediterranean political goals. Rather, the new 233

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 234

policy was designed with a sensitivity to the specific U.S.

political goal of a democratic Spain, and the U.S. military

strategy regarding Spanish bases was explicitly tailored

to this goal.

A review of the development of the new premises of

U.S. policy toward Spain in the 1970-1976 period indicates

once again the importance of factors in the international

system as inputs to U.S. policy toward Spain. Foremost

among these systemic factors, of course, was the Spanish

policy toward the United States— which, in turn, was strong­

ly influenced by the political changes in Spain from 1970 to

1976. A second systemic factor of great importance to U.S.

policy toward Spain was the deterioration of the U.S. stra­

tegic position in the Mediterranean in the 1974 to 1976

period. Perhaps the final broader systemic factor affecting

U.S. policy toward Spain involved the ending of the U.S.

military involvement in Southeast Asia— which created an

atmosphere in the United States whereby a chastened execu­

tive and a resurgent Congress could begin by 1976 to replace

confrontation with constructive attempts at cooperation on

foreign policy— with Spain once again the test case.

U.S.-Spanish Relations, 1970-1974 U.S. relations with Spain were marked by another

political honeymoon after the signing of the 1970 agreement.

President Nixon followed Eisenhower's precedent (a prece­

dent ignored by Democratic Presidents) and visited Franco

in Madrid on 2 October 1970. The crowd of over a million

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 235

Spaniards gave Nixon his largest and most enthusiastic re­

ception of his European trip.^ Upon his arrival, Nixon

stated: "An indispensable pillar of peace in the Mediter- 2 ranean is Spanish-American friendship and cooperation."

Franco basked in the renewed glow of international respect­

ability imparted by Nixon's visit, and revealed his previ­ ously noted preference for Republican Presidents by prais­

ing Nixon as "a statesman whom I admire profoundly."^

Spanish Foreign Minister Ldpez Bravo was even more effusive

in his praise of Nixon: "Nixon has the qualities that make

a Spaniard feel greater respect for the ideas and the coun- 4 try he represents." This praise has an ironic ring in

view of the subsequent Nixon "qualities" revealed by Water­

gate, but beyond that one may legitimately wonder what

"ideas" Nixon represented by going out of his way to visit

the aging Spanish dictator. Nixon's visit, like Eisen­

hower's visit a decade earlier, suggests that a sensitivity

to the "ideas" of democracy was hardly uppermost in U.S.

policy toward Spain. After this political honeymoon, and prior to the

period in early 1974 when the United States would have to

begin to review its policy toward Spain, several issues

arose to complicate U.S.-Spanish relations. Although dip­

lomatic and military issues were by far the most important

in their effect on U.S. policy toward Spain, an economic

issue was the first troubling element which arose in U.S.

relations with Spain.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 236

Spain and the EEC, after years of negotiation, had

finally signed a preferential trade agreement on 28 June

1970. The six-year first stage of this agreement provided

for tariff reductions on Spanish agricultural and indus­

trial exports to the EEC, in exchange for Spanish removal

of most quantitative restrictions and tariffs on imports

from the EEC. The second stage, involving Spanish associa­ tion with the EEC, was to be the subject of future negotia­

tions "when the necessary conditions have been fulfilled."^

The EEC intent by these provisions to avoid a formal commit­

ment to future EEC association for Franco's dictatorial

regime was obvious and understandable. But the United

States contended that the preferential treatment given

Spain was a violation of GATT trade rules, citing article

24 of the GATT, which provided that any "interim agreement"

for association with a customs union must "include a plan

and schedule for the formation of such a customs union. . .

within a reasonable length of time."^ The United States

protested to both the EEC and the GATT regarding the Span­

ish agreement. But with the passage of time U.S. policy,

while still opposed to such agreements, gradually cooled

this controversy with Spain.

Far more serious in its effect on U.S. relations

with Spain was the Spanish intention to obtain a mutual

security treaty with the U.S. in the 1975 bases negotia­ tions. By late 1973, reports began to appear that the

Spanish, who greatly resented their continuing exclusion

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 237

from NATO, would demand a security treaty with the United

States as the "only major demand" in future negotiations 7 with the United States.

It is probably no coincidence that this Spanish renewal of the demand for a formal security guarantee was

expressed immediately after a Spanish diplomatic clash with

the United States over the use of U.S. bases in the 1973

Arab-Israeli War. When this war broke out. General Franco

himself reportedly made it known to the United States that

use of the bases in connection with the Middle East hostil­

ities was forbidden "at any time, in any way, directly or

O indirectly." Nevertheless, according to one account, the

U.S. air bases in Spain "were used for days by Air Force

tanker planes to refuel F-4 Phantom jets being flown

nonstop from the United States to Israel," with this use

being "without any specific notice to the Spanish govern- 9 ment." As the Spanish became aware of this, they j

announced that the "sole" function of the bases was for use

to meet a threat "against the security of the West" in

accordance with the 1970 agreement.It was obvious that

Spain— a country with long historical links with the Arabs

and the only country in Western Europe never to have recog­

nized Israel— did not share the U.S. belief that "the

security of the West" included the security of Israel.

This entire chain of events in October 1973 resulted in

Spanish irritation at the United States and fortified their

determination to demand a security treaty in future

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238

negotiations. For the United States, the events of October

1973 once again brought to the forefront the old issue of

Spanish restrictions on U.S. use of the bases. But, in all

fairness, it must be noted that the U.S. NATO allies had

made even stronger protests over U.S. use of base facil­

ities in their countries to aid Israel. So the United

States, which did (albeit on the sly) make good use of the

Spanish bases, was not alarmed at Spain's public posturing

regarding the use of the bases.

Secretary of State Kissinger visited Madrid on

19 December 1973 with the intention of smoothing any Span­

ish diplomatic feathers still ruffled by the events of

October 1973 and, more important, beginning preparations

for the bases negotiations which would have to get underway

in 1974. Kissinger met with Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco,

whom Franco had appointed as his first head of government

in June 1973, and with Spain's new Foreign Minister

Laureano Lôpez Rodô. A joint communique after the meeting

stated that:

Agreement was reached in principle to develop a Joint U.S.-Spanish Declaration of Principles. Both parties agreed that Spain is essential for the security of the West. . . . They agreed as well that Spain must participate on a basis of equality with the other countries of the Atlantic area. . . . H

Although the United States would not offer Spain

a formal security treaty, the communique was interpreted as

implying a U.S. offer to Spain of "equal but parallel 12 status" to that of the NATO allies. Plans for a similar

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"Declaration of Principles" were at that time underway

between the United States and the other NATO allies— the

sole remains of Kissinger's earlier call for a "New Atlan­

tic Charter" in the "Year of Europe." Thus the Kissinger

visit to Madrid on 19 December 1973 set the stage for most

of the 1974 U.S. negotiations with the Spanish.

The Kissinger visit to Madrid also marked the

beginning of a wierd two-year series of occurrences whereby

critical moments in U.S. dealings with Spain coincided

with critical moments in Spanish internal politics. This

matter of timing was important, for it gave the United

States increased leverage and a wider choice of alterna­

tives in its dealings with Spain. Only hours after Kis­

singer left Madrid, Carrero Blanco was assassinated by a

tremendous explosion set off under his car by members of

the Basque terrorist group ETA.Vice President Ford, in

his first official act after assuming office, represented

the United States at the funeral of Carrero Blanco.

The importance of the assassination of Carrero

Blanco to Spain's subsequent democratic political evolu­

tion cannot be stressed too strongly. As one perceptive

account at that time noted. Franco

. . .had expected the dour admiral to keep Spain on a rightward course when he himself died and to make certain that his successor as chief of state. Prince Juan Carlos, did not fall prey to liberal ideas.^4

Had Carrero Blanco not been assassinated, Juan Carlos would

no doubt have faced a strong obstacle, and possible

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frustration, in his plans to democratize Spain. At Fran­

co's behest, the conservative former Interior Minister

Carlos Arias was named to succeed Carrero Blanco as

Premier. But Arias, despite his Interior Minister back­

ground, was never the tough alter ego to Franco that

Carrero was. In his televised 12 February 1974 policy speech

Arias referred to the 1970 U.S.-Spanish Agreement of

Friendship and Cooperation as a "treaty"— perhaps in a

deliberate public indication to Washington of the Spanish

desire to upgrade the status of the agreement in the forth­

coming negotiations.^^ Arias also cited the need for

American "reciprocity" in return for Spain's "sincere

friendship.

However, prior to the beginning of the negotiations

for a new bases agreement, it remained for the United

States and Spain to work out the separate "Declaration of

Principles" planned in December 1973. Spain's new Foreign

Minister, the career diplomat Pedro Cortina, visited

Washington on 21 and 22 June 1974 and met with Secretary

of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger.

The NATO allies meeting in Ottowa the previous week had

already reached agreement on a NATO declaration of princi­ ples, and the declaration with Spain was designed to 17 "parallel" this accord. Secretary of State Kissinger arrived in Madrid on 9 July 1974, and after agreeing on

some final details, joined Cortina in initialing the

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declaration of principles.

The fact that Cortina and Kissinger only initialed

the declaration in early July had greater significance than

might appear at first glance. The Spanish reportedly

insisted on the signature of the declaration at the level 18 of heads of state. When President Nixon (who had signed

the parallel NATO declaration of principles the week before

in Brussels) did not immediately agree tr this— perhaps

because it would imply that the U.S. relationship with

Franco's regime was being raised to too "equal" a level—

the Spanish insisted that the agreement only be "initialed,"

leaving the way open for a subsequent higher-level 19 signature. An important moment in Spain's internal politics

coincided with the moment of decision on formal signature

of the declaration of principles. Franco had entered a

Madrid hospital on 9 July as a result of complications from

treatment of phlebitis. On 19 July, Franco temporarily

delegated his duties as head of state to his designated 20 successor, Juan Carlos. The first official act of Juan

Carlos was the signature of the declaration of principles.

Although there is no concrete evidence that the United

States had delayed the signature in hopes that Juan Carlos

would assume the functions of head of state, this possi­

bility is strongly suggested by the timing of the signature

and the fact that Kissinger (on 9 July, the day that Franco

entered the hospital) had deferred the immediate signature

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 242 21 at the level of heads of state. This was important as a

first indication of U.S. intent to give full support to

Juan Carlos in hopes of encouraging a peaceful but demo­

cratic post-Franco evolution in Spain.

The "Spanish-American Declaration of Principles"

which Juan Carlos signed in Madrid and President Nixon

signed in San Clemente on 19 July 1974 consisted of ten

brief articles, which contained several interesting pro­

visions. The first article was a declaration that the

United States and Spain considered that

. . . their cooperation since the year 1953 has been beneficial for the security of both coun­ tries, has fortified the defense of the West. . . with Spain playing an important role, in this respect, in the zones of the Atlantic and of the Mediterranean.22

This article was clearly designed as an attempt by the

United States to respond to Spain's desire for a recog­

nition of her contribution to Western defense.

Article 7 stated that

. . . a threat or attack on either of the two countries would affect both, and each country would adopt that action which it considers appropriate 23 within the framework of its constitutional processes.

This article contained language very close to the 1963

Joint Declaration and, although vaguely phrased, carried a

strong implication of mutual defense responsibilities. As

such, it certainly pleased the Spanish but would have been

expected to cause howls of Congressional protest over a possible U.S. "commitment" to Spain. Yet the declaration

went largely unnoticed in the United States. This may be

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attributed to the fact that the attention of the Congress

and the press was focused on President Nixon's last month

of efforts to avoid disgrace resulting from the Watergate

scandals, and in this atmosphere little attention was

being paid in Washington to yet another vague "declaration

of principles."

Neither did the ironic statement in Article 4 that

the United States and Spain agreed that "... their

cooperation had. . . contributed to preserving the values,

the ideals, and the aspirations based on the dignity and 24 liberty of the individual" attract any public attention.

Perhaps the U.S. desire to avoid a formal signature of the

document by Franco indicated that this provision was too

obviously at variance with the reality of the Franco dic­

tatorship for even Kissinger's realpolitik to adorn with

public ceremony.

The most significant article of the agreement from

the viewpoint of future U.S. policy toward Spain was Arti­

cle 3, in which both nations reiterated "their intent to

continue the existing cooperation, based on a stable

friendship, through the reciprocal support of their defen- 25 sive efforts. ..." This article clearly implied that

the "Declaration of Principles" was, in the words of a

State Department spokesman, "a preliminary to more formal

negotiations for renewing the agreement on U.S. bases in 26 Spain." Before proceeding to an analysis of these base

negotiations, it is necessary to place the issue of U.S.

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policy toward Spain in the overall context of U.S. foreign

policy in 1974.

Overtaken by Events

The U.S. policy toward Spain in the negotiations

which eventually be an at the end of 1974 was developed

against the background of a dizzying array of events in

the international and domestic political system. These

events had the dual overall effect of creating uncertainty

as to the political future of Spain at the very time that

the value from a regional perspective of the U.S. military

presence in Spain was enhanced.

The 25 April 1974 overthrow of the dictatorial

Gaetano regime in Portugal was originally welcomed in the

United States as heralding the advent of a new democracy

with whom the United States and its NATO allies could

establish closer cooperation. But with the surge of

communist strength among Portuguese military officers radi­

calized in the long African colonial wars, the United

States began to have second thoughts. These doubts led

to deepening pessimism on the part of Secretary of State

Kissinger after General Spînola was forced out of the 27 presidency of Portugal on 30 September 1974. By the end

of 1974, reportedly Kissinger was convinced that Portugal 2 8 was as good as lost to the communists.

It is important to note at this point that, as a

result of the upheaval in U.S. internal politics which

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culminated in Nixon's 9 August resignation. Secretary of

State Kissinger was effectively in charge of foreign policy

for the new Ford administration. Thus Kissinger's pessi­

mism on the U.S. strategic setbacks in the Mediterranean

in 1974 would be of great influence as an input to the U.S.

evaluation of its policy toward Spain in preparation for

the forthcoming negotiations.

There is no doubt, that the United States had

suffered severe setbacks to its strategic posture in the

Mediterranean by the end of 1974. In addition to the

worsening Portuguese internal situation, the Cyprus crisis

coincided with Nixon's August resignation and upset U.S.

relations with both Greece and Turkey in the eastern

Mediterranean. The abortive August 1974 coup attempt

against Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios triggered a

Turkish invasion and occupation of half of Cyprus. More

important, the Turkish invasion then resulted in the over­

throw of the humiliated right-wing army dictatorship in

Greece. The United States became the target of wrath of

the Greek people for its failure to prevent the Turkish

invasion and the previous U.S. support of the Greek dic­

tatorship. Although the new Greek leader, Karamanlis, was

rather pro-American in orientation, he responded to his

nation's anger by withdrawing Greek military forces from

NATO and scaling down the U.S. military presence in Greece.

To complete this eastern Mediterranean setback for the

United States, the U.S. Congress— in an ill-advised move to

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pressure Turkish withdrawal from Cyprus— in late 1974 with­

held further U.S. military aid to Turkey. This resulted

only in the hardening of the Turkish policy toward Cyprus

and precipitated the closing of many U.S. intelligence

facilities by Turkey. To cap off the atmosphere of disarray surrounding

the U.S. Mediterranean presence after late 1974, there was

a great concern in Washington that the waning fortunes of

the perpetually tottering Italian Christian Democratic

government would soon lead to communist election victory

and participation in the Italian government.

