Quarter 2021 nd
Issue 101, 2 101, Issue
the Western Front and Today and Front Western the Accelerating Adaptation on on Adaptation Accelerating Temptations of Command Temptations Conquering the Ethical the Ethical Conquering Asymmetry Embracing
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE ONE HUNDRED ONE, 2ND QUARTER 2021 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 https://ndupress.ndu.edu
GEN Mark A. Milley, USA, Publisher Lt Gen Michael T. Plehn, USAF, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Senior Editor and Director of Art John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell
Book Review Editor Brett Swaney
Assistant Internet Publications Editor Jen Russell
Creative Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Advisory Committee BrigGen Jay M. Bargeron, USMC/Marine Corps War College; RDML Shoshana S. Chatfield, USN/U.S. Naval War College; BG Joy L. Curriera, USA/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Col Lee G. Gentile, Jr., USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col Thomas J. Gordon, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Ambassador John Hoover/College of International Security Affairs; Cassandra C. Lewis, Ph.D./College of Information and Cyberspace; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; MG Stephen J. Maranian, USA/U.S. Army War College; VADM Stuart B. Munsch, USN/The Joint Staff; LTG Andrew P. Poppas, USA/The Joint Staff; RDML Cedric E. Pringle, USN/National War College; Brig Gen Michael T. Rawls, USAF/Air War College; MajGen W.H. Seely III/Joint Forces Staff College
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; COL James E. Hayes, USA/National War College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Sailor rests after combating fire aboard USS Bonhomme Richard, San Diego, July 14, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Christina Ross); General Mark A. Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, awards Capitol Police Officer Eugene Goodman with Joint Meritorious Civilian Service Award and U.S. Constitution in Old Senate Chamber for actions taken to protect lawmakers and others during January 6, 2021, attack on Capitol building, Washington, DC, February 25, 2021 (DOD/Carlos M. Vazquez II); Airman Kendra Middleton competes in high jump during Air Force Invitational at Cadet Field House, Colorado Springs, Colorado, January 23, 2021 (U.S. Air Force/Trevor Cokley) About the Cover In This Issue Paratrooper with U.S. Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team surveys battlefield during U.S. Forum Army Europe–directed annual 2 Executive Summary exercise Saber Junction, held at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels 4 Deter in Competition, Deescalate training areas, Germany, August 20, in Crisis, and Defeat in Conflict 2020 (NATO) By Glen D. VanHerck 11 Design Thinking By Daniel E. Rauch and Matthew Tackett 18 Buy Now, Get Paid with Diversity Later: Insights
into Career Progression of 59 Sustaining Relevance: Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Female Servicemembers Repositioning Strategic Defense University Press for the Chairman of the By Monica Dziubinski Gramling Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship Logistics Innovation joint military and security studies journal designed to and Warren Korban Blackburn in the Military inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and By Paul Christian van Fenema, Ton other partners on joint and integrated operations; 25 Gray Is the New Black: national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat van Kampen, Gerold de Gooijer, terrorism; homeland security; and developments in A Framework to Counter Nynke Faber, Harm Hendriks, Andre training and joint professional military education to Gray Zone Conflicts Hoogstrate, and Loe Schlicher transform America’s military and security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting By Heather M. Bothwell freedom today. All published articles have been vetted 69 Embracing Asymmetry: through a peer-review process and cleared by the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. JPME Today Assessing Iranian National Security Strategy, 1983–1987 NDU Press is the National Defense University’s 31 Educating Our Leaders By Spencer Lawrence French cross-component, professional military and academic in the Art and Science of publishing house. Stakeholder Management The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations Recall expressed or implied within are those of the By Alexander L. Carter contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views 78 Accelerating Adaptation on of the Department of Defense or any other agency of 36 Conquering the Ethical the Western Front and Today the Federal Government. Temptations of Command: Copyright Notice By Justin Lynch This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition Lessons from the Field Grades of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions By Clinton Longenecker of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Book Reviews without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ and James W. Shufelt should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted 84 Adaptation Under Fire from or based on its content. Reviewed by Bryon Greenwald Submissions and Communications Commentary JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent 46 Flawed Jointness in the 85 Losing the Long Game research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, War Against the So-Called Reviewed by Thomas C. Greenwood academic specialists, and civilians from the United Islamic State: How a Different States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration Planning Approach Might 86 Strategic Humanism to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: Have Worked Better Reviewed by Christopher Kuennen Editor, Joint Force Quarterly By Benjamin S. Lambeth NDU Press Joint Doctrine 300 Fifth Avenue (Building 62, Suite 212) Fort Lesley J. McNair Features 88 U.S. Joint Doctrine Development Washington, DC 20319 55 The Future Joint Medical and Influence on NATO Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 By George E. Katsos Email: [email protected] Force Through the Lens of JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq nd Operational Art: A Case for 96 Joint Doctrine Update 2 Quarter, April 2021 Clinical Interchangeability ISSN 1070-0692 By Joseph Caravalho, Jr., and Enrique Ortiz, Jr. U.S. Air Force pilot Captain Melanie Ziebart, one of six Air Force pilots flying F-35B Lightning II stealth multirole fighters in Marine squadrons to disseminate inter-Service tactics and strengthen joint force capabilities, on flight deck of amphibious assault ship USS America, flies with 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 121 Green Knights, Gulf of Thailand, March 7, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Jonathan Berlier)
Executive Summary
n early conversation I had with have been successful over the past 100 Success in furthering any profession Admiral Mike Mullen just after issues, we must continue to remain comes from seeking to do better than A becoming the Editor in Chief focused on what you need us to be: the was done in the past, through careful of Joint Force Quarterly centered on voice of the joint force. examination, debate, and refinement of a crucial request: “Bill, I need you to In JFQ 1, General Powell wrote, arguments and facts, ultimately leading make sure I can read what our next “Don’t read the pages that follow if you to revising and renewing techniques, generation of senior leaders are think- are looking for the establishment point of tactics, procedures, process, policies, and ing about, what matters to them. At view or the conventional wisdom. Pick up doctrine. A constantly evolving and ev- my level, it is very hard to hear what JFQ for controversy, debate, new ideas, er-changing environment moved forward they have to say.” It is important to and fresh insights—for the cool yet lively by people and ideas, both good and bad, note that every Chairman, beginning interplay among some of the finest minds which are seen through the lens of time. with General Colin Powell in 1993, has committed to the profession of arms.” Journals like JFQ allow our rising encouraged in JFQ a range of topics After 100 issues, this continues to be our leaders to express themselves in a way they may not necessarily agree with, informal mission statement. that is often not available any other yet nonetheless state they need to read While you will find many articles that way up the chain of command. Military these ideas. With the words of General reinforce the military status quo, our journals continue to help move the Powell and Admiral Mullen as guid- authors and readers have done their best profession of arms forward in ways that ance, our team has constantly sought over the years to sound off on what they rapid-fire, light-speed mediums cannot. out the best ideas and the best way to see as the “facts on the ground,” which And it is hard to say what will endure communicate them to you. While we often clash with conventional wisdom. in this instant gratification, 24/7 news
2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 cycle, Twitter-driven world. We should understand who “gets a vote” and why excellent book reviews and the Joint not abandon our more traditional means they matter, Alexander Carter discusses Doctrine Update. to read, process information, and make the ways to learn about how best to In 1993, General Powell encouraged lasting decisions on important issues. manage one’s mission stakeholders. As members of the joint force to “Read Industry data show that despite the military officers rise up in responsibilities, JFQ. Study it. Mark it up—underline promise of paperless offices and e-read- so do temptations to do the wrong thing, and write in the margins. Get mad. Then ers wiping out traditional print media, potentially damaging a career and more contribute your own views.” What do readers of all ages, and especially “digital importantly risking the lives of those they you think? How do you read JFQ? How natives” under 35, continue to use both, lead. For those of you in the field grades, can we make it better suited to the world and for different purposes. Digital natives long our target demographic, Clinton you find yourself in? We are soon posting still read physical magazines and books Longenecker and James Shufelt have up a way for you to provide us more to gain the deeper learning experience some practical advice to keep you on the feedback. Watch this space. In the mean- those media provide. Electronic media is right path to success. time, read on! JFQ proving to be useful for quick bursts of Looking for a lively debate? In information that may be interesting, but Commentary, classic operational to stra- William T. Eliason not something the reader needs to hold tegic reporting on wars we have fought Editor in Chief in long-term memory or study as one has been hard to come by. There are a would for an academic examination. In few notable exceptions, such as the re- print, you do not have the distractions search of one of our veteran JFQ authors, that accompany an online experience, but Benjamin Lambeth, who brings us his we are there as well for those who need view on how the initial war against the to have Google or Twitter at the ready. so-called Islamic State was fought. As we begin the first of our next one Planners know the universal truth hundred issues, our Forum offers four of planning: you always have to plan for important views on current national areas you do not have the expertise to security issues: defense of the homeland, do properly. In Features, we offer a great military planning, diversity inclusion, and selection of articles on medical force gray zone conflicts. Discussing military issues, strategic logistics, and a look inside issues in defending the homeland, the the Iranian national command during the commander of U.S. Northern Command Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. Mixing op- and the North American Air Defense erational art and medical force structure Command, Glen D. VanHerck, gives us considerations, Joseph Caravalho, Jr., and a tour of his unique responsibilities. To Enrique Ortiz, Jr., discuss how best to improve military planning, Daniel Rauch meet that challenge. A team of research- and Matthew Tackett offer their ideas ers from the Netherlands, Paul Christian on using design thinking to enhance our van Fenema, Ton van Kampen, Gerold de chances of developing better operational Gooijer, Nynke Faber, Harm Hendriks, and strategic choices. Long a subject Andre Hoogstrate, and Loe Schlicher, of strong opinions, Monica Dziubinski offers their views on how advance inno- Gramling and Warren Korban Blackburn vation in strategic logistics in the military. provide their research results about the Helping us to look more deeply into impact of integration of women in the Iranian strategy in one of the longer and military profession. While the focus has more horrific wars of the Middle East in been on peer competition in recent years, modern times, Spencer Lawrence French Heather Bothwell helps us do a better breaks down their national security strat- job dealing with the “in between” or gray egy from 1983 to 1987. zone conflicts that have become endemic In Recall, Justin Lynch furthers our these days. understanding of how the Great War of JPME Today has two excellent 1914–1918 can still provide lessons on articles that discuss leadership, long a the importance of adaptation for today’s valuable and lasting conversation from joint force. In Joint Doctrine, George our JFQ authors. The military has often Katsos returns with his views on how the incorporated business lexicon into its North Atlantic Treaty Organization has concepts, and with interesting results. been influenced by U.S. joint doctrine Helping those in leadership positions development. As always, we offer three
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Eliason 3 Airman with 321st Contingency Response Squadron security team patrols with Ghost Robotics Vision 60 prototype at simulated austere base during Advanced Battle Management System exercise on Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, September 3, 2020 (U.S. Air Force/Zachary Rufus)
activities with our allies and partners in North America, and, when required, Deter in Competition, supports Federal, state, and local agen- cies with unique military capabilities to conduct defense support of civil Deescalate in Crisis, authorities. Global Competition and Defeat in Conflict Today, NORAD’s and USNORTH- COM’s missions continue to use a multitude of sensors including the By Glen D. VanHerck 1980s North Warning System, our network of globally positioned ballistic missile defense radars, and the Inte- he North American Aerospace and united in a common purpose— grated Undersea Surveillance System. Defense Command (NORAD) charged with the resolute mission of As the world’s security environment has T and U.S. Northern Command defending North America. NORAD evolved over time, our legacy systems (USNORTHCOM), both located in defends the United States and Canada have become increasingly challenged, Colorado Springs, Colorado, are two against threats in the air domain even as our attention drifted away from distinct commands, bound together and provides aerospace and maritime the possibility of major conflict, espe- warning. Founded in 2002 in the wake cially the possibility of conflict in North of 9/11, USNORTHCOM defends the America. General Glen D. VanHerck, USAF, is Commander United States against threats across all Since August 1990, when Iraq of U.S. Northern Command and North American domains, conducts cooperative defense invaded Kuwait, our national focus Aerospace Defense Command.
4 Forum / Deter, Deescalate, and Defeat JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 has been centered on the Middle East Ensuring National Security Until 2035 and inclusive information-sharing ethos, through operations Desert Storm, and the Chinese government’s declara- modify homeland defense policy, and Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom. tion of being a “near-Arctic state” are demand that we go faster in all aspects Meanwhile, our competitors’ capabilities powerful indicators of their intent to of planning, force design, force manage- have advanced. Over this three-decade exert influence in that region. Both com- ment, acquisitions, and budgetary policy. period, the United States developed petitors have pursued their efforts with Through this approach, we can and will strategies, plans, and capabilities focused national-level investments and a singular deter our competitors in competition, on projecting power forward in order to purpose: to compete with the United deescalate in crisis, and deny or defeat in take the fight to rogue regimes, violent States in every domain. conflict. extremist organizations, and other po- In addition to our peer competitors, tential adversaries. This led to a tendency the United States continues to face Global Perspective Lens toward tactical thinking against individual threats from rogue regimes, such as Iran Our competitors’ actions are global, not actors, rather than the strategic thinking and North Korea, that attempt to hold regional. We must match this reality; and analysis necessary to confront and the Nation at risk through proxies, cyber we cannot continue to apply a regional compete with peer competitors. It in- warfare, North Korea’s nuclear weapons perspective to plans, force management stilled a preference for kinetic solutions program, and advancements in missile and design, or a parochial approach to over other options—including deterrence technology. acquisitions. Regionally focused plans and an acquisition strategy that favored We also face threats across the globe do not address the fact that our peer systems (often expensive) to confront from corruption and poor governance competitors or potential adversaries single threats in one domain over mul- engendered by transnational criminal are not constrained by our organiza- tithreat, multidomain systems. These organizations (TCOs), which are creating tional boundaries or our command and right-of-launch response plans, rather opportunities for economic competition, control. They are capable of exploiting than left-of-launch denial and deterrence influence operations, and exploitation by one theater’s crisis and flanking the efforts, constrained our actions and our competitors—the very definition of United States in another, bypassing our decisionmaking. unrestricted warfare. The destabilizing surge layer of fielded forces to strike Meanwhile, our competitors took effects of TCOs can be seen at our bor- at the homeland and compromise our this limitation as an opportunity to de- der, in our cities, and even in our homes. ability to reinforce when and where velop and advance capabilities that are Drug cartels have evolved past their tra- needed. Based on this capability, the specifically aimed at perceived seams in ditional model of smuggling cocaine into current notion espoused in U.S. doc- our homeland defenses and through a the United States and have transitioned trine of a single supported commander, framework of constant global compe- to moving precursor materials and guns with all others supporting, is imprac- tition. Russia has developed a military to the south, fueling the flow of synthetic ticable. Because potential adversaries’ doctrine that envisions nonnuclear strikes drugs into the United States as well as actions will likely be global, every com- on an adversary’s critical infrastructure increasing instability south of the border. batant commander may simultaneously to compel termination of an escalating Cartel arsenals are competitive with our be both a supported—and supporting— conflict, and it has repeatedly demon- partners’ law enforcement organizations commander. We must create global strated its ability to hold our homeland and militaries, further challenging the plans that have regional components, at risk through heavy bomber patrols legitimate monopoly of the state on the focused on strategies, plans, force man- near North America. Following one use of force. agement, and force design and develop- such patrol in December 2018, official Global competitors are confronting ment concepts that integrate homeland Russian press highlighted that these the United States from all directions defense and strategic deterrence into flights could “pose a serious threat for the and in all domains. These developments every aspect of our defense, from plan- most important strategic facilities on U.S. challenge our legacy warning and as- ning to execution. territory.” China, too, has developed sessment systems. The stakes to defend But current operational plans do not a robust ability to threaten our critical the homeland are higher now than they accomplish this goal. Generically, our infrastructure in the cyber domain and have been in decades—and for NORAD OPLANs double- or even triple-task will likely field capabilities to do so with and USNORTHCOM failure is not an forces and resources, creating a competi- conventionally armed cruise missiles in option. tion for high-demand, low-density assets. the next 5 years. While China’s intent In this particular strategic security en- That means, for example, in a crisis over- for these capabilities is less clear, we vironment, it is imperative that we evolve seas, the Secretary of Defense, with advice suspect Beijing would use them to deter our capabilities, force structures, author- from the Chairman as the Department and frustrate our force flows across the ities, and culture to confront the reality of Defense (DOD) global integrator, Pacific in the event of a regional conflict. of constant global competition. We must will have to adjudicate competing re- Finally, Vladimir Putin’s Strategy for embrace a comprehensive perspective to quirements from multiple combatant Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and address these threats, develop a robust commands to determine apportionment
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 VanHerck 5 USS Connecticut surfaces in support of Ice Exercise 2018, Beaufort Sea, March 10, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Micheal H. Lee) of scarce resources—compromising peer fight. We must regain the ability given the current strategic environment, response and, more importantly, ced- and mindset to be ready to fight tonight. is a losing strategy. ing valuable and irreplaceable time to Because our requirement is not to be From that perspective, the necessity the adversary. OPLANs today need to ready for day-to-day operations—but to for cultural change should be self-evident. move past this model, identify distinct be prepared for crisis every day. Every aspect of our strategy, planning, requirements for each commander, The good news is that the transition budgeting, acquisition, and policymaking and deconflict force apportionment in has begun. We are modifying our tactics, should be viewed global, focused on all advance, knowing that simultaneous de- techniques, and procedures and renewing domains, and employ affordable kinetic mands will exist in any large-scale crisis. commitment to exercising our forces and nonkinetic capabilities to address From a capabilities standpoint, we against worst-case scenarios. As an exam- the complex and simultaneous character treat the homeland differently than ple, multinational polar exercises such as of future war. Adopting a truly global other theaters. Because the homeland Arctic Edge, Northern Edge, and ICEX perspective makes our problems more was a relative sanctuary for more than are increasing our readiness and presence solvable and affordable. Global plans that 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in the Arctic, and we are conducting start with the homeland and its deter- NORAD and USNORTHCOM forces increasingly complex national-level exer- rence requirements should lead to more have been trained and configured for cises to engage in global competition. realistic requirements overall. day-to-day and steady-state operations, If our competitors believe that they not for the possibility of conflict in the can destroy our will or ability to surge Policy, Budgeting, homeland. Today, we do not have a per- forces from the United States because and Acquisitions sistent capability to generate high-tempo of a perceived inability to defeat their Adequate homeland defense require- sustained operations within the United attacks, they will be emboldened to ments cannot be set without a support- States and Canada in response to crisis, aggressively pursue their strategic inter- ing policy in place that outlines exactly and we have not routinely equipped or ests. In essence, this situation creates an what must be defended and to what trained our continental-based forces to opportunistic gap between our nuclear extent. NORAD and USNORTHCOM operate in all environments, especially the strategic deterrent and conventional de- must be prepared to protect continuity Arctic. Likewise, our air operations cen- terrent capability for potential adversaries of government, our nuclear infrastruc- ters (AOCs) in the homeland possess a to exploit. This opportunity creates intent ture, power projection capabilities, and fraction of the personnel and capabilities and, perversely, an incentive for adversary key defense nodes. In addition, these of AOCs supporting other combatant action. Put more boldly, a strategy that two commands must be prepared to commands. North America will likely assumes unfettered power projection, protect key commercial, economic, and be a theater of operations in any future utility infrastructure, on both sides of
6 Forum / Deter, Deescalate, and Defeat JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 the border, in addition to population Mind the Gap diplomatic and partnership efforts. centers. Through strong coordination The Nation’s strategic nuclear deterrent Through unambiguous communication with Office of the Secretary of Defense remains the foundation of its defense. of our ability to counter threats below the (OSD) and the Joint Staff, DOD has Deterrence by punishment, however, nuclear threshold, we can achieve deter- identified a definitive list of critical which depends on the adversary’s fear rence by denial. assets that will allow for the generation of reprisal through nuclear retaliation Conventional deterrence by denial of informed requirements procurement to defend the United States, is not is additive to deterrence by punishment. priorities. Moreover, all aspects of likely sufficient to address the wide Through both, we will complicate a policy, including both regulatory and array of threats we face today. For too potential adversary’s decision calculus, statutory, should be reexamined to long, the United States has implicitly degrade confidence in their planning, ensure that those charged with home- relied on and assumed that the strategic and sew doubt in their mind that they land defense have access to the full nuclear deterrent is adequate to prevent can successfully achieve their objectives. range of capabilities in all domains and our competitors from attacking our The critical capabilities we are devel- are not inadvertently constrained by homeland. oping to deter by denial and close the archaic policies written in a different era In short, we have a deficient comple- strategic-conventional deterrence gap are without consideration that our home- mentary conventional homeland defense all-domain awareness, information domi- land is being held at risk. deterrent capability to defend against or nance, and decision superiority. Our acquisition processes are also respond to smaller scale conventional at- written for a different era and built to tacks on the homeland. This growing gap Left of Defeat protect from litigation rather than to spur between our nuclear strategic deterrent We have consistently fixated on kinetic innovation. These processes have reduced and our conventional deterrent capability kill capabilities to meet all threats. Lead- litigation risk by adding time-consuming is specific to our ability to defend the ership, including myself, grew up and review processes, which in turn have homeland and generate effects right here achieved success as tacticians and oper- increased risk to national security. It in North America. Unfortunately, this ators first. Kinetic capabilities are what has been this way since after the end of gap could be exploited by our compet- we know and what we are comfortable the Cold War. We live in a time where itors, kinetically or nonkinetically, with with. But a reliance on platforms, deliv- Moore’s law, the concept that computing the belief that they might achieve their ery systems, and weapons alone leads to power doubles every 2 years though the objectives and remain below the nuclear a responsive, rather than proactive strat- cost of computers is halved, is a reality threshold. In this environment, the threat egy. Senior leaders need to be provided in every commercial and consumer of a conventional attack on the homeland more options than kinetic capabilities. industry. Unfortunately, this truth has leaves military and national leaders with This can be accomplished by drawing not extended to defense technology or a grim choice: either preemptively attack, attention to the left—left of defeat, and operations; we are not fully recognizing risking escalation up to or beyond the even left of launch, to focus priority and capitalizing on how much technol- nuclear threshold, or absorb an attack efforts on identifying adversary delivery ogy is amplifying development. This has and be prepared to respond by deploying platforms and preconditions for action. to change—our innovation requires the the force or responding with nuclear We could maintain custody of delivery same sense of urgency that the Nation weapons. None of these presents a good platforms and weapons from launch to had during the Cold War. option. Lack of a credible conventional impact, greatly expanding our range To meet today’s challenges, we have deterrent also raises the risk that tactical of options and time to respond. To a range of tools in the science and tech- miscalculations could quickly escalate and accomplish this, we are pursuing a lay- nology arenas and through organizations lead to the possibility of nuclear conflict. ered-defense approach that emphasizes such as the Defense Innovation Unit, While other deterrence options exist to the use of open data architecture and the OSD Strategic Capabilities Office, bridge the gap, such as power projection machine-enhanced processing to move and Canada’s Innovation for Defence through our long-range non-uclear decision space to the left. Excellence and Security program. global strike capability, they too are esca- Development of capabilities and systems latory in nature. The Framework using the full range of available tools This capability gap limits our options, All-domain awareness is the first element could rapidly bring improved homeland constrains our actions, and is potentially of the framework required to meet defense to life, make significant headway more costly in terms of both lives and today’s challenges, especially as NORAD toward improving homeland defense, resources. The gap needs to be closed pursues modernization efforts to create and help close a widening gap between through the development of flexible and a layered network of sensors along the strategic and conventional deterrent responsive kinetic and nonkinetic conven- approaches to North America. For air capabilities. tional deterrents, including information and missile threats, this effort includes operations that selectively unveil Special enabling early indications and warnings Access Program capabilities, and through through detection, tracking, identifi-
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 VanHerck 7 Marines with Combat Logistics Regiment 25, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, tow Ahkio sled containing cold weather gear, at U.S. Army Northern Warfare Training Center, Alaska, February 20, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Sean M. Evans) cation, characterization, warning, and increases warning time for national lead- also give us a significant advantage in the attribution. With all-domain awareness ership against multiple threats, expanding remote regions of the Arctic, which is and data-sharing, including the use of available response options. Fused data can quickly becoming a key region of global artificial intelligence (AI) and machine also be transmitted across the globe to competition. learning, information dominance, the benefit every combatant commander and Information Dominance. The future second element of the framework, can create global information dominance. fight will be won or lost based on our be established (that is, the ability to Advancements in all-domain aware- ability to achieve information dominance operate inside an adversary observe- ness will inform much of the next 2-year by connecting data from all-domain orient-decide-act loop). Once informa- budgeting cycle. If we cannot see the awareness sensors to flexible and respon- tion dominance is achieved, decision threat, we cannot defend against it. sive decision superiority options. Effective makers can take action through flexible Systems such as improved over-the- information dominance systems must response options to deny or defeat horizon radars, polar communications ingest, aggregate, process, display, and the threat. These two tools together through Proliferated Low-Earth Orbit disseminate data quickly and reliably by give us deterrence, and through that, communications, Joint All-Domain leveraging the potential of AI and ma- decision superiority, the third element Command and Control (JADC2), fixed chine learning. of the framework, from the tactical to sea-bed surveillance system, undersea Information dominance begins with the strategic levels of warfare. Creating cable-laying ships, polar radars, and data. In many cases, the data is global deterrence, so that we do not have to counter–small unmanned aerial systems and exists today. However, it needs to be fight, should be the ultimate goal. (UAS) detection all appear on NORAD pried from existing stovepipes, flattened, All-Domain Awareness. Our prior- and USNORTHCOM’s Integrated and brought into a DOD cloud-based ity within this framework is all-domain Priority List. Investment in these ex- computing environment in order to awareness sensors and systems that pro- ceedingly capable technologies will enable decision superiority. Decision su- vide persistent and complete battlespace ultimately allow the earliest detection of periority—the ability able to make faster awareness, from subsurface to space sea-launched cruise missiles and small and better decisions than our potential and cyberspace. This essential capability UAS and hypersonic glide vehicles. It will adversaries—will enable us to deter, deny,
8 Forum / Deter, Deescalate, and Defeat JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 and, if necessary, defeat attacks. A flat- of images, much more efficiently than through information dominance tools, tened data architecture is a prerequisite human analysts can accomplish. This it permits the ability to overtly posture for this capability and requires cultural frees up human operators to conduct the sufficient number of forces before change. We need a committed effort to higher order processing. The data on the the adversary takes action. This supports enforce data standards across all echelons bomber deployment is then used by the a global system to prevent conflict and and every procurement program and system to send an alert to decisionmakers, better defend North America. initiative, as well as an increased com- with a recommendation for courses of mitment to data-sharing with allies and action to preposition long-range global Rapid Innovation partners. The commitment of the Joint strike capabilities or posture friendly NORAD and USNORTHCOM are Staff’s Joint All-Domain Command and air assets to intercept the competitors’ already moving concepts into proto- Control Cross-Functional Team to lead aircraft outside of normal ground-based types and into operations, bringing a new process to set data standards and radar detection distances and prior to po- an information dominant homeland improve JADC2 interoperability among tential weapons release range. Or perhaps defense architecture one step closer to all sensors and Services is an encouraging instead of deploying forces, the decision- reality. Project Convergence, JADC2, step in the right direction. maker leverages the information space to and small investments are already NORAD and USNORTHCOM message the competitor through action showing tremendous improvements in are platform agnostic. The particular in another combatant commander’s area information dominance. One example system chosen is not as important as its of responsibility or passes the information of a model for the future is the Path- ability to be employed globally, across all to the State Department to achieve a finder program, which USNORTH- domains, across all classification levels, diplomatic or political resolution. In any COM and industry partners have been and be accessible from the tactical to course of action, the competitor’s objec- working on for the past year and a half, strategic levels. Affordability and rapid tives are either dissuaded or diminished with contracting assistance from the deployment are also key considerations. based on proactive measures made possi- Defense Innovation Unit. In redesigning how data is managed, ble with the expanded decision space. Pathfinder is now in use at our air de- information dominance initiatives, such Such a scenario is not far in the fu- fense sectors as a battle management tool. as the JADC2 concept, will come to ture. Information dominance tools will It ingests air domain sensor data from fruition and allow the joint force to win help us to better understand our compe- multiple sources, including commercial in competition or conflict in future infor- titors’ potential courses of action based and military radars; leverages software mation-centric warfare. off of historically informed patterns of automation; and uses machine learning Decision Superiority. All-domain behavior and posture a response option at models to produce a fused common awareness and information dominance the decisive point ahead of need. operating picture and decision superiority put decision superiority in the hands of Decision superiority options are tool. Pathfinder did not start by picking decisionmakers. As a joint force, however, needed because our theory of victory can- a specific solution or platform, and it was we must not confuse decision superiority not only be about achieving kinetic kills; not approached as a military problem. with development of traditional kinetic that is a losing strategy, both militarily and Instead, it was approached as a data defeat mechanisms. At its heart, decision financially. It will lead us down the legacy problem for industry partners to solve in superiority is about giving senior leaders path of focusing on platforms instead of order to improve air domain awareness. options. Decision superiority expands the capabilities. Defeat mechanisms are enor- With Pathfinder, our Air Battle man- aperture beyond kinetic kill into nonki- mously expensive, and when the shooting agers are no longer required to manually netic solutions. starts, in a sense, we have already failed. correlate and compare track data from As an example, imagine a future sce- Shifting focus left of launch will vector multiple sources and systems. Instead, nario enabled by information dominance our efforts on identifying earlier indica- the systems that feed Pathfinder provide and decision superiority tools. In this tions and warnings—looking at delivery a fused track and highlights anomalous setting, all-domain awareness sensors platforms and preconditions for departure behavior. With fused data, both oper- detect potentially aggressive activity from while also maintaining custody of air ators and decisionmakers are afforded a peer competitor, and when processed, threats and missiles from launch to impact. increased time and decision space. machine-enabled insights indicate that Ultimately, we need to get inside The next step needed in developing the peer competitor is readying bomb- our potential adversaries’ OODA loops. additional tools such as Pathfinder is to ers for a pending deployment that will We need to know when aircrews are aggressively pursue every commercial heighten regional or global tensions. The stepping to their aircraft, when ships and military data source, in addition analysis, enabled by fusing multiple intel- and submarines are planning to sail, and to incorporating data from our allies ligence and sensor information streams, when missile operators and systems are and partners. Through common data is performed in a matter of minutes by preparing to launch. If we know this standards and combined networks, an AI-enabled system, conducting mil- information, then through responsive we will increase information dom- lions of calculations based on hundreds decision superiority options enabled inance and achieve true all-domain
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 VanHerck 9 Autonomous system Origin prepares for practice run on August 20, 2020, during Project Convergence capstone event at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona (U.S. Army/Carlos Cuebas Fantauzzi) awareness. On a larger scale, NORAD information dominance. These nascent While both onramps were success- and USNORTHCOM are continuing prototype capabilities are what was truly ful as demonstrations, they were not a partnership with the Services and groundbreaking and serve as a model for enough. The military must continue to other combatant commands to achieve increasing decision space from the strate- provide even more expansive opportuni- information dominance. Last year, we gic to the tactical level. ties to highlight the importance of these partnered with U.S. Space Command The same data environment was capabilities to DOD and congressional and the Air Force in the Air Battle used for further experimentation in leadership. Management System (ABMS) Onramp NORAD and USNORTHCOM’s first 2, which was one of the largest joint force Global Information Dominance Exercise In this new era of rapid Global Power demonstrations in the past decade and in December 2020. NORAD and competition, where our competitors highlighted the impact of new, innova- USNORTHCOM—in coordination with are aggressively pursuing advantages tive, and affordable capabilities against U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Indo- in the military, information, economic, live threats to the homeland. Efforts Pacific Command, U.S. Transportation and geopolitical ranges, North America such as these are serving to flesh out the Command, U.S. Strategic Command, is threatened from every vector and all JADC2 concept for the joint force. and the Under Secretary of Defense for domains. We must accelerate efforts to Many attendees left the demon- Intelligence and Security—convened a transform our culture and factor homeland stration talking about and focused on digital table-top exercise to prototype defense into every acquisition, budget, tactical defeat actions, such as a howitzer cross–combatant command AI-enabled force design, and management decision, shooting down a drone simulating a early warning alerts of peer-level threat so we can maintain advantages, outpace cruise missile. While that was spectacu- movements. The scenario was based on adversaries, and sustain strength at home. lar, it was a secondary benefit and not historic signal intelligence, electronic Through all-domain awareness, informa- the main achievement from Onramp intelligence, and satellite imagery. These tion dominance, and decision superiority, 2. The ABMS network established alerts generated possible enemy course of we will deter in competition, deescalate in during the demonstration used AI and actions and recommended proactive blue crisis, and defeat in conflict. JFQ machine learning capabilities to enable force response options.
