INTRODUCTION OR some centuries after the days of Canute the story of British relations with Denmark-Norway tells mainly of contest in Fthe field of commerce. The Danes not only hindered traffic through the Sound and by the Elbe, but absolutely forbade to British ships entry to their northern waters, whether for purposes of fishery, of trade to Iceland or northern Norway, or of mere passage. The British, on their side, resented the hindrances and defied the pro- hibition. Repeated endeavour in the course of the fifteenth century to compose the quarrels by treaty had in each case but pass- ing effect, and although that of 1583 freed the passage to the White Sea, first accomplished thirty years before, the other restrictions were maintained and not infrequently bore fruit in actual hostilities. With the opening of the Thirty Years' War political interests survened. James I, generous in words and promises, incited his brother-in-law, Christian IV, to champion the protestant cause, concluding a treaty of alliance with him in 1621. (Incidentally he borrowed of Christian sums of 200,000 and 100,000 rix-dollars, at six per cent interest, for the relief of his hard-pressed son-in-law, the Elector Palatine.) Four years later Charles I joined with Christian and the States-General in the triple treaty of the Hague, and in 1639 renewed that of 1621. But with the Commonwealth came ill-will. In 1653 the Danes, instigated by and in treaty with the Dutch, closed the Sound to British ships and seized some that ventured the passage. Cromwell then was equal to the occasion, and the restoration of Charles II brought treaties of alliance in 1661 and of commerce in 1665. And though in the next year Louis XIV was able to engage Denmark in war against Great Britain, peace was restored at Breda in 1667.1 Nevertheless, and in spite of a 1 For details of Anglo-Danish negotiations in the years 1660 to 1667 see H. L. Sehoolcraft, The English Historical Review, XXV, 457. Vll

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 viii INTRODUCTION last commercial treaty of 1670, the subject of appeal for more than a century, trade differences remained for long years the cause of ever recurrent trouble. A first concern of William III, established in England, was to gather troops for service against France, and none were more desirable than Swedes and Danes. First, however, had to be com- posed the latest outbreak of hostilities between Denmark and Holstein-Gottorp. In June 1689, in the face of a congress assembled at Altona to conciliate, Swedes and Liineburgers were actually marching to support Duke Christian Albert. William sent to Stockholm William Duncombe and to Copenhagen Robert Moles- worth, similarly instructed in the matter, save that threat of armed intervention was to be intimated by the former delicately but by the latter forcibly. And this difference of treatment showed itself in another way; Charles XI was to be invited to join the Grand Alliance, but Christian V, for the present, not. Similarly during the next forty years, save for the four when George I, as elector, was at war with Charles XII, Sweden always had the prior regard. In 1700, for instance, force was applied in aid of Charles XII, and in 1726, while the Swedes were urgently pressed to join the alli- ance of Hanover, invitation to the Danes to do so was withheld. In after times Swedish hostility to Great Britain altered the case. Before Molesworth could get to Copenhagen the immediate trouble was dispelled by the signature of the treaty of Altona, on 20 June 1689. The envoy's first business, therefore, was to attend to the instructions sent after him, to procure troops. In this he was successful, though at a price confessedly exorbitant. A treaty signed on 15 August engaged Christian V to send to England or Ireland, at the option and expense of William III, 6000 foot and 1000 horse, veteran soldiers; they to take oath of fidelity to him and to remain in his service so long as he was engaged in the present war, unless Christian, attacked in consequence, were obliged to recall them for his own defence. Were they transported to England or Scotland their price was to be 240,000 thalers a year, or if to Ireland 325,000.x Carried to Ireland they did valiant service 1 The treaty, Kecord Office, Treaties 36. It was ratified by William III, with some modifications, on 4 September (O.S.) 1689. For the reasons for his grudging acceptance of it, see the Historical Manuscripts Commission, Finch MSS. II, 237.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION ix there in the years 1690 and 1691, afterwards serving with equal distinction in the Netherlands. One provisipn of this treaty stipulated continuance of negotiation for a defensive alliance. Such further treaty was signed at Copen- hagen on 3 November 169c,1 but it remained unratified. Indeed Christian V, exempted by one clause of it from obligation to enter into war-with France, engaged with Louis XIV to stand neutral. For the rest Molesworth had to deal with the same trouble that spoilt Duncombe's work in Sweden, the prohibition of trade with France (August 1689). With Denmark, after her convention with Sweden for joint protection of their trade, a treaty on the subject was concluded, on 30 June 1691,2 but it had little effect. Seizure of ships and confiscation of their cargoes continued, even after renewal of the Swedish convention, in a stronger form, in March 1693. Actual collisions occurred, as when in the summer of 1694 a Danish captain refused to strike his flag to the British fleet in the Downs and fought his ship till it was taken.3 Offence given by Molesworth to the Danish court in June 1692 compelled his withdrawal. His secretary, Hugh Greg, left in charge of affairs without official character, had little to do but to report occurrences. Negotiations, almost exclusively connected with the war with France, were either conducted at the Hague or entrusted to special envoys. One such envoy, already in Molesworth's time, (April 1691), was Charles, Earl of Selkirk. Another, sent in 1693 to mediate in the matter of Saxe-Lauenburg, was Robert Sutton, Baron Lexington. Both missions were successful; the latter by a treaty signed on 29 September 1693.4 Again, in 1697, James Cressett, envoy to the Brunswick dukes, was deputed to take part in the conferences opened in the previous year at Pinneberg for settlement of quarrel with Holstein-Gottorp renewed. The abortive treaty of 1690 was made good by one with Great Britain and Holland signed at the Hague on 3 December 1696. Stipulated among other things was application of the casus fcedeHs, should France renew attack after peace was made. Secret 1 Record Office, Treaties 37. Mutual succours were fixed at 3000 foot and eix men-of-war for Denmark, and 5000 foot and ten men-of-war for Great Britain. 2 Ibid. 38. 8 See fully on these matters G. N. Clark, The Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade, 1688-1697, chapter V; Miss M. Lane in the Trans- actions of the Boyal History Society, Third Series, Vol. V. 1 A copy, Record Office, Denmark 23. For the affair see page 2, below.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 x INTRODUCTION articles obliged Christian V to prohibit during the present war all commerce of his subjects with France, and to forbid admission of French men-of-war or privateers to his ports, especially in the Sound. In return for this Great Britain and Holland accorded an annual subsidy of 200,000 thalers, until ratification of a treaty of peace, and in addition 300,000 annually for three years. Other secret articles concerned accession by the Emperor to the treaty, the hire of Danish troops by him, passivity on the part of Christian in the matter of the Ninth Electorate (the confirmation of which to Ernest Augustus of Hanover Louis XIV had engaged him strenuously to oppose), and the satisfaction of Danish monetary claims on Spain.I In the year 1700 Cressett was again employed on northern affairs, now with credentials as envoy extraordinary to the new king, Frederick IV. He does not, however, appear to have gone to Copenhagen. His commission had principal regard to the hostil- ities re-opened with Holstein-Gottorp, the prelude to the Great Northern War. This time the sea-powers, anxious to enlist in their cause Charles XII of Sweden, did not confine their efforts to mediation; they sent to his aid a joint fleet under command of Admirals Sir George Rooke and Philips van Almonde. Rooke was in- structed that the fleet was sent to give effect to the guarantees of the treaty of Altona ; he was to act in conjunction with the Swedish and facilitate the transport of Swedish troops into Jutland or the Isle of Fiinen, handing in to Frederick IV demand immediately to cease hostilities and to withdraw his troops out of Holstein. Action followed; junction with the Swedish fleet effected the Danish was driven into harbour and there, somewhat as a matter of form, bombarded.2 On 4 August Charles XII, thus protected, effected a landing in Zealand and marched on Copenhagen. Frederick IV gave in; peace was signed at Travendal on 18 August. Next year Greg was accredited minister resident, in order that he might renew, with his Dutch colleague, Robert Goes, the defen- sive treaty of 1696. The new treaty, elaborated from the other, was signed by them on 15 June i70i.s Dying in the following January Greg was replaced by the younger James Vernon, and he 1 Becord Office, Treaties 39. a So little damage was done that it was supposed that the bombs used were not charged. Rooke's instructions and journal, unfortunately most negligently edited (see the English Historical Review, XIII, 17), have been published in Volume IX of the Navy Records Society. 3 Record Office, Treaties 40. It engaged the service of 12,000 Danes.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xi in his turn, in 1706, by Daniel Pulteney, both as envoys extra- ordinary. They had no quiet time. In 1705, for instance, there was contest again with Holstein-Gottorp, this time about the succession to the bishopric of Liibeck, which Frederick IV claimed for his brother Charles. The sea-powers and the Emperor opposing the claim, the question was compromised by the grant of English and Dutch pensions to Prince Charles, of £4000 and £2000 a year respectively, in after years the subject of vain demands for pay- ment.1 There followed the Hamburg troubles, to compose which Dr. John Robinson was deputed in 1707, after completion of his work with Charles XII in Saxony, disputes about Queen Anne's jointure, after her husband's death, and always there was quarrel about such matters as the Sound tolls, seizure of Swedish ships carrying naval stores to England, or obstruction of the Elbe trade. After the catastrophe of Poltava in 1709 Denmark re-entered upon war with Sweden. It is unnecessary to relate here the events —finally the Danish occupation of Bremen in 1712—which set George Louis of Hanover against his old ally.2 Queen Anne's ministers did all that by remonstrance they could to save Sweden from her fate, but their retirement from the war with France left them powerless abroad. Frederick IV laughed at his aunt's threats, whether in regard to his war measures or to his impositions on British trade. The dispatches to Pulteney and other envoys testify to the wrath, and at the same time to the impotence of her last government. George Louis of Hanover had practically agreed to join the assail- ants of Sweden, as elector, before his accession to the throne of England, though his formal declaration of war was delayed until November 1714. There followed the years during which, until the death of Charles XII, Great Britain was also at war with Sweden, in effect if not in name. George I was represented at Copenhagen from 1716 by Alexander Campbell, Lord Polwarth, Pulteney having been recalled on the return of the Whigs to power, to become, later, a thorn in their sides in parliament. In the same year the 1 Cf. Townshend to Glenorchy, page 64, below. That envoy had just advised that no treaty could be made with England unless the arrears were paid up. A composition of the claim, transferred after Prince Charles's death in 1729 to his sister Sophie Hedvige, appears to have been effected in 1731. 2 See fully the editor's George I and the Northern War, chapters II, III.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xii INTRODUCTION breach between George I and Peter the Great split up the northern league. Denmark held with Hanover, but yet in 1718 proposals for a treaty with Great Britain came to nothing, principally because George I could not guarantee grant by parliament of the subsidies which Frederick IV made an essential condition. Nor had the future Grand Chancellor, Count Holsteinborg, better success, when he came to London to negotiate in February 1719. On the other hand Polwarth was able to obtain temporary satisfaction in regard to the Elbe commerce. After the death of Charles XII George changed his measures, arranged for Sweden, at great profit to himself, treaties with Hanover Prussia and Great Britain, and forced Frederick IV, by threat of isolation, to abandon his invasion of Sweden and to restore Stral- sund and Riigen, in return for Swedish money and concessions and the acquisition of ducal Sleswick under the guarantees of Great Britain and France. In April 1721, on the appointment of Lord Polwarth to represent Great Britain at the congress of Cambray, John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy, came to take his place at Copenhagen. His first con- cerns were with the general league projected by George I against Peter the Great and with proposals for a subsidy treaty. Endeavours for the former failing, nothing was left to George but to exhort the Swedes to come to terms with Peter at any cost. The result was the peace of Nystad, after which the Sleswick question dominated northern politics. Peter, and after him Catherine I, took the young duke, Charles Frederick, under their protection and during their time kept Denmark and Hanover in continual alarm by threat of forcible intervention on his behalf. The negotiation for a subsidy treaty also failed, through excessive demands by the Danes. Nor in the next year (1722) could terms be agreed, although the news of hostile Russian armaments pre- paring made them anxious to conclude, while on the British side the scare of the " Atterbury Plot" rendered Danish naval and military aid desirable. And during the next years Danish appeals had no better fate. For partly British finances still suffered from the crash of 1721; partly it was understood how distasteful agree- ments with Denmark would be to allied France. In April 1724 merit was sought at Paris by the assertion that the Danish solicita- tions had been rejected " purely out of regard to the instances of the court of France." Glenorchy was able to spend most of his

