Soviet-Uruguayan relations, 1919-1966

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Authors Gilbert, Leah Banen, 1943-

Publisher The University of Arizona.

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/318013 SOVIET-URUGUAYAN RELATIONS 1919-1966

by Leah Banen Gilbert

A Thesis Submitted t© the Faeulty of the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In. the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1 9 6 7 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfill­ ment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknow­ ledgement of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgement the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

SIGNED

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR

This thesis has been approved on the date shown belowi

J.^GREGOpY OSWALD I Date ' rofessor of History PRIFACI

This study is a general survey of Soviet^Uruguayan relations from 1919 to 1966e Sinee relations between the two have been of a highly erratie nature9 it is necessary to clarify the entire span of these relations0 This certainly is not a definitive work on the subject® Mot being able to read Russian was a major disadvantage in preparing this thesis® Another was not having complete access to the Uruguayan newspapers s The material available was sufficient only for a basic understanding of the major events occurring between the and Uruguay® The connection of initial trade and diplomatic relations of the Soviet Union and Uruguay$, and the role of the Uruguayan Communist Party is examined in the context of Soviet foreign policy from 1919 to 19^3® Uruguay extended recognition to the Soviet Union in 1926 being the first South American nation to do so® From that time to the presents there"were only seven years9 1936=19^3» in which diplomatic relations were completely severed® However8 ties were practically non-existent in other years although they were officially intact® The Soviet Union used democratic Uruguay as a base for their political and economic operations in South America® Flagrant abuse of this led to the break in the association H i iv at the end ©f 1935® Nevertheless@ relations were re-estab­ lished in 19^3 beeamse Wruguay was sympathetic to the Soviet

Union for her heroic stand in World War II. But Uruguay®s sympathy disappeared when the Cold War began even though

she did not break relations6 Soviet trade relations with Uruguay had been rel­ atively insignificant when compared to UruguayBs total

trade between 1925 and Stalin*® death in 1953® Since then the Soviets have been eager to expand trade and diplomatic relations in Latin America® At the same times, Uruguay has been suffering from serious economic crises® Consequently her trade with the Soviet Union in the past decade often reached as much as ten percent per year of the total trade which is more than any other Latin American country except Cuba® Full-fledged embassies were exchanged at the end of 1955s and Uruguay continues as the Soviet®® propaganda ©enter in South America® The U.S.S.B.- uses relations with Uruguay for political purposes primarilys while for the past ten years8 Uruguay has accepted'increased relations for economic reasons® I would like to extend thanks to my fatherg Mr® Leon Baneng for translating the Russian documents and to the

University of Arizona Library® My husbandg Wally, deserves a special thank you for his patience and understanding® Finally9 I am indebted to Dr® J® Gregory Oswald for his advice and assistance in preparing this paper® Page

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oo0OO©©OOOOOO0OOO0OOOOOOOOOOOO0QO0OO0OOOOO00OOO 1TX X X lo m m m Y g A LEADER IW imms AMD ACTIONS 1919=19300 * 1 Baekgx^oimd. © o 00000000 ooooooooooooo©©©© ©000000 ©'o© 1 Early Cemsmnist Activities ooooooo®o®os®o o ® •«e»o- 4 Diplomatic and Trade Relations with the Soviet Dnion®o©oooooo®ooo©©ooooo 6

20 COMMUNIST FORTUNES RISE AND DECLINE 1930-1941©®0*0, 13 Activities .of. the FCU©©oooooooooooo©©©©©©©©©©©® 13 The T erra Regime© © © 000 0 © © oeooooo©©©©© © © o©©©©©©© 15 Diplomatic and Trade Relations with the Soviet Union© ©©©©©©©©©©©©©©.o©©©© 21 3© THE WAXINC AND WANING 1942-1955o ©©.©©© © © © = © © © © © © © © © © 34 The Domestic Sceneo©©©©©©©©©.©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©© 34 Foreign Affairs with the Soviet Union© © © © © © © © © © 38 4© YEARS OF CRISIS 1955<=>I966©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©o©©©©©©©©© 48 Uruguay8s Political and Economic Situation© ©©©©©©©©©©©©o© © © © © © ©.© ©, 48 Activities of the PCU©©©©©©o©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©© 57 Communist Strategy© © © © © © ©©©o©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©® 60 Uruguay8s Trade Relations with the Soviet Union© ©©©©©©o©©©©©©-©©©©©© 62 Uruguay8 s Diplomatic Relations with the Soviet Union© ©o©©©©©©©©©© © © © © © © © 73

CONCLUSION 000 00© ©oooooo ©OOOO00©OOO®OOOO©OOO©OOOO©OO0OO© 9C APPENDIX As Comparison of Socialist and Communist Election Statistics 1922-1966© © © © © © © © © © © © © 95 APPENDIX Bs Uruguay8s Imports and Exports with the Soviet Union 1927“1938©© © © © © © © © © © © © © © © 96 APPENDIX Gs Uruguay8s Balance of Trade 1930-1964©© © © © © 97

APPENDIX Ds Election Returnss 1 9 6©©©©©©©©©©©©©i©©©©© 6 98 Vi APPENDIX Eg Foreign Delegates to Eighteenth Congress of PCU0 o®oooo®oo o,® 0 o ®o 99 APPENDIX Fg Uruguay8s Trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 1938=19^80 o o o o o o0 100 APPENDIX Gg Soviet Commodity Imports from and Exports to Uruguay0oeoeooo«oeo-eeo 0 101 APPENDIX Hg Communist Party and Front Peripdipalp- in,. Wrpgpay.o& .®,,o o.0 0 o.0.0 0 .»,0,0 o * 0 102

SELECTED. BIBLICGRAPEy 0 o ® 0..O o .0 » 0iO ,0 o ,o oo@pxiivO o oiO 6000006 ,00oo 104 LIST OP TABLES

Table Page ' -• f f t-< ir* 4- • / - t' lo Soviet Trade with South America®oooooos®oooo0oo0o00 ; 11

2o UruguayGNP 1955=’^-963<>®ooo o®o®o000000000000® ©0®0 ® 53

3o Uruguay8a late of x Imflaticn 1963 =-1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 »© ® o 0 ® ® 5^ 4® The Slump in Industrial Output Between 195^ and 19^20 o®ooooe®oooeo®eeoeoo6o®oo55 5o Established lumber of Trade and ' ■ ■ Payments Agreements in. Force Between Uruguay and the Soviet Bl@e0 o,**,**.*** 65

