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1 in response created were Hawks the like Forces and . Latakia, in , offensives regime notorious in the example, and 12,000 troops. 5,000 between have fielded to estimated are Hawks 2017. Desert the period, Inthis in August disbanded and was four years over for just effort regime’s warfighting the 2013. in early supported It formed as in known Brigade, Hawks Desert The Introduction indicate a range. arange. indicate to online found be could that estimate highest the and lowest the uses brief the why is This figure. official no is There 2019). November (Accessed 2018, 6November Institute, East Middle The poor and rich between divide exacerbates economy D., Makki, 2019); September (Accessed Across Action in Brigade Fire Armed Hawks: Desert The firmly in control. in firmly remained Assad President that others to awarning as served, had faithfully it regime same the by disbandment in swift resulted and arrogance greed Eventually, its itself. enrich to capabilities coercive its (ab)used also group The and loyalty. of patronage patterns peacetime –continuing economy war in Syrian astake leaders and its salaries generous received fighters its Inreturn, victories. regime several to and contributed line roles front on took gradually group paramilitary The survival. regime threatened shortages manpower wartime when Hawks Desert the created Jaber and Ibrahim Ayman Mohammad, family, brothers the Assad of the systems patronage of the 2011 before Syria in and influence part as fortune their amassed Having autocracy. link in can awartime of loyalty economics and the of coercion politics the how 2014 -2017. between highlights war civil Syrian fought in the that postmortem Its -12,000 fighters of 5,000 group paramilitary apro-Assad were Hawks Desert The flying moreno Hawks: Syrian The Desert FEBRUARY 2020 Suqur al-Sahra , South Front, 23 April 2017, April 23 Front, , South 1 It participated, for participated, It , was a pro-Assad apro-Assad , was Syria’s war war Syria’s online online , , , 3 2 to linked historically and ideologically (SSNP), Party Nationalist Social Syrian the as such , of Syrian anumber While . Russian the and militia Iranian-sponsored forces, auxiliary effective of mobilisation rapid on the successively, war. civil the of years few first the during (SAA) Army Arab Syrian the from and of number significant the from resulted that of personnel shortage the to CRU policy brief, policy 2019.CRU Social Nationalist Party Syrian the of role The war: of storm the riding Eagles (Accessed October 2019). 2015, 24 November Insights, Regional Peace, International for Endowment Carnegie War Civil Syrian the in Recruitment Rebel and The Political EconomyLiberty? of Military See: Solomon, C., Grinstead, N., McDonald, J., J., McDonald, N., Grinstead, C., Solomon, See: K., Koehler, H., Albrecht, D., Ohl, 2 Regime survival came to depend, depend, to came survival Regime , The Hague, Clingendael, Clingendael, Hague, , The

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Christopher Solomon CRU Policy Brief Clingendael CRU Policy Brief

