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Views, Hamas Leader Khaled Mishal Has Of- Fered to Cooperate with U.S Hamas’s Ideological Crisis By Matthew Levitt espite its success as the first muslim brotherhood organ- ization to control and govern territory, and in part because of that success, Hamas today is under significant stress. In the West Bank, Hamas faces a severe security crackdown that has driven the move- ment underground. And in Gaza, Hamas has been forced to choose Dbetween engaging in acts of violence or attempting to effectively govern the territory it took over by force of arms. The result is an acute ideological tension within Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, which has been forced to suspend the resistance for which it is named and by which it defines itself. For some, the cessation of vio- lence, however temporary, is a sign of moderation within Hamas. For others, Hamas’s actions, including continued radicalization and weapons smuggling into Gaza, better denote the movement’s true intentions and trajectory. To be sure, Hamas is not a monolithic movement. But the one constant among its various cur- rents is its self-identification as a resistance movement. Hamas under Stress in the west bank the ongoing israeli military presence together with a renewed commitment by the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas has largely denied Hamas the ability to function effectively there. With new, U.S.-trained Palestinian battalions successfully bringing law and order to West Bank cities, places like Jenin—commonly referred to as the suicide bomber capitol of the West Bank just a few years ago—are now calm and enjoying significant improvement 80 ■ CURRENT TRENDS IN ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY / VOL. 9 in economic prosperity.1 Within the Ministry of Interior, a department overseeing charitable organizations is systematically removing Hamas members from the boards of charity committees and social service organizations; it is also registering each charity office and its board—something that was not done under the adminis- trations of either Yasser Arafat or the short-lived Hamas-Fatah unity government in 2006.2 Still, Israeli and Palestinian security officials concur that Hamas remains pres- ent and capable in the West Bank, operating largely underground in small cells, and would quickly rebuild itself were it not for the day-to-day security and intelligence activities of both Israeli and PA forces.3 For Hamas, however, the true crisis is not in the West Bank but in Gaza. Whereas Hamas is suppressed in the West Bank, it is in the Gaza Strip—where it is the de facto governing regime—where Hamas is under significant ideological stress. Ironically, the crisis is of its own making, the result of the uneasy merger of Hamas, a social, political and military “resistance” movement, with an Islamist government. As a government, Hamas has failed to provide for the needs of its purported constituents and remains an international pariah under economic siege. At the same time, its cre- dentials as a “resistance” movement lose currency by the day as Hamas continues to refrain from attacking Israel for fear of reprisal attacks in the wake of Israel’s Cast Lead operation in December 2008 and January 2009. Hamas failed to inflict signifi- cant Israeli casualties over the course of the Cast Lead battles, and instead of protect- ing its civilian population, the group hid its leaders and armaments within civilian structures such as mosques and hospitals.4 Disenchanted with Hamas, Gaza resi- dents reportedly rue having voted for its candidates in 2006.5 Engaged in secular pol- itics, failing to institute sharia law, and cracking down on fellow Palestinians who do attack Israel or threaten its rule, Hamas in Gaza has created a vacuum which salafi-jihadi groups—often populated by disgruntled Hamas operatives and some- times inspired by al Qaeda—have been keen to fill.6 Between Word and Deed in the eyes of many journalists and academics, hamas has moderated since taking the reins of governance in the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that it did so by force of arms.7 Indeed, in recent interviews, Hamas leader Khaled Mishal has of- fered to cooperate with U.S. efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Is- raeli conflict. He has indicated a willingness to implement an immediate and reciprocal ceasefire with Israel, and stated that the militant group would accept and respect a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip based on the 1967 bor- ders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.8 Yet at other times, Mishal and other Hamas HAMAS’S IDEOLOGICAL CRISIS ■ 81 leaders expressly reject political compromise and insist that violence is the means by which the group will achieve its goals. Speaking in Damascus, for example, Mishal insisted, “We must say: Palestine from the sea to the river, from the west to the oc- cupied east, and it must be liberated. As long as there is occupation, there