60 Uruguay8 s Wool Exports®&® 0osoosoeoooooeoooooeooooo®68

7o ~ Uruguay8s Balance of Trade with the U 0S 0S 0B.0«0 ® 0 0 0 0 69

80 Percentage of Uruguayfs Trade with the Communist Bloc 1 9 6 1 = 1 9 6 5 ooo©ooeo®®o®®ooooooooeo7B 9® Uruguayan Trade with Selected Countries 1955^1964ooo®o®oo®oooo®oo ®® ooo®oo®aoo 71

vii ABSTRACT

Trade and diplomatic relations@ the role of the Urmgu&yan Gommtmist Party (PGB) and their relationship %@ Soviet foreign policy and Uruguay?s/internal^affairs,are covered in this general survey«, __ ^ Uruguay was the first South American nation to extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union® Both diplomatic and trade relations have been characterized by fluctuations ® The Soviet Union is interested in Uruguay for political purposess and therefore^ Uruguay lias" come to be recognized as the main distribution center for communist propaganda® It was relatively easy.for the Soviet Union t© establish a base of political and economic operations in Uruguay by nature of the free and democratic society in that country® The activities'of the PGU have closely followed in- struetions from Moscow® Although the party remains small0 it has made the greatest inroads in the labor movement®

Uruguay fears increased communist activity, yet at the same time, hesitates to curb this activity since many Uruguayans believe it would be contrary to the long liberal tradition Uruguay has enjoyed® But primarily for economic reasons$, Uruguay is willing to accept increased relations® " viii 6M1TER I

, URUGUAY 8 A LEADER IN IDEAS AND ACTIONS 1919=1930

. Baekgrotmd . The Repitbllea Oriental del Wrugmy, the smallest Somth American nation, is wedged between Argentina and Brazil0 Its socially integrated population of 2 ,556s000^ is almost entirely of Spanish and Italian origin0 In this strongly middle class country, two=thirds of the people live in urban centers of which the main one is the capital, Montevideo, The ninety percent literacy rate is one of the highest in Latin America while the 1,3 percent rate of population growth is one of the lowest0 lost of the people, whose annual per cap­ ita income is $395, are engaged in agriculture, livestock raising, small manufacturing, and government servicese It is one of the few countries in Latin America having a thoroughly civilian government0 As a tiny buffer between two large military states, Uruguay has no conscrip­ tion, no armaments industry, and therefore, no military secrets. The people have little respect for their army, navy, and air force02

IT As"*of 1963 census o 20 George Pendle, Uruguay, (Londons Oxford University Press, 1 9 63), P o 85° Since Uruguay9s emergence as a modern state in 1903o she has been a model with respect to democratic government and social reforms® This is remarkable in view of its chaotic development in the nineteenth century® Before 18100 Uruguay had no independent place in the Spanish Empire but was part of a region called La Plata® The George Washington of Uruguay0 Jos® Gervasio Artigasg aroused national con­ sciousness in the area known as the Banda Oriental (eastern bank) of the Rfo de la Plata® Both Argentina and Brazil coveted the Banda Orientals, but England intervened in behalf of Uruguayan independence® However8 Uruguay remained a political football for many years & and domestically there were struggles between the Blanco and Colorado parties®

It has been said that 81 in no other country has any one man so deeply left his imprint upon the life and charac­ ter of a people as did Jos# latlle y ©rdoHezat,3 & journal­

ist by .profession and founder of the newspapers 11 Ufa® he was convinced that free social development would eliminate the class struggle better than Marxism® Serving as presi­ dent from 1903™1907 and again in 1911=19158 he launched the most progressive administrations in Uruguayan history® ' He instituted such reforms as freedom of the press„ freedom of speech# universal manhood suffrages separation of church and state8 free primary and secondary educations, 3a Gerhard Masure Nationalism in Latin America® (New Yorks Macmillan Go®$ 1966)9 p® 56® and university education for women® The nation8s progress«= ive treatment of women is well known® Banks * hotels s public works 9 railroads0 and the port of Montevideo were put under government ownership0 Capital punishment and bull fighting were abolished® Uruguay led the way in the Western Hemisphere in establishing an extensive social security program® It was the first Latin American nation to adopt the eight-hour working day® Other programs were begun such as ©Id age pensions.» workingmen8s compensations unemployment insurance0 paid holidays0 and the minimum wage® featlle said of his achievementss MI have worked to prepare a plan of social reforms all designed to look after and to liberate the working classes ®

Feeling that presidential power leads to dictator­ ship, Batlle advocated a plural executive form of govern­ ment which was adopted in the 191? constitution® It was actually a compromise plan, however0 restricting the powers of the President by dividing them between the President and. a nine-member National Council® One-third of the Council membership would be renewed every two years with the party receiving the largest number of votes acquiring two of the three seats® 4® Join Gunther, Inside South America® (New Yorks Harper and Bow, 1966)» p. 220® All ©f the &b©v@"lde©l©gy was proclaimed.and much

©f the far-reaehing -'soelal leglslatlom Introdueed before

the Mexican or Bmsslan revolutions set the pace for soelal- Istle experiments @

’ Early Gommunist Activities The first reported Soviet inspired incident took place in Jammary Iflfs when police uncovered a plot to over­ throw the governments of Uruguay and Argentina by an agency known as Gentr© Oultura which was known to be directing a

Soviet m o v e m e n t *5 men were arrested# Isaac Holineff» director of the Gentr© .Cmlt-arasi who had been involved in bomb throwing plots and was engaging in Bolshevik propagandai

loses Federmanm9 wh© wanted to establish a Soviet government in Uruguay? Human Patulyoski@ who said he had met Molinoff in Russia and had come to Montevideo from Buenos Aires where he had been doing propaganda work; and Marcos lirnovich# Police later arrested the entire forty-two members ©f the ' Gemtro ©mltura® Some ©f these were known agitators among the packing house workers©

At their headquarters9 a large quantity ©f Russian

pamphlets were confiscated® As a preventative measure 9 the government discharged all foreigners from the army and sent troops' to localize strike disorders© Young President­ elect; Baltasar Brum.; a close associate of ex-Presidemt

“ — York Times® January 159 1919s p® 2® Batlie9 ©ailed for the formation of an American League on the hasis of absolute equality for the purpose of combatting common aggressions The world communist movement was quick in getting started when Lenin founded the Third Communist International

(Comintern) in larch 1919° It was dedicated to carrying out the world revolution® At the Second Congress in 1920p the Comintern established rules of discipline and absolute obedience to Moscow known as the Twenty~one Points to which all communist parties must adhere® In September 19200 a faction of the Uruguayan Socialist Party % led by Eugenio G-Smez of the Maritime Workers9 voted 10©7”11® to accept the Twenty=one Points and become the Partido Comunista®^ The dissidents led by

Dr. Emilio Frugoni re-formed' the Partido Soeialista® The Partido Comunista Uruguaya (PGU)9 which had legal status from the outset9 grew out of the trade union movement and set to building a communist labor movement® The anarchosyndicalists played a dominant role in labor in the early years of the twentieth century by controlling the PederaerSn Obrera Regional Uruguaya (FORU)® The UnlSn General de Trabajadores was under socialist influence® The labor movement lost strength in the early 1920%® The Uruguayan economy was in a state of depression® ~ 6® Robert J® Alexander9 Communism in Latin America® (Mew Brunswickg Mew Jerseys Rutgers University Press„ 1957)a P 0 l^^ @ The FORU was badly divided and split into two groups 6 The anarehosyndiealists ©ontinmed in the FORU which was the most important labor element in the 19209s and 19308s. The anti- anarchists formed the GomitS Pro Unidad Obrera (GPUO)9 and the communist-controlled maritime union joined it0 The communists worked hard to get the unions to join the Red International Labor Unien9 but they were unsuccessful6 The GPUOi8s successor in 1923 was the UniSin Sindieal Uruguaya (USU)o The communists were blocked from getting control of that body and expelled when they tried to establish a block within the USUs7