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xiii time at Aix or Spa, or on private business in England; leaving the conduct of affairs at Copenhagen to his secretary, Johann Her- mann, until in April 1726 European developments sent him hurriedly back to his post. The previous year had seen the treaties . of Vienna between Austria and Spain, the rupture of the congress of Cambray, and the counter-alliance of Great Britain France and Prussia concluded at Hanover. In the course of the winter the reports of its ministers at Vienna and Madrid, and the revelations of Ripperda, had con- vinced the British government of secret engagements between Austria and Spain for the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca, the restoration of "James III" in England, and extirpation of the protestant religion. Wrong as this belief was, at least as regarded Austria, there was enough to justify it. There had followed the final collapse of the long French negotiation at Petersburg, and it was evident that Catherine I was tending to join the allies of Vienna. A Russo-Austrian attack on Hanover and Denmark was confidently expected, and Prussia, exposed to the first brunt of it, was deserting to the enemy. Great Britain could act by sea, could dispatch one strong squadron to the Baltic, another to the West Indies to stop return of the Spanish treasure-fleets, a third to keep watch upon the coasts of Spain, but George I could not defend his German dominions with only his Hanoverians and his hired Hessians. The French objected to send troops across the Rhine, unless on lawful requisition under the treaties of Westphalia. There remained the military forces of Denmark and Sweden. To engage the former the simple course had been to invite Frederick IV to accede to the alliance of Hanover. That could not be, though he was willing. Both France and Prussia dis- favoured the proposition, and it was well understood that if the Danes came in the Swedes, whose accession was rated of equal importance with that of Holland, would stay out. It was decided to negotiate only a convention for troops, discussion of conditions for which between London and Paris took up the whole summer of 1726. George I would not share the cost; he claimed to have spent enough on naval armaments and the purchase of Hesse- Cassel. The main difficulties, however, were other; French scruples about the manner of action of their army of the Rhine and insistence on insertion of an article in favour of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, as the only means of conciliating Russia. The British government

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xiv INTRODUCTION had to allow this article, but only in a form so modified, that Townshend could boast of its emptiness.1 The draft at last agreed, the French consented to send again, after a lapse of 24 years, an ambassador to Copenhagen, Pierre Blouet, Chevalier de Camilly. The Danes raised endless difficulties. Freed from their apprehensions of the summer they saw before them six months for bargaining. In vain George I made concessions on his own part, in vain he pressed the necessity of them on the court of France. Not till 16 April 1727 was the convention signed. Then practically the whole army of Denmark was engaged for the defence of Lower Germany, at the expense of Louis XV. George I undertook, besides the troops that he was himself to furnish, to send a sufficient squad- ron to Copenhagen on first certain advice of danger from a Russian fleet, and also to make up the "agio," the difference between the depreciated Danish currency, in which the French subsidy was to be paid, and Hamburg " banco" value. The Holstein article was dropped.2 Sweden had acceded to the treaty of Hanover a month before, and late as these successes came they had their value. In May 1727 peace or war in Europe hung on the question whether the Emperor would or would not suspend his charter to the Ostend Company. The inclusion of Sweden and Denmark in the array against him must have influenced and may have determined his surrender, registered in the preliminaries of peace signed at Paris at the end of the month. Beyond that the convention had no present application. On 6 May (O.S.) Catherine I died, and with her the Russian menace vanished. They who now gained control at Petersburg cared nothing for the interests of the duke, her son-in-law, who shortly retired to his home at Kiel. The Danes disarmed, and the British squadron sent was as soon as possible recalled. In the meantime George I had died at Osnabriick on 22 June 1727. Glenorchy could now again enjoy a holiday, until in the next year the matters set out in new instructions from George II 3 obliged his return.