Thus, the events and prospects in Portugal, Italy,

Greece, and Turkey in late 1974 looked bleak from the view­

point of the general U.S. interest in maintaining a strong

Mediterranean presence on NATO's southern flank— an inter­

est all the more urgent in view of the powerful Soviet

presence in the area. Meanwhile, the internal political

situation of the Franco regime in Spain added another

element of uncertainty to U.S. policy planning in the period

leading up to the late 1974 base renewal negotiations.

Franco's plans for the perpetuation of his authori­ tarian regime had already been severely jolted by the

assassination of Carrero Blanco in December 1974. The

April 1974 revolution against the similar dictatorial

regime in neighboring Portugal left Franco Spain "more iso­ lated than ever amid the political enlightenment of Western 29 Europe." Notwithstanding the fact that the Portuguese

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revolution had its origins in a situation of colonial wars

and a radicalization of the military hardly analogous to

Spain, the overthrow of the Caetano regime clearly made

Franco nervous. In early June 1974 Franco unceremoniously

fired General Dfez Alegrfa, the former negotiator with the

United States who was then Spain's military chief of 30 staff. Dlez Alegrfa was a man of relatively liberal

tendencies who Franco evidently feared could be the "Spîn­

ola" of Spain.

The serious illness of Franco in July 1974 and his

temporary yielding of the head of state functions to Juan

Carlos provided further evidence that the end of the long

Franco era was nearing. The problem which this posed for

U.S. policy toward Spain was aptly summarized in a July

1974 Washington Post editorial:

It is hardly too soon for the United States to weigh how, during the post-Franco period, it can make known and make effective the American interest in Spain's long overdue transition to orderly demo­ cratic rule.

The loneliness of Spain's dictatorial regime was

subsequently further emphasized by the August 1974 restora­

tion of democracy in Greece. To complicate matters fur­

ther, Franco recovered from his illness and resumed his

functions as head of state on 2 September 1974.

Thus,as the United States considered its future

policy toward Spain in 1974, the importance of systemic

factors as inputs to this policy was very significant. The

most important general factor was the weakening of U.S.

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influence and strategic presence in the eastern Mediterra­

nean area as a result of the Cyprus affair. But the

increasingly radical turn of events in Portugal, and the

growing communist strength in Italy were also factors with

troubling implications for the United States presence in

the Western Mediterranean. These systemic factors, of

course, suggested the enhancement of the specific military

value of the U.S. presence in Spain and its more general

political value as part of the broader goal of a strong

U.S. Mediterranean presence. But, at the same time, the

obvious decomposition of the Franco regime in Spain meant

that U.S. policy toward Spain was being planned for the

period when an unknown post-Franco government would be in

power. Thus U.S. policy toward Spain would inevitably

involve a risk— either of renewing a close relationship

with Franco or stalling for a clearer perspective on the

probable post-Franco situation in Spain. As we shall see

later, the United States through both skill and luck man­

aged to mix both of these approaches to yield a wise policy.

Prelude to Negotiations

The preparation for negotiations on the renewal of

U.S. bases in Spain actually began in March 1974, when

Kissinger named Robert McCloskey to head the negotiations

with Spain. This was a very important and wise appointment.

McCloskey had been the State Department press spokesman at

the end of the Johnson administration, and had earned the

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highest respect of the press ". . .for being straight, hon- 32 est and professional. ..." McCloskey returned to his

former position as State Department spokesman at the

request of Kissinger in 1973, and in early 1974 McCloskey

was named ambassador-at-large. In this position, which he

held simultaneously with his 1974-1976 assignment as

negotiator with Spain, McCloskey closely consulted with

many Senators and Congressmen regarding future U.S. policy

toward Spain. To McCloskey's personal efforts must go much of the credit for the friendly reception that the eventual

1976 treaty with Spain received from the Congress.

McCloskey's 1976 testimony to the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee is the best description of the process

and the substance of the United States policy toward Spain

developed prior to negotiations with the Spanish. Respond­

ing to Senator Dick Clark's question as to whether it

would not be better to "pull out of our Spanish bases

completely. . . preferable to paying the political risks

of staying there during an extremely complex political

transition," McCloskey stated:

. . . before these negotiations began in Novem­ ber of 1974, earlier in that year, as the executive branch looked toward the expiration of the previous agreement, there was the so-called NSDM undertaken. And it examined that possibility and concluded otherwise that, and perhaps not just a matter of cost, that for other more important or equally important reasons, it was in the U.S. interest to maintain these bases. . . my instructions, which were the result of this NSC consideration, which is a serious one, were to adopt the position that the United States wanted to maintain its level of access to these bases, and that should be the point of our negotiating effort.^3

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This testimony of McCloskey clearly reveals that the U.S.

policy decision to maintain a military presence in Spain

was not only influenced by "the cost" to U.S. military

strategy to relocate the bases, but also by "more important

or equally important reasons." It seems likely that one of

these "more important" reasons was the influence on U.S.

policy of the deterioration of the U.S. strategic presence

in the Mediterranean due to the factors cited earlier.

But perhaps the most significant aspect revealed

by McCloskey's somewhat cryptic testimony was the fact that

the policy was premised on an evaluation that a U.S. pres­

ence in Spain during the "complex political transition"

would not be a liability. The unstated underlying assump­

tion of this U.S. policy toward Spain thus seems to have

been that a U.S. presence in Spain might be a positive

asset in encouraging the evolution of post-Franco Spain

toward a more democratic government (which would not,

however, be hostile to the United States). This was a

reasonable political goal for U.S. policy toward Spain, and

implied a positive wager on Spain's political stability and

evolution in the post-Franco era. In retrospect, the

policy was not only reasonable but correct.

Prior to the beginning of McCloskey's negotiations

with the Spanish in November 1974, the Ford administration

made another decision regarding Spain that was very unwise.

In September 1974 President Ford nominated former Nixon

White House aide Peter Flanigan as ambassador to Spain.

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Flanigan was a Wall Street financier whose sole ambassador­

ial qualification for the Madrid post seemed to be that his

honeymoon had been spent in Spain.

Not only did Secretary of State Kissinger have

nothing to do with the Flanigan nomination, but the

potential trouble this would cause for U.S. policy toward

Spain at a crucial time was indicated by Flanigan's

reported statements upon nomination that he, and not

McCloskey, would be in charge of the negotiations with the

Spanish.As a New York Times editorial noted "... the

Madrid post is not one for on-the-job training. A skilled

professional is called for at a time when Spain faces pain- 35 ful adjustment. ..." Flanigan's unsavory involvement

with the "selling of ambassadorships" to Nixon campaign

contributors, quite apart from his obvious lack of quali­

fications, resulted in the Senate Foreign Relations Commit­

tee stalling on approval of his nomination until Flanigan

finally withdrew his name from consideration in November

1974 By forcing the withdrawal of Flanigan's nomination

as ambassador, the Senate saved President Ford from his

own error and indirectly performed a great service to U.S.

policy toward Spain. Not only would Flanigan not be pres^

ent to undercut the negotiating efforts of McCloskey in

1975 and 1976, but Flanigan's blocking led to the desired choice of a "skilled professional" as ambassador to Spain.

In December 1974 President Ford, evidently at Kissinger's

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urging, chose career diplomat Wells Stabler, then Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to be

the U.S. ambassador to Spain.

Ambassador Stabler subsequently proved to be a

perceptive reader of the changing Spanish political scene,

whose advice contributed to the excellent timing of various

U.S. policy moves regarding Spain in 1975 and 1976. Also,

as McCloskey publicly testified. Ambassador Stabler soon

developed an ". . . entree with the King and the senior

ministers of the government. . . probably unprecedented 3 8 in contemporary times." The "entree" of Ambassador

Stabler to Spanish leaders undoubtedly aided the United

States in its:efforts to discreetly press for democratiza­

tion of Spain after Franco's death. These efforts, in

turn, were crucial to the Senate's approval of the 1976

Treaty. The importance of key individuals to U.S. policy

toward Spain at critical moments was again illustrated by

the potential disaster— and fortuitous aftermath— of Ford's

nomination of Flanigan.

The Spanish View

It is appropriate at this point, before beginning

an analysis of the negotiations, to review some of the

Spanish press comment on future relations with the United

States. Such a review of Spanish public opinion could be "

largely dispensed with previously in this study, as the

censored Spanish press simply reflected government policy

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in its negotiations with the United States. But by 1974 the Spanish press was subject to censorship only inter­

mittently, and with an eye to the post-Franco era published

a variety of articles and editorials dealing with Spain's

future relationship with the United States. A brief review

of Spanish press comment will serve to indicate the public

pressures on Spanish policy toward the United States— pres­

sures which, although not of prime influence during Fran­

co's lifetime, will be increasingly important inputs to

the policy of a democratic Spain toward the United States

in coming years.

It is particularly interesting to note the public

comments in November 1974 of two former Spanish officials

who had been closely associated with past Spanish policy

toward the United States, and a third individual who would

later sign the 1974 treaty as Spain's Foreign Minister.

Former Foreign Minister Castiella indicated by his comments

that he still advocated a "hard line" Spanish policy toward 39 the United States. Castiella emphasized that the 1970

agreement (which was signed after he was dismissed as

Foreign Minister) had failed to reduce the American pres^

ence in Spain and— by the explicit terms of the December

1970 Senate resolution— contained no U.S. commitment to

Spain's defense. Castiella also expressed dissatisfaction

with the evolution of non-military cooperation between the

two nations, noting that Spain's balance of payments with

the United States had worsened and pointing out U.S.

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restrictions on important Spanish shoe exports to the

United States. Castiella concluded that the most that the

Spanish should negotiate with the United States— and then

only if Spain received legal security guarantees— was "the

privilege of being able to depend on the use of certain

defensive facilities" in Spain. Castiella also concluded

that U.S. bases in Spain constituted "... more a risk

than a protection," and said that "the era of overseas 40 military bases is over."

A more sympathetic view of the United States was

taken by Antonio Garrigues, who as Spain's ambassador in

Washington played a central role in the 1963 renewal noted

earlier. Garrigues disagreed with the prevailing public

and official Spanish opinion, in deemphasizing the impor­

tance of a formal security treaty with the United States,

which he felt was no more binding than an executive agree- 41 ment. Garrigues furthermore expressed the belief that

the previous U.S.-Spanish agreements had ". . . o n the 42 whole functioned favorably for both nations." Garrigues

pointed out the broader issues at stake in Spain's forth­

coming negotiations with the United States when he

observed:

We are dealing with a political negotiation, not military, not economic, not technical-cultural. Its basic aim is to obtain an improvement and an anchoring of the political relationship between the United States and S p a i n . 43

But, Garrigues cautioned, the issue of nuclear weapons

"creates a problem of security for the Spanish people— as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 255 44 attested by Palomares— of the maximum gravity. ..."

These comments of Garrigues once again attest to his previ­

ously noted ability to incisively analyze the advantages

and problems in Spain's relationship with the United

States.

The third major figure whose views on Spanish

policy toward the United States merit noting was Spain's former ambassador to Washington (1954-1959), José Marfa de Areilza, Count of Motrico. Areilza was a liberal mon­

archist very close to Prince Juan Carlos' father, Don Juan.

In May 1970, Areilza was one of four Spanish figures heav­

ily fined by the Franco regime for attempting to give

Secretary of State Rogers a memorandum during his visit to

Madrid. This memo simply (and truthfully) noted that

Spain's eventual membership in NATO depended on the abol­

ishment of authoritarian institutions, the establishment of

political parties, and free elections.Areilza's acute

observations on Spain's foreign policy options are worth

noting for their own intrinsic worth, in addition to the

fact that Areilza, as the first Foreign Minister of post-

Franco Spain, would eventually sign the 1976 treaty with

the United States:

In the actual context of the world, dominated by the two nuclear superpowers, there is really slight margin for maneuver for a nation of middle size like Spain. Our geographic situation makes even more limited the options for our own foreign policy. I personally believe that our national interests of various sorts— military, economic, political and com­ mercial— make advisable a deep understanding with the United States in the present situation.46

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It is interesting to note, in view of Areilza's subsequent

insistence and success in obtaining a formal treaty with

the United States after Franco's death, that in late 1974

Areilza felt that both "the climate in Congress" and "the

situation that the power of the executive is going through" 47 made a treaty with the United States unlikely.

Spanish editorial comment on future relations with the United States reflected many of the points made by the

three influential Spanish figures cited above. The Madrid

Catholic newspaper Ya emphasized the risk to Spain of the

U.S. military presence, complained of the bilateral eco­

nomic relations of the two nations, and advocated a formal 48 treaty. The conservative monarchist Madrid newspaper

ABC contended that the deterioration in the U.S. strategic

posture in the Mediterranean as a result of events in

Cyprus, Italy, and Portugal made the Spanish bases more

valuable than ever to the United States, but pointed out

the difficulties which a treaty would face in the U.S. 49 Congress. The Madrid evening newspaper Informaciones

repeated Castiella's conclusions that the U.S. bases were

more a risk than a guarantee of defense to Spain, and strongly advocated a formal treaty if the bases were to

remain.The Marxist magazine Triunfo predictably noted

how the United States had "taken advantage of the histori­

cal difficulties that Spain has passed through" and spoke of "two hundred CIA agents in Spain" as part of a general

denunciation of the U.S. presence in Spain and Europe.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 257

The most comprehensive Spanish press analysis of

relations with the United States appeared in the weekly

magazine Actualidad Economica in late June 1974. This

article attracted the most attention in official American

circles, for it contained the first published public opinion poll of Spanish feeling on foreign policy matters.

Only sixteen percent answered "yes" to the question "Do you favor that the Americans continue with their bases in

Spain," with forty-eight percent opposed and thirty-six 52 percent no comment or opinion. This poll of 1500 Span­

iards may not have been very scientifically conducted, due

to the small interview sample and the phrasing of the

question, but the impression remained that the U.S. mili­

tary presence in Spain was unpopular with almost half the

Spanish people. The publication of this poll by the con­

servative Spanish equivalent of the Wall Street Journal,

and later oblique references to the unpopularity of the

Spanish bases during the renewal negotiations, suggest

that this public sounding was officially condoned to give

Spanish negotiators greater leverage in their subsequent

negotiations with the United States. The critical press scrutiny in 1974 and afterward

of Spanish policy toward the United States reflected two

facts. It gave evidence of the fact that the matter of

press restrictions was the one true area of liberalization

in Spain during Franco's regime. Also, the Spanish press

comment on policy toward the United States was not so much

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opposed to close relations with the United States per se.

Rather, most articles mentioned the disadvantages of the

U.S. military presence in Spain, trade restrictions, etc.,

in an apparent effort to support tougher Spanish negotiat­

ing demands. The Spanish press was serving notice that the

oft-proclaimed U.S.-Spanish cooperation "with reciprocity"

should become a reality, reflected in treaty form, instead

of remaining.a meaningless phrase for use in joint declara­

tions. Although there seems to have been a symbiotic

relationship, even in 1974, between much Spanish press

opinion and the official government policy toward the

United States, the fact that the press was no longer on a

short leash and might hold the government to account for

the final agreements no doubt stiffened the Spanish nego­

tiators in their subsequent discussions with the United

States.

Negotiations— Stage One What might be termed the first stage of negotia­

tions between the United States and Spain lasted from

November 1974 until early 1975. The negotiators, headed by

McCloskey and Spanish Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Juan José Rovira, held monthly meetings which alternated 53 between Madrid and Washington.