The PGU failed to attract a large following among the Uruguayan people in elections® In 1922, they managed

to elect one man, Gelestim© Hibelli, to the Chamber of Deputies, and increased this number by electing Eugenio GSmez in 1925®® The PGU has willingly served as a branch of the international communist movement® Its strategy and policy have consistently conformed to Soviet foreign policy®

Diplomatic and Trade Relations with the Soviet Union Although the Comintern did not place a high priority on Latin America-, a permanent representative, a Lithuanian communist named Guralsky, was sent to Buenos Aires in the 7® Ibid®® p® 138® 8® See Appendix A for the election statistics® early 1920 rse In .19228 -Alfred. Stlrner of Switzerland was placed In charge of Latin American affairs at Comintern headquarterse A special Latin American secretariat within the Comintern was created in 1925 and headed by Jules Humbert- Droz g another Swisse Victor Codovilla of Argentina was the chief Latin American of that body® It appears that the PGU took orders from Codovilla®^ In 1928, the Comintern divided the Latin American secretariat into the Caribbean Bureau headquartered in Hew York and the South American Bureau headquartered in Buenos Aires until 1930 when it was moved to Montevideo® Early trade and diplomatic feelers were extended by the Soviet and Uruguayan diplomatic representatives stationed in Germany® The Soviet representativep Brodovsky8 told of the good terms he was on with the Uruguayan repre­ sentative in several communications with the Soviet Foreign Office®10 In a letterll in 1922g he indicated that Uruguay was going to donate fifty tons of canned meat to the Soviet

Union® The meat would be shipped as far as Hamburg® Brodovsky asked if Uruguay would pay the freight charges from Hamburg to Petrograd9 but that request was refused® Russia was in the midst of a famine at the time® The 9 @ ^Ebid@ p p® Al® 10® U.SeSeR®, Dokumentii vneshnei poll (Moskvas Izdatelstv© Politiehskoi literaturii Vol® ?, p® 254 11® IMd®, Vol® 6, p® 56® letter also stated that the Uruguayan parliament was taking up the question of establishing trade relations beeause Brodovsky believed Uruguay was Interested in the Russian lumber industry® It was agreed that trade relations would be estab­

lished, and therefore, an offieial Soviet government organ­ ization, the Soviet Trading Corporation or Yuzhamtorg, was

opened in 1925 by Boris Kraevsky in Montevideoe The follow-- ing year the headquarters was set up across the river in Buenos Aires® Kraevsky traveled widely, in southern South America ostensibly to seek trading opportunities and prob­

ably to supply Communist parties with funds and propaganda•12

Since the Soviet government had few contacts abroad, the functions of diplomatic representatives were often en­ trusted to the commercial missions® Kraevsky was granted an unusual power of attorney from Amtorg, the Soviet Trading Corporation in Mew York, authorizing him to repre­ sent Amtorg before secretaries of state and national and

provincial authorities®. He visited several South American

capitals, including Montevideo, to try to persuade them to recognize the Soviet Union® Each visit coincided with heavy purchases of each country®s raw.material®

0m August 9a 19269 Kraevsky was in Montevideo to talk about recognition® On August lA, he telegraphed the

" '' " 1 2® ’Rollie Beppimo, International Communism in Latin America, (Londons - Free Fress"™6F~Glenioe9 1964), p® 158® Acting People8s Commissar for Foreign Affairs g Maxim Litarinoff, abomt the importance of establishing relations between the two countries as soon as possible®^3- 4 telegram

from the Soviet Union to the Uragmayan Foreign Affairs Mini­

sters Alvar® Saralegiai 9 which was published in 11 D#a on

August 2 6* 1 92 68 gave Kraevsky full authority to negotiate the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Uruguay and the Soviet Union®^' The telegram was dated

August 2 0®

On August 21 and 2 2® 1926$, there was an exchange

of telegrams establishing d@ .jure recognition .©f the Soviet Union by Uruguay® Foreign Minister Saralegmi sent the following August 21 telegram to .the Soviet Foreign Offices As a result of ©tar talks with Mr® Boris Kraevsky® who was supplied with the proper credentials from your government® I have the honor and pleasure to notify the People*® Commissar @f Foreign Affairs that the government of the Republic of Uruguay' has decided to recognize the Soviet Repub­ lic .as a de fact© government® Consequently®. we notify and promise that from this time on there will be official relations between the two governments®15 Maxim Mtvinoff answered the following days With deep satisfaction® I have the honor to acknowledge receiving your tele­ gram stating that the Soviet Republic is recognized as a de facte government by the Republic of Uruguay and that official 13i- Dokumentii„ V©1. 9» P® 733 iM’e Ibid® p® 732® 15® Ibid®„ p® 393® 10 diplomatic relations between the govern­ ments are established® The government of the Soviet Union takes note of the contents of your telegram and considers the official relations between the two governments re­ stored (sic)® This, government is likewise anxious to express the conviction that this act shall serve to strengthen and develop mutual understanding., and friendly relations between the two countries The Soviets expected that this first diplomatic post in South America would have an impact on Uruguay®s neighbors and would complement the efforts of Yuzhamtorg and the South. American Bureau of the Comintern® Boris Kraevsky agreed saying that "the act of Uruguay will undoubtedly have an influence on Argentina and other countries of South America® "17 It appeared that Argentina would fol­ low suit at the beginning of 1927s> but the Soviet efforts

ran into difficulty later in the year because England had broken relations then with Russia, and England exercised

considerable influence over the area® In a newspaper interview, Kraevsky was asked why he was not appointed minister to Uruguay as a reward for obtaining recognition through his negotiations„ He replied

that "they would have to find someone to replace m e , "18 implying that his present job was more important than a ' l 6 ® Ibid® 17® James G® Embry, "The Soviet Union and Diplo­ matic Relations, Communist Party Activities, and Reference to Trade with Uruguay8 The Early Years,,e (unpublished sem­ inar paper. Department of History, University of Arizona),p© 11® 18® lew York Times® December 28, 1935s> P® 1® 11 diplomatic post® In an interview with Izvestia® ^ Kraevsky reported on the progress ©f trade relations with the South American countries® Mostly hides, wool, live sheep, coffeeg eaeao, and resin were purchased, and the Soviet Union in turn exported gas and oil, kerosene, mineral oil, coal, fish, lentilsg peas, electric bulbs, cigarettes, and matches® / (See Table 1}® 'M 1 SOVIET TMDI WITH S©UTH AMEBI04 t#