10 Forum / Deter, Deescalate, and Defeat JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 B-1B Lancer assigned to 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, undergoes preflight maintenance at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, September 25, 2020, while participating in exercise Valiant Shield (U.S. Air Force/Nicolas Z. Erwin)
Design Thinking
By Daniel E. Rauch and Matthew Tackett
he COVID-19 pandemic is a poi- planning effort for the next pandemic? counterinsurgency, an invasion, or a gnant example of a rapidly chang- How would you assess the change to major unit reorganization, deliberately T ing operational environment the OE and identify the key people and approaching those problems is essential (OE). The virus’s spread has caused organizations involved and affected? to developing options, making sound chaos in almost every personal and Would your organizational readiness decisions, and providing recommen- public sector throughout the world. be drastically impacted? You probably dations that can be understood by all. Facts were sometimes slow to emerge, have an intuitive response based on this Design methodology offers a doctrinal emotions were high, and conspiracies latest pandemic. But can you validate approach to understanding, communi- ran rampant. Political guidance from those thoughts with facts and logic? cating, and developing approaches to all sides shifted and was perceived Is there structure in your supporting situations, such as a pandemic, where as reactive by some parties. If given narrative? Having a framework in place structure can be elusive. the vital responsibility, how would to assess problems is a start. Whether The U.S. military historically acts you approach the task of leading the the next problem is a pandemic, a without developing a comprehensive ap- proach to addressing what might happen once the shooting starts—and ends. Iraq, Colonel Daniel E. Rauch, USAF, and Colonel Matthew Tackett, USA, are Military Professors in the Joint Afghanistan, and, to an extent, Syria are Military Operations Department at the Naval War College. all recent examples of situations where
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Rauch and Tackett 11 Figure 1. Design Methodology ing techniques at the operational and in all aspects of operational design, “is tactical levels. The intended audience the cognitive approach by commanders Frames Terms for this article is military and civilian and staffs” (referred to henceforth as war college students, faculty, and others designers), “supported by their skill, Understand interested in understanding the basics knowledge, experience, creativity, and Actors the Guidance of design. The article does not set out judgment to develop strategies, cam- Tendencies Understand to discuss design through a theoretical paigns, and operations to organize and Develop an the Approach Tensions lens, but rather to contextualize its employ military forces by integrating Environment 4 Potentials value based on current joint doctrine. ends, ways, means, and risks.” Moreover, Understand Design is not easy to conduct, but the “Operational design is the conception the Problem framework and terminology of design and construction of the framework that methodology are understandable once underpins a campaign or major operation conversant with aspects of the doctrinal and its subsequent execution.”5 The reading. methodology of operational design is an U.S. military involvement “solved” Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint attempt to provide structure on which some elements of perceived problems Planning, the doctrine that includes to begin discourse in order to help com- but consequently created other issues. design thinking, provides a structure manders and planners understand the Following the invasion of Iraq in 2006, or model to visualize, understand, and ends-ways-means-risk questions during when the initial assessments seemed develop approaches to address complex planning.6 wrong and the situation was deteriorat- problems. For the purposes of this article, While there are other available meth- ing simultaneously in Afghanistan, the complex or ill-structured problems may ods to approach problem-solving, such Army began investigating alternative not be a single issue but rather a conflu- as the Joint Planning Process or Lean approaches to conceptual planning. ence of several nonlinear and dynamic Six Sigma, design is a relatively unpre- Design methodology, now validated in issues interacting that affect the operating tentious, robust, and doctrinal tool that joint doctrine, is the result of that inquiry. environment.1 These problems are the also supports a “recursive and ongoing This methodology is used by planners at most challenging to understand and dialogue.”7 Design’s structure allows U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special solve. Unlike well-structured problems, operational-level military commanders Operations Command and, to a degree, leaders disagree about how to solve to communicate with strategic leaders in at other unified commands, and is part of ill-structured problems, what the end- terms those leaders understand. Design the curriculum at many U.S. professional state should be, and whether the desired thinking, as addressed in JP 3-0, Joint military education institutions. Using endstate is achievable. At the root of this Operations, allows designers to use this the methodology will not guarantee a lack of consensus is difficulty in agreeing methodology when planning major successful outcome and is not a panacea on what the problem is.2 Complicated or joint operations or campaigns. Fully for solving pandemics or complex prob- well-structured problems are defined as implementing a design team is resource lems. It does, however, provide a general easy to identify because required infor- intensive and suited for large organiza- framework, supported by an underlying mation is available to solve the issues at tions (for example, unified commands); logic, for discussing problems and devel- hand. In addition, known methods—for however, the underlying thinking can oping approaches. example, math formulas—are available be beneficial at all levels. Understanding What Is Design Methodology? to solve these types of problems. While what design is, as defined by current doc- sometimes difficult to solve, well-struc- trine, is the first step to understanding the Design methodology is a model to tured problems display little interactive theory, and subsequently practicing, the aid in understanding and communi- complexity and have verifiable solutions.3 methodology. cating cause-and-effect relationships Although complex problems exist in complex environments. Although at all levels, those problems at or above Benefits of Design imperfect, it may still be useful. Design the operational level (for example, Design methodology directly supports methodology facilitates discourse, national security campaign planning at divergent thinking—the skill of con- enables questioning of guidance and the geographical combatant, functional ceiving and considering multiple cre- assumptions, and aids in articulating command, or four-star headquarters ative, diverse, and often contradictory risk and opportunity in order to develop equivalent) are likely complex and approaches, and then treating each with pragmatic options with an ends-ways- well suited for design application. This equal intellectual rigor to identify the means balance. This article addresses methodology enables an informational best approach(es). This skill and the the doctrinal application of design discourse communicated through the subsequent discourse enable designers methodology at the political-strategic lens of four “frames” and the common to visualize why the current environ- to operational level while also discussing use of four terms (as reflected in figure ment differs from their previous expe- the potential to employ design-think- 1). Operational art, which is inherent riences. Divergent thinking enables the
12 Forum / Design Thinking JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 consideration of ideas other than those Figure 2. Operational Design Framework solutions that worked in past situations. Junior U.S. military officers spend nderstand the nderstand the much of their time dealing with well-de- erational Environment trategic Guidance fined issues, or complicated problems, What is the context in which What do our national leaders the operation will be executed Understand want to solve or change that are most aptly addressed through Strategic structured approaches—but these expe- Guidance riences may create habits of thought and intuitive responses that are not condu- cive to generating solutions within truly complex environments. Intentionally Understand employing a divergent thinking process Define the the Operational ontinuous Interaction Problem(s) to a diverse and uniquely experienced Environment team (for example, epidemiologists and
economists when dealing with a pan- d n t a r demic) has the potential of mitigating t l n a e n m o cognitive biases and developing options s i s t e ra s e appropriate to the uniqueness of the s Operational us 8 Approach o o situation. Design should pull the minds erational roach nu n De ine the roblem s ti tio on ca of designers out of linear processes and How will the problem be solved li What problem(s) should be addressed and what must enable them to raise questions that be acted upon identify additional risks or tensions, as well as opportunities or potentials. Design, as codified in joint doctrine, describe all of them. The model artifi- that balances ends, ways, means, and risk, helps commanders, staffs, and designers cially separates the discussion of each and it must be continuously evaluated articulate complex relationships in a man- frame, but the interaction of the frames (and questioned) in order to confirm ner relatable to both senior military and cannot be overlooked. Designers may there are no changes. The information civilian leaders. Design provides a plain begin hypothesizing approaches at the garnered by this strategy provides the but malleable framework to structure di- beginning as a way to better determine lens through which designers are able alogue in a way that addresses problems. the interaction between and within the to understand the OE. Often, they at- The terminology is simple and relatable frames. However, the OE and problem tempt to foresee the desired future state among diverse groups. It is not military frames should be thoroughly under- of the OE—the conditions that should lexicon filled with acronyms and non- stood in order to develop an actionable exist when operations end—while fully transferable concepts, nor is it arduous approach. recognizing that these frames are not academic or scientific jargon that requires Throughout these framing discus- sequential. Designers examine guidance, unique education to be comprehensible. sions, four terms (from JP 5-0, chapter 4) or questions asked within that guidance, When fully adopted and understood, de- are used continuously by strategic leaders and ensure that the right questions are sign can assist the joint force in defining to describe and facilitate clarity within answered. At times, guidance may be and addressing complex problems. frames: actors, tendencies, tensions, and missing, incomplete, or rapidly changing. potentials. Understanding the frames and In this case, design methodology may as- Design in Doctrine terms goes beyond just knowledge of the sist in clarifying and completing guidance Design is built on the iterative and capabilities and capacities of the relevant through an examination of the envi- supporting frames of understanding actors (individuals and organizations) or ronment (including policy and political strategic guidance, the operational the nature of the OE. This understanding considerations). environment, the challenges of that also provides context for decisionmaking Using graphics to capture the opera- environment, and the development and what facets of the problem are likely tional environment provides a doctrinally of an approach that addresses a given to interact, allowing commanders and based technique that helps designers problem (see figure 2). This framing is planners to identify consequences and visualize systems as part of that environ- conducted with continuous interaction opportunities and to recognize risk.9 ment.10 One way to visualize, understand, from and into previous and later frames. Understanding strategic guidance and depict the OE is as a complex These frames can be envisioned as four is a cornerstone of design and provides adaptive system.11 Designers identify the rooms, and as one moves from room strategic or political objectives, desired actors at play in the environment and to room, the doors remain open to all endstates, force availability, and opera- then examine their tendencies in order to rooms. One must go back and forth tional limitations. This guidance is the provide a “continuous and recursive re- between rooms to understand and higher level culmination and the “why” finement of situational understanding.”12
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Rauch and Tackett 13 Actors are the individuals or groups neutral, and negative implications of • It enables a better understanding of within a specific system who operate tensions to determine the problem while the operational environment and the to advance personal or other interests. understanding that the force’s actions problem.21 Relevant actors might include states, gov- within the OE may exacerbate latent Designers develop approaches to ernments, multinational actors, coalitions, tensions.17 As designers identify these achieve an endstate—or a better state— regional groupings, alliances, terrorist problems, they also hypothesize solutions and improve the environment based on networks, criminal organizations, cartels, along the way. During exploration of the guidance received. Understanding families, tribes, multinational and inter- these frames, interactions are discovered, the environment and its actors and ten- national corporations, nongovernmental and a better understanding of the OE dencies, and the problem and tensions organizations, and others able to influ- and problem is developed, which leads associated with it, allows designers to ence the situation either through, or in to different, and potentially better, ap- identify potentials—inherent abilities or spite of, the established civil, religious, or proaches to this complex problem. capacities for the growth or development military authorities.13 Tendencies, also part To reiterate, the problem that the of a specific interaction or relationship. of understanding actors within the OE, operational approach must address is the Commanders need to identify opportuni- reflect the inclination to think or behave gap between the current and the desired ties they can exploit in order to influence in a certain manner. Tendencies are not systems or conditions.18 The operational the situation in a positive direction. When considered deterministic; instead, they approach, as defined by JP 5-0, is a limited windows of opportunity open, are models that describe the thoughts or primary product of operational design, the commander must be ready to exploit behaviors of relevant actors. Tendencies which allows the commander to continue these to set the conditions that will lead help identify the range of possibilities that the Joint Planning Process, translating to successful conflict transformation, and relevant actors may develop with or with- broad strategic and operational concepts thus to transition.22 Not all interactions out external influence.14 into specific missions and tasks in order and relationships support achieving the As thought and discussion related to to produce an executable plan.19 Failure desired endstate—design helps identify the current and desired systems continue, occurs when designers apply the wrong those that do and those that do not. the commander and staff will begin to (or any) solution to the wrong problem. Understanding these terms, and identify the problem frame—the fac- Strong commanders and designers must how they influence the previously dis- tors that must be addressed in order to consider the possible problem and its cussed frames, provides clarity in design achieve the desired system conditions. possible solutions without being tied to discourse. Design is one of several tools Understanding the problem is essential “their” solution. The problem statement available to help the joint force command to finding its solution. Essential activities identifies the areas for action that will and staff understand the broad solutions continue to be thinking critically and transform existing conditions toward for mission accomplishment and the un- conducting open and frank discussions a better state, if not a desired endstate. certainty in a complex OE. Additionally, with stakeholders, while considering their Defining the problem extends beyond design supports a recursive and ongoing diverse perspectives, thereby discovering analyzing interactions and relationships in dialogue concerning the nature of the and understanding the underlying nature the OE. It also identifies areas of tension problem and an operational approach to and essence of the problem and thus and competition—as well as opportuni- achieving the desired political or military furthering understanding of the current ties and challenges—that commanders objectives.23 It is also important to un- OE.15 The precise problem is the one that must address to transform current con- derstand the flexibility with initiating this defines the gap between the desired bet- ditions in order to attain the desired concept. The process is not linear. The ter state (defined by understanding the endstate.20 team can start by proposing solutions guidance) and the current state (defined As better understanding emerges, the as easily as by listing actors—the goal is, by the actors, tendencies, potentials, and commander and staff determine broad through research and discourse, to gain tensions of the OE). actions (the operational approach to im- the best possible understanding of all four The factors at play between actors prove the environment) that can address frames before taking action. and their tendencies impact tensions the factors of actors, tendencies, and (for example, frictions, conflicts, and tensions. JP 5-0 names three purposes for The Artifact competitions) and include geographic, developing an operational approach: The artifact, or output of a design team, demographic, economic, religious, and It provides the foundation for the will vary depending on the objective, resource consumption trends.16 Designers • commander’s planning guidance to the gravity of the situation, and the identify tensions by analyzing the context the staff and other partners. team’s audience. The initial output of the relevant actors’ tendencies and It provides the model for execution may be to simply aid discourse at the potentials within the operational envi- • of the campaign or operation and national security level. The goal is to ronment. Given the differences between development of assessments for that eventually create an initial operational existing and desired conditions in the en- campaign or major operation. approach that will be further defined vironment, analysis identifies the positive,
14 Forum / Design Thinking JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Soldier assigned to 209th Aviation Support Battalion, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, uses hand signals during 25th Infantry Division Noncommissioned Officer and Soldier of the Year competition at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, June 2, 2020 (U.S. Army/Sarah D. Sangster) and debated during detailed planning. the design team. The optimum output weighed against the tendency of a weak- In doctrinal terms, the output is best is a balance between prose narrative and ened Syrian regime that presented the described as level 1 planning detail, pictures that capture the tendencies and potential for empowering extremists—a which can take many forms. Level 1 tensions of relevant actors, along with correct foreshadow that demonstrates planning, per JP 5-0, involves the least the potentials and risks associated with understanding the environment. It is amount of detail and focuses on pro- the initial guidance. apropos to point out that Russia is not ducing multiple courses of actions to General Martin Dempsey’s July 2013 mentioned in this memo. Russia’s entry address a contingency. The product for memorandum outlining options for into the environment was a significant this level can be a briefing, command intervention in Syria is a good example change that altered the potential collapse directive, commander’s estimate, or of level 1 planning detail that effectively of the Syrian regime—a demonstration memorandum with a required force enabled strategic discourse with policy- of not fully understanding the actor(s) in, list. To inform higher level discourse, makers.24 His task was to provide military and potential(s) of, the environment. the output may be extremely descrip- options. He provided those options tive of the environment and perceived in terms of ends-ways-means-risk and Argument for Design problem. In order to move into detailed cost. His conclusion was rich with the The evolution of design into what is planning, the output must provide portrayal of the complexity of the envi- now codified in doctrine has resulted in further planning guidance, the com- ronment, the natural tensions between both positive and negative perceptions. mander’s intent, and sufficient descrip- select actors, coupled with the potentials After the invasion of Iraq, the Army tion of the environment, problem, and if acted on without a whole-of-govern- began exploring design concepts to approach. Whatever the desired use, ment approach. This memorandum was help tackle the complexity of the situa- bullet slides are generally an inappropri- written prior to the rise of the so-called tion. The School of Advanced Military ate format, as they often fail to capture Islamic State in 2014. At that time, the Studies at Fort Leavenworth studied the rich discourse and understanding of tension between acting or not acting and evaluated the Israeli version of
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Rauch and Tackett 15 Design also has opponents, who Table. Elements of Operational Design believe it simply does not work based on Termination Direct and indirect approach their experiences. However, one must Military endstate Anticipation question these opponents’ exact experi- Objectives Operational reach ences with design and how they measure Effects Culmination success. For example, did they expect that Center of gravity Arranging operations simply assembling a group and labeling it a “design team” would provide a solu- Decisive points Forces and functions tion? Were they oversold on what design Lines of operation and lines of effort brings to the table? Design facilitates understanding and communication, but design developed by the Operational Methodology, nor Marine Air-Ground it will not solve problems. The resources Theory Research Institute led by Briga- Task Force Staff Training Program put toward understanding an ill-struc- dier General Shimon Naveh.25 Naveh’s Pamphlet 5-0.1, Marine Corps Design tured problem will certainly help, and the theory derives from the interdisciplinary Methodology, suffer the same confusing quality of the designer is essential to good general systems theory introduced by language as joint doctrine. Both describe output. Just as asking someone with little a biologist in the 1930s—the concepts operational design methodology as a tool to no training or talent to paint a portrait and associated terminology of which that supports the commander’s use of will probably result in a poor product, can be elusive without extensive study.26 operational art to develop an operational executing design without the proper re- Naveh, a London-educated Ph.D. approach.31 The Department of Defense sources will also result in a poor outcome. in military sciences, adapted general Dictionary of Military and Associated Design methodology is suited for the systems theory into a methodology to Terms also captures operational design operational and strategic levels because develop approaches for complex military as a methodology and an operational ap- it is resource-intensive. However, there problems, and termed the approach proach as an output. However, there are may be a time when leadership at those systemic operational design.27 His perhaps more significant issues contribut- levels is pressured to move to action adaptation created additional complex ing to the misunderstanding of design’s before a reasonable understanding of the language drawn from his diverse educa- place in the environment. environment is available. This is when the tion—even he would admit his concepts Some overzealous advocates believe thinking that underpins design must be were “not for mere mortals.”28 Critics design will always attempt to provide executed at the tactical level. This is not of Naveh’s work have even called the solutions to problems in a complex optimal, but it is a reality. A tactical unit systemic operational design’s terminol- environment. Those that oversell its will not be resourced to fully understand ogy unintelligible.29 What is currently usefulness have also contributed to the the cause-and-effect relationships of the codified in U.S. doctrine, however, is a misunderstanding of what design is and theater, but they can use design thinking pragmatic methodology for conceptual how and when it should be used. These skills to better approach the problems planning that can be understood with individuals are easily identified, as they at hand. This is an example not of fully minimal study. present examples of tactical or operational executed design methodology, but rather Joint doctrine does create some success through the lens of design but fail of implementing design thinking. confusion by using operational design to examine the long-term condition of as the methodology (properly so) and the environment. What design advocates Conclusion then later as the elements of operational seem to imply is that “design” is the Design methodology is not the panacea design (see figure 3). This makes the manner of thinking associated with the for problem-solving. Design facilitates term sound both like a cognitive process methodology (that is, divergent, creative, discourse, enables questioning of guid- and an artifact.30 Interpreting section B, critical, iterative). These are laudable skills ance and assumptions, and enables the chapter 4, of JP 5-0 as operational design that should be used at all levels of plan- articulation of risk and opportunity to methodology may minimize the confusion ning and execution. However, design is arrive at a pragmatic ends-ways-means associated with the methodology and the focused on identifying underlying causes balanced concept. Like operational art elements that compose the approach. and testing hypotheses that have the po- and the Joint Planning Process, design Recognizing that joint doctrine is a tential to influence the environment over is one more tool or model that can compromise among the Services and 5 to 20 years (versus a 12- or 24-month foster better thinking skills and provide that design evolved within U.S. ground deployment). The resources required a common language between the forces (specifically the Army at Fort to fully frame a complex environment joint force and civilian senior leaders. Leavenworth), it is advised to consult and develop a workable cause-and-effect However imperfect, some models are Army and Marine Corps publications understanding can be significant. Those fundamentally useful. Understanding for clarity. Neither Army Techniques resources are unlikely to be available the joint doctrinal version of design Publication 5-0.1, Army Design below the unified command level. should demystify the concepts sur-
16 Forum / Design Thinking JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 rounding it. Time and resources may problems, but it does provide a structure Frank Cass Publishers, 1997). 28 To develop a clearer picture of the be required to implement design, but it that evolved from an effective (but quite influence of Naveh’s work on U.S. Army is simple enough to understand. It may complex) framework to one that can be doctrine, see the following: Matt Matthews, take a large organization to properly easily understood by any reasonably edu- “Interview with BG (Ret.) Shimon Naveh,” resource a design team, and the team cated person. And it is in joint doctrine, Operational Leadership Experiences, Combat will likely require significant outside so why not try it? JFQ Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 1, 2007, available at
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Rauch and Tackett 17 Officer candidate stands at attention during Medal of Honor run at Officer Candidates School aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, August 15, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Phuchung Nguyen)
he Department of Defense Buy Now, Get Paid (DOD) recognizes the value T that diversity brings to the joint force. In 2015, the Secretary of Defense directed DOD to establish an with Diversity Later environment where all personnel have the opportunity to rise to the “highest Insights into Career level of responsibility as their abilities allow.”1 Additionally, the directive pro- motes “a strategic vision for total force Progression of Female diversity and inclusion as a unifying core value and factor of readiness for Servicemembers Servicemembers and civilian employ- ees.” The notion that diverse teams provide more creative and innovative By Monica Dziubinski Gramling and Warren Korban Blackburn solutions to problems is well researched and supported.2 To reap the full ben- efits of diversity, DOD must foster intentional inclusivity. The Nation has made great strides toward inclusivity Lieutenant Colonel Monica Dziubinski Gramling, USAF, is Commander of the 375th Communications Support Squadron. Lieutenant Commander Warren Korban Blackburn, USN, is a Programmatics over the past few decades—today, for Analyst at U.S. Transportation Command. instance, women orbit the earth on
18 Forum / Buy Now, Get Paid with Diversity Later JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 the International Space Station and rule “could restrict units and positions procurements). At a tactical level, com- patrol the depths of the ocean on that were doctrinally required to phys- manders make decisions daily regarding Navy submarines. There are, however, ically collocate and remain with direct how best to accommodate both sexes hurdles yet to clear. DOD must address ground combat units that were otherwise in the field. From basic training units to tangible and intangible program costs closed to women.”6 Its repeal in 2012 combat deployments, commanders are to develop an environment of inclusiv- opened more than 13,000 positions forced to adjust accommodations and ity. Integrating women into typically and 6 additional specialties to women “make it work” with what they have. male-dominated career fields requires and authorized them to work and live in resource investment in equipment, locations originally designed to support Career Progression facilities, and processes. Decisionmakers only men from a spatial and process Potential costs or inefficiencies can arise must implement these accommodations prospective.7 when utilizing mixed-sex teams, espe- now to build tomorrow’s gender-inclu- Opening new locations for mixed-sex cially if only men have traditionally filled sive leadership team. teams requires resources to transform the roles or worked at the location. A facilities’ sleeping quarters, showers, and decision to avoid these investments can The Costs of Gender Integration toilets. Facility costs could include any have negative second- and third-or- Integrating women into a unit or level of support—from finding a tarp to der effects for female officers’ career environment that has been tradition- divide a sleeping tent to house both sexes progressions. Simply put, a leader’s ally staffed exclusively by men costs to procuring a building for a women’s cost-based decision could uninten- the government resources. The 1994 dorm. Leadership will likely use existing tionally change the trajectory of an Direct Ground Combat Definition and facilities to accommodate women in officer’s career. Consider the following Assignment Rule specifically named these environments. Repurposing exist- hypothetical situation: Two young costs of accommodating “berthing and ing spaces is a low-cost decision from a officers volunteer for a high-visibility privacy” as a valid reason to restrict monetary standpoint, but it is not with- deployment to an austere hostile fire women from filling specific positions.3 out other less tangible costs. Deployed zone.9 Because the forward operating The Navy has cited “return on invest- members often share sleeping quarters base has limited facilities and all current ment” as its reason for not opening with fellow unit members according team members are men, the commander positions to women on ships with to their respective shift schedules, duty chooses to send the male officer instead scheduled decommissioning dates.4 responsibilities, and places of duty. When of the female officer on the deployment Thus, the 2013 policy changes allow- a location has only a small number of to ease the logistic requirements of ing women to fill previously closed women, the women are normally given the already complicated short-notice positions in combat units have taken one room or building for sleeping quar- deployment. What seemed like a simple years to implement. Women are still not ters and bunked together, with minimal and efficient decision at the time completely integrated into some units other considerations such as rank, unit, or resulted in the female officer missing a full 3 years after the 2016 opening specialty. Because these women will likely out on valuable operational experience of “all” positions to women. Strate- be from different units and working var- and knowledge—which can lead to gic-level studies and working groups ious shifts, living in the same small space weaker records and missed promotion have been commissioned in an effort could ruin their sleep schedules. Lack opportunities. to identify the process, facility, equip- of sleep could have a cascading negative The male officer who deployed had a ment, and other changes required to effect on morale, work performance, chance to learn his trade and demonstrate support mixed-gender teams in combat and—of utmost importance—workplace leadership during combat operations. His units and locations. The Government safety.8 The current process for assigning commander rewarded him accordingly Accountability Office determined sleeping quarters is built for a homogenous with annual awards, decorations, and the Services conducted more than team, and thus leadership must invest highly stratified performance reports. The 40 studies between 2013 and 2015; time to ensure that women have adequate female officer, who stayed at her home the studies cost the Nation and DOD accommodations that do not present un- station, also demonstrated excellence and money, time, and labor force hours.5 necessary barriers to mission success. received the annual awards and reports Facilities and equipment constitute Because integrating women into expected during a steady-state non- the most tangible costs of integrating organizations comes with costs, a re- combat environment. All things being women into previously male-dominated source-constrained leader may exclude equal, when these records are compared, positions, while less tangible costs include a female officer from a high-visibility demonstrated leadership in a combat the time and labor hours of navigating opportunity—not as a matter of con- environment is a more impressive accom- integration decisions when no processes scious discrimination, but in an effort plishment. A few years later, the same two exist. One of the most substantial to save government resources (for officers will compete against each other changes was the repeal of the restriction example, additional planning, organiza- for command selection. The male officer, referred to as the “collocation rule.” This tional realignments, processes, or even the proven combat leader, is selected for
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Gramling and Blackburn 19 Figure 1. Navy Rank Distribution by Gender important to compare the percentage of the genders at the various ranks and not 25 look at simple numbers of personnel by Female Male gender because significantly more men than women are in the military. 20 On the surface, figure 1 depicts the same basic distribution across the ranks, 15 indicating advancement across the ranks 5.3 Difference is similar.11 DACOWITS also provided charts for the other Services. The Navy’s 10 chart revealed the highest difference at any rank, specifically at E6, between the Percent of Gender sexes. Approximately 10.9 percent of 5 women and 16.2 percent of men are at the E6 rank in the Navy, indicating a dif- ference of 5.3 percent. All career-related 0 factors being equal (for example, attri- E1 E7 E2 E4 E5 E3 E6 E9 O1 E8 O7 O2 O4 O5 O3 O6 O9 O8 W1 W2 W4 W5 W3 O10 tion, advancement opportunities), the percentages should be comparable—but Figure 2. Gender: Rank Distribution the data reveal otherwise. Figure 2 highlights the differences 6 between the sexes across all ranks and Services. The difference of 5.3 percent, 4 discussed for figure 1, is seen as the high- est peak at E6 in figure 2. A DOD trend
Male exists along the red line (total military) 2 across the ranks, which shows greater per- centages of men in ranks of E6 to E9 and 0 O5 to O10 and greater concentrations of women in the lower ranks of E1 to E5 and O1 to O4. Percent of Gender 2 But highlighting the lower percentage of women in a specific rank does not 4 Female address why such discrepancies exist. Considerable research has examined 6 female retention in the military, but few E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 studies address whether the retention Air Force Army Coast Guard Marines Navy Total rate is due to differences in promotion potential.12 It is difficult to separate retention from promotion because if command based on the operational ex- the female officer, who did not com- Servicemembers are not retained, they perience shown in the records. Selection mand. This narrow example shows how a cannot be promoted. A 2016 RAND and success as a commander are decisive seemingly insignificant decision based on study analyzed multiple factors in relation points in career progression in all military limited resources could have second- and to career progression for both genders. branches.10 third-order effects on an officer’s career Researchers could not infer from the The second-order effect of command progression. It is possible that missed results that family status, such as being selection, or lack of selection, further opportunities could cumulate in a less married or having dependents, causes compounds the problem facing the fe- competitive record for promotion to the gender-related differences in retention male officer: lack of experience. She has rank of O6. or promotion potential. The study now missed the opportunity to garner Figure 1 shows data drawn from the concluded that occupational disparities, command experience. Next, these officers 2018 Defense Advisory Committee on such as career field assigned, were the will compete for professional military Women in the Services (DACOWITS) main discriminators at the O5 retention education selection, and the male officer, annual report. The figure indicates the milestone, and deployment experience a graduated commander with combat percentage of men and women at a emerged as the main discriminator for experience, will be an easy choice over given rank specifically for the Navy. It is promotion to O6. Researchers have
20 Forum / Buy Now, Get Paid with Diversity Later JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Sailors assigned to USS Porter apply jubilee pipe patch during damage control competition at Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece, October 24, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Krystina Coffey) consistently shown that a history of key most dramatic changes to its 111-year officer is typically given a two-person assignments and deployment experiences history when four groups of female stateroom. Common-use heads were is directly related to promotion potential Sailors reported to the USS Wyoming, set up with ease, due to the close prox- for both sexes. If resource considerations USS Georgia, USS Maine, and USS imity of an already restricted-use head prevent female officers from selective op- Ohio.13 The first group of female Sailors to approximately 10 officers who each portunities to garner needed and valued stepped on board the USS Ohio (SSGN live within 20 feet of it. A simple sign experience, then they will not be as com- 726) in 2011 with a carefully laid-out was made to signify that the head was petitive for key assignments, education implementation plan developed by occupied by a woman. To accommodate programs, and, ultimately, promotion. senior leadership.14 One O3 supply enlisted female Sailors, modifications And the trend depicted in the figures officer with prior surface ship expe- were made to the ship to expand one of above continues. rience reported at the same time as a the two heads used by the male crew, and nuclear-trained O2 officer. To ensure the other facility was dedicated for female Submarine Integration a successful experience, these officers use. This modification cost the crew In 2011, the Navy submarine force were required to be well versed in their “lounge” space, used for socializing while used working groups to design a gender specialty and top performers in their off watch, and construction costs. Other integration plan that incorporated the respective fields. The supply officer had modifications have been requested by doctrines of processes, facilities, and served previously on a surface ship and currently serving female submariners to equipment; its execution shows how had a proven leadership record. Soon account for height or strength challenges successful female integration could be after, enlisted female Sailors reported faced in the workplace. For example, when leadership dedicates time and aboard the submarine as well. emergency air breathing connections resources to inclusion efforts. The Berthing arrangements were easily have been lowered on a few ships to ac- Navy’s “silent service” made one of the arranged in the first group, as the supply commodate the average height of female
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Gramling and Blackburn 21 Navy Sonar Technician (Surface) First Class Allison Coughlin mans helm of USS Theodore Roosevelt, Pacific Ocean, March 4, 2021 (U.S. Navy/ Alexander Williams) submariners. The Navy has stated that all submariner career and leads to competi- Los Angeles class of submarines, because future submarines will be designed for tion for flag officer selection. It will take of advanced age, will “age out” without integrated crews.15 until approximately the year 2026 until integration modifications; however, the Submarine supply officers (male the first cohort of women will be eligible new Columbia-class ballistic missile sub- or female) serve only one tour on any to command a Navy submarine.16 Of the marines are being constructed with full submarine platform; those who serve on first 19 female submarine officers, 5 have integration in mind.17 submarines gain a reputation for being decided to sign a contract to go back to There are female Sailors anxiously the sharpest of their peers and are often sea as a department head: 4 are engineers waiting to join the submarine fleet.18 The selected for competitive high-visibility and 1 is a navigator. These are typical speed at which the Navy integrates each follow-on tours. A tour as a supply sub- selections for top-tier nuclear-trained platform will influence the opportunities mariner will have a positive impact on the officers. The remaining 14 women either for these women to serve and gain experi- experience, knowledge, record, and pro- left the military, will soon leave, or are ence from such high-visibility tours. This motion potential of the Sailor assigned. serving elsewhere in the Navy—nearly example shows a successful case study of The nuclear-trained submarine the same retention rate as that of male expending integration planning time and officer career path, once designated as submariners. Leadership acknowledges resources to create accommodations for submarine service, will typically progress that it will take time and money to make women in key assignments. The cost con- under ship-to-shore rotation until the the required equipment modifications siderations were deliberately intertwined unrestricted line officer submariner during the submarines’ scheduled over- with the ship maintenance schedules to is selected for command as an O5 or hauls and to build trained, integrated minimize mission impact. DOD needs O6. Command is the pinnacle of the crews on every class of submarine. The to support future efforts to remove
