BRIEFING PAPER Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015

Iraq and - By Ben Smith and Claire Mills developments in 2015

Inside: 1. ISIS in Iraq 2. ISIS in Syria 3. Military capabilities of ISIS and other anti-government groups 4. Syrian government under increased pressure 5. Russian and Iranian intervention 6. Kurds 7. Control of terrain 8. Risks of spill-over 9. Humanitarian situation 10. The military response 11. US policy 12. UK humanitarian assistance and migrants 13. UN process on Syria 14. Outlook 15. Further reading

www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 2

Contents

Summary 4 1. ISIS in Iraq 6 Ramadi 6 Shia militias in the ascendant 6 Mosul 7 Sinjar 7 2. ISIS in Syria 9 Kobane 9 9 3. Military capabilities of ISIS and other anti-government groups 10 Impact of Coalition airstrikes on ISIS capabilities 11 3.1 Other anti-government groups 12 4. Syrian government under increased pressure 15 5. Russian and Iranian intervention 18 5.1 Russian action 18 5.2 Russian objectives 19 Problems for the Kremlin 20 5.3 Iran 22 5.4 Iran/Russia outlook 23 6. Kurds 24 7. Control of terrain 27 Syria 27 Iraq 29 8. Risks of spill-over 31 9. Humanitarian situation 34 9.1 Civilian casualties 35 10. The military response 37 10.1 Revisiting the Syria vote in Parliament? 38 Foreign Affairs Committee report 40 10.2 Towards the second debate? 40 10.3 UK shifting on Assad? 43 11. US policy 45 12. UK humanitarian assistance and migrants 46 12.1 Syria 46 12.2 Iraq 46 13. UN process on Syria 47 Transitional government 47 13.1 Continuing UN talks 48

Cover page image copyright: Ministry of Defence

3 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

Vienna meetings 48 14. Outlook 50 14.1 Towards rapprochement with the Syrian government? 51 15. Further reading 53

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Summary

Summary Some18 months since the fall of Mosul, ISIS still poses a grave threat in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere, while the suffering of and Iraqi continues unabated and a huge refugee crisis has erupted. Syria In Syria the previous stalemate has shifted. Rebel groups have found new unity and received more backing from regional powers such as Turkey, and have made some territorial advances on important towns in the north and south of the country. Those groups have collaborated with Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate. Kurds, backed by US airstrikes, have had significant success against ISIS. But ISIS has consolidated its presence in other areas, taking the Syrian town of Palmyra. The fall of Palmyra to ISIS in May 2015 was a demonstration of continuing strength, despite the US government’s ‘ISIS-first’ strategy. If the Syrian government used to give ISIS a relatively easy ride, attacking other rebel groups more ferociously, ISIS is now a significant actor in the civil war and both the government and the other rebel groups may turn more attention towards the group. There were some anti-government rebel gains over the first half of 2015, amid reports of a shortage of manpower in the . The Syrian government’s allies Iran and Russia took action. Russia surprised observers by starting air strikes in Syria in September 2015. Coordinating with the Russian air cover, Iran (and its proxy Hezbollah and other militias) increased ground offensives, collaborating with Syrian government forces. This combined push did a lot to end anti-government forces’ momentum. Russia says that it is targeting ISIS and other terrorist groups. US and other Western sources have said that the Russian air strikes are aimed principally at preventing the Assad government from falling. Iraq In Iraq, the fall of Ramadi to ISIS was a blow to the Iraqi government and to Western, including UK, policy. US-led airstrikes combined with training assistance to Iraqi forces were not enough to stop Iraqi forces collapsing in Ramadi. That left Shiite militias, backed by Iran, in a stronger position and seen by many Iraqi Shias as their only effective defenders. That does not bode well for the policy of reducing the sectarian nature of the conflict in Iraq. There have been calls for the UK parliament to revisit its 2013 decision not to participate in military action in Syria. Questions persist about the legality of any intervention and whether the Royal Air Force has the resources. The US administration has said that it will increase its support for ‘moderate’ Syrian rebels. US/Russian collaboration? Terrorist attacks by ISIS outside Iraq and Syria – their alleged bombing of a Russian airliner in Egypt and the November attacks in Paris – may encourage collaboration against ISIS between outside powers, but they still have differing objectives for the final outcome, and increasing the number of countries attacking ISIS from the air may not make as much difference as 5 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

expected; the Syrian government has been using air power against its enemies for four years. Air strikes against ISIS will cause more civilian casualties and may help the group to recruit. They will not solve the problem of the Assad government, which is widely thought to be killing far more civilians than any other group, maybe even than all the other armed forces combined. Negotiated settlement? Some analysts have argued for Russia and the US to try for a negotiated settlement involving a transitional power-sharing government and with Bashar al-Assad leaving power after a time. A deal would need to offer certain guarantees to Russia and Iran, while fulfilling minimum conditions for the US. For such a deal to go ahead, the Assad government and other combatants would need to accept that a military victory is not plausible. It is not clear that this situation is close yet, and Assad has categorically rejected standing down early.

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1. ISIS in Iraq

Summary Despite the takeover of the Sunni town of Ramadi by ISIS in May 2015, Iraqi security forces have made progress in fighting against the group. This has been achieved with heavy involvement of Shiite militias coordinated by Iran, however. These forces will find it difficult to take over Sunni areas without exacerbating the sectarian tensions that were at the root of the growth of ISIS in the first place.

Ramadi In May 2015, ISIS captured Ramadi, the provincial capital of al-Anbar, after a long struggle. The role of Shiite militias in the battle over Ramadi had been minimised, following the policies of the Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and the US. When Ramadi fell, it was a blow to anyone who In 1921 Al-Anbar province was one of the scenes of the thought that the combination of first Iraqi rebellion against British rule. Ramadi was again US-led airstrikes and the official an important centre of the second Iraqi revolt against the Iraqi security forces would win the British in 1941. battle for this city. A major difference is that these rebellions were largely Ramadi is in the heart of Sunni- non-sectarian, even though the British had in 1921 majority territory in Iraq that is imposed on the Shiite majority a Sunni monarch from relatively favourable to ISIS. It is the the Jordanian Hashemite dynasty. capital of the biggest Sunni This is symptomatic of the upsurge of conflict between province, Anbar, and was the scene the sects in the region over the last decades. The Iranian of much fighting against the US revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the 2003 invasion of Iraq occupation forces after the 2003 and subsequent violence, and the , have all served to intensify inter-sect conflict. invasion. Ramadi is crucial for control of Anbar province and for This should not be over-simplified, however. There is still towns along the River widespread mixing between the different branches of leading to al-Raqqah, the ISIS Islam and other interests may sometimes use religion as centre of operations in Syria. a convenient front.

Ramadi is also only 60km from See the Commons Library briefing ISIS and the sectarian Baghdad. The British government conflict in the Middle East, March 2015 played down the significance of the defeat, however: “we do not judge it to be strategically significant.”1 Iraqi government forces have vowed to take back control of Ramadi and are training Sunni fighters, with the help of US military advisers, to support the official military. Shia militias in the ascendant The fall of Ramadi weakened Haider al-Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister, damaging his reputation as a war leader. It also called into question his and the West’s policy of minimising the sectarian nature of the conflict by avoiding the use of Shiite militia forces to fight ISIS in Sunni areas.

1 HC Deb1 June 2015, Written question - 114 7 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

Encouraging Sunni Iraqis to support the Iraqi state was perhaps always a tall order in the middle of bloody conflict that is sharply increasing sectarian tensions, not just in Iraq and Syria, but in Yemen too.

There has been controversy about the group’s name. Many object to the group’s preferred name for itself, “Islamic State”, because they believe that the name itself is propaganda. They (including UK government ministers) argue that the group is neither Islamic nor a state. The name DAESH is increasing in popularity. It is derived from the initials of Islamic State in Iraq and the in Arabic, but it also sounds like a form of a derogatory word in Arabic.

Iran and the Iran-backed Shiite militias, under the umbrella organisation of Hashd al-Shaabi (People’s Mobilisation) of Iranians and Iran-backed Shiite militias, gained in strength and popularity among Iraqi Shias, building on their popular reputation as the only forces that could tackle ISIS.2 Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is reported to be making political capital out of Ramadi’s fall, undermining his successor. Meanwhile, the fact that some Iraqi Shia fighters were moving back into Syria to bolster the defence of the Syrian government was an indication of the dependence of both the Iraqi and Syrian governments on coordination and funding from Iran. Mosul According to the general in charge of “The Tadmur massacre took place on 27 June Nineveh province, the campaign to retake 1980, a day after an attempted assassination of Mosul officially began on 12 June 2015. President Hafez al-Asad in . The Regular Iraqi forces plus Shiite militias pressed following morning more than 100 members of the northwards from the town of Baiji, while US- Saraya al-Difa' 'an al-Thawra (Brigades for the led air forces attacked ISIS ground positions Defence of the Revolution, then under the command of the President's brother Rif'at al-Asad) in and around Mosul. Daily air strikes and members of the 138th Security Brigade, were continued throughout much of the second flown by helicopters to Tadmur (also known as half of June.3 Palmyra, visited each year by thousands of tourists). Leaving some on stand by and to guard the With the fall of Ramadi, however, any idea helicopters, 80 men, divided into units of 10, that Mosul could be retaken soon was entered the prison to kill the prisoners in their cells abandoned. The focus shifted to Anbar and dormitories. The number killed is variously province. US officials indicated that Mosul given as between 500 and 1000, mostly from the Muslim Brotherhood.” Amnesty International would have to wait until Iraqi forces were more prepared, which would not be until autumn 2015.4 Sinjar On 12 November 2015 Kurdish and coalition forces drove ISIS out of Sinjar, to the West of Mosul. The victory might have come earlier but for rivalry between different Kurdish factions. It was a significant success both because of its symbolism – it was the scene of massacres and the

2 ‘Fall of Ramadi to ISIS Weakens Rule of Iraqi Premier’, New York Times, 18 May 2015 3 Military Airstrikes Continue Against ISIL Terrorists in Syria and Iraq, US Department of Defense, 23 June 2015 4 ‘U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus to Western Province’, Wall Street Journal, 20 May 2010 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 8

flight of thousands in 2014 – and because it is in a strategic location in relation to both Mosul and the ISIS ‘capital’ of Raqqah, in Syria. 9 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

2. ISIS in Syria

Summary ISIS has been driven out of some parts of Syria, particularly in the north along the Turkish border, where the Kurds, backed by US air strikes, were successful in Kobane, for example. On the other hand, ISIS took control of Palmyra in the centre of the country.