- Imports Exports 1925-1926 1©,71@»©©0 71,4-0©

1927-1928 ^3,^95»395 1,648,504

1928-1929*** 26,935»987 3,779,06© ^Dokumentii« Vol®'; 12 s **One peso=87 kopek® ww^Flrst half of the fiscal years

Kraevsky admitted that the South American countries are mot dependent upon the Soviet Union for trade but added that the Soviet Union was working hard to establish credit, improve packaging, and lower freight costs® At the time of the interview, he"reported that freight costs had already been lowered from sixty shillings per ton t© If® Dokumentii, V©1® 12, p® 4l4« twenty-five shillings ©n shipments from South America to Russia and from forty-five to seventeen shillings per ton on shipments from Russia to South Americas He accused the European countries of Interfering in Yuzhamtorgns business ventures with the South American nations and organising an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign® Actually8 by this time, Uruguay8 Argentinag Brazils and Paraguay were convinced that Kraevsky was carrying on subversive activities®^® The lat­ ter three decided not to recognize the Soviet Union because their foreign offices felt that too much propaganda was emanating from Montevideo$ a commonly recognized headquarters for communist propaganda throughout South America®^1

Uruguay and the Soviet Union did not exchange mini­ sters after establishing relations in 1926 s, continuing to carry on official business through their representatives in Germany® There is evidences However8 concerning conver­ sations that took place about exchanging ministers® In

19298 the Soviet representative in Germany» VSM® Krastinskii,, met several times with the Uruguayan representatives Mr® Gosi©s about the possibility of exchanging ministers®22 Cosi© indicated that he wanted to be appointed as represent­ ative to Moscow® However8 ministers were not exchanged until 1933® 20® Poppino, p® 158®

21® New York Times8 December 289 1935* P® 1® 22® Dokumentiig ¥©1® 12 s’ p® 19® CHAPTER 2

COMMUNIST FORTUNES RISE AND DECLINE 1930-1941

Activities of the PGU Although the Comintern had given up the thesis of

world revolution by 192? and was now set on the idea of serving Soviet foreign policy interests e it is evident that the Latin American communist parties received extensive financial assistance from the Comintern for many years By 1 9 2 9 the Soviet Union had entered a period of isolation® True to forme the PGU busied itself by trying to set up trade union groups® In 192?@ they formed the Bloque de Unidad Obrera which was reorganized into the Confedenaeiin General del Trabajo del Uruguay (GGT) in 1929® It claimed 14$,500 dues paying members@ which in­ cluded construction workers ^ shoemakers $, telephone workers $,

and municipal and maritime employees ® 2 The first large scale communist meeting in,Latin America took place in Montevideo in May 1929® It was attended by representatives of the Profintern (the Red International of Labor Unions) $, the Comintern$, the communist la Poppimog p®’ 15 •

2." Alexander, p® 139® 13 14 dominated French labor oonfederatlon^ and communist and pro- communist labor leaders from fifteen Latin American repub­ lics e Many representatives of the major international front organizations were also there® Among them were the Anti-Imperialist League® International Red Aid (a legal aid organization) $, Red Sports Federation (2® 000 members) „ and Liga de Juventudes Comunistas (League of Communist Youth)® The manifesto convoking this communist labor con­ ference had been issued in April 1928 by representatives of the Latin American Trade Ifni on meeting in Moscow® The agenda was to contain a program of economic demands» national and international trade union unity® and the creation of the ConfederaeiSn Sindical Latino Americana® At the conference which lasted ten days® the dele­ gates discussed various problems facing the communists in the area® such as gaining adherents among the middle class and what to do about the colored races ® A resolution was accepted providing that the South American Bureau of the Comintern® which was established in Montevideo because of the free political climate there ® would be charged with directing the policy of each national communist party with regard to oppressed racial groups® Communist activity in the labor movement reached a peak in 1930o For most of the decade during the regime of Gabriel Terra® the CGT remained quite inactive ® 3 3® Robert J® Alexander® Organized Labor in Latin America® (Mew Yorks Free Press® 1965)7 ?® 57® • 15 The Teera Regime In the late 192©8 Sg Uzmgiaay began to assiame the

predominance in Latin American leaderships Eduardo Rodriguez Larreta* Uruguay8s delegate to the League of Nations9 was instrumental in forming the Latin American bloc in that bodye^ Her democratic form of government gained many admirers throughout the world„

But with the advent of the 193©®s e Uruguay found herself in the throes of a severe economic crisis and e©m~> sequently turned increasingly inwards The Great Depression had hit Uruguay just as it had hit other areas of the world® Livestock markets were shrinking steadily„ and thereforeg purchasing power for imports was reduced® Land values

were falling® Income was cut® The budget was unbalancedg and the foreign debt was becoming increasingly heavy®

Added to all this,' the worst locust invasion in years

struck in 1932® Uruguay chose a new president in a disputed elec­ tion in 193©® There are. two main political parties in Uruguay, the Blancos and the Golorados® The Blancos are vaguely conservative, while the Golorados are vaguely liberal® The two do not really have opposing ideologies® Allegiance is to tradition and persons, the Herrera and 4-® New York Times, October 2?, 1929? p® 8® 16 Batlle families, respectively9 It has been said that "a child is born a little Blanco or a little Colorado and rarely deserts his color® There are subdivisions and factions within each groupo Literally hundreds of grassroots parties are joined under the banners of the Blancos and Colorados„^ Other minor parties, each making up five percent or less of the electorate, are the Partid© Soeialista, the Partid© Comunista, and Union Oivica (Catholic)0 The Colorados are made up of four major subdivisions 0 At the time of the 1930 elections, they operated under a pe­ culiar handicap agreement0 If the Colorado faction, made up of the Colorados, Batllistas, liveristas, and Radicals, to­ gether polled more than the opposition, the party is declared the winner, and the president is chosen from one of the factions according to a previously arranged agreement0 For example, in the 1930 elections, assuming that the Colorado factions were able to poll a greater total vote than Luis Herrera, the Blanco candidate, the Biver- ista candidate would need only. 17®5 percent of the vote to win®? However, the Biverista candidate failed to get the 5® Gunther, p® 220® 6® Susan M® Soeolow, "Uruguay Today,” Current History, (November 1966), p® 271® 7® New York Times» November 11, 1930, P® 1® 17 required votee. so the election went to the BatXXista oandi» date$ Gabriel Terra® Rumors of disturbances persisted prior to the electionsg but they were unfounded® The Communist Party polled 2291 votes