22 Forum / Buy Now, Get Paid with Diversity Later JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 limitations on the number of women propagating. For example, the “Leaders into the future DOD weapons systems, accepted and accessioned into the elite First” policy, which is applicable to the deployment packages, and training submariner community. Army and Marine Corps, requires female programs— even if it costs more money leaders and trainers to be in a unit prior at the outset—will yield the dividends Recommendations to allowing junior enlisted women of of a diverse and inclusive group of war- It is imperative to provide an accepting the same branch to serve in the unit.20 fighters. For example, unisex personal and inclusive environment for both The other Services have added similar protective equipment might be accept- sexes. Simply having women on teams informal policies. The Navy, for instance, able in some circumstances, but there are will not allow them to excel as profes- requires a specific number of trained and items that must be tailor-made based on sionals. What might DOD members do integrated female officers on a submarine an individual’s body shape. DOD must to remedy the disparity that might exist crew prior to including enlisted women, assume gender inclusivity for every pro- in a fiscally constrained environment? as outlined in the submarine integration gram, unit, deployed location, and career DOD could implement the following example above. The Air Force also has field from the inception, and program the recommendations to attain the value of used an informal two-woman policy on costs of accommodation as requirements diversity: some deployment, missile, and aircraft to support warfighting readiness. crews. Leaders intended these policies spend money and resources for mod- • to be helpful from a resource, logistic, Conclusion ifications and accommodations and safety perspective; however, such Gender inclusion comes with both educate decisionmakers • guidelines could be limiting the potential tangible and intangible costs. Decision- review policies and processes for the • of those female Servicemembers who are makers must pay these costs now, break removal of barriers ready to serve prior to the competitive down barriers for women, and ensure build an inclusive future. • units meeting all the stipulations required the development of experienced diverse DOD must be willing to pay for the for integration. leaders for the future. The various inherent costs of inclusion initiatives, Additionally, inadequate or anti- expenses associated with gender inclu- such as upgrades or changes to facilities, quated processes designed to support sion span items as obvious as funding equipment, and processes. Spending all-male units must be identified and a study to less apparent costs such as money and time incorporating women updated. Commanders and senior en- labor force hours spent on berthing into the force is not a new idea. A listed leaders spend far too much time or lodging arrangement plans and Presidential memorandum from 2016 analyzing situations and deciding how decisions. The hypothetical example directed agencies to prioritize resources to make integrated teams work with above attests to how a seemingly small to expand professional development, key existing resources; providing these leaders resource-based decision can change assignments, and career advancement with processes for inclusive teams could the course of an individual’s career opportunities of women and minorities.19 alleviate the burden. DOD should re- progression. The analysis of DOD rank A miniscule investment tomorrow could vamp processes to assume that all teams distribution by gender reveals a plain create a more diverse senior leadership would need accommodations for both and sobering trend. The submarine team 10 years from now. men and women at any given number, gender integration strategy makes clear Maya Angelou declared, “Do the not at a preset number. For example, it is that planning and adequate resources best you can until you know better. Then inadequate to state a unit has eight spots can make available key assignments for when you know better, do better.” A key for women due to lodging availability. female Servicemembers. to successfully changing the culture of an A process needs to exist to support Establishing considered, intentional organization is education. DOD must ed- an integrated team for any number of plans for gender inclusivity, as the ucate decisionmakers about the potential gender mix. Setting a specified number submarine example demonstrated, and negative consequences a resource-based of women does not support the DOD following the recommendations outlined decision could have on the department’s objective to match the best person, herein will help DOD ensure equal diversity and inclusivity goals and regardless of gender, with the job. It is opportunity for female Servicemembers. Servicemembers’ careers. DOD should time to stop prioritizing cost savings, ef- Many areas are ripe for further study and urge decisionmakers at all levels, from ficiency, and convenience over equality in quantitative analysis in this area, given the tactical-level unit deployment managers DOD. Identify the policies and processes numerous policy and processes changes to Members of Congress, to consider the that are limiting the potential of women since 2013. As DOD continues to im- ripple effects resource decisions could and eliminate them. plement changes, commit resources, and have on gender inclusivity. DOD needs to build the joint force realize gender inclusivity, it will eventually DOD leaders should review current with gender inclusivity in mind and reap the benefits of a diverse and inclusive policies and processes to identify any modify current and future initiatives as joint force. JFQ potential equality or career progres- needed to accommodate gender-inclusive sion barriers they might be creating or teams. Building the cost of inclusion
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Gramling and Blackburn 23 15 Steven Beardsley, “First Female Officer Notes Reports to Submarine USS Minnesota,” New from NDU Stars and Stripes, January 14, 2015, available 1 Department of Defense Directive at
24 Forum / Buy Now, Get Paid with Diversity Later JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 F/A-18F Super Hornet assigned to “Diamondbacks” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 102 conducts flight operations in vicinity of Japan’s Mt. Fuji, January 29, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Alex Grammar)
Gray Is the New Black A Framework to Counter Gray Zone Conflicts
By Heather M. Bothwell
oday’s joint operational envi- tinuum. Joint planners must address attempts to change the status quo for ronment is characterized by indirect, deliberately ambiguous—or benefit through gradual belligerence that T states increasingly competing gray—strategies that incorporate mul- might be difficult to publicly attribute to enhance power and gain influence tiple instruments of power in order to to the aggressor. Adversaries that initiate while seeking to avoid major conflict. gradually achieve a larger effect and gray zone conflicts avoid the costs asso- Although concerted efforts to under- enhance the U.S. position in the inter- ciated with conventional warfare while cut U.S. interests without force are national system while also avoiding war. miring their opponents in questions not unprecedented, more aggressive These approaches produce gray zone involving international law, policy, and attempts to contest the status quo conflicts, a concept that is inadequately trade, thereby effectively preventing through nonkinetic means as a way addressed by current doctrine.1 decisive responses. Although gray zone to diminish U.S. power will likely Gray zone conflicts are security conflicts are typically initiated by weaker increase. As a result, the joint force challenges initiated through purposeful powers, China and Russia are also pro- must hone its understanding of the full aggression that exceeds the bounds of ponents, which raises the stakes for U.S. spectrum of conflict and increase its normal competition but remains below national security strategy. ability to respond to a complex array the threshold of conventional warfare.2 By their nature, gray zone conflicts of challenges across the conflict con- Gray zone conflicts result from adversarial are difficult to address through traditional combat power. In today’s complex and competitive international environment, Captain Heather M. Bothwell, USN, is a Senior Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency. some states may appear to pursue the
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Bothwell 25 Reconnaissance Marine with Maritime Raid Force, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, provides aerial security using M110 semi-automatic sniper system during visit, board, search, and seizure mission after taking off from USS America, Philippine Sea, January 24, 2021 (U.S. Marine Corps/Brandon Salas) status quo, particularly in areas of benefit policy and interests.4 Gray strategies using two gradualist approaches: incre- to them, while also seeking to amend effectively limit responses due to their mental and fait accompli.7 other circumstances in their favor. To characteristic avoidance of identified The incremental approach divides the deter these aims, joint doctrine must ad- “tripwires” and deliberate ambiguity, objective into incrementally small slices to dress gray zone conflicts and incorporate thereby preventing decisive action. As a allow the aggressor to slowly conquer the strategies for countering these approaches result of this inherent uncertainty, gray objective.8 The strategy intends to take into planning for steady-state activities zone conflicts generally do not trigger steps so gradual toward a specific objec- and all phases of theater campaign plan- United Nations Security Council res- tive as to completely escape the attention ning. To do anything less is to relinquish olutions, economic sanctions, or other of the target. Small-scale border incur- the advantage. international penalties, and by design sions, navigation into claimed territorial limit options for resolution. Adversar- waters, and airspace violations are all Framing the Gray Zone Problem ies employ gray strategies by carefully examples of incremental “salami-slicing Gray zone conflicts occur below the avoiding identified red lines, adjusting tactics” wherein aggressors test the com- threshold of war, which limits military activities to achieve the greatest effect at mitment of their opponent in a limited intervention options. Gray strategies are the lowest cost, often before the target way.9 These tactics result in persistent inherently part of an aggressive strategy perceives the challenge.5 and accumulated pressure that, over a to maximize interests at the expense of Gray strategies are persistent, gradu- prolonged period, ultimately achieves the another, while obscuring intent to avoid alist approaches in which opponents take aggressor’s desired effect while averting a the cost of direct military action.3 Pro- indirect, measured actions that can be crisis or direct military response.10 ponents frequently employ unexpected denied or attributed to nonbelligerent China’s position on the South China or unconventional methods, including factors, while systematically working Sea is best understood as a gray zone cyber attacks, proxies, and information toward a larger long-term objective.6 conflict in which a series of gradualist operations, to achieve their aims, pre- Regardless of the specific line of effort, efforts are aimed at changing the status senting novel complications for U.S. gray strategies can be best understood quo from one in which international law
26 Forum / Gray Is the New Black JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 recognizes multiple entities with various claims and interests to one in which Table. Explanation of Intentions Chinese control in the region is firmly Intentions established. China’s “peacefully coercive” Status Quo Revisionist approach depicts a “nine-dash line,” Security Secure or deterred Insecure and not deterred which claims approximately 80 percent of Motives Greed Deterred Not deterred the disputed area.11 By ignoring compet- ing claims from smaller nations, China is Source: Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and using an incremental approach “to erode Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 39. the existing international order . . . by acts of latent coercion” to one in which current laws and norms of international green men,” a reference to masked operational environment, some states behavior are reinterpreted in China’s soldiers of the Russian Federation in un- appear to be nonbelligerent, and even favor.12 marked green army uniforms. cooperative in some contexts, while still A fait accompli occurs when an ag- seeking to revise the status quo in their gressor quickly takes a small-scale gain Countering Gray Zone Conflicts favor. These states have resorted to gray before the opponent is able to respond.13 Because gray zone conflicts can be zone conflicts as a less costly, more am- Examples include the seizure of disputed effective in changing the status quo biguous approach to gradually achieving land, the claiming of resources outside at the expense of another actor, they their aims. The model also demonstrates established territorial waters, the sudden are exploited by revisionist states.18 In that while those states hold such revi- presence of minor or unclaimed military general, and for the purposes of this sionist intentions, they are not deterred forces, and infrastructure development discussion, revisionist states are nations from this behavior.22 Both Russia and that could project military power or that seek additional power or influence China have employed gray zone con- facilitate military operations.14 A fait in the international order. Conversely, flicts to achieve their aims, particularly accompli places the intended target in a status quo states seek to maintain the in areas where they seek to extend their position in which it is forced to accede or current balance of power, either to pre- sovereignty, deny access, or limit the risk escalation over small losses—losses serve their own security or because they ability of the United States to project that do not appear to warrant such a are deterred from seeking more power power. Though Russia and China may be response.15 Small or limited gains taken as and influence.19 partners in other areas, particularly ones a fait accompli support a greater strategy Although no nation can truly be con- in which they stand to benefit, in this to produce a larger effect that benefits the sidered a status quo power in all contexts, context they are revisionist states.23 aggressor over time.16 By forcing acquies- knowledge of a state’s tendency toward The gradual and insidious nature of cence, fait accompli approaches are likely revisionist behaviors, including use of gray strategies makes them difficult to to be repeated as the aggressor becomes gray zone conflicts, can inform analysis counter. First, incremental changes do emboldened by the target’s lack of direct of interactions with other nation-states not present a clearly defined threat until response. in the international environment. Figure the larger effect has been revealed or China, for example, is gradually 1 depicts Charles Glaser’s model to achieved.24 Second, the larger objective claiming reefs and islands in the dis- explain state intentions, in which status beyond gray zone conflict is often ob- puted waters of the South China Sea. quo seekers are either secure or deterred, scure because it is comprised of measured By enhancing existing land features while revisionists are either insecure gains. Often the perpetrator relies on and constructing facilities on small land and not deterred or are greedy and not the indirect nature of gray strategies masses, China is using the fait accompli deterred.20 The model also demonstrates to avoid responsibility or dismiss the approach to indirectly gain influence how a greedy state could be deterred, and behavior, and the gain, as an unintended and control over a vast area. China has therefore become a status quo power, consequence.25 For example, in Arms effectively used both the incremental and while revisionist states seek either security and Influence, Thomas Schelling indi- fait accompli approaches. These gradual or reward but are undeterred.21 cates that low-level incidents are often changes, while unlikely to provoke a The significance of this model lies in utilized to test commitments in a probing military response, are slowly altering the what it reveals about revisionist states: or noncommittal way, which allows territorial landscape and status quo in Regardless of whether they are seeking the transgressor to communicate the China’s favor, while the measured U.S. security or are simply greedy, these behavior as inadvertent and avoid the stance is likely perceived by the Chinese states do not accept the status quo. In perception of backing down.26 However, as acquiescence.17 In another example, fact, some states that employ gray zone if there is no response, then precedent is Russia used the fait accompli approach conflicts may appear to be status quo set for greater incursions to occur that, more aggressively in its 2014 annexation seekers but are actually revisionist. Using left unchecked, could eventually escalate of Crimea through the activities of “little this dynamic to help explain the current into overt conflicts.27
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Bothwell 27 Figure 2. Framework for Positioning threats. These threats can be identified and prevented only in steady-state opera- Positioning tions in which shaping activities dissuade Lines adversaries from actions that gradually oercion Deterrence oercion Deterrence of Effort rmed on lict erations erations and negatively affect the status quo. In addition to shaping adversaries’ Alliance/Coalition Building Alliance/Coalition Building Di lomatic perceptions, the key to countering Coercive Diplomacy Coercive Diplomacy gray zone conflicts lies in the ability to Political/Information Warfare Strategic Communications signal commitment in the face of status In ormational quo challenges. Schelling argues that Strategic Communications Information Operations military force can shape an adversary’s Financial Warfare Financial Warfare behavior outside of the context of war by Economic Targeted Sanctions Trade Agreements applying “controlled” and “measured” Economic Blockades Mobilization Arms Transfers ways to compel, intimidate, or deter ODSS Overflights Training Exercises Military opponents, thereby effectively opening Intelligence Sharing No-Fly Zones Treaty Enforcement bargaining space without engaging in Non-Kinetic Effort Kinetic Effort open conflict.36 Some examples of actions that could effectively signal U.S. resolve Source Antulio J. Echevarria II, erating in the ray one: An Alternative Paradigm for S Military Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA U.S. Army War College, 2016), 22. include border exercises, overflights, and intelligence-sharing activities.37 Other in- tegrated activities could include situations of armed or “gunboat diplomacy,” in At a minimum, in order to counter model has significant utility for campaign which military force supports nonmilitary gray zone conflicts, the joint force must planning in the face of gray zone con- actions as a means to deter or coerce the recognize gray strategies as adversarial flicts, facilitating a campaign below the opponent to cease aggressive behaviors.38 attempts to gradually alter the balance threshold of armed conflict, in which the of power—attempts that might be com- most successful competitor secures the Planning for the Counterattack mitted by states simultaneously seeking objective without invasion, occupation, Campaign planning incorporates to maintain the status quo in other areas or destruction of other regimes, thereby shaping activities that begin in Phase 0 where interests are shared. To reiterate, subordinating them.33 and continue throughout the course of states that employ gray strategies are Because gray zone conflicts are the operation. However, current models revisionist states.28 Given their revisionist designed to avoid the consequences as- have limitations about gray zone con- intentions, advocates are undeterred in sociated with direct military action, they flicts, as the greatest need for shaping the current operational environment and occur in the steady state. These conflicts activities comes during the initial stages represent a threat to U.S. national inter- underscore the importance of Phase 0 of the model, when kinetic military ests. This fact alone necessitates the joint operations to maintain the status quo on effort is at its lowest.39 However, if the force to address gray zone conflicts. issues of vital national interest, including model is built around a coercion-de- Joint planning is required to reduce strategic and military advantage. Phase 0 terrence dynamic, such as Antulio uncertainty, define the military problem operations are planned and coordinated Echevarria’s framework for positioning, set, and plan for the effective employ- actions designed to affect the strategic planning can include operations that ment of capabilities in countering gray environment and shape perceptions of deter aggressors or coerce changes in an strategies.29 Strategies tailored to meet both adversaries and allies.34 However, opponent’s behavior.40 challenges specific to gray zone conflicts current doctrine has a clear emphasis A coercion-deterrence dynamic is should be included in the joint plan- on security cooperation and the devel- instructive in identifying targeted lines ning process.30 In 2017, the Joint Staff opment of friendly military capabilities, of effort for communicating U.S. intent revised Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint which neglects shaping the perceptions of to adversaries, particularly through the Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operations adversaries. Specifically, JP 5-0 recognizes use of military force as a means to effec- Planning, titled Joint Planning in the the importance of shaping activities but tively bolster other instruments of power 2017 and 2020 versions.31 JP 3-0, which identifies the framework for those actions (see figure 2). For example, a blockade further incorporated a change in 2018, il- as “day-to-day security cooperation” becomes economic coercion by military lustrates multiple versions of the six-phase activities that are directed at partner means, indicating that reliance on diplo- model of campaign planning, but JP 5-0 nations.35 As a result, what is an effective macy or sanctions often depends on the removes the model while maintaining strategy for the operational environment capability found in the military domain.41 the use of phasing as a planning tool.32 in theaters already experiencing conflict Although a coercion-deterrence However, a modification of the six-phase fails to adequately address emerging approach offers much to counter gray
28 Forum / Gray Is the New Black JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 zone conflicts, Echevarria’s model needs Figure 2. Notional Operation Plan Phases to address campaign planning and a for Deterrence Coercion Operations phased approach to incorporate these concepts into joint operations planning. lan hases For example, by using the 2011 planning models for phased operations, the coer- cion-deterrence dynamic could introduce Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V Phase 0 Shape Deter Signal Coerce Restore Maintain Shape activities that take place after the steady state.42 If these concepts are integrated into the range of military operations, the Maintaining modified model can address gray zone Activities conflicts by actively preventing aggression through shaping activities. If shaping Coercing Activities fails to prevent these behaviors, deterring Restoring activities commence, and resolve is sig- Activities naled. If signaling activities are ignored, coercion begins until control of the oper- Signaling Activities ational environment is attained (see figure Deterring 3 for a possible modification). Activities In this conception, gray zone conflicts Shaping Activities are prevented in Phase 0 by actively shap- Theater ing the operational environment and the Shaping perceptions of our adversaries, not only Global our allies. If shaping activities fail to check Shaping aggressive behaviors, deterring activities OPLAN OPORD OPORD OPORD would commence (as they do in the Approval Activation Execution Termination existing phased model) by demonstrating Key OPLAN operation plan OPORD operations order. military capability and setting conditions for employment should a show of force or other military deployment be required. diplomacy, targeted sanctions, and infor- operations” driving an adversary to cease For purposes of this discussion, signaling mation warfare are coercive options along aggression and regain advantages at risk activities have been included in figure 3 with the other instruments of power.45 from the gray zone conflict.48 as a separate phase to allow for deliberate In terms of military operations, training The next phase remains the same as planning to signal resolve and commit- exercises, shows of force, and support in the original model but with activities ment; in terms of countering gray zone to other power instruments (such as the corresponding to restoring control of conflicts, an emphasis on signaling U.S. use of naval blockades to compel trade the operational environment and regain- resolve to adversaries is critical. Signaling sanctions) are viable coercive options. In ing the status quo—one in which U.S. activities are particularly important to the South China Sea example, China is interests are preserved—following the reduce the ambiguity associated with simultaneously conducting a gray zone cessation of gray hostilities.49 Subsequent gray zone conflicts, and activities such conflict over disputed claims to mari- maintaining activities are designed to as strategic communications and intel- time areas while expanding its import build on the newly reestablished status ligence-sharing can help lift the veil of of raw materials from Africa. Instead of quo and could include forging new deniability.43 More important, signaling confronting China in the South China cooperation in areas that maintain U.S. is necessary to communicate specific red Sea directly, the United States could interests and positions, while still ad- lines over vital interests through credible use surrogates to hold China’s African dressing the concerns that motivated the commitments, such as sunk costs or do- interests at risk in order to coerce a more revisionist aims of the aggressor. Finally, mestic “audience costs” associated with favorable outcome in the dispute.46 The new shaping activities commence to not fulfilling promises or threats.44 model presents additional possibilities thwart future gray zone conflicts. If signaling fails to alter the oppo- for coercive activities wherein “the point nent’s revisionist intentions, coercive of action might be far removed from the Conclusion: The activities then commence. Coercive point of effect, but the effect is to alter Strategic Imperative activities, which have already been sig- the decisionmaking calculus regardless of The gradual, ambiguous nature of naled as consequences, allow multiple geography.”47 Like dominating activities, gray zone conflicts requires increased lines of effort and can be coordinated to coercive activities should be “decisive understanding of aggression short of avoid direct military conflict. Coercive
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Bothwell 29 9 Ibid., 35; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 66. 10 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 67–68. 11 Michael McDevitt, The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future (Arlington, VA: CNA, November 2014), iv, 3. 12 Ibid., 48; Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges,” PRISM 7, no. 4 (2018), 3. 13 Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, 36. 14 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 67–68. 15 Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, 37. 16 Ibid. 17 McDevitt, The South China Sea, 33. 18 Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 39. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. rd th st Marines with Battalion Landing Team, 3 Battalion, 4 Marines, 31 Marine Expeditionary Unit, 21 Ibid. navigate on combat rubber raiding craft during boat launch near Peleliu, Philippine Sea, March 1, 22 Ibid. 2021 (U.S. Marine Corps/Danny Gonzalez) 23 Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, 20, 39. 24 Ibid. war and of new strategies to quell these existing planning models to incorporate 25 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 67. challenges. Although current doctrine countering activities—such as shaping, 26 Ibid.; Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, 35. does not adequately address gray zone deterring, signaling, and, if necessary, 27 Ibid.; Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, 35. 28 conflicts, existing planning models can coercing—the United States can check For more on this, see Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics, 39. be modified to emphasize shaping and revisionist intentions. Only by reframing 29 JP 5-0, I-5. incorporate activities that deter, signal, the problem of gray zone conflicts can 30 Ibid., III-39. and, if necessary, coerce opponents into the United States hope to retain posi- 31 JP 3-0, I-2. ceasing aggression. These activities will tional advantage where national interests 32 JP 5-0, iii. 33 reduce uncertainty and communicate are at stake. JFQ Nadia Schadlow, “Research & Debate— It’s a Gray, Gray World,” Naval War College resolve to our adversaries, while setting Review 73, no. 3 (2020), 2. the operational conditions to coercively 34 Scott D. McDonald, Brock Jones, and stop them, if required. Early U.S. failure Notes Jason M. Frazee, “Phase Zero: How China to recognize and respond to China’s Exploits It, Why the United States Does Not,” 1 gray zone actions in the South China Gray zone conflicts as defined and Naval War College Review 65, no. 3 (2012), 131. discussed in this article could be included in 35 JP 5-0, III-4. Sea has facilitated additional incursions Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations 36 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 67–68. and emboldened Chinese forays into (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 37 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Operating in the other arenas. New strategy options to 17, 2017, Incorporating Change 1, October Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. mitigate China’s influence are required, 22, 2018), as part of chapter V discussions on Military Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. and military planning efforts to address campaign planning. Specific concepts discussed Army War College Press, 2016), 14. for Phase 0 operations could also be outlined 38 Ibid., 13. this and other gray zone conflicts as part of JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning 39 See JP 5-0, III-39, III-41; Echevarria, should follow. (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, Operating in the Gray Zone, 10. Gray zone conflicts are aspects of the 2011). 40 Echevarria, Operating in the Gray Zone, new normal, part of the competitive op- 2 Philip Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” Special 14. erational environment that has developed Warfare 28, no. 4 (October–December 2015). 41 Ibid., 14–15. 3 Ibid. 42 JP 5-0, III-39. in the post–Cold War era. Joint planning 4 Ibid. 43 Echevarria, Operating in the Gray Zone, has not yet adequately addressed gray 5 Lindsey R. Sheppard and Matthew 26. zone conflicts or the gradualist ap- Conklin, Warning for the Gray Zone 44 Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, proaches by which they are characterized, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 137; James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political allowing opponents—revisionist states— International Studies, August 2019), 2. Audiences and the Escalation of International 6 Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Disputes,” American Political Science Review to incrementally achieve their objectives Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of 88, no. 3 (1994). while avoiding military consequences. Conflict(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army 45 Echevarria, Operating in the Gray Zone, Unchecked, gray zone conflicts will War College Press, 2016), 34–36; Thomas C. 14–15. slowly erode the status quo and under- Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: 46 Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” 24. mine U.S. interests. However, the joint Yale University Press, 2008), 66–68. 47 Ibid. 7 Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, 35. 48 JP 5-0, III-43. force can be more agile. By modifying 8 Ibid., 36. 49 Ibid., III-39.
30 Forum / Gray Is the New Black JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Firefighters with Mississippi Task Force Urban Search and Rescue ride hoist to UH-72 Lakota while participating in Patriot South 20, at Guardian Centers in Perry, Georgia, February 28, 2020 (U.S. Army National Guard/Christopher Shannon)
Educating Our Leaders in the Art and Science of Stakeholder Management
By Alexander L. Carter
hen the U.S. Army released A review of the documents, however, tribal allegiances, underlying ethnic its long-awaited critique of revealed an unflinching account of tensions, and aged infrastructure.2 W its successes and failures in some of the Service’s key failures in Planning assumptions were made the Iraq War, many questioned how planning and executing military opera- without the benefit of insight, advice, honest the Army would be with itself.1 tions at all levels of engagement—stra- and counsel from key individuals, par- tegic, operational, and tactical. One ticularly outside of military chains of explanation for this failure is that Army command, who had sufficient influence Lieutenant Colonel Alexander L. Carter, USA, leaders did not fully understand the and expertise to help the Service more is an Army Strategist and currently pursuing a operating environment in Iraq—its effectively achieve its desired endstates Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic totalitarian government structure, in that theater. Studies at the Naval War College.
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Carter 31 Soldiers prepare for next operational day in support of state efforts to provide mass COVID-19 vaccinations administered by New York State Department of Health, at Javits Convention Center in Manhattan, February 14, 2021 (U.S. Army National Guard/Sebastian Rothwyn)
How could such a well-trained Army, the corporate world because engaging One would think that these stake- led by senior officers with decades of with investors is crucial to enabling holder management skills are a regular experience and education, miss opportu- the development of successful plans part of a formal military curriculum nities to engage with these stakeholders? and strategies. Such executive abili- on leadership at any one of our officer The answer is that our senior officers, for ties should also be considered part of primary military education institutions, the most part, are not educated in stake- a military leader’s skill set in the joint such as our senior Service colleges, but holder management—that is, how one force. Like the government, private- they are not.4 Consequently, our leaders engages others with sufficient power and sector businesses grapple with changing must learn new skills related to stakehold- influence or interest to solicit diverse in- threats, market dynamics, competitors, ers, such as identifying, prioritizing, and puts and opinions to address complicated and even unforeseen events that have engaging with them, to improve results or complex problems. Thus, this article major impacts on their strategies. The as they develop strategies, plans, policies, seeks to bridge a perceived knowledge outbreak of the novel coronavirus is an and so on. To learn these skills, leaders gap with leaders and their executive com- excellent example of an incident that must leverage what seems to work in the munication skills by introducing them business strategists and military plan- private sector. to a more disciplined, formal approach ners alike could not have foreseen. In of identifying, prioritizing, and engaging such unpredictable times, companies Identifying Stakeholders stakeholders. This article suggests new likely recognize the value of broaden- According to R. Edward Freeman, a and creative ways to conduct stakeholder ing the membership of their version of stakeholder is “any group or individual management (identification, prioritiza- crisis action teams through recruitment who can affect or is affected by the tion, and engagement)—techniques of other types of stakeholders that can achievement of the organization’s borrowed from practices employed in the advise them of the viability of different objectives.”5 A stakeholder’s influence private and commercial sectors.3 approaches to tackling complex prob- can affect military strategies and plans lems. The military, like these companies, at all levels. For example, when leaders Stakeholder Management must also engage with the right indi- devise strategies, they are better served Stakeholder management is largely viduals from the right organizations to by incorporating input from a broad set considered an invaluable skill set in navigate real and emerging challenges. of stakeholders, from both traditional
32 JPME Today / The Art and Science of Stakeholder Management JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 and nontraditional sources, whose intentioned, such approaches run the risk Figure 1 Po er/Interest Grid interests and insights may challenge, of missing many potential stakeholders enrich, or support underlying planning because of a failure to employ a more High assumptions. (The process of identify- disciplined, organized, and systematic ee anage ing, mapping, prioritizing, assigning, approach to stakeholder identification. Satisfied Closely engaging, and reporting on interactions Leaders can employ at least two methods with a stakeholder can be collectively to generate a more comprehensive and Moderate defined as stakeholder management.) focused list of stakeholders at the onset o er ee The process of identifying stake- of their strategic or operational undertak- onitor nformed holders may be similar across different ing: center of gravity (COG) analysis leadership roles or functions, but the and strengths-weaknesses-opportunities- selection of these stakeholders will vary threats (SWOT) analysis. Low Moderate High based on the nature of the command Both the COG and the SWOT nterest seeking advice and counsel from such methods will help a leader think more individuals. For example, one who leads systematically and broadly about which units and formations to engage with stakeholders may best help craft a solu- In a similar manner to COG analysis, the enemy would have requirements to tion to a problem facing his or her a senior leader might look to another develop theater or regional engagement command. COG analysis, a familiar familiar tool—SWOT analysis—to (lethal and nonlethal) plans and strategies military activity typically employed generate a fresh list of stakeholders be- above and below the threshold of con- for strategic and operational planning fore embarking on a major campaign, flict. Such leaders would likely need to processes, can be repurposed for other operation, initiative, or policy proposal. involve a diverse group of experts drawn ends—namely stakeholder identifica- SWOT analysis involves identifying a set from military, government, and industry tion—while SWOT analysis is employed of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, circles. By contrast, an installation com- by many public- and private-sector and threats bearing on an organization. mander must grapple with a different set organizations to help them develop long- Typically, strengths and weaknesses are of challenges and problem sets involv- term strategies, address systemic internal internally focused, while opportunities ing an entirely new cast of stakeholders problems or challenges, or even attempt and threats are external to the organiza- and constituents. For this leader, such to develop solutions to external problems tion.9 A repurposing of traditional SWOT stakeholders might include tenant units or challenges. analysis would focus on the opportunities and commands, local civilian businesses, Joint doctrine defines the center of and threats identified by this exercise to civic associations, and even appointed gravity as “a source of power that pro- develop a candidate list of stakeholders or elected officials from Federal, state, vides moral or physical strength, freedom that could help the organization capital- and local branches of government. Or a of action, or will to act.”6 COG analysis ize on opportunities and mitigate threats. senior leader with policy or programmatic begins with the desired endstate and The benefits of conducting this disci- responsibilities at the Pentagon might systematically walks through the ways plined approach to identifying an initial have stakeholders from military, industry, or critical capabilities needed to achieve set of stakeholders are numerous. A joint academia, and policy think tanks with or maintain the endstate. From such warfighting leader and supporting staff very different but necessary views on how capabilities, one can then determine the might select stakeholders in a SWOT to advise the leader and his or her team critical requirements needed to enable analysis who could help them further on the feasibility, acceptability, and suit- means.7 COG analysis includes creating elaborate on greater opportunities for ability of a proposed action. Given that a shortlist of those capabilities that are strengthening in-region partnerships or different leadership roles require different most vulnerable to “enemy” actions— improving interoperability during joint stakeholders to potentially advise them, critical vulnerabilities.8 In each step of exercises. An installation commander how does one determine an initial list of this analysis—critical capabilities, critical might select stakeholders who could help stakeholders with whom to consult? requirements, and critical vulnerabili- improve the installation’s relationship Current approaches for identifying ties—leaders with their staffs can generate with the supporting civilian communities, stakeholders across the joint force are not a list of stakeholders that represents or- capitalizing on opportunities that might really methods at all. In many cases, the ganizations or interests that would likely otherwise not have surfaced. Similarly, default approach to identifying stakehold- influence either the positive or negative a policy or program manager might ers is simply to defer to a senior leader’s outcome of these critical capabilities that uncover a list of stakeholders while re- opinion on who should be invited “to the affect the existence of the center of grav- viewing threats or perceived obstacles to table,” to simply have staff ask around, ity. Such a novel use of COG analysis the passage or implementation of a policy. or to rely on one’s “gut instinct” to would likely yield a number of potential In both COG and SWOT analyses, generate an initial list of candidate stake- stakeholders that might otherwise have leaders could take advantage of existing holders. While understandable and well been overlooked. tools to produce a more expanded and
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Carter 33 Figure 2 Engage Manage Closely Stakeholders Stakeholders who fall in the high power/high interest quadrant would be candidates for deliberate outreach and engagement. All stakeholders are distinc- tive, though, and need to be managed ee anage Satisfied Closely as such based on their relative authority (power) and level of concern (interest). eutral Those stakeholders initially assessed
o er as having a high degree of power and ee onitor interest should be classified as “manage nformed closely,” meaning these stakeholders will be actively managed by a member of the Stakeholder Current disposition of stakeholder leader’s team based on the perceived de- nterest Stakeholder Y Desired disposition of stakeholder gree of assistance they could offer to the planning effort.
Figure 3 Stakeholder Planning for Theater Security Engaging Stakeholders Cooperation Plan evelopment Once stakeholders have been identified and prioritized, leaders must allocate Stakeholder Identification Prioritization and Engagement resources (team members) to engage Senior Leader Challenge Develope a Theater Security Cooperation Plan with those deemed critical for solicita- Theater U.S. Indo-Pacific Command tion. Stakeholders classified as having esistant Am assadors Leading e uty Chiefs of ission high interest and high power (manage Step 1 Identify and Prioritize Stakeholders closely) should be further assessed to High ilitary Liaison fficers in determine their current and desired m assy Country eams dispositions toward such plans.12 ee anage Stakeholder engagements should be Satisfied Closely scheduled and reported through exist- eutral ing leader-led meetings. Engagements Moderate egional nter o tl rgs anage Closely
o er e.g. AS A egional should be planned with supporting nstitute ee Asia acific goals and objectives for each long-term onitor .S. and oreign Academia Center nformed hink anks stakeholder relationship and short-term
n egion .S. stakeholder engagement. As seen in efense Low Moderate High Contractors figure 2, for example, two stakeholders have been assessed differently in terms of nterest na are nt l Allies artners Supportive their current and desired dispositions. A Step 2 Conduct Stakeholder Engagements to solicit leader should then assign team members information, educate, influence, gain support and/or secure funding. to reach out to these two stakeholders to move the stakeholders’ current disposi- tion toward a desired outlook relative to influential list of stakeholders. But how grid has two axes—power and interest. the command’s efforts. does one then convert a list of candidate Stakeholders are plotted on any one In this process of engagement, stakeholders into a stakeholder engage- of four quadrants based on a collective leaders could gauge stakeholders’ senti- ment plan that will solicit information, assessment of their relative power and ments, thoughts, and feelings toward advice, and counsel from those who are interest. The degree of power for each a command’s developing or proposed the most relevant and valuable to the stakeholder is assessed subjectively con- actions and plans. Stakeholders would be senior leader? sidering various types of power sources, consulted for advice, opinions, reactions, such as legitimate, informal, referent, or even participation in planning efforts. Prioritizing Stakeholders expert, coercive, connective, and so on, Such efforts could be accomplished Stakeholders are not all created equal. that may be associated with an indi- through face-to-face meetings, emails, As such, there are different ways to vidual stakeholder.11 On the other axis, video conference calls, or other means. organize and prioritize them. One the degree of interest is assessed based From such deliberate relationship plan- technique widely taught in the busi- on the stakeholder’s perceived level of ning, leaders would guide efforts to build ness world is to prioritize stakeholders interest in the outcome of the strategy stronger and more fruitful stakeholder along a power/interest grid.10 The or plan (see figure 1). relationships. Stakeholders can, and often
34 JPME Today / The Art and Science of Stakeholder Management JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 7 do, influence an organization’s planning more comprehensively developed strate- Steven D. Kornatz, “The Primacy of COG Planning: Getting Back to Basics,” Joint Force processes, especially with initiatives involv- gies with supporting assumptions that Quarterly 82 (3rd Quarter 2016), 93. ing enterprise-wide resources and strategic have been more thoroughly tested from 8 Ibid. aims.13 Results from such engagement different sources. 9 Marilyn M. Helms and Judy Nixon, “Ex- efforts would yield more comprehensively ploring SWOT Analysis—Where Are We Now? developed strategies with supporting as- Addressing the Critics A Review of Academic Research from the Last Decade,” Journal of Strategy and Management sumptions that had been more thoroughly Some may question whether our senior 3, no. 3 (August 2010), 216. tested from different sources. military leaders could or should learn 10 While employed by IBM, the author was from other professions and industries. introduced to the power/interest grid while A Combatant Command These critics argue that military culture supporting private- and public-sector clients in Perspective and environment are unique and that various consulting projects that required strate- gic and corporate planning skills. See Paul Alan Leaders charged with developing a suc- the business world, with its focus on Smith, “Stakeholder Engagement Framework,” cessful theater engagement strategy at profits and customers, can contribute Information & Security: An International the combatant command level should little to the problems that military Journal 38 (2017), available at
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Carter 35 Marine Candidate participates in fire team assault course at Officer Candidates School, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, June 17, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Cristian L. Ricardo)
Conquering the Ethical Temptations of Command Lessons from the Field Grades
By Clinton Longenecker and James W. Shufelt
There is no getting around the fact that every promotion and new position brings with it a new host of challenges, demands, relationships, problems, opportunities, and even new, and maybe even previously unseen, ethical challenges. . . . It is only a smart thing to be ready and prepared to address all of these issues.
