DOCSLIB.ORG

European Parliament

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
European Parliament dhdsh PRESS Council of the European Union EN 30 May 2017 List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the situation in Syria1 Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing 1. Bashar ( ) Al-Assad ( ) Date of birth: 11 September President of the Republic; person authorising and supervising 23.5.2011 1965; Place of birth: the crackdown on demonstrators. Damascus; diplomatic passport No D1903 2. Maher ( ) (a.k.a. Mahir) Al- Date of birth: 8 December Member of the Syria Armed Forces of the rank of ‘colonel’ and 9.5.2011 Assad ( ) 1967 the equivalent or higher in post after May 2011; Major General Place of birth: Damascus of the 42nd Brigade and former Brigadier Commander of the Diplomatic passport No 4138 Army's 4th Armoured Division. Member of the Assad family; brother of President Bashar Al-Assad. Major General of the 42nd Brigade and former Brigadier Commander of the Army's 4th Armoured Division 1 The texts on this document are for information only. They have no official or legal status in the form they are published here. The official publication is available on EUR-Lex website. 1/57 3. Ali ( ) Mamluk ( ) (a.k.a. Date of birth: 19 February Director of the National Security Bureau. Former Head of 9.5.2011 Mamlouk) 1946; Place of birth: Syrian Intelligence Directorate (GID) involved in violence Damascus; diplomatic passport against demonstrators. No 983 4. Atej ( ) (a.k.a. Atef, Atif) Najib Place of birth: Jablah, Syria Former Head of the Political Security Directorate in Dara'a. 9.5.2011 ( ) (a.k.a. Najeeb) Involved in violence against demonstrators. Member of the Assad family; cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad. 5. Hafiz ( ) Makhlouf ( ) (a.k.a. Date of birth: 2 April 1971; Former Colonel and Head of Unit in General Intelligence 9.5.2011 Hafez Makhlouf) Place of birth: Damascus; Directorate, Damascus Branch in post after May 2011. Member Diplomatic passport No 2246 of the Makhlouf family; Cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad. 6. Muhammad ( ) Dib ( ) Date of birth: 20 May 1951; Head of General Security Directorate; involved in violence 9.5.2011 Zaytun ( ) (a.k.a. Mohammed Place of birth: Damascus; against demonstrators. Dib Zeitoun; a.k.a. Mohamed Dib Diplomatic passport No Zeitun) D000001300 7. Amjad ( ) Al-Abbas ( ) Head of Political Security in Banyas, involved in violence 9.5.2011 against demonstrators in Baida. 8. Rami ( ) Makhlouf ( ) Date of birth: 10 July 1969; Leading businessman operating in Syria with interests in the 9.5.2011 Place of birth: Damascus; telecommunications, financial services, transport and property passport No 454224 sectors; he has financial interest in and/or holds senior and executive positions in Syriatel, the leading mobile telephone operator in Syria, the investment funds Al Mashreq, Bena Properties and Cham Holding. He furnishes financing and support to the Syrian regime, through his business interests. He is an influential member of the Makhlouf family and closely connected to the Assad family; cousin of President Bashar al- Assad. 2/57 9. Abd Al-Fatah ( ) Born: 1953; Head of Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI); involved in 9.5.2011 Qudsiyah ( Place of birth: Hama; violence against the civilian population. ) diplomatic passport No D0005788 10. Jamil ( ) (a.k.a. Jameel) Hassan Born: 1953 Officer of the rank of Major-General in the Syrian Air Force in 9.5.2011 ( ) (a.k.a. al-Hassan) post after May 2011. Head of Syrian Air Force Intelligence in Place of birth: Homs, Syria post after May 2011. Responsible for violent repression against Head of Syrian Air Force the civilian population in Syria. Intelligence 2 11 3 12. 13.11 Munzir ( ) (a.k.a. Mundhir, Date of birth: 1 March 1961; Involved in violence against the civilian population as part of 9.5.2011 Monzer) Jamil Al-Assad ( ) Place of birth: Kerdaha, the Shabiha militia. Latakia Province; Passports No 86449 and No 842781 144. 