1 See his dispatch to Glenorchy, pages 75, 76, below. 2 The convention, Record Office, Treaties 46. For full details of the negotiation see the editor's The Alliance of Hanover, chapters XIX, XXXII, XLIV. 3 See pages 81 f., below.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xv The first of these concerned the jealously guarded trade to the East Indies. Frederick IV thought to resuscitate the old East India Company of Copenhagen, now in the last stage of decay, by setting up a filial at Altona, the port which he had long been endeavouring to develop at the expense of Hamburg. Sailing thence the ships would escape the dangerous passage of the Cattegat, and there was prospect, besides, of establishing trade by the Elbe with Central Germany. It was not likely that the sea-powers, fresh from their victory over the Emperor in the matter of the Ostend Company, would tolerate this extension of the other. They could not object to the old-established trade from Copenhagen, but they could and did object, forcibly, to the present scheme, and were supported by France. Investors, consequently, held back, and the project fell through. Frederick took over the business into his own hands, himself finding the necessary funds with the help of his brother-in-law, Count Reventlow, and others of the court. Reconstituted by Christian VI, the " Asiatic Company " was able to prosecute a considerable trade to Trancobar and China. The present trouble with Hamburg concerned the currency. To meet the flood of depreciated Danish money the burghers had at length, in 1726, set up a bank for the issue, for trade purposes, of coin of like value. Frederick IV adopted retaliatory measures, and what was practically a state of war ensued.1 He, and his son after him, closed their Holstein frontier to Hamburg trade, raided effects of the burghers in Norway ports, and seized their ships at sea. The British government could not but give ear to the outcry of the Merchant Adventurers,2 interested as part owners or as in- surers. For years dispatch followed dispatch, document replied to document, counter-proposal to proposal, but it was not until 1736 that the Hamburgers surrendered to the unshakable demand of Christian VI for abolition of the bank and that trade relations could be restored. The third subject, that of the Elbe " wrecks," is fully explained in the instructions. On the other hand, in matters that regarded Hanover, Frederick IV showed himself well disposed to act in concert with George II. When an imperial decree of 11 May 1728 terminated the " Reichs- 1 For particulars of this see Holm, Danmarh-Norges Historie, I, 224 f. 2 The Company of Merchant Adventurers, incorporated in 1564, had long since fixed its headquarters at Hamburg.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xvi INTRODUCTION execution " in Mecklenburg, portending establishment of Prussian authority in that duchy, George declined to recall his Hanoverian troops in occupation and called upon Denmark and Sweden for support. The Mecklenburg nobles were as strongly represented at Copenhagen as at Hanover, and in course of time (May 1729) Frederick IV was brought to join the " treaty of union " arranged by George II with other German princes. Again, when in August 1729 a Prussian invasion of Hanover seemed imminent, and Brigadier Sutton * was sent on a special mission to Copenhagen to require, the succour stipulated under the treaty of 1727 and to report, as a military expert, on the number and efficiency of the troops that could be sent, Frederick readily concurred and under- took at once to march a force towards Hamburg. This quarrel, mainly about men kidnapped on either side, was referred to arbitration by the dukes of Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel and Saxe- Gotha, but when again Prussian action threatened, in connexion with the imperial condemnation of the Italian provisions of the treaty of Seville, on this matter also the Danish minister at Ratisbon was ordered to work with his Hanoverian colleague. In December 1729 Walter Titley, who had come in May to take charge of affairs during the absence of Glenorchy, reported the Danes in warlike humour, and in June 1730 had it that the Danish court had laboured to convince that of Berlin that it would act in support of Hanover. Glenorchy not returning to Copenhagen, on the accession of Christian VI (October 1730) Titley was given credentials as minister resident. He had new men, with whom to deal. Queen Anna Sophie, the second wife of Frederick IV, who had so dominated her husband and whose marriage to him the royal family had so strongly resented, was relegated with her adherents, including her brother-in-law, Grand Chancellor Count Holsteinborg, to obscurity. One member of the Council, Christian Ludwig von Plessen, retained his seat, with charge of the finances, but the others gave place to his younger brother, Karl Adolf, the particular confidant of Christian VI, and to Iver Rosenkrantz, who, as head of both the Danish and German Chanceries, was Grand Chancellor in all but the name. Titley reckoned all three Anglophile and had from them the best 1 Probably the Richard Sutton who had been sent on a mission to Hesse- Cassel in 1727. He was at Copenhagen from 30 August to 21 September 1729.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xvii assurances. The Plessens were sons of that Christian Siegfried, the1 brilliant finance minister of Christian V, who had acted as busi- ness manager for Prince George of Denmark and Queen Anne; Rosenkrantz, their brother-in-law, had twice been accredited envoy to that queen. Joined by the treaty of 1727 with France and Great Britain, with Sweden in the same political system, and with Russian support to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp withdrawn, the Danes could view their present position with satisfaction. But this comfortable state was not to last. The entry of Great Britain into alliance with Austria and Spain in 1731 marked the end of her fourteen years' co-operation with France; henceforward the two powers were to contest control at the northern courts. It was to be largely a question of money, and here Louis XV had the advantage, for what he had he could bestow as he pleased, but George II had to apply to parliament, and could obtain grants for subsidies only in return for services. Already in March 1731 protestation of the innocence of the treaties of Vienna and invective against French intrigue appear in the dispatches. In April Titley marked the French ambassador. Count Plelo, cool towards and working in opposition to him; in July he was " more and more confirmed " in suspicion of French efforts to attach Denmark and Sweden to herself. Recourse was had in November to proposals for a treaty of defence and mutual succour, with separate articles concerning Sleswick and the Elbe " wrecks." x It would serve the Danes, says Titley, by " taking off the imperial court from protecting the duke of Holstein and dis- turbing in the affair of Sleswick." They, however, were found in no hurry to conclude ; as Titley put it: " They are now equally in negotiation with the Emperor England France Muscovy and Sweden, and what we have proposed is perhaps the least offensive step they can possibly take on any side, yet they are not eager to end with us, th6 they were so impatient to begin." The Sleswick question, despite the Russian abandonment of the duke, had continued to be agitated in the courts of Europe, and uneasiness on the subject at Copenhagen had been ever growing. In the present negotiation Christian VI stood out firmly for payment by Great Britain of the half of any compensation to be accorded to the duke, in conformity with the electoral undertaking 1 See Harrington to Titley, pages 100 f., below. B.D.I. VOL. III. B Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xviii INTRODUCTION of George I in 1715. TheBritish government, naturally, repudiated the claim. On the other hand neither would the Danes close with great offers made by France, nor was the position ripe for conclusion with Sweden. With Austria and Russia they came to terms. Report of secret negotiations between Copenhagen and Petersburg had seriously perturbed minds in England, Russia being still an enemy, in the time of Peter II.1 Interrupted by his death, they were renewed by his successor, Anne, who in July 1731 sent to Copenhagen a special minister, Baron Casimir von Brackel, one of her Courlanders. In May 1732 appeared there on the part of the Emperor the redoubtable Count Seckendorf, he who had gained the day at Wusterhausen in 1726 and now was charged to obtain a Danish guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. He, says Titley, awed the Danish ministers at first 2 but quickly gained complete ascendancy over them.3 The result was a treaty concluded with Russia and Austria jointly on 26 May 1732. Christian VI guaran- teed the Pragmatic Sanction and undertook to pay to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp a million crowns in return for his complete renunciation, to be obtained by Charles VI and Anne, of his claim to Sleswick for himself and all his agnates. Should he refuse (and he did refuse) it was agreed that Denmark should be free of his claims entirely under Austrian and Russian guarantees. It was suggested that Great Britain might accede to the treaty, but objected that that would entail a guarantee of the conquests of Peter the Great. There followed conventions with Austria and Russia separately for succours in case of war. A year later broke out the war of the Polish Succession, when Denmark was found disposed to stand with Austria rather than with France, in spite of all that Plelo could say or offer. In October 1733 Titley was assured that, although unwilling to break with France sooner than was necessary, the king would certainly fulfil his engagements with the Emperor. And in fact, in May 1734, a 1 See Townshend to Titley, pages 93, 94, below. 2 " His alert appearance, together with his busy turbulent character, seem to have put the ministers of Denmark on their guard. ... I do not perceive that they are downright afraid of him, th6 his tight habit and brisk motions, with a behaviour that shows him to be entirely gladiatorio animo, are indeed enough to daunt quiet sober people " (13 May 1732). 3 " In short, they give into anything he proposes, and seem to be animated only by him. . . . Count Plelo seems to be entirely out of the question " (24 May).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xix Danish force marched to join Prince Eugene. Shortly afterwards Plelo met a gallant death in a personal attempt to retrieve French honour at Dantzig. No disposition, on the other hand, was shown to fulfil engage- ments with Russia. Titley wrote on 20 April 1734: " They are now fully sensible of the inconsistency of their engagements with Muscovy, and heartily sick of it, but do not however think it time directly to enter into an opposite treaty." That treaty, however, with Sweden, was concluded at Stockholm in September, with the object, according to Titley, of keeping Sweden from joining France " and consequently to prevent the existence of the case of their alliance with Muscovy " ; besides ulterior design of joint opposition to the increase of Russian power in the Baltic. It gave great satisfaction in England. Also now mutual concessions procured conclusion of a British treaty, signed at Westminster on 19 September (O.S.) 1734. George II engaged for his service, if required, 1000 Danish horse and 5000 foot, in return for an annual subsidy of 250,000 crowns for three years, or, should the troops actually pass into his service, 150,000 in addition to their pay. Secret articles stipulated a further con- vention for 1000 men more, if wanted, and no part to be taken by either side in any troubles that might arise in the north.1 Before this the two Plessens, whose credit had been falling steadily, had retired from the Council voluntarily, the elder in April 1733, the younger in January 1734. Nor did Rosenkrantz maintain his former credit. He lacked the favour of the queen's mother, the margravine Sophie Christiane of Brandenburg-Culmbach, who ruled at court and with whom pietistic fervour counted for more than political ability. One man to her taste was Johann Ludwig Holstein, son of the former minister, Johann Georg, admitted to the Council in May 1735 after succeeding Christian Ludwig von Plessen at the head of the finances. Titley credited him with no opinions of his own, but with seeking to discover the king's wishes and supporting them.2 Now also was coming to the front Johann Sigismund Schulin. Son of a German pastor, he had been tutor to the mar-