Ba’ath party and its political dominance over When the government liberalised the long- the Syrian state, others sprung instead from isolated Syrian economy to generate growth the informal, patrimonial networks on which and attract foreign investment, the state’s the Assad regime relied for economic and clientelist structure of rule enabled wealthy political support. The story of the Desert business figures, who often had ties with Hawks is an example of the latter, centred on such networks, to obtain profitable licences, the brothers-cum-strongmen Mohammad, monopolies and economic privileges, Ayman and Ibrahim Jaber. The Jabers provided their loyalty to the regime was were prominent figures in Syria’s private undisputed and kickbacks offered. This sector, both wealthy and well-connected pre-conflict trend of elite capture of the to the Assad government and the military benefits of liberalisation and the associated establishment. The opportunity to serve corruption was turbocharged during the Assad allowed the Jabers to protect their war and resulted in large-scale profiteering, assets from destruction and seizure, as well looting and the rapid development of an as to project an image of national service and extensive war economy.6 patriotism. The wealth and influence of Mohammad, This brief assesses the evolution of the Ayman and Ibrahim Jaber derived from Desert Hawks Brigade as a fighting force in their links to the president’s family and the context of the . It offers their influence over Syria’s energy, iron and some key insights into how the politics of steel industries.7 Of the three brothers, coercion are linked with the economics of Ayman Jaber was the best known. As well loyalty.4 as being connected to President Assad’s family through marriage,8 he was also a businessman and engineer prior to the Syria’s political economy: conflict, founder of the Arab Company wealth, patronage and the for Metal Rolling (ASCO) and co-founder of the Addounia TV Channel.9 Moreover, Jaber family he was thought to be linked with - based, Emirati-owned Overseas Petroleum Prior to 2000/01, Syria had a state-led Trading (OPT) via Sytrol, Syria’s state-owned economy with low productivity and a modest oil company. Through OPT, Ayman Jaber output. The country was also home to paid ’s Tri-Ocean Energy to secure various black market and criminal networks.5 oil supplies for the Syrian government.10 In addition, he allegedly facilitated an oil smuggling network spanning the Syrian- Iraqi border on behalf of the Syrian Ministry 4 This brief is the product of a literature review as of Petroleum.11 His brother, Mohammad well as two in-depth interviews with anonymised Syrian sources for reasons of safety and confidentiality. It was produced for Clingendael’s research programme that examines the 6 Cornish, C., The men making a fortune from Syria’s influence of hybrid coercive organisations on war, The Financial Times, 3 October 2019, online. state development during times of conflict. It has (Accessed 27 July 2019). benefited from a review by Samar Batrawi and 7 Winter, L., ‘Syria’s Desert Hawks and the Loyalist Erwin van Veen (both Clingendael). Response to ISIS’, Small Wars Journal, 3 January 5 Quite a few of these networks can be traced back 2019, online (Accessed 27 July 2019). to the country’s 1976 intervention in the Lebanese 8 See: http://www.souriyati.com/2015/04/23/5772. Civil War when the Syrian military expanded into html (Accessed 15 January 2020). the narcotics and arms trade. See: Haddad, B. 9 Aliqtisadi, Who is Ayman Jaber? Profile: A Syrian Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy businessman resides in the Latakia Governate, online of Authoritarian Resilience, Stanford University (Accessed 27 January 2020). Press; 1st edition (15 August 2012); Steenkamp, 10 Payne (2013), op. cit. C., ‘The Crime-Conflict Nexus and the Civil War in 11 Primavera, M., and the Syrian war Syria’, Stability: International Journal of Security & economy, the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Development, 6(1), 28 September 2017, online, p. 6 Eastern and African Studies, 25 April 2018, online (Accessed 6 October 2019). (Accessed October 2019)

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Jaber, was not as well-known in Syria prior As part of a bid to recapture and secure to his involvement with the Desert Hawks access, the regime issued Legislative Decree militia.12 But his past as general in the Syrian Number 55 in August 2013. This allowed Arab Army (SAA) would prove crucial in non-state entities to procure contracts to developing the military prowess of the Desert protect the country’s energy production Hawks. Little is known about a third brother, infrastructure from opposition forces.16 Ibrahim Jaber, except that he was involved In other words, it enabled businesses to in the incident that led to the group’s hire ‘mercenaries’ to protect strategic disbandment. In other words, the Jabers were economic assets. While the name ‘Desert part of the clientelist circle of businessmen Hawks’ reflects the group’s original task that rendered handy services to the regime in the – closely linked with and provided it with revenues while turning a the petroleum dealings of the Jabers from tidy profit for themselves in the process. Such before the war – the militia took on a greater ‘services’ took a more macabre turn after the offensive role on the government’s behalf as outbreak of the conflict, including the Jabers’ the conflict progressed. support for the in the Latakia (triggering US sanctions against Ayman In all likelihood, the militia’s initial Jaber)13 and organising the supply of barrel development relied heavily on Mohammad bombs to the Syrian Arab (SAAF).14 Jaber – a retired SAA general. Mohammad In such a context, the creation of the Desert is said to have turned to the SAA’s Special Hawks is best seen as rendering the regime Forces for recruitment.17 To further enhance yet another service – albeit a large one – in the military capabilities of the Desert the expectation that economic rewards Hawks, the Jabers also engaged Colonel would follow. Mohsen Said Hussein. He was the Deputy Commander of a unit based at the Desert Military Intelligence Purpose, relations and Branch in Palmyra.18 Parallel recruitment performance of the Desert drives unfolded over the course of 2015 in , Tartous and Lattakia with the help of Hawks Ayman Jaber’s local connections. It proved easy to find recruits as Desert Hawks’ The Desert Hawks were initially created to employment conditions, pay, and access help secure the supply of oil to the Syrian to arms and supplies were superior to the regime. As the conflict progressed, the corrupt SAA.19 Pro-government outlets regime rapidly lost territory across the described the salaries of rank‑and‑file country to a growing number of rebel groups. fighters as ‘generous’, which further This included the region, home facilitated recruitment.20 to the country’s oil and gas fields, and thus regime access to crucial oil supplies. In fact, The Desert Hawks obtained weapons, in May 2013, the Syrian Ministry of Petroleum including heavy and small arms, through and Mineral Resources noted a more than unspecified Western sources. The group’s sevenfold drop in the production of oil from desert camouflage uniforms and vehicles 380,000 barrels per day to 50,000.15