15.5 2 The entry was deleted on 28 May 2015 following a delisting decision. 3 The entry was deleted on 22 June 2015 following a delisting decision. 4 The entry was deleted on 28 May 2014 following a delisting decision. 5 The entry was deleted on 29 September 2016 following a delisting decision. 3/57 16.12 Faruq ( ) (a.k.a. Farouq, Date of birth: 10 December Former Vice-President of Syria; involved in violence against 23.5.2011 Farouk) Al Shar' ( ) (a.k.a. Al 1938 the civilian population. Char', Al Shara', Al Shara) 17.6 18.13 Mohamed ( ) Hamcho ( ) Born: 20 May 1966; Leading businessman operating in Syria, with interests in the 27.1.2015 Passport No 002954347 engineering and construction, media, hospitality and health sector. He has financial interest in and/or holds senior and executive positions within a number of companies in Syria, in particular Hamsho international, Hamsho Communication, Mhg International, Jupiter for Investment and Tourism project and Syria Metal industries. He plays an important role in the business community in Syria as general secretary of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce (appointed by the then Minister for economy Khodr Orfali in December 2014), chairman of the China-Syria Bilateral Business Councils (since March 2014) and chairman of the Syrian Metal and Steel Council (since December 2015). He has close business relationships with key figures of the Syrian regime, including Maher Al-Assad. Mohammed Hamcho benefits from and provides support to the Syrian regime through his business interests, and is associated with persons benefiting from and providing support to this regime. 19. Iyad ( ) (a.k.a. Eyad) Makhlouf Date of birth: 21 January 1973; Brother of Rami Makhlouf and GID Officer involved in 23.5.2011 ( ) Place of birth: Damascus; violence against the civilian population. passport No N001820740 6 The entry was deleted on 27 May 2016 following a delisting decision. 4/57 20. Bassam ( ) Al Hassan ( ) Presidential Advisor for Strategic Affairs; involved in violence 23.5.2011 (a.k.a. Al Hasan) against the civilian population. 21. Dawud Rajiha Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces responsible for the military 23.5.2011 involvement in violence against peaceful protesters. Died in the 18 July 2012 bombing. 22. Ihab ( ) (a.k.a. Ehab, Iehab) Born: 21 January 1973; Leading businessman operating in Syria. Ihab Makhlouf is Vice 23.5.2011 Makhlouf ( ) Place of birth: Damascus; President of, and shareholder in Syriatel, the leading mobile Passport No N002848852 telephone operator in Syria. He also has business interests in several other Syrian companies and entities, including Ramak Construction Co and Syrian International Private University for Science and Technology (SIUST). As Vice President of Syriatel, which transfers a significant part of its profits to the Syrian government by way of its licensing contract, Ihab Makhlouf is also directly supporting the Syrian regime. He is an influential member of the Makhlouf family and closely connected to the Assad family; cousin of President Bashar al- Assad. 23. Zoulhima ( ) (a.k.a. Zu al- Born: 1951 or 1946 or 1956; Head of presidential security; involved in violence against 23.6.2011 Himma) Chaliche ( ) (a.k.a., Place of birth: Kerdaha demonstrators; first cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad. Shalish, Shaleesh) (a.k.a. Dhu al- Himma Shalish) 24. Riyad ( ) Chaliche ( Director of Military Housing Establishment; provides funding 23.6.2011 ) (a.k.a. Shalish, Shaleesh) (a.k.a. to the regime; first cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad. Riyad Shalish) 5/57 25. Brigadier Commander Mohammad Date of birth: 1 September General Commander of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, 23.6.2011 ( ) (a.k.a. Mohamed, uhammad, 1957; Place of birth: Yazd, involved in providing equipment and support to help the Syrian Mohammed) Ali ( ) Jafari Iran regime suppress protests in Syria. ( ) (a.k.a. Jaafari, Ja'fari, Aziz; a.k.a. Jafari, Ali; a.k.a. Jafari, Mohammad Ali; a.k.a. Ja'fari, Mohammad Ali; a.k.a. Jafari-Naja- fabadi, Mohammad Ali) 26. Major General Qasem ( Commander of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC - 23.6.2011 ) Soleimani ( ) (a.k.a. Qods, involved in providing equipment and support to help the Qasim Soleimany) Syrian regime suppress protests in Syria. 