There was considerable unrest in Uruguay® The

economic and financial situation was not promising® As a results, a coup d 8etat® the first major disturbance in

nearly thirty years» occurred on larch 31m 1933® Many had been calling on Terra to overthrow the constitution® He moved quickly by establishing censorship and seized the - penitentiary and several public utilitiess including the postal and telegraph facilities® The Executive Council condemned these acts and asked the Assembly to nullify theme which it did® Terra responded by seizing portions

of the University and dissolved the nine-man executive- sharing council® The result was a mild dictatorship by Latin American standards® People continued to criticise the government and hold mass meetings of protest®^ Terra appointed eight prominent citizens to help run the government® Shortly thereaftere he announced plans to prepare a new consti­ tution® One of the most well-known Uruguayans8 Dr® Baltasar 8® Philip B® Taylorr Jr® $ Government and Politics of Uruguay3 (New Orleanss Tulane University Presss 1962)s p® 150® 9® Austin P® MacDonaldg Latin American Politics and Government® (lew Yorks Thomas Y® Crowell Co., 195^)» p ® 488 o ' Briamj, committed suicide as a result of these events«,

The new constitutions, an adaptation of the French parliamentary plang was adopted in 193^® It called for a presidents prime ministerg cabinets Senate6 and Chamber of Deputies® It embodied the advanced social legislation for which Uruguay had long been noted® It contained two unusual protections for the minority which foredoomed the plan to failure® Three seats of the nine-man cabinet were to be from the minority* and one-half of the Senate would go to the minority regardless of the vote cast, giving that group an opportunity to block all legislation® The Constituent Assembly re-elected Terra to a four-year term beginning in 1935 by a vote of 2^0-4$^®

Only the four communists voted against him, but many other groups abstained® He ignored the new constitution and ruled by decree when he could not get legislation passed®^^

The government instituted many depression recovery measures such as import controls, equilibrium in the balance of pay­ ments, a balanced budget, reorganization of the pension system, and wage reduction® Censorship was lifted for foreign correspondents but rigidly maintained on Uruguayan newspapers ® Deported socialist leader Emilio Frugoni said in Buenos Aires that United States petroleum interests 10® Current History® May 1934, p® 21?® 11® MacDonald, p®489® 19 financed Terra'®'s seizure of dictatorial powers in order to overthrow the state gas monopoly which refined Russian oil and was selling it at a much lower price than imported gas refined elsewhere*, The Terra regime severely restricted the activities of the communists even though the party was never outlawed® The government closed down both the party headquarters and the communist newspaperg Justicia,, charging that the com­ munists were planning to overthrow the government® Police refused the Communist Party from holding a meeting of pro­ test® Courts ordered raids of all premises frequented by persons or groups known to be in sympathy with communist activities® It was fashionable at this time to label any dis­ turbances or so-called subversive movements as being com­ munist-inspired® For example$ a revolt» led by the son of a late Blanco leader named Saravia® broke out in the north on the Uruguayan-Brazi1ian frontier® The government charged that it was part of a communist plot aimed at drawing troops to the Brazilian frontier and leaving Montevideo unguarded for the communist takeover® A large cache of arms was supposedly hidden on Uruguay8s northern river boundaries $, but a search revealed nothing® ~~J " 12o Mew York Times® April 1933» P® 7® 13® Ibid®» February 10s 1931, p®'8® 20 As a result of this and other minor Incidents8 sev­ eral foreigners and alien communists were arrested and deported® Police continued "breaking up communist Hplots81 "by raids8 On the eve of the Pan American Conference, they arrested twenty notorious agitators and seized a large quantity of inflammatory handbills„^ In these ways, the dictatorship suppressed what it callecj. communist activities0 With the change in the Comintern8s line from iso­ lation to the ’'Popular Front88 tactics, the communists attempted to join forces with other groups in opposition to the Terra regime® They participated in many demon­ strations and strikes but to no avail® There was one serious threat to Terra8s dictator­ ship in January 19 3® 5 A revolt, broke out simultaneously in all nineteen provinces® The leaders were General Mtinoz, a seventy-six year old agitator? members of political parties who had been ousted from the government in the 1933 coup? and returning exiles® However, the movement was quite weak internally and collapsed® The leaders were arrested, but no executions took place since they were prohibited in the constitution®^5 The "Popular Front" concept failed in Uruguay mainly because the socialists were unreceptive to the Communist Party overtures ® The party organization was Ify® Ibid®a November 11, 1933s P® 12® 15® Ibid,» February 17, 1935, P® 9® 21 kept small so opposition would not be aroused® Therefores leaders sent from Moscow could continue their work of organ­ izing party activities throughout the continent

Diplomatic and Trade Delations with the Soviet Union

By the early 19308Sg, Boris Kraevsky8s usefulness as a Soviet agent diminished® He was replaced as director of Yuzhamtorg by Alexander Minkin® Kraevsky remained in South

America for a time* but he was denied entry into Brazil and was deported from Chile® He made his way back to Europe in 1935®1^ Across the La Plata River in Buenos Aires9 a coup d 8 etat installed a junta headed by General Jos# F® Uriburu in power® Immediately* Argentine police began investigating Yuzhamtorg9s activities® Newspapers had uncovered evidence that Yuzhamtorg was engaged in widespread dumping opera­ tions® Police raided the offices and arrested 150 persons of which thirty-one were quickly released®1® Torches were used in opening a safe in which the police hoped to find a secret code enabling them to translate the Russian docu­ ments® The contents of the safe revealed $1*000*000 of Soviet securities* Argentine money and receipts* and one receipt for $35*000 to Dr® Mario Guido * Vice Governor-elect

1 6® Alexander* p® 23®

17® New York Times* December 28* 1935* P® 6®

18® Ibid® * August 3* 19319. P® 5® . of Buenos Aires provinces, an attorney who drafted the corpo­ ration charter for Yuzhamtorg.in 1926 Minkin was in Montevideo on business when the office was raided® The Soviet Union had purchased Hereford bulls from Uruguay for breeding purposes9 These bullss descend­ ants of bulls brought to Uruguay from United States prairies9 numbered 250 and were obtained for $180 e a c h ® 20 Minkin indicated a desire to purchase more®

After the raids, Minkin was asked to return to Argentina for questioning® He was assured he would not be molested and could leave Argentina when he desired® But since the police gave no formal promise of not arresting him9 he decided to remain in Montevideo instructing his subordinates to conduct no business from the Buenos Aires office® It was announced shortly thereafter that Yuzhamtorg would move its offices to Montevideo®21 Now e^ty would be the main center of Communist activities in South America® It had been the main propaganda center for sev­ eral years already® Yuzhamtorg was organized as a limited liability corporation permitting commercial and financial operations 8 establishment of factories $, and acquisition of water r ig h ts ®22 Minkin remained the director® ' 19®".Ibid®® August 5c 1931$ P® 5® 20® Current History® March 1930» P® 1208®

21® Mew York Times® August 9$ 1931 $> p® 6® 22'®, Ibid®„ October 29$ 1931s p® 9® Several mesaishs /before Yiazham'borg was moved t© Montevideog, the Uruguayan government refused to guarantee eredlt arrangements and therefore8 turned down a proposed "barter plan® After it was anncranee& that Yuzhamtorg would transfer Its offices,' the Bank of the BepmTalle opened eredlt in favor of ..Yuzhamtorg, and the government began considering-the plan® Breeding animals and hides were to. be traded for Bussian gasoline at the price ©f 53 United