The first round of negotiations, held in Madrid on

4—7 November 1974 was exploratory in nature. Despite news

reports that "neither side established a detailed position,"

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the Spanish negotiators reportedly complained in detail of

their past unequal treatment and demanded a formal security 54 treaty. The second round of negotiations was held in

Washington from 9 to 12 December 1974. This meeting in­

cluded the military advisors who would be present at subse­

quent negotiations to handle the military details of the

new agreements— U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Patrick Hannifan,

Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Pol­

icy, and Operations and General Gutiêrrez Mellado of

Spain's High General Staff. This second round featured

military briefings which concentrated on "the defensive

aspects of :he relationship between the two nations. . 55 . ." The third round of negotiations, which McCloskey

was unable to attend, took place from 10 to 12 February 1975.56

The positions of both the United States and Spain

in the first stage of these negotiations was publicly

revealed by McCloskey during hearings in June 1976 before

the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs:

When I began these negotiations, my instructions were to complete the negotiations for a renewal of the executive agreement as it had been since 1953 and renegotiate another 5 years... . In the initial phase of the negotiations, the Spanish were seeking a mutual security treaty with the United States and we spent the first 3 to 4 months with my trying and finally convincing the Spanish that the Congress of the United States would not support another mutual security treaty. . . . Midway, then in the negotia­ tions, the question arose from the Spanish side: We want to see our new agreement somehow or other changed from what it had been before. I then asked

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for authority from the President to submit the agreement as a treaty, so long as it was under­ stood by Spain and the Congress of the United States that it was not a mutual defense treaty.

This McCloskey statement is very interesting, for

it reveals that the Spanish did press for a mutual security

treaty in the first stage of the negotiations. More impor­

tant, from the viewpoint of U.S. policy toward Spain, it

indicates that the Ford administration originally planned

the new agreement with Spain to be another executive

agreement.

Negotiations— Stage Two

McCloskey's public testimony on the U.S. and Span­

ish positions in the negotiations explains very well the

initial impasse over Spanish demands for a mutual security

treaty, and also mentions the ultimate treaty form of the

U.S. agreement with Spain. What McCloskey did not discuss,

however, was the second stage of the negotiations, which

lasted from approximately February to July 1975. An analy­

sis of Spanish and U.S. policy positions during the

February-July 1975 period is most important, for the United

States, in attempting to respond to Spanish demands engaged

in two diplomatic initiatives of dubious value. After the third round of negotiations in February,

reports began to appear in the Spanish press that Spain was

demanding a U.S. withdrawal from the Torrej6n air base 5 8 near Madrid in the absence of a mutual security treaty.

Secretary of State Kissinger stated at a late February

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press conference that "this report seems to be, at least 59 premature; in fact, it is inaccurate."

The actual Spanish position in the second stage of

the negotiations in early 1975 offered the United States a

choice. Accepting the fact that they would be unable to

obtain a mutual security treaty, the Spanish demanded

either a U.S. withdrawal from Torrej6n (and withdrawal of

the small U.S. contingent remaining at the largely inactive

Morôn air base) or "a direct NATO acknowledgement that U.S.

access to bases in Spain contributes to NATO d e f e n s e .

This choice was probably first tabled by the Spanish at the

third meeting in February 1975, and subsequently made more

explicit to McCloskey in the fourth round of negotiations

from 10 to 13 March. By the time the fifth round of nego­

tiations was held in early April, the U.S. had decided to

push for the "NATO acknowledgement" at the May NATO summit

conference in Brussels.

The U.S. decision to press the NATO allies for a

formal acknowledgement of the contribution of Franco Spain

to NATO's defense was probably unwise, as it led to a

rebuff by the NATO allies which embarrassed and angered the

Spanish. The NATO allies, especially some NATO governments

that were led or influenced by socialist factions— Norway,

Holland, Belgium, and Britain— retained their resentment at

Franco's dictatorial regime. Given these facts, the question naturally arises

as to why the United States agreed to bring this matter up

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with the NATO allies. One may also question what was to be

gained by the scheduling at this time of a visit by Presi­

dent Ford to Madrid after the NATO summit meeting. These

moves were partly a response to the tough Spanish negotiat­

ing position. As the Ford administration was unable to

offer a mutual security treaty to Spain, and did not want

to have to withdraw from the Torrejdn base, the appeal to

the NATO allies to acknowledge Spain seemed a plausible

alternative. As logical as this seemed, it should have

been foreseen as doomed from the start— for the opposition

to Franco's regime among some of the U.S. NATO allies had

more to do with emotion than logic. (Notwithstanding the

emotion motivation, a good case could be made in mid-1975

for avoiding NATO overtures to a dictatorial regime which

was obviously in its twilight.) The Ford trip to Madrid

was probably best described by Benjamin Welles, who termed 6 2 it "a consolation prize for Franco."

The efforts by the United States to obtain formal

NATO acknowledgement of Spain's contributions to Western

defense resulted in predictable failure in Brussels at the

end of May 1975. Even at the meeting of defense ministers,

the best that then Secretary of Defense Schlesinger could

obtain was a statement in the final communique that the

U.S. had reported on "the present state of the bilateral

agreements on the use by U.S. forces of military facilities

in Spain, it being understood that these arrangements

remain outside the NATO c o n t e x t .

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When President Ford spoke at the NATO summit con­

ference following the regular ministerial meeting, he again pressed the Spanish issue. After noting Spain's contribu­

tion to Western defense "as a result of its bilateral rela­

tionship with the United States," Ford urged the NATO ’J

allies to ". . . begin now to consider how to relate Spain

with Western d e f e n s e . Ford's diplomatic efforts were

also to no avail, and Spain was not even mentioned in the

final communique from the NATO summit. At a press confer­

ence afterwards. Ford lamely admitted that "we recognize

the impossibility of" Spain's relationship with NATO "in

the immediate future.

President Ford immediately proceeded to make

another diplomatic move of questionable value by visiting

Franco in Madrid on 31 May and 1 June 1975. The danger of

this move was identified (with some exaggeration) by an

editorial in the New York Times which noted that President

Ford . . .by fawning on Franco. . . is giving lasting offense to Spanish democrats and trading short-run gains— a new agreement on bases— for major trouble with those who will govern Spain after the General­ issimo is g o n e . 66

In fact, the Ford visit produced few gains even in

the "short-run." The tepid public reception and bland

Spanish press comment on the Ford visit were a marked con­

trast with the enthusiastic receptions given Eisenhower and

Nixon. More important, little progress was made toward a

new bases agreement in Ford's meetings with Franco,

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Premier Arias, and Foreign Minister Cortina. Kissinger

admitted at the end of the visit that the question of U.S.

withdrawal from Spanish bases had "not been decided yet"®^

For his efforts. President Ford got to listen to a

warning by Franco that the Western world was "in need more

than ever before of the values that are common to us : 6 8 all." At this time in 1975, when Franco was putting the

brakes on even the cautious liberalization plans of Prime

Minister Arias and had just declared a "state of emergency"

in the Basque provinces, it was clear that whatever these

common "values" were, they did not include democratic

freedoms.

If this bleak situation was all that there was to

U.S. policy toward Spain in mid-1975, we might be tempted

to agree with the acerbic comments of Nicolas von Hoffman

regarding the Ford visit to Spain:

Jerry Ford, what are you doing in that picture with an octogenarian Spanish fascist riding in an antique Rolls Royce accompanied by a wing of museum- piece Horse Guards? Political values aside, they learned you better common sense than that in Grand Rapids.

But there is considerable evidence that the United States was in fact following a two-track policy toward

Spain— dealing with the Franco regime to obtain the U.S. strategic goal of a continued military presence in Spain

and at the same time dealing with Juan Carlos and Spanish

dissidents to further a U.S. political goal of a democratic

post-Franco Spain. As early as December 1974, reports

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appeared that United States diplomats in Madrid had begun

a dialogue with the democratic opponents of Franco, and

that the continuation of these contacts would be a large 70 part of the mission of Ambassador Stabler. At the time of Ford's visit to Spain, U.S. officials reportedly stated

that the main purpose of the visit was "to prepare for the

future" when Juan Carlos would be Spain's head of state, 71 not ". . . to embrace Franco or his policies." And

indeed. Ford spent more time in private discussions with

Juan Carlos than with Franco. These facts tend to neutral­

ize some of the criticism of the Ford visit for indicating

support for Franco's dictatorial regime.

It seems likely, then, that U.S. policy toward

Spain in mid-1975 was partly directed to the political goal

of a future democratic Spain. Yet the U.S. diplomatic

effort for Spain at the NATO meeting and the Ford visit to

Franco, on balance, may have been unwise, and not only

because the humiliating NATO rebuff to the Spanish could

have easily been foreseen. More important, as noted earl­

ier in this study, a Presidential visit to Franco inevi­ tably, if unintentionally, had the appearance of embracing

Franco and his policies.

Broader systemic factors seem to have influenced

the decision of Kissinger and Ford in mid-1975 to under­

take these two highly visible diplomatic efforts regarding

Spain. This was the period when the U.S. strategic posi­

tion in the world, and especially in the Mediterranean,

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looked bleakest for the United States. In southeast

Asia, Cambodia and South Vietnam had just fallen to the

dommunists. In the eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. had lost

base facilities in Greece and Turkey in the aftermath of

the Cyprus affair. In the western Mediterranean, it was

the period of maximum communist influence in Portugal, and

according to one observer Kissinger "was quick. . . to

let his innate pessimism guide him" to believe that Portu- 72 gal was virtually lost to communism.

If this reading of the tangle of U.S. policy toward

Spain in mid-1975 is correct, Kissinger and Ford were

panicked by the apparent deterioration of the U.S. strate­ gic posture in the Mediterranean into a desperate effort

to assure the retention of the Spanish bases. The U.S.

efforts at the NATO meeting and the Ford visit to Madrid

thus appear as short-sighted initiatives, based on what

subsequently was proven to be an unduly pessimistic reading

of the Mediterranean situation.

Fortunately for U.S. policy toward Spain, changes

in Spain's political situation by the end of 1975 enabled

U.S. policy to concentrate on the political goal of a

democratic post-Franco Spain and adapt U.S. military strat­

egy regarding Spanish bases to this goal. But this subse­

quent good fortune and good timing in U.S. policy toward

Spain should not be allowed to totally obscure the poten­ tial danger to U.S. relations with a post-Franco Spain

resulting from the apparent embrace in May 1975 of a

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dictatorial regime whose days were clearly numbered. There is a general lesson here for U.S. foreign policy (a lesson

reinforced by other Kissinger-inspired reactions in 1975

to the situations in Vietnam and, later, Angola)— when

apparent foreign policy setbacks multiply, it is more

important than ever for U.S. policy-makers to keep a cool

head and a long-term perspective, instead of yielding to

pessimism and engaging in a flurry of somewhat desperate

responses.

Negotiations— Stage Three

The third stage of negotiations began in Washington

with the sixth meeting of the negotiating teams on 16-18

June 1975. The official communique after this meeting

made reference only to the consideration of "fundamental

aspects of the defensive relationship of the two nations."

But unofficial reports indicated that the U.S. still 73 refused to consider a treaty with Spain. After the

seventh round of negotiations, held in Madrid from 30 June

to 2 July, reports appeared that in lieu of a formal

treaty Spain was asking $1.5 billion in aid and a reduction 74 of the U.S. military presence in Spain. The official

communique referred only to the beginning of the outlining

of the "technical" details of the new agreement. After the

eighth round of negotiations on 21 to 23 July, the only

progress reported was the "progress accomplished by the 75 working groups." The ninth round of negotiations, from

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18 to 21 August, resulted in a report of agreement on "a

draft of the section on cultural matters, and a new section

on energy, technology, science, agriculture and environ- : 76 ment." No progress was indicated on the major military

sections of a new agreement.

Obviously, at the end of this third stage of nego­

tiations the United States and Spain remained far apart on

the most important aspects regarding the future of U.S.

bases in Spain and the U.S. aid to Spain in return for

these bases. As the 26 September 1975 expiration deadline

for the previous agreements approached, the United States

continued to resist the stubborn Spanish demands for a

huge $1.5 billion aid package and reduced U.S. military

presence in Spain. The United States negotiators were

evidently surprised by the toughness of the Spanish nego­

tiating position. But this tough Spanish policy had a

paradoxical and salutary effect from the viewpoint of U.S.

policy toward Spain— it almost forced the United States to

do what it should have done in any case, which was delay

on a new agreement. The obvious deterioration in Franco's

health and the political ferment in Spain in the summer of

1975 suggested that the United States might soon have the

opportunity to advance the U.S. political goal of a demo­

cratic Spain by signing a new agreement in treaty form

with a new post-Franco regime. It is impossible, of course,

to know how explicitly this consideration figured in U.S.

policy toward Spain at the end of the summer of 1975— but

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the subsequent timing of the new agreement with Spain

suggests that this may have been a consideration behind U.S. policy.

The Framework Agreement

U.S. policy in the latter stage of the negotiations

with Spain was greatly influenced by rapid and historic

changes in Spain's internal politics. The importance of this factor as an input to U.S. foreign policy can hardly

be overemphasized. The "pragmatic" decision of the Ford

administration to refrain from criticism of the Franco

regime in its troubled latter days, and the temporary

renewal of Spain's international isolation, contributed to

the conclusion of a "framework agreement" in early October

1975.

The tenth and last regular round of the negotia­

tions ended on 17 September 1975 without agreement. The

United States reportedly offered Spain only $500 million

in credits for military equipment and told the Spanish

that their requests for either a treaty or $1.5 billion in 77 military aid would never be approved by Congress. The Spanish negotiators reportedly replied that "the U.S.

administration should accept Spain's terms and let Congress 7 8 decide." In what was evidently a final negotiating ploy,

the Spanish government publicly stated in mid-September

that if no new agreement was reached by 26 September, Spain

would not agree to the six-month extension of the agreement

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and the United States "would have to be out of the bases

by 26 September 1976."^^

This situation was soon altered, however, for the

expiration of the agreement coincided with a major event in

Spain which attracted worldwide attention and led to a

weakening of the Spanish negotiating position and a corres­

ponding increase in U.S. leverage on the Spanish. At a

cabinet meeting on 26 September, Franco had refused to

commute the death sentences imposed on five members of the

Basque ETA group and the Maoist FRAP organization for

alleged terrorist killings of Spanish police. The accused

men had been judged by a military court and denied legal

appeal from the decision. On the morning of 27 September, 80 these five men were executed by a firing squad. The immediate world response to the executions was

best summed up in a New York Times headline: "Spain Recap - 81 tures Her Old Role as Europe's Outcast." Every country

in Western Europe recalled its ambassador from Madrid— a

withdrawal which, in a highly unusual move, included even 82 the envoys of neutral Switzerland and the Vatican.

Spanish buildings and offices were attacked and sacked by

outraged mobs throughout Europe. All of a sudden, for what

proved to be the final weeks of Franco's long rule, the

Franco regime was back to the isolation of the late 19 40's.

The United States response to the furor over the Spanish executions exemplified Kissinger's renowned "prag­

matism" at its worst and at its best. Kissinger's

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pragmatism was shown at its worst when the administration

remained silent on the executions and then, in response to

charges of "moral insensitivity," took the position that it 83 was "... basically an internal Spanish matter. . . ."

As columnist William Safire (who can hardly be accused of

bleeding-heart liberal tendencies) noted at the time:

Franco's transfer of the terrorists' trial from civil courts to military courts was wrong and we should say so. The principle of summary execution, without the right of appeal, is abhorrent to our idea of justice. And we should make our opinion known.

The positive side of Kissinger's pragmatism was

shown by how he took advantage of Spain's renewed isolation

to gain additional leverage for a new bases agreement.

Kissinger had already met on 22 September with Spanish

Foreign Minister Cortina, who was in the United States to

attend the U.N. General Assembly meeting. Although both

men expressed some optimism after this first meeting, they

remained far apart on a new agreement.

