Counter-Piracy in the Arabian

Home , Gulf of Aden, Jeffrey Gettleman, MV Sirius Star

Middle East May 2011 Program

Gulf analysis paper

Counter-Piracy in the Arabian Sea: summary Challenges and Opportunities for GCC Action Piracy in the Arabian Sea represents a principal threat to maritime trade, By Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Scott Goossens which GCC economies depend on...... The challenge of addressing this Organized piracy has become a major threat to regional trade and maritime threat presents an opportunity for security in the wider Arabian Sea,1 costing the global economy between $7 GCC governments to adopt a coor- and $12 billion per year.2 In the Gulf of Aden, the southern entry point to the dinated counter-piracy strategy in the Suez Canal, acts of piracy are so frequent that the area has become known as coastal waters off the Arabian Penin- “Pirate Alley.” This body of water, already the most dangerous in the world sula, which would protect their economic interests and demonstrate lead- for piracy, has grown increasingly more treacherous as hijackings, kidnappings, ership on an important regional issue. and extortion have proliferated over the past several years. With each success, pirates grow ever more emboldened, particularly as international efforts key facts to implement a comprehensive counter-piracy strategy continue to flounder. ●● An estimated 50 pirate bands, comprising 2,000 to 3,000 pirates, Piracy not only threatens to disrupt maritime trade in the region that Gulf operate out of six known pirate economies depend on, it also undermines confidence in the ability of region- bases along the coast of Somalia. al governments to address security challenges in their own “backyard.” The ●● Pirate attacks in the Arabian Sea, problem provides a unique opportunity for local actors, most importantly the Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, to demonstrate initiative and exer- have risen from 20 in 2006 to 219 cise regional leadership by taking decisive action against this growing threat. in 2010, and the pirates’ range now extends up to 1,300 nauti- pirate operations, tactics, and motivations cal miles from the Somali coast. Pirates have been operating freely off the southeastern shores of the Horn of ●● Pirate earnings for 2010 are Africa since the collapse of Somalia’s central government more than 20 years estimated at $238 million, ago.3 Local law enforcement has remained either absent, corruptible, or in- with the average ransom hav- effective. As a result the frequency, range, and aggressiveness of pirate at- ing risen from $150,000 in 2005 to $5.4 million in 2010. tacks have increased in recent years. In the spring and summer of 2008, pirates expanded their reach by shifting their activities north into the Gulf of

gulf analysis papers In conjunction with its Gulf Roundtable series, the CSIS Middle East Program issues periodic policy papers addressing key economic and security issues in the Gulf region. The papers are distributed prior to a corresponding Gulf Roundtable to help in- form the debate and generate discussion. Launched in April 2007, the Gulf Roundtable series convenes monthly and assembles a diverse group of regional experts, policymakers, academics, and business leaders seeking to build a greater understanding of the complexities of the region and identify opportunities for constructive U.S. engagement. Topics for discussion include the role of Islamist movements in politics, the war on terror, democratization and the limits of civil society, the strategic importance of Gulf energy, media trends, trade liberalization, and prospects for regional integration. The roundtable defines the Gulf as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran and is made possible in part through the generous support of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates.■