States cents per gallon® The tariff would make it 1 0 e8 cents, yet this still represented a-great saving®jn the final agreement,- the Soviets planned to import 3 ,0 0 0 bulls, 25©i»000 hides, million pounds of wo&l and all the easein Uruguay eould produce, while Uruguay agreed to purchase 3 8 ©00 $ 00© pesos worth of Soviet gasoline and kerosene ■

In justifying the lenieney shown to the Soviet

Union and Yuzhamtorg, Uruguay8s Foreign Minister, Dr. Juan Garles Blanco, wrote to JosS/:Hiehleig, the Uruguayan Charge de Affairs in Washington, that "communism cannot prosper in Uruguay because the laws ©f the country guaranteed the rights of the workers and offered him a great measure ©f well-being® -A majority of agents who came to Uruguay left convinced good sense and masses-of workers made Uruguay a

23% Ibid®» August 14, 1931, p® 8® 24® Ibid®, October:29, 1931s P® 9« poor field for propaganda®,r^ He denied that Uruguay was a ©enter of agitation and propaganda activities® On the contraryg more propaganda came into Uruguay than went out®

Furthermore8 the Communist Party there was very small and lacked leaders® Howeverg it was probably the economic and financial situation of the time that prompted Uruguay to seek increased relations with the Soviet Union since markets were difficult to find® The Uruguayan economy was largely dependent upon foreign trade8 so allowing Yuzhamtorg to establish itself in Montevideo seemed like a propitious thing to do regard­ less of the internal problems in the country® ' In view of the increasing trade relations® the Uruguayan Foreign Minister® Alberto Manet® sent the follow­ ing telegram to the Soviet Foreign Office on August 1 1® 1933 s I am glad to inform you that in , view of the increasing trade relations between Uruguay and the Soviet Union my government has decided to establish permanent diplomatic representatives in the U.S.SoB. on the basis.of the telegrams of August 21 and 2 2® 1926® At the same time my government proposes that a trade treaty be concluded between the two countries and trusts that this will receive a favorable response on the part of your government®26

25® Ibid®, July k;, 1932® p® A®

26® Leonard Shapiro (ed®)9 Soviet Treaty Seriess 1929-1939®-(Washingtons Georgetown University Press® 1955K Vol® II® p® 75s 25 On August 13$ 1933s the Acting People®® Commissar for Foreign Affairs 9 He Kr est insky $ replied.# In answer to your telegram of August 1 1g I am glad to inform you that the Government of the U.@,,SeB.. has taken due note of the decision 06 the Uruguayan government to establish a permanent diplo­ matic representative in the Ueg.S.B. and the;UoSeSaRe will, in turn, appoint a diplomatic representative to Montevideo@ In addition I am glad to inform you that the Soviet government accepts the proposal of the government of Uruguay to enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a trade treaty between the U.S.S.B. and Uruguay®27

In accordance with the agreements, an Uruguayan mission arrived in Moscow in March 193^H and two months later a Soviet mission arrived in Montevideo8 ^8 Alexander Minkin was appointed minister of the legation®

In connection with the desire expressed in the exchange of the above two telegrams to continue and expand trade relations, a trade agreement between the two nations was signed in May 1935® In this treaty, the Soviet Union agreed to purchase Uruguayan products up to ten percent of the value of goods bf Soviet origin arriving In Uruguayan customs houses® Payments for this ten percent would be at the disposition of the Bank of the Republic and would be made at the official exchange rates to be established by a

"27% Ibid. 28® Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policys Vol® III, 1933=1941, (Londons Oxford University Press, 1953)s p® 1 6 0® , ■ 26 special exchange agreement® The commercial exchange would not be less than 100 s, 000 pounds sterling nor more than

300»000 pounds sterling although the amount could be increased by mutual consent929 Uruguay was to export hides, wool9 and livestock in exchange for liquid fuels from the

Soviet Union® This-treaty was to be very short-lived8 however®

In a rather confusing situation, Brazil charged the Soviet legation in Montevideo with dispatching revolutionary instructions to Luis Carlos Prestes, who was leading a re­ volt against the GetAlio Vargas government® The charge, which was made December 27, 1935® also accused Prestes, leader of the Alianza Libertador, of being in close contact with Alexander Minkin and receiving Soviet gold®30 As a result, Uruguay asked Minkin to leave the country and on the following day, severed diplomatic relations charging that the Soviet legation in Montevideo was directing and financing subversive communist agitation in other Latin American countries® The note, in part, asserted 68that the Soviet government instigated and supported the communist elements in Brazil through the agency ©f the Soviet mission to our government®t!31

*29® Shapiro, p® 128®

30® Current History, March 1936, Vol® 43, p® 637®

3 1® Degras, p® l6l® 27 In breaking relations* President Terra cited the Brazilian revolt as being led by a graduate of the Comintern® He added that the ?,Sovlet government cannot disclaim con­ nection with the Comintern and its revolutionary program in South America9 for Joseph Stalin opened and closed the last congress of the Comintern® We have proof that Minkin was organizing a revolution in Uruguay for next February or

M a r c h ® H32 The severance was also described as a precaution­ ary move against possible armed uprisings to protect the tourist business®

Minkin denied the charges to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister& Jos# Espalters declaring that no dependency existed between the Soviet government and the Communist International® Espalter handed back Minkinas denial note saying that Minkin no longer had diplomatic status in Uruguay ® Minkin then asked Uruguay for proof of the charges® This was considered undiplomatic® Uruguay, con­ sidering the matter closed, refused to discuss it any further® Reporting that the real reason for the break in relations was over the purchase of some cheese, Izvestia declared the followings The government will take measures to force Uruguay to prove its charges and implications of Comintern propaganda before the League of Mations® The Uruguayan

' " 32® Time® January 6, 1936, p® 20® 28 government possibly made its decision under pressure from Brazil and the Vatican0 and there are reports of special activity by the Italian mini­ ster to Uruguayo The anti-Soviet attacks by which Uruguay attempts to justify its decision only prove its helplessness in efforts to mask the absence of independence in Uruguay® Soviet citizens will do without Uruguayan cheese g, and Moscow will do without Uruguayan ministers®33 The Soviet Union protested the break at the League of Nations charging that Article XII of the Covenant had been broken® The Article stated that any member has the right to bring to the attention of the League any circum­ stance affecting international relations which threatens to disturb world peace9 and that any dispute likely to lead to a rupture of relations shall be submitted to arbi­ tration and judicial settlement by the League Council. It was a test ease as this was the first time that this type of complaint was brought up under Article XII. The Soviet minister to the League was Maxim Litvinoff® He quickly assured the League that the matter was being brought up only on principle as the Soviet Union was quite unaffected by a rupture of relations with such a remote country as Uruguay® He believed that the rupture was an "odious international act" because Uruguay did not proceed through the proper channels as outlined in the

