Linking Ends and Means

Published Exclusive February 2021

The – Evolution of the 's Way of War Campaigns The Israel Defense Forces Official Eyal Berelovich - Content House Research Doctrine and Concepts Department (R.D.C), IDF Ground Forces Command

Military Strategy Magazine (MSM), formerly Infinity During the years of the Syrian civil war (2011-) the Syrian army Journal, is one of the leading peer-review electronic publications dedicated to the study and discussion of changed its modus operandi in the Strategical, operational, and strategy. Our intent is to bring you a strategy publication tactical level. The change accord because the previous operational rich in thought by assisting in greater awareness of what concept failed, and the army forces were unable to carry major strategy is and to advocate for the bringing together of ideas offensive operations. This paper will examine the reasons for the from academics and practitioners. changes, how they were implemented and how they affect the MSM aims to make the discussion of strategy accessible to rebuilding of the Syrian army in the near future. the widest possible audience, which is why we keep rigid language to a minimum and simplicity to a maximum.

MSM is a completely private venture with no connection to any institution and with no political agenda. MSM's only aim To cite this article: Berelovich, Eyal, “The Syrian Civil War – is to increase awareness, understanding and education. We Evolution of the Syrian Army's Way of War,” Military Strategy welcome all views and rigorous arguments are encouraged. Magazine, MSM Exclusive, February 2021. Subscribe for free today!

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MilitaryStrategyMagazine.com We are pleased to bring you this MSM Exclusive Article, written by Eyal Berelovich, which was originally published in Hebrew and has been translated into English for readers of Military Strategy Magazine.

The original article appeared in Ma'arachot, the Israel Defense Forces’ Content House. It was one article in a Special Edition published in October 2020 titled, “The Syrian Civil War - Operational and Tactical Lessons,” (pages 10-15).

MilitaryStrategyMagazine.com ii The Syrian Civil War – Evolution of the Syrian Army's Way of War Eyal Berelovich - Research Doctrine and Concepts Department (R.D.C), IDF Ground Forces Command

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Department, or the Israel Defense About the author Forces.

Eyal Berelovich is a Senior Defense Analyst at the Israel Defense Force Ground Forces (GF) Research, Doctrine and Concept Department. Professor Eyal Zisser's 2018 article on the He previously filled positions at the IDF Training and Doctrine Syrian Civil War begins with the following Department/J-3. He is a PhD candidate in Middle Eastern History at words: "In March 2011 a revolution erupted the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His main area of research is the in . It began as a limited local non- Ottoman army in the late 19th century and early 20th century. violent protest in the rural and peripheral areas of the country, and within a few months escalated into a bloody civil war that quickly became sectarian, and worse The views expressed above are those of the author and do yet – religious, a holy war (Jihad). The civil war attracted not represent those of the IDF Ground Forces, the R.D.C foreign intervention that transformed Syria into a regional

To cite this article: Berelovich, Eyal, “The Syrian Civil War – Evolution of the Syrian Army's Way of War,” Military Strategy Magazine, MSM Exclusive, February 2021.

MilitaryStrategyMagazine.com 1 The Syrian Civil War – Evolution of the Syrian Army's Way of War Eyal Berelovich and international arena of conflict, with the rival sides As the rebellion escalated and proliferated to multiple being used by the global and regional powers as pieces on fronts the Syrian regime adapted the logic of the two-front the chess-board of their conflicts." [i] war plan to contend with it – concentrate on the major cities and the travel-routes connecting them. All else was Most descriptions and analyses of the war divide it initially ignored.[iv] chronologically into several main phases. Some discuss it according to its geographic separation into the main arenas Army units sent to reconquer the cities, while beginning where the actual battles occurred (east Syria vs west Syria, to suffer from mass desertions of Sunni-Arab personnel of north vs south). To provide a wide view of the war this all ranks, included maneuver units and special forces. The article will therefore describe the war according to these former were chosen according to their proximity to these two parameters. cities and the latter because they were regarded as loyal to the regime. The operations emphasized quick maneuvers along the major streets to dominate focal points, without The Intra-Syrian War (April 2011 – Summer attempting to conduct methodical clearing operations or to 2013) destroy rebel forces. The attacking forces received only a minimum of artillery or air support. During this period the Syrian Regime army attempted to reconquer the cities in which the rebellion broke-out, In early 2012 the Syrian regime forces adopted a new employing the forces locally available in their permanent concept of operations which can be summarized under the pre-rebellion garrisons and using pre-rebellion combat slogan: Clear and Hold. Regime forces conducted pincer doctrines. maneuvers to surround rebel-held regions, then employed massed artillery and air strikes to destroy the built-up Syria's pre-rebellion strategic planning envisioned two areas and enemy forces. After lengthy fire preparation, threat scenarios: tanks, infantry (riding armored vehicles to their objectives then dismounting to fight) and special forces conducted • A war with Israel requiring it to focus its forces in methodical clearing operations through the built-up southern Syria areas. On completion of the clearing phase chosen units were deployed throughout to hold the ground, dominate • A two-front war with Israel in the south and the US the population and prevent the rebels from returning to forces attacking from Iraq in the east. reclaim them.