1 Record Office, Treaties 47. a " These alterations proceed entirely from the Margravine, who has the whole influence at present, and seems resolved to mould the Church the Counsel and the Court to her own likeing, th6 to the extreme disgust and dissatisfaction of the nation " (Titley, 28 May 1735).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xx INTRODUCTION gravine's younger sons, had followed the family to Denmark, and combining ability with piety had quickly won the royal favour. Appointed secretary of state he soon began to take the lead of Rosenkrantz in foreign affairs.1 From the first he was a partisan of France, joining in that policy with another man of foremost influence, General Paul Lovenorn, head of the army and marine. In July 1737 he was admitted to the Council. It was the aim of Rosenkrantz to form an alliance of protection against Russia by extending the treaty of 1734 with Sweden to include Great Britain. Now, however, the British government was on good terms with that of Petersburg. Diplomatic relations had been restored in 1730, and a treaty, mainly commercial, concluded on 2 December (O.S.) 1734. Nevertheless the idea was favoured on the British side, though as a matter, Titley advised, to be " very cautiously managed and well digested and properly timed." 2 But nothing resulted. Although to forward his work Titley sought and gained the confidence of the margravine, that advantage was lost by her death in August 1737, and with Schulin he could effect nothing. In June he had reported Rosenkrantz, having " entirely lost all the secret management of affairs," to have " cautiously and honestly " declined further action in support of his said aim, though still holding it in view, while Holstein and Schulin, if not manifest- ing dislike to the project in general, were not forward to promote it, and it could easily be seen that any overture, conveying no offer of money, would be but coldly entertained by them. For one thing, relations were disturbed by the establishment of a College of Commerce for the encouragement of Danish industries. Schulin was a principal member of it. The measures taken involved a practical prohibition of the import of manufactured goods from England, and, what the British government yet more strongly resented, the engagement of English and Scottish expert work- men to supervise. The subject bulks largely in the dispatches 1 " His great reputation and abilitys have not been sufficient to secure him from the politicks of the Margravine, and from the hatred which the Queen bears to his wife ; this is the source of the mortifications he meets with " (the same, 24 December). 2 See Harrington to Titley and the instructions to the latter, pages 109 f., below. About this time we find a long document, not dated, entitled " Some Considerations upon the Project for making at this time a Defensive Alliance between Great Britain Denmark and Sweden " (Record Office, Denmark 70).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xxi of the time, but nothing that could be done in opposition availed. In August 1737 a new French envoy appeared at Copenhagen, the Chevalier de Chavigny, a diplomatist of experience, who since 1729 had represented Louis XV in England. Before long obser- vation of secret interviews of his with Schulm gave Titley anxiety, and that deepened when the complete victory of the " Hats " in Sweden had brought about the signature of a treaty with France (November 1738). To it Chavigny, the main point of whose instruc- tions had been to effect union between the two Scandinavian king- doms in the French interest, set himself to obtain the accession of Denmark. The alternative presented to the Danish ministers was renewal of the British treaty of 1734. Various difficulties stood in the way of this ; besides the injury of the Danish protective measures and claims for old arrears of subsidy, minor matters such as the plundering of a ship of the Asiatic Company wrecked on the Irish coast, a suit at law entered against the Danish government by one Robert Wightman, and the arrest in London of Baron Sohlenthal's secretary for debt. In that matter Titley particularly pressed for arrangement, were he to be successful in his work. Worst, however, was an affray between Danish and Hanoverian soldiers at Steinhorst, near the Saxe- Lauenburg frontier of Holstein. A troop of Danes sent to occupy the place was attacked and driven out by a stronger Hanoverian force, the captain and several soldiers being killed. Christian VI was furious, but George II, while upholding his right to the place, as once belonging to Saxe-Lauenburg, in present circumstances preferred accommodation. That was effected through Christian's trusted friend and intimate correspondent, his first cousin Count Stolberg of Wernigerode, who afterwards came on to Copenhagen and exerted himself strongly in the English interest. It was time, for the Danes had gone so far with France that the issue, Titley advised, hung on whether he should receive full powers, or Chavigny his final orders, first. Authorised in time, he threw over a number of amendments proposed from England and signed a treaty, a renewal of that of 1734 with only verbal alterations, on 14 March 1739. * In reward for his success he was advanced to the rank of envoy extraordinary. He now, mistakenly, set down Schulin, " the only man in favour," as " entirely in the right systeme and 1 Becord Office, Treaties 48.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xxii INTRODUCTION heartily approves the English alliance. . . . This good prospect and happy change of affairs is entirely owing to Count Stolberg." The news of the treaty, it is to be noted, gave special satisfaction at Petersburg and Dresden, as was formally notified by the ministers of Anne and Augustus III. For it might be expected to restrain the Danes from joining in the attack on Russia, for which the Swedes were seen to be preparing. Titley, on the strength of assurances by Rosenkrantz and of Schulin's apparent change, believed the Danish intention to be to work for maintenance of peace in the north, and in case of war to side against the aggressor. Such equanimity, however, could not be shared in London ; advices received there of French and Swedish overtures to Denmark were too specific. (Christian VI was, indeed, at this time in serious negotiation with Sweden, but his demands proved inadmissible.) When Titley failed to obtain prolongation of the term of his treaty by two years perturbation grew extreme. Dispatch after dispatch during the winter of 1739/40 exposed the intrigues of France and emphasized the dangers threatening. Titley himself turned to believe in some secret understanding with France.1 When in pursuance of strict orders he prepared a memorial, demanding a positive declaration of fidelity, for presentation to the king per- sonally, Christian refused to receive it otherwise than through his ministers. Of Schulin's duplicity he could not now say enough. And though Lovernorn died at the end of February 1740, that advantage was neutralised two months later by the final retirement of Rosenkrantz.2 In June Titley marked the French party "in a manner predominant " ; in August everything governed by the queen and her brother, the margrave Friedrich Ernst, both entirely in the French interest.3 This year 1740 opened a new era in European politics. Frederick William I of Prussia died in June, the emperor Charles VI and Anne of Russia in October. In December Frederick the Great inaugur- 1 On 26 January 1740 he set out a tale of grounds for conviction of " some pityful double dealings on foot to get money from Trance and to raise the price upon England at our next bargain." 2 " Thus at last that honest and worthy minister, whose reputation is BO well established in the world, and whose management of affairs was equally advantageous and honourable to his master, is wholly discharged " (30 April 1740). 3 In Chavigny's instructions, however, the margrave figures as anti- French (Recueil des Instructions, XIII, 149).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xxiii ated his sinister career by his sudden attack upon Silesia. The news of this brought solemn assurance by Christian VI of his in- tention to execute engagements exactly. Still refusing to prolong his treaty with Great Britain, he readily accorded service of the troops engaged by it, declaring that he would hold to his guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction and act in concert with George II to preserve the quiet of Lower Saxony. By the middle of May 1741 the force was in Holstein, ready to pass the Elbe on requisition, and not only the 6000 engaged but 1900 more, if George would pay for them. Titley could report the French party, lately so trium- phant, now quiescent, " nobody cares publickly to discover the least inclination to that interest." At the same time, with reference to the present Swedish attack on Russia, " nothing is more remarkable, notwithstanding all profession to the contrary, than the unwillingness of this court to take any effectual step towards restraining the Swedes from disturbing the tranquillity of the north." Indeed, when demand came from Petersburg for the succour stipulated by the treaty of 1732, excuses were found for not at once complying. Titley conjectured Danish desire to be to see both powers weakened. When France had joined in the attack on Austria, and the French army in Westphalia threatened Hanover, urgent demand came for the Danish force to cross the Elbe. In spite of difficulties about payment of the subsidy, and on other points, the demand was met (September 1741). Now, however, George secured his German dominions by a neutrality convention with Louis XV, and that was the end of his hold on Denmark. Titley's efforts to procure pro- longation of hiis treaty of 1739 remained ineffectual. The final answer given him in January 1742 was that Christian could desire nothing better than ability to comply with the request, but that the Hanoverian convention justified him in seeking safety by like means, and he could not in present circumstances denude himself of so many troops. Thereon came request from England for with- drawal of those already sent, as no longer needed. The fact was that Louis XV had succeeded in buying Denmark for neutrality. The terms were liberal; 400,000 rix-dollars a year for five years and renewal of the French guarantee of Sleswick, with no offensive obligation in return. Christian VI could not but accept the offers. Funds to push trade and industries, to equip fleet and army, and to meet the extravagance of the court were urgently

