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Iraq and Syria - by Ben Smith and Claire Mills Developments in 2015

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Iraq and Syria - by Ben Smith and Claire Mills Developments in 2015 BRIEFING PAPER Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 Iraq and Syria - By Ben Smith and Claire Mills developments in 2015 Inside: 1. ISIS in Iraq 2. ISIS in Syria 3. Military capabilities of ISIS and other anti-government groups 4. Syrian government under increased pressure 5. Russian and Iranian intervention 6. Kurds 7. Control of terrain 8. Risks of spill-over 9. Humanitarian situation 10. The military response 11. US policy 12. UK humanitarian assistance and migrants 13. UN process on Syria 14. Outlook 15. Further reading www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 2 Contents Summary 4 1. ISIS in Iraq 6 Ramadi 6 Shia militias in the ascendant 6 Mosul 7 Sinjar 7 2. ISIS in Syria 9 Kobane 9 Palmyra 9 3. Military capabilities of ISIS and other anti-government groups 10 Impact of Coalition airstrikes on ISIS capabilities 11 3.1 Other anti-government groups 12 4. Syrian government under increased pressure 15 5. Russian and Iranian intervention 18 5.1 Russian action 18 5.2 Russian objectives 19 Problems for the Kremlin 20 5.3 Iran 22 5.4 Iran/Russia outlook 23 6. Kurds 24 7. Control of terrain 27 Syria 27 Iraq 29 8. Risks of spill-over 31 9. Humanitarian situation 34 9.1 Civilian casualties 35 10. The military response 37 10.1 Revisiting the Syria vote in Parliament? 38 Foreign Affairs Committee report 40 10.2 Towards the second debate? 40 10.3 UK shifting on Assad? 43 11. US policy 45 12. UK humanitarian assistance and migrants 46 12.1 Syria 46 12.2 Iraq 46 13. UN process on Syria 47 Transitional government 47 13.1 Continuing UN talks 48 Cover page image copyright: Ministry of Defence 3 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015 Vienna meetings 48 14. Outlook 50 14.1 Towards rapprochement with the Syrian government? 51 15. Further reading 53 Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 4 Summary Summary Some18 months since the fall of Mosul, ISIS still poses a grave threat in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere, while the suffering of Syrians and Iraqi continues unabated and a huge refugee crisis has erupted. Syria In Syria the previous stalemate has shifted. Rebel groups have found new unity and received more backing from regional powers such as Turkey, and have made some territorial advances on important towns in the north and south of the country. Those groups have collaborated with Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate. Kurds, backed by US airstrikes, have had significant success against ISIS. But ISIS has consolidated its presence in other areas, taking the Syrian town of Palmyra. The fall of Palmyra to ISIS in May 2015 was a demonstration of continuing strength, despite the US government’s ‘ISIS-first’ strategy. If the Syrian government used to give ISIS a relatively easy ride, attacking other rebel groups more ferociously, ISIS is now a significant actor in the civil war and both the government and the other rebel groups may turn more attention towards the group. There were some anti-government rebel gains over the first half of 2015, amid reports of a shortage of manpower in the Syrian armed forces. The Syrian government’s allies Iran and Russia took action. Russia surprised observers by starting air strikes in Syria in September 2015. Coordinating with the Russian air cover, Iran (and its proxy Hezbollah and other militias) increased ground offensives, collaborating with Syrian government forces. This combined push did a lot to end anti-government forces’ momentum. Russia says that it is targeting ISIS and other terrorist groups. US and other Western sources have said that the Russian air strikes are aimed principally at preventing the Assad government from falling. Iraq In Iraq, the fall of Ramadi to ISIS was a blow to the Iraqi government and to Western, including UK, policy. US-led airstrikes combined with training assistance to Iraqi forces were not enough to stop Iraqi forces collapsing in Ramadi. That left Shiite militias, backed by Iran, in a stronger position and seen by many Iraqi Shias as their only effective defenders. That does not bode well for the policy of reducing the sectarian nature of the conflict in Iraq. There have been calls for the UK parliament to revisit its 2013 decision not to participate in military action in Syria. Questions persist about the legality of any intervention and whether the Royal Air Force has the resources. The US administration has said that it will increase its support for ‘moderate’ Syrian rebels. US/Russian collaboration? Terrorist attacks by ISIS outside Iraq and Syria – their alleged bombing of a Russian airliner in Egypt and the November attacks in Paris – may encourage collaboration against ISIS