will be re- sistance to the occupation.”9 Violence, Mishal stressed, “is our strategic option to liberate our land and recover our rights.”10 The inconsistency in Hamas’s messaging is, at least in part, a result of its inter- nally conflicted nature. Hamas the government sees the need for at least appearing moderate for political expedience in an effort to achieve near term political goals such as opening the border crossings into Gaza to trade. In particular, Hamas is eager to gain access to building materials and financing to rebuild infrastructure destroyed during last winter’s fighting. Every day Gaza’s shattered infrastructure remains un- repaired is another day Gaza residents are reminded of the cost they bear as a result of Hamas’s rocket attacks on Israeli towns and the Hamas leadership’s incapacity to do anything about it. The sometimes conciliatory tone of Mishal’s public messaging is belied by the group’s continued violent actions and radicalization on the ground, as well as the rise to prominence of violent extremist leaders within the group’s local shura (con- sultative) councils. Indeed, Hamas’s activities of late appear to be diametrically op- posed to the compliance of the more moderate public statements issued by Mishal, who has personally been tied to acts of terrorism and is himself a U.S.-designated ter- rorist.11 Despite talk of a ceasefire and pursuit of a peaceful resolution to the Arab- Israeli conflict, Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, continues to engage in terrorist activities. Shooting attacks are still common along the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip, including the firing of rocket-propelled grenades and mortar shells. In late July, two Qassam Brigades operatives were killed in a “work accident” while placing explosives along the border fence near the al-Buraij refugee camp in central Gaza.12 A few days later, Israeli defense officials revealed that Hamas has been digging tunnels—often used by the group to smuggle weapons and conduct kidnapping operations—next to UN facilities, including one near a UN school in Bait Hanun that had recently collapsed. The placement of the tunnels near UN facilities was purportedly intended as a preventive measure against an Israeli attempt to de- stroy the tunnels.13 In September 2009, a Hamas operative was killed, along with a militant from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), as he was planting a bomb along the Gaza border fence.14 Meanwhile, over the past several months, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank have seized at least $8.5 million in cash from arrested Hamas members who plotted to kill Fatah-affiliated government officials. Palestinian officials reported that some of the accused had “recently purchased homes adjacent to government 82 ■ CURRENT TRENDS IN ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY / VOL. 9 and military installations, mainly in the city of Nablus” for the purpose of observing the movements of government and security officials. PA officers also seized uniforms of several Palestinian security forces from the accused Hamas members.15 In April 2009, Palestinian forces raided a weapons workshop in the basement of a mosque in Qalqilya as part of an increased PA counterterrorism campaign. The forces discovered the workshop following a series of explosions heard at the mosque earlier that month. Eighty kilograms of explosives were found, including pipe bombs and a seven-kilogram IED. The officials arrested seven people, believing them to be connected to the arms laboratory. Although Hamas has denied any connection to the weapons workshop, many residents of Qalqilya have condemned the group in response, since Hamas is known for caching weapons in mosques, such as in Judea and Samaria.16 Hamas control of the Gaza-Egyptian border, combined with the ineffectiveness of Egyptian border security forces, opened the frontier to extensive smuggling activity. As a result, Hamas accelerated its military buildup, enabling the terrorist organization to better equip its troops with weapons and ammunition. Beyond small arms, Israeli intelligence estimates that some 250 tons of explosives, 80 tons of fertilizer, 4000 rock- et-propelled grenades, and 1800 rockets were transported from Egypt to Gaza from September 2005 to December 2008. According to Israeli figures, from June 2007 to December 2008, Hamas increased not only the quantity but also the quality of its ar- senal in Gaza, improving the performance of its improvised explosive devices and ex- panding the distance and payload capabilities of its Qassam rocket warheads.17 In late August 2009, Egyptian police discovered two tons of explosives hidden on the Egyptian side of the border ready to be smuggled into Gaza. A few days earlier, Egyptian police thwarted an attempt to smuggle 1,100 pounds of explosives into Gaza.18 Most small-range rockets fired from Gaza prior to and during the recent conflict were locally produced.
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