Covenant of the League9 and the break was actually made

33o Literary Digest. January 119 1936» p® l4« 29 because of pressure from BraziX03^ Furthermores Litvinoff declared that the matter went back even earller6 He cited a discussion between the Soviet Minister in Montevideo and the Uruguayan Foreign Office in December 1935 concerning

Simon Radovitsky* an anarchist imprisoned in Uruguay on a charge of terrorist attempts0 Uruguay desired to deport Radovitsky to the Soviet Union on the grounds that he was born in Russia* But the Soviet Union refused to admit him since he was not a Soviet citizen* Litvinoff then pro­ duced a telegram from Minkin dated December 10,1935* The Uruguayan Foreign Minister tells me that the President of the Repub­ lic would consider himself compensated for our refusal to admit Radovitsky if we would buy 200 tons or so of Uruguayan cheesee I would recommend for the improvement of re­ lations with President Terra the purchase of a small consignment of cheese®35 The Soviet Union did not purchase any cheese, and

Litvinoff revealed another telegram from Minkin "proving"

Uruguay9s vexation® It was dated December 19, 1935® Uruguay has no complaint of incorrect conduct on the part of the Soviet mission in Montevideo or inter­ ference in the internal affairs of Uruguay or any other Latin American republic, but grievance over refusal to admit Radovitsky and buy c h e e s e ® 36

”34® Degras, p® 150.® 35® Arthur U s Pope, Maxim Litvinoff» (New York; L®B® Fischer, 1943), P® 397® 36e Ibid® 30 It seems likely$ howevers that if cheese really entered the pictures, it- would be worth almost any amount of cheese to maintain the Soviet8s only legation in South Americas Relations with Uruguay were not as unimportant as Litvinoff would have us believe® It would not be far­ fetched to conclude9 therefore? that the Uruguayan and Brazilian charges were valid® In answer to the charge that the Soviet legation sent large sums of money to Brazil in the form of checks payable "to order?M Litvinoff demanded that Montevideo reveal all his legations financial transactions to the League since those checks should have been returned to the Uruguayan bank upon which they were drawn® The request was refused by Dr® Alberto Guani? the Uruguayan delegate? who maintained that the break was in self-defense against possible civil war? and therefore? the League had nothing to do with it® . At this point? Brazil offered to provide Uruguay with additional proof of Soviet agents responsible for revolt in Brazil® B£>© police announced the arrest of a

Harry Berger? who allegedly was the resident director of Soviet activities in South America? and his Russian born wife®. He had entered Brazil on a United States passport which was being investigated® Police claimed to have found papers in his files throwing light on events leading to the expulsion of Minkin and evidence of intense propaganda 31 and plans to establish a revolutionary junta with Luis

Carlos Prestes as President03? With a note that seemed to be bordering almost on hysteria* the Bio police chief called Berger the "most dangerous communist we ever caught®" Back at the League* Litvinoff* in what was con­ sidered an undiplomatic move * began citing Encyclopedia Britanniea showing the history of Brazil and Uruguay to be one of political intrigue* uprisings* disorders, and mutinies, and therefore, they did not need any guidance of outsiders in these matters ® Uruguay requested the Council not to intervene on the grounds that war was not threatening® The question was referred to a committee headed by Dr® Hicolas Titulescu of Romania, Salvador de Madariaga of Spain, and P.R. Munch of Denmark® Soon the Soviets agreed to drop the charges leaving the issue to the judgement of world opinion® So the dispute was dropped from the Council agenda with a resolution expressing hope that the two would renew re­ lations and refrain from anything harmful to peace® Thus, the main issue of whether the League could act in such ruptures was left unanswered® Meanwhile, Alexander Minkin left Uruguay aboard the French steamer, Massilia, bound for Europe® The Soviets subsequently closed the Yuzhamtorg office in

37® Hew York Times, January 8, 1936, p® 7® 32 Montevideo$ the only Soviet trading company in Latin

A m erica®38

Revenge must have been sweet for Uruguay when in December 1939 she sent a note to the Secretary General of the League condemning the (Soviet Union for aggressive acts in Finland and demanding she be dropped from League member- ship® And the League acted swiftly in this instance after having proven itself ineffective in the face of Japanese9 Italian^ and German aggression earlier® From 1936 trade declined to almost nothings 39 and the PGU did not fare much better® In the 1938 elections$ pitting Terra8s brother-in-law against Terra8s son-in-laws a return to democracy was seen with the brother-in-laws Alfredo Baldomir$ the winner® The PGU polled about 5700 votes electing Eugenio GSmez to the Chamber of Deputies® GSmez was also the Secretary of the PGU- In conforming to the international line when the Hazi-Soviet Pact was signed in 1939s he was anti-British and anti-United States® He wanted. Uruguay to remain neutral in the European war® This attitude made relations between the communists and other elementss who were pro-ally, in the labor movement difficult® Treason charges were levied against all party members who disagreed with him® GSmez carried out a purge that was so severe the party was deprived of all its 38® Hew York Times® January 26$ 1936, P® 26® 39® See Appendix B® 33 leadership® The party was badly split as was the ease in other Latin American and European countries®

Uruguayan policy was decidedly anti-Nazi at the time® ' This is evidenced by the Graf Spee incident which took place December 1939® The Graf Spee was a German pocket battleship that was driven into the Montevideo harbor by British warships® Uruguay did not allow the

Graf Spee to make an extended stay for repairs9 so it had to be scuttled® CHAPTER 3

THE WAXING AND WANING 1942-1955

The Domestic Scene Since the Constitution of 1934 was proving unwork­ able, President Baldomir postponed the elections from March 1942 to November of that same year in order to revise the document® The main new feature was that political parties would be represented in direct proportion in the Senate® When the elections took place, Baldomir8s hand- picked successor, Juan JosS Amezaga» won through the peculiar Colorado handicap system® The Blanco opponent was perennial candidate, Luis Herrera, who was pro-Axis Amezaga was a firm friend of the United States® The German invasion of Russia had brought an about- face in the PCU which now became the most passionate sup­ porter of the Allied cause® Consequently, the PCU made gains in the elections, polling about 14,000 votes or three percent of the total, electing two candidates to the Chamber of Deputies® This was followed by success in the labor movement® A united trade movement was now possible® A new central organization, the UniSn General de Trabajadores (UGT), was founded under communist and socialist leadership® The " I® MacDonald, p® 491® 35 Secretary General was a OcmzHmistp Enrique Rodriguez of