To tackle the first scenario about half of the Syrian army Regime forces were organized in combined arms was permanently garrisoned in southern Syria and would battlegroups: tanks, mechanized infantry, artillery, be reinforced with forces garrisoned elsewhere across the combat-engineers and logistics. Though successful in country. To tackle the second scenario the Syrians planned Homs, the Regime army did not have enough personnel to focus their defense on the four main cities of Syria, the to conduct multiple simultaneous operations across the prime centers of population, economy and political power entire country.[v] Furthermore, such operations inflicted that are considered to be the 'centers of gravity' of the state no fewer casualties to Regime forces than to the rebels. In – , Hama, Homs and Aleppo – along with the this context one must again mention the mass desertions border with Israel. This plan meant giving-up the mostly that reduced the Syrian army's personnel to less than half unpopulated desert of eastern Syria without a major fight. its prewar figures. [ii] The pre-rebellion Syrian army was organized in organic The permanent deployment of the Syrian army was as permanent divisions. As the Civil War progressed it follows: [iii] adopted more flexible division-equivalent task organized headquarters, shifting subordinate units between them. 1. Southern Syria: 1st Corps, 4th Corps, majority of These commanded not only official Syrian army units Republican Guard units, majority of 4th Division and but also militias established in populations loyal to the supporting forces. regime (such as the Shabakhya). Initially the militias were especially prevalent in the Homs and Ladakiya regions, the 2. Central Syria: Around Hamma and Homs – most of 3rd concentrations of the Alawite communities. Missions began Corps. being allotted based on the political and professional trust of the Regime in various commanders and various units. 3. Eastern Syria: 17th Division and supporting units. This new pattern would continue throughout the war.

4. Northern Syria: 14th Special Forces Division, reduced By autumn 2012 the initial successes of the Regime faded as 15th Special Forces Division, 76th Armored Brigade, 41st the need to employ more and more forces to hold reclaimed and 46th Special Forces Regiments. territory reduced the ability to concentrate enough forces for

MilitaryStrategyMagazine.com 2 The Syrian Civil War – Evolution of the Syrian Army's Way of War Eyal Berelovich clearing operations in other areas. Meanwhile the gradually direct military intervention of more foreign powers into the growing rebel forces counter-attacked or infiltrated into war, especially the non-regional powers – the USA (2014) cities and towns and conquered or took control (depending and Russia (2015). on the presence of Regime holding forces or lack thereof) of entire regions, cities, towns and major portions of the four In 2014 the US, which had been providing support for critical cities, Damascus, Homs, Hamma and Aleppo. The the Syrian Rebels, initially only non-lethal but gradually regime responded by trying to defend everywhere and to adding some weapons, escalated supplies of weaponry to counterattack to retake all lost ground almost everywhere. 'acceptable' rebel factions and initiated training programs This caused it to dilute its forces even further – thus, for – which ultimately failed. [vii] example, in 2012 the Republican Guard units (the most loyal and professional units of the Syrian army) were In late 2015 Russia too, which had till then provided concentrated in Damascus with a portion in Aleppo; during diplomatic support, vetoing anti-Assad UN resolutions, and 2013 more and more Republican Guard units were sent to weapons, concluded that it must escalate its involvement Aleppo and some also to Deir al-Zor in eastern Syria; by both in quantity of weapons, training programs for the 2014 the Republican Guard was spread even more: brigades Regime army, and in actual physical involvement by and independent battalions in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir al- embedding advisors in Regime units and employing small Zor, and Ladakiya. [vi] Russian forces to participate directly in combat.