—U.S. Army War College student observation
Dr. Clinton Longenecker is a Distinguished University Professor and the Director of the Center for thical lapses committed by senior Leadership and Organizational Excellence in the College of Business and Innovation at the University business leaders are reported of Toledo. James W. Shufelt is Professor Emeritus in the Army Strategic Education Program at the almost daily. Unfortunately, U.S. Army War College. E
36 JPME Today / Conquering the Ethical Temptations of Command JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 similar reports about military leaders in “morally sound cultures,” can still Exploring the Temptation also frequently appear; browse almost make less than fully ethical and moral of Command any contemporary military publication, choices—with devastating conse- To understand the temptations associ- and there is usually an article discuss- quences, especially at the senior leader- ated with military command, we con- ing an ethical failure by a high-ranking ship level.5 Research shows that any ducted structured focus groups with Servicemember. Although Department number of factors can erode or degrade 271 senior military leaders at 4 different of Defense figures attest that the actual the most principled leader’s character, senior Service colleges. We asked par- number of these failings is statistically causing questionable moral choices ticipants to anonymously answer the fol- small, they garner disproportionate and unethical decisions when operating lowing open-ended question: “Based on attention.1 The critical nature of the within the realities, dynamics, and pres- your experience, what are the specific U.S. military mission makes it incum- sures of the modern workplace.6 temptations or opportunities for wrong- bent on leaders to possess not only In his book The Lucifer Effect, Philip doing associated with your most recent great technical competency in their Zimbardo identifies several workplace position?” We encouraged these leaders jobs but also great character and integ- factors that can damage the moral fiber to focus on the temptations associated rity. Because of this demand, the U.S. of individuals, including negative situ- with the position that they held rather military has high formal standards for ational and environmental forces, lack of than discussing personal temptations ethical leadership behavior. accountability, bad bosses, toxic organi- that they might be dealing with on an The requirements for ethical behavior zational cultures, bad group dynamics, individual level. We collected, shuffled, by all members of the military—and es- persistent personal isolation, a significant and randomly distributed the group’s pecially those in leadership positions—are failure, and even success.7 These fac- responses to everyone and asked par- clearly stated in U.S. law, Department of tors confront even the most upstanding ticipants to read at least 10 response Defense policies, Service regulations, and leaders, potentially allowing them to be sets from their peers and make observa- doctrine and joint Service publications.2 influenced or “tempted” to engage in un- tions on what stood out. Subsequently, The U.S. military’s commitment to these ethical decisions and even activities that we randomly assigned participants to high ethical leadership standards is mani- are knowingly wrong.8 5-person groups in which they com- fested in three important areas that cut It is our position that if leaders—re- pared and discussed their observations across all the Services: gardless of their rank—are going to and recorded a top 10 list of command continually make effective ethical and temptations on a flipchart to share with clearly articulated and demanding • moral choices and demonstrate exem- everyone. standards and codes of conduct plary management in every situation, After each focus group discussed its for ethical leader behavior and they must be able to conquer the temp- findings with the entire group, individu- decisionmaking tations that come with the territory of als returned to their small groups and ongoing leadership ethics training • command.9 In this context, temptation addressed the following statement as a and development initiatives can be defined as something that entices team: “Please identify the specific prac- daily accountability for “exem- • individuals or groups to desire something tices and action steps that you believe plary leader conduct” and ethical that is unacceptable or considered wrong leaders need to take to avoid making decisionmaking.3 and not in their best interest.10 wrongful decisions in responding to the The criticality of adhering to high Although the word temptation rarely specific temptations we have just identi- ethical standards was emphatically re- appears—and is even more seldomly fied.” We instructed groups to think iterated in Secretary of Defense James discussed—in leadership development about these practices as “guardrails,” Mattis’s August 4, 2017, memorandum, circles and ethics literature, we main- protective barriers used in dangerous “Ethical Standards for All Hands,” which tain that every leader faces ethical and environments to prevent serious injury stated that all members of the defense moral temptations associated with the by preventing hazardous activity. Each community should focus on the essence position. Therefore, every leader must team then developed a list of 8 to 10 of ethical conduct, “doing what is right at be prepared to answer this question: specific leadership guardrails, which were all times, regardless of the circumstances What are the specific moral and ethical subsequently presented to the larger or whether anyone is watching.”4 temptations associated with the position group. Having reviewed, tabulated, and I hold, and am I prepared to conquer conducted a content analysis on the Moral Choices and Temptations them? The purpose of this article is to presentations from each of the 57 focus Despite this overarching organizational identify potential temptations associated groups, we learned a great deal from this commitment to ethical military leader- with senior military positions and offer exercise about both the temptations of ship, history shows that, without due specific practices that can prevent leaders command and the leadership guardrails diligence and moral courage, leaders from engaging in wrongful, immoral, that can potentially help prevent moral with great integrity, high ethical stan- and unethical behaviors. and ethical failures. dards, and effective training, operating
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Longenecker and Shufelt 37 Observations on the oneself look more successful. Participants consideration. Though there may be rare Temptation of Command noted this issue is a very pervasive reasons to justify this practice, “playing and Guardrails temptation given the military’s competi- favorites” and related preferential treat- From our focus groups, we have several tive, information-rich, and data-driven ment of personnel, for whatever reason, observations on the interactive process environment. can create a variety of negative, unfore- of temptation-mapping and guardrail- 2. Misuse of Government Funds/ seen, and unpredictable problems in any ing. First, when participants were asked Resources/Personnel. To enable them to command structure. to engage in this exercise, they were complete the mission, leaders at all levels 6. “Blind Eye” and Failure to Report reminded that the focus was not on are entrusted with significant monetary Wrongdoing. The U.S. Army officer them as leaders but rather on the temp- and other tangible government resources corps has a tradition of ethical behavior tations attached to the positions they that, without due diligence and atten- starting with the West Point cadet honor hold. Second, during the process of tion, can be misused. Such mishandling code, which states that “a cadet will not reading the temptation lists from fellow might result in unauthorized pay reim- lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who participants, there was typically a great bursements or improper personal use of do.”11 This same ethos is pervasive in deal of notetaking and some nervous government vehicles or other equipment. every Service’s formal ethical standards; laughter from participants as the leaders At the same time, the misuse of military however, in a highly competitive—and at saw, in writing, many of the ethical personnel for personal benefit also sur- times political—environment, participants challenges they all face. Third, the faced as a real temptation. Employing noted that there may be incentives that focus group discussion on the tempta- these resources for personal advantage is could cause a leader to look away from tions of command was quite beneficial, a potential temptation that senior leaders or ignore wrongdoing. Whistleblowing as there was typically great empathy must always address and avoid. has established processes and is encour- about and consensus on common 3. Inappropriate Sexual aged across all the military branches, but temptations. Fourth, when the focus Relationships. The issue of inappropriate participants made it clear that there exists group charts identifying temptations of sexual relations quickly emerged in these a potential personal cost for engaging in command were compared, there was discussions as a potential Achilles’ heel for this practice—one that might have a chill- normally exceptional consensus, which many senior leaders, despite the military’s ing effect on leaders, encouraging them was further reinforced by each group’s exceptionally strong prohibition against to ignore a problematic situation. explanations to the larger group. Finally, sexual harassment, assault, fraternization, 7. Exerting Inappropriate Influence when asked to identify the specific and adultery. Participants highlighted on Personnel Decisions. The U.S. military guardrails that can prevent leaders’ many explanations for allowing this has well-defined standards and require- ethical failure, participants typically had powerful temptation to grow into actual ments for human resource decisions meaningful team discussions in coming wrongful behavior, such as extended at all levels. Despite these established to consensus, as these talks naturally separations from loved ones, isolation and processes, participants stated that senior evolved into effective team-building and loneliness, stress-related sex, and hubris. leaders can have a powerful influence coaching experiences for all involved. 4. Alcohol/Substance Abuse. Any dis- on personnel processes for selection, cussion of temptation in military circles promotion, and hiring decisions and, in The Temptations of Command will always include a discussion of alcohol, some cases, can clearly overstep these During these exercises, focus group and our participants were no exception. stated guidelines. While leaders might, in participants identified many potential They made the case that, although the their minds, have the best interest of the temptations of command. The top military formally frowns on alcohol organization at heart, they can nonethe- 10 temptations, ranked by frequency, abuse, the military culture as a whole less override or unduly influence these follow. is still accepting and tolerant of alcohol established decision processes with poten- 1. Falsifying, Massaging, or consumption, which can create significant tially damaging and unforeseen negative Manipulating Information or Data. problems for both individual leaders and side effects, as these activities do not take Participants identified that many senior their subordinates. Participants noted place in a vacuum. leaders face a real temptation to be less that other substance abuse opportunities 8. Offering/Accepting Gifts or Bribes than candid and honest, or even ma- also surface as temptations in any military or Quid Pro Quo. Senior leaders have nipulative, when presenting information environment. specific guidelines concerning offering or and data attached to their positions. 5. Favoritism or Preferential accepting gifts, yet virtually every focus This potential misuse of information/ Treatment. Fairness is the cornerstone group shared accounts of leaders being data has any number of causes, including of effective command; however, our offered tickets to a sporting event or en- paperwork exhaustion, time constraints, a leaders made the case that the tempta- tertainment venue or a personal gift that desire to protect individuals/operations/ tion to treat personnel by different or was contrary to these strict guidelines. organizations, and/or a self-serving personally convenient standards was an Participants agreed that this temptation is willingness to personally benefit or make issue that required attention and serious very real; they shared the belief that, the
38 JPME Today / Conquering the Ethical Temptations of Command JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Training officer, on left, assigned to Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 11, briefs squadron’s chief staff officer and executive officer aboard 34-foot Sea Ark patrol boat during navigation check ride exercise off coast of Long Beach, California, November 12, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Nelson Doromal, Jr.) higher one rises in the organization, the an additional warning, they made it to look at these temptations and judge greater the likelihood and frequency of clear that the higher a leader rises in the these leaders as somehow lacking, flawed, this temptation. In addition, participants organization, the greater this potential broken, or defective, these participants— frequently tied quid pro quo to this dis- temptation. from a wide cross-section of Services and cussion and it was frequently associated 10. Seeking/Demanding Deference functions—were given an assignment to with a dialogue of how “transitioning to or Preferential Treatment. Groups collect intelligence on the threats they retirement” can open a potential hornet’s identified the issue of showing favorit- faced because of the positions they hold; nest of ethical questions, predicaments, ism as a temptation of command. They these were their conclusions. All leaders and dilemmas. also pointed out that if leaders are not face temptation, but the real question is 9. Hubris. In a large and mission- careful, they can find themselves seeking whether they have the strength of charac- driven enterprise, it is important that or even demanding favoritism or special ter and moral courage to withstand those rules and the chain of command be treatment as they navigate the military’s temptations and continue to do the right followed. Yet participants stated that, large and complex operating systems. thing regardless of circumstance.12 in select circumstances, some officers This temptation can come in many forms, might be tempted to knowingly violate including seeking perks, travel arrange- The Ethical Guardrails of policy or disobey an order if they believe ments, and line jumping, among others. Effective Command doing so can provide them with a desired These actions are frequently driven by After participants identified tempta- benefit or outcome. The keywords in leaders’ belief that the rules do not apply tions, we asked them to cite any specific these discussions were knowingly and to them, as previously discussed, or the ethical guardrails to help conquer these personal gain. Participants discussed the need for expediency. enticements. We next discuss the top 10 temptation that exists when leaders er- In summary, focus groups openly guardrails that emerged from the focus roneously believe that they are bigger discussed and honestly identified poten- groups, ranked according to frequency than rules, policies, and regulations, tial temptations—the moral and ethical of mention; each is followed by a key which is frequently driven by unbridled challenges that leaders can face in senior leadership question for senior leader ego, egocentrism, and hubris. And as military positions. While it may be easy consideration and action.
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Longenecker and Shufelt 39 Army instructor with 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion, assigned to Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, writes team evaluation during Counter Illicit Trafficking Junior Leadership Course examination at Queen Elizabeth Park, Uganda, October 10, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/J.D. Strong II)
1. Develop and Maintain Real meaningful relationships and a “battle command. Participants viewed being Accountability Relationships. Our buddy” or “wing man” are critical to mentally and physically equipped to con- participants emphatically believe that effective leadership and fostering a will- front a temptation as critically important personal and professional accountability is ingness to always do the right thing. In to ensure leaders are prepared for their a critical vehicle to deal with the tempta- a nutshell, the conclusion was that there “moment of truth”—when they are tions of command. It has been stated is no substitute for relationships and ac- confronted with a real-world temptation. that it is lonely at the top. Loneliness countability in staying on the straight and Participants made it clear that prepara- suggests the absence of relationships, and narrow. tion and rehearsal are critical to ensure thus a lack of social support and account- Key Leadership Question: Who is truly leaders are prepared to make a good ability, both of which our senior leaders holding you accountable for effective and ethical choice, demonstrating their moral agreed can create real trouble. Group ethical leader behavior and encouraging courage to conquer each and every temp- discussions and presentations revealed you to be your very best? tation they face. Simply stated, there is no the importance of creating professional 2. Create Situational Awareness substitute for preparation when entering accountability by establishing peer-level Around Potential Ethical Temptations an ethical battlefield. accountability partners; fostering effective and Prepare for Your Moment of Truth. Key Leadership Question: Are you working relationships with key advisors, Once ethical temptations have been situationally aware of the temptations you such as executive officers and senior identified, individuals must increase situ- face, and have you rehearsed how you enlisted leaders and advisors; and devel- ational awareness to avoid them, as it is will defeat them when confronted with oping a personal “board of directors” easier to sidestep temptation than to resist your moment of truth? to provide a professional and personal it. In the same vein, senior leaders spoke 3. Develop, Own, and Maintain a source of accountability, counsel, and of being properly prepared to effectively Personal Code of Conduct. The U.S. encouragement. Participants believe that respond to the various temptations of military has exceptionally well-developed
40 JPME Today / Conquering the Ethical Temptations of Command JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Marines stand at attention for “Anchors Aweigh” during graduation ceremony for Lance Corporal Leadership and Ethics Seminar, Class 1-21, at Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, January 28, 2021 (U.S. Marine Corps/Michael Neuenhoff) standards for ethical behavior; however, 4. Make Proactive Use of Existing Key Leadership Question: Have you participants made it clear that individual Military Checks/Balances and Protocols. taken the time to fully recognize and leaders need to create a personal code Leaders had thoughtful discussions own the various military guardrails that of conduct for their current position about the military’s wide spectrum of are available to you in order to help you and the ethical challenges they face. checks and balances that, when properly defeat the temptations of command? Participants suggested such personal employed, serve as valuable guardrails 5. Increase Personal Faith, Self- codes of conduct should include state- and as potential deterrence to wrong- Reflection, Awareness, and Assessment. ments clarifying one’s leadership purpose doing. Although participants believe According to participants, the tempo, and mission, articulating one’s personal that existing military safeguards against pace, and workload of senior military values and virtues, and identifying key ethical wrongdoing can be effective, leaders have increased in recent years, leader behaviors and practices, among they noted that if someone wishes to which has had a debilitating effect on others. In addition to developing this bend the rules, “go off the reservation,” their time to think and reflect. To help personal code of conduct, participants or “do their own thing,” these checks maintain a moral compass, participants believe that leaders need to take owner- and balances are of reduced value. The stated that it is imperative to take the ship of that code by making it part of key point is for leaders to clearly know time to build on personal faith or belief their daily reflections, leadership ethos, and understand the preexisting organi- systems and to set aside moments for practices, and personal behaviors/habits. zational guardrails and to use them to self-reflection, awareness, and assess- Key Leadership Question: Have you advantage. These checks and balances ment. These practices are critical cerebral taken the time to develop a personal code can also come in the form of personnel, guardrails to avoid ethical wrongdoing, of conduct that addresses the challenges including executive officers, senior non- as they help leaders stay morally and ethi- of the current position you hold, and do commissioned officers, and chaplains. cally strong. Contemplative activities can you “own it”? help keep leaders grounded, but taking
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Longenecker and Shufelt 41 Recruit division commander assigned to Officer Training Command Newport, in Newport, Rhode Island, corrects Officer Candidate School student’s form during remedial physical training, March 9, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Darwin Lam) time to remember their higher calling as superciliousness, hubris, arrogance, and those in your command succeed and to leaders can easily be lost in the frenzied pomposity. Participants made it clear that help keep your ego in check? heat of battle and the frantic pace of daily these negative leadership qualities can set 7. Proactively Create and Foster an military life. According to participants, the stage for ethical wrongdoing, as peo- Ethical Leadership Culture in Your there is no substitute for taking the time ple might begin to believe that the rules Command. Our leaders stated that to look in the mirror, reflect on one’s per- do not apply to them or that they are de- creating an ethical leadership culture is sonal code of conduct, and think through serving of special treatment. Participants a critically important guardrail for those all the challenges one faces in every part spoke of the importance of keeping one’s in their command structure, as well as of the job. ego in check and maintaining humility, themselves. When senior leaders lead by Key Leadership Question: How often and they mentioned practicing servant example, operate with transparency, and do you take time to think about your leadership. In these discussions, senior help establish an ethical/moral command higher calling as a military leader and officers frequently spoke of the impor- climate, employing all the tools available build on your personal value system tance of serving their operations and the to them, they create not only downward through self-reflection, awareness, and people who depended on them for mis- accountability for their people but also assessment? sion success. They considered this servant upward accountability for themselves. 6. Keep Ego in Check and Practice mindset to be a buttress against arro- Participants shared in these discussions Servant Leadership to Maintain gance and hubris. Participants stressed that a toxic leadership climate breeds Humility. Successful military leadership that arrogance is a precursor to poor poor performance and opens the door requires self-confidence, self-assuredness, ethical decisionmaking, while humility for a host of potential ethical disrup- and a bit of swagger, to be sure. These can help a leader stay on task. tions. Conversely, creating an effective can be noble and positive leadership Key Leadership Question: Do you and principled command climate, where qualities, but, when taken to an ex- practice daily servant leadership to help performance and ethical guidelines are treme, they can lead to overconfidence, clearly established, discussed, trained, and
42 JPME Today / Conquering the Ethical Temptations of Command JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 reinforced on a daily basis, creates a pow- Key Leadership Question: When mak- personal accountability.13 One of the erful set of guardrails for all. ing important decisions with ethical most powerful lessons brought on by the Key Leadership Question: What implications, do you seek wise counsel anticipation of combat is that there is no specific actions are you taking in your from people in your organization who substitute for preparation. command to clearly establish a culture of can help you make the best possible deci- Conduct a Temptation-Mapping high performance and ethical behavior sion for your operation? Session with Your Staff. Senior leaders that is known, understood, and felt by all? 10. Keep Good Records and Accurate must encourage their staffs to openly 8. Establish and Maintain Documentation. The final guardrail par- identify and discuss the potential tempta- Transparency, Openness, and ticipants identified is the practice of using tions they may face as members of their Consistency in Decisionmaking and personal discipline and organizational leadership team. Leaders might consider Communications. The senior leaders skills to keep good documentation of using their executive officer, judge advo- made it clear that a key indicator a leader decisions, activities, and ongoing report- cate general, or chaplain as a facilitator might be succumbing to temptation is ing functions. Participants pointed out for this critically important discussion; a lack of transparency, openness, and that if a leader sets the goal of accurate it is important to have this discussion to consistency in his or her daily actions. documentation, good recordkeeping, create both openness and a sense that When a senior leader engages in ongoing and transparency, there is less temptation leaders are not alone in the challenges decisionmaking and communications to manipulate or falsify information or they face. Temptation-mapping can be an that demonstrate transparency, openness, data and decisions. Leaders should use invaluable reconnaissance tool to reveal and consistency, he or she is creating a staff members for secondary oversight to leaders what they are up against both positive and principled command culture. whenever possible in this regard. This individually and collectively, which helps This practice creates a powerful guardrail fundamental practice requires orga- get everyone on the same page concern- not only for the senior leader but also for nization and discipline and serves as a ing these challenges.14 the rest of the organization. When these powerful guardrail, while potentially Conduct a Guardrailing Session. behaviors are found to be lacking in these increasing a leader’s efficiency and opera- Senior leaders can help their staffs con- critical practices, a moral or ethical vac- tional effectiveness. struct safeguards to make it easier for uum that can lead to a less than optimal Key Leadership Question: As a leader, team members to stay on the moral high command culture might manifest. do you keep good and accurate records, ground and reach their full leadership Key Leadership Question: What especially regarding reports and informa- potential. Senior leaders should have a specific actions do you take to make tion that are deemed as being critically follow-up discussion after temptation- decisions and to communicate in a trans- important? mapping with their teams. In this parent, open, and consistent fashion with discussion, they should engage in a dia- those in your command structure? A Call to Action logue that identifies and operationalizes 9. Seek Out Input/Counsel from To conclude our discussion, a call to activities that prevent failure by identify- Experts. According to participants, the action is appropriate at both the individ- ing specific guardrails to protect their military provides some exceptional guard- ual and the organizational levels, stress- integrity and avoid wrongful behavior. rails, including the input and counsel of ing key practices that senior leaders and Again, the use of facilitators can be quite staff members who can advise senior lead- their staffs can employ to help conquer beneficial in this conversation, but senior ers on ill-defined or ethically challenging the ethical temptations of command. leaders should be actively engaged in decisions. Senior leaders should seek Walk the Ethical Talk. Individual listening to this discussion so that they counsel from their legal advisor, resource leaders must use their disciplined military are in a better position to lead, under- manager, human resource specialists, training and strong thought processes stand, and set an example. The important equal opportunity/equal employment to apply these lessons in a proactive and point is to get team members to own the opportunity compliance officers, senior disciplined fashion. This requires lead- behaviors and actions that they believe enlisted leaders, chaplains, and other ers, on a personal level, to identify the are most important for success. This trusted experts/advisors to help them temptations associated with their current exercise is a double-edged sword in that it make more effective and ethically re- position as well as the requisite guardrails gives individual leaders specific guidance sponsible decisions while maintaining an needed to prevent ethical failure. When in conquering their temptations while environment of transparency, openness, senior leaders pinpoint these issues, they at the same time serving as an effective and consistency. Again, making use of are in a much better position to protect team-building exercise to enhance unit these resources can lead to better deci- themselves from ethical temptation, and cohesion and culture. sionmaking while concurrently sending a they will also set a first-rate example for Prepare and Equip Individuals for powerful message that the organization’s those who are depending on them for Ethical Success. Senior leaders can use the leaders are serious about making effective their own success. It is imperative that practices identified in the guardrailing ses- and ethical decisions with input and ac- senior leaders make use of all the avail- sion as a needs assessment to help create countability from key stakeholders. able resources at their disposal to ensure meaningful ongoing leadership training
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Longenecker and Shufelt 43 and development initiatives. Leadership we must win if we are to maintain our derstanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: Random House, 2007). teams may need sessions on how to integrity and ability to lead others. 8 Sydney Finkelstein, Jo Whitehead, and develop an accountability relationship, Andrew Campbell, “What Drives Leaders to improve their situational awareness, create No truer words have been spoken; all Make Bad Decisions,” Leader to Leader, no. 53 a personal code of conduct, or better ap- leaders must prepare themselves to con- (June 2009). preciate the power and nuances of servant quer the temptations associated with their 9 Dean C. Ludwig and Clinton O. Longe- necker, “The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical leadership. It is important to note that positions and must answer the call to help Failure of Successful Leaders,” Journal of Busi- most of the key guardrailing practices are their people do the same. JFQ ness Ethics 12 (April 1993). also the cornerstones of great leadership 10 Craig E. Johnson, Meeting the Ethi- development, which can be a powerful cal Challenges of Leadership: Casting Light or motivator for the engagement of junior Notes Shadow, 7th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 15 Publications, 2021). officers and staff. 11 1 United States Military Academy at West Coach and Reinforce the Right Inspector General, Department of Defense (DOD), Hearing on “Senior Leader Misconduct: Point, “Admissions Frequently Asked Ques- Behaviors and Decisions. Senior leaders Prevention and Accountability,” Subcommittee tions (FAQs),” n.d., available at
44 JPME Today / Conquering the Ethical Temptations of Command JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 call for entries for the 2021 Secretary of Defense and 2021 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions
Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners.
Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows.
What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college.
When? Anytime during the 2020–2021 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 2021, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/About/Essay-Competitions/ President Barack Obama talks with Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki during secure video teleconference in Situation Room, The White House, October 21, 2011 (White House/Pete Souza) Flawed Jointness in the War Against the So-Called Islamic State How a Different Planning Approach Might Have Worked Better
By Benjamin S. Lambeth
ot long after the first round of U.S. Central Command (USCENT- Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth is a Nonresident anemic air strikes against the COM) lacked an overarching strategy Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and N so-called Islamic State (IS) on based on a well-founded understanding Budgetary Assessments. This article is an August 8, 2014, it became clear to most of the enemy and on a weighing of updated excerpt from his recently published book Airpower in the War Against ISIS (Naval that the initial effort ordered by Presi- the full spectrum of available response Institute Press, January 2021). dent Barack Obama and undertaken by options. Instead, USCENTCOM’s
46 Commentary / Flawed Jointness in the War Against the So-Called Islamic State JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 leaders fell back on their familiar past conducted the necessary prior target of noncombatant fatalities and reluc- experiences and assessed IS as simply system analyses in both Iraq and Syria tance to expand the fight into Syria a resurrection of the recently defeated that would be essential for underwriting until having been absolutely dragged Iraqi insurgency rather than as the very the campaign’s strikes against the en- there by events that accounted for different and ambitiously aggressive emy’s greatest vulnerabilities, assigned a [USCENTCOM’s] initial muddled state-in-the-making that it actually subordinate Combined Joint Task Force response to the [IS] threat.”1 was. As a result, they opted to engage (CJTF) commander for OIR whose That said, even with all due allowance the jihadist movement with an inap- component was best suited for conduct- for the constraints imposed by Obama propriate counterinsurgency (COIN) ing the campaign’s initial operations, and and his White House subordinates that approach that misprioritized rebuild- then amended that command structure’s so badly hampered USCENTCOM’s ing the Iraqi army as its predominant leadership as deemed most appropri- freedom of action at the campaign’s concern rather than pursuing a more ate once the U.S. role in the campaign start, that organization’s long-ingrained promising strategy aimed at not shifted from an air-only counteroffensive land-warfare predispositions also figured only addressing Iraq’s most immedi- toward overseeing a more truly joint prominently when it came to generat- ate security needs but also attacking and combined air-land campaign. Such a ing the command’s ultimately chosen the enemy’s most vulnerable center more fruitful approach would have lever- response to the rise of IS. As one Air of gravity in Syria from the first day aged USCENTCOM’s air component Force colonel aptly recalled in this re- onward. as the supported force element at the gard, “it would be an understatement to To be sure, throughout the 4-year- campaign’s start. Later, the coalition air say that there was a very Army-centric long effort belatedly codenamed component would have been swung to a dose of operational art [prevalent at Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the more fully supporting role under a CJTF USCENTCOM’s headquarters] in the performance of the coalition aircrews ground commander once U.S. and allied summer of 2014.” That fact, he stated, who fought the war at the execution level special operations forces (SOF) teams and worked mightily “to constrain any was invariably able and impressive, re- joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) semblance of an interdiction campaign” flecting the high standards of competence began working with indigenous Iraqi emerging as a part of that command’s first showcased in Operation Desert Storm and Syrian ground troops in a final land- initial combat response.2 In a compelling in 1991 and later sustained in all subse- centric push to defeat the enemy once testament to that predisposition when quent U.S.-led air operations worldwide. and for all. it came to their initial tasking to take on Yet by having wrongly adjudged IS as just IS, USCENTCOM’s leaders almost by a reborn insurgency and having misguid- Some Consequential Missteps natural force of habit misread the jihad- edly engaged it as such, USCENTCOM at the Campaign’s Start ist movement as simply a regenerated took as long to neutralize a fairly tractable Any effort to learn usefully from the insurgency of the sort that they had pre- low-technology enemy in the bounded early failings of OIR must first rec- viously fought throughout the preceding spaces of Iraq and Syria in the second ognize that the main reasons for the decade. That flawed assessment naturally decade of the 21st century as it took the campaign’s initial slowness to show drove them to pursue an inappropriate United States, in a total war for ultimate much progress did not emanate from COIN strategy and to accede to equally stakes, to defeat the far more powerful within USCENTCOM, but rather inappropriate and inhibiting ROEs quite Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany in two were occasioned entirely by a top-down independent of the constraints insisted on theaters on opposite sides of the globe decree from the Obama White House. by Obama’s White House. That approach during World War II. As was later recalled by USCENT- stressed the minimization of civilian casu- This review of the OIR experience COM’s deputy commander at the time, alties as the campaign’s main imperative considers how an alternative approach Vice Admiral Mark Fox, it was “the rather than going with all determination that made better use of USCENTCOM’s Obama administration’s . . . palpable for the Islamist movement’s throat. fighting components in a more produc- reluctance to get more deeply involved Those initial planning missteps, how- tive flow plan might have yielded the that was the underlying cause of the ever, were themselves natural outgrowths desired outcome more quickly and at a campaign’s slow and halting activities of an arguably even more suboptimal substantially lower cost in overall sor- during the early days of the crisis.” decision by USCENTCOM’s com- ties flown, expensive munitions used Admiral Fox further underscored that mander, General Lloyd Austin III, USA; against often meaningless targets, and “it was Obama’s decision to completely namely, his having assigned a three-star innocent Iraqi and Syrian noncombatant withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq in infantry general to oversee the first round lives lost along the way. Such a more 2012 that created the vacuum that [IS] of fighting against IS, even though he purposeful response would have begun filled in 2014,” and it was the Obama surely knew that any such effort would by USCENTCOM’s having first sized up national security team’s “insistence on entail air-only operations for a year or the adversary for what it actually was—a extremely restrictive rules of engage- more, at least on the part of any involved self-avowed embryonic state—and ment [ROEs] to ensure the avoidance U.S. forces. To be sure, as Admiral Fox
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Lambeth 47 U.S. Soldiers assigned to Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, fire M777 155mm howitzer during fire mission near Mosul, Iraq, February 3, 2017, in support of Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. Army/Craig Jensen) later pointed out, USCENTCOM’s air OIR, Lieutenant General James Terry, Assigning a CJTF Commander component commander at the time had USA, both proceeded to cast their Perhaps at least partly due to awareness a full enough plate already, providing impending effort instead as a land war, of that fact, as was later acknowledged needed air support to the ongoing war in with USCENTCOM’s air component by OIR’s first deputy air component Afghanistan, whereas the Army general relegated solely to providing on-call commander, Major General Jeffrey ultimately tapped to command OIR “had support to a still only anticipated land Lofgren, USAF, the prospective a joint task force headquarters already counteroffensive yet to come. In a reveal- command arrangements for the coming set up in Kuwait and had no combat ing post hoc confirmation of that largely campaign were “hotly debated with responsibilities in Afghanistan.”3 Yet if unheeded reality on the ground in Iraq, the [USCENTCOM] commander there ever was a nascent challenge in when General Austin finally presented over several weeks.” Although General USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility his envisioned construct for such a land Lofgren did not indicate when that that begged for an air-centric solution, campaign to Secretary of Defense Ashton back and forth first began, who its main at least while IS was still gaining strength Carter 6 months later for the latter’s ap- protagonists were, or what spectrum and when the now-moribund Iraqi secu- proval, Carter immediately saw that the of concerns it addressed, the simple rity forces (ISF) were nowhere near ready plan “was entirely unrealistic at that time” fact that the debate was both heated to take on the jihadist movement, it was because it “relied on Iraqi army forma- and protracted would seem to suggest at the start of OIR in mid-August 2014 tions that barely existed on paper. . . . that it centered, among other pos- and throughout the campaign’s first year Building the kind of Iraqi force that could sible issues, on the ultimate question thereafter. retake Mosul would ultimately take the of whether the strategy for the war’s Nevertheless, General Austin and better part of a year.”4 opening round should be land-centric his chosen subordinate commander for
48 Commentary / Flawed Jointness in the War Against the So-Called Islamic State JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 or air-centric and, directly related to when serving in that capacity from May both centrally and effectively as the sole that question, whether the CJTF for the 2017 to May 2018: kinetic contribution to an overall ground- coming fight should be led at the start centric war plan. As the third of these by an Army general or by an Airman. I wonder how the ISF and our partners senior Airmen, Major General Smith, General Lofgren further acknowledged in Syria would have done at developing later pointed out: that “the Air Force was asked to provide the necessary trust and deep partnership manpower to the CJTF and did not do with an Airman in lieu of a U.S. Army Given the great work done by [his Air so initially, which [ultimately] shaped three-star as the CJTF-OIR commander? Force predecessors, Major Generals] the early constructs [for the cam- The [Army-specific concept that lay at the Peter Gersten and Scott Kindsvater, when paign].”5 In the end, he recalled, “the heart of the campaign’s strategy] requires I stepped into the position, I felt like I was [USCENTCOM] commander’s going very close commander-to-commander very empowered by the CJTF commander with the choice of ARCENT [U.S. relationships and a keen understanding of . . . to ensure that “airmindedness” could Army Central Command] to plan and ground schemes of maneuver. be in every CJTF senior leader discussion. oversee it was driven more by comfort It also allowed me to provide detailed un- [on General Austin’s part] and the fact Adding that the successive Army derstanding of issues from the CJTF and that the air component was not pos- CJTF-OIR commanders under whom subordinate land component commanders’ tured to be able to execute the CJTF he had served “knew [personally] many perspective to the [air component com- mission.”6 of the ISF general officers from their mander and his deputy].10 Yet there was no reason in principle previous multiple combat deployments why USCENTCOM’s air component to Iraq,” he stressed that any Airman That eventually well-tuned integra- commander could not have been tasked serving in the same capacity “would need tion of U.S. and coalition airpower as with assuming initial oversight of at least to be deliberately experienced and devel- the lead player in OIR’s effort against the air portion of the impending cam- oped” to a similar high degree in order to IS, however, was anything but the paign and then laying down the essentials be successful.8 norm during the campaign’s first year. for a more appropriate starting course of In a similar vein, Major General As later explained by Major General action both easily and seamlessly within Andrew Croft, USAF, who had served Charles Moore, Jr., USAF, who had the framework of the existing CJTF under Major General Smith as the deputy been the most senior U.S. Airman in structure in Kuwait. Ultimately, what commanding general for air in CJTF- Baghdad during the war’s initial months should have mattered most was not the OIR’s land component and as its Joint by virtue of his posting in the Office of “command and subordinate staff that Air Component Coordination Element Security Cooperation in Iraq, his orga- had [previously] worked and trained director during the campaign’s final nization engaged on a daily basis with together,” and that General Austin was phase, likewise recalled: USCENTCOM, including with all of most “comfortable” with, but rather its subordinate components and with what class of expertise and associated By the time I got there, the advise-and-assist the Iraqi government. Eventually, he skill set would be best suited for the mission that was being done by the Army recalled, by around the start of 2015, the commander ultimately chosen to plan brigade up in Mosul was absolutely critical Air Force sent Brigadier General John and lead a successful campaign against to the fight. It therefore made sense to have Cherrey, a combat-seasoned A-10 pilot, the unique challenge that IS presented, the battalion-brigade-division-corps chain to OIR’s forward headquarters in Kuwait at least at the start of OIR.7 That chal- of command and processes in place that to help plan and direct air operations in lenge all but begged for a well-targeted the Army brought to the battlefield. . . . We its still slowly developing war against IS. air attack plan as the looming campaign’s tied in the airpower from our positions, but For at least the campaign’s first 5 centerpiece. had an Airman commanded the CJTF, we months, however, CJTF-OIR had no To be sure, once OIR had evolved still would have needed the same ground- formal air representation in its command from its hesitant air-only start in August centric capabilities.9 section. Yet during those same first few 2014 into its more well-developed pace months, the only American combat as a land-centric campaign 3 years later, it Fortunately for the ultimate success operations being conducted against IS was entirely natural that the most senior of OIR, its Army-led headquarters by were from the air, with OIR’s Army Airmen in its chain of command would mid-2016 and thereafter—at long last personnel focused solely on rebuilding have felt that a ground-force general of- having included an uninterrupted suc- what had been lost from the fragile ISF fered the most apropos competency for cession of experienced two-star Air Force following President Obama’s withdrawal overseeing such an endeavor. As the third fighter pilot generals in the key position of all U.S. forces from Iraq in 2012. successive Airman assigned as CJTF- of deputy commander for operations That meant that USCENTCOM’s only OIR’s deputy commander for operations and intelligence—finally developed a component actually engaged in combat and intelligence, Major General Dirk smoothly running battle rhythm in which operations against IS was not in com- Smith, USAF, recalled in this regard USCENTCOM’s air component figured mand of those operations. In that plainly
