Policy Notes for the Trump Notes Administration the Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ 2017 ■ Pn41
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TRANSITION 2017 POLICYPOLICY NOTES FOR THE TRUMP NOTES ADMINISTRATION THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ 2017 ■ PN41 MIDDLE EAST MARITIME SECURITY The Growing Role of Regional and Extraregional Navies THEODORE KARASIK JEREMY VAUGHAN IN THE PAST, the Great Powers were alone in establishing naval bases throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and to project power. Today, by contrast, a number of leading regional states, including Iran, Israel, and several members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), are increasingly active in acquiring access and basing rights throughout MENA; furthermore, they have begun to flex their military muscle and are building logistics networks to support this growth. Meanwhile, Russia has returned to the Middle East, and the Chinese and Indian navies are playing a greater regional role. Together, these developments are transforming MENA’s maritime security environment in ways that have profound implications for both the region and U.S. interests. ©2017 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. KARASIK | VAUGHAN Historically, only the dominant naval powers—pri- waned. Britain withdrew its forces to “east of the Suez” marily Britain and the United States—maintained mari- in 1968, leaving a vacuum that was filled in subsequent time logistical support in the region, providing it in the decades by the United States. But the U.S. presence has following ways: diminished over the past five years, offset by growing GCC naval basing, bunkering, and access to match a UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT by combat sup- more assertive security role in the region. Either by build- port ships capable of refueling, rearming, and pro- ing bases or by blocking rivals, the United Arab Emirates visioning the fleet at sea. These support ships can and Saudi Arabia have been the most successful actors, compensate somewhat for the absence of an on- while Iran, Russia, China, and India are still struggling to shore logistics infrastructure, but cannot operate far establish a foothold for their forces. from a fueling port. PORT ACCESS, the least diplomatically intensive Trade Trends and Maritime Security but also the least logistically supportive option, fills The MENA strategic security environment is being trans- an important need. With access to a port, a ship formed by tectonic shifts in global maritime trade. In can pull into safe harbor in times of heavy weather, broad terms, signs are plentiful that the extended down- meet food, water, and other supply requirements, turn in maritime trade that accompanied the global and obtain medical, repair, or other assistance in financial crisis is over. For example, since the Decem- case of emergency. Yet deploying to a region with ber 2015 completion of the $143 million general cargo port access only can be risky. Ports can be closed addition to Oman’s deepwater port at Salalah, container for diplomatic reasons, and fuel and food stores volume has risen 29 percent.2 In Egypt, since the $8 bil- 3 not guaranteed. lion Suez Canal expansion was completed in August 2015, cargo traffic is growing despite slow global trade.4 BUNKERING ARRANGEMENTS, which are gen- In 2016, the critical Strait of Malacca and Singapore erally more flexible, allow transiting ships to plan Strait saw a 3.4 percent increase to a record 83,740 their navigation and operations around guaran- transits in 2016.5 The Red Sea region, already support- teed fuel stores located at the port. ing 10 percent of global maritime trade, is seeing explo- sive growth even as it is considered one of the world’s OWNERSHIP OR LEASING OF A LOGISTICAL least exploited markets.6, 7 The United Nations expects PORT OR BASE, from which a nation can operate the basin’s population to double in thirty-five years, sup- its ships, offers the best and most secure option. porting a regional tripling of GDP and a fourfold growth In such a case, access to land, food, aid, fuel, in trade, 90 percent of which is expected to be over sea and—in some instances—ammunition is ensured, routes. Maritime trade between Africa and the rest of the mitigating much of the risk associated with operat- world has increased 200 percent since 2000.8 A major- ing far from home. Upgrading a port into a logis- ity of remaining seaborne import/export trade growth in tics hub, the ultimate power-projection facilitator, the region is tied to China. Today, more than 85 percent requires established rail and air infrastructure as of crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz is exported to well as extensive regional vendor and industrial Asian markets.9 China’s One Belt One Road policy, dra- base support. matic demographic growth in India, and growing energy Networks of logistics ports are hard to acquire and demands throughout the Far East will