Kobane The end of January 2015 saw ISIS expelled from Kobane, backed by intensive air cover from the US-led Syria coalition. In April 2015, with important help from Shia militiamen, government forces re-took Tikrit, home town of Saddam Hussein and a Sunni stronghold. These were both important symbolic setbacks for ISIS, and the group has not made serious gains in any Shiite-dominated areas of Iraq. On 15 May the Pentagon described ISIS as being ‘on the defensive’.5 Soon afterwards dramatic gains by ISIS in Iraq and Syria undermined that assertion. Palmyra Success in Ramadi was followed a few days later by the takeover of Tadmur, or Palmyra, in central Syria, showing that ISIS could attack on two fronts at once. Palmyra is particularly important to rebels against the Syrian government because it is the location of the Tadmur prison, notorious for the incarceration, torture and murder of Syrian political dissidents. Palmyra is also a significant prize for ISIS because it is in the middle of gas fields, and because of its classical antiquities: it is one of the finest archaeological sites in the world. Both the gas and the antiquities give ISIS leverage and money. ISIS took control of two gas fields near Palmyra in May 2015 and control of the town will consolidate their threat to the Syrian government’s gas supplies. The fields are essential for Syria’s electricity generation. After taking the city, ISIS is reported to have placed explosive charges around the Roman ruins, perhaps with the intention of using them as bargaining chips, perhaps simply to destroy them.

5 Update on Operation Inherent Resolve, US Department of Defense, 15 May 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 10

3. Military capabilities of ISIS and other anti-government groups

Summary The relative strength of different groups in Syria is very hard to judge. Information during wars in notoriously unreliable and in Syria it is particularly difficult because fighters may change allegiance depending on which flag gives best access to resources. Some suggest that the ‘moderate’ Syrian forces number as many as 70,000, while others say that the West is indulging in wishful thinking.

There is no definitive estimate of the military assets at ISIS’ disposal. However, it is widely accepted to be a “very well-organized and very well-resourced force”,6 having acquired significant resources and advanced weaponry as it has seized territory across Iraq and Syria. ISIS is thought to possess both light weaponry such as assault rifles and mortars, in addition to heavy weaponry such as tanks, armoured vehicles, self-propelled artillery, rocket launchers and anti-tank missiles and launchers. ISIS insurgents in northern Iraq are also alleged to have seized modern, portable, anti-aircraft missile systems from the ,7 in addition to a number of drones and MiG-21 fast jet aircraft. Following the takeover of Mosul in June 2014, one assessment suggested that ISIS had seized four divisions’ worth of equipment and at least three armaments depots from fleeing Iraqi security forces. Much of the equipment taken was considered to be front-line US weaponry, including Stinger air-to-surface missiles, artillery, Humvees, assault rifles and ammunition. An analysis by Jane’s Defence Weekly in August 2014 also listed the equipment believed to have been captured by ISIS when it over-ran a number of Syrian Arab Army bases in Al-Raqqah province. It reported: The IS also acquired considerable quantities of weapons and equipment when it overran these military facilities. For example, solely from the 121st Regiment base it captured at least 12 130 mm M-46 towed field guns and dozens of crates of associated ammunition; at least seven BM-21 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) with 400-500 122 mm Grad rockets; several T-55 main battle tanks; dozens of military vehicles; hundreds of rocket- propelled grenades (RPGs); tens of thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition; several anti-tank guided missiles; and large quantities of assault rifles and hand grenades. At the 93rd Brigade, at least 20 T-55 tanks and five 122 mm D-30 howitzers were captured, along with considerable quantities of other weaponry.8

6 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Operations in Syria by Lt. Gen. Mayville in the Pentagon Briefing Room”, US Department of Defense, 23 September 2014 7 Global Security.org, ISIS profile 8 “Islamic State seeks to link its conquered territories”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 August 2014; Business Insider also provides a list of likely capabilities, including 11 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

A report from the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center in November 2014 also asserted that ISIS forces have used mustard gas several times in Syria and may have other types of chemical weapons, such as chlorine gas.9 Despite the extent of the military assets at ISIS’ disposal, questions remain about the usability of the more advanced weaponry, given the lack of training of ISIS fighters and a lack of spare parts for maintenance. When asked about ISIS’s aerial capabilities in a November 2014 interview, US Centcom Commander General Lloyd Austin commented: “I don’t think that’s currently a significant threat”.10 An analysis by the organisation Breaking Defence concluded that although ISIS has captured Iraqi and Syrian military equipment, the group remains relatively low-tech, relying “overwhelmingly on civilian pick-up trucks jury-rigged to carry machine guns.”11 ISIS also makes extensive use of improvised explosive devices. Impact of Coalition airstrikes on ISIS capabilities After months of coalition air strikes and efforts by Iraqi and Kurdish forces to retake Iraqi territory seized by ISIS, opinion on whether the campaign is successfully degrading ISIS’ capabilities continues to differ. Initial assessments of the campaign widely acknowledged that ISIS had been forced to adapt its tactics in the face of airstrikes, which was hailed in some quarters as a sign of success. As US Department of Defense Spokesman, Rear Admiral Kirby, pointed out: …one of the ways we know we're having an effect is precisely because the terrorists have had to change their tactics and their communications and their command and control. Yes, they're blending in more. Yes, they're dispersing, and yes they aren't communicating quite as openly or as boldly as they once were. That's a good thing, because if they aren't operating as freely, then they aren't as free to achieve their goals.12 Indeed, by February 2015 the Head of the Royal Jordanian Air Force, General Mansour Al-Jbour, suggested that ISIS had lost 20% of its military capability since the start of the coalition campaign.13 An April 2015 assessment by the US Department of Defense suggested that the populated Iraqi territory in which ISIS can operate freely had been reduced by 25-30%.14 In November 2015 the Pentagon estimated that Operation Inherent Resolve had achieved the following results:

descriptions: “As ISIS Routs The Iraqi Army, Here's A Look At What The Jihadists Have In Their Arsenal”, Business Insider, 8 July 2014 9 ISIS: portrait of a Jihadi terrorist organization, November 2014. This story was also reported in The Guardian in October 2014 10 CNN.com, 7 November 2014 11 “ISIS Force remains low-tech: DOD data”, Breaking Defense, 10 September 2014 12 Department of Defense Press Briefing, 30 September 2014 13 “Jordan: ISIS lost 20% of its military capabilities”, Al Arabiya, 8 February 2015 14 US Department of Defense Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 12

Operation Inherent Resolve: targets damaged/destroyed

Tanks 129 HMMWVs 356 Staging areas 676 Buildings 4,517 Fighting positions 4,942 Oil infrastructure 260 Other targets 5,195

Source: US Department of Defense

3.1 Other anti-government groups Estimates of the strength of rebel groups differ widely. Armed units are likely to change allegiance quite easily, depending on which ‘flag’ is having more success and providing access to resources. The Institute for the Study of War’s Guide has a table of local groups running to nearly 45 pages.15 It divides the groups into ‘operations rooms’, or alliances for fighting particular campaigns. These ‘operations rooms are listed below. More information about them is available in the ISW opposition guide. ISIS does not appear to cooperate much with other groups on the ground in Syria. The al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and other jihadi groups are reported to oppose ISIS, which aims for a monopoly of control on territory. Despite uncertain support from the West and determined opposition from the Syrian government and its allies, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the largely secular force fighting the government (originally made up of defectors from Syrian regular forces) remains a significant actor in the conflict. Estimates of the strength of the FSA vary from 45,000 to 60,000 or more.16 In his statement to the House of Commons on 26 November 2015, David Cameron said that there were: …around 70,000 Syrian opposition fighters, principally of the Free Syrian Army, who do not belong to extremist groups, and with whom we can co-ordinate attacks on ISIL…17 It is hard to be sure whether this estimate is realistic; rebels readily transfer their allegiance depending on which umbrella groups have better access to weapons and money and will be more successful. The US government has abandoned its training programme for ‘moderate’ Syrian rebels that should have swelled the ranks of the FSA. It was producing very few trainees and having no impact. This pointed

15 Institute for the Study of War, Syrian Opposition Guide, 7 October 2015 16 ‘Syria crisis: Spooked by rebel gains, Jordan doubles down vs. Islamic State’, Christian Science Monitor, 4 May 2015 17 See below. HC Deb 26 Nov 2015, c1491 13 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

up the failure of the US and other Western countries to promote a coordinated and effective ‘moderate’ rebel force to fight the Assad government. The US is now giving aid directly to ‘vetted’ opposition groups rather than trying to train fighters. A spokesman did not name the recipients of a recent air drop of ammunition to Arab groups in northern Syria but said they were fighting ISIS.18 In his statement to the House of Commons on 26 November 2015, David Cameron said that there were some 70,000 fighters for the Free Syrian Army. Western hopes depend very much on the existence of a moderate opposition. Not only does Western policy envisage these fighters resisting the Syrian government’s attacks and the advances of ISIS; it also wants forces such as these to be there if and when the conflict ends. The alternative is that either the Syrian government continues as it is or that radical Islamist forces fill the vacuum. Jaish al-Fatah Jaish al-Fatah, or the , is a coalition of Syrian Islamist groups mainly active in , Hama and Damascus Governorate. It has scored some notable successes since it declared its formation in spring 2015, which is thought to be a result of the stronger and more co- ordinated support going to Islamist rebel groups from Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Jaish al-Fattah is reported to cooperate with Jabhat al-Nusra in some campaigns, but not ISIS. Jabhat al-Nusra One source says that Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate, has 10,000 fighters in southern Syria.19 An earlier estimate put its overall strength at 15,000 in mid-2014.20 Nusra is generally reported to be well supplied with weaponry and effective fighters, and to be supported by Qatar. Turkey designated Nusra a terrorist organisation in summer 2014, some time after other countries had done so. Ahrar al-Sham Ahrar al-Sham or ‘free men of Syria’, is an important Islamist/jihadi coalition that has worked with Jabhat al-Nusra but has clashed with ISIS. Its force was estimated at some 20,000 fighters, making it one of the largest unified groups fighting the government. It is part of Jaish al- Fattah, Ansar al-Sharia and a number of other regional alliances. Fatah Halab (Aleppo conquest) An alliance of Islamists and Western-backed groups. Does not cooperate with Jabhat al-Nusra and opposes ISIS.

18 ‘US airdrops ammunition to Syrian rebel groups after strategy shift’, Guardian, 12 October 2015 19 ‘Syria crisis: Spooked by rebel gains, Jordan doubles down vs. Islamic State’, Christian Science Monitor, 4 May 2015 20 ‘Jabhat al-Nusra Tries to Look Like a Moderate Terrorist Group’, Fanack Chronicle, 1 July 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 14

Ansar al-Sharia Operational in Aleppo; aims to establish sharia law. Battle of Victory (Marakat al-Nasr) Largely operates in Jisr al-Shigour, Idlib. Anti-regime. Jaish al-Nasr Anti-government alliance operating in Hama. Victory of the Oppressed Anti-government and anti-ISIS alliance operating in Homs. Eastern Ghouta Unified Command Anti-government and anti-ISIS alliance operating in the suburbs of Damascus. One Flag Alliance Anti-government alliance operating in and around Damascus. Gathering of Western Qalamoun Anti-government and anti-Hezbollah alliance operating around Damascus. Eastern Qalamoun Operations Room Anti-government and anti-ISIS alliance operating around Damascus Jaysh al- Harmoun Anti-government alliance operating southwest of Damascus. Southern Front Anti-government alliance operating in Dera’a and Quneitra governorates.