But by 26 September, when Kissinger began a new

series of meetings with Foreign Minister Cortina, Spain

was once again under attack and isolated in Europe. Kis­

singer made clear to Cortina that if the Franco regime in

that difficult moment wanted even the very moderate poli­

tical support that the United States could offer, a modera­

tion in the Spanish position on renewal of the bases 85 agreements would be required. Thus the United States

maintained its silence during the furor over the

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executions— and received praise from Cortina for "no inter- O g ference in our political situation." Spain, in turn,

evidently moderated its negotiating demands, and the out­

line of a new agreement was announced in early October.

Thus the "pragmatism" of U.S. policy in refraining

from criticism of the executions had both a positive and a

negative effect. The question of the wisdom of this policy

boils down to a judgment on whether the United States might

have made known its moral and legal beliefs without so

angering the Franco regime as to preclude a new bases

agreement. Examination of the extent of Spain's diplomatic

isolation at the end of October 1975 suggests William

Safire's analysis was correct in concluding that a U.S.

. . . statement of our beliefs, including a unique emphasis on the tragedy visited on the fami­ lies of the dead policemen, could be fashioned in a way that would not be unwelcome in Spain.8?

From "Framework Agreement" to Treaty

Kissinger and Cortina announced after their final

meeting in Washington on 4 October 1975 that a "new frame­

work agreement governing cooperative relationships between 88 the United States and Spain" had been reached. The

announcement provided few specifics of the new agreement,

and further negotiations were needed to arrange the details.

But it was reported that the United States would continue

to have access to all the bases in Spain (with "some reduc­ tion in U.S. presence" on the bases), and that Spain would

in return receive $500-$750 million in military aid over

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 273 89 the five-year period.

The most significant aspect of the 4 October 1975

"framework agreement" was that it was to be concluded

"strictly as an executive agreement without recourse to 90 Congress." It was after the conclusion of this "frame-^

work agreement" that McCloskey began another round of con­

sultations with members of Congress regarding the form of

the new agreement. Distaste for another executive agree-,

ment deal with Franco behind the back of Congress was,

predictably, even stronger in the aftermath of the Franco

regime's executions.

At this crucial moment, internal events in Spain

once again influenced U.S. policy toward Spain. After

several days of rumors that Franco was ill, the Spanish government announced on 21 October 1975 that he had suf- 91 fered a heart attack. On 23 October, the State Depart­

ment announced that the new agreement with Spain would be 92 submitted to Congress for approval. Although the State

Department said that this decision had been reached before

Franco's illness became known, the timing of the two 93 events is curious, to say the least. But Franco was still nominally Spain's leader and

it was reported that the administration at that time merely

planned ". . . t o seek a joint resolution of both houses

approving the agreement," with the submission of the pact 94 as a treaty "a less likely alternative." Democratic

Senator Dick Clark of Iowa introduced a resolution in

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early November urging the administration to submit the 95 agreement as a treaty. Franco's death soon made Senator

Clark's request attractive to the Ford administration.

Franco's illness continued to worsen throughout October, and on 30 October 1975 he again delegated his

powers as head of state to Juan Carlos. Unlike the summer

of 1974, this delegation of powers became permanent.

Franco, after a long fight to survive, finally died on

20 November. President Ford's condolence message said that

"the United States for its part will continue to pursue the

policy of friendship and cooperation which has formed the

touchstone of excellent relations existing between our two

countries. While most other world figures responded to

Franco's death in cautious terms, former President Nixon

broke his silence in San Clemente to issue a tribute to

Franco that revealed more about Nixon than the late

Spanish dictator:

Few leaders in this century have guided their country with such firm conviction and strength. . . . He united a divided nation through a policy of firmness and fairness toward those who had fought against him. . . Gen. Franco earned the deep affec­ tion of his own people and respect for the Spanish nation around the world.9'

With the crowning of King Juan Carlos I on 22 Novem­

ber 1975 Spain's previous diplomatic isolation vanished

overnight. Not only did Vice President Rockefeller attend

the coronation ceremonies of the new king, but European

leaders such as President Giscard d'Estaing of France and

President Walter Scheel of West Germany also attended.

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The immediate effect of Franco's death and the resulting transition of power to Juan Carlos was a two

month standstill in U.S. negotiations with Spain over the

new agreement. But a more profound effect was the change

in perspective on the future U.S.-Spanish relationship

that the new situation in Spain offered both nations. The

United States was anxious to preserve the favorable "frame­

work" of the new agreement reached in October. But, in

response to the petitions of both Spain's new Foreign

Minister Areilza and members of the U.S. Congress, a deci­

sion was made in early December to make the new agreement 98 a formal treaty. The Spanish government headed by Prem­

ier Arias (renamed by Juan Carlos) meanwhile was flexing

its new diplomatic muscles. In a December Newsweek inter­

view Arias spoke of the need for "U.S. military aid to 99 Spain to increase, at least double."

Meanwhile, Spain's new Foreign Minister, José Maria

de Areilza,met with Secretary of State Kissinger when both

were in Paris for the international economic conference on

16 December 1975. In an interview in Le Monde, Areilza .

called for "a gesture" of "real help" from the United

States to the new monarchy.Spain particularly desired

more military aid, for the support of the armed forces

was deemed essential to Juan Carlos' plans for democratic

liberalization in Spain. As one account noted. The desire by the United States to keep its bases going here is considered to be the leverage by which the king and the government can make good their promises to the m i l i t a r y . ^®1

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In early January, a letter from Areilza to Kis­

singer requested that the agreement be elevated to treaty

format. The United States was prepared to agree to both

the Spanish request for a treaty and their request for

increased military aid, as a "gesture" of support for

Spain's new king. On 22 January 1976, McCloskey arrived

in Madrid to undertake the final negotiations with the

Spanish. The next day, McCloskey met Kissinger at the NATO

meeting in Brussels and Kissinger obtained the agreement

of the allies to a reference in the new agreement to 102 Spain's defense contributions to the West. Kissinger arrived in Madrid on 24 January and, after meeting with Foreign Minister Areilza, Premier Arias,

and King Juan Carlos, signed the new Treaty of Friendship

and Cooperation with Spain. At the press conference after

the signing, Kissinger indicated the political dimension

of the new agreement by expressing confidence that Spain

would progressively enter the framework ". . . o f all those

human and political values that link the Western world. .

. . " Spanish Foreign Minister Areilza expressed the

Spanish satisfaction with the new agreement, terming it "a

capital step in relations between the two countries

Before proceeding to a detailed review of the

provisions of the new treaty, it is important to again note

how the rapid changes in Spain's internal situation since the "framework agreement" had made possible both a new

form and, as we shall see, a new substance to U.S. policy

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toward Spain. The rapid adaptation and sympathetic

response of the United States to the new political situa­

tion created by Franco's death enabled the new agreement

to express and assist the specific political goal of the

development of Spanish democracy at the same time that it

preserved the strategic goal represented by Spanish bases.

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

A review of the major provisions of the new treaty

is important as a measure of the change from past agree­ ments. Of even greater significance, this treaty remains

the basis of U.S. relations with Spain through 1981.

Secretary of State Kissinger's letter of submittal of the

treaty to President Ford provides the best summary of the

lengthy provisions of the eight articles, seven supple­

mentary agreements, and eight related exchanges of notes

which comprise the treaty:

The new agreement is in the form of a Treaty. This solemn form was deemed appropriate not only because of the wide scope and importance of the subject matter covered but also because both Spanish and United States authorities wanted to assure the soundest political basis for the new stage in United States-Spanish relations symbolized by the agreement. The Treaty covers a broad spectrum of areas of mutual concern in United States-Spanish relations, with specific articles and supplementary agreements treating cooperation in the areas of economic af­ fairs, education and culture, science and tech­ nology, and defense matters. It also provides an institutional framework to enhance the effectiveness of cooperation in all these areas. The principal new elements of substance are in this institutional area, and include the creation of a high-level United States-Spanish Council, to oversee the implementa­ tion of the entire agreement, and a set of

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subordinate bodies, including joint committees for the various areas of cooperation and a Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff. The agreement specifies the military and non-military assistance to be given Spain over the five-year initial term of the agreement, and grants to the United States essentially the same rights to use military facilities in Spain which it enjoyed under the 1970 arrangments. The principal changes in military facilities are a reduction and relocation of United States tanker aircraft within Spain and the establishment of a date for withdrawal of the nuclear submarine squadron from the Rota Naval Base. Article I of the Treaty. . . establishes the United States-Spanish Council, under the joint chairmanship of the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of Spain. The Council, which is to meet at least semi­ annually, will have headquarters in Madrid, a permanent secretariat, and permanent representatives serving as deputies to the Chairmen. . . . An impor­ tant aspect of the new agreement is the integration of the military cooperation into the Council struc­ ture. Article II. . . calls for the development of closer economic ties between the United States and Spain. . . the agreement takes into account the current readiness of the Export-Import Bank to commit credits and guarantees of approximately $450 million to Spanish companies. . . . Article III. . . provides for a broad program of scientific and technical cooperation. . . . A total of $23 million would be provided by the United States in the form of grants to support this five- year program. One of the first matters of concern. . . will be studies relating to a solar energy institute. . . . Article IV. . . provides for a continuation and expansion of educational and cultural cooperation. The agreement contemplates a grant from the United States in the amount of $12 million to support this five-year program. . . . Articles V and VI of the Treaty. . . deal with cooperation in the area of defense. The defense relationship which these provisions represent is woven firmly into the fabric of existing United States philosophy and planning for the defense of the North Atlantic area. It represents a decision to assist Spain in developing a role which will contribute actively to that defense, and provides

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transitional institutions to prepare the way for an appropriate Spanish role in NATO^ These provisions do not constitute a security guarantee or commitment to defend Spain. They do, however, constitute a recognition of Spain's importance as a part of the Western world. To this end, a Combined Planning and Coordination Staff, with no command functions, is provided for by Supplementary Agreement Number Five, which sets forth a carefully drawn mandate and geographic area of common concern. All activities of the staff focus on the contingency of a general attack on the West. There is no commitment, express or implied, in the drawing up of the contingency plans. To further the purposes of the Treaty, Spain grants the United States the right to use and main­ tain for military purposes those facilities in or connected with Spanish military installations which the United States has heretofore enjoyed, with the exception that the number of KC-135 tankers in Spain will be reduced to a maximum of five and the remain­ ing tankers relocated; and that the nuclear submar­ ines will be withdrawn from Spain by July 1, 1979, a date which corresponds with our changing require­ ments. In addition, the United States undertakes not to store nuclear devices or their components on Spanish soil. . . . The details of the military assistance to be pro­ vided Spain. . . . The United States would provide over the five year initial term of the Treaty, repay­ ment guarantees under the Foreign Military Sales program for loans of $600 million, $75 million in defense articles on a grant basis, $10 million in military training on a grant basis, and a U.S. Air Force contribution on a cost-sharing basis, of up to $50 million for the aircraft control and warning net­ work used by the U.S. Air Force in Spain. In addi­ tion, provision is made to transfer to Spain five naval vessels and 42 F4E aircraft. . . . The notes exchanged include United States assur­ ances to Spain on settlement of damage claims which might result from nuclear incidents involving a United States nuclear powered warship reactor. . . . Associated with the Treaty and its supplementary agreements. . . are an Agreement on Implementation and procedural annexes thereto which regulate such matters as the status of United States forces in Spain and the use of the facilities there. These documents are being provided to the Congress for its information. . . .105

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As one account of the new treaty pointed out, the

treaty

. . . not only bolsters the image of the monarchy that succeeded the late Generalissimo Francisco Franco and meshes Spain with NATO, but it also assures U.S. use of strategic bases in the southern Mediterranean. ,"106

The new treaty thus fulfilled basic policy goals for both Spain and the United States.

The new Spanish government under King Juan Carlos

was of course pleased to have obtained the long-desired

Spanish goal of a formal treaty relationship— even though

the treaty did not commit the United States to Spain's

defense. The Spanish were also pleased by the upgrading of

the relationship reflected in the establishment of the

United States-Spanish Council and the link to NATO joint

defense planning provided by the Combined Military Coordin­

ation and Planning Staff. Finally, the total aid provided

enabled the Spanish to claim that it was ". . . a billion

dollar treaty on their side, because they are counting in

terms of credits.The U.S. pledge not to store nuclear

weapons in Spain and to reduce and relocate the KC-135

refueling tankers from Madrid, as well as the provision to

remove the last U.S. nuclear presence in Spain— the Polaris

submarines at Rota— by mid-1979 met the Spanish need to

allay public concern over the risks of the U.S. military

presence in Spain. In sum, the provisions of the treaty

met several long-standing Spanish policy goals and was

rightly considered a diplomatic victory.

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The United States could also claim with justice

that its major policy goals had been obtained. McCloskey

noted in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee how the new treaty format was in response to 108 Congressional as well as Spanish desires. He explicitly

identified how the new treaty was premised on a broader

U.S. political objective for Spain:

. . . the administration is firmly convinced that the treaty will benefit U.S. interests in Spain and Europe by giving positive impetus to the transition now underway in Spain. We also believe that transi­ tion will facilitate the development of a more con­ structive and harmonious association between Spain and the other West European countries. That is the broader objective of our policy. . . . The United States supports Spain's progress toward democracy out of a dedication to human rights and out of the simple understanding that we are all part of a wider Atlantic Community whose strength and cohesion demands that high standards in these matters be met and main­ tained by all members. The treaty is a clear signal of our moral support for Spain at this time.^®^

With respect to the U.S. strategic goal of retain­

ing Spanish bases, the provisions of the new treaty were

appropriately described by President Ford as reflecting

". . . a careful balancing of Spanish concerns with the

changing requirements of United States military deploy­

ment. The United States had been forbidden to overfly

Spain with nuclear weapons since the 1966 Palomares inci­

dent, so the provision requiring the United States not to

store nuclear weapons in Spain was not strongly resisted.

The only U.S. need for such weapons might be in connection

with the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) tactical fighter

aircraft at Torrejôn, but testimony revealed that their

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"... strike mission. . . would be launched from Aviano

Air Base, Italy, and Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.Pre­

sumably, then the necessary weapons for these aircraft

could be stored at their forward bases (if such was not

already the case). The reduction in number and the reloca­

tion to Zaragoza of the five remaining KC-135 refueling

tankers likewise caused no serious problems for U.S. mili­

tary strategists, as these aircraft have a sufficient

range to be operated from alternate bases in the United 112 States. The provision that attracted the most attention was

the planned withdrawal of the Polaris/Poseidon nuclear sub­

marines from Rota, but even this aspect reflected a prudent

blending of changing strategic requirements and Spanish

desires. As Vice Admiral Hannifan testified,

. . . within 4 or 5 years, it would be our prefer­ ence to move the submarines out of Spain and operate them from the east coast. We still start bringing them into the inventory of longer range missiles. . . and it is a considerable cost not only to logisti- cally support the submarines there, but also to fly the crews back and forth from the United States to Spain.113

This change in deployment plans was made possible by

advances in the range of submarine-launched missiles. The

original Polaris A-1 missile had a range of only 1200 miles,

whereas the currently deployed Polaris A-3 and Poseidon missiles have a 2500 mile range, and the Trident-I missile

slated for initial deployment in 1979 will have a 4000 mile 114 range. These increased ranges mean that submarines can

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 283

be based in the United States without a significant reduc­

tion in on-station patrol time.