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Lambeth 49 dysfunctional situation from an ideal That perspective and intention, one can round. This Airman remarked that what joint-Service perspective, CJTF-OIR’s fairly state in hindsight, should have been Army and Air Force leadership within first commander, Lieutenant General a key part of CJTF-OIR’s campaign ap- USCENTCOM had both failed to recog- Terry, would brief the daily air opera- proach from the very start. nize in sufficient time was tions flow via videoteleconference from Kuwait to USCENTCOM’s commander, The Lost Opportunity of a that [IS] was a proto-state requiring more General Austin, sitting in his headquar- More Promising Approach than just support to the indigenous ground ters back in Tampa, Florida. As Major As a notional alternative to the maneuver elements. It also required a General Moore later recalled, in that odd command structure for OIR that ulti- distinct and separate aerial bombing briefing arrangement, USCENTCOM’s mately emerged, what if General Austin campaign on strategic targets and air in- air component commander, Lieutenant had instead picked his air component terdiction, and this needed to happen right General John Hesterman III, participat- commander to take the lead, at least at away while the coalition was still gestating. ing from his Combined Air Operations the start of campaign planning, from That, in turn, meant duly supporting the Center (CAOC) in Qatar, “was often the first moment USCENTCOM was embattled Iraqis . . . while concurrently left with little to say when it was his turn, tasked by the White House to engage doing our utmost to hurt [IS’s] warfighting which usually occurred last.”11 It was not IS? Given the realities of the strategic capability with a sustained air campaign. until May 2015, nearly a year into the landscape that prevailed in Iraq and Yet we did the former but not the latter campaign, when Major General Gersten Syria in late July and early August during OIR’s pivotal first two years. . . . arrived in position as CJTF-OIR’s as- 2014, a more promising initial move by At a time when the campaign should have signed deputy commander for air. This USCENTCOM’s commander would been mainly air-centric, it wasn’t. Its con- provided direct senior air representation have been to accept that there would be struction from 2016 onward was probably on Lieutenant General Terry’s staff for no sufficiently combat-ready indigenous correct. But its construct at the beginning the first time since the campaign began. ground troops in the region for his air was flawed.14 In light of that long-delayed move to assets to “support” in a truly influential insert a senior air presence in the CJTF’s way for at least a year, and that until On this important count, even retired command section, it should hardly be such a reality was finally at hand, he Colonel Peter Mansoor, USA, who surprising that the air contribution to should instead pursue a more logical had served as a key advisor to General USCENTCOM’s war against IS was so approach for the interim by designating David Petraeus in Iraq during the latter’s ineffectual throughout its first year when his air commander as his first subordi- eventually successful surge of 2007, sug- it came to weakening IS in its most vital nate CJTF-OIR commander and duly gested that “if this [effort against IS] was strategic center. empowering that Airman to apply his going to be just an air campaign [which Regarding the air component’s and his staff’s collective skills toward it most definitely was for U.S. forces eventual effort to heighten the airpower determining how best to carry the fight during its first 2 years], it would have focus within CJTF-OIR, the campaign’s to IS, at least until a true joint and com- made much more sense to have an Air second successive air component com- bined air-land campaign was ready to be Force officer in Baghdad and have him mander, Lieutenant General Charles unleashed with determination. lead the charge.”15 With such more ap- Brown, Jr., USAF, almost as a first order In a strong seconding motion to such propriate leadership in place, an Air Force of business after having reported aboard an alternative approach, General Brown commander for CJTF-OIR at the outset in that position, moved his Air Support later suggested that at least during the would have had every inclination and op- Operations Center from collocation with campaign’s initial stages, as CJTF-OIR’s portunity to mobilize the vast intelligence CJTF-OIR’s land component head- land component was mainly focused on resources at his disposal to take the full- quartered in Baghdad, which was almost rebuilding the ISF, USCENTCOM’s air est measure of IS and to undertake the exclusively Iraq-focused, to CJTF-OIR’s commander “could and probably should needed initial target system development headquarters in Kuwait so as to achieve a have been designated as OIR’s supported before committing to any ensuing plan for broader airpower focus across that com- commander, with an eventual handover the war’s opening round. mand’s entire area of operations, most of CJTF-OIR to the most senior ground Of course, in order to ensure the notably including in Syria as well as Iraq. general once serious offensive land opera- eventual reconstitution of the ISF to As to his rationale for that important tions were set to begin. This alternative the degree necessary for it to engage move, General Brown later recalled, approach would have had the right IS effectively in sustained land combat, “I wanted to conduct more deliberate leadership and expertise in charge more there would still have been a need for strikes in Syria to support the future close properly aligned with the initial scheme CJTF-OIR to interact closely from the fight in Iraq. I often shared with my staff of the campaign.”13 A similar sentiment effort’s first day onward with the ISF’s that although Iraq may be first in priority, was offered by an Air Force F-16 pilot leadership. And that need would have de- it was second on my playlist when it came who flew in two successive OIR rotations manded a depth of land-warfare expertise to where I wanted to apply airpower.”12 during its largely ineffectual opening and familiarity with the Iraqi situation
50 Commentary / Flawed Jointness in the War Against the So-Called Islamic State JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Marines attached to 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit load GBU-54 bomb onto AV-8B Harrier on flight deck of USS Kearsarge, supporting Operation Inherent Resolve, Arabian Gulf, December 28, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Tyler Preston)
on the ground that no Airman could who served for a year previously as CJTF- overall commander might well have have been expected to offer. However, OIR’s deputy commander for operations chosen a different template for engaging as David Deptula rightly noted, that role and intelligence after the campaign had the jihadist threat by pursuing a more could easily enough have been fulfilled already been well under way, Major air-centric course of action that would by a suitably experienced two-star Army General Kindsvater, reasonably doubted not require, at least at the outset, the deputy CJTF commander for land opera- whether an Airman could have effectively spectrum of land warfare skills that later tions with intimate previous connections led what he called the “multidivision and would be essential for commanding a with his ISF counterparts. “But without then corps/two-nation fight” that was preponderant ground force of the sort an Airman in charge,” Deptula added, being conducted by CJTF-OIR when the that ultimately became the centerpiece “there would have been no possibility of needed skills for exercising proper com- of OIR. In this regard, Major General a strategy being developed from the very mand oversight in such a capacity have Charles Corcoran, USAF, who served as start that put the [IS] center of gravity in never, as he rightly put it, been tradition- the chief of staff to USCENTCOM’s air Syria in the crosshairs as a campaign first ally part of the Air Force’s “functional component in 2013 and 2014, offered priority rather than second priority.”16 expertise.”17 one retrospective insight into how an True enough, anyone viewing CJTF- Yet the “multidivision and then Airman as the overall CJTF commander OIR’s challenge as it eventually unfolded corps/two-nation fight” that CJTF- might have approached the initial plan- could rightly conclude that the organiza- OIR ultimately ended up conducting ning for the impending campaign in a tional wherewithal and skills offered by against IS was not the only alternative way substantially different from the route USCENTCOM’s air commander would available to USCENTCOM for tak- ultimately chosen. Having had a catbird have been ill-suited to render him a com- ing on the jihadist movement from the seat in the CAOC from which to observe pelling choice for effectively overseeing campaign’s first day onward. To the developments from up close as the jihad- such an air-land campaign endgame. In contrary, there is every reason to believe ist movement first arose, he later recalled that regard, the Air Force fighter pilot that an Airman as CJTF-OIR’s initial that a major reason for OIR’s faltering
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Lambeth 51 missteps at the campaign’s start was intelligence and planning organiza- pulverized [IS] leadership and cash flow “simply our lack of understanding of the tions, to have stepped out with the at the beginning. We eventually got there, enemy.” He then added, “Target system greatest dispatch toward generating but we lost some serious opportunities up analysis takes time,” and USCENTCOM the needed wherewithal to conduct front with blatantly identifiable targets . . had not done its needed homework the requisite target system analysis and . in which we could have done some serious before embarking on its Iraq-dominant, weaponeering for underwriting such a damage and saved lots of lives. We flew COIN-oriented, and land-centric initial campaign. On this count, any number over such targets in Syria day in and day response to IS, when what was actually of OIR principals have hastened to out with bombs on our jets, reported them to needed was a plan fundamentally differ- stress how USCENTCOM lacked everyone we could, and still we did nothing ent in both nature and level of intensity. the needed inputs at the campaign’s about it.22 “We need to learn this lesson,” he in- start to conduct such an undertaking. sisted, and continued: For example, in pushing back against General Brown himself later re- any intimation that “we had a ton of marked, “One area I was pushing for We can’t wait for a conflict [as we did options to move more rapidly in Syria,” was target system analysis to get to the while IS was first gaining strength the Special Presidential Envoy for the ‘so what’ and target more effectively. I throughout Iraq and Syria] to understand Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic didn’t want to wait for a product that our potential enemies and their critical State of Iraq and the Levant, Brett was six months or so in the making but infrastructure. We need to do this analysis McGurk, pointed out that “we had instead wanted a 50 percent solution now . . . in peacetime. . . . Once we have nothing to work with in Syria and very so we could start striking in a more that in hand, we can [then] develop a little fidelity as to what was happening deliberate manner.”23 Had such a more campaign to dismantle and defeat [the on the ground” in that country during energetic response been undertaken by enemy] using all forms of power at our OIR’s first halting months.20 Similarly, USCENTCOM in a sufficiently timely disposal, including airpower.18 Vice Admiral Fox noted “the absolute way at the campaign’s start, General lack of targeting intelligence” needed Brown’s more promising approach, ap- Unfortunately, militating against during OIR’s initial phase to underwrite plying more permissive ROEs, could much of a chance of USCENTCOM’s an effective interdiction campaign.21 have caused far more serious harm to the having arrived at any such more appropri- Yet there was ample testimony from movement’s most valued assets, and at ately focused approach toward engaging line operators actually engaged in the an earlier stage of the campaign had IS IS from the very start, “CJTF-OIR from fight that the needed information was been correctly assessed and engaged from day one onward was more accurately a there all along—had it only been mar- the outset as a proto-state rather than an U.S. Army Corps headquarters,” as the shaled, assessed, and disseminated in a insurgency. British Royal Air Force’s air contingent timely way. As the above-quoted F-16 commander for the campaign later pilot later recalled: Opportunity Costs recalled, “and the U.S. Army was more Viewed in hindsight, the disappoint- comfortable with Iraq than with Syria During each sortie during the campaign’s ing early returns yielded by the halting because of its previous years there— first month, we would watch all sorts of air war that unfolded against IS for perhaps an explanation for its delays in [IS]-related activity going on in Syria. . . . more than a year was mainly a result executing an effective plan for Syria.” To The targets were definitely out there for us of the Obama administration’s obses- make matters worse, with no formal air to kill. I saw them day after day. . . . No one sive top-down micromanagement representation in the subordinate com- listened to us. True, we were unsure going of the campaign and its insistence at mand structure that USCENTCOM had into Syria at the time, because it was new the bombing’s start on oppressive cobbled together for OIR for at least the and different. . . . But had we acknowledged restrictions on attackable targets in campaign’s first 5 months, “air was rarely [IS] for the proto-state entity that it was, the vain and totally unrealistic hope embedded early in CJTF planning and we could’ve moved swiftly on these targets of of achieving zero civilian fatalities. had to fight valiantly to be heard.”19 opportunity despite all the other issues with However, it also was a predictable ground fidelity. result of USCENTCOM’s suboptimal An Initial Dearth of Needed command arrangement and resort to Target Intelligence Clinching his argument, he added, an inappropriate COIN strategy from Of course, to have been most produc- the campaign’s first moments onward. tive from the start, any alternative The overall strategy did not need to be a After what Secretary Carter later well approach toward countering IS with a new one. It simply should have been: Find characterized as USCENTCOM’s “ad principal focus on interdicting its most their center of gravity and hit it quickly hoc launch” of its initially flawed war vital assets on the move would have and accurately. Part of OIR was admit- plan in early August 2014, the vast oil required USCENTCOM and its air tedly trying to get the Iraqis back on their reserves in Iraq and Syria that were component, along with their organic feet. But at the same time, we should have being controlled and exploited by IS
52 Commentary / Flawed Jointness in the War Against the So-Called Islamic State JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 KC-135 Stratotanker pilot with 340th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron preflights aircraft before taking off from base in U.S. Central Command area of responsibility in support of mission conducting airstrikes in Syria, September 23, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Matthew Bruch)
for copious financial gain were not tar- interests of Army generals in Baghdad that finally allowed well-prepared indig- geted and struck until a full 15 months who, in fact, commanded no forces actu- enous friendly Iraqi and Syrian ground later, offering yet another testament to ally engaged in the fight. Had such an troops, supported by unerringly effective the downside costs of the misguided alternative approach been pursued instead coalition airpower, to sweep IS off the gradualism and inappropriate focus of by CJTF-OIR from the campaign’s start, battlefield in both Iraq and Syria. USCENTCOM’s initial approach to its the vast majority of USCENTCOM’s counter-IS effort.24 That faulty mindset early air surveillance operations would Some Implications and the campaign plan that naturally have been flown not over Iraq’s urban Worth Pondering flowed from it gave the jihadist move- areas but, as Major General Moore later In the end, despite its slow and ineffec- ment some $800 million a year in black put it, “across the border in Syria and in tual start, OIR turned out to have been market revenue that allowed it to con- the Anbar desert[,] building situation another successful exercise in joint and tinue recruiting Islamist zealots from awareness for our interdiction attacks. combined force employment in which around the world and to continue ter- Imagine the Ho Chi Minh trail, but in a U.S. and coalition airpower ultimately rorizing the Iraqi and Syrian noncom- desert!”25 overwhelmed IS with an invincible batants who were caught in its grip. By and by, more determined new monopoly of asymmetric aerial fire- In marked contrast, a more produc- leadership in the White House by the power, thereby ensuring that eventually tive strategy would have concentrated start of 2017, driven by a deeper commit- well-endowed and highly motivated instead on interdicting IS’s flow of oil and ment to ending the war decisively, issued Iraqi and anti-regime Syrian ground other vital supplies from the campaign’s new directives to USCENTCOM for the troops, supported by U.S. SOF teams first moments onward rather than wast- latter to lift its most burdensome impedi- and JTACs, would ultimately crush the ing valuable sorties in a misprioritized ments to more rapid progress toward that once-formidable jihadist movement. air “support” endeavor flown over Iraq’s reformulated goal. That pivotal top-down That performance offered a compel- cities mainly to serve the advise-and-assist change soon made the crucial difference ling testament to the intrinsic leverage
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Lambeth 53 of today’s American air posture in all effectively argue for such a more promis- Assad Regime,” Strategic Culture, June 24, 2016, available at
54 Commentary / Flawed Jointness in the War Against the So-Called Islamic State JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Air Force pararescuemen assigned to 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron load simulated casualties on board CH-47F Chinook, flown by members of Army Task Force Brawler, during personnel recovery exercise, Afghanistan, March 6, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Gregory Brook)
oday there is little dispute over The Future Joint the constant nature of war. Over T time and throughout history, however, the character of war has been fluid. In a recent strategic assessment, Medical Force General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the future security environ- Through the Lens of ment as both complex and uncertain, with adversarial competition and overt conflict being transregional, multido- Operational Art main, and multifunctional in nature.1 The joint force has adapted to keep pace with this new character of war, A Case for Clinical although doing so has been no easy feat. The U.S. military has been chal- Interchangeability lenged recently by burgeoning and worsening regional instability driven by both state and nonstate actors. The By Joseph Caravalho, Jr., and Enrique Ortiz, Jr. United States can justifiably expect contested domain dominance in any future military operation. Additionally, Dr. Joseph Caravalho, Jr., Major General, USA (Ret.), is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Henry M. Jackson Foundation for the Advancement of Military Medicine, Inc. Colonel Enrique Ortiz, the current operational tempo—with Jr., MS, USA, is Chief of the Medical Modernization Division at U.S. Army Futures Command. no clear end in sight—is affecting the
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Caravalho and Ortiz 55 Marine aids Royal Thai sailor with simulated casualty while participating in mass casualty evacuation drill during exercise Cobra Gold 2020, at Hat Yao Beach, Sattahip, Kingdom of Thailand, February 27, 2020 (U.S. Marine Corps/Hannah Hall) military’s equipping, training, and while human casualties remained low. health care delivery benefit at the expense modernizing posture. Indeed, the This latter point proved paramount to of a strengthened operational joint medi- Department of Defense (DOD) has maintaining the American will to endure, cal force readiness.4 This comprehensive prioritized pressing readiness issues— as the collective population agonized over reform was informed by the 2015 namely lethality and modernization, every warfighter lost in combat. Military Compensation and Retirement among others. The joint health enterprise (JHE)— Modernization Commission Report, These collective problem sets drove commonly referred to as the military which recommended DOD ensure the Joint Staff to implement the doctrinal health system (MHS)—has been key Servicemembers receive the best possible approach of globally integrated opera- in driving recent combat casualty rates combat casualty care while also increasing tions.2 The key concept is central to the to the lowest in the Nation’s history. access to and value of home station health name: integration. Under this construct, However, with the advent of a new, care.5 This report also affirmed that joint an employed joint force must quickly in- uncertain future security environment, military readiness must be proficient in tegrate capabilities across all domains and the JHE faces potentially overwhelming delivering both routine health care and organizations, implement global agility obstacles that threaten a reversal. It there- combat casualty care in operational en- while operating in small footprints, exer- fore must contemplate national strategic vironments.6 A former Deputy Secretary cise flexibility, leverage partners, enable redirection through novel and innovative of Defense recently directed the Under speedy decisionmaking, and operate with means. Secretary of Defense for Personnel and disciplined discrimination to decrease In the 2017 National Defense Readiness, with Joint Staff support, to unintended consequences. Authorization Act (NDAA-17), Congress work with the Services to develop an Politically, the American population not only acknowledged military medi- implementation plan to meet NDAA-17 has tolerated the fiscal cost of conflicts cine’s unmatched wartime successes,3 but MHS reform requirements. His intent for the past two decades, in large part also conveyed deep frustration with the was to reform the MHS from a collabora- because U.S. interests were safeguarded MHS overemphasis on the peacetime tive Service-centric health system to a
56 Features / The Future Joint Medical Force JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 high-performing integrated health system requests for minimum-sized medical organize, train, and equip medical focused on joint readiness.7 This process units capable of surgical resuscitation. forces for deployment. Ultimately, the has continued through several NDAA Anything more than this small size would joint medical force provides a fully iterations intended to shape the future often be larger than the unit being sup- capable, integrated, and synchronized direction of DOD medicine. ported. Even with the ad hoc creation of medical capability to meet the com- smaller surgical teams, the Services have mander’s operational needs. The Operational Environment strained to meet increasing operational Integration is the most critical In anticipated conflicts of the future, demand. This gap has created conten- component to optimize operations geographic distance will pose an opera- tious sourcing efforts and, at times, and capacity. Three distinct, invaluable tional challenge. To expand its reach unfilled, validated requirements. This ways to deliver effective integration are against widely dispersed unconventional shortfall has also proved unacceptable interoperability, interdependence, and military threats, the joint force has to the collective endstate. The GCCs interchangeability. leveraged small, disaggregated unit have exercised innovative approaches to Joint Publication 3-0, Joint employments. Ground commanders mitigate this lack of contingency surgical Operations, defines interoperability as have had to optimize their warfight- support, including increasing the time the ability to act together coherently, ing capacity through modular, tailored standards for evacuation, partnering with effectively, and efficiently to achieve employments and effective use of coalition medical assets, and canceling tactical, operational, and strategic ob- partner capabilities. specific military operations. jectives.11 For the joint medical force, The future security environment Another source of Service tension is interoperability occurs at all three spheres will impact the joint medical force in the concomitant requirements of deliv- of influence—tactical, operational, and this same way. The force therefore must ering health care at home stations and strategic—and is guided by joint planning support warfighters through globally providing operational medical support in and standardization. integrated health services (GIHS)—the deployed settings. In fact, Congress has Interdependence is the purposeful reli- strategic management and global syn- acknowledged this dichotomy, noting ance by one Service on another Service’s chronization of joint medical assets.8 Key that peacetime health care comes at the capabilities to maximize the complemen- to this approach is the Services’ collective expense of medical force readiness.10 In tary and reinforcing effects of both—that ability to deploy tailorable, interoperable, NDAA-17, Congress conveyed its con- is, synergy.12 Joint interdependence is and networked medical forces. In turn, cern that the Services were risking their essential for joint effectiveness. A good these joint medical forces must efficiently medical relevancy to operational readi- example of interdependence is the con- and effectively combine and synchronize ness. As mentioned, the Services’ lack tinuum of care, in which ground-based their capabilities to best support joint of agility to tailor small-unit capabilities hospitalization is interdependent with operations. Medical support, like logistic has threatened their ability to use limited Air Force strategic patient movement support, must factor in geographical resources to meet an ever-increasing capabilities. Essentially, interdependence considerations as much as—if not more demand. obviates the need for each Service to be than—the size of the joint force’s popula- Directed NDAA-17 reforms, albeit self-sufficient, thus eliminating costly tion at risk. culturally challenging, have presented redundancy. the Services the opportunity to rightsize Although interchangeability is not a The Problem their force structure for the specialties doctrinal term, in the military setting, the Limited resources, unmet requirements, and capabilities forecast to meet current word can be described as an innovative and the accompanying geographic and future joint force requirements. and agile way to readily exchange forces combatant command (GCC)–Service This ongoing opportunity lends itself that possess equivalent capabilities—that tensions are not uncommon operational to improving global force management is, capable of changing places. Indeed, challenges. When viewed separately, processes, with more agile business rules the authors’ contention is that health medical operations are no different. friendlier to tailoring of forces into small- professionals in uniform are among the The Joint Concept for Health Services unit employments. closest thing to a military commodity. highlighted this dilemma in its problem (Another example is the military Catholic statement: “How can the joint force The Art: Innovative priest: the uniform does not matter; mass provide comprehensive health services Means of Integration will always be the same.) Within military to deployed forces in an operating The JHE’s strategic endstate is a high- medicine, clinicians train to the same environment characterized by highly performing integrated military health national standards in their respective distributed operations and minimal, system. In turn, the joint force imple- internships, residencies, and fellowships. if any, pre-established health service ments GIHS as the desired military Clinical knowledge, skills, and abilities infrastructure?”9 endstate. Service surgeons general take are the same for any specialist or subspe- At the root of the GCC–Service this concept into account when execut- cialist, regardless of underlying Service tension are the ground commanders’ ing their respective roles to recruit, affiliation.
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Caravalho and Ortiz 57 Service medical assets can and should timely maneuverability. Alternatively, combine specialized medical and surgical operate interchangeably whenever and relying solely on doctrinal unit employ- assets in an interchangeable fashion to wherever appropriate to support the ment through a formal request for meet deployment requirement demands. mission at hand. Although the environ- forces may well prove untimely for the This interchangeability could positively ment and operational conditions differ joint force. address risk concerns and provide among the Services’ primary warfighting This type of Service-agnostic clinical commanders in the field with the com- domains, this situation could be eas- employment flexibility may introduce prehensive medical services they need to ily overcome through predeployment operational risks. At the tactical level, fight and win. JFQ training. Any Army, Navy, or Air Force Service-unique characteristics make clinician could execute his or her clinical wholesale integration impractical. The skills in any warfighting domain under joint force could mitigate risk by align- Notes appropriate operational command and ing medical units to the Service typically 1 control. Rather than the requirement to affiliated with the intended warfight- Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “Strategic Chal- lenges and Implications,” Joint Force Quarterly permanently assign clinicians to a par- ing domain, namely, Army with land, 83 (4th Quarter 2016), 2–3. ticular Service or medical unit, clinicians Navy with sea, and Air Force with air. 2 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations would simply augment to a Service- Tactically, sound command and control (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2012), iii. aligned medical unit most appropriate of these units would be delivered by 3 National Defense Authorization Act for the warfighting domain. The guiding Service-aligned leadership; it is only the for Fiscal Year 2017 Report (to accompany S. 2943), Senate Committee on Armed Ser- precept should be to avoid unnecessar- clinical expertise that is interchangeable vices, S. Rep. 114-255, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., ily aligning clinical assets by Service to in this model. Practically speaking, over 2016, 173, available at
58 Features / The Future Joint Medical Force JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 F-35B Lightning II fighter aircraft with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 265 (Reinforced), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, takes off from flight deck of USS America during air defense exercise, Philippine Sea, March 23, 2020 (U.S. Marine Corps/Isaac Cantrell)
Sustaining Relevance Repositioning Strategic Logistics Innovation in the Military
By Paul Christian van Fenema, Ton van Kampen, Gerold de Gooijer, Nynke Faber, Harm Hendriks, Andre Hoogstrate, and Loe Schlicher
ilitary organizations tend to fighting smarter.”2 Building on the think about their overarching revolution in military affairs programs, strategy in two ways: how their a new era of digital innovations in the Paul Christian van Fenema is a Professor of M Military Logistics at the Netherlands Defence organization will remain relevant and commercial realm underpins the U.S. Academy (NDA). Ton van Kampen and Gerold which future operations they must be National Defense Strategy and Third de Gooijer are Faculty Members in Military 1 Business Studies at NDA. Nynke Faber, Harm able to conduct. In the information Offset Strategy to explore the use of Hendriks, and Andre Hoogstrate are Professors era, military organizations struggle new technologies for the military.3 of Military Logistics on the Faculty of Military with the “design capabilities that will While new operational concepts such Sciences at NDA. Loe Schlicher is a Faculty Member of Military Sciences in Military offer . . . credible strategic options as hyper war and kill webs are emerg- Business Studies at NDA. and then the ability to win, through ing, attention to the strategic element
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Van Fenema et al. 59 Figure 1. Positioning Strategic Logistics Innovations for stimulating and synergizing micro-innovations. This article contributes to the ongo- (B) Strategic operational (D) Military operations innovation (across concepts) ing challenge of strategically rethinking logistics for the military, but not by proposing a new concept for the digital era—that is, the what. Since these con- (C) Developing new Operational Realm (A) Operational strategy cepts rapidly change, this article instead operational concepts emphasizes the process side—the how. Ongoing evolution in the Instead of talking about specific con- operational realm cepts, such as forward floating depot or
Operational-logistics interaction over time distribution-based logistics, this article is concerned with strategic logistics in-
ocus o this article novation as a process of coordinating the 9
Dual impact of digital revolution Dual impact of digital revolution (B) Strategic logistics development of new logistics concepts. (D) Logistics operations innovation (across concepts) The digital era requires attention to
Data- and model-driven operations logistics strategic innovation in both the opera- tions and logistics realms (see figure 1). Logistics Realm (C) Developing new We embed strategic innovation in both (A) Logistics strategy logistics concepts realms in a model that includes strategy, Ongoing evolution development of new concepts, and opera- in the 10 operational realm tions. Focusing on strategic logistics innovation, we argue that these realms Ongoing commercial logistics should interact more intensely in the and technology innovations digital era; the logistics realm must lever- age commercial logistics and technology of innovation seems difficult to realize On the one hand, there are intra-Service innovations.11 Specifically, strategic inno- regarding military logistics.4 Strategic logistics, such as the U.S. Army Logistics vation is required to coordinate multiple innovation concerns processes of pro- branch, and on the other hand, cross- micro-cases of concept development. active and systematic thinking about Service shared entities, such as the U.S. We propose collaborative services and gaps that an organization can fulfill by Transportation Command, the Office innovation to connect multiple problem- developing new game plans.5 of the Under Secretary of Defense for solving areas and process multiple trends. In the U.S. military, the Third Offset Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Collaborative denotes interaction among Strategy has major and unexplored im- F–35 Lightning II Joint Program Office. stakeholders involved in different prob- plications for logistics. New technologies Other nations have a similar collection lem-solving areas. Services in this context have crossover effects for operations and of logistics organizations. We focus on are not organizational entities such as logistics. For instance, drones are be- this entire collection of organizations, as the Navy, but interactions aimed at value coming part of new operations, and they we are interested in military logistics as contributions—for example, technology can support logistics, such as picking a function of the military and strategic as a service.12 Innovation concerns the de- up wounded soldiers or secretly resup- innovation as a process vital to sustaining velopment of new products or procedures. plying special operations forces. New an edge over relevant opponents. Taken together, collaborative services technologies, however, need new versa- Military logistics innovation lacks a and innovation stress the importance of tile support networks. They also incur cross-service strategic picture. It hardly a vibrant military logistics community cyber risks, particularly in an antiaccess/ enjoys the backing of a strong military that is externally connected. We propose area-denial environment.6 Innovations academic research community, with the interventions that accelerate concurrent powered by crossovers between opera- exception of historical logistics studies.8 development of new operational and logis- tions and logistics cannot be addressed The operational domain by comparison tics concepts. These interventions enable with present routines. performs better in this respect, with logistics capability development for new In the military logistics domain, multiple think tanks, DOD units, and generations of warfare. innovations are mostly organized in universities constituting a vibrant intel- a reactive and stovepiped manner.7 lectual community. To sustain relevance Military Logistics: Beyond Moreover, within the Department of in the digital era, we need insight into “You Ask, We Deliver” Defense (DOD) or a ministry of defense effective strategic logistics innova- Logistics are planning processes for (MOD), responsibility for military logis- tion processes, including instruments implementing and controlling the tics is allocated to myriad organizations. efficiency and effectiveness of transpor-
60 Features / Sustaining Relevance JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Sailors move away from MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to “Eightballers” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 8 as it lifts cargo from flight deck of USS Theodore Roosevelt during replenishment-at-sea with USNS Henry J. Kaiser, Pacific Ocean, July 1, 2020 (U.S. Navy/Erik Melgar)
tation and storage of goods from the example, technology management success is readiness—not profit.15 More point of origin to the point of consump- and maintenance). specifically, military logistics is required tion. Future autonomous systems are to operate in a cost-efficient mode during Even in the era of cyber informa- increasingly part of the logistics equa- peacetime, and then transition to a pos- tion warfare, logistics remain relevant tion. This reality leads to an extended ture wherein effectiveness is paramount to human warfighters and physical definition of military logistics as activi- to the secondary consideration of cost. resources. Generally speaking, logistics ties required for the following: After all, a military conflict does not connect both intent and delivery. While come with the luxury of second chances procuring military organizations’ standard logistics enable commercial • afforded to business competition. physical goods (for example, supply businesses to outperform competitors chains and military mobility, among on services and costs, the objective of Opportunities and Challenges others); acquiring people and future military logistics is to serve user demands Increasingly, organizations focus on autonomous systems and adminis- with acceptable costs and capital use in new opportunities stemming from trating and moving these entities mind. The military logistics perspective advanced technologies as a mode for toward, within, and out of a theater13 is broader, comprising both peacetime changing logistics.16 In launching new accommodating the military all over logistics and support for on- and offshore • establishments such as the DOD Joint the world (for example, facilities operations, planned and unplanned.14 Artificial Intelligence Center, organi- and services for people and future This perspective must also establish, or- zations leverage artificial intelligence autonomous systems) ganize, and run lines of supplies so armies (AI) for coordinating—in a responsive ensuring soldiers, and future can move and fight. The primary objec- • manner—learning, predicting, and autonomous systems, receive and tive of military logistics is to enable and innovating.17 For example, during use relevant commercial and mili- sustain a specific state of preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic, the Joint tary technology for their jobs (for war at the lowest possible overall cost. Artificial Intelligence Center “has built Thus, the metric for military logistics
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Van Fenema et al. 61 Marine refuels AH-1Z Viper at forward arming and refueling point during Integrated Training Exercise 1-21 at Marine Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California, October 16, 2020 (U.S. Marine Corps/Zachary Zephir) a prototype AI tool that uses a wide that inspire new operational concepts. a next-level challenge for joint opera- variety of data streams to predict [infec- Therefore, interaction between opera- tions in terms of integration. Relatedly, tion] hotspots and related logistics and tions and logistics could become more the military needs strategic logistics in- supply-chain problems.”18 Military reciprocal, as depicted in figure 1. novation to develop coherent platforms organizations want to optimize support Future operations are likely to involve capable of such seamless activation. for real demand or underlying needs for multiple domains and focus on criti- Logistics, therefore, needs to be brought pivotal functions, such as transporta- cal infrastructures (some without clear into the joint strategic environment and tion, ammunition, maintenance, health, geographical sites), symbolic-meaning integrated into joint strategic planning. and cleaning. networks, and urban areas. Success will A seamless blend of human intel- Traditionally, military logistics has depend on data integrity, as well as deci- ligence and AI will require highly versatile been affected by operational innovations sion and information superiority, chiefly command and control to direct “a fluid aimed at information advantage and the distinction between real and fake in- transition from one operation to an- coordination and execution of nonkinetic formation. As stated during a U.S. Senate other.”21 Semi-autonomous swarms of effects. In an inverse manner, logistics hearing on the future of warfare, “Great technologies will be able to operate with could shift to an innovative-challenging Powers can and will fight across all the unprecedented levels of precision and role (for instance, logistics could be mo- domains. This will present new threats flexibility. Military organizations collabo- tivated not to support fuel-consuming in areas where we’ve had unfettered ac- rating with partners such as Microsoft energy production systems primarily, but cess.”20 The present task is to prepare and Amazon will leverage innovations in instead favor alternative energy sources to the military for operations that fluidly the commercial sector. make bases cheaper, more independent, shift across domains or engage parallel These operational projects, however, and more environmentally friendly).19 Or domains, activating different kinetic and lack strong intellectual counterparts on logistics could sustain special operations nonkinetic technologies and associated the logistics side, which results in discon- forces with intelligent drones in ways logistics processes. This task represents nected logistics–information technology
62 Features / Sustaining Relevance JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 infrastructures and suboptimal logistics organizations struggle with the pro- both operational efficiencies and strategic support for novel operations. Logistics longed time—often multiple decades— flexibility? Presently, the unstructured and often does not have the attention of required to develop, acquire, absorb, fluid nature of modern warfare cannot senior commanders, who underestimate and use and maintain new technologies, be catered to.29 Especially in the digital the complexity of military logistics in- including soft technologies such as new era, “you ask, we deliver”—as a unilateral novation and overestimate the usefulness logistics concepts developed elsewhere customer-supplier relationship—will not of commercial services. New technologies (for example, last-mile logistics con- do the job in terms of logistics innovation such as AI become relevant when they cepts). This situation widens the gap and future logistics services. Both col- support strategy and operations—which between logistics and the fast-moving laborative services and innovation imply senior commanders are very interested operational organization that it serves. a tighter link to related problem-solving in. Logistics performance increasingly Externally, logistics innovation in- areas in order to ensure relevant capabil- depends on technological innovations,22 volving outside partners faces multiple ity development. while at the same time physical-cyber hurdles along the way. For example: vulnerabilities of logistics systems and Trends and Effects Military organizations collaborat- processes themselves are drawing more • Several trends influence the networked ing with national or international attention.23 Opportunities are emerging problem-solving required for capabil- partners face difficulty when trying to better predict technology availability ity development, including military to collectively improve networked and logistics demand, as well as to con- logistics capabilities. We organize these logistics. Problems include collabora- firm information reliability. This ability trends based on their effects. tion challenges, turf wars, as well as translates into enhanced precision, speed, Actors. The first effect stems from learning and mutual adaptation.26 and operational continuity. In addition to automation and changes to weap- New concepts do not guarantee these technology-induced opportunities, • ons systems. Other military tasks are success. For instance, efforts to logistics changes in an organizational increasingly executed by networked change relationships with sup- sense. In a departure from the traditional semi-autonomous or remotely controlled pliers toward performance-based in-house approach, logistics trans- technologies.30 Moreover, the qualities of logistics suffer from deteriorating forms into cross-organizational supply weapons systems continually change in performance and control problems.27 networks.24 This change introduces, terms of enhanced complexity, digitiza- Laudable initiatives such as the in addition to new technologies, new tion, network capabilities, and frequency North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s challenges when military organizations of (modular) updates. These two trends Operations Logistics Chain Manage- are required to work with their military lead to a theater with fewer people on the ment project struggle with nations’ counterparts or businesses. battlefield but with networked, advanced willingness to share logistics informa- technologies tied to military sustainment tion and to participate in collective Current Practice organizations and industries remotely responsibility. Current logistics within military orga- monitoring and updating their technolo- Innovative concepts for logistics col- nizations faces internal and external • gies in the background. laboration are typically frozen or not problems. Internally, military logistics Spatial Dimension. The second executed in line with their original organizations tend to rely on concept effect concerns the unprecedented intention. An example of such drift- development that sequentially follows scale and speed of future warfare. New ing is a European pooling arrange- operational concept development. technologies truly lead to the “death of ment that introduced using spare Logistics is typically understood in distance.” Examples include hypersonic military aviation capacity, replicating terms of fixed concepts and tends to be missiles, as well as command and control similar initiatives in, for example, fragmented across multiple decentral- at great distances, including outer space. the airline industry and electricity ized organizations. This fragmentation These trends lead to future operations market.28 At the network level, an stems from the combination of specific and enabling logistics that are extremely optimal utilization rate of assets can Services (for example, Army, Marines), mobile and can link globally distributed be realized. However, the planners’ logistics autonomy, and economies of conflicts in short timespans. strategy shifts over time toward a scale (for example, central purchasing Virtualization. The third effect more nationally oriented perspective. and provisioning of similar categories concerns the digitization of operations of products and services). As a result, These internal and external challenges and their influence. With virtualization, logistics often focuses on reactive, for military logistics organizations call warfare and targeting partially shift to plan-based execution rather than inno- for changes to innovation processes in nonphysical domains or multidomains. vation-oriented strategic exchange with order to render them more strategic. Logistics as physical services by real peo- operational and external partners. Some How can military logistics organizations ple no longer seems relevant. However, even argue that “civilian logistics has break through crippling inertia to create a the technologies required for digital surpassed military logistics.”25 Military dynamic logistics function that relates to operations will have traditional logistics
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Van Fenema et al. 63 Figure 2. Service-Centric Foundational Approach to the role of the third form—services— Interdependence of Problem-Solving Modes leading to increasingly connected and Original model in gray from Patr cio and Fisk . advanced platforms spanning multiple levels. In the commercial world, service Strategic political military systems are conceived as integrated problem-solving approaches for connecting strategies and operations, with the latter includ- ing technology, resources, and logistics. esigning the service value proposition As a mental exercise, a customer could Strategic management/ Marketing/business design be replaced with the adversary, service- value propositions with desired effects by political-military stakeholders, and services with operational (targeting) ilitary operations Logistics problem-solving esigning the esigning the problem-solving processes. This allows for the adop- current and future service backstage Service service inter ace current and future logistical concepts Operations rontstage design operational concepts tion of a foundational military network and capabilities management/ Interface Engineering design and capabilities model combining the four modes of problem-solving and the three forms of interdependence, with an emphasis
esigning supportive on services (see figure 2). This service- techologies centric foundation details interdepen- Information systems/ software enginnering dencies of collaborative services and innovation. Next, when we look at innovation, Technology problem- the interdependence of problem-solving solving within and outside of the military modes is vital for capability development. We understand this interdependence as Source Lia Patricio and Raymond P. Fisk, “Creating New Services,” in Serving ustomers lo al networked problem-solving (for instance, arketing ers ectives, ed. Raymond P. Fisk, Rebekah Russell-Bennett, and Lloyd C. Harris (Melbourne Tide University Press, 2013), 190. “Technology matters but so do concepts of operation,” and “New ways of using needs such as energy and maintenance/ assist users with selecting sensors, effec- technology can stun an adversary”34). update services. tors, and support elements across military Unfortunately, stakeholders associated Radical Renewal of Production and domains . . . to form and adapt kill webs with each mode of problem-solving tend Logistics. The fourth effect concerns the to deliver desired effects on targets.”32 to pursue their own issues and develop military intelligently sensing needs, and Each domain’s logistics challenges must their own mindsets.35 developing and producing technologies be considered in conjunction with the Presently, military logistics tends and parts, in a highly customized and others. Multimodal transportation, for to remain somewhat passive and reac- flexible manner. Hence, smart produc- example, can leverage capabilities associ- tive. For strategic logistics innovation, tion and logistics alter production ated with land, sea, air, and space. we argue that networked problem- chains. Products are composed of inter- solving—across the four modes—must be changeable modules, and their digital Interdependence, Services, improved as a means of processing trend components are frequently updated, such and Networked Problem- effects.36 Networked problem-solving can as the technology in Tesla cars. Additive Solving for Innovation be analyzed using two dimensions: cou- manufacturing decentralizes production Interdependence of strategic political- pling and temporal relatedness (see figure capabilities and eliminates several spare military, military operations, logistics, 3). We propose a dual shift: Logisticians parts in supply chains. and technology problem-solving is should no longer wait for the other prob- Cross-Domain Fluidity. The fifth well acknowledged in command and lem areas to conclude their processing of effect concerns the increasing number control.33 This interdependence takes trends; they must tighten their interac- of domains in warfare, which calls for three forms: political control processes, tions with counterparts.37 Moreover, a cross-domain operations and logistics information interdependence for coor- proactive role for military logistics inno- command and control. Operations dination (for example, an operation vation calls for concurrent development.38 become not only networked but also generates required logistics informa- The present institutionalized en- unanimously effective across domains.31 tion, logistics performance determines vironment does not seem ready for For instance, the Defense Advanced operational capabilities, and operations collaborative services and innovation. Research Projects Agency’s Adapting trigger demand for new technologies), Interventions are required to break down Cross-Domain Kill-Webs program “will and services. Digitization has increased the stovepipes of stakeholders in strategic
64 Features / Sustaining Relevance JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 political-military, military operations, Figure 3. Positioning Networked Problem-Solving logistics, and technology areas.