15 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

4. Syrian government under increased pressure

Summary In the first half of 2015 the Syrian government came under increased pressure as Gulf- and Turkish-backed groups became more effective and the Syrian armed forces ran short of manpower.

In the first half of 2015 rebels made significant gains in the north and south of the country. In March, Islamist rebels drove the government out of Idlib, a provincial capital in the north, and in April they took Jisr al-Shigour, a strategically located town near Idlib. Gains have also been made in the south, with the mainstream rebels taking a crossing on the Jordanian border. But in the centre of Syria, ISIS achieved a major publicity coup by capturing the city of Palmyra from the government. Increased coordination These gains have been attributed to increased unity: Jaish al-Fatah (‘Army of Conquest’) has been set up to coordinate the forces of radical Islamist militias including Jabhat al-Nusra (the al-Qaeda affiliate) and Jabhat al-Nusra Ahrar al-Sham, a fundamentalist Islamist coalition, as well as more ‘moderate’ groups. Analysts say that the contribution of Jabhat al-Nusra has been particularly important to the Islamists’ gains.21 The increased coordination on the ground in Syria has come about partly because the foreign powers supporting the various rebel factions have found more unity themselves. The accession to the Saudi throne of Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud has brought a more dynamic and assertive policy from Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has muted its resistance to supporting Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups. This has allowed it to mend fences with Turkey and Qatar, both countries that have traditionally supported the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia has also set about increasing its support for its favoured rebel groups in the conflict. The US has a programme to train 5,000 mainstream rebels per year (see US policy, below). Syrian government stretched thin The years of battle and the huge death toll among Syrian soldiers has worn Syria’s official armed forces thin. Rebel groups have also taken territory near to the Alawite heartland of Latakia, on the coast,

21 United States Institute for Peace, Likely courses of action in the Syrian civil war June – December 2015, 12 June 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 16

undermining the government’s narrative that it is the effective protector of non-Sunnis in Syria. The Assads’ own community of Alawites, traditionally the government’s firmest supporters, are becoming increasingly reluctant to supply recruits for the army when the death toll is so high and ultimate success increasingly uncertain.22 Forced conscription from religious minorities took another blow in June 2015, when Jabhat al-Nusra massacred 20 Druze. A leading Druze religious leader declared that the Syrian Druze were no longer obliged to join the Syrian army, cutting down another important supply of soldiers for the Syrian government.23 Deserting the government’s side does not mean that the Druze will join anti-government forces. As well as running short of recruits, the Syrian government is running out of money. Syrian GDP has about halved since the conflict began.24 Oil production under government control has fallen from 387,000 barrels per day to less than 10,000. Some of that lost production is now in the hands of ISIS. Increasing reliance on Iran has marginalised senior government military figures, who resent the role of Iranian advisers and Hezbollah, particularly since Iran has concentrated on building up pro-Assad militias rather than regular Syrian forces. Shiite militiamen have also been brought in from Iraq. Some of the Syrian military top brass have abandoned their jobs in protest.25 In response to the manpower problems of the government, Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite militias have increasingly moved back into Syria. In 2014, these Iraqis had been pulled back to Iraq to deal with the gains of ISIS in Iraq. Since spring 2015, they have been redirected to Syria to support the Syrian government.26 Sunni tribal forces Meanwhile, the US and the United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura have been in talks with Syrian Sunni tribal leaders, with a view to encouraging the creation of a tribal force similar to the Anbar Awakening force that was crucial to the pacification of Sunni Iraq in the middle of the last decade. The tribal leaders have also talked to other leaders from the Gulf. Sectarian tensions intrude on this process as well, however, as the tribal leaders, who could provide a significant boost to anti-government and anti-ISIS forces, complain that US forces support the Kurds and Iraqi

22 ‘Tartus the Mother of Martyrs’, Stratfor, 7 June 2015 23 Hassan Hassan, ‘Druze Unrest Could Transform Syrian Conflict’, Chatham House, 22 June 2015 24 David Butter, Syria’s economy: picking up the pieces, Chatham House, 23 June 2015 25 ‘Syrias Revitalized Rebels Make Big Gains in Assads Heartland, Foreign Policy, 28 April 2015 26 Phillip Smyth, ‘Iraqi Shiite Foreign Fighters on the Rise Again in Syria’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 May 2015 17 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

Shiite militias but not Syrian Sunnis. They are also wary of being manipulated by foreign governments.27 Similar problems exist in Iraq, where Sunni tribal forces complain that they are marginalised by the Iraqi government, which is reluctant to arm them, and that the US government is not standing by them as it did in 2005.28 Shiite politicians are wary of arming Sunni irregular forces. They claim that in the past, weapons have been sold. They also fear that weapons might be turned against them, the Shiites. There were indeed reports that some tribal forces helped ISIS take Ramadi. Legislation was presented in early 2015 to re-create an Iraqi National Guard, answerable to provincial government. This was a way of formalising Sunni militias, providing Sunni communities with a force Iraqi National Guard they trust more than the Iraqi police and army. The bill is stuck in the Council of Representatives after disagreements between Sunni politicians and the government. Sunnis wanted to lift the ban on former Baath Party members and were not happy with the provisions in the draft legislation.29

27 ‘Isis in Syria: Influential tribal leaders hold secret talks with Western powers and Gulf states over possibility of mobilising against militants’, Independent, 8 July 2015 28 ‘Anbar Awakens With a New Bedfellow’, Foreign Policy, 7 May 2015 29 ‘Iraqi cabinet approves draft law to set up national guard’, Reuters, 3 February 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 18

5. Russian and Iranian intervention

Summary Russia and Iran increased their commitment in autumn 2015, with Russia launching air strikes in September and Iran increasing ground attacks, coordinating with the Syrian armed forces and Hezbollah. The Russian intervention is not without its problems – the shooting down of one of its fast jets by the Turkish air force was a stark example of the practical and political problems. Russia also risks getting bogged down in an intractable conflict, causing further isolation from Sunni Arab countries. And many observers think that the alliance with Iran is relatively shallow and could encounter problems in the longer term.

5.1 Russian action On 30 September 2015 Russia launched its first airstrikes in Syria, the first time that Russian forces have undertaken a military operation beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War.30 Russia was immediately criticised for targeting rebel groups rather than ISIS, including moderate opposition forces supported by the US. According to RUSI, approximately 80% of Russian air strikes in the first month targeted armed opposition groups fighting the Assad regime rather than ISIS.31 In a Joint Statement issued on 2 October, the governments of France, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the US and the UK criticised Russian actions: [We] Express our deep concern with regard to the Russian military build-up in Syria and especially the attacks by the Russian air force on Hama, Homs, and Idlib which led to civilian casualties and did not target Da-esh. These military actions constitute a further escalation and will only fuel more extremism and radicalization. We call on the Russian Federation to immediately cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians and to focus its efforts on fighting ISIL.32 The continuation of Russian airstrikes and the incursion by Russian combat aircraft into Turkish airspace also prompted a statement from the NATO North Atlantic Council on 5 October: Russian military actions have reached a more dangerous level with the recent violations of Turkish airspace on 3 October and 4 October by Russian Air Force SU-30 and SU-24 aircraft in the

30 For more on the military aspects of Russia’s intervention, including de-confliction, see the Commons Briefing Paper ISIS/Daesh – the military response in Iraq and Syria, November 2015 31 “Russia’s war plan in Syria”, RUSI Analysis, 2 October 2015 32 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2 October 2015 19 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

Hatay region. The aircraft in question entered Turkish airspace despite Turkish authorities’ clear, timely and repeated warnings. In accordance with NATO practice, Turkish fighter aircraft responded to these incursions by closing to identify the intruder, after which the Russian planes departed Turkish airspace. Allies strongly protest these violations of Turkish sovereign airspace, and condemn these incursions into and violations of NATO airspace. Allies also note the extreme danger of such irresponsible behaviour. They call on the Russian Federation to cease and desist, and immediately explain these violations. Allies call on the Russian side to take all necessary measures to ensure that such violations do not take place in the future. The security of the Alliance is indivisible, and Allies stand in strong solidarity with Turkey. We will continue to follow the developments on the South-Eastern borders of NATO very closely.33 Russia has also launched attacks on targets in Syria from Russian warships based in the Caspian Sea. Russia’s Ministry of Defence confirmed that four warships had fired 26 land attack cruise missiles on 11 targets in Syria. The use of land attack missiles, as opposed to air strikes, in this instance has been questioned by a number of analysts. Jonathan Marcus, defence correspondent with BBC News, suggested that: Sea-launched cruise missile have long been a favourite US weapon of choice in interventions overseas, so there may be an element of Russia demonstrating that it has the full military panoply of any other “superpower”.34 However, western analysts have also questioned the success of the strikes after it was suggested that four of those missiles had failed to reach their targets and hit Iran, an allegation which both Moscow and Tehran have disputed.

5.2 Russian objectives Russia presents the action as a counter-terrorist action to protect religious minorities and to protect the secular government. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says that it is targeting ISIS “and other terrorist groups” in Syria at the invitation of the legitimate Syrian government.35 Asked whether Russia had targeted groups supported by the US and its allies, he repeated that Russia had targeted ISIS. Russia’s longer-term strategy aims to lend effective support to the Assad regime, which has been coming under increasing pressure in recent months. Russia denies, however, that Bashar al-Assad himself must remain in power (and it is reported that Russia offered in 2012 at the

33 ‘Statement by the North Atlantic Council on incursions into Turkey’s airspace by Russian aircraft’, NATO press release, 5 October 2015; this statement was also mirrored in a press release following a meeting of the Council of the European Union on 12 October 2015. 34 “Syria: what can Russia’s military do?”, BBC News Online, 7 October 2015 35 ‘Russian Foreign Minister Defends Airstrikes in Syria’, New York Times, 1 October 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 20

UN to provide for Bashar to step down in 2012 – an offer which Western powers ‘ignored’).36 But Moscow wants to maintain its relationship with whatever Syrian government eventually emerges from the conflict there – Syria is one of the last states in the region that is clearly friendly to Russia. Syria’s pro- Russian alignment is one of the reasons, along with a perfectly reasonable objective to have a secular government in Syria, why it is so important for Russia to avoid the arrival in power of a Sunni Islamist regime in Damascus. Russia also wants to keep its military bases on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. It could be useful, especially with the Assad government increasingly under threat, for Russia to build up a significant military presence as soon as possible so that a more decisive intervention is possible in the event of imminent government collapse. Moscow is also eyeing increased trade and economic opportunities with Syria after the conflict, particularly in energy.37 Many commentators see more negative reasons for the dramatic intervention, however. Russia is widely reported to have attacked the ‘moderate’ rebel groups that are the basis for Western hopes for a political solution. One source says that only 20% of Russian attacks have been against ISIS.38 Russia may also be interested in: • Supporting the Syrian government’s strategy of making the rebellion more terrorist in nature, bolstering its claim to be fighting terrorism rather than resisting democracy • Spoiling any potential Western-backed solution, underlining the weakness of the US and the West in the region. • The Kremlin may even be happy to see the conflict worsen so that the West remains distracted from other rivalries with Moscow; deeper intervention by outside powers is likely to prolong the conflict and cost more Syrian lives. Nevertheless, given its problems with jihadi violence at home, Russia does have a genuine interest in preventing the establishment of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Problems for the Kremlin Russian influence in Damascus is not that strong. Russian attempts to broker some sort of deal involving ‘constructive’ elements of the opposition were obstructed by the Syrian government; the present action is in part designed to ensure that the Assad government is more dependent on Russian protection (perhaps relative to the growing Iranian help that Damascus has been getting, especially in view of potential rapprochement between Iran and the West).