From summer 2013 to summer 2015 the weapons and A Civil War Assisted by Foreigners (Summer capabilities of the rebels improved considerably as they 2013 – 2018) began to receive funding and advanced weapons from the Arab Gulf states and the USA. New anti-tank missiles proved Two decisions had transformed the civil protest into a useful in countering the Regime's advantage in armored general civil war: the use of the army to suppress the vehicles – these missiles being more advanced than the protests in Dar'a and the attempt by rebel politicians to models pilfered from Regime army stores. In 2013 the form an organized national opposition as an alternative rebels recorded 107 anti-tank missile attacks, 288 in 2014, to the Assad regime (in fact rebel factions were many and 547 in 2015, 667 in 2016. However, from 2017 the frequency of the organization never represented more than a minority anti-tank missile attacks dropped. This was caused by the of them). These decisions also created the conditions weakening of the Rebel factions amenable to the West vice for foreign intervention with different foreign powers the strengthening of Jihadist factions and the successful supporting different sides in the conflict. resurgence of Assad's forces – proving to the Western supporters that the war could not be won without sending Initially foreign intervention was limited to diplomacy, their own military forces to Syria. The West, therefore, funding and supply of weapons. However, as the pressure gradually withdrew its support and supply of weapons to mounted through 2012, and a trend of gradual defeat the rebels. [viii] loomed, the Assad Regime began to request direct military involvement from its allies Iran and Iran's semi- During the same period the Rebels also began to use drones, independent Lebanese proxy Hezbollah. Meanwhile the initially for intelligence collection and then for dropping Rebels requested assistance from the Sunni-Arab Gulf munitions on Regime forces. The Islamic State lead the States, the West, Turkey or al-Qaeda (depending on the way in quantity and quality of use, but the others followed. Rebel faction in question). By summer 2013 the civil war was Iranian and Hezbollah forces also employed drones for no longer an internal Syrian affair, but a regional conflict, surveillance and attack and gradually the Syrian Regime and was gradually becoming a global affair as non-regional forces too adopted Russian and Iranian surveillance drones powers intervened diplomatically or with the supply of to assist in directing air and artillery fire, but not to conduct funds and weapons. Iranian proxy militias and Iranian strikes themselves. [ix] forces were actively fighting with the Syrian Regime. Border clashes occurred with the Turkish military as it supported The period 2013 – 2018 can be sub-divided chronologically: the rebels near the border. from 2013 to 2015 period covering the gradual defeat of the Assad Regime and 2016 to 2018 seeing the reversal of In 2014 transfer of Regime forces from Eastern Syria enabled this trend and the gradual defeat of the rebels, but it is the Islamic State (declaring its independence from al- more useful to divide the fighting throughout this period Qaeda and announcing the reestablishment of the Moslem geographically – dividing the war into two separate Caliphate) to stake a claim to this area and begin conquering campaigns: one in eastern Syria and one in western Syria it – fighting the minimal Regime forces there and also the and covering each one chronologically. It is, however, disorganized and disunited rebel forces. The eruption of impossible to completely separate the operations in each the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and its horrific massacres area from the other because of reciprocal effects between of rival groups and non-Sunni populations hastened the them.

MilitaryStrategyMagazine.com 3 The Syrian Civil War – Evolution of the Syrian Army's Way of War Eyal Berelovich