Figure 1: The Arabian Sea employ capable intelligence networks and fairly sophisticat- ed technologies such as radar and GPS.12 The use of heavier weaponry, such as machine guns and rocket-propelled gre- nade launchers, has allowed pirate bands to shift their operations from hijacking small vessels to commandeering more lucrative cargo ships, container vessels, and oil tankers.13 Regardless of the size of the vessel, pirate bands typically share a common operational model: hijack a ship and take hostages, then extort a ransom for the safe return of both. Pirates have discovered that the rewards of hijackings far outweigh the risks of capture and punishment. Piracy of- fers lucrative work in Somalia, a nation that is short on jobs and money. One estimate put piracy earnings from last year alone at $238 million.14 According to a report by Al-Jazeera, a number of locals have abandoned tradi- Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office. tional occupations such as fishing for the far more lucrative pursuit of piracy.15 With a successful hijacking yield- ing an average ransom of $5 million—and as much as $9.5 4 Aden and Arabian Sea. By September 2008—only million—the financial attractiveness of piracy is clear. nine months into the year—the International Maritime Bureau, a maritime crime watchdog group, had reported The allure is only increasing, in part because pirates have an increase of over 60 percent in attacks or attempted at- successfully exploited the willingness of many ship- tacks by pirates in the Gulf of Aden from 2007 totals.5 ping companies to pay a negotiated ransom for the re- lease of valuable ships, crews, and cargoes. The number It is estimated that about 50 known pirate bands, comprising of hostages captured by pirates increased from 163 in 2,000 to 3,000 pirates, operate out of six known pirate bases 2007 to 1,065 in 2010. Insurer Munich Re estimates that 6 along the coast of Somalia. In the first quarter of 2011, 97 kidnap and ransom amounts rose tenfold between 2008 attempted attacks were registered, compared to 35 for the and 2009,16 while another estimate suggests that average 7 same period the previous year. Success has encouraged the ransoms have risen from $150,000 in 2005 to $5.4 mil- development of new tactics that allow the pirates to increase their operational range. For example, the use of “mother ships,” usually hijacked vessels serving as floating logis- Figure 2: Expanded range and frequency of piracy tics bases, has enabled pirates to carry out attacks further attacks (2006–2010) from shore and stay at sea for extended periods of time.8 In the past, pirates operated primarily along the coast- line, which provided a safe retreat for their skiffs. Today, with their increased confidence, deepening experience, and improved tactics, pirates have attacked ships more than 1,000 miles off the coast,9 increasing their operational range from an area previously about the size of Texas to an area now closer to the size of the continen- tal United States.10 In one episode in April 2010, pirates attacked a vessel 1,300 nautical miles east of the Horn of Africa, at a point closer to India than to Somalia.11

Moreover, since 2008, pirate attacks have evolved from rela- Source: International Maritime Bureau. tively unsophisticated raids to well-coordinated attacks that center for strategic and international studies | middle east program CSIS Middle East Program | Gulf Analysis Paper | 3 lion in 2010.17 In November 2010, a $9.5-million ransom Figure 3: Total hostages captured by Somali pirates was paid for the South Korean oil tanker Samho Dream. the threat of piracy to the gcc The Gulf of Aden, one of the world’s most highly trafficked waterways, has become one of the most vulnerable areas for pirate attacks. Approximately 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf each year, or roughly 20 percent of global commercial shipping.18 According to estimates from the U.S. Department of Energy, about 3.3 million barrels of oil—roughly 4 percent of daily global demand—pass through the Gulf each day.19 While piracy affects international shipping, the GCC states have become particularly vulnerable as pirate operations Source: One Earth Future Foundation. have expanded beyond the Gulf of Aden. Roughly 90 percent of GCC oil exports transit in tankers through the waters of the Persian Gulf and into the Arabian Sea via the pertanker MV Sirius Star, which was fully loaded with Strait of Hormuz,20 constituting nearly 40 percent of the 2 million barrels of crude oil (more than a quarter of world’s traded oil supply.21 In addition, nearly 1,800 bil- Saudi Arabia’s daily oil production output) worth at least lion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas also pass through the $100 million. In March 2011, HH Sheikh Abdullah bin strait each year en route to markets in Europe and Asia.22 Zayed Al Nahyan, UAE minister of foreign affairs, de- Beyond energy exports, GCC economies more broadly scribed maritime piracy as “quickly becoming one of depend on maritime trade. According to a Saudi Maritime the most threatening challenges of the 21st century.”28 Company official, nearly 95 percent of Saudi Arabia’s trade travels through pirate-infested waters.23 In addition to tank- international responses and options ers, other ships carrying goods such as grain, iron ore, sugar, Since pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden spiked dramati- and finished goods transit the Strait of Hormuz travelling to cally in 2008, piracy has increasingly captured interna- and from major ports like Dubai.24 The United Arab Emirates tional attention. Three major military operations currently (UAE), as a global transit hub, in particular has felt the address piracy in the region: Operation Atalanta, an EU sting of piracy. As of February 4, 2011, pirates held captive deployment (EU-NAVFOR) originally tasked with pro- nine vessels either owned by UAE companies or originat- tecting UN World Food Program shipments to Somalia; ing from UAE ports immediately prior to their hijacking.25 Operation Ocean Shield, a NATO deployment with simi- Crude oil tankers seem to have become especially vulner- lar responsibilities; and Combined Task Force 151 (CTF- able to pirate attacks. Rising fuel prices have led large tank- 151), a U.S.-led international effort comprising 25 na- ers to decrease their steaming speed, making them more tions and headquartered in Bahrain. In addition, Saudi susceptible to interception by pirates. Because they are Arabia, Russia, China, Japan, India, and Iran all conduct 29 seen as high-value targets, crude oil tankers also tend to pay independent maritime security operations in the area. higher ransoms than other merchant vessels. Whereas glob- In June 2008, UN Security Council Resolution 1816 au- al shipping companies have the option of avoiding the Gulf thorized international naval vessels to enter Somali ter- of Aden by rerouting,26 due to their location, GCC states ritorial waters in pursuit of pirates.30 The majority of an- have no other choice.27 In short, crude oil tankers transiting tipiracy operations consist of visit, board, search, and the Strait of Hormuz and sailing through the Arabian Sea seizure (VBSS) operations, in which small teams board will continue to supply a steady stream of pirate targets. and search suspected pirate vessels from larger naval The danger is not just theoretical. In March 2011, pirates ships such as cruisers and destroyers. Overall, the in- hijacked the Kuwaiti oil tanker MV Zirku off the south- ternational response has centered on patrols and inter- east coast of Oman. In 2008, pirates seized the Saudi su- vention but has failed to comprehensively address the