36 ‘West 'ignored Russian offer in 2012 to have Syria's Assad step aside'’, Guardian, 37 Salam al-Saadi, ‘Russia’s Long-Term Aims in Syria’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 October 2015 38 Igor Sutyagin, ‘Russia's War Plan in Syria’, Royal United Services Institute, 2 October 2015 21 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

Syria is outside Russia’s self-declared ‘privileged sphere of interest’. Russian and Soviet leaders have avoided taking such ‘out of area’ action in recent history, preferring to concentrate resources on countries bordering Russia. Close involvement in Syria risks diluting Russian influence closer to home. A long-term military presence on the ground is inherently risky. Firstly, it may be difficult to secure the goals that Russia has set itself – to prevent the Assad government from falling. Once committed, Russian forces may be drawn deeper into the conflict and it would be difficult to hide the costs in human lives and money from the Russian people. The USSR’s Afghan entanglement was an important factor in its collapse. As an article in Jane’s Defence Weekly has noted: In the apparent absence of a political endgame, Russia has made an open-ended commitment to a complicated conflict that could ultimately undermine rather than enhance its standing on the international stage.39 Regional impact Russia aims to maintain its influence with Damascus, but supporting the Assad government may undermine Russian influence with Sunni governments, most notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

On 24 November, Turkish officials say their fast jets shot down a Russian Turkey shoots down warplane near the Syrian border after warning it that it was entering a Russian Sukhoi Turkish airspace. The Russian government said that the SU-24 never left fighter jet Syrian airspace, with President Vladimir Putin himself saying it was 1km inside Syria. The Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said that it was a ‘planned provocation’ on the part of Turkey.40 Russia announced the suspension of its military cooperation with Turkey over the incident, although the Kremlin also said that there would be no war because of it. The shooting down of the Russian warplane was a stark illustration of not only the practical difficulties of Russian intervention but also its regional political implications. Sunnis are in a majority in most Muslim countries in the region. Reports suggest that Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar are likely to increase their support for rebel groups in the face of the Russian intervention. One Saudi analyst said: Since the beginning of the uprising in Syria, the view in Riyadh has been that Bashar al-Assad must go. There is no indication whatsoever that Riyadh will change this position. What is clear to Riyadh and its regional allies is that the recent Russian and Iranian escalation will only create a more unstable region and spill more blood.41 In a sign of the strength of reaction in Saudi Arabia, 55 Wahhabi Saudi clerics signed a document calling for jihad against Russia for its military

39 “Analysis: Russia’s unguided intervention”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 October 2015 40 ‘Turkey shooting down plane was ’planned provocation’ says Russia’, Daily Telegraph, 25 November 2015 41 ‘Gulf states plan military response as Putin raises the stakes in Syria’, Observer, 4 October 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 22

intervention in Syria.42 The document also attacked the West for failing to support the anti-Assad rebels. Russia does not seem to be shy of provoking the Sunni powers. Incursions by Russian warplanes into Turkish airspace were widely seen as intentional.43 Allegiances in the region are shifting, however, and the situation is complicated. Other states have not been as hostile to Russia as might be expected. Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomed Vladimir Putin to Cairo in 2015 and has taken a different line from the Gulf States and Turkey to a Syrian solution. Binyamin Netanyahu visited Moscow in September.

5.3 Iran The removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq was a major strategic gift to Iran. While the Sunni Hussein was vehemently pro-Sunni and supressed Shiites in Iraq, he also led Iraq, with some support from the West, during the disastrous Iran-Iraq war, which cost the lives of around a million people. With Saddam out of power and a government dominated by the Shiite majority in Iraq, Iran had lost a major threat and gained a compliant state dominated by co-religionists who looked to Iran for leadership. The Assad regime in Syria, too, is extremely valuable to Iran. Until the establishment of , Syria was Iran’s only allied Arab state and it provided an important bridge to Iran’s other major allied Arab force: Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran has been perhaps the major supporter of the Syrian government in the conflict there, supported increasingly overtly by the Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran has contributed to the fight against ISIS by helping to organise Shiite militias that have been an important part of Baghdad’s fight-back following the failures of the Iraqi army. US and other Western sources have been relatively coy about any coordination between Iranians and the Western advisers that are also supporting the Iraqi state. The delicacy for the West of cooperating closely with Iran after decades of antagonism is particularly acute because of the ongoing negotiations about the Iranian nuclear programme. Iranian President Rouhani appeared to tie cooperation with Iran over ISIS to the progress of the nuclear negotiations during his visit to the United Nations in September 2014: We are determined to continue our confidence-building approach and our transparency [in the negotiations]. If our interlocutors are equally motivated and flexible, [We can start cooperating on] very important regional issues, such as combating violence and extremism.44

42 ‘Saudi opposition clerics make sectarian call to jihad in Syria’, Reuters, 5 October 2015 43 ‘Syria conflict: Russia violation of Turkish airspace 'no accident'’, BBC News Online, 6 October 2015 44 ‘Iran Says It's Willing to Fight ISIS, for a Price’, Newsweek, 29 September 2014 23 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

However, reacting to the Turkish Parliament’s vote paving the way for Turkish support to the military action, Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif telephoned the foreign ministry in Ankara and criticised Turkey’s decision to move towards military action, worried that such action might worsen tensions. He said: “In the current situation, the countries of the region must act with responsibility and avoid aggravating."45 October’s escalation On 7 October the Syrian army and allied militia started a ground offensive against rebel forces, backed up by Russian airstrikes. Those allied militia are thought to include several thousand Iranian fighters. This was an escalation of Iran’s already considerable commitment of military advisers. There are at least several hundred Iranians on the ground in Syria, and as many as 20,000 foreign Shiite militiamen, largely organised by Iran. Added to that, Iranian-backed Hezbollah fighters are fully engaged along the border with Lebanon. The coordination of these disparate fighting forces has been carried out by Iranian generals from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the elite Iranian force. Six of them have been killed since the conflict began, three of those since the beginning of October.46 The Iranian operation is thought to be led by Qassem Soleimani, from the IRGS’s Quds Force.

5.4 Iran/Russia outlook Although Iran and Russia are collaborating on their immediate goals of preventing the fall of the Assad government and stopping the spread of ISIS, in the longer term their relationship may prove difficult. They are rivals for influence over Syria. The most fundamental difference between them may be over the fate of the Assads and the Alawite regime. To Iran, this is essential because the Alawites are the guarantee of a connection to Shiite Iran. Russia may care less about the fate of the Alawites because any government that maintained its links with Russia could serve Russian interests. Russian military assets are, however, in the Alawite region. Russia has consistently stated that the departure of Assad should not be a condition in the peace negotiations and Russia and Syria are likely to stick together for now.47

45 ‘Turkish MPs back military action as jihadists advance’, Daily Star (Lebanon), 3 October 2014 46 ‘Deaths of Iranian generals in Syria a sign of commitment to Assad’, McClatchy DC, 23 October 2015 47 ‘West looks for splits in Russia’s alliance with Iran over Syria’, Financial Times, 20 November 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 24

6. Kurds

Summary The Kurds have proved to be the most effective and reliable of the West’s allies on the ground, but they are divided and are not so effective at taking territory outside Kurdish areas. Added to that there are some stories of ethnic reprisals in areas they have retaken.

Much of the territory reported to have been lost by ISIS in the last few months has been along the margins of Kurdish-held areas. Kurdish forces have been relatively effective in northern and eastern Iraq, as well as in northern Syria along the border with Turkey. They have been the focus of much of the military aid sent by Western countries. Syria The main Kurdish force in Syria is the People’s Protection Units or YPG, the armed wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the principal Kurdish party in the Kurdish region of northern Syria. The PYD is linked to the Turkish PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organisation by the US and the UK. One of the anchors of the Kurds’ The battle of Kobane, on Syria’s border with traditional pro-Western outlook is a very Turkey, turned into a major showdown between different attitude to Israel compared to ISIS and the Kurds, supported by US-led airstrikes. other Muslim peoples in the region. In January 2015 ISIS was forced to admit defeat. It Some Kurds looked on with admiration was a major propaganda setback; the first time at the creation of the State of Israel, that ISIS had been stopped. It also confirmed the mindful of the similarities between the Kurds’ position as one of the most effective backgrounds of the two nations: armed forces against ISIS, both in Syria and Iraq, relatively small, deprived of a state, suffering unspeakable atrocities at the and would increase Kurdish bargaining power in hands of their more powerful any future negotiations over a settlement. neighbours. Particularly under the In June 2015, Syrian Kurds took control of Tal Saddam regime, there were clandestine Abyad from ISIS. The town was an important ties between Iraqi Kurds and Israel. supply route for ISIS and is not far from ISIS’s However, ISIS has also pushed Kurds main base, Al-Raqqah. A spokesman for the towards Iran, which makes any Israel ties complicated. Kurdish forces said that they would move on Al- Raqqah “…in the near future.”48 That enthusiasm was curbed when ISIS re-entered Ain Issa, which the Kurds, supported by air strikes, had captured a few days before. There are growing reports of foreign nationals, including from Western countries, joining forces with Kurdish fighters in both Iraq and Syria.49 Technically, foreign fighters are not allowed to join the Iraqi Peshmerga on the front line; that would undermine the professional nature of the

48 ‘U.S. Allies in Syria Cut Islamic State Supply Line’, Wall Street journal, 16 June 2015 49 ‘War with Isis: The 'international brigade' of foreign fighters joining up to help Kurdish Peshmerga tackle Islamists’, Independent, 6 July 2015 25 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