War in the East numerical superiority over the enemy and were supported by Russian air strikes.[xiii] The Regime offensive reasserted By 2014 the territory previously known as Syria included its presence in central eastern Syria, its control over a three political entities trying to defeat each other: the Assad section of the Syria-Iraq border and broke the siege of Regime, the Islamic State and an amorphous collection of Deir al-Zor in September 2017, while the Islamic State was militias (sometimes fighting each other) collectively called simultaneously fighting a losing battle against the Kurds the Syrian Rebels. The principle generator of the change further north. [xiv] in the political and military fields was the Islamic State. It conquered most of eastern Syria easily against only sporadic weak resistance of Regime and rebel forces because these War in the West were concentrated in western Syria. Subsequently, the arrival of Islamic State forces in western Syria created the The first employment of non-Syrian forces in the Civil impression that Assad's time was up, however, it actually War occurred with the entry of Hezbollah units into created the conditions for Assad's ultimate victory. combat around the city of al-Qusayr in 2013. The battle for al-Qusayr was commanded by a Hezbollah commander The Islamic State's operational art and tactics dazed its who, in addition to a brigade's worth of Hezbollah troops, rivals. Islamic State forces emphasized fast movements in received armored, mechanized, artillery and air units of multiple columns to surprise and overwhelm the enemy the Regime army under his command – creating a division with concentric attacks and protect themselves from enemy sized taskforce. [xv] aerial superiority. [x] When they encountered an organized determined enemy they failed – thus at Deir al-Zor, the From summer 2013 to autumn 2015 fighting raged through 104th Paratrooper Brigade of the Syrian Republican Guard, all western Syria from the north to the south: 137th Mechanized Brigade and units from 17th Infantry Division, successfully defended the city and its environs for • In the north-west the Regime lost most of Idlib province three years against all Islamic State attacks. [xi] to the 'Victory Army', a coalition of rebel militias lead by Jabhat al-Nusra (the Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda). In 2014 the US began to directly attack the Islamic State The loss of Idlib increased pressure on Regime forces forces in eastern Syria and in Iraq, also providing aerial fighting to retake eastern Aleppo from the rebels. strike support to Kurdish militias in Syria who were being attacked by the Islamic State and barely holding out. Islamic • In the center-west Islamic State forces captured State difficulties in eastern Syria impacted its abilities to major suburbs of Damascus such as the al-Yarmoukh free forces to fight in western Syria, where too it was Palestinian Refugee Camp and the al-Suweyda district. attacking both Rebel factions and Regime forces. They also conquered northern Homs, the environs of al-Rustan and parts of Hamma district. Unlike the failure of US support and training programs for Rebel factions in western Syria, the US support and training • In the south-west the rebels gradually captured most programs for the Kurdish forces in north-eastern Syria of the Syrian Golan and parts of Dara. Repeated rebel succeeded in creating a viable force that ultimately, with attempts to enlarge their holdings were defeated only at American fire support, defeated the Islamic State and even great cost to Regime forces.[xvi] Regime counterattacks conquered its capital Rakka (October 2017), eliminating it as were defeated in turn. a major player in the war, though as a nuisance it continues to fight to today. By the end of 2014 Regime regular forces were down to 125,000 active personnel from the original 250,000 to In July 2017, simultaneously with the gradually successful 325,000 serving on the eve of the civil war. The dearth of Kurdish offensive against the Islamic State, the Regime personnel, caused by mass desertion, defection, draft- army conducted an equally successful offensive against dodging as well as mass casualties, compelled the Regime the Islamic State in central-western and eastern Syria. to mobilize reservists (many of whom also did not report The Regime employed Divisional Battle Groups such as the for duty or defected) and rely more and more on private militia-based 'Tiger Force' commanded by Suhil al-Hassan, militias raised by private citizens who supported the the 'Desert Hawks' brigade and the 30th Republican Regime – mostly from the religious minorities who feared Guard division. The offensive began with a pincer attack Sunni rule, and the forces provided by Iran and Hezbollah. surrounding Islamic State forces in Hama and Homs By the end of 2014 the ratio of army personnel to militia districts, followed by an offensive towards Deir al-Zor. The personnel was approximately 1:1.[xvii] offensive was conducted simultaneously on multiple axes (M-20, Route 42, and Route 4), conquering towns, villages The personnel issue impacted the organization of forces for and the countryside. [xii] battle, so that, for example, in the battle for Hamma in early 2014 was conducted by an ad-hoc task-force combining units In each phase Regime forces maneuvered to achieve of the Alawite National Defense Forces militia, an Iranian