16 Winter, (2019), op. cit. 12 Source: Personal interview, Solomon, C. with 17 Aboufadel, L., Who are the Syrian Desert Hawks?, “Elijah” of the unofficial SSNP News Twitter Al Masdar News, 4 June 2016 online (Accessed account, September 2019, (email correspondence). December 2019). 13 Payne, J. EXCLUSIVE - Assad’s secret oil lifeline: 18 He was killed in November 2014 when the Desert Iraqi crude from Egypt, Reuters, 23 December 2013, Hawks launched a counterassault to recapture the online (Accessed 31 August 2019). Al-Sha’ar Gas Fields from IS. See: Tadmur (Palmyra) 14 Winter, (2019), op. cit. News Network Facebook page, 19 November 2014, 15 Dagher, S., Assad’s Not-So-Secret Weapon: Loyal online (Accessed 13 October 2019). Syrian Businessmen, The Wall Street Journal, 19 Winter, (2019), op. cit. 24 May 2013, online (Accessed November 2019). 20 Aboufadel (2016), op. cit.

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were allegedly US products.21 The Desert differences at senior military or political Hawks have also been photographed fielding levels. Furthermore, the Desert Hawks did Grads, MRLs, and Fagot anti-tank guided work with clearly religious armed groups missiles.22 The Small Wars Journal described on the battlefield, suggesting that such the group’s tactics as follows: ‘The Desert differences were surmountable in practice. Hawks employed tactics similar to those For example, Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi of [IS]. They relied on speed and superior interviewed members of an Iraqi Shia group firepower to conduct rapid counterstrikes fighting under the name ‘Liwa Assad Allah against advancing IS forces and occasionally al-Ghalib fi al- wa al-Sham’ (Conquering received fire support from the SAAF and Lion of God Forces of Iraq and the Levant) government artillery units. The Badia, the and reported that this group performed an Syrian Desert, was favourable terrain for IS’ advisory role for the Desert Hawks during ‘small, disparate mobile desert units’ which, operations in the Latakia region in 2015.27 when attacked, could easily ‘dissolve away Its credible battlefield performance in Latakia into the desert, leaving small and determined in turn enabled the Desert Hawks to improve bands of fighters to deflect and bleed-out their standing among the loyalist segments of the invading force’. For both [IS] and the the Syrian populace.28 Desert Hawks, the difficulty lay not in striking targets but in holding terrain.’23 During the long battle for Aleppo (2016), Syria’s largest city held by opposition forces, The militia’s strength varied, and its sectarian the Desert Hawks participated both in the composition is unclear. The outlet siege and the assaults that broke opposition ‘South Front’, said it fielded an estimated defences. The group was featured in videos 5,000 fighters in late 2016.24 The Desert liaising with the Syrian Republican Guard Hawks also included female fighters, and firing artillery pieces.29 The Desert although it is uncertain how many were Hawks were also deployed extensively engaged in frontline combat. A social media during the government’s campaign to post from the pro-Assad Al-Masdar News recover the Palmyra region from IS in 2017.30 website shows a female Desert Hawks Ayman Jaber allegedly received a share of militia fighter deployed with the SAA near funds generated from oil production in the Palmyra in March 2016.25 It is also unclear Badia region when pro-government forces how the Desert Hawks related to the other advanced into the area, possibly as a reward pro-regime forces, such as . for the Desert Hawks’ contribution to the As a non-religious, non-ideological militia, operation. the Desert Hawks could have experienced cultural tensions with Hezbollah at the By this time, the militia had been largely individual troop level, for example, on matters integrated into the Syrian military’s Fifth such as drinking alcohol and blasphemy.26 However, there are no recorded public