Peshmerga. Kurdish fighters said that what they needed more was heavy guns. Kurdish forces are noted, too, for the prominent role that women have taken in the fighting. According to one report, they represent as many as 40% of the YPG’s forces.50 Not only are the women reported to be effective fighters; the inclusion of women also serves to underline the Kurds’ ‘progressive’ reputation. Iraq The Iraqi Peshmerga was a significant and effective force in Iraq before the emergence of ISIS. The success of the Kurdish forces has been based on a relatively stable organisational background, at least in Iraq, and valuable experience in fighting. Western countries, including the UK,51 have been relatively enthusiastic about providing training and military equipment to Iraqi Kurdish forces, partly because they perceive the Peshmerga as effective and partly because of the Iraqi Kurds’ traditional pro-Western orientation: helping to underline their less sectarian approach, Kurds are helping coordinate Yazidi militias in Iraq.52 Despite their success, too much expectation could be placed on Kurdish forces. The Iraqi Kurdish population is only around five million, although there are more in Turkey. One of the reasons for their success is that they are fighting for territory they consider their homeland; Kurds might not fight so impressively to expel ISIS from areas they consider to be Arab territory. Mosul is traditionally a mixed city, although its Arab population was intentionally increased under Saddam Hussein’s Arabisation programme and Mosul is not part of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. The Kurdish Regional Government has said that it will participate in its liberation from ISIS if certain conditions on the administration of the area afterwards are met. While the Peshmerga is generally regarded as a legitimate force of the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government, it does have some characteristics of a militia; it is split between the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties, with some units aligned with the KDP and others with the PUK. Increasing Kurdish divisions are allowing more influence for Iran and PKK (the Turkish separatist Kurdish party), according to the International Crisis Group.53 Strengthening the Peshmerga could also hasten the disintegration of the Iraqi state. Western military aid was originally provided with the consent of the Iraqi central government and is channelled through Baghdad, going some way towards countering the forces tending to

50 ‘One group battling Islamic State has a secret weapon – female fighters’, Reuters, 3 February 2015 51 For more on the UK’s military involvement in Iraq, see the House of Commons Library briefing: ISIS, the military response in Iraq and Syria, June 2015 52 ‘Yazidi Militias Fight IS In Iraq, Amid Kurdish Rivalries’, RFE/RL, 11 June 2015 53 Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, Inviting Conflict, International Crisis Group, 12 may 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 26

pull Iraq apart. Increasingly, support has gone directly to the Kurdish fighters. Iraqi Kurds are keen to protect their autonomy and maximise the territory they hold. 27 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

7. Control of terrain

Summary The situation on the ground is shifting, maps do not tell the whole story since strategic towns are far more important that sparsely inhabited country, and there is no series of easily comparable maps. Nevertheless, these maps do give some idea of changes over the last few months.

Syria July 2015

Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 28

Syria, November 2015

The maps suggest that: • Hezbollah has helped the government to prevent its territory around Damascus from being cut off from the Alawite homelands around Latakia and Tartus • Kurds have extended their hold of territory along the border with Turkey, at the expense of ISIS • ISIS has increased its territory in the centre of the country, around Palmyra • Territory controlled by ‘rebel’ or ‘opposition’ forces has not changed much 29 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

• Russia may have shifted the focus of its air strikes from ‘rebels’ to ISIS in recent weeks Iraq Iraq and Syria, April 2015

Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 30

Iraq, November 2015

These maps suggest that • Despite taking Ramadi in May 2015 and maintaining its hold of Fallujah, ISIS is retreating in Iraq • The Iraqi security forces and pro-government Shiite militias have increased the territory they hold • Kurds have also increased their territory, although they are not a unitary force. 31 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

8. Risks of spill-over

Summary The risk of the conflict spreading outside Iraq and Syria has always been there. It has probably got worse with the escalation of Russian and Iranian interventions and the increased funding of rebel groups by the Gulf states and Turkey. Also, many groups in countries such as Libya have pledged allegiance to ISIS, and ISIS has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks, most famously the November 2015 attacks in Paris.

Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey Higher levels of conflict in the south of Syria, and a possible escalation of Hezbollah’s involvement, could spell more trouble for Syria’s neighbour Lebanon. Both ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra have been involved in fighting with Hezbollah in Syria, and there has been a number of bombings in Shiite areas of Lebanon. Analysts fear that the tacit collaboration between Hezbollah and the Lebanese army could break down under the pressure of the Syrian conflict, allowing bombings to resume on Lebanese territory.54 Jordan is also at risk, hosting over a million Syrian refugees and participating in the US led coalition conducting strikes in Syria. These strikes are not universally popular in Jordan. In a poll taken before the execution of the Jordanian pilot by ISIS, only 61% of Jordanians viewed ISIS as a threat. Although there was an outburst of anger among Jordanians, the death may undermine Jordan’s commitment to the fight against ISIS in the longer term. ISIS would certainly like to extend the conflict into the Western-aligned monarchy. As jihadi forces increased their threat, the Jordanian government started in June to implement plans to set up a buffer zone in the south of Syria, near its border with Jordan. The zone would include some of the provinces of Deraa and Suwayda and would include Deraa City. It was not clear how much official international support the Jordanian armed forces would have in setting up a buffer zone, although reports suggested there would be behind-the-scenes help.55 Turkey is also reported to be considering establishing a humanitarian buffer zone along its border with Syria. The buffer zone would protect the Turkish border and help Turkey to manage its enormous refugee burden. But the Turkish government is also uneasy about Kurdish successes in northern Syria in the context of a faltering Syrian government; it would limit the ability of Kurds to declare an autonomous region. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish President, said:

54 ‘Syria Spillover Risks Lebanon’s Uneasy Peace’, Chatham House, 17 June 2015 55 ‘Jordan to set up buffer zone in southern Syria’, Financial Times, 29 June 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 32

We will never allow a state to be established in northern Syria and in the south of our country. No matter what the cost, we will continue our struggle in this regard.56 Israel has also suggested that it might intervene in Syria to protect the Druze minority near the , Syrian territory occupied by Israel.57 Tunisia and Libya At least 27 British tourists out of a total of 38 were killed in a terrorist attack in Tunisia on 26 June 2015. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack and, according to the Tunisian security services, the killer had trained in Libya at the same time as the men who attacked a Tunisian museum in March 2015.58 The deaths supported the argument that ISIS represents a direct security threat to Western lives and interests. Groups pledging allegiance to ISIS have a strong presence in Libya and are said to be in control of towns such as Derna and Sirte. Kuwait and France On the same day as the Tunisia attack a suicide bomber set off an explosion in a Shiite mosque in Kuwait City, killing 27 and wounding another 227 people. The attack was later claimed by ISIS in a message on the group’s website, saying it was an attack on the “rejectionist” temple, the name it gives to Shia Muslims, who constitute about a third of the population.59 Also on 26 June, a factory manager was killed in France by a supporter of ISIS. The attacks may have been timed to coincide with the month of Ramadan, holy to Muslims; ISIS had called for supporters to attack during Ramadan.

On 13 November 2015, a series of coordinated attacks took place in Mass Paris attacks and around Paris. A total of 130 people were killed by suicide bombers and shooters armed with machine guns and rifles. The attacks were claimed by ISIS, and were reported to have been ordered from Syria, planned in Belgium and carried out by residents of Belgium and France. The Paris attacks, coming on top of a number of other serious incidents, brought a sharp reaction from the French government, which said that they were an act of war on the part of ISIS. France called for an international coalition against the group, including more cooperation with Russia. President Hollande called for “a union of all who can fight this terrorist army in a single coalition.”60

56 ‘Turkish military wary of Erdogan plan for Syrian buffer zone’, Al-Monitor, 5 July 2015 57 ‘Jordan is mulling a significant military intervention in southern Syria’, Syrian Observatory for human Rights, 30 June 2015 58 ‘Tunisia attack: Sousse killer Rezgui 'trained in Libya', BBC News Online, 30 June 2015 59 ‘27 killed in ISIS attack on Kuwait mosque’, Al-Arabiya, 26 June 2015 60 ‘Paris attacks: Iran likely to join war on Isis following Francois Hollande's plea for unity’, Independent, 18 November 2015 33 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

Other pledges of allegiance to ISIS Groups that proclaim allegiance to ISIS rename themselves as provinces or governorates of the ‘Islamic State’. Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, an Egyptian group based in the Sinai Desert, declared its allegiance to ISIS in November 2014. It has been Egypt’s most active jihadi group, carrying out attacks mainly against the Egyptian security forces in the region, and it sharply increased the pace of its attacks after the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood president in Egypt, Mohammed Morsi.61 Boko Haram, the Nigerian jihadi group, pledged its allegiance to ISIS in March 2015. Boko Haram has been conducting a rebellion against the Nigerian government in the largely Muslim-populated north east of the country and has carried out a number of atrocities, including the kidnap of over 200 girls, and has killed over 5,000 civilians since the start of 2014, according to Amnesty International.62 Abu Sayyaf, an extremist group in the Philippines, also announced their support for ISIS, as did the Indonesian group Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid. According to one author, ISIS has offered money in exchange for these pledges.63

61 See the House of Commons Library briefing Egypt 2015 62 ‘Chibok one year on: A day to remember all Boko Haram’s victims’, Amnesty International press release, 14 April 2015 63 ‘What a Pledge of Allegiance to ISIS Means’, PBS, 12 November 2014 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 34

9. Humanitarian situation

Summary Syria and Iraq together constitute the worst refugee crisis in decades. The scale of human suffering is enormous. The Syrian government is the biggest single cause of violent death and destruction in the region.

Iraq There are 3.5 million internally displaced persons in Iraq and about 350,000 refugees from other countries, largely Syrians.64 The UNHCR has limited access to the internally displaced because of the armed conflict raging across the country. An increasing number of Iraqis are fleeing to other countries, including Jordan, where there are some 60,000. This number pales in comparison with the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan, however, of whom about 800,000 are registered with the UNHCR.

Iraq is in increasing danger of suffering a food crisis, as the major grain- Looming food crisis producing areas have been heavily affected by the fighting.65 In total, over 8 million people need urgent help because of the conflict. In areas controlled by ISIS, there have been mass executions and systematic rape. In areas re-taken by forces opposing ISIS, there have been reprisals including destruction of Sunni Arab villages and crops. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has an appeal for $500 million for its operations in Iraq in 2015.66 Syria The needs of Syrians are even more pressing. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that more than 12 million Syrians are in need of assistance inside Syria,67 while the situation for the more than four million who have fled to neighbouring countries is critical, as host countries’ capacities are overwhelmed and support from rich countries falls short.68 The High Commissioner for UNHCR and World Refugees, António Guterres, said that it was the worst crisis the UNHCR Food Programme had faced in 25 years and appealed for more help for UNHCR running out of money programmes:

We are so dangerously low on funding that we risk not being able to meet even the most basic survival needs of millions of people over the coming six months.69

64 UN High Commission for Refugees, Iraq 65 Hadi Fathallah, How Iraq is Driving Itself to Hunger, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 June 2015 66 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Response Plan 2015 67 UNOCHA, Syria Crisis: regional overview, About the Crisis 68 ‘More than four million Syrians have now fled war and persecution’, UNHCR press release, 9 July 2015 69 ‘Funding shortage leaves Syrian refugees in danger of missing vital support’, UNHCR press release, 25 June 2015 35 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

Less than a quarter of the $4.5 billion required for UN- and NGO- delivered programmes had been received by the end of May 2015, meaning that conditions for refugees are worsening. Most urban refugees (those not in refugee camps) in Jordan, for example, live on less than $3.2 dollars a day and may have their food coupons stopped altogether, while 1.6 million refugees have already had their food allocation reduced because of a shortage of funds.