MilitaryStrategyMagazine.com 4 The Syrian Civil War – Evolution of the Syrian Army's Way of War Eyal Berelovich funded Shiite militia from Iraq, an Iranian Revolutionary forces in sequential offensives rather than the previous Guards unit, the 106th Syrian Republican Guard Brigade, tendency to disperse forces to fight everywhere remnant units of tanks, mechanized infantry, artillery simultaneously. and engineers taken from a variety of Regime formations, Syrian combat aircraft allocated for the battle and Iranian The Russian takeover of planning and command of RPV units. In July 2014 the 11th Armored Division took over operations brought a significant change in strategy and the defensive battle around Hamma. In August units from operational method: rather than the previous concept of the 4th Armored Division were sent to Hamma to conduct surrounding an area, conquering it, clearing it methodically a counterattack. In October the 'Tiger Force' militia, which and then holding it; the Russians changed the object of the was also commanding units allocated to it from the 11th operations: surrender of the enemy verses his destruction, Armored Division and others, lead the attack to conquer to be achieved mainly by a continuous bombardment that the town of Murak. would gradually break the defenders' spirit rather than by maneuver. Simultaneously to the constant bombardment, In the long battle for Hamma the Regime forces conducted Regime forces raided the rebel positions or captured key a complex operation that included: terrain. The aim of these maneuver-operations was to increase pressure on the local population and erode the • Isolating the city with army and militia units; ability of the opposition forces to resist. This new method of operations was usually conducted in the following manner: • A heavy preparatory bombardment; • The area of operations was carved into smaller • An armored and mechanized assault to capture the geographical sectors; edge of the city's built-up area; • Each sector was attacked in turn, enabling a larger • Followed by a methodical fire-intensive combined- concentration of force. The Regime army attacked and arms attack to conquer and clear the city portion by conquered only towns and villages that it needed to portion. create an effective encirclement of the main objective.

The emphasis was still on the maneuver portion of the battle • During the attacks and after the entire area of operations and the goal was destruction of the rebel forces rather than was surrounded and bombarded for days. negotiating their surrender or chasing them away. • Following days or weeks of bombardment and a The introduction of Russian commanders and units into gradually tightening siege the Regime offered terms the war in September 2015 brought a significant change to of surrender that included transporting unrepentant the capabilities of Regime's forces: rebels to the rebel-held Idlib province so they could join their compatriots there and allowing repentant • Russian domination of the planning and command rebels to reintegrate as loyal citizens – their 'misdeeds' of operations significantly improved tactical and forgiven. administrative conduct. This method drastically reduced Regime casualties. Its one • Dramatic improvement in the ability to locate rebel drawback was the survival of many rebels 'to fight another forces and positions. day' – but apparently the Russians assessed that a dozen small successful battles followed by one big one would be • Dramatic increase of the Regime's firepower by cheaper than a dozen medium-sized battles. Events were to deploying Russian combat aircraft to Syria. prove them correct.

The Russians rushed to learn the situation on the ground An example of this new method can be seen in the battle and to integrate themselves into the massively disrupted for East – a major suburb of Damascus. East Ghouta Regime military structure. Two issues they chose not to was besieged from 2012 to February 2018 and all attempts to change: conquer it by the previous method had failed. In February 2018 Regime forces attacked according to the new method. • First, the employment of flexibly composed divisional The area was divided into sectors to be treated separately taskforces based on commanders and units known for one-by-one. From February till the end of April Syrian their loyalty to the regime and known for their ability to artillery pounded the more densely populated western achieve their tactical and operational objectives in the sector with short pauses. Every day 300 to 500 shells and battlefield bombs were fired into the built-up area, on some days 900 and on one specific day 1,660 artillery shells and 1,250 aerial • Second, focusing operations in western Syria around bombs. Syrian ground forces conducted 'nibbling' attacks its vital core. Rather they increased the focus of these to tighten the siege and gradually cut different sectors off operations with an emphasis on concentration of