Not only could the United States legitimately claim

that no damage to U.S. strategic needs was done by these

provisions of the treaty, but it could also claim that the

cost of the new treaty to the United States was not exces­

sive. We have previously noted how the Spanish, by count­ ing credits and loans in the agreement, could claim they

received over one billion dollars. But, as one of the mem­

bers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted:

". . . from the viewpoint of the cost to the U.S. taxpayer

. . .it is only about $34 million a year, or $170 million 115 total." McCloskey testified that the $450 million loan

from the Export-Import bank (to go to Spanish companies for

probable use in purchasing nuclear reactors in the United

States) had already been under separate negotiation, and

was included in the treaty "at the request of Spain.

The other large sum provided by the treaty was the $600

million in loans to Spain for military purchases in the

United States. As McCloskey noted, the total credits of $1.05 billion dollars provided by the treaty are for pur­

chases in the United States and thus ultimately benefit the United States as well as Spain.

The provisions in the treaty with perhaps the

greatest long-term significance involve the establishment

of joint U.S.-Spanish defense planning. This is a change

from the joint committees for military coordination

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contained in previous agreements, for these committees in

the past dealt only with problems involving U.S. use of the

Spanish bases or U.S. military aid to Spain. Even the 1970

provision for membership of the Deputy NATO Commander meant

only that the Spanish were informed of NATO activities.

The new Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff,

headquartered in Madrid and headed by U.S. and Spanish

generals, will systematically involve Spain for the first

time in defense planning for the North Atlantic area. This

staff will develop contingency plans for a Spanish role in

the event of a general attack on Western Europe. As Kis­

singer's letter pointed out, this exposure of the Spanish

to broader NATO defense planning concepts will help to

define Spain's role and prepare her for possible eventual

NATO membership. As McCloskey admitted, this new arrange­

ment also responded to long-standing complaints by the

Spanish military that the United States simply used bases

in Spain but "acted quite independently of Spanish military 117 within its own country."

This review of the major provisions of the 1976

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation suggests that it pro­

vides a sound basis for U.S. relations with Spain. The

timing, form, and substance of the agreement met Spanish

policy needs and had the explicit political goal of en­

couraging the progressive democratization of Spain. The military provisions of the treaty satisfied U.S. strategic

requirements, duly modified in light of technological

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 285 advances, and provide a sound basis for U.S.-Spanish

defense cooperation in preparation for Spain's probable eventual entrance in NATO.

Advice and Consent, 1976

The actions in 1976 of the Senate and the House of

Representatives regarding the new treaty with Spain marked

the first major effort to restore constructive executive-

legislative cooperation in U.S. foreign policy after the

long and bitter mutual distrust of the Vietnam and Water­

gate years. But the Congress asserted its independent

role in U.S. foreign policy by attaching its own declara­

tions of desired U.S. policy toward Spain to the approval

of the agreement. The declarations had the positive over­ all effect of clarifying the U.S. desire for a democratic evolution in Spain.

Even before President Ford submitted the new treaty

to the Senate on 18 February 1976 for its advice and con­

sent, two individuals had made important contributions to

the approval of the treaty. As noted earlier, McCloskey

had kept the members of Congress informed of the progress

in the negotiations with the Spanish. Another positive

influence on approval of the treaty was Democratic Senator

Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, a former Foreign Service

officer and one of the senior members of the Senate For­

eign Relations Committee. Senator Pell had been arrested

in the early days of the Franco regime for refusing to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 286 118 give a fascist salute during a visit to Spain. Senator

Pell visited Spain for the first time in thirty-five years

in early February 1976. After talks with King Juan Carlos,

Premier Arias and Foreign Minister Areilza, Pell stated his

satisfaction "with the move in the right political and

economic direction" and said "I will vote for ratifica- 119 tion." Pell was a forceful advocate of the treaty's

political goal of encouraging a democratic Spain in the

subsequent Senate hearings on the new treaty.

Several major issues arose during Congressional

hearings on the new treaty with Spain. The most important

controversy involved a challenge by the chairman of the

House International Relations Committee, Democratic Repre­

sentative Thomas Morgan of Pennsylvania, to the "... pro­

visions in the treaty which the executive branch viewed as

constituting authorization in law for the appropriations

necessary to implement the treaty." 120 This reaction

indicated the continuing sensitivity of Congress to execu­

tive actions in foreign policy which might infringe on

Congressional prerogatives— in this case, the constitu­

tional responsibility of the House to originate appropria­

tions. Also, the Ford administration was negotiating in

early 1976 similar long-term agreements with Greece and

Turkey, and the Congress was clearly concerned not to set

a precedent with the Spanish treaty. Democratic Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was responsive to the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 287 concerns expressed by Representative Morgan and other House

members. The problem was resolved (with the Ford adminis­

tration's reluctant acquiescence) by the attachment of a

declaration to the Senate approval of the treaty stating

that the funds pledged to Spain ". . . shall be made avail­

able for obligation through the normal procedures of the

Congress, including the process of prior authorization and 121 annual appropriations. . . ." A broader political question underlying the treaty

was also raised during the Senate hearings. A number of

witnesses who testified expressed doubt whether Juan Carlos

could or would dismantle the Franco dictatorship. Taking

a pessimistic view, they pointed out that the new treaty

would commit the United States to the support of the

undemocratic status quo.

This pessimistic view was not totally unwarranted

at the time of the hearings in March 1976— the left in

Spain had responded to Franco's demise with massive strikes

which resulted in casualties when the police responded in

their customary harsh manner; Premier Arias and other for­

mer Franco associates were still authoritarian stumbling

blocks to any true democratic reform; and, despite his good intentions for a democratic Spain, it was unclear that Juan

Carlos would be able to dismantle the dictatorial institu­

tions and control the reactionary forces bequeathed to him

by Franco.

Subsequent events in Spain in 1976 and 1977 proved

Reproduced with permission ot the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 288

wrong those who doubted Juan Carlos' intent or ability to

move toward democracy. As the Washington Post noted

editorially;

The Ford administration took the view— cor­ rectly, in our judgement— that Gen. Franco's passing provided the opportunity for closer U.S.- Spanish ties, and that the treaty itself— by its promise of broader cooperation and the internation­ alization of the insular Spanish military, and by its timely negotiation and ratification— could it­ self enhance democratic prospects in S p a i n . ^^2

King Juan Carlos gave further credibility to the

Ford administration's bet on Spanish democracy in a historic

state visit to Washington in early June 1976. Addressing

a joint meeting of Congress in fluent English, the king

expressed a commitment to democratic rule and "the orderly

access to power of distinct political alternatives" through 123 free elections. With this assist from the king, the

Ford administration optimism that the new treaty would

assist instead of hinder the advent of democracy in Spain

was accepted by the Senate. The Senate again demonstrated

its ability to play a constructive role by adding a declar­

ation to the approval of the treaty which noted; The United States. . . hopes and intends that this Treaty will serve to support and foster Spain's progress toward free institutions and toward Spain's participation in the institutions of Western Euro­ pean political and economic cooperation. 324

One critic of the new treaty, testifying at the

Senate hearings, attacked the military rationale for the

U.S. bases in Spain. He contended that these bases were

"not essential to the security of the United States or its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 289

NATO allies," and also stated that they had "been made

obsolete by developments during the last decade and a half 125 in weapons systems." "Essential" is a very strong word,

and it is hard to argue with a contention that Spanish

bases are not "essential" to the United States, in the

sense that we could not defend ourselves without these

bases. Yet this critic reveals his narrow grasp of the role of the Spanish bases when he concludes that they are

obsolete merely because their former role as bases for the

U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent had been eliminated.

The negotiators of the treaty ably rebutted this

criticism of the military rationale for Spanish bases.

They emphasized the important role of the Spanish bases in

support of the U.S. conventional NATO force deployment in

southern Europe, through the tactical fighter wing and 126 transport aircraft facilities at Torrej6n air base.

They also emphasized the role of the Spanish bases in sup­

porting U.S. forces committed to NATO in central Europe, through staging and reinforcement facilities at Torrejdn 127 and the air weapons training range at Zaragoza. With

respect to the Rota naval base, the Defense Department

witness testified that:

. . . the more important aspects of Rota have to do with support of the 6th Fleet, both in terms of logistics and communications, and the antisub­ marine warfare flights that are conducted from Rota, rather than the submarines, which are more glamorous and more well-known. I would put them third in terms of importance in R o t a . 328

The United States was still required to consult the Spanish

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on wartime use of the bases, but now there would be formal procedures for consultation in the new U.S.-Spanish 129 Council.

The Senate found the administration case for the

Spanish bases persuasive, but wanted to again make clear

that the new treaty did not commit the United States to

Spain's defense. The Senate thus combined a statement

that the treaty "does not create a mutual defense commit­

ment" with a statement of support for the eventual member­

ship of "a democratic Spain" in NATO and attached this as

another declaration to their approval of the treaty.

The Senate added two additional declarations to

the approval of the treaty. One of these declarations

urged Spain to become a party to the Nuclear Non-Prolifera- 131 i tion Treaty (NPT). Although Spain^ has no program to

obtain nuclear weapons, she has held her options open by 132 refusing to sign the NPT. McCloskey assured the Sena­

tors that all nuclear reactors purchased by Spain from the

United States would be placed under strict International 133 Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The second additional

declaration stated that Senate approval was given only for

the initial five-year period of the agreement, and if it

should be extended for the second five-year period further 134 Senate approval would be required. This was another

assertion of the Senate's prerogative in foreign policy.

Aside from these issues raised in the Congressional

hearings on the treaty, the important economic benefits to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 291

the United States of close U.S.-Spanish relations were

pointed out by the testimony of the American Chamber of Commerce in Spain:

U.S. exports to Spain in 1975— goods and serv­ ices— totalled almost $2.6 billion, up 69% over the $1.5 billion exported in 1973. During the same period Spanish exports to the U.S. jumped from $710 million to $840 million, an increase of 18%. . . the major categories of U.S. exports to Spain are cere­ als, oil seeds— primarily soybeans, machinery and transportation equipment. Spanish exports to the U.S. are concentrated in consumer items such as foot­ wear, food, olive oil and wine. Direct investments by United States enterprises in Spain have increased . . . U.S. companies invested $1.6 billion in Spain in 1974, an increase of 211% over the $770 million invested in 1970. Return flows from direct U.S. investment in Spain— dividends, royalties and other remittances— contributed $202 million in 1974 to our balance of payments accounts.335

Clearly the close ties developed with Spain over the years

since 1953 have been beneficial to U.S. trade.

Indeed, as the Spanish press complained in 1974,

the benefits have been almost too good for the United

States, as there is an almost three-to-one trade imbalance

between the two nations. Other figures for 1975 reveal

that Spain imports more from the United States than any

other country (sixteen percent of total imports— with Saudi

Arabia and West Germany the next most important exporters

to Spain), whereas the United States is third behind France T36 and West Germany as an importer of Spanish products.

At Spain's urging, in view of this trade imbalance with the

United States, both nations pledged in the new treaty to avoid the development of a disequilibrium in trade.

With the strong support of liberals hoping to

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encourage Spain's democratic evolution, the treaty was

approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by an 137 11 to 2 vote on 18 May 1976. On 21 June, the Senate i

passed a resolution of advice and consent to the new

treaty (containing the declarations noted earlier) by an 138 overwhelming 84-11 vote. The House of Representatives,

with its institutional concerns satisfied by the declara­ tion on yearly aid appropriations, subsequently approved

the first year's funds for Spain promised in the treaty.

The treaty entered into effect upon the exchange of the 139 instruments of ratification on 21 September 1976.

Conclusions

The subsequent Spanish internal political evolution

satisfied and exceeded the fondest hopes of those who sup­

ported the new treaty as a spur to Spanish democracy. As

C. L. Sulzberger noted in June 1976, perhaps the greatest

initial impact of the king's visit to the United States and

the late June ratification of the treaty was "felt inside

Spain.Within days of the Senate approval of the new

treaty with Spain, Juan Carlos fired the conservative Arias

and named 43-year old Adolfo Suârez as Premier. As the

young SuSrez was more concerned with the political future

than the past, the pace of political change in Spain soon

quickened. Within a year, Spain had legalized labor unions

and political parties (including the communists). On

15 June 1977 Spain's first free elections for a Congress and

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Senate in forty years were won by Suârez's center coali­

tion, with a strong showing by the Spanish Socialist Work­

ers Party (PSOE) and a poor showing for both the communists

and the neo-Francoist right.

The predictions of the pessimists that approval

of the 1976 treaty with Spain would hamper the chances of

democracy in Spain were clearly proven wrong. The optimism

of the supporters of the treaty (including most liberals in

the Senate) that the treaty would give a boost to Spanish

democracy was justified by the timing of Spain's subsequent

political changes— although primary credit for the evolu­

tion of democracy in Spain must of course go to Juan

Carlos, Suârez, and the good judgement of the Spanish

people. A Washington Post editorial best summed up the

evolution and wisdom of recent U.S. policy toward Spain:

Though Spain's progress is its own, the United States is entitled to beam upon it with a patron's discreet favor. The administration and the Congress, mutually supportive if not always synchronized, have had a positive effect in encouraging the forces of democracy. It was a wise move, for instance, to convert the U.S.-Spanish bases agreement into a treaty— a step endowing the link with the extra weight of Senate consent. Suitable executive- Congressional formulations were worked out in and around the treaty to express the Senate's hope that the treaty would advai ' ' democracy, and to assure Spain of adequate cont. -lity, though not a blank check, in military support. The terms of the treaty, by tightening the military and political links be­ tween the two countries, furnished an additional measure of foreign assurance to Madrid as it tackled its delicate domestic s i t u a t i o n . 141

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 294

CHAPTER 6 ; FOOTNOTES

1,Washington Post, 3 October 1970, p. Al.

2'Ibid..

^New York Times, 3 October 1970, p. 1. 4 San Diego Evening Tribune, 10 November 1970, p. 2.

^William T. Salisbury, "Spain and the Common Market: 1957-1967" (Ph.D. dissertation. The Johns Hopkins Univer­ sity, 1972), p. 278. This is the best study in English of Spain and the EEC.

^Gerald M. Meier, Problems of Trade Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 19.

^New York Times, 26 November 1973, p. A 6 . O Washington Star News, 2 November 1973, p. C30. 9 New York Times, 26 November 1973, p. A 6 .

^^Washington Star News, 2 November 1973, p. C30.

^^Washington Post, 20 December 1973, p. A26.

^^Ibid.

^^Ibid., 21 December 1973, p. Al. 14 "Murder of the Alter Ego," Time, 31 December 1973, p. 26.

^^Washington Post, 13 February 1974, p. A25. l^ibid.

^^Ibid., 23 June 1974, p. A3. 18 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 266.

^^Ibid. 20 Washington Post, 20 July 1974, p. Al. 21 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 266.

^^ABC [Madrid], 10 July 1974, p. 19.

^^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 295

^^Ibid. 26 Washington Post, 23 June 1974, p. A3. 27 Tad Szulc, "Behind Portugal's Revolution," For^ eign Policy 21 (Winter 1976): 27. 28 Ibid., p. 33. 29 Washington Star News, 26 May 1974, p. FI. 30 Washington Post, 15 June 1974, p. A15.

^^Ibid., 22 July 1974, p. A24. 32 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1969), p. 710. Halberstam also tells (p. 712) how McCloskey's candor at a press briefing on Vietnam once caused the following memo­ rable outburst of President Johnson: "Who the goddam hell leaked this? Who the hell was McCloskey? McCloskey— where the hell did he come from? Some kid at State. Well, his ass was going to be briefing people in Africa very goddam soon. " 33 U.S., Congress, Senate, Spanish Base Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 3, 12 and 24 March 1976, p. 39. 34 Washington Post, 6 October 1974, p. C7. 35 International Herald Tribune [Paris], 2 October 1974, p. 4.

