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Borgarting Lagmannsrett - Dom - LB-2019-78359 Utskrift fra Lovdata - 13.03.2020 10:26 Borgarting lagmannsrett - Dom - LB-2019-78359 Instans Borgarting lagmannsrett – Dom Dato 2019-12-30 Publisert LB-2019-78359 Stikkord Strafferett. Terrorforbund. Deltakelse i terrororganisasjon. Universalprinsippet. Straffeloven (2005) § 136a og § 133 første ledd, jf § 5 tredje ledd. Straffeloven (1902) § 147d, jf. § 5 tredje ledd og § 147a fjerde ledd, jf. § 12 fjerde ledd. Sammendrag Tiltalte ble funnet skyldig i å ha inngått terrorforbund med terrororganisasjonen Nusra-fronten i Syria i perioden 2014 til utgangen av 2016. Tiltalte, som var statsløs palestiner fra Libanon, ble frifunnet for deltakelse i terrororganisasjon. Lagmannsretten kom til at FNs sikkerhetsråds resolusjon 1373 gir hjemmel for å anvende norsk straffelovgivning på terrorforbund inngått av utlending i utlandet, men at folkeretten ikke gir hjemmel for å anvende universalprinsippet på deltakelse i terrororganisasjon i et slikt tilfelle. Lagmannsrettens flertall kom til at det dreide seg om et langvarig forbund der tiltalte ved gjentatte anledninger på nytt bekreftet avtalen nær opp til gjennomføringen av terrorhandlinger som innebar risiko for tap av mange menneskeliv mv. Straffen ble satt til fengsel i 8 år og 6 måneder etter fradrag for at tiltalte bidro bidrag til å lette etterforskningen og lang varetektstid. Dissens. Saksgang Oslo tingrett TOSLO-2018-141077 – Borgarting lagmannsrett LB-2019-78359 (19-078359AST-BORG/03). Parter A (advokat Alexander Nyheim Jenssen og advokat Brynjar Nielsen Meling) mot Det nasjonale statsadvokatembetet (statsadvokat Frederik G. Ranke). Forfatter Lagmann Tonje Vang og lagdommer Jørgen F. Brunsvig.Meddommere: rådgiver Odd Magne Johansen, produksjonsleder Mia Jonette Finckenhagen, sjefskonsulent i EVRY Hogne Neteland, bussfører Arne Hermann Vevle og avdelingsleder Ingeborg Beate Kristin Solstad. LB-2019-78359 Side 1 Utskrift fra Lovdata - 13.03.2020 10:26 Innholdsfortegnelse Borgarting lagmannsrett - Dom - LB-2019-78359......................................................................................1 Innholdsfortegnelse ...................................................................................................................................2 Lagmannsretten bemerker:......................................................................................................................4 1. Sakens bakgrunn...............................................................................................................................4 1.1 Innledning....................................................................................................................................4 1.2 Om borgerkrigen i Syria, ulike opprørsgrupper og Nusra-fronten mv. ...............................5 1.2.1 Borgerkrigen i Syria............................................................................................................5 1.2.2 Voldelig, ekstremistisk islamisme ......................................................................................6 1.2.3 Etablering av Nusra-fronten – forbindelse med al-Qaida og ISIL.................................6 1.2.4 Nærmere om Nusra-fronten...............................................................................................7 1.2.5 Nusra-frontens allianser, særlig om Jaish al-Fatah .........................................................7 1.2.6 Sivile lidelser ........................................................................................................................8 1.2.7 Roumieh-fengselet og Hizbollah.........................................................................................8 2. Skyldspørsmålet ................................................................................................................................9 2.1 Noen utgangspunkter .................................................................................................................9 2.2 Bestemmelsene i straffelovgivningen om terrorforbund – tiltalebeslutningen post II.........9 2.3. Bestemmelsene i straffelovgivningen om deltakelse i terrororganisasjon – tiltalebeslutningen post I. ...............................................................................................................12 2.4 Nærmere om bevissituasjonen.................................................................................................13 2.4.1 Sikret videomateriale ........................................................................................................13 Video nr. 18 fra Idlib by ........................................................................................................13 Video nr. 11 fra Camp Qaramid...........................................................................................13 