27. Hossein Taeb (a.k.a. Taeb, Hassan; Born: 1963; Deputy Commander for Intelligence of Iranian Revolutionary 23.6.2011 a.k.a. Taeb, Hosein; a.k.a. Taeb, Place of birth: Tehran, Iran Guard Corps, involved in providing equipment and support to Hossein; a.k.a. Taeb, Hussayn; help the Syrian regime suppress protests in Syria. a.k.a. Hojjatoleslam Hossein Ta'eb) 28. Khalid ( ) (a.k.a. Khaled) Leading businessperson operating in Syria, with interests 27.1.2015 and/or activities in the telecommunications, oil and plastic Qaddur ( ) (a.k.a. Qadour, industry sectors and close business relations with Maher Al- Qaddour, Kaddour) Assad. He benefits from and provides support to the Syrian regime, through his business activities. Associate of Maher Al-Assad, including through his business activities. 29. Ra'if ( ) Al-Quwatly Born: 3.2.1967; Business associate of Maher Al-Assad and responsible for 23.6.2011 ( managing some of his business interests; provides funding to ) (a.k.a. Ri'af Al-Quwatli a.k.a. Place of birth: Damascus the regime. Raeef Al-Kouatly) 6/57 30.25 Mohammad ( ) (a.k.a. Head of Syrian Military Intelligence in the town of Hama, 1.8.2011 Muhammad, Mohamed, involved in the crackdown on demonstrators. Mohammed) Mufleh ( ) (a.k.a. Muflih) 31. Major General Tawfiq ( Head of the Department for Internal Security of the General 1.8.2011 ) (a.k.a. Tawfik) Younes ( Intelligence Directorate; involved in violence against the ) (a.k.a. Yunes) civilian population. 32. Mr Mohammed ( ) Makhlouf Date of birth: 19.10.1932; Influential member of the Makhlouf family, business associate 1.8.2011 ( ) (a.k.a.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Bulletindeliaisonetd'information
    INSTITUT KUDE RPARD IS E Bulletin de liaison et d’information N°314 MAI 2011 La publication de ce Bulletin bénéficie de subventions du Ministère français des Affaires étrangères (DGCID) et du Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (FASILD) ————— Ce bulletin paraît en français et anglais Prix au numéro : France: 6 € — Etranger : 7,5 € Abonnement annuel (12 numéros) France : 60 € — Etranger : 75 € Périodique mensuel Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 13 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tél. : 01- 48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01- 48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: [email protected] • TURQUIE : UNE CAMPAGNE ÉLECTORALE SANGLANTE POUR LES LÉGISLATIVES • SYRIE : LES KURDES ENTRE ESPOIR DE CHANGEMENT ET CIRCONSPECTION • KURDISTAN D’IRAK : DEUXIÈME CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE KURDOLOGIE À DUHOK • CULTURE : LANCEMENT D’UN PROJET D ENCYCLOPÉDIE « BEDIRKHAN » TURQUIE : UNE CAMPAGNE ÉLECTORALE SANGLANTE POUR LES LÉGISLATIVES a campagne électorale Ministre turc, Recep Tayyip territoire turc. Cette fois, le pour les législatives en Erdo ğan, qui était visée par un Premier Ministre s’est contenté L Turquie n’a pas été des attentat qui n’a pas été immédia - de mentionner vaguement des plus pacifiques, émaillée tement revendiqué. Alors en « affiliés à une organisation ter - d’attentats, de manifesta - pleine tournée électoral, le roriste ». Il est à noter que cette tions meurtrières et d’accrochages Premier Ministre a en effet région de la mer Noire n’est pas, entre l’armée et le PKK. essuyé des tirs au fusil- habituellement, un théâtre mitrailleur et à la grenade.