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xxiv INTRODUCTION needed, and while Great Britain was, no doubt, a powerful ally, for France to be an enemy was dangerous. A treaty was signed on 15 March 1742, the day after the expiry of the British; one of commerce followed in August. Henceforward until after the Seven Years' War France was to hold the reins at Copenhagen. Reason for Christian VI wishing to keep his troops at home, and for the naval and military preparations which Titley marked, lay in what was passing in Sweden, the choice of a successor to that crown. Christian was working and spending money to obtain, by force if necessary, the election of his own son Frederick, a fact to which Titley appears to have been blind, imagining Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, the present king's brother and still, as of old, the British candidate, to be favoured at Copenhagen.1 In the hope of escaping from the disasters of the Russian war the Swedish diet, in October 1742, unanimously chose the legitimate heir, young Charles Peter Ulrich of Holstein-Gottorp, now under protection of the new Russian empress, his aunt Elizabeth. Very soon, however, it was known that he had been adopted into the Greek church and declared successor in Russia. He could not, therefore, reign in Sweden. In his place Elizabeth nominated another of his house, Adolphus Frederick, bishop of Lvibeck and present administrator of Holstein-Gottorp. The Danes could not calmly face the prospect of one hereditary enemy on the throne of Russia and another on that of Sweden. Orders went out to get the troops in Norway Holstein and Zealand in readiness to march. When, despite the armed revolt of the Swedish peasant order in favour of Prince Frederick, the Russian concessions at Abo procured election of the Holsteiner, in June 1743, Christian VI declared for war, if that prince would not satisfy him in regard to Sleswick and Holstein. On 17 September he ordered a descent on Scania. This was wholly contrary to British views ; indeed Lord Carteret, now secretary of state again, had just indited a letter of strongest remonstrance. In fact, since their late conclusion of a treaty of defensive alliance with Russia, the British government had covertly supported election of the administrator. But it was the action of Elizabeth that mattered. She sent a 1 As late as January 1743 Titley scouted the idea of electing Prince Fred- erick as but " a French infusion, designed only to prevent their uniting with us in favour of the Prince of Hesse."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xxv strong naval and military force for the defence of Sweden, and through her minister at Copenhagen, Baron Korff, made positive declaration that she would oppose Danish ambitions with her whole forces. Finding himself isolated, and with his treasury empty, Christian VI issued orders for.his troops to retire into winter quarters. The outcome was agreement, in February 1744, to uphold and to rely on the provisions of the treaties of 1720 and 1734. Soon also agreement was reached with Russia on the Sleswick question. In November 1743 Karl Holstein, brother of the first minister, Johann Ludwig, had been sent as ambassador to Peters- burg, before long to find Grand Chancellor Alexis Bestuzhev work- ing strongly against Adolphus Frederick and the " Hats" in Sweden. A treaty concluded in June 1746 engaged Elizabeth to work for an amicable settlement in favour of Denmark. Prince Frederick was now married to Louisa, the youngest daughter of George II. How the match was contrived furnishes a somewhat diverting story. Secret proposals for it had been made in 1739, but Christian had then said that he was not prepared to consider the question of his son's marriage yet. In 1742 it was ripe for settlement. Frederick's parents had their eyes on one of two German princesses, Louise Ulrica of Prussia, who afterwards married Adolphus Frederick of Sweden, or one of Brunswick- Bevern. On knowledge of this Titley made confidential approach to the one hearty supporter of British interests remaining at Copenhagen, the king's cousin and intimate Count Frederik Danneskjold-Samsoe. He, in recognition of service in reorganising the navy, a matter particularly dear to Christian VI, had displaced Lovenorn as secretary of marine in 1735, and further had been placed at the head of the College of Commerce. More than once attacked by the partisans of France, the result had always been his complete vindication and confirmation of Christian's confidence in him. He advised obtaining from England, secretly, a good miniature of the princess, which he would submit, with others, to the king on pretence of helping him to choose an artist fit to paint a portrait of the queen. The miniature received, and shown, the artifice worked. Christian, attracted, asked whether the likeness was thought to be a good one ; Danneskjold said yes, but not at all to do the princess justice. The king then took it to the queen, and was closeted with her for over an hour, postponing other busi- ness. Subsequently Danneskjold showed it to the prince, who

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xxvi INTRODUCTION swore that he would marry none other and held to his resolve. Schulin, then, announced himself authorised to propose not only this marriage, but also that of Christian's daughter Louise to the duke of Cumberland, conditionally, on removal of opposition to Prince Frederick's candidature for the throne of Sweden. The reply gave ready consent to the former match, but put off the question of the other on the ground that the £15,000 a year at present assigned by parliament for the duke and his heirs was not sufficient provision for a princess of Denmark.x Difficulties about the amount of the princess Louisa's appanage having been surmounted, after a preliminary ceremony at Hanover she was married to Prince Frederick at Copenhagen on 11 December 1743, quickly to gain all hearts by her beauty and amiability. The Cumberland negotiation, although unsuccessful, gave Christian VI excuse for declining unwelcome proposals from Sweden for his daughter's betrothal to Adolphus Frederick. At the end of 1744 the matter was raised anew at Copenhagen, and again by Sohlenthal at Hanover in August 1745, when he was informed that the multiplicity of affairs prevented its consideration, and that decision was for the Privy Council in England. The end was a polite but firm refusal by George II in October 1746. Treaty proposals renewed in July 1744, after France had declared war against Great Britain, still proved fruitless, as did also appli- cation , after the first Jacobite successes in September 1745, for Danish troops to serve in England. The Danes included in their condi- tions undertaking to make full compensation for loss of the French subsidies and trading privileges, should Louis XV interpret the action as contrary to treaty. Titley was informed in November 1745 : " the terms demanded by your court are so excessive, that it is not possible for his Majesty to think of purchasing that assist- ance at such an unreasonable price." Nor could he do better during the winter ; on the contrary, on 9 April 1746 the French treaty was renewed. Four months later Christian VI died. The new king, Frederick V, affable and easy of approach, had little liking for the religious austerities of his parents. Aspiring to be a Dane rather than a German, he was to be a popular monarch, and his queen had made herself universally beloved. They showed Titley special favour; the " family minister," he called himself. Yet Frederick, if amiable, was weak, and wholly under the in- 1 See Carteret to Titley, pages 133-4, below.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xxvii fluence of his private adviser Adam Gottlob Moltke, now made Grand Marshal. He and another man of power, the wealthy French financier Jean Henri Huguetan, Count Gyldenstein,1 worked in close accord with Schulin. Moreover Danneskjold had now at last to succumb to his enemies' attacks, being dismissed from his control of the marine. Titley could obtain no satisfactory answers to his protests whether on commercial grievances or against the reception of French privateers and Jacobite refugees in Norway ports. In his view Danish policy, confessed, was to provide for the present without consideration of permanent interests or future advantages. The new king, he said, inherited " empty coffers, and kingdoms well nigh exhausted, not to speak of debts. . . . Money seems to be still, as it was in the last reign, the only motive and object of this court." Frederick himself was open enough about the situation. He could not, he told Titley at a private interview, dispense with the French sub- sidies, unless compensated. And in February 1747 that he did not see how to escape from his father's engagements with France, save at the sacrifice of good faith ; if Titley could suggest means, accept- able both for the security of Denmark and for the reparation of losses that might be sustained, then, in accordance with his own personal preference, he would be glad to embrace them. Soon there was endeavour to obtain the accession of Denmark to the alliance of France Prussia and Sweden formed in May 1747. The bait was renunciation by Adolphus Frederick of his reversionary claims to Sleswick and Holstein. The British government proposed the accession of Denmark to a counter-alliance of Austria Russia and Great Britain, but without effect. Titley continued in appre- hension of action contrary to British interests, citing especially the influence of the queen mother, until in October placed more at ease. Moltke then confessed to him solicitations from all sides, but declared that the king would be very cautious about new engage- ments and that acceptance of the French proposals was contrary to his views and interests. Instructed to make definite inquiry, whether 9000 Danes could be found for the service of the maritime powers, Titley believed the king " heartily disposed " thereto, so far as might be consistent with his honour and interest, but in the end had to learn from him that a secret article of the French treaty absolutely tied his hands. Frederick hoped that he would not > Particulars about him, BecueU des Instructions, XIII, 143.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xxviii INTRODUCTION suffer in the estimation of his father-in-law by adherence to engage- ments made before his accession. Efforts to detach Denmark from France were not relaxed after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, although by it the immediate need for troops lapsed. In January 1749 Titley had wind of negotiation for renewal of the treaty expiring the next year, and understood the new French offers to be an annual subsidy of 200,000 rix-dollars for three years, or double that sum, would Denmark join the alliance with Prussia and Sweden. Nothing, he wrote in May, but the offer of a sufficient sum from England could prevent acceptance of them. Thereon were sent him instructions for a new British treaty,1 and later he was provided with full powers and authorised to increase the offer of £40,000 a year to £50,000, if must be, or even, as an absolute limit, to £60,000, equal to the highest sum that France was likely to offer. In vain ; in July he was told that the negotiation with France had gone too far to be broken off, and finally that the British offers had come too late and that Frederick had no troops to spare. The Danish treaties with France and Sweden were renewed in August, and on 25 April 1750 Adolphus Frederick was brought by France formally to renounce for himself and his heirs all claim to ducal Sleswick, and to promise, should Holstein fall to him, to exchange that duchy for Oldenburg and Delmenhorst and the sum of 200,000 rix-dollars. On 13 April 1750 occurred what was to Titley a " lucky in- cident," the death of Schulin. It was expected in England that he would be replaced on the Council by the Danish ambassador at Paris, Baron Johann Hartwig Ernst von Bernstorff, from whom, Titley was told, as of Hanoverian birth and always on the best of terms with his Majesty's ministers at Paris, much might be expected. Although of French sentiment, his dislike of Prussia was " a good circumstance." His appointment, however, had to await the death of Frederick, Prince of Wales, for whose service he was retained in the event of that of George II. It took place in May 1751. Seeing that it was his business to keep Denmark and hostile Sweden apart, Titley was now horrified at discovering secret negotiation, apparently on the point of conclusion, for the betrothal of Frederick's four-year-old daughter, Sophie Magdalene, to the Swedish heir presumptive, Prince Gustavus. Immediately he sought audience of the queen, to learn that the contract would 1 See Newcastle to Titley, pages 145 f., below.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xxix certainly be signed unless an equal match for the princess could be proposed from England, namely with Prince George, the future George III. Writing to recommend this (16 January 1751) Titley suggested also the engagement of Prince George's third sister, Louisa Ann, to the baby crown-prince Christian. The Danish princess he described as healthy, if somewhat delicate, well-shaped intelligent and sweet-tempered. The former proposal was approved, provided that no constraint were placed upon Prince George. Frederick V, however, practically committed to the Swedish offer, could not be brought further than to promise for him eventually one of his three daughters, whichever George II should deem the most suitable, and were she free. On 19 December 1751 befel " unexpected disaster, and irrepar- able loss," in the death of Queen Louisa. Her strong support was gone, and while of Bernstorff's opening conduct Titley could write well enough, Moltke he distrusted.1 He could assert positively, however, that the king would not take for a second wife the Prussian princess Amalie, against whom there was violent invective from England.2 In fact, on 26 June 1752 Frederick married Juliana Maria of Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel.3 In September 1753 President Jean-Francois Ogier arrived at Copenhagen as French minister plenipotentiary, specially instructed to obtain prolongation of the French treaty until 1764, when that with Sweden would expire. Titley had been warned to watch him closely, as able and artful. He reported him wealthy also, and intending to make a great show. No doubt, he thought, extreme effort would now be made to bring Denmark into alliance with France and Sweden, an outcome which he was urgently instructed to oppose. On the other hand he could report overtures for the 1 " M. Bemsdorf, whose good intentions are unquestionable, is as able and sensible a minister as Denmark, perhaps, ever had, yet the gentleness of his temper, and his extreme caution, seems to hinder his progress, and it is very certain that he cannot influence his Danish Majesty, in the least, by any other way than thro' the canal of the Grand Marshal, who is sole guide of all the royal resolutions of importance, so that the good effects of M. Berns- dorf's ministry are not to be looked for as yet, but may justly be expected, as I have observed formerly, from time and incidents " (7 March 1752). It maybe noted that Bernstorff's first doings by no means gave satisfaction at Paris, by reason of his opposition to engagements with Sweden and Prussia ; see the Becueil de8 Instructions, XIII, 164-6. 2 See page 152, below. * The public ceremony, and her coronation, followed on 8 July.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xxx INTRODUCTION betrothal of Prince Christian to that English princess, whom he eventually married, the two-year-old Caroline Matilda, and in February 1754 the court to be " wholly bent upon living in peace, and pushing their trade," finding " the profitable neutrality offer'd by France very agreable to that purpose." From Bernstorff, whom he believed to be sincere, he heard that " I might be sure that, let what would happen, Denmark would never be found among the enemies of Great Britain." These assurances failed, however, to allay anxiety in England; too much was known there of French efforts to bring Denmark into alliance with enemy Prussia, This danger was the subject of emphatic dispatches in 1753 and 1754. When in March 1755 the Franco-British collisions in North America portended a new war, inquiry about the supply of Danish troops was made again. Titley, at first, understood that they were wanted for the defence of Hanover. Bernstorff, while antici- pating difficulty in finding them at present, gave a satisfactory answer: the king, he said, looked on Hanover as " a kind of bulwark to Denmark on the side of Germany," and would hold to his guarantee of Bremen and Verden. It was not for that purpose, however, it was explained, that the troops were wanted, but for service in Ireland, to secure that country, denuded of English regiments, against Jacobite attempts. A draft of a treaty was sent, but this case was viewed differently. Were there real danger to the Protestant Succession, said Bernstorff, no contrary engage- ment should withhold the king from giving all help that was possible, but " a bare prudential foresight of danger " was not sufficient; troops sent to Ireland would free a proportionate number of men to fight against France, and Danish neutrality would be compromised. Titley set forth among reasons for the decision interests of trade, now rapidly expanding, the bad con- dition of the army, and fear of Sweden on the one side and of Prussia on the other. In Sweden, however, conditions were changing. Titley had much to write of dissensions between king and senate and of both French and Prussian influence falling. Expecting " some important catastrophe " he advised resumption of diplomatic relations with Stockholm, broken off since 1748 ; if a public minister could not be sent, then perhaps, as Korff suggested, a secret agent to watch the proceedings of the approaching diet under guise of a secretary of the Russian embassy. Then suddenly, in January 1756, the