1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org/mideast 4 | CSIS Middle East Program | Gulf Analysis Paper more complex issues of deterrence and punishment. 18 gunboats to shepherd convoys across the Gulf of Aden.33 Aside from raising numerous legal complications, the For their part, international shipping companies have tak- private security escort solution is also costly. According to en two approaches to dealing with the piracy problem in Jacob Larsen, security officer at the Baltic and International the Gulf of Aden. The first is to avoid the Gulf entirely, Maritime Council (BIMCO), a major umbrella shipping by rerouting ships around the Cape of Good Hope. This trade organization, the cost of armed security for the three- option adds significant time and expense. A single tanker day transit through the Gulf of Aden is $50,000—10 times operating for a year between Saudi Arabia and the United the daily profit for very large crude carriers (VLCCs).34 States by way of the Cape of Good Hope would add an additional 2,700 miles to each voyage, see its annual pro- opportunities and challenges for ductivity reduced by more than 25 percent, and incur ad- more effective strategies ditional annual fuel costs of $3.5 million.31 A report by While the international community has largely driven the the U.S.-based One Earth Foundation calculates the ad- piracy debate, it is the GCC states that have the most to ditional cost to shippers of rerouting 10 percent of ves- lose if the problem goes unaddressed. Taking the lead on sels to be around $2.3 to $3 billion a year.32 In addition, responding to the threat provides both an opportunity for with the pirates’ range now reaching up to 1,300 miles off GCC governments to demonstrate leadership and initiative. the coast of East Africa, even this substantial rerouting Some noteworthy steps have been taken. In April 2011, would not fully place ships beyond the range of pirates. the UAE convened a high-profile international counter- The second approach is to accept the risk of a poten- piracy conference focused on long-term on-shore solutions tial hijacking and ransom demands and to continue to the piracy problem. The preceding year, the UAE held shipping operations in the area. To reduce the level of the chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium risk for “running the gauntlet,” many shipping com- (IONS), a group made up of 33 countries around the Indian panies now implement the shipping industries Best Ocean, while Bahrain currently leads Combined Task Force Management Practices (BMP) while operating in the re- 152 (CTF-152), a multinational effort under the supervi- gion and install recommended Self-Protection Measures sion of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which patrols the Gulf but (SPM) to help protect their vessels from pirate attacks. does not participate directly in counter-piracy operations. In addition, a proliferation of private security companies While these efforts are encouraging, progress remains slow. now offer armed escorts to merchant ships across the Gulf To date, GCC counter-piracy operations mostly have been of Aden. On April 26, 2011, leading British insurer Jardine coordinated via third countries, for example by integrating Lloyd Thompson announced that it is organizing a fleet of GCC naval officers into multinational fleets and through low-level Saudi, UAE, and Bahraini participation in CTF- 151.35 GCC leaders have often hinted at a more robust Figure 4: Naval military manpower of GCC states (2010) GCC involvement in counter-piracy operations. After the seizure of the MV Sirius Star in November 2008, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia said his country intended to join international efforts to battle piracy.36 Subsequently, in June 2009, representatives from every GCC state gathered in Riyadh to discuss an all-Arab naval task force for combating piracy, but the talks have failed to result in any concrete action. The UAE in particular has been vocal in calling for an increased GCC role in counter-piracy operations. In April 2010, the commander of the UAE Navy, Staff Brigadier Ibrahim al-Musharakah, called for the security of the Gulf’s waterways to eventu- 37 Source: Cordesman, “The Gulf Military Balance in 2010.” ally be under the permanent leadership of GCC navies.