^^Washington Post, 17 November 1974, p. Al.

^^Ibid., 13 December 1974, p. A4. 38 Spanish Base Treaty Hearings, p. 23. 39 The following information is from Informaciones [Madrid], 6 November 1974, p. 17. 40 Ya [Madrid], 6 November 1974, p. 15.

^^Ibid., 8 November 1974, p. 15. 42 ABC [Madrid], 7 November 1974, p. 3.

^^Ibid.

^^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 296 45 Christian Science Monitor, 26 June 1970, p. 5. 46 Ya [Madrid], 7 November 1974, p. 19. 47 Ibid. 48 °Ibid., p. 7. 49 ABC [Madrid], 6 November 1974, p. 30.

^^Informaciones [Madrid], 7 November 1974, p. 18.

^^M. VSzquez Montalbân, "Las Bases," Triunfo, 16 November 1974, pp. 8-11. 52 "Acuerdos Espana-Estados Unidos," Actualidad Economica, 22 June 1974, p. 46. 53 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 268. Rovira is now Spain's ambassador in Washington. 54 Washington Post, 8 November 1974, p. A4.

^^Chamorro and Fontes, p. 269.

S^ibid., p. 270. 57 U.S., Congress, House, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Commit­ tee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 8 and June 1976, p. 54. 5 8 Washington Post, 24 February 1975, p. Al. 59 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 271.

^^Washington Post, 7 May 1975, p. A46. G^ibid.

G^ibid., 27 May 1975, p. A16.

G^ibid., 24 May 1975, p. A16. 64 Ibid., 30 May 1975, p. A16.

^^Chamorro and Fontes, p. 278.

^^International Herald Tribune [Paris], 29 May 1975, 6.

^^Washington Post, 2 June 1975, p. A 6 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 297 1 June 1975, p. A14.

G^ibid., 4 June 1975, p. Bl.

^^Ibid., 20 December 1974, p. A21.

^^Ibid., 1 June 1975, p. 1. 72 Szulc, p. 33. 73 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 283.

^^"'Guerra de Papel," Cambio 16, 30 June 1975, p. 15, 75 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 286.

7Gibid., p. 287. 77 Washington Post, 15 September 1975, p. A20.

^®Ibid.

7*Ibid. 80 International Herald Tribune [Paris], 29 Septem­ ber 1975, p. 1. 81 New York Times, 5 October 1975, p. 6 . 82 International Herald Tribune [Paris], 29 Septem­ ber 1975, p. 1. 83 Washington Post, 30 September 1975, p. A18. 84 International Herald Tribune [Paris], 3 October 1975, p. 4. 85 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 292. 86 International Herald Tribune [Paris], 6 October 1975, p. 1.

®^Ibid., 3 October 1975, p. 4. o o Ibid., 6 October 1975, p. 1.

G^Ibid. 90 Ibid., 29 September 1975, p. 8 . ^^Ibid., 22 October 1975, p. 1. 92 "Ibid., 24 October 1975, p. 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 298

^^Ibid.

^^Ibid., 6 November 1975, p. 3.

^^Washington Post, 21 November 1975, p. A16.

^^Ibid., 22 November 1975, p. A7. 98 Chamorro and Fontes, p. 298.

9^ibid.

^^^International Herald Tribune [Paris], 18 Decem­ ber 1975, p. 1. lO^Ibid. 102 Washington Post, 23 January 1976, p. A18.

^^^Chamorro and Fontes, p. 303. 104 International Herald Tribune [Paris], 26 Janu­ ary 1976, p. 1.

^^^Hearings, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, pp. 77-79.

^Washington Post, 26 January 1976, p. A 6 .

^^^Spanish Base Treaty Hearings, p. 44.

^°®Ibid., p. 1 0 .

^°^Ibid., p. 9.

^Hearings, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, p. 76.

ll^Ibid., p. 4. 112 ^^^Ibid., p. 42.

ll^ibid., pp. 18-19. 114 For a more detailed discussion, see U.S., Con­ gress, House, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean, Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 27 March 1977, pp. 2 1 -2 2 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 299

^^^Spanish Base Treaty Hearings, p. 44.

^^^Hearings, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, p. 62.

^^'ibid., p. 60. 118 Spanish Base Treaty Hearings, p. 45. 119 International Herald Tribune [Paris], 14 Febru­ ary 1976, p. 2. 120 U.S., Congress, House, Implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Un it^ States and Spain, H. Report 94-1393 to Accompany H. Rl 14940, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 5 August 1976, p. 2. 121 Hearings, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, p. 118. 122 Washington Post, 4 June 1976, p. A24. 12 3 -^Ibid., 3 June 1976, p. A2. 124 Hearings, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, p. 118. 125 Spanish Base Treaty Hearings, p. 73. X26 Hearings, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, pp. 3-5. 12?Ibid.

^^®Ibid., p. 55. 129 Spanish Base Treaty Hearings, p. 13.

^^^Hearings, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, p. 118. l^libid. 132 See The Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Insti- tute, 1972), pp. 46-47. 133 Spanish Base Treaty Hearings, p. 150. 134 Hearings, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, p. 118.

^^^Spanish Base Treaty Hearings, p. 67.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 300

[Madrid], 28 August 1975, p. 19. 137 Washington Post, 19 May 1976, p. A2. *1 OQ ^^°Ibid., 22 June 1976, p. A17. 1 39 ^^=Ibid., 23 September 1976, p. A27. 140 International Herald Tribune [Paris], 16 June 1976, p. 6 . 141 Washington Post, 24 November 1976, p. A14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

The United States is just as excited as Spain over the progress being made toward democracy. Vice President Walter Mondale May 1977

With the birth of democracy in Spain, it is a

particularly appropriate moment to evaluate past U.S.

policy toward Spain. The conclusions drawn from this study

will serve to place the quarter century of close U.S. rela­

tions with the Franco regime in historical perspective.

Some of these conclusions are even more interesting for

what they indicate about U.S. foreign policy in general over this period. Finally, this appraisal will provide

a basis for recommendations for future U.S. policy toward

Spain.

U.S. Policy Toward Spain Since 1950

The shift in U.S. policy toward Spain from 194 7 to

1953 is a classic example of how bureaucratic politics,

viewed as a struggle between competing policy actors and

institutions with their particular goals and interests, can

affect U.S. foreign policy. The bureaucratic politics

analytical perspective proved useful in helping to account 301

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 302

for U.S. policy toward Spain, but has two obvious defects

revealed throughout this study. The motivations behind the

stands of policy actors are not so neatly compartmentalized

as the bureaucratic politics approach implies, and the

influence of events in the international system on U.S.

foreign policy is much more decisive than the bureaucratic

politics approach suggests. Notwithstanding these prob­ lems, the bureaucratic politics analysis revealed how a

conservative Congress, aroused by professional lobbyists,

and in alliance with the military, gradually prevailed on

a reluctant State Department and President to establish

close ties with Franco Spain. The end of the U.S. policy

of ostracism of Franco's regime in 1950 was only a prelude

to the 1951 decision to establish U.S. military bases in

Spain.

It is clear that the U.S. policy toward Spain after

1951 was based on considerations of military strategy

instead of the political goal of a democratic Spain where

human rights would be respected. The quasi-alliance with

Franco's dictatorial regime may seem in retrospect to have

been a Faustian bargain to obtain U.S. bases in Spain. But

the harshness of our historical judgment must be tempered by an awareness of what Reinhold Niebuhr termed the "moral

ambiguities" of history. The decision to establish U.S.

bases in Spain cannot be fully understood without an appre­

ciation of the international and domestic political atmos­

phere at the time of the Korean War. U.S. policymakers

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 303 perceived— incorrectly as it turned out, but not without

reason at the time— an imminent military threat to Western

Europe from the Soviet Union. In this atmosphere, the

threat from Stalin's totalitarian regime overshadowed

previous moral and political reservations on enlisting the

dictatorial Franco regime as a willing associate in the

struggle against communism.

It is ironic that by the time the U.S. air bases in

Spain became operational in the latter part of the 1950's,

the advent of intercontinental missiles and long-range

bombers had begun to render obsolete their original urgent

strategic rationale as bases for the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Although the air bases retained a residual deterrent func­

tion until the mid-1960's, their more lasting geopolitical

value as support bases for the U.S. presence in Europe and

the Mediterranean was clearly more important by the time of

the 1963 renewal.

The U.S. renewal of the bases agreements with Spain

in 1963 was marked by none of the fierce executive-legisla­

tive clashes that characterized the original 1950-1951

change in U.S. policy toward Spain and were to become a

feature of subsequent renewals. This was typical of an era

when Congressional acceptance of Presidential leadership in

foreign policy was at its height. There were few policy­

makers in Washington— even among "the best and the bright­

est" in the relatively liberal Kennedy administration—

inclined to question the military presence of the United

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States in Spain. The unusual bond between Spain's ambassa­

dor in Washington and President Kennedy suggests the impor­

tance of attention to the role of key individuals when

analyzing foreign policy. Other interesting aspects of

the 1963 renewal agreements were the willingness of the

United States to offer Spain a weak but implied defense

commitment and the development of a new rationale for the

Rota naval base as a homeport for part of the Polaris

submarine component of the nuclear deterrent.

U.S. policy toward Spain from 1968 to 1970 was

still premised on the role of the Spanish bases in U.S.

military strategy. The Spanish bases, as elements of

support for the broader political goal of maintaining a

strong U.S. presence in the Mediterranean, were enhanced

in value by the increased Soviet naval presence in the

Mediterranean. But broader systemic factors— the public

and Congressional wariness of foreign expenses and commit­

ments as a result of Vietnam— resulted in a fierce Congres­

sional attack on this U.S. policy of close military ties

with Franco Spain. U.S. policy toward Spain became the

first test case of the will of Congress to reassert its

role and guard its constitutional prerogatives in foreign policy. Thus the Congress resisted the renewal of the

agreements with Spain in executive agreement format. Many

members of Congress even questioned whether it was wise to

continue the close military relationship with Spain in any

form— for even the military rationale for bases in Spain

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was no longer immune from criticism. Spanish policy

toward the United States in the 1968-1969 period further

complicated relations between the United States and Spain

by making excessive demands for increased aid and political

support to compensate for the risk of the U.S. military

bases in Spain demonstrated by the Palomares incident.

After an eventual Spanish moderation of their negotiating

position, the Nixon administration obtained the new Agree­

ment of Friendship and Cooperation in August 1970. The

Senatorial opponents of a new executive agreement with

Spain, already aroused by the Nixon administration's actions

in Southeast Asia, made a major issue of the new agreement

with Spain. President Nixon easily outmaneuvered the

Congress by hastily signing the new executive agreement

with Spain— but at the high cost of compounding Congres­

sional distrust of the executive branch in foreign policy.

The negotiations for a new agreement with the Span­

ish from 1974 to 1976 revealed again the influence of

events in the international system on U.S. policy toward

Spain. With the approach of the post-Franco era in the

1974 to 1975 period, it seems that the United States

quietly began a long overdue attempt to base its policy

toward Spain on the specific political goal and ideal of

a democratic Spain, in addition to the previously ascendant

strategic goal of retaining U.S. bases in Spain. Yet a

series of events in Southeast Asia, Greece, Turkey, and

Portugal had by mid-1975 resulted in a temporary decline

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of the U.S. strategic posture. This so alarmed President

Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger that they backtracked

into an apparent embrace of the Franco regime intended to

advance the U.S. strategic goal of retaining the bases in

Spain, whatever the long-run political costs.

Fortunately, the timely demise of Franco in Novem­

ber 1975 and the subsequent flexibility and rapid adapta­

tion of U.S. policy opened the way to a transformation of

the U.S. relationship with Spain. The resulting Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation of January 1976 marked for the

first time the proper adaptation of the goals of U.S. mili­

tary strategy in Spain to the express U.S. political goal

of a democratic Spain. The timing and terms of the new

treaty provided a boost to King Juan Carlos as he embarked

on the difficult task of dismantling the dictatorial Franco

regime and developing democracy in Spain. In contrast to

1970, the resurgent U.S. Congress warily cooperated with

the chastened executive branch in a constructive effort to

make even clearer the U.S. political goal of a democratic

Spain. In many ways, then, U.S. policy toward Spain since

World War II is representative of broader trends of

executive-legislative relations on foreign policy matters.

Indeed, the timing of the various major shifts and strug­

gles over U.S. policy toward Spain periodically transformed this issue from its basically secondary status to a primary

focus of legislative-executive conflict over foreign policy.

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The evolution of U.S. policy toward Spain since World War II also epitomizes the varying degrees of concern

with the ideals of freedom and human rights in U.S. foreign

policy. The initial postwar ostracism of Franco's dicta­

torial regime reflected a brief period of postwar demo­

cratic idealism. When this policy was frustrated by

Franco's obstinate survival (at the same time that the •> postwar idealism of the United States was disillusioned by

Soviet advances in Eastern Europe), a more pragmatic U.S.

policy evolved which still expressed U.S. moral and politi­

cal values in disapproving of Franco's regime but nonethe­

less normalized diplomatic relations.

Soon thereafter, the Korean War and McCarthy atmos­

phere of anti-communist hysteria led to a more unrestrained

pragmatism in U.S. foreign policy. In the case of Spain,

this meant the junking of U.S. political and moral reserva­

tions about embracing the Franco regime as a quasi-ally, in

view of Spain's strategic value. President Eisenhower

exemplified the prevailing lack of sensitivity to demo­

cratic ideals in U.S. foreign policy by literally embrac­

ing Franco during his 1959 Madrid vist. While the Demo­

cratic administations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson

refrained from such gratuitous associations with the Span­

ish dictator, U.S. foreign policy toward Spain was still

premised on pragmatic considerations of military strategy

in the lingering Cold War atmosphere of their era. Presi­

dent Nixon and President Ford followed in the footsteps of

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their Republican predecessor in the White House and paid

Franco the compliment of a visit to Madrid. Yet in the i.

latter days of the Ford administration both the President

and Secretary of State Kissinger saw an opportunity to

express America's democratic ideals in support of the desires of Juan Carlos and the Spanish people for a demo­

cratic post-Franco Spain. It is to the credit of Ford and

Kissinger that they quickly seized this opportunity while

at the same time retaining the essence of the U.S. strate­

gic needs in Spain. The treaty with Spain which the Ford

administration bequeathed to President Carter provides a

sound balance between America's political ideals and the

changing needs of U.S. military strategy.

The temptation to conclude that "all's well that

ends well" regarding U.S. policy with Spain should be

resisted. By trading to Franco implicit political support—

and tangible military and economic support— in exchange for

military bases in Spain, the United States took a risk that

a post-Franco government would rally its domestic support

against the U.S. military presence in Spain. The example

of Greece after the dictatorship of the colonels may be

instructive in this regard, although not exactly analogous

due to the great effect of events in Cyprus on U.S.-Greek

relations.

The United States was, to put it bluntly, lucky in the timing and nature of Spain's political transition from

Franco's dictatorship. The Spanish were also diverted from

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an anti-American reaction by the rapid and wise adaptation

of U.S. policy in 1976 to support and encourage Spain's

democratic evolution, and by the subsequent advent of the

Carter administration with its express concern for the

ideals of democracy and human rights.