The High Commissioner also linked poor conditions for refugees in “Worsening Syria’s neighbours to the pressure for them to come to Europe: conditions are driving Worsening conditions are driving growing numbers towards growing numbers Europe and further afield, but the overwhelming majority remain towards Europe” in the region. We cannot afford to let them and the communities hosting them slide further into desperation.70 The fact that ISIS is reported to pay fighters about $400 a month plus free housing, utilities and medical care is also relevant.71

9.1 Civilian casualties Many reports suggest that the Syrian government has killed far more civilians than ISIS has. Several sources used figures from the Syrian Network for Human Rights which claimed that government forces had caused 76% of civilian casualties.72 While such figures are difficult to verify, most observers come to similar conclusions.73 Amnesty International’s spokesperson on Syria said: It’s important that ISIS’s many crimes are properly documented and the perpetrators brought to justice, but the far bigger killing machine in Syria is the one made in Damascus.74 The government’s greater access to heavy weaponry and air power, including such weapons as barrel bombs, is likely to explain any preponderance of government victims. This means that, although groups such as ISIS are known for particular atrocities, they are probably not capable of indiscriminate killing on the scale that the government “Assad regime main manages. Government forces are also known to use shelling and source of death and bombing as a means of collective punishment for whole destruction” neighbourhoods that have supported rebels. Emile Hokayem, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said: For all the Islamic State’s horrendous brutality, we can’t forget that the Assad regime has been the main source of death and

70 More than four million Syrians have now fled war and persecution’, UNHCR press release, 9 July 2015 71 Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, Islamic State 72 Syrian Network for Human Rights 73 See for example ‘Islamic State has killed many Syrians, but Assad’s forces have killed more’, Washington Post, 5 September 2015; ‘Syrian government forces killing hundreds of civilians in air strikes as world watches Isis’, Independent, 4 February 2015 74 ‘Syrian government forces responsible for more civilian deaths than Isis, human rights group claims’, Independent, 7 October 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 36

destruction in Syria since 2011. You can’t solve the conflict unless you find a way to address this, which the world hasn’t yet. The UN Security Council has demanded an end to indiscriminate targeting of civilians, including the use of barrel bombs, on a number of occasions. Tobias Ellwood drew attention to the efforts of the UK government at the UN to ban barrel bombs and other indiscriminate attacks on civilians: Protection of civilians in Syria, as well as those who have been forced to flee the country, is a priority for the UK. In the UN Security Council the UK has co-sponsored a number of humanitarian resolutions that call for an end to: indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including the use of barrel bombs; starvation as a method of warfare; and obstruction of the flow of humanitarian aid.75 Press reports suggest that Russia has opposed further resolutions on barrel bombs, saying that now is not the right time, when delicate negotiations are in progress.76

75 HC Written question – 16557, 17 November 2015 76 ‘Russia, Citing Talks, Opposes Measure To Bar Syrian Barrel Bombs’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 November 2015 37 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

10. The military response

Summary There are separate US-led coalitions in Iraq and Syria. Iraqi, Syrian, Iranian and Russian armed forces are also participating in strikes against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria and other rebel groups in Syria. The UK is debating extending its military action from Iraq to Syria.

The United States has led airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria since August 2014. Offensive military action has so far been restricted to air operations in support of local forces, providing reconnaissance, surveillance and attack capabilities. Training is also being provided by a number of coalition countries to the Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga in the north of the country, while the US is also leading a programme of training for moderate opposition forces in Syria. Who is in the coalition? The coalition against ISIS is being led by the United States. According to the Department of Defense, more than 60 countries are assisting in efforts to counter ISIS, from measures to restrict the flow of foreign fighters and foreign financing to participation in the training of Iraqi, and local, security forces and offensive military operations in Iraq and Syria. The United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Jordan, Canada and Denmark have all conducted air strikes in Iraq. With the exception of Canada, all have been reluctant to intervene militarily in Syria. Iran is also reported to have conducted airstrikes in eastern Iraq, although not in coordination with the US-led coalition. Canada has now withdrawn from military action in Iraq. So far only the US, Canada, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates have participated in airstrikes in Syria. The UK is conducting surveillance reconnaissance operations over Syria. The UAE and Canada have now withdrawn from military action in Syria. Participation of the other Gulf countries is minimal. The United States, the UK and a number of other coalition countries have also deployed military personnel on the ground in Iraq to train Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. These are not combat troops and are not deployed in an offensive role. The UK also announced in March 2015 the sending of 75 trainers and headquarters staff to train Syrian moderate rebel forces.77

77 HC Deb 26 March 2015, Written statement - HCWS501. See also the Commons Briefing Paper ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria, 7 July 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 38

A significant proportion of the sorties conducted by UK planes is dedicated to intelligence-gathering.78 Legal basis Military action in Iraq is being conducted at the request of the Iraqi government, which coalition partners consider provides a firm legal basis for operations in that country. Concerns over legality have restricted the number of countries participating in air strikes over Syria.79 A new Security Council resolution on Syria in November 2015 changed the situation somewhat (see below). Duration of the mission It is widely acknowledged that the campaign against ISIS will not be over soon. During the Commons debate in September 2014 David Cameron warned Members of Parliament that “we should not expect this to happen quickly. The hallmarks of this campaign will be patience and persistence, not shock and awe.”80

10.1 Revisiting the Syria vote in Parliament? The UK continues to contribute to the US-led military operation in Iraq but not in Syria,81 following votes in Parliament. On 29 August 2013, the House of Commons voted against UK military action in Syria,82 then on 26 September 2014 voted in favour of UK action in Iraq.83 The 2013 Syria debate was focussed on the use by the Syrian government of chemical weapons. Since then, the nature of the problem in Syria has changed dramatically, particularly after the fall of Mosul in Iraq to ISIS and widespread pledges of allegiance to ISIS across the Middle East and North Africa. With the increasing worries about the progress of the campaign against ISIS, there have been suggestions that the UK might step up its contribution, extending action to Syria as well as Iraq. Defence Secretary Michael Fallon said in the House of Commons on 2 July 2015 that the new Parliament should revisit that question and that the government would probably seek parliamentary approval: As the Prime Minister said on Monday, there must be a full- spectrum response to deal with ISIL at its source in places such as Syria, Iraq and Libya. We know that ISIL is organised and directed from northern Syria. That is why the Prime Minister said during last September’s debate on taking military action in Iraq that

78 HC Deb 2 July 2015, c1672 79 For more on the legal implications of extending UK military action to Syria, see the Commons Briefing Paper Legal basis for UK military action in Syria, November 2015 80 For a full account, see the House of Commons Library Briefing Paper ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria, 7 July 2015 81 See the House of Commons Library briefing ISIS: the military response in Iraq and Syria, 15 June 2015 82 House of Commons debate on Syria, parliament.uk 83 Commons recalled to debate Iraq: Coalition against ISIL, parliament.uk 39 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

“there is a strong case for us to do more in Syria”.—[Official Report, 26 September 2014; Vol. 585, c. 1259.] However, he recognised the reservations that some Members had, and we will not bring a motion to the House on which there is not some consensus. However, this is a new Parliament and it is for all Members to consider carefully how best to tackle ISIL, an evil caliphate that does not respect state boundaries. Therefore, our position remains that we would return to the House for approval before conducting air strikes in Syria. The exception, as the House knows, is if a critical British national interest was at stake, or if there was the need to act to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. We are also clear that any action we take must not provide any succour to Assad or his regime.84 Vernon Coaker, then Shadow Defence Secretary, said that the Labour Party was prepared to consider the government’s proposals: We must tackle that threat to our citizens both at home and abroad. We stand ready to work with the Government to defeat ISIL and will carefully consider any proposals that they decide to bring forward. We all need to be clear about what difference any action would make to our objective of defeating ISIL, the nature of that action, its objectives and its legal basis. Any potential action must command the support of other nations in the region, including Iraq, and the coalition that is already taking action in Syria.85 Julian Lewis, Chair of the Commons Defence Select Committee, said that taking military action in Syria would entail helping either the Assad government or ISIS: In 2013, the Government wanted to remove Assad without helping al-Qaeda or similar groups that later became Daesh. Now we apparently want to remove Daesh but without helping Assad. Those two things are incompatible. It is a choice of two evils. Which does my right hon. Friend think is the lesser of those two evils? 86 Crispin Blunt, Chair of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, expressed doubts about the legality of intervening in Syria: I don’t think it’s quite as clear as people have said it is. It’s easy to come in as the guest of the government in Iraq, at their invitation, in their country. It becomes slightly more questionable when you don’t have a United Nations security council resolution and you’re operating in another country.87 He also questioned whether UK participation would make much difference, when the UK was only flying “5%” of the missions in Iraq. Alex Salmond, for the Scottish , advised caution: [A] reason for my scepticism is my experience—an experience that I have shared with a number of Members over the last 12 years— of successive military interventions in a range of Islamic countries. At each stage it was argued, and we were assured, that the next intervention would be the absolute key, or at least would deliver

84 HC Deb 2 July 2015, c1671 85 HC Deb 2 July 2015, c1680 86 HC Deb 2 July 2015, c1671 87 ‘Labour signals it could back government over Syria bombing’, Daily Telegraph, 2 July 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 40

progress towards the objectives of this country. I think it must be said that, on each and every occasion, exactly the reverse has come about.88 Foreign Affairs Committee report On 3 November 2015, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee published a report setting out questions that the committee thought should be answered before Parliament could support UK military action in Syria.89 a) On an international strategy: i) How the proposal would improve the chances of success of the international coalition’s campaign against ISIL; ii) How the proposed action would contribute to the formation and agreement of a transition plan for Syria; iii) In the absence of a UN Security Council Resolution, how the Government would address the political, legal, and military risks arising from not having such a resolution; iv) Whether the proposed action has the agreement of the key regional players (Turkey; Iran; Saudi Arabia; Iraq); if not, whether the Government will seek this before any intervention; v) Which ground forces will take, hold, and administer territories captured from ISIL in Syria. b) On the military imperative: i) What the overall objective is of the military campaign; whether it expects that it will be a “war-winning” campaign; if so, who would provide war-winning capabilities for the forces; and what the Government expects will be the result of extending airstrikes to Syria. ii) What extra capacity the UK would contribute to the Coalition’s actions in Syria.