center for strategic and international studies | middle east program CSIS Middle East Program | Gulf Analysis Paper | 5

Potential exists for increased GCC leadership, but this goal Figure 5: Selected GCC naval ships by category (2010) remains aspirational. At the moment, GCC navies lack a significant ocean-going capability and have relatively limited maritime capacity beyond coastal vessels. Saudi Arabia is currently the only Gulf state with the naval assets to potentially contribute to maritime security operations beyond its own territorial waters.38 Although GCC states have been enhancing their naval capability—the UAE recently acquired 6 French-built corvettes, along with 24 amphibious assault ships and 70 transport and attack helicopters, while Oman has invested in at least 3 offshore vessels, to be supported by 36 naval helicopters—the ob- jective of such acquisitions is the defense of their own Source: Cordesman, “The Gulf Military Balance in 2010.” territorial waters a mere 12 nautical miles off the coast.39

Still, the UAE recently achieved one notable counter- ing 16 high-speed boats and 1,600 Special Forces.42 While piracy success. On April 2, 2011, UAE Special Forces, the effort has not eliminated Yemeni-based pirate opera- backed by air force units and in coordination with the tions, such initiatives can be a step in the right direction U.S. Fifth Fleet, boarded and retook the Abu Dhabi- to suppress their growth. However, if current political un- owned bulk carrier MV Arrilah-I, which had been hi- rest in Yemen worsens, such modest progress may be lost. jacked and was under pirate control. The forces secured Piracy’s complexity hampers international efforts to reach the safe rescue of the crew and arrested the pirates, consensus on how best to deal with the issue. Two ma- who will be charged and prosecuted in the UAE.40 jor problems exist at the root of this challenge: the scope Beyond these operational considerations, a more ro- of operations at sea and the lack of local governance and bust individual and collective role for GCC states would law enforcement on land.43 The pirates’ effective operat- have to account for several key factors. For one thing, ing range now covers more than 1 million square miles the GCC’s uneven track record in developing unified of ocean, an impossible area to patrol effectively, accord- strategies, let alone effective, interoperable forces that ing to military officials and policy analysts.44 The cor- are able to carry out common missions, is a major chal- nerstone of pirates’ freedom of operations remains the lenge to overcome. As Anthony Cordesman writes, “the safe haven that an ungoverned Somalia provides. Pirates Southern Gulf states have large military resources but experience no pressure from the local government what- limited real-world effectiveness and have made limited soever. They remain untouched by any form of local law progress towards collective and integrated defense.”41 enforcement. As long as safe havens exist, piracy in the Moreover, the United States continues to guarantee the broader Arabian Sea will flourish. As Jason Alderwick, collective and individual security of GCC states, and so a maritime defense analyst at the International Institute primacy in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf seems for Strategic Studies (IISS), noted, “Maritime security unlikely to shift from the United States to the GCC any- operations in that area are really only a sticking plas- 45 time soon. Still, a more active GCC role in counter-piracy ter, they are addressing the symptoms not the causes.” operations presents GCC navies with the opportunity to In addition, inadequate legal frameworks limit the ability gain operational experience and improve interoperability of international forces to combat piracy. Specifically, some (both with other GCC states and with the United States) laws of Western nations restrict preemptive action against in an environment where the threat is manageable. suspected pirates. The pirates are aware of these complicat- 46 Yemen, a non-GCC state, has also taken some indepen- ed rules of engagement and use them to their advantage. dent actions against pirates operating on its coast. The Perhaps even more legally difficult than intervention Yemeni Coast Guard created an antipiracy unit compris- is the prosecution of the pirates once detained by na-