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xxxi whole situation was changed by the defection of Prussia from France and her alliance with Great Britain. For Denmark the ever-pressing menace from Berlin was for the time laid. In view of the new war Denmark and Sweden resorted again to a convention for protection of their trade, on 12 July 1756. It stipulated neutrality, closure of the Baltic to ships of war and privateers of the belligerents, and junction of forces to protect Danish and Swedish trade in all goods not contraband. Titley, supported in his expostulations by a menacing protest from Korff on the part of Russia, was assured that the measure was not directed against England solely, but against all powers who should attempt to interfere with lawful trade. Swedish and Danish squadrons made formal junction at Flekkaro in Norway in September. Prussia being now on the side of Great Britain, as great effort was made to bring Denmark into alliance with her as two years previously to prevent it. The endeavours, however, failed; the Danes were found determined to preserve neutrality. In January 1757, indeed, Titley could report the king to believe in the necessity of supporting Prussia, "in order to maintain the protestant cause and a ballance of power in the empire," but nevertheless new proposals for a subsidy treaty x failed as before. With all possible assurances it was declared that the neutrality determined on for- bade alliance with one of the principals in the war; only good offices could be employed. These were, indeed, exerted. In the first place was communi- cated a proposal from Vienna to guarantee Hanover from attack, would George II engage to withhold help from Frederick of Prussia. This was condemned from England on the ground that there was nothing to show that the French would assent to it. Besides, its presentment by the Danish envoy in London, Count Rantzau, through the Hanoverian representative there, Philipp Adolf von Munchausen, instead of to the British secretary of state, gave strong offence. Titley was admonished : " You may very properly take this opportunity of expressing his Majesty's surprize that the court of Denmark should have given way to that ridiculous notion of separating the King from the Elector." Request was made for reprimand to Rantzau, and indeed he was shortly recalled. Secondly, when a French attack on Hanover was imminent, and Titley thought the time come to call upon the Danes to give effect 1 For these see in Holdernesse to Titley, page 161, below.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xxxii INTRODUCTION to their guarantee of Bremen and Verden, a convention for the security of those provinces was signed by Bernstorff and Ogier, on II July 1757. And thirdly, after the defeat of the duke of Cumberland at Hastenbeck on 26 July, it was Count Lynar, now governor of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, who negotiated for him the convention of Klosterzeven, which Frederick V offered to guarantee, were it confirmed. In November 1758, again, Count Bothmer, the new Danish envoy in London, presented, as author- ised from Paris, proposals for a separate peace between Great Britain and France. Asked whether that would include the allies of George II, he supposed that that would be so, so far as regarded France. He was informed that his Majesty, while not disinclined to consider just and equitable propositions for himself and his allies, including Prussia, was prevented by his engagements from entering into any separate negotiation. At the end of this year 1758 the wrath of the Danes at the depre- dations committed on their merchant shipping by the British men-of-war and privateers burst into flame. Titley was impor- tunate in urging the necessity of some alleviation. He did not doubt of " a project of combination against us on the anvil," a league of neutral powers, Denmark and Holland and Spain, for protection of their trade, a league which might be joined by Russia and Sweden. Bernstorff he reported to foresee ruin not less certain from continuance of the seizures than from a breach with England. It was " a most serious crisis " ; Denmark was secured by France from danger of a Russian or Swedish attack and had ready 30,000 or 40,000 men and thirty men-of-war; British trade to the Baltic and the Elbe might be cut off and the Russia Company ruined. The force of these representations was recognised. Lord Holdernesse, in careful dispatches of 6 and 9 February 1759, argued in detail the legality of the British action, but intimated acceptance of an expedient proposed, namely, that security should be given for such part of the cargoes of the ships detained as should be deemed confiscable, and they then be released, with full safe- conducts, to pursue their voyages unhindered. This quieted minds in Denmark for a time, and though the concession had little real effect financial and political exigencies precluded more than protest during the remaining years of the war. Security afforded by France referred to a new treaty of 4 May 1758, when the Russian army advancing to the relief of the Swedes