27 Al-Tamimi, A., Liwa Usud al-Hussein: A New Pro- 21 Aboufadel (2016), op. cit. Assad Militia in Latakia, Syria Comment, 19 February 22 Roche, C. and Beshara, V., Assad Regime Militias 2016 online (Accessed 5 October 2019). and Shi’ite Jihadis in the Syrian Civil War, Bellingcat, 28 October 2019 email correspondence with an 30 November 2016, online (Accessed 12 October anonymous Syrian-American who travels to Latakia 2019). a few times every year. 23 Winter, (2019), op. cit. 29 Desert Hawks Brigade in Battle for Aleppo 24 The Desert Hawks: Armed Fire Brigade in Action (Infographics), South Front, 2 November, 2016, Across Syria, South Front, 23 April 2017, online online (Accessed October 2019). (Accessed September 2019). 30 Aboufadel, F., Desert Hawks redeploy to west 25 Twitter post, Al-Masdar News, 24 March 2016, Palmyra to lead new offensive, Al Masdar News, online (Accessed 24 August 2019). 7 February 2017, https://www.almasdarnews.com/ 26 International Crisis Group, Hizbollah’s Syria article/desert-hawks-redeploy-west-palmyra- Conundrum, Report N ° 175, 14 March lead-new-offensice/, online (Accessed 27, January 2017, p. 24 (Accessed October 2019). 2020).

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Corps,31 but retained an appreciable level of Russia saw the Desert Hawks as a capable autonomy as well as benefiting from higher local force, able to deliver on government salaries.32 Service in the Desert Hawks could objectives and thus decided to provide it with also open doors for career advancement substantial military support. and generate new economic opportunities when fighters left the brigade. For example, a young Syrian man from the city of Masyaf Getting too big for its boots returned home from in 2014 and joined the Desert Hawks. He served with the Next to its fighting prowess, the Desert brigade for roughly a year and later formed Hawks increasingly earned a negative his own group of approximately 70 fighters. reputation for looting and for excessively His new militia then formed a relationship violent behaviour on the battlefield. Following with the Tiger Forces33 and he received the fall of Aleppo in December 2016, social 75,000 SYP a month, along with a vehicle, media images showed the group’s fighters weapons, mate tea and tobacco. His unit was looting furniture from civilian homes eventually merged with the Tiger Forces.34 (an accusation that was denied by the pro‑Russian outlet South Front due to the The Desert Hawks were allegedly close to fact that the figures did not have any insignia Russian military forces operating in Syria. on their uniforms).36 Another item circulated The research group Bellingcat suggested on social media showed alleged members of that ‘Russian involvement with these Jaber the Desert Hawks holding the severed head groups is higher than with any others, of an enemy fighter.37 including potentially the supply of some weapons’ and pointed to video recordings of Reporting on the timing of Desert Hawk the group fighting in Aleppo. Bellingcat also battlefield successes and excesses loosely indicated that the Desert Hawks operated suggests that the Desert Hawks gradually its own training camps and suspected the transformed from a small but high-powered group’s logistical capacity to exceed that military unit with good ties to both the of other loyalist forces.35 It is likely that regime and Russia into a more abusive outfit that sought to defend its gains from looting and to protect its position in the war economy (smuggling, criminal activity) 31 See for example: Waters, G., The Lion and The Eagle: from other pro-regime elements.38 This The Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth, interpretation is lent credence by the MEI, 2019, online; Omran Center for Strategic fights the Desert Hawks picked with other Studies, The Syrian military establishment in 2019: loyalist units as it became more powerful. Sectarianism, Militias and Foreign Investment, For instance, President Assad’s paternal Omran Center, 2019, online (especially page 95 cousin, Munther al-Assad, is thought to have and following). 32 Balanche, F., An Opening for the Syrian Regime in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Institute for Policy, 12 July 2017, online (Accessed 15 September 2019). 36 The photos were posted by Edward Dark, the 33 The pro-regime Tiger Forces have been described anonymous Syrian civil war writer in Aleppo. as ‘decentralised’, but closely integrated with Do Syrian Soldiers Loot Towns Liberated from Russia’s command and support, along with a Terrorists? (Photo), South Front, 20 November 2016, ‘higher-than-average competence’ among the online (Accessed October 2019) officer corps. See: Waters, G., The Tiger Forces: 37 See tweet by @bm21_grad, 22 May 2016, online Pro-Assad fighters backed by Russia, The Middle (Accessed October 2019). East Institute, 29 October 2018, online (Accessed 38 Al-Hassan, O. Baladi News, Al-Mayadeen December 2019). correspondent: Suhail Al-Hassan members 34 Khaddour, K., Syria’s Troublesome Militias, Carnegie killed civilians and stole their property in Aleppo, Middle East Center, Diwan, 5 November 2018, 18 November 2016, online (Accessed 27 January online (Accessed 21 September 2019). 2020); See also: Fadel, A. , A thunderous 35 Woods, E., Lost Boys – Child Combatants of the scandal of Assad’s militia and its closest officers, Syrian Civil War, Bellingcat, 16 November 2016, 18 November 2016, online (Accessed 27 January online (Accessed 5 October 2019). 2020).