MilitaryStrategyMagazine.com 5 The Syrian Civil War – Evolution of the Syrian Army's Way of War Eyal Berelovich from each other. Each 'island' was then attacked separately Stabilization Operations (2018 –) till the rebels within surrendered. [xviii] Apart from Idlib and a few small scattered areas where By mid-2018 the Regime and its allies had completed the rebel presence is still prevalent, the Regime has begun reconquest or surrender of virtually all western Syria. After work on rebuilding the shattered country – including the a period of recuperation and reorganization the Regime rebuilding of its army. Many former rebel leaders and their now focused on the last rebel-held province – Idlib. The followers have been integrated into the local government campaign to retake Idlib included a political-military bureaucracy and even into Regime military forces as complication – the presence of Turkish troops monitoring a regional commanders in charge of local peace, each in his ceasefire agreed upon by them and Russia while the Regime region. Occasionally friction arises between former rivals forces were busy elsewhere. and sometimes this leads to local firefights. The Regime responds by setting up an ad-hoc taskforce that 'floods' the Turkish direct military involvement had begun in 2016 troubled area with forces and conducts forced arbitration and escalated since: capturing bits of tactically important between the belligerents. What fighting continues along the ground along the border, providing supporting fire to rebel Idlib front and here and there across Syria, especially in the forces near the border and providing weapons and training former Islamic State areas in the east, have de-escalated to for rebel forces. In 2017 the Turks invaded Syrian territory low intensity guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations. outright, using both their own forces and a proxy Syrian Rebel militia. Their main objectives – drive the Syrian The rebuilding of the Syrian army has begun. However, Kurds away from the Turkish border to prevent cooperation this is fraught with political rivalries too: the Iranians are between them and Turkish Kurd rebels, stop the massive trying to increase their political say in Syria and are funding migration of Syrian civilians to Turkey by providing a safe- certain army commanders and units; the Russians have haven on the Syrian side of the border and prevent the total their favorites too. Assad is trying to regain independence defeat of the Sunni Rebellion. from both but seems to prefer Russian tutelage to Iranian – especially as the Iranians are trying to embroil him in The Regime offensive into Idlib was conducted very fighting with Israel. Israel was not directly involved in slowly – the success of the previous battles had brought a the civil war, but it has a major interest in its results and large concentration of rebel forces there and these were over the years has worked to further those interests with supported by Turkey. Regime forces conducted a methodical humanitarian aid to the Syrian population near its border, attack – each one aimed at taking only a small area: military actions and diplomatic agreements with Russia. methodical surveillance of the area to detect Rebel forces and positions, an air and artillery bombardment lasting days to reduce them, a combined-arms attack – usually The Way Ahead in two prongs several kilometers apart to surround the chosen area, and then a methodical clearing of that area in a During the years of the civil war the Syrian army changed converging attack. The focus was along the eastern portion its modus operandi at the strategic, operational, and of Idlib – further from the Turkish border and through tactical level. The change occurred because the previous which ran the main highway connecting central Syria to operational concept failed, and the army forces were unable Aleppo. Gradually, as small success followed small success, to carry major offensive operations. The Russian military and despite a number of successful rebel counterattacks, intervention brought a different approach to utilizing the the Regime forces advance increased its pace. To halt it Syrian military force. Attrition-based warfare proved the in February 2020 the Turks escalated their presence and correct strategy for reconquering Syria. It also proved provided artillery support to the rebels and began to suffer to be an operational concept that allows the Syrian army a trickle of casualties themselves. Then, on 27th February, to overcome its enemies. The question is will it affect the a single Regime airstrike killed 33 Turkish soldiers. Turkey future structure and military strategy of the Syrian army: responded with an all-out armed-RPV aerial offensive on The new Syrian army will need to face three separate threat the Regime forces and a major rebel counterattack assisted scenarios: by Turkish artillery. However, after an initial shock that allowed the rebels to recapture a swathe of territory, Regime • A renewal of the rebellion; forces recovered, adapted to the new tactical situation and resumed their advance, taking again all the ground lost to • A Turkish invasion; the Rebel counterattack and more. On 5th March Turkey capitulated, withdrew its demand that the Regime forces • War with Israel. withdraw to the previous ceasefire line and agreed to a new ceasefire on Russian terms. By then the Regime had taken Each scenario requires a slightly different force posture 43% of Idlib province and opened the highway – a clear-cut and capabilities though the latter two are similar. As it now victory. stands it seems the Russians are leading the Syrian military revival so one can assume a future Syrian army similar in

MilitaryStrategyMagazine.com 6 The Syrian Civil War – Evolution of the Syrian Army's Way of War Eyal Berelovich structure and doctrine to the directions the Russian army it is plausible to think that the army will be made of two is developing, adapted to the unique local circumstances armies: one that can execute offensive operations to limited – especially the need to conduct counter-insurgency geographical objectives and another that will be able to only operations on a day-to-day basis for the foreseeable future do defensive operations. Both armies will have sufficient while simultaneously building the capability to fight a fire power to attrite enemy forces while minimizing the technologically superior regular warfare enemy. Thus, damage the enemy could cause them.