From the perspective of a quarter-century, we know

that a Soviet attack on Western Europe was not imminent in

1951 and that the need for Spanish air bases for the U.S.

nuclear deterrent was neither as urgent nor as lasting as

it appeared at the time. Yet, despite the political risks

and blindness to our best ideals that often resulted from

the U.S. policy decision to establish close ties with

Franco Spain, it would be a mistake to conclude that this

policy was not in the long run beneficial to both the

United States and Spain, The beneficial results for the

United States have already been assessed— access to highly

useful Spanish military bases, the growth of favorable

trade ties and, most important, the peaceful and democratic

evolution of Spain after Franco's death without any major

anti-American reaction.

The benefits for Spain of the past quarter century

of close ties with the United States are less easy to

prove conclusively but nonetheless real. The U.S. agree­

ments with Spain ended the previous diplomatic isolation of

the Spanish government, and the U.S. military presence in

Spain ended the previous social isolation of the Spanish

people from the influences of a modern and democratic

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people. Although U.S. economic aid to Spain totalled less

than $1 billion and virtually ended by 1963, the influence

and aid of the United States was essential to the junking

of the Spanish fascist economic policies in the Stabiliza­

tion Plan of 1959. This marked the end of Spain's isola­

tion from the Western economic system and was a precondi­

tion to the development of a modern industrial economy in

Spain. The critics who, in attempting to minimize the

U.S. influence on Spain's economic development, note that

Spain's rapid economic growth was not strongly influenced

by the relatively small sums of U.S. aid, miss the point.

The U.S. contribution lay not in the amount of aid to

Spain but the timing of that aid. Similarly, the observa­

tion that Spanish society has been most strongly influenced

by the millions of European tourists who have visited Spain yearly since the early 1960's misses the point that it

was the United States which in the 1950's first opened up to foreign influences an isolated Spain.

Reinhold Niebuhr once wrote that the most signifi­

cant elements in U.S. history are the ironic ones.^ This

seems particularly true with regard to U.S. policy toward

Spain. It is ironic that the most positive and lasting

effects of U.S. policy on Spain— the opening of Spain to

modern democratic economic and social influences in the

1950's— were largely inadvertent by-products of the basic strategic goals of U.S. policy toward Spain. Yet these

economic and social effects were probably essential as a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 311 foundation for a modern and democratic Spain in the post-

Franco era. When these inadvertent but positive effects of

U.S. policy toward Spain in the Franco era are added to the

positive results of the explicit U.S. support for Spain's

democratic evolution after Franco's death, the overall

result of U.S. policy toward Spain since 1953 appears to be

positive for Spain as well as the United States.

Spain and NATO

Since Spanish foreign policy decisions will be

very important to the future evolution of U.S. relations with Spain, a brief review of Spain's foreign policy posi­

tions and alternatives is appropriate. The Spanish deci­

sion on entry into NATO will be the central factor deter­

mining whether the current bilateral U.S.-Spanish defense

cooperation provided for in the 1976 treaty must be modi­

fied. The decision to seek NATO membership, of course,

must be made by the Spanish themselves. The unanimous agreement of the NATO allies would then be required to

approve Spain's membership in NATO. Such agreement would

probably be forthcoming, for even the Scandinavian coun^ tries and the Netherlands found the free elections held in

Spain in June 1977 to be convincing proof that Spain was

firmly proceeding down the path to democracy. The positions taken by the major political parties

regarding Spanish foreign policy will clearly be of in­

creased importance as Spain begins to function as a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 312 democracy. One of the more interesting aspects of the June 1977 political campaign is that foreign policy, and partic­

ularly the question of relations with the United States, 2 never became a major issue. A review of the major party

positions on foreign policy will nonetheless be useful to

indicate future changes which might affect U.S. relations

with Spain.

The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) made a

strong second-place showing in the June 1977 elections and will hold one-third of the seats in the lower house of

Spain's new parliament. The PSOE is led by the dynamic and

young (35 years old) Felipe Gonzalez. The electoral

strength of the PSOE, and the fact that the rivalry of

Suârez and Gonzâlez is likely to become a characteristic

feature of the Spanish political scene in coming years,

indicates that particular attention should be devoted to

PSOE foreign policy views.

The PSOE party platform denounced

. . .the renewal of the military-base agreements with the U.S.A. because they mortgage the national territory, and in addition, the home and foreign politics of the Spanish State. They are also de­ nounced because they were established without the full approval of the Spanish people, expressed specifically on this matter.3

Shortly after the June 1977 election, PSOE leader Felipe

Gonzâlez indicated that he wanted the new parliament to 4 take up the question of the U.S. military bases in Spain.

This appeal was, however, probably more designed to attract

publicity than to begin a serious foreign policy debate.

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Despite the strong neutralist tinge of past PSOE

foreign policy pronouncements, the party is likely to be

increasingly influenced toward more moderate positions.

The PSOE already supports Spanish entrance in the EEC, and

also has a close relationship with the West German Social

Democratic Party. These ties may gradually influence a

moderation in PSOE foreign policy. As the PSOE assumes positions of democratic respon­

sibility in parliament and looks toward the eventual possi­

bility of forming a government, certain elements of logic

may also be persuasive in moderating its neutralist foreign

policy stance. The respected liberal Madrid newspaper

El Pais recently pointed out the defects of a neutralist

defense policy alternative. This analysis found the "pas­

sive neutralism" concept (membership in the EEC but not in

NATO) to be totally inapplicable to Spain, noting that

"Spain is not a strategically marginal country like Ireland

but instead is crucial. . . . The editorial also noted

the defects of an "active neutralism," which would mean

cutting Spain's ties with Western Europe on international

issues and require a very costly "all azimuths" defense program.®

The Spanish parliament elected in June 1977 for a

four-year term must deal with serious questions of adminis­

trative and economic reform and write a constitution for Spain before new elections are held. Thus, even if the

PSOE demand is accepted for new elections once the new

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 314 constitution is written, it seems likely that such elections

could not be held before mid-1979. By that time, under the

terms of the U.S.-Spanish treaty of 1976, the last U.S.

nuclear presence in Spain will be withdrawn. At this

point, the PSOE may well be prepared to accept a continuing U.S. military presence in Spain in the NATO context.

Although the PSOE had in the past opposed Spanish member­

ship in NATO, in late June 1977 Felipe Gonzâlez said, "I

would prefer Spain in the North Atlantic Treaty alliance

instead of the bilateral treaty. . .but. . . would make

certain conditions, among them the withdrawal of U.S. n forces from Torrej6 n," It seems likely that these com­

ments give a fair indication of what the PSOE policy would

be by the time it might have the opportunity to form a

government.

The foreign policy position of the Spanish Commun­

ist Party (PCE) headed by Santiago Carrillo also merits

note. The PCE had only nine percent of the vote in the June 1977 elections and, as the PSOE rejects any alliance

with the PCE, has few prospects of entering Spain's govern­

ment in the near future. PCE strategy is instead directed

to building up strength at the local government and trade O union levels.

Ironically, the PCE position on U.S. bases in

Spain is more moderate than that of the PSOE. As Santiago Carrillo stated in a January 1977 interview, "We are for

the American bases in Spain as long as an accord is not

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 315 reached that dismantles the military bases— American and 9 Soviet— in the whole of Europe." Carrillo stated his

opposition to Spanish entrance into NATO but also said,

"If the Spanish Parliament votes entry into NATO, we will

obviously accept it.These PCE policies are worthy of mention not because the PCE will have a direct influence

on the foreign policy of the Spanish government but rather

as an indication of the moderation of Carrillo's brand of

Eurocommunism and also because such PCE policies mean

that the PSOE need not adopt anti-American policies to

avoid being outflanked on the left.

The really important determinant of Spanish policy

toward the United States until at least 1979 will be

Adolfo Suârez and his center government. Suârez avoided

taking any position on Spanish membership in NATO in the

June 1977 election campaign. Suarez did promise, however,

to respect the existing treaty with the United States.

The issue of NATO membership for Spain has in the

past often been considered in connection with the question

of Spain's entrance in the EEC (supported by all major

parties from the communists to the neo-Francoist right).

With the advent of democracy in Spain, the former political

impediment to Spanish entry in the EEC no longer exists.

But a variety of problems persist— France and Italy are

wary of agricultural competition from Spain; Ireland fears the loss of some of its regional aid funds to poorer regions

in Spain; the West Germans are wary of having to pay even

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 316

more agricultural subsidies; and the Benelux countries fear

that further EEC enlargement will lead to a directorate of

Britain, West Germany and France making decisions.The

question of Spanish EEC membership is also implicitly

linked to EEC consideration of the pending membership

applications of Greece and Portugal. Despite these prob­

lems, it is likely that the EEC will eventually accept

Spain (along with Greece and Portugal) to help these coun­

tries in the consolidation of democracy. But the best

estimate is that "the bargaining over Spain's bid could 12 take four years."

With the prospect of a long delay in Spanish EEC

membership, there is evidence that the Suârez government is

considering decoupling the EEC and NATO membership issues.

New York Times columnist C. L. Sulzberger, whose contacts

with Spanish leaders are excellent, reported after the

June 1977 Spanish elections that Suârez was considering "a

souped-up effort to join NATO rapidly and then perhaps

switch to it control of the strategic bases now held here

by the United States under a biItérai accord.

At this point the question arises of Spain's mili­

tary preparation for NATO membership and the reciprocal

advantages to Spain and NATO of such membership. The

Spanish Navy and (to a somewhat lesser extent) the Spanish

Air Force are already compatible with their NATO counter- 14 parts in organizational and tactical matters. The

Spanish Army would require changes in its organization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 317

logistics, and tactics to be compatible with NATO forces.

Some Spanish Army generals, fearing inferiority to NATO

armies and perhaps also that a NATO role for the Spanish

Army would mean the end of the Army's influence in Spain's

domestic affairs, are leery of NATO membership. Another

reason sometimes cited by the Spanish as an argument

against NATO entry is the cost to bring Spain's military

up to NATO standards. This is a bogus argument, because

the real issue is whether Spain's military forces are to be

modernized. This modernization would probably be just as

costly if carried out in support of a neutralist policy

and outside the NATO infrastructure. Thus neither the

current readiness of Spain's armed forces nor the cost to

make necessary improvements are a real impediment to Span-

ist membership in NATO.

The value to NATO of Spanish membership is also

clear. The Defense Department representative who testified

at the 1976 House hearings on the new treaty noted how U.S.

forces now stationed in Spain "... are inseparably linked

to NATO defense and directly support NATO strategy.

The strategic advantages of Spain, which the United States

has long enjoyed, would be even more valuable if coordinated

and shared by all the NATO allies. These advantages pri­

marily stem from Spain's strategic geographic position,

which makes it an ideal location for supply, training, and

reinforcement of front-line NATO forces. Spain would not necessarily need to station any forces in central Europe,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 318

but could in peacetime circumstances play a valuable role 17 in coordination with NATO forces on her own territory.

The final decision to seek membership in NATO is

a political decision which the Spanish alone must make. As

Sulzberger suggested, the new Suârez government may indeed

apply for NATO membership in the fall of 1977. If so,

Spain's membership would probably be approved by the NATO

allies in time for the U.S. bases to come under NATO con­

trol at the same time that the U.S. nuclear presence in

Spain is ended on 1 July 1979. The center party of Suârez

controls forty-eight percent of the seats in Spain's lower

house, and could expect to have the support for Spain's entrance in NATO of Fraga's right-wing Alianza Popular,

which has an additional five percent of the seats. These

facts, plus the comfortable majority Suârez enjoys in

Spain's upper house, indicate that the Suârez government

could obtain parliamentary approval should it decide to

promptly seek NATO membership.

The real question is whether Suârez, who will need

wide parliamentary support on more pressing matters such

as the terms of the new constitution, is now prepared to

spend the political capital necessary to gain parliamentary

approval of NATO membership over the objections of the

PSOE and the PCE. Another possibility, indicated by the

comments of PSOE leader Gonzâlez noted earlier, is that Suârez might even obtain PSOE support for Spain's member­

ship in NATO if he were willing to seek an end to the U.S.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 319

military presence in Torrej6 n. Thus there are a number of

possibilities for Spanish foreign policy with respect to

NATO. These considerations of Spanish foreign policy have

been reviewed in some detail, for they are important

factors which might affect the current bilateral military

cooperation with Spain which is a central element of U.S.

policy toward Spain.

Policy Recommendations

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation will con­

tinue in effect until 21 September 1981, and provides a

sound basis for U.S. policy toward Spain in this period.

There are no major problems between the United States and

Spain at the present time, and the visits of Premier Suârez

to Washington in April 1977 and Secretary of State Vance

and Vice President Mondale to Madrid in May 1977 evidence

the strong political support of the Carter administration

for Spain's new democracy.

Minor problems arose in early 1977 between the

United States and Spain but were quickly resolved. The

Spanish, with a large trade imbalance with the United States, were upset by protectionist moves to restrict

Spain's shoe exports to the United States. President Carter

resolved this problem in March 1977 when, as part of a

broader liberal trade policy, he refused to place import

restrictions on Spanish shoes. U.S. relations with Spain

will benefit from a similar avoidance of protectionist

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 320 policies in the future.

President Carter's insistence on «lore restrictive i nuclear proliferation safeguards temporarily alarmed the

Spanish in early 1977. The nine nuclear reactors currently

under construction by American companies in Spain are essential to an ambitious Spanish nuclear power program. 18

But this problem was resolved for the moment when President

Carter and Premier Suârez reached agreement in Washington

in April 1977 on provisions for safeguards and reprocessing.

The United States should continue to urge Spain to sign

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). An additional

benefit of Spanish membership in NATO is that Spain might

well be willing to sign the NPT if she had the NATO secur­

ity guarantee.

As the earlier consideration of Spanish foreign

policy indicated, the one area where there might be a need

for a modification of the 1976 treaty involves military

cooperation between the United States and Spain. VJhen

Secretary of State Vance visited Madrid in May 1977 for the

first meeting of the U.S.-Spanish Council, he was accom­

panied by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General

George Brown. Final agreement was reached on the details of the establishment by July 1977 of the Joint Military

Committee. Under the terms of the 1976 treaty, this Joint

Military Committee "operates under the aegis" of the U.S.- Spanish Council, and overseees the work of the Combined 19 Military Coordination and Planning Staff. This combined

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 321

staff, headed by U.S. and Spanish generals, is responsible

. . . to prepare and coordinate plans, which are in harmony with existing security arrangements in the North Atlantic area, for actions. . . in case of an attack against Spain or the United States in the con­ text of a general attack against the W e s t . 20

The Joint Military Committee and planning staff

provisions of the 1976 treaty provide an ideal mechanism

for introducing the Spanish military to NATO planning con­

cepts and defining the possible future role of Spain in

NATO. The best thing that U.S. policy can do at the moment

is to work conscientiously with the Spanish military in

these bodies established by the 1976 treaty. If this is

done, both the United States and Spain will be better pre­

pared for Spain's entrance in NATO should this eventually

occur.

The present policy of the Carter administration

regarding Spain's entrance in NATO is to ". . . support

steps to bring Spain into the NATO alliance when its 21 government takes such an initiative." This is a prudent

policy and should be continued. Any effort to pressure Spain into NATO might well be counterproductive. It is

best for the United States to let the political forces in

Spain described earlier work out this decision for them­

selves. The United States should closely follow the Span­

ish thinking on NATO membership, and be prepared to make

the necessary adjustments in the U.S. military presence in Spain which this might require. For example, if the Suârez

government decides to seek PSOE backing for NATO membership.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 322

a reduction in the U.S. presence at Torrejôn might be neces­

sary. In any case, it would be wise for the United States

to flexibly and rapidly adapt to changes in military tech­

nology which enable the reduction of the U.S. military

presence in Spain. It would be politically advantageous

for the United States to place its military presence in

Spain in the multilateral NATO context, for this would

likely forestall much of the Spanish public criticism of

the U.S. military presence in Spain.