Limited collaboration for Collaborative services and innovations, Interventions to Foster logistics innovation. Network including logistics innovation. Network Collaborative Services problem-solving tends to be problem-solving tends to be fast and and Innovation inefficient due to limited Shift effective but requires substantial
Concurrent cross-learning. to tight coordination. Intervention 1: Develop Sensitizing coupling Concepts. This first intervention intro- Shift to Shift to duces and elaborates core ideas and concurrent concurrent concepts that can be shared across the Fast track, sequential innnovation scattered community of stakeholders Formally organized logistics and procurement, including logistics innovation. Network problem- associated with each problem area. innovation. Network problem-solving solving tends to be slow as steps Shift across problem-solving areas tends to relatively slow but benefits We propose sensitizing concepts that are followed in a linear fashion. Sequential to tight from a cross-phase coordination. encourage theoretical development. coupling Decades ago, Herbert Blumer argued
Is innovation sequentiallyIs innovation or concurrently coupled Loose Tight that “a sensitizing concept . . . gives the user a general sense of reference How tightly is innovation coupled across problem-solving areas and guidance in approaching empiri- cal instances. . . . Sensitizing concepts Concept blending merges content ele- experience, and flexibility. This type of merely suggest directions along which to ments from different input spaces.41 It dynamic process must be carefully filtered look.”39 This is already taking place via not only respects input spaces but also and calibrated to disrupt institutionalized various formal and informal communica- moves forward to new blended or hybrid ways of doing things and to prepare for tions such as conferences, Web sites, concepts. Thus, content elements are the future. Interaction across opera- listserves, publications, and interpersonal transferred while the core structure of tions and logistics encourages mutual communications. Examples of sensitiz- the concept within a particular problem- understanding and idea generation. ing concepts permeating the network of solving area is maintained. In order to Hence, collective (digital) spaces for problem-solving areas include “together- exist in the operational domain, hybrid operations-logistics experimentation are ness” concepts such as multidomain, warfare necessitates a blend of elements of paramount importance. These spaces interoperability, network, connected, from various domains. Conceptual blend- can be conceived of as add-ons to already and (spider)web, and concepts stressing ing primarily mixes requirements and existing, specialized operations and lo- self-reliance, self-repair, and resilience. insights from operations with logistics gistics simulation and experimentation. These sensitizing concepts will be shaped concepts from the military or its commer- Facing challenges presented by multi- within and across problem-solving areas cial partners. For instance, the operational domain battle, U.S. military Services are in different ways; their meanings are domain calls for extremely flexible high- experimenting with integrated operations likely diverse across stakeholder groups, tech human-machine nodes in a network. (for example, a recent exercise combin- yet a “translation” vocabulary might This situation could be blended with ing Army air and missile defense with be developed as a means to coordinate elements from both existing combat lo- Air Force F-35s).43 While, at present, these interpretations and generate new gistics concepts and electronic commerce joint operations tend to be sustained in understandings. This process’s delib- concepts, such as drone delivery and a separate manner, we suggest a concur- erate management might undergird smart management of stocks. rent exploration of logistics opportunities networked problem-solving, including Intervention 3: Compress and risks at the network level that move activating military logistics innovation in Experiential Cycles and Run These beyond shared services. In other words, a concurrent mode. Moreover, logistics in a Concurrent and Interdependent concept development could be executed concepts developed within a service unit Manner. While traditional methods in parallel instead of sequentially.44 This such as special operations forces might propose sequential steps, researchers have type of development implies intensifying become a learning platform for others in found that innovative companies com- task interdependence and coordination the military ecosystem. press their development of new products requirements (from a sequential “I wait Intervention 2: Blend Concepts. and services. Leading and accelerating for you” to a concurrent interdependence In 2003, the importance of concept this process are more important than the “What you do matters to and inspires blending was acknowledged in military resulting designs or concepts. This faster my work, and vice versa”).45 The fruits of literature describing transformation as “a pace does not simply consist of taking less these enhanced coordination efforts are process that shapes the changing nature time for sensing-seizing-reconfiguring.42 acceleration, quality improvement, and of military competition and cooperation Research shows that organizations also exploration of the unknown. Researchers through new combinations of concepts, must rely on improvisation, real-time propose different information-processing capabilities, people and organizations.”40
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Van Fenema et al. 65 Figure 4. Risks Involving Multiple Problem Areas installations may completely disrupt eco- nomic and military activities.48
Digital technology (Yoo et al., 2010) The problem-solving areas mentioned earlier need to develop capabilities to ad- dress the individual pieces of this complex Contents Layer Content risk puzzle and, thus, the issue as a whole. (e.g., fake, misleading) Involvement of suppliers is indispensable, Backup or alternatives since they have most of the technology
Service Layer components expertise. The industrial Service risk, capabilities report offers strategic-sectoral including AI 49 Backup or alternatives risk assessment. In addition, at a micro Network Layer level, analysis of risks pertaining to tech- Logical transmission nology components, as depicted in figure Physical Network risk technology risk Physical technology Physical transport 4, is necessary. Comprehensive “digital Backup or alternatives Backup or alternatives twins” of weapons systems and software Device Layer for understanding their associated supply Energy and critical resources Logical capability Energy and critical Device risk chains will help in understanding which resource risk Backup or alternatives Physical machinery physical and digital technologies are in Backup or alternatives use and which supply chains are required Infrastructure Physical Backup or alternatives for maintenance and updates. Conversely, infrastructure risk the military must analyze the fabric of opponent technology for new opportuni- ties in order to achieve operational and Friend or foe risk exploitation strategic objectives. strategies between concurrently linked systems, and business-logistics services. Conclusion processes depending on, for instance, We highlight the physical dimension of This article contributes to the ongoing the level of ambiguity. Military logistics this layered digital technology because challenge of strategically rethinking concept development could vary across of its importance to logistics. The physi- logistics for the military. We propose a these strategies depending on the rhythm cal dimension relies on energy, critical collaborative services and innovation of operational concept development. resources, and, ultimately, infrastructure approach, along with a shift in thinking Finally, suppliers are increasingly entering (for example, glass fiber networks, satel- from known concepts toward concept the equation, taking responsibility for lites, and technologies for solar energy). development and strategic innovation. key services to sustain weapons systems Each technology component could be A strategic, proactive, and networked and provide logistics services right to exploited by adversaries, and each re- view of logistics innovation will ensure the tip of the spear. If its weapons sys- quires backup or alternatives to ensure military logistics remains future-proof, tems operate in a networked mode, the survivability. The interplay of risks and is able to “adapt and integrate sustain- military must fine-tune suppliers’ active opportunities across the technology ment operations into the maneuver involvement in operations and logistics, components is complex and unknown. commander’s plan,” and continues considering criteria such as effectiveness Networked problem-solving is required functioning as a “combat multiplier.”50 and security. in dealing with this exciting playground We propose four interventions to foster Intervention 4: Explore Cross-Area of friendly and enemy forces in offensive strategic logistics innovation in close Opportunities and Risks. We already and defensive manners. For instance, interaction with the operational realm. referred to opportunities and risks across fake news in the content layer could Implementing this view on collab- problem-solving domains. In the digital lead to incorrect situational awareness, orative services and innovation requires era, technology has become more com- with disastrous strategic-military and awareness of different ways of relating plicated in the sense of different layers. operational implications. On the physical to DOD and MOD external partners The dark gray rectangle in figure 4 shows side, new targets (for example, networks, such as allies and weapons manufactur- these complex digital technology layers, devices, energy, critical resources, and ers. Partners feature their own strategic from content (for example, fake news and infrastructure) have emerged that could focus and values depending on their misinformation problems) down to ser- be attacked in a kinetic or digital-cyber positioning in the public or commercial vices, networks, and devices (for example, sense. Additionally, a digital attack on sector.51 With its close ties to suppliers, control software problems).46 Examples infrastructure control software may ulti- the military could be considered a hybrid of layered military technology include mately have a ripple effect on the content and culturally unique organization. It command and control systems, weapons layer.47 An unexpected attack on energy relies on a variety of interorganizational
66 Features / Sustaining Relevance JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 relationships. Increasingly, the military organization is taking to position itself, while Notes the latter refers to the process of developing organization could be viewed as an ex- this direction. The phrase development of new tended enterprise, comprising its core as a 1 Joseph C. Wylie, Jr., Military Strategy: A concepts is defined as “a process of exploration lead organization and partnering organi- General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, and experimentation and tends to unfold as a zations on whom it depends.52 MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989). hypothesis-antithesis-synthesis dialogue.” See 2 How might a shift toward collabora- UK Army. 2015. Agile Warrior Report. John F. Schmitt, “A Practical Guide for Devel- AUTHOR QUERY oping and Writing Military Concepts,” Work- tive services and innovation be embraced? 3 Peter Dombrowski and Andrew L. Ross, ing Paper 02-4, Defense Adaptive Red Team, Strategic logistics, or innovation, must “The Revolution in Military Affairs, Transfor- McLean, VA, December 2002, 22, available at become accepted in the joint strategic mation, and the Defence Industry,” Security
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Van Fenema et al. 67 20 U.S. Senate, The Future of Warfare, Research Projects Agency, available at
68 Features / Sustaining Relevance JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Show of force during Iranian Revolution, 1979
Embracing Asymmetry Assessing Iranian National Security Strategy, 1983–1987
By Spencer Lawrence French
he Iran-Iraq War has affected the United States and the Gulf States. to achieve strategic ends through con- Iranian leaders’ decisionmaking Iran’s decisions in 2019 and 2020 espe- ventional means. Unable to escalate the T calculus over more than three cially—such as attacking international conflict vertically in Iraq, Iran sought decades, shaping military strategy, oil tankers, launching missiles at oil and to escalate it horizontally against those force structure investments, and risk military targets, and leveraging Shi’a supporting Iraq’s war effort while tolerance. The cumulative effects of proxies across the region—reflect Iran’s deploying proxies, terror, and economic the war are strikingly evident today experience during the Iran-Iraq War warfare capabilities in a piecemeal and in Iran’s asymmetric strategy against when the country faced better equipped reactive fashion. Thus, while these adversaries while simultaneously strug- wartime efforts were often successful gling with economic troubles and inter- at the tactical level, they had limited Major Spencer Lawrence French, USA, is a national isolation. Iran’s war strategy operational effects and failed to achieve student at the U.S. Army Command and General was born from the country’s inability the desired strategic coercion. Staff College.
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 French 69 Current supreme leader Ali of 1982, Iran had pushed Iraqi forces 80 fully operational fighter aircraft, Khamenei, who was president of Iran back to pre-war boundaries. compared with more than 400 under the during the war, and nearly all of Iran’s However, instead of seeking terms, Shah.5 Estimates suggest that Iraq had an current top military and national security Khomenei expanded his war aims from eight-to-one advantage over Iran in com- leaders either helped implement or at the restoring the territorial integrity of Iran bat aircraft.6 Further combat losses and very least witnessed this strategy during to including the abdication of Saddam, the lack of replacement parts meant that, the war.1 From their limited perspec- as well as obtaining war reparations from by mid-1986, Iran likely had no more tive of the war, these leaders potentially Iraq. Despite the clear military risks, the than 50 operational fighter aircraft.7 The concluded that the tactical effects of per- possibility of exporting its Islamic revolu- situation was no better on the ground. By sistent low-intensity asymmetric warfare tion to Iraq was impossible to refuse. For 1984, Iraq had a four-to-one advantage did have strategic impact and that better the next 5 years, Iran mounted largely in- in armored vehicles,8 and by 1986, this synchronization at the operational level effective offensives while Iraq conducted gap had increased to a six-to-one Iraqi or more resources could have led to vic- an adequate defense of the approaches to advantage.9 tory. The success of Iran’s asymmetric Baghdad. Iran’s ground forces ultimately warfare in advancing its objectives in Iraq proved unequal to the task of seriously Fighting on an Anemic in the 2000s likely reinforced the wrong threatening Baghdad, seizing the centers and Hobbled Economy lessons about the coercive power of asym- of Shi’a religious life in Iraq, or convinc- Crushing arms embargoes, financial metric warfare and colored the country’s ing Iraq’s Gulf financiers to end their shortfalls, and an inability to expand its analysis of the Iran-Iraq War. Given the support. Iran simply lacked the ground domestic production of sophisticated lasting impact the war has had on Iran’s forces capable of seizing territory, air weapons systems meant that, while Iran military actions, examining the country’s forces capable of breaking Iraqi morale was able to secure some supplies from experience during the conflict offers a and wartime infrastructure, or naval China, North Korea, Syria, and Libya, unique window into Iranian decisionmak- forces capable of blockading Iraq and the as well as spare parts from Europe, its ing today. Gulf States. procurement was dwarfed multiple times over by Iraq.10 Additionally, most Background and the Origins Fighting with Insufficient of these purchases were for small arms of Iran’s Asymmetric Weapons ammunition, infantry antitank weapons, Approach to Conflict By 1984, Iran had practically exhausted, and spare parts, as opposed to combat In September 1980, the Sunni- and had no way to replace, its pre-war vehicles, self-propelled artillery, or other dominated Arab nationalist state of heavy weapons. While able to contain sophisticated equipment necessary to Iraq invaded Iran under the pretext of Iraqi counterattacks and launch limited truly challenge the Iraqi army on the liberating the ethnic-Arab population offensives of its own, Iran was incapable approaches to Baghdad. Furthermore, of Khuzestan Province and annexing of defeating Iraq on the battlefield. Iran was unable to locate a reliable the oil-rich province along the Persian The Iranian Revolution terminated the source of Western and, particularly, U.S. Gulf. To Saddam Hussein, Ayatollah country’s relationship with the United parts and end items, thus forcing it to Khomenei “constituted an implacable States, its primary arms supplier, and replace U.S. equipment with Eastern ideological foe,”2 and Iran, motivated caused the United States to curtail Bloc equipment. This complication by political Islam, represented an exis- Iran’s access to other foreign weapons resulted in logistics, training, and tential threat to Ba’athist Iraq. By 1980, suppliers. Iran’s military industrial base doctrinal problems as Iran attempted Iran’s post-revolution political isolation in the late 1970s and 1980s was unable to assimilate the new equipment while and officer purges had begun a spiral of to fill the gap, being primarily focused simultaneously at war. declining armed forces combat effec- on infantry weapons systems and Throughout the mid-1980s, oil prices tiveness, which represented a window of ammunition.3 The chaos of the Iranian were relatively low, but coordinated U.S. opportunity that Saddam felt compelled Revolution further reduced the coun- and Saudi actions further reduced prices to seize. The heavy losses sustained try’s already limited arms production.4 to $15 per barrel in mid-1986, reducing in the first months of the conflict Thus, in the months preceding the war, Iranian state revenue by two-thirds.11 exacerbated this decline, and Iran was Iran had no domestic or international During the mid-1980s, Iran thereby simply unable to reconstitute, rearm, source for arms, technical assistance, or lacked the currency reserves to meet its and retrain its first-rate Shah-era forces. training. procurement requirements on the foreign Lacking military hardware and profes- Iran became unable to replace plat- market and was unable to meet its needs sional leadership, Iran was forced to forms and trained crews once they were domestically, largely due to “short- blunt and reverse the Iraqi gains using lost. The Central Intelligence Agency ages in raw materials caused by import massed irregular light infantry forces. (CIA) estimated that, by mid-1984, the restrictions, low productivity, and faulty While costly, this approach ultimately Iranian air force, once the preeminent management practices,” exacerbated by a proved successful, and by the summer air power in the region, had fewer than “scarcity of expert personnel, insufficient
70 Features / Assessing Iranian National Security Strategy, 1983–1987 JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 USS Stark listing to port after being struck by two Iraqi-launched Exocet missiles, Persian Gulf, May 17, 1987 (U.S. Navy)
receptivity to innovations, and excessive to substitute by drawing on its superior west of the city, are open, favorable for bureaucratic formalities” and an overall manpower reserves to field primarily a mobile counterattack.17 Along the “weak technological industrial base.”12 mass infantry formations. Yet these northern portions of the Iran-Iraq bor- U.S.-sponsored financial and trade formations suffered high attrition and der, the situation was similar, because sanctions further reduced Iranian access continuously required replacements. “while the mountainous terrain on the to foreign capital. Over $6 billion in Such high throughput meant training border favored infantry operations, the Iranian assets remained frozen even after was limited, and in 1984, Basiji troops, more open terrain lying beyond provided the 1981 Algiers Accords. The United making up 20 percent of frontline units, Iraqi armor with an enormous advantage, States also reimposed sweeping sanctions received only approximately 2 weeks of of which it made full use.”18 Thus, by in 1984 in response to Iranian support initial training before deploying.15 This 1984, the combination of terrain and for Lebanese Hizballah while blocking resulted in poor combat performance, Iran’s shortfalls in armor and artillery Iranian attempts to obtain World Bank higher attrition, a generally low level of effectively ensured that the country loans.13 Finally, facing domestic pressure experience in frontline units, and overall would be able only to impose cost on over the Iran-Contra affair, and in re- low combat effectiveness. Iraq through a bloody stalemate and local sponse to Iranian attacks in the Gulf, the The Iranian offensive near Basra in attacks on favorable terrain. Iran would Ronald Reagan administration levied a February 1984 is illustrative of Iran’s not be capable of conducting the type of ban on all Iranian imports to the United inability to mount a strategic offensive large-scale offensive necessary to achieve States in 1987.14 that could legitimately threaten Iraq. its expanded aims. As the gap between Iran suffered at least 40,000 casual- Iraqi and Iranian capabilities grew over A Vicious Cycle and Stalemate ties assaulting the marshes north of the the course of the conflict, it only further In short, Iran was caught in a vicious city and failed to secure the approaches underscored this reality. cycle of poor combat effectiveness. to Baghdad or isolate Basra.16 This Yet it took Iranian leaders time to Losses in armor or aircraft could not be breakdown clearly demonstrates Iran’s comprehend this situation, and Iran oscil- replaced because Iran possessed neither problem. The terrain east of the Iran-Iraq lated between executing a war of attrition a reliable international supply nor a border is more complex than the terrain and attempting to seize the initiative robust domestic production base. Even to its west. The terrain south and east of through costly and largely ineffectual of- if Iran secured equipment, it was woe- Basra is waterlogged and unfavorable to fensives. The Karbala offensives of 1986 fully lacking in trained operators and armored or mechanized formations, yet and early 1987 demonstrated that Iran maintenance personnel. Iran was forced the approaches to Baghdad, particularly could not sustain large-scale conventional
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 French 71 offensives in Iraq and that Iraqi defenses of Iranian training of terror groups in the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian leadership were more than a match for Iranian ca- the Gulf, predicting that “because of its hypothesized that the threat of mines pabilities.19 Recognizing the limitations military weakness, Iran may now turn to would be enough to have a coercive of its conventional capabilities, and yet terror as a means to weaken Baghdad’s effect, without forcing Iran to engage intent on fulfilling its expansive war aims, support in the Gulf.”21 In keeping with in a costly and difficult mine-laying Iran developed an asymmetric strategy the strategy of reducing Gulf support campaign.25 By January 1985, they aimed at attacking Iraq’s perceived weak- for Iraq, while simultaneously driving assessed that Iran could “probably lay nesses as opposed to its conventional up oil prices, Iranian-backed sabo- enough mines to raise insurance rates strengths. Iran increasingly focused on teurs bombed Kuwaiti oil facilities in and deter shipping to Gulf ports.”26 expanding the war horizontally to target June 1986. Four bombings followed Under this logic, producers would pass Iraq’s enablers and fielded a suite of in 1987, along with Kuwaiti-Shi’a higher insurance rates on to consumers asymmetric tools that it would employ, protests.22 as higher oil prices, thus disrupting Gulf with some effectiveness at the tactical The year 1987 also witnessed the suppliers while making Iranian exports level, for the duration of the war. birth of Hizballah al-Hijaz, formed by that escaped Iraqi targeting more the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard profitable. Targeting Iraq’s Gulf Lifeline: Corps (IRGC) primarily from disaffected In 1987, at the height of the Tanker Economic Warfare and Terrorism Shi’a based in the oil-rich Saudi Eastern War, as the United States launched Key to Iraq’s ability to continue the province. Between August 1987 and Operation Earnest Will and began re- conflict was the financial support of the March 1988, the group attacked a gas flagging Kuwaiti tankers, mine warfare Gulf States. Throughout the war, Iran plant and bombed petrochemical installa- became Iran’s economic weapon of suffered a lack of currency reserves due tions at Ras Tanura and Jubail.23 Despite choice. Iranian mines did have a limited to low oil prices. Thus, Gulf oil produc- the investment in these groups, at least tactical effect. They damaged some tion directly contributed to the Iraqi during the Iran-Iraq War, they posed lit- tankers and forced the United States war effort and hurt Iranian finances. tle danger to global oil markets or regime to deploy additional minesweeping as- Iran’s leaders concluded that to offset security. Iranian leaders likely saw their at- sets to the region; however, they failed Iran’s conventional weakness and shift tacks as a way to demonstrate to the Gulf to have the desired strategic effect of the strategic balance, the country States the vulnerability of their installa- substantially reducing Iraq’s ability to needed to expand the horizon of the tions and the level of Iranian control over finance the war. After the reflagged oil conflict, coercing Saddam’s supporters portions of their populations, but there tanker MV Bridgeton hit a mine in July to abandon him. The difficulty lay in is no indication that Gulf leaders were 1987, global oil prices held steady for 3 how to achieve this without inviting coerced to lower support.24 Part of the weeks before continuing the downward the outright intervention of the Gulf reason behind this fact is that, despite the trend. In the month following the at- States or their Western allies. Iranian tactical successes of these groups in orga- tack, crude oil prices fell 1.1 percent as leaders operated under the hypothesis nizing and executing complex attacks, the compared to 1.6 percent in the month that a low-level campaign of terrorism sporadic nature of the attacks unsynchro- before the attack.27 This trend suggests and disruption of oil commerce could nized with other coercive tools presented that Iranian mining operations might have this coercive effect. The campaign the Gulf States with a real dilemma. have spooked oil markets and forced the culminated in 1987–1988 but, despite industry to factor their small cost into certain tactical success, never achieved Mining the Gulf pricing and insurance rates. However, the intended strategic result. Similarly, in 1984, Iran faced a con- the change was so inconsequential as to certed Iraqi campaign against the have no lasting effect on the underlying Shi’a Proxies Iranian oil industry. Given that Iraq market dynamics. Once the actual costs The presence of largely repressed Shi’a could count on Gulf finances as a back- of Iranian mining operations were shown minorities in the Gulf provided Iran stop, damage to the Iraqi oil industry to be minimal compared with other busi- with raw materials for proxy groups. had less impact than similar damage ness costs, markets adjusted. Similarly, Iran’s Shi’a revolutionaries themselves to Iran. Mines promised the ability while mining allowed Iran to avoid losing were part of a larger ecosystem of to impose cost on Gulf oil producers a conventional battle with the United political Shi’ism that had begun to in a relatively deniable fashion, thus States, Iranian use of economic terrorism flourish in the 1960s, and thus had an avoiding the direct intervention of invited further U.S. military, economic, ideological as well as a practical reason the superpowers while simultaneously and political engagement in the region. for supporting armed movements in the expanding the scope of the conflict to Thus, while Iran succeeded at the tacti- region during the war. As early as 1981, target Iraq’s financial backers. So, as cal level in employing mines against Iran sponsored a Shi’a insurrection early as 1984, Iran began expanding its individual tankers as a means to offset in Bahrain,20 and by 1984 American mine-laying program. While Iran never U.S. conventional strengths, the country intelligence began seeing indications possessed the capability to fully close failed both at the operational level to
72 Features / Assessing Iranian National Security Strategy, 1983–1987 JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Muslim cleric, possibly Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha, speaking behind cloth-drapped stand displaying photograph of Ayatollah Khomeini, outside U.S. Embassy, Tehran, Iran, 1979 (Library of Congress/Sharok Hatami) significantly influence the volume of Gulf bility was not up to the task of credibly never exceeding 100 missiles on hand at shipping and at the strategic level to influ- threatening the destruction of Gulf oil any point, and probably averaging sub- ence global oil markets and reduce Iraq’s infrastructure. Despite attempts to stand stantially fewer than that estimate. ability to finance its war effort. up a domestic ballistic missile manufac- Iran’s Scuds had an accuracy of only turing program, Iran had no ability to within 1 kilometer at two-thirds of its Missiles as Economic domestically produce medium-range maximum range,31 and while oil facilities Terror Weapons ballistic missiles during the conflict, and are large targets, precision is necessary In seeking to threaten Gulf oil supply had limited success in producing short- to deliver truly lasting damage. Iran was in addition to transportation, Iran was range ballistic missiles (only starting in thus forced to launch 10 to 20 missiles confronted again by its limited aviation 1988).28 From 1985 to 1987, Iran was or more to have a chance of crippling assets. Iran’s Gulf neighbors possessed almost entirely dependent on Libya for the target.32 Consequently, Iran never advanced air defense capabilities. While clandestine transfers of a small quantity possessed a large enough inventory of attack aircraft might have been the most (at least 50) of Soviet-manufactured ballistic or cruise missiles to meet the task cost-effective option for degrading oil Scud-Bs as well as Libyan ballistic of credibly threatening the destruction infrastructure, such a conventional strat- missile expertise.29 From mid to late of a meaningful percentage of Gulf oil egy was not an option for Iran given 1987, Iran procured about 100 North infrastructure. its limited aircraft and pilots and its Korean–manufactured Scud-B mis- In keeping with the theory that inability to procure substantial amounts siles.30 Consequently, Iran’s inventory economic terrorism creates market uncer- of new equipment and training. At the remained limited from 1985 through tainty, Iran’s leadership hypothesized that same time, Iran’s ballistic missile capa- the end of the conflict, almost certainly firing one or a small number of missiles
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 French 73 at an oil facility might raise prices, even if United States to do more than rely on were engaged in offensives near Basra, doing so was likely to cause only minimal Iraq to hold Iran in check, while mod- Iranian paratroopers infiltrated behind damage.33As Saudi Arabia began lower- erately increasing maritime security. Iran Iraqi lines and, with support from the ing global oil prices through increased was more successful at the tactical level, Kurdish Peshmerga, seized positions production in 1986, Iran brandished its leveraging a multiplicity of proxies and near Mosul, threatening the Kirkuk- missiles, hoping to spook markets. In weapons systems to strike targets of their Dortyol pipeline.40 Confronted with October 1987, Iran launched short-range choosing. Iranian leaders might imagine mounting battlefield losses, Iran went Silkworm antiship missiles at Kuwait’s Sea that such tactical successes translated into to great lengths to broker a compre- Island petroleum export terminal, seeking a strategic coercive effect in the Gulf; hensive agreement between the PUK to deter Kuwait from cooperating with however, there is little evidence to sup- and KDP to form the Iraqi Kurdistan the United States and Iraq.34 The markets port this conclusion. Front (IKF) in the spring of 1987. This were largely unaffected, and the threats unified Iranian-backed Kurdish bloc went unheeded. In April 1988, Iran ac- Targeting Iraq’s Internal forced Iraq to deploy up to one-third of cused Kuwait and the United States of Fault Lines: Proxies and its combat power to defeat the Kurdish directly assisting Iraq in launching an Terror Weapons insurrection.41 Yet, once again, Iran was offensive on al-Faw.35 In response, Iran Iran attempted to leverage asymmetric unable to capitalize on this temporary fired a single Scud into the U.S.-operated capabilities to gain direct advantage advantage to seize momentum, and the Wafra oil field in the neutral zone.36 Iran over its Iraqi adversary, degrade Iraq’s IKF soon collapsed under Iraqi pressure clearly intended to send the message ability to marshal its resources against and internal infighting. that continued support for Iraq would Iran, and deter Iraq from applying its Iran built new proxies aligned ideo- have economic consequences for the superior conventional means against logically with Tehran and over which it United States, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia; Iran. Iranian leadership identified had direct control. Following the Iranian however, this idea was not credible given Iraq’s ethnic and religious fault lines as revolution, Saddam cracked down on Iran’s ballistic missile force capabilities. opportunities that could be exploited Shi’a political groups, and many dis- Furthermore, global oil markets were to force the Iraqi government to shift sidents, especially those of the Islamic not shocked by this approach, and at best forces from the front to perform inter- Dawa Party, fled to Iran. In anticipation the attack only held prices steady for 2 nal security roles. Iran also viewed the of the possibility of the overthrow of months before they resumed their down- Iraqi public’s growing dissatisfaction Saddam, in 1982, Iran used some of ward trend.37 Thus, the military effect of with the war as a vector for degrad- these dissidents to form the Supreme Iran’s missile attacks on Gulf oil facilities ing regime security. Finally, Iraq’s oil Council for the Islamic Revolution in during the war was negligible, and the economy, like that of the Gulf, appeared Iraq (SCIRI).42 As Iranian forces proved psychological effect on global oil markets ripe for disruption. By 1987, Iran was unable to break the stalemate of 1983, was transient at best. Iranian leaders may regularly striking Iraq with missile and Iran established the Badr Corps under have seen the utility of ballistic missiles as proxy terror attacks, but the country’s the IRGC as SCIRI’s military wing43 and an instrument of coercion, psychological assumptions about the weakness of the began recruiting and impressing Iraqi warfare, and economic terrorism, but the Iraqi polity and the effect of small-scale Shi’a prisoners of war, dissidents, and capabilities and inventory of the Iranian strikes proved unfounded. refugees into service as guerrillas.44 These ballistic missile program proved insuf- Shi’a militants, while irrelevant when ficient to credibly coerce. Kurdish Partners and deployed alongside conventional forces, All told, Iran’s coercive acts in the Shi’a Proxies could conduct bombings and assassina- Gulf failed to significantly alter the stra- While more partner than full proxy, the tions deep in Iraq. Yet Badr terrorism tegic landscape. As the price of oil fell, Kurds were Iran’s most capable ally in failed to paralyze Iraqi leadership or seri- Iranian state revenues plummeted, Gulf Iraq. From the beginning of the war, ously strain Iraqi security services. Most powers continued to support Iraq, and Iran provided direct assistance to the important, SCIRI and Badr failed in their ultimately the United States stepped Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) primary mission to ignite a Shi’a revolu- in to guarantee freedom of navigation. forces in their conflict with Baghdad tion in Iraq. Other Iraqi Shi’a leaders Iran sought to “apply steady pressure but had strained relations with the more amenable to working with Saddam, on their rivals without using any one Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).39 such as Muhammad Sadiq Sadr, had instrument with such force that it invites By 1984, Iran began more serious stepped in during the war to fill the Shi’a retaliation.”38 The Gulf States might attempts to utilize special operations “leadership vacuum” left by the flight have understood Iran’s intended message forces and Kurdish irregulars to divide of Dawa’s cadre.45 So, while over 70 that lower support for Iraq would result Iraqi combat power, occasionally creat- percent of Iraq’s enlisted men but only in lower costs to Gulf oil industries, but ing windows of opportunity to seize the 20 percent of its officers were Shi’a,46 no the relatively uncoordinated and ineffec- approaches to Baghdad. For instance, amount of Iranian organizing engineered tive campaign never forced them or the on May 15, 1986, while Iranian forces enough defection or sabotage in the
74 Features / Assessing Iranian National Security Strategy, 1983–1987 JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 USS John Young shells two Iranian command and control platforms in response to recent Iranian missile attack on reflagged Kuwaiti super tanker, October 19, 1987 (U.S. Navy/National Archives and Records Administration)
ranks to substantially decrease Iraqi com- Between March and June 1985, Iran substantial military effect, as almost all bat effectiveness. Thus, while Iran’s more launched a dozen Scuds at Baghdad. To the supposed targets, such as Ba’ath recent success deploying Shi’a militants reduce the psychological impact of the headquarters and military training acad- makes the investment during the 1980s strikes, the Iraqi government initially emies, survived.51 The strikes’ economic seem prescient, the actual impact during tried to claim the strikes were terrorism effect was, likewise, negligible. While the Iran-Iraq War was negligible. or sabotage.48 Yet this public deception Iranian attempts to degrade Iraqi oil pro- was actually counterproductive, and once duction had begun at the outset of the Missiles as Terror Weapons the Iraqi government began acknowl- war, between 1986 and 1988 Iran fired In 1984, Saddam increased airstrikes edging the strikes and civilians became at least five Scud missiles at refineries in on Iranian cities in an attempt to break accustomed to their limited lethality, the Kirkuk and other mid-range ballistic mis- morale and force Iran into negotiations. temporary dip in morale self-corrected.49 siles at facilities near Banmil.52 Damage The high casualties of the previous Even when these strikes on population was minimal, and, as with strikes in the year’s offensives as well as the declin- centers were synchronized with large- Gulf, the missile attacks had no more ing living standards in Iran made the scale conventional offensives, they failed than a fleeting effect on global markets. Iraqi bombing campaigns a pressing to produce the intended synergistic Iranian ballistic missile strikes did threat.47 Lacking attack aircraft and operational result.50 Iran’s strategy of perhaps succeed in increasing Iranian possessing inadequate air defenses, Iran low-intensity employment of these terror morale. It is likely not lost on Iranian had few options to respond. Given its weapons spread over a long period made leaders today that missile launches, paired limited stockpile of ballistic missiles and their psychological impact less dramatic with Iranian state propaganda, enabled procurement challenges, Iran sought to than if they had been more concentrated the government to communicate to the use its missiles coercively to force the in time and space. population that it was capable of retaliat- Ba’athists to confront their own morale Furthermore, there is little evidence ing.53 If messaged correctly, strikes were issues, thereby restoring deterrence. to suggest that Iranian Scud strikes had a source of national pride, increasing