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xxxiii in Pomerania threatened further design on Sleswick-Holstein. The course advised by Titley as the best, to join forces with Prussia, did not commend itself. The treaty mentioned included engage- ments on the part of Denmark to maintain, at French expense, an army of defence in Holstein, and on the part of France to support the scheme of exchange of ducal Holstein for Oldenburg and Del- menhorst. Still during the next years Frederick V held with France. " It is astonishing and almost incredible," Titley wrote, " what a sway the French ambassador has with those that govern here." And when Denmark acceded to the Russo-Swedish treaty of 1758 for excluding foreign war-ships from the Baltic, it looked as though hostilities might result. Titley suggested the dispatch of a strong squadron to the Sound; Copenhagen, perhaps, to be bombarded, in default of an undertaking to observe exact neutrality during the war. Yet he believed the Danes " rather confounded than satis- fied " by the step taken, seeing that Grand Duke Peter still stood obstinate on the Sleswick-Holstein question. Russia, Bernstorff had admitted, was " still the great object of their apprehension." 1 That question was, indeed, becoming acute. Discussing the subject in a series of dispatches in the spring of 1761 Titley looked on war between Denmark and Russia as inevitable, upsetting the balance of the north and to the great prejudice of British trade, if the dispute could not be accommodated.. The British govern- ment, however, refused part in the affair. Then, in January 1762, came news of the death of the empress Elizabeth and of the quiet succession of Peter III. There followed Peter's peace with Prussia and menace of attack on Holstein, and at Copenhagen hurried preparations for defence. Bothmer in London applied for execu- tion of the British guarantee of Sleswick, accompanying his memorial with the draft of a treaty with Peter III proposed, only to learn again that George III would not interfere. A Danish army under the command of Count Louis de St. Germain, who in the previous year had entered the Danish service as Field-Marshal- General, had actually advanced into Mecklenburg to join battle

1 " What the Danes principally aim at is undoubtedly to secure to them- selves the quiet possession of Sleswick and to acquire the ducal part of Hoi - stein. Upon this all their policy turns, and with this view it is that they have been led to cultivate the good will of Russia by acceding to the Baltic convention " (28 May 1760). B.D.I. VOL. III. C

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xxxiv INTRODUCTION with the Russians, when the whole situation was changed by Peter's sudden deposition. Catherine II, Titley wrote on 31 July 1762, had declared for leaving the Sleswick-Holstein question quiet; there was prospect of an " amicable and final adjustment of their grand dispute." And again : " Every body here is sensible that the great event, which happened lately in Russia, has saved this country from utter ruin, at the very moment of time when it seemed to. be inevitable." And now Russian control replaced that of France at Copenhagen. Payment of the French subsidies had ceased ; the treaty expiring in March 1764 was not renewed ; one with Russia a year later conveyed the promise of a provisional arrangement about Slestyick-Holstein. The order of the day was to economise ; the fleet was recalled and laid up, the army heavily reduced, and crown lands sold for anything that they would fetch.1 Moreover disposition was shown for agreement with England. On 25 September 1764 Dudley Cosby, who had come, with the character of minister resident, to assist the old and infirm Titley in his work, reported ministers " not insensible of the unhappy state " the alliance with France had brought them into and desirous, it seemed, of some negotiation with England, if only as a spur to procure payment of the French arrears. Disappointed, he said, in their expectation of his bringing some proposal, they had only been able to insinuate to Ogier the naturalness of such a com- mission. Connected with this, we may suppose, was formal request now for the hand of Caroline Matilda, the youngest sister of George III, for Crown-Prince Christian. This proposal, for her or for her sister Louisa Ann, had been renewed from England in April 1762, Frederick V having then answered that, with all willingness to accept, he preferred to defer decision in the matter until the prince should be of riper years. Now the marriage to Caroline Matilda was contracted. After a year's stay the breakdown of Cosby's health obliged his return to England. He was replaced in April 1766 by Robert Gunning, who was advanced in September to the rank of envoy extraordinary. Meanwhile, on 14 January 1766, Christian VII

1 Heinrich Karl Schimmelmann, a German who had made a great fortune as an army-contractor to Frederick II and was now Superintendent of Com- merce in Denmark, purchased all the royal property in the West Indies for the sum of 400,000 rix-dollars (Titley, 2 April 1763).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xxxv had succeeded to the throne of Denmark, wanting yet a fortnight to complete his seventeenth year. The new reign was held to augur well for British interests. Christian was the son of one English princess and was soon to be the husband of another.1 His particular intimate was another grandson of George II, Prince Charles of Hesse-Cassel, whom he appointed Viceroy of Norway and a member of the Council and married to his sister Louise. From him Titley had strongest assurances of support. Another member of the Council, since January 1763, was Ditlev Reventlow, sometime envoy at Paris, who as master of Christian's household when Crown Prince had held him in habitual subjection and now was made Grand Cham- berlain.2 As in hot rivalry with Moltke, that " principal obstacle to and opposer of our interests," that " declared enemy," in Gunning's phrase, he was well regarded by the two British ministers. Success seemed assured when in July Moltke was dismissed from all his appointments and when there returned to his post at the Admiralty and to be made a member of the Council " the firmest friend we have in this country," Count Danneskjold-Samsoe. Moreover Ogier was gone: Informed in April that to hold Denmark in attachment was no longer considered worth the while, he had left Copenhagen at the end of May.3 Titley had at once reopened negotiation for a subsidy treaty, noting the immensity of the national indebtedness, the anxiety of the young king to rehabilitate the army, and the consequent indis- pensability of money from somewhere. Some talk resulted in London,4 and afterwards Bernstorff declared that he would not oppose a defensive alliance with Great Britain, even without a subsidy, provided a guarantee of the " expected acquisitions in Hol- 1 His marriage to Caroline Matilda was celebrated by proxy at St. James's on 1 October 1766 and publicly at Copenhagen on 8 November. On the same 1 October Christian's sister, Sophie Magdalene, was married by proxy to Prince Gustavus of Sweden. 2 " A man of integrity and resolution," in Titley's estimation, " listened to and treated by his Majesty with a kind of habitual deference and respect." 3 Recue.il des Instructions, XIII, 177. * Christian, says Titley (13 May), had " already hinted to the ministers his inclination for England, and it was by his express direction that Count Bothmer was ordered to sound his Majesty's ministers at London upon the subject of a political alliance ; and this proceeded from my having confiden- tially enquired of Baron Bernstorff, how far they might be disposed to enter into any engagements, general or particular, with England."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xxxvi INTRODUCTION stein." Christian himself expressed readiness to enter into close engagements, such as might benefit both kingdoms. Titley was all for striking while the iron was hot, but the British government dallied, and the opportunity passed when at the end of November Kaspar von Saldern, rough and rude and forcible, appeared on the part of Catherine II to bring the Sleswick-Holstein question to conclusion. He declared to the British envoys that he would talk to the Danish ministers " le baton a la main," and insist, as his first condition, on their " renouncing totally effectually and for ever the very idea of French connection." He got his treaty signed on 22 April 1767, though Titley and Gunning had no inkling of its conclusion before the end of the year. The main points of its 34 articles were re- nunciation of Gottorpian claims on Sleswick, agreement on exchange of ducal Holstein for Oldenburg and Delmenhorst with payment of 250,000 rix-dollars, and resignation by Prince Frederick, Christian's half-brother, of his right to the coadjutorship of Liibeck ; the whole subject to confirmation by the grand duke Paul, when he should attain his majority.1 The treaty was confirmed by Paul on 21 May 1773. Saldern on his arrival had been prodigal in professions of attach- ment to British interests,2 but soon took offence at imagined cold- ness on the envoys' part. However, in February 1768, just before Titley's death, mutual explanations restored a good understanding, and after Saldern's departure Gunning worked in close accord with the Russian envoy, Major-General Mikhail Filosofov,—during 1769, in particular, to defeat French efforts in Sweden—until in December 1770, after the fall of Bernstorff, that envoy, disgusted with Struensee's new methods, departed without taking leave. Already in the first year of his reign Christian VII was showing signs of that want of balance, which was to develop into insanity. Talented enough, his education had not been such as to impart to