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engaged in armed clashes with the Desert the regime. Moreover, public perception Hawks in Latakia in July 2016.39 Conflict had started to view the Desert Hawks as with Suheil Hassan’s Tiger Forces even no longer answering to the Presidency or the seems to have forced the regime to separate and their disbandment rival militias by deploying them to different was a highly symbolic act by which Assad theatres of operation.40 unequivocally asserted his authority. In the event, the fighting capability of the group In late 2017, the Desert Hawks made the was not lost as it was simply transferred to mistake of stopping President Assad’s other military formations. Finally, the move convoy at gunpoint on the way to Qardaha, indicated that the regime had begun thinking the Assad family’s hometown. In the about Syria’s post-war order. In order to aftermath of this incident, Aymen Jaber was reconstruct the central state, sooner or later put under house arrest,41 Ibrahim Jaber was the regime would have to reign in the militias. jailed, and a pro-government news outlet reported that Mohammad Jaber had left Syria for Russia on private business.42 The Conclusion Desert Hawks Brigade was subsequently ordered to disband43 and its units integrated While the breakdown of Syrian government into the SAA’s Fifth Corps, along with a authority over pro-regime militias has been number of other pro-government militias.44 repeatedly highlighted by a number of commentators, this brief joins ranks with One might question why the regime would those analysts that have been more cautious stand down one of its more effective on the matter. In 2017, Nick Grinstead loyalist units in times of war. The most likely assessed that ‘the regime seemingly has explanation is that the Desert Hawks were adequate control over the larger loyalist turned into an example to discourage overly armed groups […]. Instead, persistent brazen and crass behaviour from other crime, low-level repression and extortion pro-regime militias. It signalled that even are more likely to prevail.’45 In the same militias that performed well on the battlefield year, Sam Heller noted that ‘the assembly owed continued fealty and obedience to of pro‑government militias actually fit into existing regime networks of control: a set of official and unofficial strings that all run up to the single, pivotal locus point, Assad 39 Roche, C. and Beshara, V. (2016), op. cit. himself,’ adding: ‘when those strings pull 40 Schaap, F., Assad’s Control Erodes as Warlords Gain 46 Upper Hand, Der Spiegel, 8 March 2017, online taut, they can be puppeteered in sync.’ (Accessed 27 January 2020). While the regime has had to tolerate a level 41 Samaha, N., Can Assad win the peace? European of wartime autonomy on the part of its Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, 15 May militias – from which the Syrian population 2019, online (Accessed 28 July 2019). has suffered most – its longer-term focus 42 Aboufadel, L., Pro-government “Desert Hawks” is to reassert regime dominance over the disbanded after three years of service, Al-Masdar very militias that ensured its survival as the News, 8 February 2017, online (Accessed current conflict enters its final stages. The September 2019). regime shares this interest with its Russian 43 Grinstead, N., The (Last) King of Syria: backers, as noted elsewhere.47 It is Russia’s The Feudalization of Assad’s Rule, War on the Rocks, 22 November 2017, online, (Accessed September 2019); This account was also later partially replayed by a Russian think tank, although 45 Grinstead, N., Assad Rex? Assessing the autonomy it did not specifically say President Assad was of Syrian armed groups fighting for the regime, in the government convoy, See: Semenov, K., The Hague: Clingendael, 2017. Who Controls Syria? The Al-Assad family, the Inner 46 Heller, S. The Signal in Syria’s Noise, War on Circle, and the Tycoons, Russian International the Rocks, 30 June 2017, online (Accessed Affairs Council, 12 February 2018, online (Accessed 24 November 2019). September 2019). 47 Batrawi, S. and N. Grinstead, Six scenarios for 44 Samaha, N., Survival Is Syria’s Strategy, The Century pro-regime militias in ‘post-war’ Syria, The Hague: Foundation, 8 February 2017, online (Accessed Clingendael, 2019, online, (Accessed 24 November September 2019). 2019).