The views expressed above are those of the author and do not represent those of the IDF Ground Forces, the R.D.C Department, or the Israel Defense Forces.

References

[i] Eyal Zisser, "The Civil War in Syria – A Human Tragedy and Failure of the International Community", Politics, Issue 27 (Spring 2018), pg 23, (Hebrew).

[ii] Shmuel Shmuel, "The Syrian Army 2006 – 2011: Organization and Operational Concept", Ma'arachot (October 2020), pp 16 – 24 (Hebrew).

[iii] Force deployment see: Joseph Holliday, "The Syrian Army: Doctrinal Order of Battle", Institute for the Study of War, 15 February 2013, p.35.

[iv] Threat scenarios and plans see: Training and Doctrine Command – G-2 ACE Threats Integration, U.S. Army TRADOC Report: Syria Threat Tactics (February 2016), p. 3.

[v] Shmuel Shmuel, "The Syrian Army 2006 – 2011: Organization and Operational Concept", Ma'arachot (October 2020), pp 16 – 24 (Hebrew).

[vi] Holliday, 2013, pp. 13-15.

[vii] Gregory Waters, "Syria's Republican Guard Growth and Fragmentation", Middle East Institute (December 2018), pp. 3-4.

MilitaryStrategyMagazine.com 7 The Syrian Civil War – Evolution of the Syrian Army's Way of War Eyal Berelovich

[viii] David Alexander, " U.S. military pays Syrian rebels up to $400 per month: Pentagon", Reuters, 23 June 2015.

[ix] "Syria crisis: 'Only four or five' US-trained Syrian rebels are still fighting", BBC, 17 September 2015; Paul Mcleary, "The Pentagon Wasted $500 Million Training Syrian Rebels. It’s About to Try Again" Foreign Policy, 18 March 2016.

[x] Yogev Elbaz, "Anti-Tank Combat in the Syrian Civil War 2012 – 2020", Ma'arachot (October 2020), pp 24 – 30 (Hebrew).

[xi] Ariyel Biton, "The Employment of Remotely Piloted Aerial Vehicles in the Syrian Civil War", Ma'arachot (October 2020), pp 38 – 46 (Hebrew).

[xii] Andrea Beccaro, "Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study", Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29(2), (2018), p. 211.

[xiii] Jessica D. Lewis, "The Islamic State: A Counter Strategy for a Counter State", Institute for the Study of War (June 2014), pp. 13-16.

[xiv] Christopher Kozak, "An Army in all Corners – Assad Campaign Strategy in Syria", Institute for the Study of War (April 2015), pp. 34 – 35.

[xv] "Syria War: Army breaks IS siege of Deir al-Zour", BBC, 5 September 2017.

[xvi] Chris Tomson , "Syrian Army, Palestinian militia dislodge ISIS from strategic town in east Aleppo, AMN, 10 May 2017;

[xvii] Leith Aboufadel , "Elite Republican Guard unit deploys to Sukhnah for big battle with ISIL", AMN, 26 July 2017;

[xviii] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 16 July 2017, https://www.syriahr.com/en/69998/

[xix] "Syrian army encircles Daesh militants in desert: monitor", Arab News, 24 August 2017.

[xx] Chris Tomson, "In pictures: ISIS ready to fight to the last man in besieged Aleppo pocket – Map update", AMN, 1 July 2017.

[xxi] "Involvement of Hezbollah in the Syrian Civil War", The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2 June 2013, pp 7 – 14, 17 – 33.

[xxii] See for example: Aron Lund, "The Battle for Daraa", Carnegie Middle East Center, 25 June 2015.

[xxiii] https://twitter.com/archicivilians/status/613926043011776512;

[xxiv] Christopher Kozak, " The Assad Regime Under Stress: Conscription and Protest among Alawite and Minority Populations in Syria", Institute for the Study of War, 15 December 2014; Training and Doctrine Command – G-2 ACE Threats Integration, U.S. Army TRADOC Report, p.5; "Insight: Battered by war, Syrian army creates its own replacement", Reuters, 21 April 2013.

[xxv] Lukas Andriukaitis, Emma Beals, Graham Brookie, Eliot Higgins, Faysal Itani, Ben Nimmo, Michael Sheldon, Elizabeth Tsurkov, Nick Waters, Breaking Ghouta, Washington: The Atlantic Council, 2018, pp. 14- 45.

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