1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org/mideast 6 | CSIS Middle East Program | Gulf Analysis Paper val forces. Legal complexities of Western nations and to a primary role in combating piracy in the coastal waters the lack of political will to prosecute has led to the re- off the shore of the Arabian Peninsula. A focused effort on lease of between 500 and 700 pirates over the last three managing operations within the Gulf of Aden should be a years, with some pirates having been arrested multiple starting point. The smaller vessels of GCC navies and their times.47 Often naval forces must ensure that the pirates current coastal capabilities are more suited to patrolling have enough supplies and fuel to return home—and that narrow waterway rather than the vaster expanses of the have even performed engine repairs to pirate vessels.48 Arabian Sea to the west. Moreover, the limited geographic area is a manageable mission to test GCC naval capabili- recommendations and conclusions ties. In addition, GCC navies could over time manage secu- Current antipiracy efforts have not been enough to discour- rity of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor age the practice. As of April 14, 2011, the 17 hijackings this (IRTC), a section of water that vessels transiting the Gulf year are on pace to equal if not surpass last year’s total of of Aden are recommended to sail through for safety. 49 hijacked vessels.49 In fact, the pirates are becoming more This is a long-term process, but in the short term GCC violent. In February 2011, pirates hijacked a sailboat cap- navies could work toward these goals by increasing their tained by a retired couple from California. The pirates killed participation in CTF-151 and by taking on expanded all four Americans on board before the U.S. Navy could ef- roles in strategy, command, and operations. In conjunc- fectively intervene. The action marked a departure from the tion, GCC states should increase their investment in modus operandi of most pirates, who prefer to keep hostag- training for VBSS operations and continue expanding es alive in order to collect ransom. A U.S. State Department their fleets of coastal vessels and auxiliary helicopters. official signaled that the killing of the four Americans was These efforts should be fully coordinated with U.S. and a game changer: “We get it. We need to recalibrate.”50 other naval forces to maximize coordination and coop- Yet at the same time, piracy in the Gulf of Aden and eration. In designing these strategies, GCC states should Arabian Sea does not constitute a grave and immediate seriously study other subregional counter-piracy efforts— threat to the security interests of the international com- for instance, the recent initiatives by the Association of munity or the United States. However, as piracy expands Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which have dramati- and the success of its activities reaches deeper into the cally reduced piracy in and around the Strait of Malacca. Arabian Sea, piracy will become a greater danger to GCC Second, GCC states should complement enhanced anti- trade and a more difficult threat to eradicate. It is now piracy naval operations with developing effective law en- clear that, based on the rising number of incidents and forcement and legal mechanisms to efficiently prosecute improving capabilities of pirates, the activity has become and imprison pirates. This would serve as an increased de- a way of life in the region, not a passing phenomenon. terrent to pirates, who are seldom charged and prosecuted Addressing the piracy problem will require a coordinated due to the lack of suitable legal framework. Such a sys- response by a number of international actors. The interna- tem might include specially designated courts and prisons tional community, led by the European Union and United for prosecuting and incarcerating pirates and should be States, must continue multilateral efforts to develop a developed in cooperation with international legal bodies. consolidated and comprehensive legal framework for the None of this can happen if GCC states do not make coun- detention and prosecution of suspected pirates. While the ter-piracy operations a higher priority. Currently, counter- international community can assist in shaping the legal piracy is low on the GCC foreign policy agenda, and state- framework, the states of the region, whose direct interests ments or initiatives to address the issue occur sporadically are threatened and who have the financial capabilities to and only as a response to high-profile hijackings or suc- address the issue, must take the lead in combating piracy. cessful operations by local naval forces. In order to seri- In order to bolster their own counter-piracy capabilities, ously address the problem, GCC states need to match their GCC countries could take a number of concrete steps. political commitment to greater investments and resources. First, in coordination with international actors, GCC gov- Piracy is a problem that plays out in the GCC’s own back- ernments should seek to transition from a secondary role yard and poses an opportunity for GCC governments to center for strategic and international studies | middle east program CSIS Middle East Program | Gulf Analysis Paper | 7 demonstrate greater individual and collective leadership in 14. The Economist, “Piracy: No Stopping Them.” regional maritime security. Failure to do so risks a further 15. AlJazeera.net, “Q&A: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden.” deterioration in the safety of regional waterways and the maritime trade that GCC countries depend on. Ultimately, 16. Ibid.; and Bowden, “The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy,” 11. counter-piracy represents a chance for the GCC coun- 17. Ross McCracken, “Piracy: An Escalated Threat to Shipping?” tries to lead. They should not pass up the opportunity. Platts.com, March 30, 2011. 18. The Economist, “Piracy: No Stopping Them.” about the authors 19. Cummins, “Piracy Grips Gulf of Aden.” 20. Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat Rick “Ozzie” Nelson is senior fellow and director of the to the Strait of Hormuz,” International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program. 2008), 82, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3301_pp082- Scott Goossens is a researcher in the Homeland Security 117_Talmadge.pdf; and Eugene Gholz et al., “Strait of Hormuz: Assessing Threats to Energy Security in the Persian Gulf” (policy and Counterterrorism Program. research project, Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin, August 2008), http://hormuz. robertstrausscenter.org/alt_export_routes. notes 21. Claire Webb, “Record Oil Prices: Iran and the Strait of Hormuz,” 1. The Arabian Sea is bordered by the Arabian Peninsula on the west The Times Online, July 3, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ and India in the east. business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article4262388.ece.