Video nr. 5 fra Musaybin ......................................................................................................13 Video nr. 14 fra vei 60 (mellom al-Mastouma og Ariha)....................................................14 Video nr. 1, 9 og 10 fra Majdaliyah......................................................................................14 Video nr. 15, 16, 6, 21, 22 og 23 fra Majdaliyah og Ariha..................................................14 Video nr. 2 og 3 fra Ariha......................................................................................................14 Video nr. 13 og 17 fra Muhambel.........................................................................................15 Video nr. 12 fra Al-Fuah .......................................................................................................15 Video nr. 19 og 20 fra al-Eis..................................................................................................15 2.4.2 Beslaglagt materiale ..........................................................................................................16 2.4.3 Tiltaltes forklaring ............................................................................................................16 2.5 Vurderingen av skyldspørsmålet.............................................................................................17 2.5.1 Saksforholdet og konklusjon – tiltalens post II ..............................................................18 2.5.2 Hovedpunktene i bevisvurderingen – tiltalens post II ...................................................19 2.5.3 Hovedpunktene i bevisvurderingen – skyldspørsmålet for tiltalens post I..................20 2.6 Mindretallets votum .................................................................................................................22 2.7 Kan norsk straffelovgivning anvendes på de aktuelle handlingene foretatt i Syria?.........22 2.7.1 Stedlig virkeområde for norsk straffelovgivning ...........................................................22 2.7.2 Generelt om begrensninger av stedlig virkeområde for norsk straffelovgivning etter folkeretten. .........................................................................................................................24 2.7.3 Kan resolusjoner fra Sikkerhetsrådet i FN gi hjemmel for inngrep i en stats suverenitet? .................................................................................................................................25 2.7.4 Gir resolusjon 1373 fra FNs sikkerhetsråd grunnlag for universaljurisdiksjon?.......25 2.7.5 Er bestemmelsen om inngåelse av terrorforbund (tiltalebeslutningen post II) innenfor rammene av resolusjon 1373?....................................................................................27 2.7.6 Er bestemmelsene om deltakelse i terrororganisasjon (tiltalebeslutningen post I) innenfor rammen av resolusjon 1373? .................................................................................28 2.8 Oppsummering av skyldspørsmålet........................................................................................29 3. Straffutmåling. ................................................................................................................................29 3.1 Innledning..................................................................................................................................29 3.2 Flertallets vurdering av straffespørsmålet .............................................................................30 3.3 Mindretallets vurdering av straffespørsmålet .......................................................................31 3.4 Oppsummering av straffespørsmålet......................................................................................31 LB-2019-78359 Side 2 Utskrift fra Lovdata - 13.03.2020 10:26 Saken gjelder spørsmål om deltakelse i terrororganisasjon og inngåelse av terrorforbund. Statsadvokatene ved Det nasjonale statsadvokatembetet (NAST) har ved tiltalebeslutning 11. mars 2019 satt A, født 0.0.1983, under tiltale for overtredelse av: for perioden til og med 14. oktober 2015 I Straffeloven (1902) 147d. jf. straffeloven (2005) § 5 tredje ledd for å ha deltatt i en terrororganisasjon, når organisasjonen har tatt skritt for å realisere formålet med ulovlige midler. og for perioden fra og med 15. oktober 2015 Straffeloven (2005) § 136 a. jf. § 5 tredje ledd for å ha deltatt i en terrororganisasjon, når organisasjonen har tatt skritt for å realisere formålet med ulovlige midler. Grunnlag: Fra begynnelsen av 2014 til utgangen av 2016, i Syria, deltok han i terrororganisasjonen Jabhat al-Nusra (fra juli 2016: Jabhat Fatah al-Sham), ved at han, med hjelp fra organisasjonens nettverk, reiste fra Libanon
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