    [Show full text]
  • Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic
    Distr.: General 18 March 2014 Original: English Human Rights Council Twenty-fifth session Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Oral Update of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic 1 I. Introduction 1. The harrowing violence in the Syrian Arab Republic has entered its fourth year, with no signs of abating. The lives of over one hundred thousand people have been extinguished. Thousands have been the victims of torture. The indiscriminate and disproportionate shelling and aerial bombardment of civilian-inhabited areas has intensified in the last six months, as has the use of suicide and car bombs. Civilians in besieged areas have been reduced to scavenging. In this conflict’s most recent low, people, including young children, have starved to death. 2. Save for the efforts of humanitarian agencies operating inside Syria and along its borders, the international community has done little but bear witness to the plight of those caught in the maelstrom. Syrians feel abandoned and hopeless. The overwhelming imperative is for the parties, influential states and the international community to work to ensure the protection of civilians. In particular, as set out in Security Council resolution 2139, parties must lift the sieges and allow unimpeded and safe humanitarian access. 3. Compassion does not and should not suffice. A negotiated political solution, which the commission has consistently held to be the only solution to this conflict, must be pursued with renewed vigour both by the parties and by influential states. Among victims, the need for accountability is deeply-rooted in the desire for peace.
    [Show full text]
  • Syria and Repealing Decision 2011/782/CFSP
    30.11.2012 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 330/21 DECISIONS COUNCIL DECISION 2012/739/CFSP of 29 November 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/782/CFSP THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, internal repression or for the manufacture and maintenance of products which could be used for internal repression, to Syria by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be particular Article 29 thereof, prohibited, whether originating or not in their territories. Whereas: The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this paragraph. (1) On 1 December 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/782/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria ( 1 ). 3. It shall be prohibited to: (2) On the basis of a review of Decision 2011/782/CFSP, the (a) provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering Council has concluded that the restrictive measures services or other services related to the items referred to in should be renewed until 1 March 2013. paragraphs 1 and 2 or related to the provision, manu­ facture, maintenance and use of such items, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, (3) Furthermore, it is necessary to update the list of persons Syria; and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in Annex I to Decision 2011/782/CFSP. (b) provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the items referred to in paragraphs 1 (4) For the sake of clarity, the measures imposed under and 2, including in particular grants, loans and export credit Decision 2011/273/CFSP should be integrated into a insurance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, for any sale, single legal instrument.
    [Show full text]
  • Key Actors and Abbreviations
    Key actors and abbreviations The Assad regime and its allies ‘The regime’ Bashar al-Assad, Syrian President 2000– Hafez al-Assad, Syrian President 1971–2000 Asma al-Assad (née Akhras), Syria’s First Lady 2000– Maher al-Assad, brother of Bashar al-Assad, Commander of Republican Guard and 4th Armoured Division Anisa Makhlouf, mother of Bashar al-Assad Assif Shawkat, brother-in-law of Bashar al-Assad, head of military intelligence 2005–9, deputy minister of defence 2011–12 Rami Makhlouf, cousin of Bashar al-Assad, wealthy businessman Manaf Tlass, Republican Guard General, defected 2012 Farouk al-Sharaa, First Vice President of Syria 2006– Walid al-Muallem, Foreign Minister 2006– Bouthaina Shabaan, political and media adviser to the Syrian President 2008– Ba’ath – Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the ruling party of Syria since 1963 Mukhabarat – Set of notorious regime intelligence agencies Shabiha – Gangs of irregular pro-regime thugs NDF – National Defence Force, formed 2013 Russia Vladimir Putin, Russian President 2000–8, 2012–, Russian Prime Minister 2008–12 Dmitri Medvedev, Russian President 2008–12, Russian Prime Minister 2012–20 Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister 2004– Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Foreign Minister 2011– Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran 1989– xii 5146.indd xii 19/06/20 5:00 PM KEY ACTORS AND ABBREVIATIONS xiii Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranian President 2005–13 Hassan Rouhani, Iranian President 2013– Ali Akbar Salehi, Foreign Minister 2010–13 Mohammad Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister 2013– Qassem Suleimani, Commander