2. Anna Bowden et al., “The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy” 22. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs: (working paper, One Earth Future, Louisville, CO, December 2010), Qatar, January 2011, http://www.eia.doe.gov/countries/cab. 25, http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/The%20Econom- cfm?fips=QA. ic%20Cost%20of%20Piracy%20Full%20Report.pdf. 23. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, “Saudi Arabia Signs Pact to Fight Sea 3. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Suddenly, a Rise in Piracy’s Price,” New York Piracy,” Zawya.com, March 14, 2010, http://www.zawya.com/Story. Times, February 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/ cfm/sidZAWYA20100314033119. weekinreview/27pirates.html. 24. Webb, “Record Oil Prices: Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.”

4. Chip Cummins, “Piracy Grips Gulf of Aden,” Wall Street 25. Carol Huang, “UAE Hosts Global Summit on Piracy Threat,” Journal, September 8, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/ The National, February 4, 2011, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae- SB122083029536208391.html. news/uae-hosts-global-summit-on-piracy-threat?pageCount=2.

5. Ibid. 26. According to the One Earth report, Ap Moeller-Maersk has 6. Captain Gordon Van Hook, “Pirates on the High Seas” (lecture, diverted its fleet of 83 tankers, as has the Norwegian Odfjell shipping World Affairs Council of Western Michigan, Grand Rapids, March group with a fleet of 90 tankers, and Frontline, one of the world’s ma- 21, 2011), http://www.worldmi.org/great-decisions-2011.html. jor oil transporting companies. Some trading nations can also bypass the Somali piracy threat relatively easily. For instance, Australian-or- 7. ICC Commercial Crime Services, “Attacks of the Somali Coast igin tonnage transiting through the Suez Canal dropped steeply from Drive Piracy to Record High, Reports IMB,” April 14, 2011, http:// 25,279,000 tons in 2008 to 3,679,000 in 2010. See Bowden, “The www.icc-ccs.org/news/441-attacks-off-the-somali-coast-drive-piracy- Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy,” 12. to-record-high-reports-imb. 27. Although some pipelines exist that can transport oil to ports on 8. The Economist, “Piracy: No Stopping Them,” February 5, 2011, the Red Sea, such as Saudi Arabia’s 745-mile East-West pipeline, http://www.economist.com/node/18061574. which has a capacity of 5 million barrels per day (bpd), these remain underutilized. 9. Gettleman, “Suddenly, a Rise in Piracy’s Price.” 28. Emirates News Agency (WAM), “Maritime Piracy Is Quickly 10. Van Hook, “Pirates on the High Seas.” Becoming One of the Most Threatening Challenges of 21st Cen- tury: Abdullah,” March 2, 2011, http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/ 11. The Economist, “Piracy: No Stopping Them.” Maritime_piracy_is_quickly_becoming_one_of_the_most_threaten- 12. Ibid. ing_challenges_of_21st_century_Abdullah/44627.htm.