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 French 75 support for the conflict and shifting blame they saw as overwhelming odds stacked while continuing to enjoy the advantage for hardships from the state to the enemy. against them. For these leaders, the of being geographically positioned to In total, Iranian ballistic missile strikes real lesson of the Iran-Iraq War is that, threaten the world’s most important numbered only a few hundred, delivering given a fully realized resistance economy petroleum production centers and ship- relatively little total explosive tonnage and capable of withstanding international ping lanes, now possesses “the largest and doing only marginal damage to the Iraqi pressure and a well-developed regional most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle economy, security apparatus, or armed network of proxies, Iran could generate East,”54 with systems many times more forces. The strikes failed to do lasting strategic advantage through the skillful accurate than those deployed during the damage to Iraqi will or regime security synchronization of asymmetric means. war. Economically, Iran also has learned and were hardly more effective operation- Although this view may appear as a how to mitigate the damage of sanctions ally, doing little to degrade the combat misreading of the conflict, Iran’s lead- over the past 40 years and has adapted performance of Iraqi army units in their ers have both ideological and practical its economy to build resiliency.55 On defense of the approaches to Baghdad. reasons to persist in their belief in the the diplomatic front, while Iran remains Iranian leaders did, however, witness efficacy of an asymmetric offset strategy. largely isolated, Iraq is no longer a foe, the propaganda value of ballistic missile The concept that religious faith brings and unlike the 1980s, the superpowers strikes and explored their potential to about political change through revolu- are not aligned against Iran. As long as provide deterrence. tionary struggle is central to the identity Iran avoids conventional escalation with In short, Iranian leaders saw Kurdish of the Islamic Republic. While clearly the United States, it need not be con- and Shi’a irregulars, as well as ballistic pragmatic, Iran’s leaders are products of, cerned with battlefield defeat and regime missiles, as a means to offset Iraq’s con- and in some cases creators of, a system removal as it had to during the war. Thus, ventional advantages. Yet while Kurdish that identifies this concept as an article of situated in a more favorable geopolitical guerrillas and Badr terrorists fixed some faith. In 1979, they witnessed firsthand landscape, Iran now has greater coercive Iraqi resources in internal security roles, the power that religious ideals hold to capabilities and ability to resist foreign they did not come close to forcing Iraq to motivate small groups to overcome seem- pressure. Yet in an echo of the 1980s, undermine its defense of the approaches ingly impossible odds. Consequently, the question remains whether Iran’s to Baghdad. Likewise, Iranian Scuds despite the mixed record of its proxies, expansive aims exceed its total coercive failed to degrade Iraqi morale or infra- particularly during the Iran-Iraq War, capabilities. Success will hinge, as it did structure. While Iran’s employment of Iranian leaders naturally continue to view in the Iran-Iraq War, on Iran’s ability proxies and terror in Iraq may have dem- religiously motivated proxies as a poten- to synchronize its asymmetric means to onstrated the potential for using Scuds tially decisive tool. Finally, while Iran has generate sufficient coercive power to coercively within a conventional armed succeeded in developing its own domestic dramatically alter its adversaries’ strategic conflict, the intended strategic effect arms production industry and “resistance calculus. JFQ never materialized, largely due to Iran’s economy,” it remains isolated and finan- inability to synchronize these effects in cially hobbled. Yet much like during the any meaningful way. At no point did post-1982 years of the Iran-Iraq War, Notes these efforts mass effects synergistically Iran’s regional aims are misaligned with 1 to produce enough pressure on the Iraqi its actual limited conventional military ca- Today, virtually all general and flag of- ficers within the armed forces of the Islamic regime to force difficult decisions. pabilities. Thus, to a certain extent, Iran Republic of Iran and numerous senior civil- has no choice but to continue to turn ians within the Iranian defense and security Conclusion to asymmetric means such as threaten- community served in some capacity during In 1988, Iran conceded that its maxi- ing Gulf economic and maritime targets the Iran-Iraq War. For example, the current malist war aims were out of reach, and to offset conventional disadvantage. secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani (Ret.), Khomenei drank the “cup of poison.” Abandoning this strategy would force served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard While somewhat successful tactically, Iran to confront this mismatch and dra- Corps (IRGC) navy during the war. Current Iran’s asymmetric strategy neither matically scale back its regional aims of chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces gen- broke the deadlock on the battlefield regional leadership and of withdrawal of eral staff, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, nor bankrupted Iraq. Yet Iran’s leaders the United States from Iraq and the Gulf. served in various combat and intelligence positions within the IRGC during the conflict. today, the same individuals who While asymmetric means failed to The current IRGC commander, Major General executed the strategy in the 1980s and generate strategic advantage for Iran Hossein Salami, and the current IRGC Quds oversaw the successful use of proxies during the Iran-Iraq War, such an ap- Force commander, Brigadier General Esmail during the 2000s and 2010s, likely proach may be somewhat more suited to Ghani, were both ground forces commanders drew different conclusions from the the environment today. The IRGC has during the war. The now-deceased, long- serving former IRGC Quds Force commander, conflict. They may have either conflated spent the past four decades transform- Major General Qassem Soleimani, famously tactical success with real strategic impact ing the disaffected Shi’a minorities of was gravely wounded numerous times during or attributed the failure of Iran to what the region into coercive levers. Iran, the conflict.
76 Features / Assessing Iranian National Security Strategy, 1983–1987 JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 2 Nigel Ashton and Bryan Gibson, The 25 The Iranian Mine Warfare Threat (Lang- 40 Razoux, Iran-Iraq War, 361. Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives ley, VA: CIA, November 1984), 1, available at 41 Ibid., 414. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 2.
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 French 77 Men of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment (The Sherwood Foresters) marching along Amiens-St. Quentin Road, from Foucancourt, near Brie, Somme, March 1917, after German withdrawal to Hindenburg Line (Courtesy Imperial War Museum/Ernest Brooks)
Accelerating Adaptation on the Western Front and Today
By Justin Lynch
n wars, militaries rarely start out per- enemies. The ability to adapt more tion, but to capture such advantages, fectly suited for the challenges they quickly than an adversary gives a force the joint force must invest in its digital I will encounter. Their organization, a significant advantage.1 The growing workforce and infrastructure. tactics, and weapons are not optimally role software plays in military technol- matched to their environment or their ogy could augment the speed of adapta- Adaptation in Warfare Williamson Murray’s Military Adapta- tion in War opens by stating that “adap- tation in war represents one of the most Justin Lynch served as an Active-duty Army officer before transferring to the Army National Guard. As a civilian, he has served in multiple roles in the national security enterprise, including ones focused on persistent, yet rarely examined problems emerging technology policy. that military institutions confront” and
78 Recall / Accelerating Adaptation on the Western Front and Today JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 that “one of the foremost attributes Germans were establishing trenches with to increasingly use motorized transports of military effectiveness must lie in the interlocking fields of machine-gun fire on to move troops, supplies, and equipment. ability of armies, navies, or air forces the Aisne. By October, disorganized ma- The French used 600 Renault taxis to to recognize and adapt to the actual neuver had begun changing into a form move 3,000 soldiers to the First Battle of conditions of combat.”2 A short study of mutual siege warfare. By November, the Marne in the world’s first motorized of warfare on the Western Front during trench warfare prevented either side from military convoy in 1914.9 By 1916, the World War I showcases adaptation’s achieving a decisive victory using any pre- French had transported 180,000 metric importance. After the emergence of vious tactics, and thus forced a strategic tons and 300,000 men by vehicle.10 The trench warfare, both sides quickly began stalemate.6 improvement in logistics infrastructure, adjusting their technology, tactics, and Trench Warfare and the Race to however, largely stopped behind the organizations in an attempt to achieve Adapt. Historians and artists often depict front. Units assaulting across no-man’s- an operational breakthrough. The result trench warfare as a static struggle char- land still did not have the logistic tail was a race between combatants to adapt acterized by incompetent leaders who needed to sustain their attack and break faster than their adversaries. ordered hopeless attack after hopeless the stalemate.11 attack in pursuit of the white whale of Mechanization offered a potential World War I operational breakthrough.7 Although not solution. Mechanized forces grew out In summer 1914, young men across entirely untrue, that narrative captures of the belief that armies could use trac- Europe marched to war. They left for only a sliver of reality. The challenges tor technology to cross muddy terrain what most of them believed would be of trench warfare prevented both sides and survive enemy fires. Great Britain’s a short conflict, one decided by the from breaking through and defeating the War Office largely ignored tractor power of the offensive. After 4 months, enemy. Both sides looked to a combina- technology’s potential in 1914. But they had settled into trench warfare that tion of technological and operational that eventually changed, and the British bore little resemblance to the war they adaptation to solve this problem. Rather used tanks in combat for the first time had prepared for. Four long years later, than just a static war, the Western Front on September 15, 1916, at Flers.12 The the war on the Western Front bore was a competition to see which side could attack failed to create the hoped-for even less resemblance to the vision held adapt its organizations and tactics, create breakthrough, but it did teach the British before August 1914. new weapons for trench warfare, and important lessons about tank construc- Before combat began, military lead- react to adversary adaptations quickly tion and employment. (The French faced ers understood that war was changing. A enough to seize an advantage.8 a similar course.) By 1917, however, great deal of new military technology— The advent of commercial dual-use tanks were a major component of British such as scientific artillery, the machine technology played a particularly promi- offenses. Tanks, properly armed and gun, motor vehicles, and barbed wire— nent role. Much like today, technology armored, could escort infantry forma- had developed in the years before 1914. development in the early 20th century tions into trench systems and reduce Military leaders had already seen some of took place largely in the private sector. sustainment issues by carrying water and these tools in action, but few realized the Private-sector companies created aircraft, ammunition. nature or the magnitude of the impact motorized vehicles, and other dual-use The role of aircraft also changed. that increased firepower would have technology that became significant dur- Before the war, military theorists believed on warfare between peer adversaries.3 ing World War I. Military leaders were aircraft would serve primarily as recon- Moreover, because the combatants did aware that emerging civilian technology naissance and artillery spotters. But once not understand the effects new weapons with potential military applications in the war started, new roles emerged. Air would have, military tactics had barely communications, aircraft, and mecha- warfare quickly grew into a fight for changed since the 19th century.4 nized vehicles was mature enough to air superiority. Initially, air combat was War of Maneuver. After hostilities quickly prototype; when the war began, fought between individuals. By late 1917, began, the Germans and the French they began adapting technology to try to mass formations had reduced the role of sought to destroy each other’s armies overcome the new challenges found on individual aerial duels, and the ability of via maneuver at the operational level.5 the Western Front. each state’s industrial base to produce Neither side had prepared for the newly For the infantry, trenches and other aircraft was as important as the courage increased firepower, and so they had fortifications drove a shift from maneuver of individual pilots.13 Air warfare also disorganized maneuver and indecisive to mass. Continuous layered trench lines expanded to include close air support and results rather than the power of the of- eliminated exposed flanks and forced eventually into the bombing of cities such fense. As a result, the war quickly began units to rely more on frontal assaults as Liège, Paris, and London.14 to transition away from operational driven by mass. To build mass, both sides Militaries improved their growing air maneuver. At the end of August 1914, began expanding their logistics infrastruc- forces in two ways. They competed to casualties were high, but the war was ture. Stable fronts allowed participants to develop a combination of doctrine and still one of maneuver. By September, the build roads up to their trench systems and training that would allow them to achieve
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Lynch 79 of dual-use technology allowed both sides to quickly introduce new weapons. The generals who led these armies found themselves unprepared for the type of warfare they would fight; however, contrary to widespread belief, this lack of preparation was due more to their quickly changing circumstances than to incompetence. Instead of fighting the war they had prepared for, generals found themselves struggling to understand how combat had changed from operational maneuver to trench warfare—and then how to alter it yet again to achieve deci- sive victories.17 As a result, the armies that marched off to battle in the summer of 1914 would barely have recognized the type of warfare they would fight by the sum- mer of 1917. The Hindenburg Line’s fate illustrates the rate of change on the Western Front. When it was built in rd Gun crew from Regimental Headquarters Company, 23 Infantry, firing 37-millimeter gun during 1916, circumstances had changed, and it advance against German entrenched positions during Meuse-Argonne offensive, September 26– was one of the strongest, most advanced November 11, 1918 (U.S. Army/National Archives and Records Administration) defensive positions in Western Europe; by air superiority and deliver effects. Aircraft artillery and aircraft contributed heavily the time allied forces reached it in 1918, technology also changed quickly: The to allied breakthroughs. German lead- it was obsolete.18 final report of the Chief of the Air Service ers coined the term Panzerschreck (tank at the end of the war claimed that “the fright) to describe the mass fear that tank The Present improvement in pursuit airplanes was so formations inspired.16 Militaries will undoubtedly face new rapid that few types retained their superi- The new armies constituted a major and sometimes unexpected operational ority for more than six months.”15 innovation. They created new tactical and challenges—and to overcome them, The New Armies. By late 1917, the operational concepts, trained their sol- they will need to adapt their doctrine, contest to adapt to trench warfare had diers to fight in a new way, and integrated organizational structure, training, caused both the Germans and the Triple civilian technology—all of which resulted and technology. Although no one can Entente to develop new types of armies: in forces that were more tightly coordi- predict the future, practitioners should the German coordination-of-arms model nated than previous military forces and use history to drive their inquiry and and the Entente tank-army model. The that applied firepower more effectively. to understand how to question their former, a combined arms force, relied The biggest changes to warfare, however, assumptions.19 on an unprecedented coordination of came from the role of tanks and aircraft. What Is the Likely Role of Dual-Use aircraft, artillery, and shock troops to Mechanization gave maneuver forces Technology Today? There is every reason create and exploit breakthroughs. It new mobility, survivability, and firepower. to believe that adaptation will continue included improved small arms, aircraft, Airpower expanded war from the land to play a role in conflict. It is also likely and artillery but relied noticeably less on and sea to the air. Tanks and aircraft fun- that, much like during World War I, technological solutions than the tank- damentally changed the context within dual-use technology will be adapted for army model. The tank-army model relied which wars were fought and showed the combat. Since the end of the Cold War, predominantly on the tank to help infan- power of integrating emerging technol- the U.S. research and development base tries cross no-man’s-land. At the Battle of ogy and tactics. By comparison, the has shifted from the government to the Cambrai in November and December of coordination-of-arms model’s failure to private sector. Commercial firms develop 1917, the British sent 450 tanks followed accomplish its strategic objectives showed most new technologies, including those by 6 infantry divisions across a dry, flat the cost of an inadequate response to new with possible military application.20 The section of the Western Front—and was operational challenges. private sector, including businesses that able to advance 7 kilometers. Though The Scale of Change. The states and do not usually work with the military, the attack failed, by 1918, tanks backed armies that fought World War I under- leads the development of autonomous by massed infantry and supported by went massive changes. The introduction systems, machine learning, software,
80 Recall / Accelerating Adaptation on the Western Front and Today JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 heavy equipment manufacturing and to stop armored vehicles using computer factories could produce and deliver new repair, biotechnology, and other potential network attacks, but it has not publicly hardware in 1918. In 1918, a ship de- dual-use technologies at a faster rate explored that capability’s limitations or parting the East Coast for a combat zone than does the Department of Defense potential in combat.25 arrived in the same state, with the same (DOD).21 If DOD and its foreign One implication of software’s increas- capabilities, as when it departed. Today, a counterparts attempt to adapt dual-use ing significance is that tactical adaptation ship leaving the East Coast that receives technology themselves—or turn to the will begin to include—and, in some cir- software updates to its communication private sector and ask it to do so for cumstances, require—software changes. systems, targeting software, and the the sake of nationalism and profit—it If future conflicts see a software-driven programs controlling its automatic and is highly probable they will be able to race to adapt similar to the race on the autonomous systems can have different quickly weaponize existing technology Western Front, then adversaries will capabilities when it arrives in theater; this that is not already in military use. The change their platforms to perform bet- will only be truer tomorrow. result is a situation in which states that ter in the environment and against their can more quickly adopt dual-use technol- foes. Weapons guidance systems will need Recommendations ogy and integrate it into their tactics and to better track adversaries using new The joint force should establish rapid strategy will have the advantage. camouflage, control systems will need to development and acquisition capabilities How Will Changes in Technology respond faster, electronic warfare plat- that can help commands quickly react Affect Adaptation? Although the sum- forms will need to better infiltrate enemy to a changing threat environment, spot mer of 1914 and the present day have systems, and possible autonomous weap- opportunities, and create the hardware some things in common, there are key ons systems will need to better locate and and software that warfighters need to differences. The most significant is the attack their targets. defeat their adversaries. Although this increasingly important role software plays focuses on the production and use of in society and warfare. Digital systems Software’s Acceleration digital technology, the biggest changes have become integral to most economies, of Adaptation to the joint force will need to be in its infrastructure, and social systems. Many One of the biggest discontinuities investments in human capital and orga- militaries, particularly the U.S. military, between today’s software and the types nizational structure. have become more and more digitized— of technology adapted during World Public-Private Partnerships. The and therefore reliant on their software’s War I is that engineers can develop new most commonly discussed solution to performance. Eric Schmidt, former chief software more quickly than they can military innovation challenges is to estab- executive officer of Alphabet and chair new hardware. Software development lish stronger public-private partnerships. of both the Defense Innovation Board relies on programming instead of manu- DOD already has several programs in and the National Security Commission facturing processes, allowing updates to place to improve its relationship with pri- on Artificial Intelligence, refers to bypass some of the physical constraints vate-sector developers or to solve specific the current day as the age of software that slow down hardware development. problems.26 Although these programs supremacy.22 Software can change the Engineers can create new programs as address important issues, improving capabilities of hardware without changing quickly as they can type code and verify public-private partnerships alone will not its physical features. Examples include its functionality. solve the challenges described herein. network updates that reduce vulnerabili- Once completed, software changes The current DOD relationship with ties and improve intrusion and anomaly can also be implemented faster than the private sector has several challenges. detection, improvements to algorithms hardware updates. New programs and These include a labyrinthine contracting that control tracking systems, and updates can spread across the joint force process, cultural differences between the changes to data management systems that as quickly and as broadly as an email, then military and startup communities, and allow warfighters to communicate faster install in seconds or minutes. It takes far the DOD focus on long procurement and more efficiently. Other examples less time to download a software update cycles.27 It is also difficult to predict how will soon include improvements to au- on a desktop computer than it does to fly organizations that justifiably view them- tonomous systems that will perform a or ship heavy equipment from the United selves as global companies will respond significant role in actual combat.23 States to an overseas theater. to war.28 Software’s role in conflict has already Overall, software’s increasing im- Personnel. Instead of relying primarily been demonstrated, particularly dur- portance for military operations, pace on the private sector, DOD should grow ing attacks on digital systems. Some of development, and speed of delivery its own software development capa- network breaches—such as Stuxnet and will accelerate the rate of technology bilities. Stephen Peter Rosen argues that the various and frequent hacks by state adaptation in warfare. Imagine weapon “peacetime innovation has been possible actors of one another’s public and private adaptation taking place at the rate when senior military officers, reacting systems—have made headlines.24 In Silicon Valley can produce new software not to intelligence about the enemy but 2017, the U.S. military tested its ability updates—instead of the rate at which to a structural change in the security
JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Lynch 81 understand system requirements. Machine learning in particular requires access to large data sets. Training and retraining algorithms to address new chal- lenges will often require access to data sets from units encountering the chal- lenge. To meet this requirement, tactical units need the bandwidth, computing power, software tools, and training to share and process large data sets. To be clear, this architecture, authorization, and access to data are not intended to create new technology; they are necessary to allow DOD to use existing technology effectively. Organizational Structure. As it acknowledges the need to quickly create software for tactical environments, the joint force must determine where in its organizational structure it should place its developers and their tools. The degree to which software development and adapta- U.S. Soldiers of 30th Infantry Division with German prisoners following capture of Bellicourt, France, tion is centralized should be a function of after Battle of St. Quentin Canal, September 29, 1918 (Courtesy Imperial War Museum/David McLellan) both the consequences of errors and the environment, have acted to create a new developers. Rapidly identifying oppor- consequences of adapting slowly. Systems promotion pathway for junior officers tunities and creating software to exploit with little margin for error that do not practicing a new way of war.”29 To create them will be a form of maneuver just as need to change quickly, such as aircraft the ability to adapt software to rapidly critical as performing fleet movements, carrier preventive maintenance, should be changing circumstances, DOD must have flying aircraft, or plotting ground forces. tightly controlled at a centralized facility highly skilled military and civilian person- Because the Services would be extremely where maintenance and development nel who provide three things: reluctant to rely on outside sources to experts can methodically control quality. perform these roles, they should treat Other capabilities have a wider margin a centralized group of experts that • software development with the same for error and require more rapid, local- can create high-quality software and degree of concern. Parts of the mili- ized adaptation. Units in ground combat algorithms and control their quality tary—such as U.S. Special Operations have fewer systems that can produce personnel distributed to tactical units • Command, the Air Force’s Kessel Run, catastrophic failures, and these units who can recognize new challenges and the Army’s Software Factory—have often experience stark differences in their and opportunities and create early made a start, but the military needs more operating environment; they may have to versions of new software software developers in more units.31 operate with limited bandwidth to their the ability to quickly build and • Code and Data Access. Once in place, higher headquarters. In these circum- update networks for new capabilities. software developers require architecture stances, decentralized adaptation—and, These proficiencies are different from and authorizations that allow them to in some cases, even decentralized devel- those of U.S. Cyber Command, whose locally manage, build, review, test, and re- opment—may be more appropriate. focus is on “defending the DODIN lease code. The Defense Innovation Board Some traditional private-sector [DOD information networks], providing Software Acquisition and Practices study companies that have integrated artificial support to combatant commanders for recommends managing source code in a intelligence and other modern software execution of their missions around the single repository but encourages engineers development processes have benefited world, and strengthening our nation’s to fix problems “independent of program from implementing a hub-and-spoke ability to withstand and respond to cyber boundaries.”32 For engineers to manage, model. Generally, the hub, or central attack.”30 Though critical, that mission build, debug, and release new software, facility, is responsible for the training, focuses more on the defense, exploita- they need access to their systems’ codes, education, and management of experts, tion, and attack of networks than on the the authorization to change them, and the some research and development, and creation of new software. ability to disseminate changes. the development and promulgation To meet these needs, each branch Access to data will also be cru- of standards. Spokes, or decentralized of the military requires its own software cial. Data helps software developers teams that reside within other programs,
82 Recall / Accelerating Adaptation on the Western Front and Today JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 identify and exploit local opportunities, Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1. cyber-wars-how-the-us-stacks-up-against-its- 3 Hubert C. Johnson, Breakthrough! Tactics, digital-adversaries>. all while sending updates to the hub. Technology, and the Search for Victory on the 25 Rachael Kalinyak, “Soldiers Deter In the joint force, hubs could exist in Western Front in World War I (New York: Presi- Simulated Tank Assault with Cyber, Electronic unified commands or centers of excel- dio Press, 1994), 6–7. Warfare,” Army Times, June 8, 2017, available lence. Spokes would exist in tactical- and 4 Jorn Leonhard, Pandora’s Box: A His- at JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Lynch 83 necessarily selective in its examples and tactical approach and applying classic case studies, it should generate ample dis- counterinsurgency doctrine in Ramadi and cussion within the military Services and, Tal Afar a year before FM 3-24 appeared, importantly, their professional military and Special Forces Captain Mark Nutsch, education (PME) institutions. for his team’s support of Uzbek warlord The work unfolds in three parts. The Abdul Dostum during the early days first section provides a brief summary of of Operation Enduring Freedom. They the literature on prewar innovation and also offer withering criticism of Generals in-war adaptation, drawing heavily on George W. Casey, Jr. (commander, Multi- the work of Allan Millett and Williamson National Force–Iraq, June 2004–February Murray, Stephen Rosen, Barry Posen, 2007) and David D. McKiernan (com- and Adam Grissom. Additionally, Barno mander, International Security Assistance and Bensahel offer short illustrative Force, and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, June examples of success or failure in the 2008–May 2009) for failing to understand adaptation of doctrine, technology, and the conditions of conflicts they were fight- leadership to prepare the reader for the ing and adapting their theater strategies to later analysis of the conflicts in Iraq and maximize U.S. and coalition opportunities Afghanistan. for success. The second section, the heart of the The third section considers the book, provides the reader with a wither- challenges of future war, particularly ing critique of the Army’s performance, the influence of the space and cyber particularly at the institutional (big Army) domains; assesses the U.S. military’s level, in adapting its doctrine, accepting adaptability today; and recommends Adaptation Under Fire: How new/modified technology, and altering how the Department of Defense (DOD) Militaries Change in Wartime its strategic plans. Perhaps as expected, and the Services could improve their By David Barno and Nora Bensahel the individual Soldier and tactical leader individual and institutional adaptability. New York: Oxford University Press, (exemplified by Captain John Abizaid Their critiques and recommendations will 2020 adjusting his company’s tactical plan in find favor and raise questions. Regarding 430 pp. $34.95 Grenada in 1984) come off well, while doctrine, they recommend that the joint ISBN: 978-0190672058 the institutional Army performs poorly force add “adaptability” as a principle across all areas, with the possible excep- of war, integrate adaptation and free Reviewed by Bryon Greenwald tion of General David Petraeus’s going play into major exercises, train and test around the Army bureaucracy to produce units under degraded conditions, and the 2006 Field Manual (FM) 3-24, emphasize resilience across the force. n the 1970s, the late Sir Michael Counterinsurgency, in record time. Concerning technological adaptability, Howard cautioned military leaders In four excellent chapters, Barno and they recommend that DOD restore that they would inevitably fail in I Bensahel hail the doctrinal and techni- rapid adaptive organizations such as the predicting the conduct of the next war. cal adaptability evident in the drafting Strategic Capabilities Office and the What really mattered, he opined, was of FM 3-24, the creation of Provincial Asymmetric Working Group, require all not getting it right, but not being “too Reconstruction Teams, the modifica- military technology operate in degraded badly wrong” and having the individual tion of Apache helicopter tactics to (non-networked, no space link) environ- and institutional wherewithal to adapt provide close air support in Afghanistan, mental conditions, and sponsor an annual to the new or revealed conditions of and the MacGyver-like ability of those rapid-adaptation competition. To improve conflict in time to avoid defeat and ulti- pilots in keeping their aircraft flying. leadership adaptability, they advocate mately prevail. Appropriately, they eviscerate the insti- that the Services add it as a rated area In Adaptation under Fire, Lieutenant tutional Army (and Marines) for failing on efficiency reports, expand the techni- General David Barno, USA (Ret.), and to accept the MRAP (mine-resistant cal literacy of future commanders, and Dr. Nora Bensahel, frequent contributors ambush protected vehicle) and Palantir send more officers to an Advanced Civil to War on the Rocks, analyze this “adapt- Technologies’ intelligence system (over Schooling program. And while their com- ability gap” in the American Army with Distributed Common Ground Station– mentary on PME is episodic and perhaps specific examination of doctrine, tech- Army) earlier during the conflicts. dated, they are nonetheless correct in nology, and leadership at the individual Regarding tactical leadership, they arguing that PME reform would advance and institutional levels during the wars extol the adaptive thinking of then adaptable thinking within the military. in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book is a colonels Sean McFarland and H.R. It is with this last recommendation welcomed addition to the field. Although McMaster in Iraq for changing their that this reviewer, a retired senior officer 84 Book Reviews JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 and PME administrator and instructor, innovation, adaptation, and change in the (2009–2013). His book, Losing the quibbles slightly. Adaptation Under military. Its analysis of the wars in Iraq and Long Game, is elegant, thoroughly Fire tends to tar all PME with wide and Afghanistan are its most compelling and researched, and comprehensible; it indiscriminate brushstrokes. As they note, illuminating chapters, but its recommen- belongs on the syllabus of every war PME should be more academically rigor- dations should and will generate much college and policymaker’s desk for ous, and even fail students, but in their worthy conversation and debate. JFQ two reasons. First, the author shines critique the authors fail to acknowledge a spotlight on the opaque (sometimes that some institutions, such as the Joint secretive) history of U.S.-sponsored Advanced Warfighting School, conduct Professor Bryon Greenwald, Ph.D., is the former regime change in the Middle East and, Dean of the Joint Forces Staff College and a over 40 individual and collective as- Professor at the Joint Advanced Warfighting in so doing reveals many rich insights. sessments of students and routinely fail School, where he teaches military theory, history, Second, Gordon dispels the misguided colonels out of the war college for aca- and innovation. notion that American exceptional- demic (nonethical) reasons. ism endows the United States with Barno and Bensahel argue for more unmatched foresight and wisdom to civilian schooling to avoid the groupthink effectively reengineer Middle East gov- prevalent among uniformed faculty and ernments in a way that advances U.S. students; but beyond stereotyping, they national security interests, promotes neglect to cite the increasing number regional stability, and strengthens the of civilian faculty employed at those international order. institutions for the express purpose of Gordon examines seven cases of elevating academic rigor and infusing regime change over the past 70 years: curricula with external ideas and at- Iran (1953), Afghanistan (1979–1992), titudes. Like others, they also wistfully Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Egypt compare DOD’s PME institutions to (2011), Libya (2011), and Syria (2011). the Nation’s best graduate schools, like They all failed to deliver the policy out- the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced comes desired by Washington, made the International Studies (SAIS), where they Middle East more volatile, and more teach. For a host of reasons including recently, were a strategic distraction from mission, faculty, student body, political other emerging threats such as China and capital, and budget, this is an illogical Russia. comparison. SAIS has one of the best The author explains that these failures and most selective international relations did not result from impure U.S. motives 2-year master’s degree programs in the (for example, take the oil and run) or country; its purpose is to prepare much even an unwillingness to double down younger students (average age 26, with by increasing troop levels and funding, 2-years of work experience) for lower which failed to save the day in either level work in business and government. Losing the Long Game: Iraq or Syria. Rather, once policymakers The mission of DOD’s officer education The False Promise of Regime decide on regime change as their pre- enterprises, specifically its war colleges, is Change in the Middle East ferred option, “they overstate the threat, to educate and prepare almost 600 senior underestimate the costs and risks, over- By Philip H. Gordon officers annually for positions of higher promise what they can accomplish, and St. Martin’s Press, 2020 responsibility. Unlike very selective grad- prematurely claim success if and when the 368 pp. $26.49 uate programs, not every captain (O6) or targeted regime falls.” Yet Gordon does ISBN: 978-1250217035 colonel entering PME is an Einstein or not ignore the possibility that the costs of Eisenhower. They are competent, tacti- Reviewed by Thomas C. Greenwood inaction (that is, of not intervening and cally proficient leaders, but not all possess undertaking regime change) could have the inherent capacity to become strategic been higher and more harmful over the saviors. The task of PME is to improve ew authors are more qualified to long run. the critical thinking and communication write on U.S.