10.2 Towards the second debate? After the Paris attacks, pressure for UK and international action increased. On 20 November, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for states to take ‘all necessary measures’ against ISIS.90 The resolution, a compromise between differing positions from Security Council members, was ambiguous, in that it was not taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the mandatory action provision, and, although it used the UN code for military action (‘all necessary measures’) it did not use the word ‘authorise’.91 On 26 November, the Prime Minister made a statement to the House of Commons in which he set out the government’s arguments for extending military action to Syria and its answers to the questions in the

88 HC Deb 2 July 2015, c1692 89 The extension of offensive British military operations to Syria, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report, HC 457, 2015–16 90 Security Council resolution 2249 (2015), 20 November 2015 91 For more on the legal implications of the November resolution, see the Commons Briefing Paper 7404, Legal basis for UK military action in Syria, November 2015 41 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

select committee’s report.92 A memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee was also released.93 He said: First, why? The reason for acting is the very direct threat that ISIL poses to our country and to our way of life. … But why us? My first responsibility as Prime Minister—and our first job in this House—is to keep the British people safe. We have the assets to do that and we can significantly extend the capabilities of the international coalition forces. … …why now? The first answer to that is, of course, because of the grave danger that ISIL poses to our security—a danger that has clearly intensified in recent weeks—but there are additional reasons why action now is so important. Just look at what has changed—not just the attack in Paris, but the fact that the world has come together and agreed a UN Security Council resolution. There is a real political process under way. Let me turn to the question of legality. … The Prime Minister referred to the memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee, which contained a summary of the legal advice, and added: It is founded on the right of self-defence as recognised in article 51 of the United Nations charter. The right of self-defence may be exercised individually where it is necessary to the UK’s own defence, and of course collectively in the defence of our friends and allies. The main basis of the global coalition’s actions against ISIL in Syria is the collective self-defence of Iraq. He said this legal basis was “underscored” by the new Security Council resolution. On the question of ground troops he said that the Syrian situation was complex, but that there were non-extremist Syrian fighters and Kurds to be relied on: However, as the report I am publishing today shows, we believe that there are around 70,000 Syrian opposition fighters, principally of the Free Syrian Army, who do not belong to extremist groups, and with whom we can co-ordinate attacks on ISIL. In addition, Kurdish armed groups have shown themselves capable of taking territory, holding it and administering it, and, crucially, of relieving the suffering that the civilian population had endured under ISIL control. He then turned to the question of overall strategy, describing the four pillars of the strategy: a comprehensive plan to prevent and foil plots at home

92 HC Deb 26 November 2015, cc1489-1537 93 Memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee: Prime Minister’s Response to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015-16: The Extension of Offensive British Military Operations to Syria, November 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 42

support for the diplomatic and political process military action immediate humanitarian support and, even more crucially, longer- term stabilisation.94 The election of the Jeremy Corbyn to the leadership of the Labour Party raised questions about whether Labour would support military action in Syria, and particularly whether there would be a split between the new leader and some of the Parliamentary Party. Responding to the Prime Minister’s statement, Jeremy Corbyn asked for assurances about the policy: …does the Prime Minister believe that extending air strikes to Syria, which is already being bombed by the United States, France, Russia and other powers, will make a significant military impact on the ground… …is the Prime Minister’s view that the air campaign against ISIL- held areas can be successful without ground forces? …without credible or acceptable ground forces, is not the logic of an intensified air campaign mission creep and western boots on the ground? Can the Prime Minister today rule out the deployment of British ground forces to Syria? …does the Prime Minister believe that United Nations security resolution 2249 gives clear and unambiguous authorisation for UK air strikes? … how does the Prime Minister think an extension of UK bombing would contribute to a comprehensive negotiated political settlement of the Syrian civil war, which is widely believed to be the only way to ensure the defeat of ISIL in the country? …what assessment has the Prime Minister been given about the likely impact of British air strikes in Syria on the threat of terrorist attacks in Britain? …does the Prime Minister accept that UK bombing of Syria could risk more of what President Obama called “unintended consequences”, and that a lasting defeat of ISIL can be secured only by Syrians and their forces within the region?95 Angus Robertson for the Scottish National Party asked how the government’s plan would secure peace; who would take and administer territory from ISIS and how the UK would ensure long-term reconstruction, pointing to the example of Libya.96 After the debate, Jeremy Corbyn sent a letter to Labour MPs saying that he was not convinced of the case for extending action to Syria.97 Some members of the Shadow Cabinet were reported to be in favour of action. It was not clear whether there would be a free vote for Labour MPs in any Commons debate to approve action.

94 HC Deb 26 November 2015, c1492 95 HC Deb 26 November 2015, c1494-5 96 HC Deb 26 Nov 2015, c1498 97 ‘Jeremy Corbyn 'cannot support UK air strikes in Syria', BBC News Online, 26 November 2015 43 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

10.3 UK shifting on Assad? While the UK government has consistently said that the Assad government was the main problem in Syria, it has tended not to describe its policy in Syria as one of ‘regime change’. In the 2013 debate on military action against Syria’s use of chemical weapons, the Prime Minister said that the proposal for action was just about chemical weapons: It is not about taking sides in the Syrian conflict, it is not about invading, it is not about regime change, and it is not even about working more closely with the opposition; it is about the large- scale use of chemical weapons and our response to a war crime— nothing else.98 In the November 2015 debate on the Prime Minister confirmed that the government would like to see President Assad removed through a political process: All these elements—counter-terrorism, political and diplomatic, military and humanitarian—need to happen together to achieve a long-term solution in Syria. We know that peace is a process, not an event. I am clear that it cannot be achieved through a military assault on ISIL alone; it also requires the removal of Assad through a political transition. But I am also clear about the sequencing that needs to take place. This is an ISIL-first strategy.99 And went on to acknowledge the importance of Assad’s departure to win over majority Sunni opinion: …Secondly, does our view that Assad must go help in the fight against ISIL, or—as some claim—does that confuse the picture? The expert advice that I have could not be clearer: we will not beat ISIL if we waiver in our view that ultimately Assad must go. We cannot win over majority Sunni opinion, which is vital for the long-term stability of Syria, if we suddenly to change our position.100 And when specifically asked to deny that the policy was regime change, he obliged. I am happy to say that. We are not taking or proposing to take military action to achieve regime change in Syria. That is not the agenda. The agenda is to help others, including our allies, to degrade, deflate and ultimately destroy ISIL. We believe, as everyone in the Vienna process believes, that there needs to be political transition in Syria. That is not just the British view; it is the French view, the American view, and indeed in many ways also the Russian view, as well as the view of others. Whatever one’s view about Assad, there will need to be over time a comprehensive and pluralistic Government in Syria that can represent all the people. 101 The idea of cooperating with Russia and Iran to fight against ISIS and therefore compromising on the demands for Assad to go gained in popularity, particularly after the Paris attacks.

98 HC Deb 29 August 2013, c1426 99 HC Deb 26 September 2015, c1492 100 HC Deb 26 September 2015, c1493 101 HC Deb 26 November 2015, c1520 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 44

Although the tone of UK government’s comments may have changed a little, it is behind the scenes in negotiations in Vienna and elsewhere that any shift in policy will emerge.

45 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

11. US policy

The US continues to lead the different military coalitions conducting airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, arming the Peshmerga, the Iraqi armed forces and other partners on the ground, and providing training and other support. US officials describe their policy as “Iraq first” and “ISIS first”.102 The fall of Ramadi and Palmyra to ISIS strengthened those voices criticising the US response as inadequate, but also encouraged those who think that any US involvement makes the situation worse.103 The increasing urgency of combatting ISIS, however, might also further complicate the situation in Syria, where other critics have argued that the US is not paying enough attention to the Assad government, which has committed as many atrocities as ISIS, if not more. The Syrian theatre remains much larger than Iraq. An increased focus on the Assad government would certainly sit well with the Sunni governments in the region, whose priority has long been to see the removal of the Assads. On 10 June 2015 US President Obama approved the deployment of 450 extra US troops to advise and train the Iraqi army. In July President Obama said that the US campaign in Northern Syria would be further intensified. Airstrikes on the ISIS administrative centre of al-Raqqah were stepped up, aiming to bolster Kurdish forces after recent successes in Kobane and restrict ISIS’s freedom of movement. However, the US President reiterated that no ground troops would be sent to Syria. The US training programme for Syria has not delivered as much as hoped. The $500 million programme to train ‘moderates’ in Turkey and Jordan has only processed 60 people so far, while the target was for 3,000-5,000 to be trained per year.104 US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter informed Congress that the delay was due to rigorous vetting of candidates. The US policy of supporting the Free Syrian Army and other ‘moderate’ rebels does not look particularly convincing. Although groups proclaiming allegiance to the FSA are active in Syria, particularly in the south of the country, their presence is limited and other groups, particularly the Islamist Jaish al-Fatah, have been making more progress. The administration, along with European allies, has been signalling in recent months that Assad’s immediate departure is not a precondition for negotiations on a transitional government.105

102 The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, 11 June 2015 103 See for example Zbiegniew Brezinski, ‘Syria: Intervention Will Only Make it Worse’, Time, 8 May 2013 104 ‘US admits it has trained only 60 Syrians to fight ISIL’, Al-Jazeera, 8 July 2015 105 For more on these negotiations, see the Commons Briefing Paper Seeking a negotiated solution in Syria, November 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 46

12. UK humanitarian assistance and migrants

12.1 Syria The UK has allocated £1.1 billion in humanitarian aid to the crisis in Syria since 2012. This funding is supporting the immediate needs of vulnerable people in Syria and of refugees in the region. DFID have published a fact sheet on the government’s Syria response,106 which contains more details, for example a country-by-country breakdown of spending. The money goes to United Nations agencies and international NGOs. The UK has set up a scheme for accepting a small number of Syrian refugees in Britain.107 At the end of March 2015, 187 people had been brought to the UK under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme.108 The scheme was significantly extended in September 2015, when the Prime Minister announced that Up to 20,000 Syrian refugees could be resettled in the UK over the course of this Parliament.109

12.2 Iraq DFID has allocated £79.5 million to the crisis since June 2014. The funds have gone to providing essentials such as food, water, sanitation and shelter.110 These are emergency funds and there is no long-term UK-Iraq bilateral assistance programme. Iraq is a middle income country that should be able to finance its own development, according to UK policy. The UK government’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), a cross-departmental fund that draws from the Foreign and Commonwealth office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence, is looking for projects in Iraq to fund, focussing on political reconciliation, community cohesion and security.111

106 DFID Syria crisis response summary, 29th October 2015 107 See the Commons Briefing Paper Syrian refugees and the UK, June 2015 108 Immigration statistics January to March 2015, Home Office, 21 May 2015 109 For more information see the Commons Briefing Paper ‘Syrian refugees and the UK’, September 2015 110 DFID, Iraq crisis response summary, November 2015 111 UK-Iraq Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, 1 July 2015 47 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

13. UN process on Syria

Summary Most agree that a political solution is necessary in Syria, but there are certain sticking points – notably the fate of President Assad and the decision as to which rebel groups could participate in negotiations and which are ‘terrorist’. So far, Syrians themselves have been a glaring absence from most rounds of talks. One achievement in the latest round, the ‘Vienna Process’, was the presence of Iran and Saudi Arabia around the same table.

