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Scenarios for the Future of Syria

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Scenarios for the Future of Syria MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA Scenarios for the Future of Syria OE Watch Commentary: The first accompanying passage from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, discusses three possible scenarios for the future of Syria. One of these scenarios involves a change of leadership in light of the upcoming elections in 2021. The other passages from local and regional sources expand on this scenario, looking at possible successors to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. As the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights discusses, the first scenario involves Assad taking Syria “down the North Korea route, isolating the nation from the global economy, consolidating its status as a global pariah...” The second scenario entails Syria taking a turn for the worse, with extreme levels of “destitution, famine and worsening criminality...” In this scenario, “loyalist unity would dissolve... leaving in its wake a Somalia-type failed state that’s both a human-rights disaster and a breeding ground for dangerous extremists Vladimir Putin visited the command post of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria. The Russian President and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad heard military reports on the situation in various regions of the country. and regional instability.” The final scenario pertains (January 2020). to the upcoming elections where “instability, anger, Source: The President of Russia, Kremlin.ru, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62545, CCA 4.0 disenchantment and perhaps a Russian push might end up unseating [Assad] for another established regime name.” The second passage is from Zaman al-Wasl, an electronic Syrian newspaper founded in 2005, whose editorial line has leaned towards the Syrian opposition since the revolution. Regarding the Syrian elections in 2021, the author notes “the United States and some European countries were expected to exert more pressure to achieve a smooth political transition and transparent elections under international supervision...” but highlights that the world is now preoccupied with fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. The author also provides insight into two possible names that may be agreed upon by all conflicting powers and put forth by international institutions: Manaf Tlass --a former Brigadier General of the Syrian Republican Guard and member of Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle who defected in 2012; and Ali Mamlouk-- a special security adviser to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and head of the Syrian Intelligence Directorate. The third passage discusses Moscow’s position regarding Assad and the elections. The author notes that Russia would like to solidify its gains in Syria by installing a government that “represents all groups, instead of just Syrian Alawites,” in light of recent Russian polls that apparently show that Assad would get a maximum of 30% of the votes in the 2021 elections. The fourth passage further points out, “some have speculated that the Russians are grooming General Suhail al-Hassan, the head of the Tiger Forces part of the Russia-backed Fifth Corp, to replace al-Assad.” Gen. al- Hassan has been referred to as “Syria’s ‘Shoigun’ in the making” by Turkish defense expert Can Kasapoğlu, who also echoes this speculation. In the final passage, Kasapoğlu writes, “to serve Russia’s strategic interests, the Kremlin will have to contain Iran-backed Shiite militancy from now on. General Suheil al-Hassan appears to be Moscow’s hope to re-unite the Syrian Arab Armed Forces to become the only military entity across Syria.” End OE Watch Commentary (Kaya) “Some have speculated that the Russians are grooming General Suhail al-Hassan, the head of the Tiger Forces part of the Russia-backed Fifth Corp, to replace al-Assad.” “[Regarding the Syrian elections in 2021]... among the names in circulation are Manaf Tlass and Ali Mamlouk, but the nature of government is still undetermined...” OE Watch | July 2020 52 MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA Continued: Scenarios for the Future of Syria Source: “Is Assad about to Fall?,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 19 June 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/170731/ For now, taking all current circumstances into account, three scenarios appear to be on the horizon. On the one hand, Assad could take Syria down the North Korea route, isolating the nation from the global economy, consolidating its status as a global pariah, and attempting to unify his loyalist population with a sense of solidarity in victimhood. In many ways, Assad has prepared his loyalist base, particularly Syria’s many minority communities, for this very scenario over the past nine years of conflict, though the extent to which a genuine and unshakable cult of personality has been built around his rule is open to question. Syria could also take a truly unprecedented turn for the worse, crashing into a debilitating crisis that tears every fiber of the country apart and, as hard as it is to imagine in 2020, leaving even greater levels of destitution, famine, and worsening criminality and predatory behavior. In this scenario, loyalist unity would dissolve altogether, leaving in its wake a Somalia-type failed state that’s both a human-rights disaster and a breeding ground for dangerous extremists and regional instability. Or finally, as several longtime loyalists have suggested to me in private in recent days, this extraordinary internal crisis could spark a change at the top. In their eyes, this moment may already represent a greater threat to Assad’s survival in power than the one posed by the opposition at its peak in years past. In this scenario, the Assad path for Syria may emerge as so deeply distasteful for so many Syrians that instability, anger, disenchantment and perhaps a Russian push might end up unseating him for another established regime name. Source: “Syrians hope US-Russian consensus to topple Assad as 2021 presidential election nears,” Zaman al-Wasl, 24 April 2020. https:// en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/54384/ Less than a year remains until the presidential elections in Syria, and while analysts predicted that by mid-2020, the new constitution would be ready, the issues of war and local, regional, and international conflicts over the country are not yet resolved. The United States and some European countries were expected to exert more pressure to achieve a smooth political transition and transparent elections under international supervision that guarantees the participation of millions of refugees, in order to move to the next stage. However, currently, the world is preoccupied with the novel coronavirus (Covid-19)... ... Apparently, international institutions are ... [presenting a list] meant for pushing for the selection of a person that is agreed upon by all conflicting powers. Among the names in circulation are Manaf Tlass and Ali Mamlouk, but the nature of government is still undetermined, whether it will be military, civil-military, transitional, or something else. Source: Mehmet Koçak, “İran’ı Suriye’den çıkarma ve Esed’siz dönem hesapları (Calculations to Remove Iran from Syria and for an Era without Assad),” Haber7.com, 16 May 2020. https://www.haber7.com/yazarlar/mehmet-kocak/2975289-irani-suriyeden-cikarma-ve-esedsiz- donem-hesaplari The commentary and debate about “the Assad dynasty is collapsing,” is taking place not only in Syria, but in world capitals, while post- Assad calculations are being made... It is no longer a secret that Moscow, Washington and Ankara are in search of new relationships regarding the future of Syria, within the context of preparations for a post-Bashar Assad [period]. Moscow wants to make its wins [in Syria] permanent via a [Syrian] government that represents all groups, instead of just Nusayris (Syrian Alawites). Because the polls that the Russians have conducted show that Bashar Assad can get a maximum of 30% of the votes in the 2021 elections. Source: Anton Mardasov, “Has Russia grown tired of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad?,” al Jazeera, 19 May 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/ indepth/opinion/rift-moscow-damascus-200517173011730.html Moscow does not have an Assad alternative and does not want to see his regime destabilised.... Some have speculated that the Russians are grooming General Suhail al-Hassan, the head of the Tiger Forces part of the Russia-backed Fifth Corp, to replace al-Assad. Source: Can Kasapoğlu, “Syria’s ‘Shogun’ in the Making: Russian-Backed General Suheil al-Hassan and Future of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces,” Edam.org [Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Research (Turkey)], 14 November 2018. https://edam.org.tr/en/syrias-shogun- in-the-making-russian-backed-general-suheil-al-hassan-and-future-of-the-syrian-arab-armed-forces/ President Putin had to overcome Salafi jihadism and Sunni insurgency to ‘win the war’ in Syria. The Russian campaign has made a significant progress in this respect. Inevitably, for ‘winning the peace’ and rebuilding the civil war-torn country to serve Russia’s strategic interests, the Kremlin will have to contain Iran-backed Shiite militancy from now on. General Suheil al-Hassan appears to be Moscow’s ‘great white hope’ to re-unite the Syrian Arab Armed Forces to become the only military entity across Syria. OE Watch | July 2020 53.
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