    [Show full text]
  • How Over-Compliance Limits Humanitarian Work on Syria Challenges of Fund Transfer for Non-Profit Organizations Working on Syria
    Invisible Sanctions: How over-compliance limits humanitarian work on Syria Challenges of Fund Transfer for Non-Profit Organizations Working on Syria 1 Invisible Sanctions: How over-compliance limits humanitarian work on Syria Challenges of Fund Transfer for Non-Profit Organizations Working on Syria Principal Researcher: Dr. Joseph Daher Review and editing: Dr. Erica Moret IMPACT - Civil Society Research and Development e.V. Principal Researcher: Dr. Joseph Daher Review and editing: Dr. Erica Moret Graphic Design: Tammam Al-Omar Published by: IMPACT - Civil Society Research and Development e.V Keithstraße 10 , 10787 Berlin Not for Sale. IMPACT e.V - ©2020 All rights reserved, no part of this publication can be printed, reissued or used in any shape or form without the publisher’s prior written consent. The views and opinions expressed in this report are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of IMPACT e.V . Despite going to great lengths to verify the authenticity of the information contained in this report, IMPACT e.V cannot guarantee their total impartiality. Table of Contents Acknowledgement ................................................................................................................................... 2 Executive summary and Main Findings of the Research ............................................................................ 3 Added value to the literature ................................................................................................................... 4 Recommendations ..................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Access Resource
    The State of Justice Syria 2020 The State of Justice Syria 2020 Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) March 2020 About the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) strives to prevent impunity, promote redress, and facilitate principled reform. SJAC works to ensure that human rights violations in Syria are comprehensively documented and preserved for use in transitional justice and peace-building. SJAC collects documentation of violations from all available sources, stores it in a secure database, catalogues it according to human rights standards, and analyzes it using legal expertise and big data methodologies. SJAC also supports documenters inside Syria, providing them with resources and technical guidance, and coordinates with other actors working toward similar aims: a Syria defined by justice, respect for human rights, and rule of law. Learn more at SyriaAccountability.org The State of Justice in Syria, 2020 March 2020, Washington, D.C. Material from this publication may be reproduced for teach- ing or other non-commercial purposes, with appropriate attribution. No part of it may be reproduced in any form for commercial purposes without the prior express permission of the copyright holders. Cover Photo — A family flees from ongoing violence in Idlib, Northwest Syria. (C) Lens Young Dimashqi TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 2 Introduction 4 Major Violations 7 Targeting of Hospitals and Schools 8 Detainees and Missing Persons 8 Violations in Reconciled Areas 9 Property Rights
    [Show full text]
  • What Does Syria Want?
    What Does Syria Want? A Presentation by Raymond Hinnebusch for the Center for Naval Analyses and the ForumForum dudu FuturFutur (france) 1 A Presentation by Raymond Hinnebusch for the Center for Naval Analyses and the Forum Du Futur (France) The distinguished American academic Raymond Hinnebusch, Director of the Centre for Syrian Studies and Professor of International Relations and Middle East Politics at the University of St. Andrews (UK), recently spoke at a France/U.S. dialogue in Paris co-sponsored by CNA and the Forum du Futur. Dr. Hinnebusch agreed to update his very thoughtful and salient presentation, “What Does Syria Want?” so that we might make it avail- able to a wider audience. The views expressed are his own and constitute an assessment of Syrian strategic think- ing. Raymond Hinnebusch may be contacted via e-mail at: [email protected] (Shown on the cover): A double portrait of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (left) and his father (right), Hafez al-Assad, who was President of Syria from 1971-2000. 2 What Does Syria Want? the country and ideology of the ruling Ba’th party, is a direct consequence of this experience. By Raymond Hinnebusch Centre for Syrian Studies, “Syria is imbued with a powerful sense University of St. Andrews, (UK) of grievance from the history of its formation as a state.” With French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s invitation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to Paris in July, More than that, from its long disillusioning experience 2008, the question of whether Syria is “serious” about with the West, Syria has a profoundly jaundiced view changing its ways and entitled to rehabilitation by the of contemporary international order, recently much re- international community, has become a matter of some inforced, which it sees as replete with double standards.