U.S. policy toward Spain in mid-1977 is character­

ized by a wise balance of political support for democratic

ideals and military cooperation. By the expiration of the

current Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1981, it is

likely that Spain will be a member of NATO. The United

States should continue to support— but not pressure— Spain

for membership in NATO. Until such time as Spain enters

NATO, the United States should continue preparation with

the Spanish for eventual NATO membership through the plan­

ning committee established by the treaty.

The United States will have to get used to dealing

with Spain as an ordinary Western industrial democracy, not

an isolated dictatorship with few diplomatic alternatives

to its dealings with the United States. The 1976 treaty

provides a sound foundation for the present and future

relationship of mutual respect, cooperation, and benefit

between the United States and Spain.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 323

CHAPTER 7; FOOTNOTES

1 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of .^erican History (New York: Charles Scribner^s Sons, 1952), p. 2.

New York Times, 25 June 1977, p. A6.

^"Resolutions of Special Interest to International Socialists," PSOE 27th Congress, December 1976, p. 2. 4 Washington Star, 20 June 1977, p. A4.

^E1 Pais [Madrid], 15 May 1977, p. 8.

J l h i d .

^Washington Post, 24 June 1977, p. A13. g For more information on the PCE, see Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon, "Spanish Communism in the 1970's," Problems of Communism 24 (March-April 1975): 43-55 and "The Foreign Policy of the Spanish Communist Party," May 1977. (Mimeographed.) 9 New York Times, 16 January 1977, p. A3. ^°Ibid.

^^Washington Post, 25 June 1977, p. A12. l^ibid.

^^New York Times, 19 June 1977, sec. 4, p. 17. 14 For more information on Spain's prospective role in NATO, see Fernando de Salas Lopez, Espaha, La OTAN y Los Organismes Militares Internacionales (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1974) and "Falta Cooperacion Eficaz Entre Los Très Ejercitos," Actualidad Economica, 18 February 1975, pp. 34-37. See also Captain R. A. Komorowski, USN (Ret.), "Spain and the Defense of NATO," U.S. Naval Institute Pro­ ceedings , vol. 102, no. 879, May 1976, pp. 190-203.

^^Washington Star, 6 April 1977, p. A22.

^^Hearings, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, p. 3.

^^Salas Lopez, p. 264. 18 New York Times, 14 April 1977, p. A7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 324 19 Hearings, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, p. 80.

2°Ihid., p. 93.

^^Washington Post, 25 January 1977, p. Al.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

There are surprisingly few books which deal compre­

hensively with the subject of U.S. policy toward Spain.

The most extensive study in this field is Professor

Arthur P . Whitaker's book Spain and Defense of the West;

Ally and Liability, published by the Council on Foreign

Relations in 1961. But this book is obviously very dated

and does not deal with the important evolution of U.S.

policy toward Spain in the last fifteen years. A more

recent book, Spain; Implications for United States Foreign

Policy, is a collection of materials presented by the

liberal Fund for New Priorities in America to a conference

of liberal Congressmen in June 1975. In addition to the

book's short and unscholarly nature, it suffers from a

lack of objectivity due to the polemical anti-Franco

posture of the conference participants. Furthermore, for

even so recent a study as this, the fast pace of events

in U.S. relations with Spain since June 1975 has rendered

much of the book's analysis obsolete. In 1976, the U.S.-

Spanish relationship was analyzed at some length for the

first time in a book published in Spain— Las Bases Norte-

americanas en Espana, by two Spanish journalists, Eduardo

Chamorro and Ignacio Fontes. This book suffers from

journalistic style and anti-American bias. 325

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 326 The most useful sources of information on U.S.

policy toward Spain deal with the period leading up to the

1953 Pact of Madrid. The McCown doctoral dissertation is

perhaps the best analysis of U.S. policy toward Spain from

1945 to 1950. Professor Lowi's article is an excellent

case study of the decision to establish U.S. military

bases in Spain. Much useful information on the Congres­

sional role in the bases decision may be found in the 1967

doctoral dissertation by President Ford's former Assistant

for National Security Affairs, General Brent Scowcroft.

The 1969 doctoral dissertation of Albert Dorley also

focuses on the role of Congress. Other highly useful

sources for this period were the State Department's Foreign

Relations of the United States series, the Congressional

Record, and the New York Times.

The only source which analyzes the 1963 renewal

agreements in any detail is Benjamin Welles' book Spain—

The Gentle Anarchy. U.S. policy toward Spain in the 1968-

1970 period received particularly thorough press coverage.

The New York Times, Washington Post, and Christian Science

Monitor were especially valuable sources for this period.

The various committee hearings on U.S. policy toward Spain

in 1969 and 1970 in the Senate, and the 1971 House hear­

ings, are excellent sources of information. The two arti­

cles by Stephen Kaplan provide a thorough appraisal of the value of U.S. bases in Spain. The March 1977 Congressional

study provides an up-to-date evaluation of the role of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 327 Spanish bases in U.S. military strategy. Finally, the 1976

hearings of various Senate and House committees dealing

with the new treaty with Spain provide the best insights

into U.S. policy toward Spain since Franco's death.

In recent years, a number of Spanish magazines have

published articles on U.S.-Spanish relations. The articles

in Actualidad Economica, Cambio 16 a'ad Triunfo provided

insights into the Spanish viewpoint. A survey of relevant

articles in the leading Madrid newspapers was also useful.

The memoirs of key U.S. policymakers proved to be

one of the most disappointing research sources on U.S.

policy toward Spain. Neither Truman's Memoirs nor Eisen­

hower's Mandate for Change mention the agreements with

Spain. The U.S. association with the Franco regime

receives only one passing mention in the Ted Sorensen book,

Kennedy, on the Kennedy administration, and no mention at

all in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s A Thousand Days. Presi­

dent Johnson's memoirs. The Vantage Point, make no mention

of Spain. Only in Dean Acheson's Present at the Creation

do we find some insight into the attitudes of Acheson and Truman toward Franco.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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328

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______. "El Padrino Politico." Triunfo, 31 January 1976, pp. 7-8. Mujal-Leon, Eusebio M. "Spanish Communism in the 1970's." Problems of Communism 24 (March-April 1975): 43-55.

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"The Spanish Succession." Newsweek, 3 November 1975, pp. 7-13.

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U.S. Government Documents — Department of State

U.S. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. "Documents Concerning Relations Between the Spanish Government and the European Axis," 17 March 1946.

Department of State Bulletin. "Position of France, U.K., and U.S. on Relations With Present Spanish Government," 17 March 1946, p. 412.

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Department of State Bulletin. "United States Policy Toward Spain," 22 May 1949, pp. 660-61.

Department of State Bulletin. "Return to Normal Exchange of Diplomatic Representation with Spain Urged," 30 January 1950, pp. 156-59.

Department of State Bulletin. 25 September 1950, p. 517.

Department of State Bulletin. "Spain's Role in the European Defense," 30 July 1951, p. 170.

. Department of State Bulletin. "Negotiations with Spain on Military Matters," 24 March 1952. p. 50.

Department of State Bulletin. "Agreements Concluded Between the U.S. and Spain," 26 September 1953, pp. 1-2.

. Department of State Bulletin, 5 October 1953, pp. 435-42.

. Department of State Bulletin. "Mutual Benefits From the U.S.-Spanish Security Agreements," 7 Decem­ ber 1953, pp. 793-95.

Department of State Bulletin. "Our Partnership with Spain," 29 March 1954, pp. 476-78.

Department of State Bulletin. "Not One of Us Alone," 19 April 1954, pp. 579-83.

. Department of State Bulletin. "Current Aspects of U.S.-Spanish Relations," 9 January 1956, pp. 43- 48.

. Department of State Bulletin. "Strengthening United States Relations with Spain," 15 September 1958, pp. 963-66.

Department of State Bulletin. "Joint Declara­ tion,^26 September 1963, pp. 1^2.

. Department of State Bulletin., "U.S. and Spain Confer on Extension; Joint Communique," 14 April 1969, p. 324.

. Department of State Bulletin. "U.S. and Spain Extend Defense Agreement; Joint Statement," 7 July 1969, p. 15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 338

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. 5, p. 667. Foreign Relations of the United States, Confer- ence of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, vol. 2, p. 1510.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. vol. 5, p. 1041.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, p. 1066.

. American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955; Basic Docu­ ments , vol. I, pp. 1695-96. . American Foreign Policy; Current Documents, 1957, pp. 617-18.

U.S. Government Documents — House of Representatives

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on Emergency Foreign Aid. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 10-25 November 1947.

______. House. 80th Cong., 2d sess., 29 March 1948. Congressional Record 94, part 3.

House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Hearings on The Mutual Security Act of 1954. 83d Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 1954.

. House. Mutual Security Act of 1955. Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 84th Cong., 1st sess., 25 May 1955.

. House. 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1959. Congres­ sional Record 103, part 4.

House. 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961. Congres­ sional Record 108, part 12. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Greece, Spain and the Southern NATO Strategy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe. 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971. House. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, Hearings before tha Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs SI the Committee on International Relations. 94th Cong., 2d sess., 8 and 16 June 1976.

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House. Implementation of the Treaty of Friend­ ship and Cooperatioh Between the United States and Spain. H. Report 94-1393 to Accompany H.R. 14940, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 5 August 1976.

. House. United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean. Report prepared for Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 27 March 1977.

U.S. Government Documents — The Senate

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings on the European Recovery Program. 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948.

Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Depart­ ments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary; Appropriations Bill for 1950. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949.

. Senate. 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949. Congres­ sional Record 95, part 8.

Senate. 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950. Congres­ sional Record 96, part 5.

Senate. 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950. Congres- sional Record 96, part 9.

. Senate. Resolution Approving the Action of the President of the United States in Cooperating in the Common Defense Efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty Nations! S . Res. 99! 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951.

. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Mutual Security Appropriations Bill, 1952. Sen. Rept. 960, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951.

. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services. Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area. Hearings. 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951.

Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Spain and Portugal, Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments'

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 340

Abroad. 91st Cong., 2d sess., part II, 11 March and 14 April 1969 and 17 July 1970. . Senate. 91st Cong., 2d sess., 28 July 1970. Congressional Record.

Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hear­ ings on Spanish Base Agreement. 91st Cong., 2d sess., 6 and 26 August 1970.

Senate. Spanish Base Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 94th Cong., 2d sess., 3, 12 and 24 March 1976.

Newspapers

ABC [Madrid], 17 February 1955; 2 October 1961; 10 July, 6, 7 November 1974; 12 June 1975.

Baltimore Sun, 8 August 1970.

Christian Science Monitor, 20 November 1968; 30 April, 27 May, 18 November 1969; 21 January, 31 March, 26 June, 12 August 1970.

El Pais [Madrid], 15 May 1977.

Florida Times-Union [Jacksonville], 6 June 1969.

Informaciones [Madrid], 6, 7 November 1974.

International Herald Tribune [Paris], 2 October 1974; 29 May, 29 September 3, 6, 22, 24 October, 6 Novem­ ber, 18 December 1975; 26 January, 14 February, 16 June 1976.

La Prensa [New York], 28 January 1963.

New York Times, 19 September 1945; 17 April, 6, 10 October, 20 November 1948; 14 January, 14, 15 July, 16 Septem­ ber, 1 October 1949; 4 August, 3, 17 November, 29 December 1950; 20 July, 28 October 1951; 4, 11, 22 January, 8 February, 10 April 1952; 27, 29 Septem­ ber, 3, 4, 5 November 1953; 8, 17, 25 April 1956; 18 May, 9 September 1958; 12 November, 23 December 1959; 17 January 1960; 27 September 1963; 21 November 1968; 1, 12, 26 March, 29 October, 2 November 1969; 11 February, 12, 15 April, 25, 27, 30 May, 25, 28 July, 4, 7, 9, 14 August, 3 October 1970; 26 No­ vember 1973; 5 October 1975; 30 May 1976; 16 January, 14 April, 19, 25 June 1977.

San Diego Evening Tribune, 10 November 1970.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 341 Washington News, 7 August 1970.

Washington Post, 6 October 1963; 22 November 1968; 25 Feb­ ruary, 17, 18, 25 March, 5, 22, 23 April, 6 June, 20 December 1969; 11 January, 11 February, 16 April, 2 June, 7, 8, 12, 15, 20, 27 August, 3 October 1970; 20, 21 December 1973; 13 February, 15, 23 June 20, 22 July, 6 October, 8, 17 November, 13, 20 December 1974; 25 February, 7, 24, 27, 30 May, 1, 2, 4 June, 15, 30 September, 20, 21, 22 November 1975; 23, 26 January, 19 May, 3, 4, 22 June, 23 September, 24 November 1976; 25 January,24, 25 June 1977.

Washington Star, 6 August 1970; 6 April, 20 June 1977.

Washington Star-News, 2 November- 1973; 26 May 1974.

Ya [Madrid], 6, 7, 8 November 1974; 28 August 1975.

Unpublished Materials

"Background of the Spain Program." JUSMG-MAAG, Madrid, Spain, 1957. (Mimeographed.)

Blankinship, Byron E. "Major Twentieth Century Factors in Spanish Foreign Policy Applicable to United States Military Posture." Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 1953. (Mimeographed.)

Dorley, Albert Joseph, Jr. "The Role of Congress in the Establishment of Bases in Srain." Ph.D. dissertation, St. John's University, 1969.

Dunham, William B. (Spanish Desk, Department of State) and Wilson, James (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs). "Paper on Policy Toward Spain." May 1950. Declassified from Top Secret on 23 June 1977, upon my request under the Freedom of Information Act,

McCown, Arlene Idol. "Spain and the Spanish Question; External/Internal Sources of Foreign Policy." Ph.D. dissertation. The American University, 1973.

Mujal-Leon, Eusebio M. "The Foreign Policy of the Spanish Communist Party." May 1977. (Mimeographed.)

"Resolutions of Special Interest to International Social­ ists." PSOE, 27th Congress. December 1976.

Salisbury, William T. "Spain and the Common Market; 1957- 1967." Ph.D. dissertation. The Johns Hopkins Univer­ sity, 1972.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 342

Scowcroft, Brent. "Congress and Foreign Policy; An Examination of Congressional Attitudes Toward the Foreign Aid Programs to Spain and Yugoslavia." Ph.D, dissertation, Columbia University, 1967.

Interviews

Albert, The Honorable Carl. Speaker of the House of Representatives. Washington, D.C. 21 December 1976

Briesky, Art. Counselor for Political/Military Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Madrid, Spain. 21 July 1976, 14, 16 June 1977.

Caldwell, Ray L. Secondary Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Madrid, Spain. 14 June 1977.

Dixon, Colonel James. U.S. Army Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Madrid, Spain. Various dates in 1975 and 1976.

Fulbright, Senator J. W. Chairman, Senate Foreign Rela­ tions Committee,- Washington, D.C. 20 January 1970.

Demos, Rear Admiral William E. U.S. Navy, Chief, JUSMG- MAAG Spain, Madrid, Spain. 23 June 1976.

Lennhoff, Colonel Charles D. T., U.S. Army (Ret.). Former legal advisor to U.S. military negotiators with Spain, 1952. Washington, D.C. 22 December 1976.

McCown, Henry. Spanish Desk Officer, U.S. Department of State, 1971-74. Washington, D.C. Various dates from November 1973 to April 1974.

Payne, Stanley G. Professor of History, University of Wisconsin. London, 30 May 1975.

Woodward, Robert F. Former Ambassador to Spain (1962-65). Washington, D.C. 27 April 1977.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.