increase the traffic expensive to maintain. Even at the height of their mari- through MENA’s ports. time strength, the Soviets faced challenges in building a While the eastern routes will remain the most impor- periodic, or crisis-response, presence in the Mediterra- tant, Saudi Arabia is making the Red Sea region a key nean and MENA regions, forcing them to largely refuel maritime transit zone by expanding port facilities there. at sea. Ultimately, given the high costs and complications Significant Saudi investment in the Port of Jizan, King of such force projection without any guarantee of long- Abdullah Economic City and Port, and al-Muajjiz oil ter- term access, they abandoned those waters.1 The British minal will help diversify the kingdom’s oil transport away and subsequent U.S. presence in MENA, likewise, has from a Strait of Hormuz threatened by Iran but increases 2 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY MIDDLE EAST MARITIME SECURITY the security pressures in the Bab al-Mandab (BAM) stretched by rising global threats, notably in the South Strait, a chokepoint threatened by Iranian pseudo- China Sea and around the Korean Peninsula. While proxies. Egyptian and Moroccan port facilities, along Adm. John M. Richardson, the current U.S. Navy chief of with heavy Chinese investment in inland transit infra- naval operations, does not explicitly outline force-struc- structure, including railways, roads, and airports, will ture goals for the Middle East in “A Design for Maintain- also accelerate waterborne traffic through the BAM as ing Maritime Superiority,”13 the Navy remains on track to Africa potentially replaces Asia10 as the region with the marginally increase its presence in the Gulf region, as highest demographic and economic growth rates past outlined in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea 2040. To be sure, as the world’s economic powers are Power.14 This temporary bump in forces steaming into the positioning themselves for a share of growing Asian Red Sea, along with others assigned to the area by the and emerging MENA markets, the security of regional Combined Maritime Forces, still leaves a security gap, chokepoints, including the critical Strait of Hormuz, the which will need to be filled by regional forces. important BAM, and areas throughout the Red Sea, will rise in importance. Basing and Bunkering Strategies The growth of maritime shipping will increase secu- rity requirements in and around these critical SLOCs. Military logistics for Arab navies is growing in impor- Regional nations that heretofore have provided periodic tance as these nations begin taking a more active role in coastal protection may find they must expand patrols securing the region and a more assertive role in project- from the Strait of Hormuz to Egypt’s Suez Canal, transit- ing power. The ability of Arab navies to build bases out- ing between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and side their international maritime boundary constitutes down the east coast of Africa to secure the waterways. the geopolitical entrance fee for military operations far Underscoring the need for a robust naval presence are removed from coastal waters and littoral regions. While attacks by Yemeni Houthis on both naval and merchant information sharing, bilateral and multilateral exercises, vessels, using rockets, cruise missiles, and remote-con- and search-and-rescue plus interdiction operations help trolled boat bombs.11 Regional navies are responding. build interoperability at the most basic levels, all require Egypt, seeing threats to the Suez Canal and its Red Sea beans, bullets, and fuel to usefully support military trade routes, has invested heavily in its navy and posi- effort. Regional navies—including Israel’s—are invest- tioned many newer units in the Southern Fleet Com- ing in all these areas. mand, which was created in January 2017 with the goal of offering “safety, security and rescue assistance to UAE Arab brothers in the Gulf.”12 In the Horn of Africa, coun- The UAE has invested heavily in naval logistics, terpiracy operations have brought scores of regional amplifying the effect of its small navy in the region. In and extraregional naval ships together as part of the the Horn of Africa, Yemen, and the Bab al-Mandab, U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces. Finally, Saudi Ara- Abu Dhabi has invested in projecting a strong naval bian and Emirati naval forces maintain a continuous presence. Specifically, the UAE has presence in the Red Sea as their coalition persists in its fight against the Houthis. used the roll-on/roll-off terminal at Little Aden (Yemen) 15 Further, the May 2017 visit by U.S. president Don- as a beachhead, providing amphibious and naval ald Trump to Saudi Arabia signaled a new era in access to the mainland from the Gulf of Aden; expanded GCC capabilities, not only through U.S. liberated and subsequently gained access to the port arms sales but also through the growth of indigenous maritime-defense enterprises.