    [Show full text]
  • ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1
    ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1 S-JO-100-18-CA-004 Weekly Report 209-212 — October 1–31, 2018 Michael D. Danti, Marina Gabriel, Susan Penacho, Darren Ashby, Kyra Kaercher, Gwendolyn Kristy Table of Contents: Other Key Points 2 Military and Political Context 3 Incident Reports: Syria 5 Heritage Timeline 72 1 This report is based on research conducted by the “Cultural Preservation Initiative: Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq.” Weekly reports reflect reporting from a variety of sources and may contain unverified material. As such, they should be treated as preliminary and subject to change. 1 Other Key Points ● Aleppo Governorate ○ Cleaning efforts have begun at the National Museum of Aleppo in Aleppo, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Heritage Response Report SHI 18-0130 ○ Illegal excavations were reported at Shash Hamdan, a Roman tomb in Manbij, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0124 ○ Illegal excavation continues at the archaeological site of Cyrrhus in Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0090 UPDATE ● Deir ez-Zor Governorate ○ Artillery bombardment damaged al-Sayyidat Aisha Mosque in Hajin, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0118 ○ Artillery bombardment damaged al-Sultan Mosque in Hajin, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0119 ○ A US-led Coalition airstrike destroyed Ammar bin Yasser Mosque in Albu-Badran Neighborhood, al-Susah, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 18-0121 ○ A US-led Coalition airstrike damaged al-Aziz Mosque in al-Susah, Deir ez-Zor Governorate.
    [Show full text]
  • Annex Ii: List of Natural and Legal Persons, Entities Or Bodies Referred to in Article 14 and 15 (1)(A)
    VEDLEGG II ANNEX II: LIST OF NATURAL AND LEGAL PERSONS, ENTITIES OR BODIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 14 AND 15 (1)(A) A. Persons Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information Date of birth: President of the 23.05.2011 (ب شار) Bashar .1 September Republic; person 11 (اﻷ سد) Al-Assad 1965; authorising and Place of birth: supervising the Damascus; crackdown on diplomatic demonstrators. passport No D1903 Date of birth: Commander of the 09.05.2011 (ماهر) Maher .2 (a.k.a. Mahir) 8 December 1967; Army's 4th ,diplomatic Armoured Division (اﻷ سد) Al-Assad passport No 4138 member of Ba'ath Party Central Command, strongman of the Republican Guard; brother of President Bashar Al-Assad; principal overseer of violence against demonstrators. 3. Ali ( ) Date of birth: Director of the 09.05.2011 Mamluk ( ) 19 February 1946; National Security (a.k.a. Mamlouk) Place of birth: Bureau. Former Head Damascus; of Syrian Diplomatic passport Intelligence Directorate No 983 (GID) involved in violence against demonstrators Former Head of the 09.05.2011 (عاطف) Atej .4 (a.k.a. Atef, Atif) Political Security ;Directorate in Dara'a (ن ج يب) Najib (a.k.a. Najeeb) cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad; involved in violence against demonstrators. Name Identifying Reasons Date of listing information Date of birth: Colonel and Head of 09.05.2011 (حاف ظ) Hafiz .5 April 1971; Unit in General 2 مخ لوف ) Makhluf )(a.k.a. Hafez Place of birth: Intelligence Makhlouf) Damascus; Directorate, diplomatic Damascus Branch; passport No 2246 cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad; close to Maher Al- Assad; involved in violence against demonstrators.