13. AlJazeera.net, “Q&A: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden,” No- 29. The Economist, “Piracy: No Stopping Them.” vember 19, 2008, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/afri- 30. Cummins, “Piracy Grips Gulf of Aden.” ca/2008/11/2008111971844162942.html.

31. U.S. Maritime Administration and U.S. Department of Transpor- 49. ICC Commercial Crime Services, “Piracy News and Figures,” tation, “Economic Impact of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden on Global April 11, 2011, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/pira- Trade,” September 2010, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Eco- cynewsafigures. nomic_Impact_of_Piracy_2010.pdf. 50. Gettleman, “Suddenly, a Rise in Piracy’s Price.” 32. Bowden, “The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy,” 12.

33. UPI, “Firms Plan Private War Against Pirates,” April 26, 2011, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/04/26/ Firms-plan-private-war-against-pirates/UPI-26481303846794/.

34. McCracken, “Piracy: An Escalated Threat to Shipping?”

35. General (Ret.) Khaled Abdullah Al Bu-Ainnain, “The GCC and Piracy: An Arab Solution” (briefing paper for “Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime Piracy,” Madinat Jumeirah Hotel, Dubai, UAE, April 18–19, 2011), http://counterpiracy.ae/briefing_papers/Bu%20Ainnain%20The%20 GCC%20and%20Piracy%20An%20Arab%20Solution.pdf.

36. Faiza Saleh Ambah, “After Hijacking, Saudi Foreign Minister Says Nation Will Join Anti-Piracy Efforts,” Washington Post, No- vember 19, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2008/11/18/AR2008111801167.html. This analysis paper is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a pri- 37. Loveday Morris, “A Regional Solution to Gulf Naval Security,” vate, tax-exempt institution focusing on international The National, April 18, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae- public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and news/a-regional-solution-to-gulf-naval-security. nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific poli- 38. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: National Security in a cy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, and Troubled Region (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger/CSIS, 2009), 35. conclusions expressed in this publication should 39. Michael Knights, “The Changing Military Balance in the Gulf,” be understood to be solely those of the author(s). RealClearWorld.com, September 15, 2009, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/09/15/changing_military_balance_in_the_ © 2011 by the Center for Strategic and gulf_97162.html. International Studies. 40. David Mugridge, “The GCC Can Solve, Not Just Manage, the CSIS MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM Somali Piracy Threat,” The National, April 5, 2011, http://www. thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/the-gcc-can-solve- Jon B. Alterman not-just-manage-the-somali-piracy-threat. With additional informa- Director tion from Khaled Abdullah Al Bu-Ainnain, “The GCC and Piracy: An Arab Solution.” Haim Malka Deputy Director 41. Anthony Cordesman and Aram Nerguizian, “The Gulf Military Balance in 2010: An Overview” (working paper, CSIS, Washington, Matthew Burnard D.C, April 22, 2010), 2, http://csis.org/files/publication/100422_ Research Associate GulfMilBal.pdf. Michael Dziuban 42. Khaled Abdullah Al Bu-Ainnain, “The GCC and Piracy: An Arab Research Assistant Solution.” Allison Hutchings 43. Gettleman, “Suddenly, a Rise in Piracy’s Price.” Program Coordinator/Research Assistant 44. Ibid. John Nowak 45. AlJazeera.Net, “Q&A: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden.” Molly Brister 46. The Economist, “Piracy: No Stopping Them.” Interns 47. Ibid. Please visit our website at www.csis.org/mideast to 48. Ibid. learn more about the program’s work.

center for strategic and international studies | middle east program