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intention to rebuild and reequip the It remains an open question to what conventional armed forces of the Syrian state extent the current financial and economic as a way to recentralise the legitimacy and pressure on the regime – resulting from the power of the regime. It is largely Russia the Lebanese financial crisis, European/ that is behind the creation of the SAA’s US sanctions, wartime destruction and Fifth Corps as an instrument to facilitate economic mismanagement – will increase the transition of loyalist militias, as well as tensions between the different networks rebel factions that have surrendered, into and factions that appear to constitute the regime’s formal military apparatus.48 the regime of President Assad. Growing The travails and fate of the Desert Hawks is a tensions over reduced resources may result good case study that illustrates this narrative in coercive capabilities, such as militias, rather well. being increasingly used to assert dominance, setting elements of the regime against Other pro-regime militias have also recently others in a struggle for control. While this come under scrutiny. For example, the does not reflect the current situation, it Bustan group, the charitable organisation is an indicator to watch. Further points headed by Rami Makhlouf, funds and of attention for policy makers include the supplies an array of loyalist militia.49 need for ongoing analysis of whether/how Some of these groups are also feeling the remaining loyalist militias will be integrated regime re-asserting its authority, amid into Syria’s reconstituted conventional alleged tensions between Assad and forces and how this affects the interests of Makhlouf as part of a selective crackdown both Russia and . Should it ever come on financial corruption.50 Opposition sources to western re-engagement with the Syrian allege that the SSNP’s militia faction regime – or support for reconstruction – the Eagles of the Whirlwind – has been efforts, including security sector reform – disbanded. However, it is unclear whether the such knowledge will be essential to shape regime’s focus extends to the party’s entire effective intervention. militia or just the fighters associated with the Amana faction, which was the closest to Makhlouf.51

48 Lund, A., From Cold War to Civil War: 75 Years of Russia-Syrian Relations, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, UI.SE, July 2019, p. 40-41. 49 Others include the Tiger Forces, the Leopards of , and the -dominated Homeland Shield. See: Al-Tamimi, A., Liwa Dir’ al-Watan: A New Pro-Assad Militia in , 24 February 2016, personal website, online (Accessed November 2019); Al-Tamimi, A., The Leopards of Homs: A Pro-Assad Militia, personal website, http://www. aymennjawad.org/18833/the-leopards-of-homs-a- pro-assad-militia. 50 Foy, H. and Cornish, C., Syria: Assad, his cousins and a Moscow skyscraper, The Financial Times, 11 November 2019, online (Accessed November 2019); Assad Disbands Makhlouf Militias, Renames ‘Tiger Forces,’ Asharq Al-Awsat, 30 August 2019, online (Accessed November 2019). 51 Why did the “Eagles of the Whirlwind” militia evacuate their camps in Homs? Orient News, 13 November 2019, online (Accessed November 2019); For background on the SSNP’s three factions, see: Solomon et al. (2019), op. cit.

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About the author

Christopher Solomon is a Middle East analyst and works for a U.S. defense consultancy in the DC area. He also covers Iraq as a weekly contributor for the Economist Intelligence Unit. His work been published by Gulf International Forum, The Diplomat, Syria Comment, Small Wars Journal, NRT English, and Global Risk Insights. Chris received his MA in International Affairs from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) at the University of Pittsburgh.