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Bulletindeliaisonetd'information INSTITUT KUDE RPARD IS E Bulletin de liaison et d’information N°314 MAI 2011 La publication de ce Bulletin bénéficie de subventions du Ministère français des Affaires étrangères (DGCID) et du Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (FASILD) ————— Ce bulletin paraît en français et anglais Prix au numéro : France: 6 € — Etranger : 7,5 € Abonnement annuel (12 numéros) France : 60 € — Etranger : 75 € Périodique mensuel Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 13 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tél. : 01- 48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01- 48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: [email protected] • TURQUIE : UNE CAMPAGNE ÉLECTORALE SANGLANTE POUR LES LÉGISLATIVES • SYRIE : LES KURDES ENTRE ESPOIR DE CHANGEMENT ET CIRCONSPECTION • KURDISTAN D’IRAK : DEUXIÈME CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE KURDOLOGIE À DUHOK • CULTURE : LANCEMENT D’UN PROJET D ENCYCLOPÉDIE « BEDIRKHAN » TURQUIE : UNE CAMPAGNE ÉLECTORALE SANGLANTE POUR LES LÉGISLATIVES a campagne électorale Ministre turc, Recep Tayyip territoire turc. Cette fois, le pour les législatives en Erdo ğan, qui était visée par un Premier Ministre s’est contenté L Turquie n’a pas été des attentat qui n’a pas été immédia - de mentionner vaguement des plus pacifiques, émaillée tement revendiqué. Alors en « affiliés à une organisation ter - d’attentats, de manifesta - pleine tournée électoral, le roriste ». Il est à noter que cette tions meurtrières et d’accrochages Premier Ministre a en effet région de la mer Noire n’est pas, entre l’armée et le PKK. essuyé des tirs au fusil- habituellement, un théâtre mitrailleur et à la grenade. d’opérations du PKK. Aussi, la Ainsi, le 4 mai, à Diyarbakir, lors L’embuscade s’est produite peu police turque accuse des groupes des funérailles de quatre combat - après que la voiture officielle a d’extrême-gauche de relayer la tants de la guerilla, un cortège de quitté la ville de Kastamonu guerilla kurde hors de son ter - plusieurs milliers de Kurdes s’est (mer Noire). Même si le journal rain. Cependant, la mer Noire est heurté aux forces de l’ordre qui Taraf, relayé par les quotidiens aussi le fief de l’extrême-droite avaient tiré en l’air pour disper - Milliyet et Sabah, a affirmé que, turque et compte de nombreux ser la manifestation. Un véhicule selon les sources de la sécurité, sympathisants des Loups Gris de police a été pris à parti par la l’attaque proviendrait d’un com - (MHP). foule, trois policiers ont été frap - mando de six membres du PKK, pés et un quatrième blessé à aucune accusation précise n’a été Le même jour, le parti kurde l’arme blanche. lancée par les autorités, pourtant (BDP) en campagne, réuni à promptes, en général, à désigner Diyarbakir, a condamné les opé - Le lendemain, 5 mai, c’est la le PKK comme auteur rations militaires des derniers propre voiture du Premier d’attentats, réels ou fictifs, sur le jours, les arrestations de plu - • 2 • Bulletin de liaison et d’information n° 314 • mai 2011 sieurs militants, et menacé de démocratique, à laquelle tout le familles. Les forces de sécurité boycotter les élections. Le monde participe. Mais les deux sont intervenues et ont pu Premier Ministre turc a immé - parties trouvent un peu leur reprendre les quatre corps portés diatement réagi : « Le BDP compte dans cette tension sur la par les manifestants. À cherche à atteindre ses objectifs question kurde. Erdogan veut Diyarbakir, à Siirt, Istanbul et avec le soutien des terroristes ». prendre des voix au MHP, donc dans la province de Batman, plu - il mène une politique nationalis - sieurs affrontements ont eu lieu Finalement, le 6 mai, l’attaque te et s'en prend aux Kurdes accu - avec les forces de l’ordre. contre le convoi du Premier sés de menacer l'unité nationale. Minsitre a été revendiqué dans Quant au parti pro-kurde, "il Le 23 mai, un autre attentat a été un communiqué du PKK, « en montre ses muscles et fait la déjoué contre le Premier représailles à la terreur exercée démonstration qu'il défend sa Ministre, toujours en tournée, par la police sur le peuple communauté » (AFP). cette fois dans les régions kurde (Firat News) » affirmant kurdes. Une bombe télécomman - curieusement que la cible de Les accrochages avec l’armée se dée contenant 36 kg d'explosifs a l’attentat n’était ni le Premier sont poursuivis, avec deux été en effet trouvée et désamor - Ministre, ni les civils, mais la membres du PKK abattus à cée au pied d'un pont dans la police. Mardin, un policier tué et un province de Sirnak où Recep autre grièvement blessé dans Tayyip Erdogan devait se rendre Dans le même temps, le leader une attaque du mouvement pour un discours électoral. Le 26 du