between outside powers, but they still have differing objectives for the final outcome, and increasing the number of countries attacking ISIS from the air may not make as much difference as 5 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015 expected; the Syrian government has been using air power against its enemies for four years. Air strikes against ISIS will cause more civilian casualties and may help the group to recruit. They will not solve the problem of the Assad government, which is widely thought to be killing far more civilians than any other group, maybe even than all the other armed forces combined. Negotiated settlement? Some analysts have argued for Russia and the US to try for a negotiated settlement involving a transitional power-sharing government and with Bashar al-Assad leaving power after a time. A deal would need to offer certain guarantees to Russia and Iran, while fulfilling minimum conditions for the US. For such a deal to go ahead, the Assad government and other combatants would need to accept that a military victory is not plausible. It is not clear that this situation is close yet, and Assad has categorically rejected standing down early. Number CBP 7261, 27 November 2015 6 1. ISIS in Iraq Summary Despite the takeover of the Sunni town of Ramadi by ISIS in May 2015, Iraqi security forces have made progress in fighting against the group. This has been achieved with heavy involvement of Shiite militias coordinated by Iran, however. These forces will find it difficult to take over Sunni areas without exacerbating the sectarian tensions that were at the root of the growth of ISIS in the first place. Ramadi In May 2015, ISIS captured Ramadi, the provincial capital of al-Anbar, after a long struggle. The role of Shiite militias in the battle over Ramadi had been minimised, following the policies of the Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and the US. When Ramadi fell, it was a blow to anyone who In 1921 Al-Anbar province was one of the scenes of the thought that the combination of first Iraqi rebellion against British rule. Ramadi was again US-led airstrikes and the official an important centre of the second Iraqi revolt against the Iraqi security forces would win the British in 1941. battle for this city. A major difference is that these rebellions were largely Ramadi is in the heart of Sunni- non-sectarian, even though the British had in 1921 majority territory in Iraq that is imposed on the Shiite majority a Sunni monarch from relatively favourable to ISIS. It is the the Jordanian Hashemite dynasty. capital of the biggest Sunni This is symptomatic of the upsurge of conflict between province, Anbar, and was the scene the sects in the region over the last decades. The Iranian of much fighting against the US revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the 2003 invasion of Iraq occupation forces after the 2003 and subsequent violence, and the Syrian civil war, have all served to intensify inter-sect conflict. invasion. Ramadi is crucial for control of Anbar province and for This should not be over-simplified, however. There is still towns along the Euphrates River widespread mixing between the different branches of leading to al-Raqqah, the ISIS Islam and other interests may sometimes use religion as centre of operations in Syria. a convenient front. Ramadi is also only 60km from See the Commons Library briefing ISIS and the sectarian Baghdad. The British government conflict in the Middle East, March 2015 played down the significance of the defeat, however: “we do not judge it to be strategically significant.”1 Iraqi government forces have vowed to take back control of Ramadi and are training Sunni fighters, with the help of US military advisers, to support the official military. Shia militias in the ascendant The fall of Ramadi weakened Haider al-Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister, damaging his reputation as a war leader. It also called into question his and the West’s policy of minimising the sectarian nature of the conflict by avoiding the use of Shiite militia forces to fight ISIS in Sunni areas. 1 HC Deb1 June 2015, Written question - 114 7 Iraq and Syria - developments in 2015 Encouraging Sunni Iraqis to support the Iraqi state was perhaps always a tall order in the middle of bloody conflict that is sharply increasing sectarian tensions, not just in Iraq and Syria, but in Yemen too. There has been controversy about the group’s name. Many object to the group’s preferred name for itself, “Islamic State”, because they believe that the name itself is propaganda. They (including UK government ministers) argue that the group is neither Islamic nor a state. The name DAESH is increasing in popularity. It is derived from the initials of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Arabic, but it also sounds like a form of a derogatory word in Arabic.
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