1 A copy, in German, authenticated by Bernstorff's signature and seal, Record Office, Denmark 120. 2 General Conway, secretary of state, had written in September 1766 : " By this time it's probable Monsr. de Saldern is with you. He seems a gentleman of many words and probably much curiosity, so that his conver- sation is to be used with caution. He knows the affairs of his court, I believe, pretty intimately, and if treated with confidence may be useful, by a com- munication of what passes there. He has always profess'd being a warm friend to our interests, and therefore deserves every mark of civility and attention."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xxxvii him either knowledge of affairs or idea of government. An auto^ crat at the age of 17, he was managed by persons who played on his ambition to act as such. As Gunning put it, the idea was in- stilled into him " that every act in opposition to his Council is an accession to his own power and authority." This in 1770, but already in May 1767 Titley had written : " Everything is wavering and unsettled here ; great alterations have already been made and more are still expected, nor can any certain judgment be formed of what is like to ensue." Ministers gave their attention to private cabals, none feeling secure against the king's caprice. In March Prince Charles had been deprived of his offices, and soon retired with his bride to his own Hanau. Bernstorff himself was dismissed from his offices one day, to be reinstated at the instances of the royal grandmother, Sophie Magdalene, the next. In October, supported by Saldern, he gained the victory over his bitter rival Danneskjold, who had to yield his post at the Admiralty to his worthless cousin of Laurvig. In February 1768 Reventlow also was dismissed, but he returned to the Council, also by Saldern's influence, the next month. Moltke, too, came back into favour. And so each in his turn. One instance of the young king's exercise of his will was his " unprecedented " round of visits in 1768 to London Paris and other capitals. But it is unnecessary to follow here the tragic course of a reign, of which so full an account is given in the Cambridge Modern History.1 Titley died at his country seat on 27 February 1768. Gunning stayed until at the end of June 1771 Colonel Robert Murray Keith came from Dresden to relieve him. His latest endeavours, ineffectual, had been to procure equal Danish participation with Great Britain and Russia in the expense of managing, against the French interest, the Swedish diet assembling after the death of King Adolphus Frederick. Keith, after the overthrow of Struensee in January 1772, signalised himself by forcing, by threat of war, the release of Queen Caroline Matilda from her prison. For this service a letter of effusive compliment notified him his elevation to be a Knight of the Bath, extra numerum. In June he escorted the fallen queen to her refuge at Celle and did not return to Copenhagen, being promoted to Vienna ; in his place as envoy extraordinary came at 1 By W. F. Keddaway, VI, 742 f. See also, with particular reference to Struensee, his articles in the English Historical Review, XXVII, 274, XXXI, 59, XLI, 78, and his review of Hansen's great work, XL, 621.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xxxviii INTRODUCTION the end of August 1772 Ralph Woodford, from Hamburg. He had to combat French activity renewed at Copenhagen, after its success in promoting restoration of the royal authority in Sweden. Louis XV, however, could not prevail against what Woodford termed " the very servile dependence of this court on all occasions, small and great ", on Russia. Towards Great Britain he received strongest assurances of amity, and even overtures for renewal of alliance, but they were coldly received by George III from men who had so maltreated his sister. Needless to say the accusations of misconduct against her published were denounced from England as scandalous libels and angrily resented. After Woodford's departure in August 1773 George III was not represented at Copenhagen again until the arrival of Daniel De Laval, as minister resident, in October 1774. Instructed to hold aloof from political negotiation with Guldberg's government, his concern was limited to such matters as the supply of arms and ammunition to the North American rebels, troubles in the West Indies and about the Greenland whale-fishery, and imposts upon trade. He succeeded in establishing friendly relations with the younger Bernstorff, Andreas Peter, in charge of foreign affairs since April 1773 and open in his assurances of devotion to Great Britain, and for his services was advanced to the rank of envoy extraordinary in June 1778, to be replaced eight months later by Morton Eden, in the same capacity. Now the renewal of war with France changed conditions. Danish naval aid was sought, and Eden was instructed to take advantage of any inclination that he might observe towards renewal of treaties of alliance and commerce, and the formation of a definite league of the northern powers with Great Britain against France.1 Bernstorff, however, whose assurances of attachment to England Eden held to be sincere, was not master of the situation. The real rulers since 1772, Ove Guldberg and the queen dowager, Juliana Maria, were openly hostile. And now, with the war, was to the fore again the old trouble of the seizure of neutral trading vessels, aggravated by the extension of British activities in this respect to West Indian waters. The Swedes, taking the side of France, armed convoys to protect their ships, and invited the Danes to action in concert. Bernstorff waxed warm on the difficulty, in the excited temper of the merchants, of withstanding such solicitations. 1 See the dispatches of 1779/80, pages 196 f., below.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xxxix Negotiation, consequently, was confined to amendment of the commercial treaty of 1670. The outcome was the Armed Neutrality League of Catherine II. She had been approached on the subject both from Copenhagen and from Stockholm in 1778, without success ; she would not be a second. Two years later was impressed on her the glory of heading a great combination of all neutral powers, and she consented. The preamble to her convention of 11 July 1780 with Denmark stated design, on her initiative, to unite " en un corps de systeme permanent et immuable les droits prerogatives bornes et obligations de la neutralite." The first clause expressly prohibited carriage of contrabrand.1 Sweden and other powers, including Holland, shortly followed suit. Bernstorff declared the Russian offers to have been such as could not be declined, repudiated the thought of engagement with Holland, and asserted sentiments towards Great Britain to remain unchanged ; the Danish intent being only " with the assistance of Russia to protect their trade against the attacks of Spain." But on 13 November 1780, to the " astonishment and real concern " of every- one, says Eden, no-one having ever been more generally beloved and revered, that " very respectable and good minister " fell. His place was taken by Baron Marcus Gerhard Rosenkrone, brought from Berlin ; in Eden's eyes " the mere tool of the wretch Guldberg and his crew." Nevertheless, in January 1781, approaches from England were renewed. But in March came news of the capture of a Danish convoy in the West Indies, whereon loud outcry, the highest personages being interested. Eden had assurance from Guldberg of sole desire to keep navigation in the Baltic free and uninterrupted, of joint remonstrance with Russia and Sweden against the action of Dutch privateers there, and of Holland (now at war with Great Britain) being regarded as a belligerent; but on the other hand, in answer to proposals that he made, was told that no new engagement could be undertaken without the consent of Russia, a fact now definitely recognised in England. For the remainder of his stay Eden was mainly concerned with continual British protest against Danish maritime action in con- nexion with the war. Having requested recall on the ground of ill health, in January 1783 he was replaced as envoy extraordinary by Hugh Elliot, immediately after whose arrival came the news of 1 Copies, Record Office, Denmark 136.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 xl INTRODUCTION preliminaries of peace arranged with France and Spain. The immediate result for Denmark was alike the end of the commercial prosperity, fostered by the war, and of political importance. Says Elliot on 13 December 1783 : " This country, ruined in its finances and commerce, and governed in the name of an unfortunate Prince by the Queen Dowager and her son, is not capable of any great degree of exertion." The time was ripe for the revolution pre- pared against the coming of Crown-Prince Frederick to legal age. The date of that was Palm Sunday, 4 April 1784, when the young prince was solemnly confirmed. Appearing in the Council ten days later he obliged his imbecile father to transfer rule to him.1 Bernstorff was recalled; Guldberg and his associates disappeared. Elliot, in his first exultation, gave the chief credit to Frederick himself: " although the Prince Royal has been seconded by men of great weight talents and integrity, yet it is chiefly to his own ability decision prudence and magnanimity that the success of a measure, so big with difficulty and danger, must be attributed." The news was well received in England; Prince Frederick was a nephew of George III, and the new ministry was reckoned Anglo- phile. There ensued, however, no change in foreign policy; Den- mark remained under the heel of Russia. Elliot and his secretary James Johnstone, in charge of affairs when he was absent, had during the next years but little to do. The first excitement came with the sudden appearance of Gustavus III of Sweden in person at Copenhagen at the end of October 1787, determined now to attack not Denmark, as in 1783, but Russia. His proposals for alliance against Catherine II met with no success. In Elliot's phrase, " to enjoy a menial and temporary security under the haughty protection of Russia " remained " the ultimate view of Danish politicks." In 1786 came up the question of Prince Frederick's marriage. Queen Juliana Maria, the friend and sister-in-law of Frederick the Great, had practically engaged him to the eldest princess of Prussia.2 This was repugnant alike to the new government and to the prince himself, who approached Elliot privately on the subject of obtaining an English princess for his bride. After the death of Frederick the Great this proposal was taken up seriously. It was kept a 1 For the scene see the Cambridge Modern History, VI, 755. 8 Frederica Charlotte, married in 1791 to Frederick, Duke of York.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.40, on 28 Sep 2021 at 10:03:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000005987 INTRODUCTION xli secret from Bernstorff, and confided only to Count Schack-Rathlou and to Johann Billow, the close associate of the young prince. Elliot advocated the project strongly: " without the success of the marriage between the Prince Royal and one of our Princess's there never will be an unreserved epanchement de coeur between the two courts; were that to take place we should certainly be masters of the direction of the Danish councils, and if we did not obtain a powerful friend, we should at least get a very humble servant." However, the scheme failed : on 31 July 1790 the prince married Marie Sophie Frederica, daughter of his uncle Prince Charles of Hesse-Cassel. In June 1788 the resignations of Counts Schack-Rathlou and Frederik Christian Rosenkrantz left Bernstorff alone in power. Elliot did not like the change ; he now distrusted Bernstorff, believing him to be strongly attached to the two imperial courts. He drew a most gloomy picture of the wretched condition of Denmark and of the political outlook. And now Gustavus of Sweden had launched his long premeditated attack on Russia. Bernstorff had pressed for the intervention of England, stating that if the war broke out Denmark must fulfil her engagements with Russia. That proved true. In spite of strongest pressure in favour of neutrality from both London and Berlin—Prussia, as the result of what had passed in Holland, having once more ex- changed enmity for alliance with Great Britain,—the Danes not only gave naval aid to Russia but entered also on an invasion of Sweden from Norway. The fall of Gothenburg was prevented only by Elliot himself, who boldly and without authority repaired to the Danish camp and by threats of forcible intervention obtained an armistice. That gave Gustavus breathing time, and soon Elliot's further efforts, backed by a Prussian ultimatum, forced the retirement of the Danes from Sweden under the convention of Uddevalla.1 Elliot's action was commended, and he was pressed to renew endeavour to bring Denmark into British alliance. All, however, that could be effected was engagement to neutrality, a neutrality which Bernstorff was able to maintain during the remain- ing years of his beneficent and enlightened rule.

1 For particulars see Sir R. Lodge, Great Britain and Prussia in the Eigh- teenth Century, pp. 183-4. Elliot's own detailed story is in Record Office, P.O. 22, 10.

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