PKK, Abdullah Öcalan a kurde à Silopi le 7 mail. mai, un attentat à la bombe, cette menacé, de sa prison : « "Soit un fois à Istanbul, a fait huit blessés, processus de négociations Le 13 mai, douze guerilleros dont deux grièvement. La bombe sérieuses commencera après le kurdes étaient tués, alors qu’un était placée sur un engin deux- 15 juin, soit ce sera le début commando tentait de franchir la roues et a explosé à 9 heures du d'une grande guerre », mais frontière, à partir du Kurdistan matin, sous un pont, près d'un comme ce n’est pas la première d’Irak, près de Şirnak. Le 14 mai, arrêt d'autobus, dans un quartier fois que ce genre d’ultimatum un soldat turc était tué par une huppé de la rive européenne. « précède un prolongement de ces - mine lors d’une opération de Une femme a eu un pied arraché sez-le-feu, la menace a peu ému ratissage dans la montagne de par la déflagration et une autre la classe politique turque. Par Hakkari. Le 16 mai, des manifes - souffre de brûlures du système contre, l’éditorialiste Mehmet Ali tations ont eu lieu dans plusieurs respiratoire » (Agence Anatolie). Birand a estimé que la déclara - villes du Kurdistan de Turquie Selon les services de sécurité, « le tion du BDP au sujet d’un éven - pour protester contre la mort de fait que l'explosion s'est produite tuel boycott des élections était à ces douze Kurdes, alors que des à proximité d'une école de police prendre au sérieux : « La légiti - centaines de manifestants ont laisse penser que l'attentat a mité des élections serait en franchi la frontière avec le peut-être visé la police. » Une cause", et M. Erdogan serait très Kurdistan irakien pour récupérer fois encore, le Premier Ministre a embarrassé, car il veut faire la les corps des combattants tués laissé entendre que le PKK pou - démonstration d'une élection afin de les ramener à leurs vait être à l’origine de l’attaque. SYRIE : LES KURDES ENTRE ESPOIR DE CHANGEMENT ET CIRCONSPECTION entant toujours de comme Hassaké. Certains esti - droit ? La négligence du Conseil mettre fin, par la force ment, en effet, que cette mesure de Sécurité de l’ONU et des T ou les « gestes poli - n’est pas suffisante. Ainsi le organisations des droits de tiques » aux manifesta - chanteur kurde Omar Şan, origi - l’homme concernant les droits tions qui se déroulent naire d’Afrin, a-t-il déclaré au du peuple kurde est regret - en Syrie, le président Bachar Al- site Aknews que la citoyenneté table. » Assad a rétabli officiellement les syrienne, accordée seule, ne quelques 300 000 Kurdes « apa - signifiait rien : « Les Kurdes ont De même l’activiste kurde Aras trides » dans leur citoyenneté, le besoin de beaucoup d’autres Yussuf juge que les Kurdes doi - 2 mai. À cette annonce, les mani - choses, allant de l’électricité aux vent voir tous leurs droits recon - festations se sont arrêtées à soins médicaux, qu’est-ce que nus en tant que citoyens vivant en Qamishlo et Amude, mais ont cette « citoyenneté creuse » va Syrie, indiquant que l’octroi de la continué dans d’autres villes, leur apporter s’ils n’ont aucun nationalité n’est qu’une petite n° 314 • mai 2011 Bulletin de liaison et d’information • 3• partie de ces droits. Sur l’arrêt des Sur l’attitude des Kurdes de villes arabes, le gouvernement ne manifestations à Qamishlo et Syrie devant les révoltes arabes souhaite pas ouvrir un « second Amude, Aras Yussuf a également syriennes, Rêber estime que les front » dans les villes kurdes. indiqué que tous les réseaux des opinions sont partagées, les Enfin, la Syrie fait face à de téléphones mobiles et autres Kurdes attendant de voir com - lourdes pressions internationales moyens de communication ayant ment les choses vont tourner. et le fait que de nombreux été coupés, cela a pu mettre un Étant politisés depuis des décen - Kurdes vivent de l’autre côté de frein aux rassemblements de rue. nies en Syrie, et la plupart affiliés ses frontières, que ce soit en à des organisations, soit poli - Turquie ou en Irak, la dissuade Par ailleurs, même si l’accès à tiques, soit de défense des droits d’ajouter d’autres afflux de réfu - Internet est beaucoup plus res - de l’homme, il leur est facile, en giés qui rencontreraient, cette treint en Syrie que dans les une journée, de mobiliser plu - fois, le soutien de compatriotes, autres États arabes, une résistan - sieurs milliers de personnes pour en plus de celui des Kurdes ce par Facebook et Tweetter exis - manifester dans les villes. Mais vivant hors du Moyen-Orient. te cependant et les sites et orga - les buts de la révolution syrienne nisations kurdes libres, que ce laissent les Kurdes dans Autre signe de cette « distance soit au Kurdistan d’Irak ou dans l’expectative, en tant que minori - kurde » par rapport à la diaspora relaie cette voix.
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