Transitional government A mutually agreed transitional government was at the heart of the communiqué from the first Geneva conference on Syria held in 2012 and the UK government’s position remains that a negotiated solution is the right policy: A negotiated political transition in Syria remains the only way to end the conflict and alleviate Syria’s humanitarian crisis. The Geneva Communiqué, agreed in June 2012, set out steps that must be in place to establish a transitional governing body, leading to full, free and fair elections in Syria. UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, is in consultations with the parties to the Syria conflict as well as the key regional and international powers, including the UK, to establish a route back to political talks. We continue to exchange views with Mr de Mistura and his team.112 Precious little progress has been made since then, but some observers think that the shifts on the ground mean that circumstances are now more favourable. John Kerry visited Russia in May, and Syria was reported to be on the agenda for discussions with Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. The details of conversations are not made public, but analysts speculate that there may have been discussion of some sort of transitional government.113 That could avoid overt regime change, which Russia has

consistently opposed, while removing Bashar al-Assad, fulfilling the demand that the US has made since early in the uprising. Such a transitional plan would need the support of Iran, the other main backer of the Assad government. The signature of the deal between the six world powers and Iran in July 2015 could see significant changes in the region: the Iranian government’s tax receipts should be sharply improved as sanctions are lifted. This could allow Iran to pursue its support for Damascus more vigorously. But the deal could also encourage Iran and the West to cooperate on finding a solution to the Iran nuclear deal region’s problems. Much may depend on the successful implementation of the nuclear deal, developments in the US Congress, and Iranian internal politics.

112 HL Deb 10 June 2015, Written question - HL389 113 Ahmad Beetar, ‘An exit strategy for Syria’, Fikra Forum, 14 May 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 48

On the other hand, opposition to any accommodation with Iran is ferocious among many Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis. A transitional government would probably mean sharing power between mainstream rebel forces, both secular and Islamist, and certain figures from the present regime. It would be a difficult balance to strike. For any such transitional government to be acceptable to Western governments and mainstream rebel forces, it would have to be dramatically different from the present one. Nevertheless, the Syrian government side would have to cooperate with the deal, agreeing for Bashar al-Assad to leave voluntarily. And the transitional government would be expected to extend its authority over areas with populations of different sects whose levels of mutual trust are low. A transitional government would need to disarm the myriad militias at present governing swathes of the country, trying to avoid the outcome in Libya, which has all but disintegrated amid fighting between heavily Libya scenario armed militias. It would be fiercely opposed by ISIS. An alliance of Alawites and secularists backed by the West, Russia and Iran would be an ideal opponent for ISIS propaganda purposes.

13.1 Continuing UN talks The UN has tried to negotiate local ‘freezes’, where the conflict would be halted to allow civilians a breathing space and humanitarian assistance to be delivered. These attempts have foundered because the opposition says that previous local ceasefires have been used by the government to disarm rebels and impose its control on rebel-held areas. The government launched an assault on Aleppo on the day that a freeze in the city was announced at the UN. In May 2015, the third round of talks in Geneva, mediated by the UN and its special representative Staffan de Mistura, took place. They were not billed as ‘peace negotiations’, rather consultations on areas that Geneva III might be suitable for later talks – ‘Geneva III’ – that were to take place towards the end of June. In a demonstration of how difficult any negotiated solution would be, most mainstream rebel groups, both secularists and Islamists, declined to attend the meetings. The groups accused de Mistura of bias in favour of the Syrian government.114 ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra were not invited. Vienna meetings The UN process was revived with meetings in Vienna in November 2015.115 These meetings included Iran for the first time. This development resulted largely from the success of Iran’s negotiations with the world

114 ‘“Syrians have overthrown Staffan de Mistura:” An Interview with Subhi al-Refai’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 May 2015 115 For a full account of the Vienna meetings, see the Commons Briefing Paper Seeking a negotiated solution in Syria, November 2015 49 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

powers over its nuclear programme. The dynamics on the ground in Syria were also different, with Russia taking direct military action and Iran more deeply committed. Together with a series of ISIS-linked terrorist attacks outside Syria, the latest being in Paris, these factors gave the talks a new and different impulse, but the negotiations did not include any Syrians. The outside forces at the talks remained divided over the fate of Bashar al-Assad, with the Russians and Syrians opposing any precondition that al-Assad should leave. Which rebel groups constitute the legitimate opposition, and therefore can form part of a transitional government, and which are terrorists, is also likely to remain controversial. Even with those questions answered, getting Syrians to support a political process would be difficult. The Syrian government has categorically ruled out Bashar al-Assad leaving office before the end of his term. Many observers thought the major achievement of the Vienna meetings was to get Saudi Arabia and Iran to sit around the same negotiating table.

Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 50

14. Outlook

Both Iraq and Syria lack effective governments that command the allegiance of their populations and have competent security apparatuses. Neighbouring states that might help to control the violence are divided. This amounts to a power vacuum in both countries that makes fighting ISIS extremely difficult. Many observers fear that in the present circumstances the conflict can only drag on and possibly intensify, increasing radicalisation and the enmity between different groups, and destroying the physical and social capital of both countries.116

Some have questioned Iran’s continued commitment to funding the Iranian support Syrian and Iraqi governments, particularly in view of the fall in the oil price. It seems, nevertheless, that Iran is still able and willing to offer support. In May, Syria’s central banker announced that a further $1 billion line of credit for the Syrian government had received preliminary approval by Iran. Iran has also signalled its continuing commitment in various statements. Nevertheless, Iran’s pockets are not bottomless and some analysts have suggested that the Iranians might be prepared to abandon al-Assad if their interests were protected. Iranian financial support has led to a growing trade relationship between the countries,117 so those interests are economic as well as strategic. Iran would for example like to see the realisation of a plan agreed with the Assad government for a natural gas pipeline to be built through Iraq and Syria to Europe, and to have a leading role in the eventual reconstruction of Syria.

Russia continues to supply armaments to Damascus – a crucial element Russia in support for the government. In January one report suggested that that support was increasing.118 The support to the government from Iran and Russia has been more consistent than Western and Gulf support for the rebels, even if that help is now firming up. It has also played to the advantages of the Syrian government: heavy weaponry and air superiority. Even if it would be difficult for the government to regain control of all the country, dislodging it from its strongholds would be difficult, especially with increased Russian and Iranian military assistance. ‘Victory’ impossible? Even if the situation on the ground is fluid and the military effectiveness of the Syrian government is wearing down, that does not mean that any side is necessarily in a position to win. ISIS has consolidated its position in large areas of Sunni-majority Syria, but the government still has a firm

116 See for example ‘Statement on a Syrian Policy Framework’, International Crisis Group, 27 Apr 2015 117 ‘Iran’s Stakes in Syria’s Economy’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 June 2015 118 ‘Russia arms Iraq, Syria to help combat Islamic State: Lavrov’, Reuters, 22 April 2015 51 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

grasp on the capital Damascus and in the Alawite heartlands around Latakia. Mainstream rebels may have improved their performance but from a low level. The training commitment from the US has been enhanced and their performance is likely to improve further, but these mainstream rebels are not in a position to defeat the government and jihadi groups. Nor are they a credible government in waiting for Syria.119 With strengthened and more coordinated interventions from the Sunni camp (Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia), Islamists and more mainstream rebels may increase their power but they remain disparate and often locally-based.

US-led air strikes do not appear to have had a decisive impact overall, US-led airstrikes although they have played a big role in certain victories, such as the expulsion of ISIS from Kobane. So should the West do more? Western electorates are sceptical about military intervention but some recent events may have increased support for military action. In France, for example, a public that was majority- opposed to intervention in 2013 shifted to support it in May 2015.120 UK public supports According to polls by YouGov, UK public support has remained steady Syria air strikes at 59% in favour of the RAF conducting air strikes against ISIS in Syria throughout 2015, including after the Paris attacks.121 Divisions among the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council are continuing to hinder any decisive intervention under the mandatory provisions of chapter VII of the UN Charter. Even if external intervention could decide the outcome, putting Iraq and Syria back together again would be difficult. One analyst writes that Syria might end up looking something like Somalia: One faction or another may certainly gain the upper hand before splintering and starting all over again, and some warlords will be more powerful than others. Cities will be taken and retaken, and battles will be won and lost, until we all lose track. But you cannot win a war like Syria’s any more than you can win a plague or an earthquake.122

14.1 Towards rapprochement with the Syrian government? Since the takeover of Mosul, the focus of world attention has gradually switched from the atrocities committed by the Assad government to the horrors advertised over the internet by ISIS. The strategies of both have been remarkably successful:

119 For more on the Western-led military interventions in Iraq, see the Library briefing paper, ISIS: the military response in Iraq and Syria, 15 June 2015 120 ‘French public back military intervention in Syria – poll’, Reuters, 24 May 2015 121 ‘Strong and consistent public support for RAF air strikes within Syria’, YouGov, 25 November 2015 122 Aron Lund, ‘What if No One Is Winning the War in Syria?’, Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, 28 May 2015 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 52

• The Syrian government has turned what started out as peaceful protests against a despotic and murderous regime into a fight against a bloodcurdling jihadi menace. • ISIS has managed to take control of a large ungoverned space in Iraq and Syria and has dominated the headlines in the Western media, as well as taking the threat to Western countries themselves. It is closer to drawing Western countries (‘crusaders’) into direct confrontation, its ‘apocalyptic fantasy’.123 After the Paris attacks, the temptation to move gradually towards an acceptance of the Syrian government, which is still probably the most effective force against ISIS, grows stronger. But the Syrian government remains responsible for far more civilian deaths than any other group, and probably more than all the others combined. It is responsible for using chemical weapons against its own people and for indiscriminate attacks on civilians including with barrel bombs, actions which are widely regarded as contrary to international humanitarian law. The Assad regime may have a past record or protecting ethnic and religious minorities but it has intentionally made the Syria conflict a sectarian one. Rapprochement with the Syrian government is attractive in the short term as a way of handling ISIS but in the longer term it might result in recruiting far more fighters to the Sunni jihadi cause. The details of any Syria transition and the fate of the Assads remain perhaps the biggest question for the future of the region.

123 Shadi Hamid, Is there a method to ISIS's madness?, Brookings, November 24, 2015 53 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015

15. Further reading

Syrian refugees and the UK, Commons Briefing Paper SN06805, 18 June 2015 Syrian refugees in Jordan, Commons Briefing Paper SN06943, 21 July 2014 ISIS and the sectarian conflict in the Middle East , Commons Briefing Paper RP15-16, 19 March 2015 ISIS: the military response in Iraq and Syria, Commons Briefing Paper SN06995, 7 July 2015 Parliamentary approval for military action, Commons Briefing Paper 7166, 12 May 2015 Legal basis for UK military action in Syria, Commons Briefing Paper 7404, 26 November 2015 Malcolm Chalmers, UK Air Strikes in Syria: Time for a Decision?,RUSI, 18 November 2015 Seeking a negotiated solution in Syria, Commons Briefing Paper 7392, 18 November 2015 Shadi Hamid, Is there a method to ISIS's madness?, Brookings Institution, 24 November, 2015 Neil Quilliam, What the UK Can Do to Solve the Refugee Crisis, Chatham House, 7 October 2015 An Alarming New Escalation in the Syria War, International Crisis Group, 24 November 2015 The World Bombs Syria International Crisis Group 19 November 2015

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