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EU Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP

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EU Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP ISSN 1725-2555 Official Journal L 121 of the European Union Volume 54 English edition Legislation 10 May 2011 Contents II Non-legislative acts REGULATIONS ★ Council Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria . 1 DECISIONS ★ Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria 11 Price: EUR 3 Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period. The titles of all other acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. EN 10.5.2011 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 121/1 II (Non-legislative acts) REGULATIONS COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 442/2011 of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and, in particular, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial and the right to the protection of personal data. This Regulation should be applied in accordance Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European with those rights. Union, and in particular Article 215 thereof, Having regard to Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May (4) The power to amend the list in Annex II to this Regu­ 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria ( 1 ), adopted lation should be exercised by the Council, in view of the in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on serious political situation in Syria, and to ensure European Union, consistency with the process for amending and reviewing the Annex to Decision 2011/273/CFSP. Having regard to the joint proposal from the High Represen­ tative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and (5) The procedure for amending the lists in Annex II to this the European Commission, Regulation should include providing designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies with the grounds for listing, so as to give them an opportunity to submit observations. Where observations are submitted, Whereas: or substantial new evidence is presented, the Council should review its decision in light of those observations and inform the person, entity or body concerned accordingly. (1) Decision 2011/273/CFSP provides for an arms embargo, a ban on internal repression equipment, and restrictions on the admission to the Union, and the freezing of funds and economic resources, of certain persons and entities responsible for the violent repression against the civilian (6) For the implementation of this Regulation, and in order population in Syria. Those persons, entities and bodies to create maximum legal certainty within the Union, the are listed in the Annex to that Decision. names and other relevant data concerning natural and legal persons, entities and bodies whose funds and economic resources must be frozen in accordance with this Regulation, must be made public.Any processing of (2) Some of those measures fall within the scope of the personal data should comply with Regulation (EC) No Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the regulatory action at the level of the Union is therefore Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of necessary in order to implement them, in particular with individuals with regard to the processing of personal a view to ensuring their uniform application by data by the Community institutions and bodies and on economic operators in all Member States. the free movement of such data ( 2 ) and Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of indi­ viduals with regard to the processing of personal data (3) This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and and on the free movement of such data ( 3 ). observes the principles recognised in particular by the ( 2 ) OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1. ( 1 ) OJ L 121, 10.5.2011, p. 11. ( 3 ) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31. L 121/2 EN Official Journal of the European Union 10.5.2011 (7) In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this (e) ‘technical assistance’ means any technical support related to Regulation are effective, this Regulation should enter into repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, main­ force on the day of its publication, tenance, or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruction, advice, training, the transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting services; HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: including verbal forms of assistance; Article 1 (f) ‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the shall apply: conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace. (a) ‘funds’ means financial assets and benefits of every kind, including but not limited to: Article 2 1. It shall be prohibited: (i) cash, cheques, claims on money, drafts, money orders and other payment instruments; (a) to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, equipment which might be used for internal repression as (ii) deposits with financial institutions or other entities, listed in Annex I, whether or not originating in the Union, balances on accounts, debts and debt obligations; to any person, entity or body in Syria or for use in Syria; (iii) publicly- and privately-traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks and shares, certificates (b) to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the representing securities, bonds, notes, warrants, object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions debentures and derivatives contracts; referred to in point (a). (iv) interest, dividends or other income on or value 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to protective clothing, accruing from or generated by assets; including flak jackets and helmets, temporarily exported to Syria by United Nations (UN) personnel, personnel of the Union or its Member States, representatives of the media or (v) credit, right of set-off, guarantees, performance bonds humanitarian and development workers and associated or other financial commitments; persons exclusively for their personal use. (vi) letters of credit, bills of lading, bills of sale; 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities in the Member States as listed in Annex III may (vii) documents evidencing an interest in funds or financial authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment resources; which might be used for internal repression, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, if they determine that such equipment is intended solely for humanitarian or (b) ‘freezing of funds’ means preventing any move, transfer, protective use. alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, desti­ nation or other change that would enable the funds to be Article 3 used, including portfolio management; 1. It shall be prohibited: (c) ‘economic resources’ means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, which are (a) to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance related not funds but may be used to obtain funds, goods or to the goods and technology listed in the Common Military services; List of the European Union ( 1 ) (Common Military List), or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods included in that list, to any person, entity or body (d) ‘freezing of economic resources’ means preventing their use in Syria or for use in Syria; to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging them; ( 1 ) OJ C 86, 18.3.2011, p. 1. 10.5.2011 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 121/3 (b) to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance or to circumvent the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 brokering services related to equipment which might be shall be prohibited. used for internal repression as listed in Annex I, to any person, entity or body in Syria or for use in Syria; Article 5 (c) to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology listed in 1. Annex II shall consist of a list of natural or legal persons, the Common Military List or in Annex I, including in entities and bodies who, in accordance with Article 4(1) of particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for Decision 2011/273/CFSP, have been identified by the Council any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for as being persons and entities responsible for the violent any provision of related technical assistance to any person, repression against the civilian population in Syria, and natural entity or body in Syria or for use in Syria; or legal persons and entities associated with them. (d) to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions 2. Annex II shall include the grounds for the listing of listed referred to in points (a) to (c). persons, entities and bodies concerned. 2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the prohibitions refered to therein shall not apply to the provision of technical 3. Annex II shall also include, where available, information assistance, financing and financial assistance related to: necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers, — technical assistance intended solely for the support of the gender, address, if known, and function or profession.
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