    [Show full text]
  • COUNCIL DECISION 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Syria
    L 147/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 1.6.2013 COUNCIL DECISION 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures against Syria THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, products which could be used for internal repression, to Syria by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be particular Article 29 thereof, prohibited, whether originating or not in their territories. Whereas: The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to (1) On 27 May 2013, the Council agreed to adopt for a determine the relevant items to be covered by this paragraph. period of 12 months restrictive measures against Syria in the following fields, as specified in Council Decision 2012/739/CFSP of 29 November 2012 concerning 2. It shall be prohibited to: restrictive measures against Syria ( 1): — export and import restrictions with the exception of arms and related material and equipment which (a) provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering might be used for internal repression; services or other services related to the items referred to in paragraph 1 or related to the provision, manufacture, main­ — restrictions on financing of certain enterprises; tenance and use of such items, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Syria; — restrictions on infrastructure projects; — restrictions of financial support for trade; (b) provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the items referred to in paragraph 1, — financial sector; including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, for any — transport sector; sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services to any natural or legal person, entity or — restrictions on admission; body in, or for use in, Syria.
    [Show full text]
  • Into the Tunnels
    REPORT ARAB POLITICS BEYOND THE UPRISINGS Into the Tunnels The Rise and Fall of Syria’s Rebel Enclave in the Eastern Ghouta DECEMBER 21, 2016 — ARON LUND PAGE 1 In the sixth year of its civil war, Syria is a shattered nation, broken into political, religious, and ethnic fragments. Most of the population remains under the control of President Bashar al-Assad, whose Russian- and Iranian-backed Baʻath Party government controls the major cities and the lion’s share of the country’s densely populated coastal and central-western areas. Since the Russian military intervention that began in September 2015, Assad’s Syrian Arab Army and its Shia Islamist allies have seized ground from Sunni Arab rebel factions, many of which receive support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, or the United States. The government now appears to be consolidating its hold on key areas. Media attention has focused on the siege of rebel-held Eastern Aleppo, which began in summer 2016, and its reconquest by government forces in December 2016.1 The rebel enclave began to crumble in November 2016. Losing its stronghold in Aleppo would be a major strategic and symbolic defeat for the insurgency, and some supporters of the uprising may conclude that they have been defeated, though violence is unlikely to subside. However, the Syrian government has also made major strides in another besieged enclave, closer to the capital. This area, known as the Eastern Ghouta, is larger than Eastern Aleppo both in terms of area and population—it may have around 450,000 inhabitants2—but it has gained very little media interest.
    [Show full text]
  • State-Led Urban Development in Syria and the Prospects for Effective Post-Conflict Reconstruction
    5 State-led urban development in Syria and the prospects for effective post-conflict reconstruction NADINE ALMANASFI As the militarized phase of the Syrian Uprising and Civil War winds down, questions surrounding how destroyed cities and towns will be rebuilt, with what funding and by whom pervade the political discourse on Syria. There have been concerns that if the international community engages with reconstruction ef- forts they are legitimizing the regime and its war crimes, leaving the regime in a position to control and benefit from reconstruc- tion. Acting Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, Ambassador David Satterfield stated that until a political process is in place that ensures the Syrian people are able to choose a leadership ‘without Assad at its helm’, then the United States will not be funding reconstruction projects.1 The Ambassador of France to the United Nations also stated that France will not be taking part in any reconstruction process ‘unless a political transition is effectively carried out’ and this is also the position of the European Union.1 Bashar al-Assad him- self has outrightly claimed that the West will have no part to play 1 Beals, E (2018). Assad’s Reconstruction Agenda Isn’t Waiting for Peace. Neither Should Ours. Available: https://tcf.org/content/report/assads-recon- struction-agenda-isnt-waiting-peace-neither/?agreed=1. 1 Irish, J & Bayoumy, Y. (2017). Anti-Assad nations say no to Syria recon- struction until political process on track. Available: https://uk.reu- ters.com/article/uk-un-assembly-syria/anti-assad-nations-say-no-to-syria- reconstruction-until-political-process-on-track-idUKKCN1BU04J.
    [Show full text]