-sponsored regime Two of Gordon’s most riveting skills of those individuals such that they F change in the Middle East than ideas, however, are that regime change contribute to the Nation’s defense at the Philip Gordon, who worked as Special frequently fails because of the security next, if not perhaps the ultimate, level of Assistant to President Barack Obama vacuums it creates (filled by actors military responsibility. for the Middle East (2013–2015) who are often more repressive than the Adapting Under Fire is a solid and and as Assistant Secretary of State toppled regimes), and the unanticipated useful addition to the literature on for European and Eurasian Affairs consequences that escape rigorous JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Book Reviews 85 analysis by policymakers before they act: The book’s overall thesis would have raising tension between armed opposi- been strengthened had Gordon discussed tion groups, disrupting the distribution the limitations of regime change—a of scarce resources, fostering long-term means to a higher end—within the dependency on outside powers, and context of U.S. grand strategy. Here, perpetuating the harmful optic that the introducing G. John Ikenberry’s idea of United States is the self-appointed global a “liberal hegemonic order” would have cop. helped readers better understand why Gordon uses the example of Libya to U.S. leaders of all stripes feel the mes- illustrate just how dangerous security vac- sianic urge to spread democratic values uums can be. When Muammar Qadhafi’s around the globe—even if they can only successor, Abd al-Hakim Belhaj—former be imposed by force and by violating head of the al Qaeda–affiliated Libyan other countries’ sovereignty and right to Islamic Fighting Group—declared self-determination. himself the leader of all liberation forces, After taking the reader on a jour- other Western-oriented opposition lead- ney of tears, the author recommends a ers became infuriated and competing policy alternative to regime change. It militias began killing each other. By June is a hybrid approach of practical mea- 2014, Libya had two competing govern- sures including a mix of containment, ments backed by competing militias, and deterrence, diplomatic engagement and the country had descended into a multi- support for partners, selective military sided civil war with no end in sight. action, arms control, and economic Gordon is also equally damning about investment and “the restoration of the Strategic Humanism: the ripple effect the moral hazard created United States as a respected, prosperous, Lessons on Leadership in Libya had on Syria’s rebel groups. The and democratic alternative [that] will from the Ancient Greeks latter believed that by escalating violence, produce better results than the pursuit of By Claudia Hauer the world’s most powerful militaries costly, quixotic and unrealistic campaigns Toronto: Political Animal Press, 2020 would intervene on their behalf. Sadly, to overthrow regimes.” 180 pp. $24.99 instead of leading to Bashar al-Asad’s Perhaps. But even if policymakers ISBN: 978-1895131444 ouster, it caused, “the greatest humani- adopt the author’s more robust menu of tarian catastrophe since World War II, a soft and smart power policy options, the Reviewed by Christopher Kuennen refugee crisis, the destabilizing of Syria’s temptation to undertake regime change neighbors, the growth of the [so-called] will remain irresistible as long as America Islamic State, and political spillover into fails to internalize the hard lessons of the t some point between the leg- Europe and beyond.” Middle East and remains wedded to a endary Greek siege of Troy and Gordon believes the following factors misguided sense of exceptionalism. JFQ A the infamous defeat of Athens contribute to regime change failures: at Syracuse, the philosopher Heraclitus inadequate planning for what comes after rather astutely discerned that Êthos regime collapse; U.S. forces being viewed Colonel Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.), is anthrôpôi daimôn (Character is fate). a Research Staff Member in the Joint Advanced as occupiers instead of liberators; not rec- Warfighting Division at the Institute for Defense His assertion might be thought of ognizing that local actors will pursue their Analyses. as a pithy distillation of the practical interests first; regional neighbors seeking wisdom of ancient Greece. In Strate- to destabilize new regime leadership; gic Humanism, Claudia Hauer urges moral hazard created elsewhere; a general leaders to engage with this tradition; lack of U.S. knowledge about the Middle military officers and defense policymak- East; the difficulty of staying committed ers stand to gain not only theoretical after intervening; unrealistic expectations insights from an attentive reading of about transplanting democratic values the Greek classics, but also a way of abroad; and a mistaken belief that throw- perceiving the world and its conflicts ing more money and troops at a problem as beyond total human mastery and will make it better. Unfortunately, these yet shaped by the virtues and vices of factors can become intertwined and un- human character. leash their own dynamics that neither the Hauer’s presentation of the value of White House nor Pentagon can control. humanistic study is especially compelling in light of the evolving implications of 86 Book Reviews JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 artificial intelligence (AI) for the profes- draws on the account of King Croesus a common language to share stories of sion of arms. In February 2020, the in Herodotus’s Histories, for instance, virtue and notions of the common good, Department of Defense (DOD) officially to illustrate the danger of interpreting and withers as utilitarian nihilism drives adopted five ethical principles to guide situational ambiguity according to a them to act out of self-interested fear. its ongoing development and use of AI: framework constructed of one’s own pre- Hauer successfully demonstrates how namely, that it be responsible, equitable, conceived hopes and biases. Herodotus engaging with the Greek classics can help traceable, reliable, and governable. recounts how around 550 BCE a mount- broaden one’s moral imagination, even Though these principles are meant to ing Persian threat prompted the Ionian as the technology one depends on might embody “existing and widely accepted Greeks to prepare for conflict. For his otherwise limit it. ethical and legal commitments,” DOD part, King Croesus of Lydia offered Strategic Humanism draws on has nevertheless recognized its need to sacrifices to the Delphic Oracle for divine Hauer’s time as a visiting humanities better understand how to actually apply counsel. The oracle answered Croesus’s professor at the Air Force Academy, and the principles. It is this perennial and supplications by predicting that if he at- though her work lacks explicit connec- important challenge of putting principles tacked the Persians, a great empire would tions to many of today’s most prominent into practice that Hauer addresses in be destroyed. Croesus proceeded to defense issues (for example, warfighting Strategic Humanism. begin a campaign against Persia—but in in the space and cyberspace domains), The primary obstacle to imposing the end, it was his own empire that was her perspective manifests a perspicacious ethical norms on the technical develop- ruined. According to Hauer, Croesus’s and broadly applicable awareness of ment and operational application of AI is failure exposes the limits of his interpre- the poverty of a technocratic approach the infinitely complex context in which tive imagination; he failed to consider to forming military minds. Especially practical choices occur. The finite aims how the particularities of his situation as AI rapidly alters the pace and nature and mechanisms of a given technology bore on the information at his disposal. of our decisionmaking, we should take pose inherent obstacles to unfettered Since technology too has the effect seriously the ability of the Greek classics appreciation for the range of morally of not only solving problems but also to “liberate human judgment to reflect relevant factors surrounding its use in framing them in a specific way, our tools strategically on what we are doing.” any particular situation. In the crowning can sometimes impede our interpretive Readers convinced by Hauer’s ac- chapter of Hauer’s book, she emphasizes imagination, our ability to perceive all the count of the relationship between this fundamental lesson of Aristotelean factors relevant in making ethical deci- human character and technology can ethics: “As something essentially interac- sions: “If all you have is a hammer, then find additional insight in the work of AI tive, moral action cannot be worked out everything looks like a nail.” Indeed, ethicist Shannon Vallor, including in her in advance, prior to our immersion in reducing unintended bias (for example, Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical whatever situation calls for our response.” for race or gender) is already one of the Guide to a Future Worth Wanting This condition of moral decisionmaking foremost topics in the discipline of AI (Oxford University Press, 2016). But should influence not only the objectives ethics, and DOD directly addresses such even if you do not read Hauer or Vallor, of algorithmic design but also the manner bias in its own “equitable” principle. heed their advice: read the Greeks. JFQ in which tech developers and opera- Strategic Humanism offers a strategy for tors are trained in ethics. If there are no expanding the moral imagination of its “categorical imperatives”—no universally readers—including military AI developers Captain Christopher Kuennen, USAF, is an Intelligence Officer at the National Air and Space applicable rules for judgment—then and users—by putting key themes of the Intelligence Center. moral action demands a character capable profession of arms in dialogue with the of discerning what is best in any given Greek humanists. situation. AI cannot be “ethical” if the Hauer accomplishes her intended human beings designing it and employ- goal—“to familiarize the reader with ing it lack a virtuous ethos, an excellent a Hellenic way of seeing the world, in character. which character displays itself in ac- Strategic Humanism presents Homer, tion”—by exploring how the Greeks Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aristotle wrestled with such diverse and timely as partners in an ever-fruitful dialogue topics as vengeance, intercultural compe- aimed at educating such a character. tency, and violent deterrence. Running Hauer argues that these thinkers provide through the collection of six essays that an important check on the somewhat constitute Strategic Humanism is an ironic, though widely influential, insightful metanarrative that connects the Cartesian prejudice against the role that fate of the ancient Greeks to their charac- human subjectivity plays in even the ter, socially and individually. The power most rigorously scientific analysis. She of Greek city-states grows as they use JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Book Reviews 87 Waterborne Romanian troops prepare to move across Danube River as part of U.S.-led exercise Saber Guardian 2017, in Romania, July 17, 2017 (Courtesy NATOChannel, Jack Somerville) oint doctrine captures and social- izes fundamental principles U.S. Joint Doctrine J that guide the Armed Forces in campaign activities and military opera- tions. Moreover, its content forms the Development and foundation for assisting partnerships such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in its imple- Influence on NATO mentation of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security By George E. Katsos activities. Joint doctrine’s importance is so influential that NATO modeled its own allied joint doctrine development system after it. While the library of Those possessed of a definite body of doctrine and of U.S. joint publications (JPs) continues to be a steadfast repository of informa- deeply rooted convictions will be in a much better position tion, joint doctrine’s Achilles’s heel is to deal with the shifts and surprises of daily affairs. its inability to reflect changes quickly —Sir Winston Churchill Colonel George E. Katsos, USAR (Ret.), is a Program Manager on the Joint Staff. 88 Joint Doctrine / U.S. Joint Doctrine Development and Influence on NATO JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 enough to optimally serve today’s gen- quo.6 From global integration to the the interpretation and separation of eration of warfighters that is actively competition continuum to creating a new broad policy direction versus strict joint implementing policy. As such, it cannot military Service or adding members to doctrine guidance, the expectations of drive rapid systemic changes in the the JCS, it is important that joint doc- individual subject matter experts versus NATO system. This article examines trine navigates leaders and readers away enterprise gatekeepers (doctrineers and how the U.S. system is becoming more from outdated approaches that may not terminologists), and military Service ca- responsive to change and could influ- allow military workforces to adapt quickly pability relevance in the face of joint force ence NATO more quickly. enough. New challenges and anticipation integration.11 Military advice can often be conflict- of them—whether impacting cooperation In order to be adaptable and better ing unless coming from the same school or stemming from adversarial competi- support allies, the U.S. joint doctrine of thought.1 In 1985, a Senate Armed tion or conflict—are occurring faster and community must refine its policies and Services Committee staff report identified with less warning from more directions streamline its procedures to address poorly developed joint doctrine as one of simultaneously and with far greater preci- these and other challenges and overcome the symptoms of inadequate unified mili- sion, lethality, and disruption than ever status quo tendencies. To reinforce both tary advice.2 Joint doctrine’s purpose is to before.7 While joint doctrine has served Alliance purpose and unity, the United provide a common framework that U.S. the United States and supported NATO States agrees to abide by certain NATO military leaders refer to when providing efforts well in the past, its system must policies and procedures and participates advice to civilian counterparts and lead- constantly be reassessed as to whether it in the allied joint doctrine develop- ers. As a result of that report, at least in is agile or responsive enough to meet the ment process. The following groupings part, the following year Congress issued challenges presented by external factors provide an overview of U.S. and NATO legislation that vested overall responsibil- that now drive change.8 systems and processes as well as potential ity for U.S. joint doctrine development In the past 30 years, the process of the efficiencies. in a single individual—the Chairman of U.S. joint doctrine development system the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).3 Shortly is often described as a consensus-driven Twentieth-Century after, the Chairman placed joint doctrine function that links together a capstone, Growth (1905–1991) and terminology standardization respon- keystone, and subordinate JP pyramid U.S. doctrine can be traced back to sibilities in the Joint Staff J7. Over the hierarchy based on traditional Joint Staff the Civil War, but formal U.S. doctrine next few decades, the joint doctrine de- directorate lines of responsibility (J1, comes into focus in 1905 with the velopment system brought together some J2, J3, and so forth) through vertical publication of Field Service Regula- of the brightest minds in the Department and horizontal alignment. This system tions (FSRs).12 (European history also of Defense (DOD) to build a common continues to survive waves of expansion, contains many individual doctrine writ- foundation for the modern era of joint contraction, and reorganization.9 The ings, most from military scholars from doctrine. NATO system was originally structured the 18th century onward.) U.S. origins Joint doctrine is official advice and on the U.S. model. It bins allied joint stem from the early 1920s Army and should be followed unless a commander publications (AJPs) content in three Navy joint action in pursuit of coordi- determines otherwise. However, joint categories: Level 1, capstone/keystone; nation during operations.13 In 1939, doctrine offers much more than guiding Level 2, functional area publications that FSRs were superseded by U.S. Army mission success; it informs DOD and make up the AJP library; and Level 3, field manuals. During World War II, allied personnel on joint warfighting lower level publications. Both U.S. and the Army developed its first military capability improvements, senior civilian NATO publications are developed within dictionary to improve interoperability leadership on approaches to military a consensus-based system. among military Services and allies. In workforce employment, and non-DOD The issue with a consensus-based 1948, that document transformed into and non–U.S. Government personnel on system is that it usually drives to the low- the first U.S. joint dictionary.14 After how the U.S. military perceives and inter- est common denominator of agreement World War II, Service-driven doctrine acts with their organizations.4 and is often seen as one interest group became the backbone for 29 JCS pub- A recently published document by the rolling another or the development of lications guided by joint action policy.15 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) states that the content watered down, losing original in- While the nomenclature system was at U.S. military workforce requires leaders tent.10 For the topics of library expansion best random, the JCS publication foot- at all levels who can achieve intellectual and contraction, the iterative challenge print and subsequent 1959 guidance overmatch against adversaries.5 In the face is whether one process automatically on united Armed Forces action policy of new geopolitical realities, expanding course-corrects the other or whether informed the modern 1991 JP library warfighting domains, emerging technical correction has to happen with brute structure. Through this period, the capabilities, and accumulating resource force. For library reorganization, the Services were still given wide latitude in constraints, reflections on these issues are balance is fought between necessity and JP development responsibilities. While already challenging the doctrinal status political will. Other challenges include NATO early on had communications, JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Katsos 89 Croatian soldiers discuss logistics during Immediate Response 19, co-led by Croatian armed forces, Slovenian armed forces, and U.S. Army Europe, in Croatia, May 27, 2019 (Courtesy NATO) technical, and other publications, in means of either identifying or address- and consistent content).19 Compared 1958 it also developed its first official ing doctrinal voids. to previous practices, the Chairman was glossary of NATO terms and defini- Joint doctrine was also published now solely responsible for joint doctrine tions subsequently published in the without formal evaluation. Initially with development and, through the J7- 1959 U.S. dictionary of military terms, approximately 58 JPs in 1988, develop- managed development system, refined its further strengthening the foundation of ment continued; however, command process and established new definitions, cooperation between entities.16 staffers years later found it difficult to procedures, processes, and structures maneuver through joint doctrine’s 120- along with refining key positions (that Post–Cold War (1991–2000) plus approved and emerging JP titles. is, lead agent, primary review authority, Before the 1986 National Defense In essence, readers did not know where JCS doctrine sponsor, coordinating and Authorization Act, there was no individ- to start or what they needed to know.17 technical review authorities).20 Moreover, ual responsible for U.S. joint doctrine NATO’s development policies and archi- not only did J7 lead the effort to organize development. There was no standard tecture formulated in the mid-1990s had the joint doctrine library structure, but it process for initiating, coordinating, approximately 35 AJPs and were built also spearheaded ongoing JP consolida- approving, or revising joint doctrine. and based on the U.S. model.18 tion and creation. This change brought Moreover, there was no require- At one joint doctrine semiannual structural logic to the joint doctrine ment for congruity between joint and conference, General John Shalikashvili library under traditional JCS directorate Service doctrine, nor was the difference personally addressed the U.S joint doc- lines of responsibility, while new JPs filled between joint and Service doctrine trine community and certain NATO joint doctrine gaps in support of joint clear. Significantly, there was no mecha- attendees about the joint doctrine operations. nism that incorporated the expertise development system and process being Additionally, combatant command and knowledge that commanders were stovepiped, time development horizons involvement was now mandatory, and expected to use. In addition, the joint too elongated, and library subject mat- the 5-year JP revision cycle required doctrine development system had no ter unorganized (and of lesser quality content consistency within and without 90 Joint Doctrine / U.S. Joint Doctrine Development and Influence on NATO JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 revised JPs. As such, the J7 began to out-of-date National Military Strategy horizons were so long and slow that there exercise a more assertive role to include (published in 1997 and replaced in was a demand to send out draft joint JCS directorate involvement and to keep 2004).23 While strategic guidance took doctrine to push updated information them active in the process while the its time to arrive, so did its impact on to the warfighter quicker. The NATO Services adhered to the primacy of joint joint doctrine. process was similar in time and steps. doctrine.21 Overall, actions taken between The U.S. joint doctrine library To address revision practices and library 1991 and 2000 got the U.S. joint doc- retained its hierarchy with a capstone expansion, the U.S. joint doctrine enter- trine house in order. JP underpinned by six keystone JPs sup- prise not only refined procedures but also For allied joint doctrine development, ported by a subsequent layer of subject embarked on its second consolidation the J7 Joint Education and Doctrine matter JPs. Changes to joint doctrine’s effort to reset the JP library structure by Division was responsible for ratifying keystone layer of JPs were slow to appear, decreasing it by over 33 percent. This Levels 1 and 2 AJPs for the United based on traditional versus irregular con- reset was similar to the first organiza- States. The J7 also ensured U.S. joint tent after 9/11, as the joint force awaited tion—forced by circumstance, but with doctrine was used as the initial basis for senior-level policy guidance. A reissuance J7 now advocating for top-down driven U.S. inputs during NATO Levels 1 and of JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, took approaches both to protect resources and 2 AJP staffings and worked with multina- almost 5 years; JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for its process to be more responsive to tional partners and U.S. representatives almost 7 years; JP 3-0, 5 years; JP 4-0, change and to the warfighter.24 To fur- to minimize impacts of variances between Joint Logistics, 6 years; JP 5-0, Joint ther expedite joint doctrine development, the United States and NATO. Other Planning, 5 years after 9/11 and over 2 a test publication process was refined that DOD entities were responsible for Level years after the planned invasion of Iraq; became a vehicle for field-testing vali- 3 allied publication ratification. The J7 and JP 6-0, Communication Systems, over dated joint concepts. also acted as the U.S. Head of Delegation 4 years. Most concerning, however, was Both U.S. and NATO processes pro- for allied joint doctrine and terminology that joint doctrine’s capstone document, vided more opportunities for individual standardization purposes at the NATO JP 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the publication consolidation and quick revi- Military Committee Terminology Board United States, took years to be reissued, sion. While these processes were born 10 and Allied Joint Doctrine (AJOD) waiting for National Defense Strategy years apart and the models operated simi- working group. NATO foreign liaison and National Military Strategy direction larly, there was a year-and-a-half lag time and exchange officers on the Joint Staff and publication. Regardless of national for NATO to capture related changes also attended and briefed at the semian- limitations in strategy formulation, the made in the U.S. system. Moreover, a nual joint doctrine planners conference, aforementioned senior-level JPs were joint doctrine survey to the joint force re- thereby staying informed of U.S. military what U.S. military planners and operators vealed the size of, and impact to, full-time workforce challenges and improvements went to war with both in Afghanistan staffs and government billets dedicated to and using lessons learned to improve (2001) and Iraq (2003). joint doctrine development. This survey their own allied joint doctrine develop- NATO’s joint doctrine develop- opened the aperture for future discus- ment system. ment system began similar to the U.S. sions on what and how much product the one but has significant differences that joint doctrine development community 9/11 (2001–2010) influenced its evolution. One difference should or could focus on. Additionally, On September 10, 2001, the Joint Staff is that NATO manages voting participa- the irregular warfare construct finally J7 published JP 3-0, Joint Operations, tion from individual nations with their began to make its way down from policy and the Joint Doctrine Capstone and political influences compared to the U.S. into filling voids in joint doctrine.25 Keystone Primer.22 Linked to existing system managing DOD voting organiza- While J7 socialized more top-down strategic guidance and the primacy of tions (combatant commands, military changes, community consensus limited traditional approaches to warfare (vio- Services). Another is that NATO allows progress. Efforts did bear fruit, however, lence used to dominate opponents), its military committees to formulate with the standardization of military ter- the very next day these two documents and catalogue both doctrine and policy minology. As an ever-expanding doctrinal became obsolete in the preparation for terminology, while the United States dictionary was impacted by policy term conflict with state and nonstate actors eventually halted that practice and infiltration from DOD directives and and their irregular approaches to offset- generated criteria for joint doctrine termi- NATO proposals, this lack of clarity in ting dominant opponent advantages. nology primarily from JPs. and protection of the DOD dictionary The response to the terrorist attacks For the U.S. process, joint doctrine added much confusion as to who was in of September 11, and the subsequent development managed the JP life cycle control of the language that U.S. mili- second conflict with Iraq, generated a adequately, but with multiple draft tary forces used to communicate with strategic shift in policymaking that over- benchmarks, many JP dates did climb each other.26 As a result, the dictionary came a nonexistent National Defense well beyond the 5-year threshold. Joint changed focus to reflect well-vetted JP Strategy (published in 2005) and an doctrine revision and production time glossary doctrinal terms with acceptance JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Katsos 91 of senior-level policy terms that filled development.”31 Furthermore, J7 evolving one that reflects senior-level temporary gaps in joint doctrine develop- addressed previous reports on the lack guidance and a static one that is con- ment. While the strategic surprise in this of interoperability with interagency cerned with theory and foundations. JP era of the 9/11 attacks showed how slow stakeholders by cooperating with them 3-0 continued its vertical alignment with the joint doctrine development process to build the first Joint Guide for Inter- JP 1, but now other keystones align hori- and system were to change, the example agency Doctrine. Released in 2019, the zontally with JP 3-0 to best support it. of exercising a top-down approach guide expanded on current knowledge The primacy of individual keystones now with terminology cascaded into subse- and assisted in the strategic art of navi- reinforces subsequent vertical alignment. quent reform efforts in joint doctrine gating government bureaucracy to make Library organization now has reinforced formulation.27 workforces collaborate more efficiently logic and can support top-down directed For organizational purposes, U.S. in pursuing national policy objectives. policy insertion placement. Procedures Africa Command (USAFRICOM) stood Additionally, J7 formulated an annual now support updating doctrinal expertise up in 2007 and became a part of the joint call process that many of these civilian- from multiple sources into a specific JP doctrine development community. As led organizations now have as a direct with a one-time horizon. Under Adaptive more U.S. military support activities oc- link to the highest levels of the U.S. Doctrine and new business rules, the curred on the continent, USAFRICOM’s military for the first time through the United States cut 8 to 10 months off area of responsibility brought new per- joint doctrine development process.32 In staffing timelines, removed lower level spectives on doctrinal gaps relating to this process, interoperability improved staffing that subsequently emphasized civilian populations on the move from between workforces through input on 06/planner-level involvement, and sup- natural and manmade threats.28 NATO joint doctrine assessments and draft JPs ported one product per routine revision also created bilateral strategic com- that reflect organizational perspectives in 12.5 months with the development mands. In support, the U.S. European and interaction that put civilian orga- stage as well as more streamlined U.S. Command commander served as the nization perspectives in front of senior staffing efforts on NATO Levels 1 and 2 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, military leaders and warfighters. publications without losing quality. and the U.S. Joint Forces Command In pursuit of resource efficiencies, While some challenges persist, prog- commander served as the Supreme Allied some progress in reorganizing JP content ress was made on issues that existed in Commander, Transformation (SACT), to the warfighter was stunted by support the previous decades. J7 initiated joint with command over force development for, and translation of, outdated restric- doctrine notes to encourage still emerg- activities including doctrine development tions and policies. In turn, J7 adopted ing ideas. Standardized terminology and NATO’s centers of excellence.29 a more assertive top-down approach and the DOD dictionary received more Additionally, former Warsaw Pact nations to joint doctrine development under a protection from policy term infiltra- began to join NATO, increasing the senior-level initiative termed Adaptive tion by housing it as an appendix in the numbers of allied joint doctrine voting Doctrine. Under Adaptive Doctrine, J7 CJCS-signed JP 1. Consolidation and members, and France rejoined NATO’s instituted a more agile process to opti- top-down action reversed hierarchy integrated military command structure. mize the JP library in becoming more structural erosion that made keystones adaptable and flexible in organization weaker than subsequent hierarchical JPs. The Next Decade of as well as meeting joint force demands Campaign schedule and plan efficiencies War (2011–2020) to best support joint operations and not countered sequestration and resource The publication of the titles Decade of be overrun by individual communities constraints. Strategic guidance and War and Lessons Encountered exposed of interest. The J7 reduced its library 15 countering adversarial practices content that military forces and leaders had to percent over the last 2 years. were captured faster through change change their approaches to working Annually, JPs are now selected for processes, top-down driven actions, and with civilian-led organizations.30 While revision by the joint doctrine develop- mid-year schedule and plan corrections. the incline was real, some writers ment community based on necessity and Furthermore, library reset put in motion credited the joint doctrine enterprise importance. This approach removed the the system’s third consolidation effort via with being one of two remaining U.S. traditional 5-year JP time horizon revi- top-down guidance, but this time with Government Beltway entities that sion cycle. With an annual master priority an automatic 5-year reset disclaimer that consistently reached out to cooper- list and new single draft system, changes protects the joint doctrine development ate with civilian-led organizations on streamlined the revision process, putting community from future burdensome whole-of-government efforts. Richard JPs that fell under annual cut lines and practices, driving the community toward Hooker and Joseph Collins wrote, those with similar content to other JPs evolution and away from permanent stasis “Unfortunately, emphasis on working as well as others with older dates under and automatic expansion.33 whole-of-government issues is fading more scrutiny. Since 2011, NATO’s AJP library has across the U.S. Government, except in For library reset purposes, J7 split increased 23 percent. NATO’s routine the field of joint concept and doctrine its capstone JP into two volumes, an development stage estimate timeline is 92 Joint Doctrine / U.S. Joint Doctrine Development and Influence on NATO JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 now 8 months longer than the recently shortened U.S. model with more staff- ing products. This divergence not only affects national resources in both systems but also brings to light the opportunity for efficiencies. The best example is that the United States began the process of combining content from five stand- ing JPs on joint intelligence under one JP with a single time revision horizon. NATO, however, remains at 10 Levels 1 and 2 joint intelligence–related AJPs with 10 different time revision horizons to update the complete joint intelligence doctrinal footprint. Additionally, multiple drafts push off senior officer input until the end of the process. The number of custodians, revisions, and ratification commitments of intelligence AJPs and other sources should generate reassess- ment of national resource commitments to non-U.S. efforts. NATO has also ex- panded its membership to 30 nations, all with voting rights in allied joint doctrine development. For military organizational structure, the doctrine development community added the National Guard Bureau, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Space Command, and U.S. Space Force as voting members. U.S. Joint Forces Command was disbanded in 2013 and NATO’s SACT responsibilities trans- ferred to a French general officer. Joint Warfighting Center doctrine personnel now fall under the Joint Staff J7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division. The DOD Terminology Program reformed and implemented new policy that streamlined 75 percent of the DOD dictionary content and encouraged the U.S. Government to build and publish its own compendium of interagency terms.34 Soldier from North Macedonia in full “ghillie suit” camouflage during Immediate Response 19, in Furthermore, program managers for Croatia, May 29, 2019 (Courtesy NATO) both DOD terminology and allied joint doctrine development assist in senior- and innovative in the face of today’s allocates risk.” The late Senator John level guidance and influence efficiencies complex threats. Former Under Secre- McCain (R-AZ) stated: and resource protection. tary of Defense Michèle Flournoy testi- fied to Congress about defense policy development . . . in DOD has become para- Top-Down Approach formulation becoming a “bottom-up lyzed by an excessive pursuit of concurrence U.S. and NATO joint doctrine system staff exercise [that] includes hundreds or consensus. . . . Innovative ideas that and process challenges are not isolated. of participants and consumes many challenge the status quo rarely seem to sur- Other areas, such as U.S. policy, strat- thousands of man-hours, rather than a vive the staffing process as they make their egy, and plan formulation, face similar top-down leadership exercise that sets long journey to senior civilian and mili- impediments to becoming more agile clear priorities, makes hard choices, and tary leaders. Instead, what results too often JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Katsos 93 U.S. Marine with Marine Rotational Force-Europe 21.1, Marine Forces Europe and Africa, stands watch during cold weather training in preparation for Exercise Reindeer II, in Setermoen, Norway, November 12, 2020 (U.S. Marine Corps/William Chockey) seems to be watered-down, lowest common Instruction and Manual will establish a Now, communities can commit their denominator thinking that is acceptable to more explicit top-down approach that expectations and resources toward all relevant stakeholders precisely because it sets boundaries for the Joint Staff to be topics of necessity and importance. is threatening to none of them.35 more assertive in managing change. The A new committed approach to policies will empower process owners to consolidation and library reset could While U.S. systems face procedural consolidate or cancel publications at any update the full library in 3 years or less. challenges in the speed of decisionmak- stage of the JP life cycle, better navigate Moreover, joint doctrine was dissemi- ing and content dissemination, a top- the process of updating like-minded nated as hard copies. Distribution went down approach could further explore information simultaneously, and save from mailing copies to compact disc and forcefully emplace improved orga- the joint doctrine community thousands management and then to Web page ac- nizational results. of hours and free hundreds of thou- cess and downloading. Looking toward sands of man-hours for other priorities the future, more U.S. joint doctrine will Next 30 Years in joint doctrine development. Conser- be considered sensitive and protectable Given the last decade, it is important vative estimates show that a routine full behind firewalls with limited access. to continue capturing and formulating JP revision cycle costs approximately For NATO, there is a huge efficiency content on adversarial approaches and $300,000 ($100,000 per full revision in allied joint doctrine gained using competitor influences and how military of NATO AJP) and 8,000 man-hours the new U.S. JP 2-0 as a strawman for force is applied, whether tied to conflict (2,000 man-hours and 500 custodian intelligence allied joint doctrine reor- or not.36 In order to further reduce and hours per full revision of NATO AJP). ganization. NATO could also explore eliminate policy and process imper- Per the old 5-year JP cycle, documents moving away from its 30 voters, at least fections, the new 5120 Series CJCS lined up in a queue regardless of topic. in the AJOD, and move toward strategic 94 Joint Doctrine / U.S. Joint Doctrine Development and Influence on NATO JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 th and subordinate commands as voters 99 Cong., H.R. 3622, October 1, 1986, jointarmynavyact00unit/?sp=5>; United States available at JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 Joint Doctrine 95 available at 96 Joint Doctrine JFQ 101, 2nd Quarter 2021 New from NDU Press A Persistent Fire: The Strategic Ethical Impact of World War I on the Global Profession of Arms Edited by Timothy S. Mallard and Nathan H. White 2020 • 412 pp. Since “the war to end all wars” witnessed the rise of global war among competing nation- states conducted in often tenuous alliances with nascent professional militaries—characteristics that continue to mark contemporary warfare a century later—then studying that conflict’s impact seems a relevant method to decide ways in which the profession of arms will develop in the next 25 to 50 years. Indeed, like a smoldering, persistent fire that threatens to re-erupt into a fresh conflagration, World War I continues to deeply shape and guide the profession of arms today. Download the EPUB, MOBI, or PDF version for free. Scan the QR Code above or go to: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/ Books/A-Persistent-Fire JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE ONE HUNDRED ONE, 2ND QUARTER 2021 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 40,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 40,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, Authors include scholars from National the National Defense University and the Institute for Strategic Assessment 2020 providesStrategic Assessment an expert of the most and nuanced understanding Strategic Studies who have been directly pioneers engaged as thought leaders and policymaking the new era of GPC. Chapters and combinations ofgrappling with the strategic contours of international relations, and of national security, chapters will be not only useful for students foreign affairs academic setting, but also of great in an to policy practitioners. value important between the three dimensions of GPC emerging Great the United Powers in 2020: stands atop the triumvirate, with It establishes that the United States States, China, and Russia. for top-level prestigeChina a rising competitor and Russia vying signs of while facing clear dyad is likely to be the dominant Greatdecline. The Sino-American competitive rivalry Power into the future. Great Chapters focus on the critical activities among these Powers and develop nonstate actors, and global institutions. major implications for other state actors, New from NDU Press New from Competition 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Strategic Assessment III Lynch Edited by Thomas F. Great relations is a framework for understanding interstate Power competition that dominated Past GPC eras have featured II. multiple powerful War prior to World geopolitics for centuries states jockeying for relative status and position. After lying dormant period during a two-decade of GPC the dynamics globalization and American international primacy, of post–Cold War returned to international relations security studies in earnest and during the late 2010s. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked