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TEMARAPPORT 2016-11-10, version 1.0 Syriens säkerhetsapparat Lifos Temarapport: Syriens säkerhetsapparat Om rapporten Denna rapport följer EU:s allmänna riktlinjer för framtagande av landinformation (2008) avsedd för handläggning av migrationsärenden. Rapporten bör inte användas som exklusivt underlag i samband med avgörandet av ett enskilt ärende utan bör vägas mot annan relevant rapportering och bevisning. Informationen i rapporten återspeglar inte nödvändigtvis Migrationsverkets officiella inställning i alla delar. Lifos har ingen avsikt att genom rapporten göra politiska eller rättsliga ställningstaganden. Temarapport: Syriens säkerhetsapparat 2016-11-10, version 1.0 Lifos – Center för landinformation och analys inom migrationsområdet © Migrationsverket (Swedish Migration Agency), 2016 Omslagsbild: Militära säkerhetstjänstens gren 235/”Palestine Branch”, Damaskus (ORION-ME/DigitalGlobe/Google Earth/Lifos, 2016) Publikationen kan laddas ner från http://lifos.migrationsverket.se 2016-11-10, version 1.0 2 (57) Lifos Temarapport: Syriens säkerhetsapparat Innehåll Brief summary ................................................................................................ 5 1. Introduktion ............................................................................................ 5 1.1. Avgränsning och begränsningar ...................................................... 6 1.2. Säkerhetsapparatens framväxt ......................................................... 6 1.3. Infrastruktur av kontroll .................................................................. 7 1.4. Apparatens mer eller mindre kända grenar ..................................... 9 1.4.1. Från militära elitförband till civila informatörer ...................... 9 1.4.2. Kända element i översikt ........................................................ 10 1.4.3. Domstolen för säkerhetsärenden ............................................ 11 1.4.4. Militärpolisen och Sednaya militärfängelse ........................... 11 1.4.5. Kriminalunderrättelsetjänsten (CID) ...................................... 12 1.5. Militära grader ............................................................................... 13 2. Värnpliktiga inom säkerhetstjänsterna ................................................. 14 2.1. Rekrytering och placering ............................................................. 14 2.2. Något om ansvar/delaktighet ......................................................... 16 3. De fyra huvudgrenarna ......................................................................... 17 3.1. Styrning och samordning (CCMC, NSB) ...................................... 18 3.2. Militära säkerhetstjänsten (MID) .................................................. 20 3.2.1. Högsta ledarskap .................................................................... 21 3.2.2. Centrala MID-grenar .............................................................. 22 MID, gren 211 – Technical/Computer ................................................. 22 MID, gren 215 – Raids ......................................................................... 22 MID, gren 216 – Patrols ....................................................................... 23 MID, gren 220 – Sa’sa/Front Intelligence............................................ 23 MID, gren 225 – Communications....................................................... 23 MID, gren 227 – Area .......................................................................... 23 MID, gren 235 – Palestine Branch ....................................................... 24 MID, gren 237 – Wireless .................................................................... 24 MID, gren 248 – Military Investigations ............................................. 24 MID, gren 291 – Headquarters Branch ................................................ 25 MID, gren 293 – Internal Affairs ......................................................... 25 MID, gren 294 – Information/Military Security .................................. 25 3.2.3. Regionala MID-grenar ........................................................... 25 MID, gren 219 – Hama ........................................................................ 26 MID, gren 222 – Hasakah .................................................................... 26 MID, gren 243 – Deir ez-Zour ............................................................. 26 MID, gren 245 – Dara’a ....................................................................... 26 MID, gren 261 – Homs ........................................................................ 27 MID, gren 271 – Idlib .......................................................................... 27 MID, gren 290 – Aleppo ...................................................................... 27 MID – Latakiya .................................................................................... 27 MID – Suweida .................................................................................... 27 3.3. Flygvapensäkerhetstjänsten (AFI) ................................................. 27 3.3.1. Högsta ledarskap .................................................................... 28 3.3.2. Centrala AFI-grenar (Damaskus) ........................................... 29 AFI, Flygplatsgrenen – Airport Branch ............................................... 29 2016-11-10, version 1.0 3 (57) Lifos Temarapport: Syriens säkerhetsapparat AFI, Bab Touma – Bab Touma Branch ............................................... 29 AFI, Underrättelsegrenen – Intelligence Branch ................................. 29 AFI, Utredningsgrenen – Mezzeh/Investigations Branch .................... 29 AFI, Operations & Special Operations ................................................ 30 AFI, ”Missions Branch” ....................................................................... 30 3.3.3. Regionala AFI-grenar............................................................. 31 AFI, Aleppo ......................................................................................... 31 AFI, Dara’a .......................................................................................... 31 AFI, Hasakah........................................................................................ 31 AFI, Homs ............................................................................................ 31 AFI, Latakiya ....................................................................................... 31 AFI, Rif Damaskus – Harasta .............................................................. 32 3.4. Allmänna säkerhetstjänsten (GID, ”State…”) ............................... 32 3.4.1. Högsta ledarskap .................................................................... 33 3.4.2. Centrala GID-grenar (Damaskus) .......................................... 34 GID, gren 111 – Administration/Head of Branch Office ..................... 34 GID, gren 225 – Internal Security ........................................................ 34 GID, gren 251 – Internal Branch.......................................................... 34 GID, gren 255 – Information ............................................................... 35 GID, gren 279 – External Branch ........................................................ 35 GID, gren 280 – Engineers................................................................... 36 GID, gren 285 – Investigative Branch ................................................. 36 GID, gren 290 – Patrols ....................................................................... 36 GID, gren 295 – Raids ......................................................................... 36 GID, gren 300 – Espionage .................................................................. 36 GID - Palestine ..................................................................................... 36 3.4.3. Regionala GID-grenar ............................................................ 37 GID, gren 318 – Homs ......................................................................... 37 GID, gren 320 – Hama ......................................................................... 37 GID, gren 322 – Aleppo ....................................................................... 37 GID, gren 327 – Deir-ez-Zour ............................................................. 37 GID, gren 330 – Qamishli .................................................................... 37 GID – Dara’a ........................................................................................ 37 GID – Idlib ........................................................................................... 37 GID – Latakiya ..................................................................................... 38 3.5. Politiska säkerhetstjänsten (PSD) .................................................. 38 3.5.1. Högsta ledarskap .................................................................... 39 3.5.2. Centrala PSD-grenar (Damaskus) .......................................... 39 PSD Mezzeh; gemensamma lokaler för frihetsberövanden ................. 40 PSD, Utredningsgrenen – Investigations/Interrogation Branch ........... 40 PSD, Informationsgrenen – Information Branch ................................. 40 Övriga centrala PSD-grenar ................................................................. 40 3.5.3. Regionala PSD-grenar ............................................................ 41 PSD – Aleppo ......................................................................................
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