the Shoemaker8s Unlon» and the Secretary of Social Affairs

was Juan A 0 Acu&a, the principal Socialist leadera2 This

new-found unity did not last long* A 19^3 strike announced

by the packinghouse workers was opposed by the communists

on the grounds it interfered with meat shipments to the

Soviet Union9 and therefore the strike was the work of

"Nazi agentso" The socialist-controlled unions withdrew

from the UGT since they supported the strike0 Many others

subsequently left0 By 19^5s> the UGT was completely a com­

munist body*

Riding the wave of pro-Allied sentiments the com­

munists reached their highest point of influence in 19^-6 0

The UGT claimed 50s000 members,,' The PGU scored the largest

gain of any party in the 1946 elections0 The Batllista

ticket of TomAs Berreta and Luis Batlle Berres won handily

over the PerSn supported Blanco candidates old faithful

Luis Herrerao The seventy year old Berreta died shortly

after the inaugurations so JosS Batlle8s nephew became

president although he never equalled the reputation of his

distinguished uncle0

The communists more than doubled their 1942 vote

by polling 33,000 votes'which represented about five per­

cent of the totals They won five seats in the Chamber of

Deputies and a Senate seat for the first time when Julia

2o Alexanders Communism in Latin American p 6 l43<> Arevalo de Roche won it0

With the advent of the Gold War, the tide turned against the communists® The WGT slipped in numbers and importance® By 1950 it was reduced to third in size and influence in Uruguay® A new central labor body that was non-communist, the Gonfederaci6n Sindical Uruguaya, was established in 1951° It was the largest, most impressive group for the entire decade®

Since a majority of the Uruguayan people were sympathetic to the West, they tired of the communists using their organizations for political purposes® Some favored strong measures to curb their activities prior to the election of 1 9 5 0 , but others did not want to do away with the tradition of Uruguayan liberty® Although the radio stations declined to sell time to the Communist Party, it had full freedom of speech, press, and assembly® The PCU candidate for president was their leader, Eugenio G8mez ®

He also became the candidate for the Senate when the party decided to drop their woman Senator in an attempt to obtain a forum for the number one Communist Party mouthpiece®^

The communists suffered a rout in the elections, losing their only Senate seat and having their representation in the Chamber of Deputies cut to three® The combined

Colorado vote once again defeated the Blanco candidate,

Herrera® Andris Martinez Trueba of the Batllista faction

” 3® Hew York Times, Movember 11, 1950, p® 6 ® 37 became presidentc On the defeat of the oomnmnists, Trueba said, ^For us, it was simply the logical thing. Remember that the antidote for communism is liberty

Uruguay voted on December 1951 to abolish the presidential system and return to a nine man executive council. The council would be elected for a four year term, and members of the majority would take turns act­ ing as President of the Council for a one year period. Six men would be from the majority party and three from the minority.

The council was formed for many incompatible reasons® Cesar Batlle pushed blindly after the goal defined by his father, Jos#, hoping at the same time to strike a blow at Luis Batlle, Luis Herrera, tired of his endless pursuit of the presidency, apparently decided that one-third of the loaf was better than n o n e ® 5 Most of the same defects were present as those in the 1918 constitution®

Uruguay seemed to be at the height of prosperity in 1950® At the same time, a further decline in communist strength was noted. Many of their strikes were dismal failures. They lost another seat in the Chamber of Depu­ ties in the 195^ elections® The party was wrought with factionalism from within® Its founder, Eugenio GSmez, was

Ibid., December 1, 1950? p, 13

5, Taylor, p. 15^° 38 purged on the charges of being a Stalinist and a "Yankee spy0M One of the results of this feuding was a further reduction of communist influence in the labor movement and a loss of what little political influence the party had lefto

Foreign Affairs with the Soviet Union

Uruguay announced readiness to renew diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1942 if the United

States would negotiate between the two0 Secretary of

State, Cordell Hull, expressed willingness to help.

In January 1943a Alberto Guani journeyed to Wash­ ington as Foreign Minister even though he was to be inaugu­ rated as vice president on March 1® Guani hoped to obtain a loan from the United States of 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,000 Uruguayan pesoso The money would be used for public works projects to relieve threatened unemployment® He also had plans to confer with Maxim Litvinoff, then Soviet Ambassador to

Washington® Stopping in H£o on the way to the United

States, Guani, who was described as bald, rumpled, and

Falstaffian, had the following to say on the possibility of renewing relations with the Soviet Unions

Uruguay broke diplomatic and com­ mercial relations with the Soviet Union in 1936o Now, however, the situation is com­ pletely different0 The Soviet Union is playing a preponderant role in the battle against Nazi Germany 0 Uruguayan people do

60 One peso equalled 53o50 cents® not understand why we do not maintain diplomatie relations with this country0 I cannot see any inconvenience in the re-establishment of relations with the Soviet Uniono7 While in Washington* Guam! received a credit of

120*000*©00 from the Export-Import Bank and an assurance of a sixteen percent increase in the supply of liquid fuel from the United .States 0 His talks with Litvinoff were also successful for on January 2?* an exchange of notes re-estab­ lished diplomatic and commercial relations between the Soviet Union and Uruguay„^ The agreement was signed by the President and all members of the cabinet 0 Popular sentiment had strongly supported the Soviet Union for her heroic stand against the Germans 0 Uruguay named sixty- three year old Emilio Frugomi* long time socialist leader* as envoy to Moscow* The Soviet Minister* Sergei Orlov* arrived in Montevideo in March 19*MK but he died a few months later*9 By 19^6* the Soviet Union had forty-six registered diplomats in Uruguay„ Even the gardener* cook* ID chauffeur* wives * and children had diplomatic visas* The reason given for everyone having diplomatic immunity was that the Russians were so far from home and in an 7* Time* February 1* 19^3» p* 25o

8* Robert M@ Slusser and Jan F* Triska* Calendar of Soviet Treaties* (Stanford University Press* 1959) s P<* 153®

9® Times (London) * October 2 6* 19#-* p* 4* 10* La Premsa* January 3* 1966* p* 1* unfriendly atmosphere ®

In February 19^5 Uruguay joined the United Nations following her declaration of war on the Axis powers 0 As

Berlin fell in May, there were large popular street demon­ strations o There were speeches by President Amezaga, United

States Ambassador, William Dawson, and. the Bussian Minister,

Nikolai Gorelkin0 Mobs stoned the buildings of the news­ papers, El Dia and El Debate« when they refused to hoist the Bussian flag beside the United States and British flagso

Interior Minister, Juan J = Carvajal, blamed these dis­ turbances that injured forty-three people and destroyed much property on local communist fanaticism. He emphasized that he was not blaming the Soviet Union or Embassy,H

The highpoint in Soviet diplomatic relations was reached with Latin America in 1946, By that year, fifteen of the twenty republics had extended recognition to the

Soviet Union, The exceptions were Haiti, Honduras, Peru,

Panama, and Paraguay,3-2 Resident Soviet missions were established in eight of the fifteen countries.

Following these lines of goodwill, a three-year most-favored-nation treaty of friendship, trade, and navi­ gation was signed in Moscow in the Spiridonovka Palace by

Emilio Frugoni and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade,

Anastas Mikoyan, on August 9» 1946, It gave the Soviet

1 1 , New York Times, May 26, 1945, p, 5®

12, Poppino, p, 194, 41

Union the right to a tradre mission in Montevideo consisting of one representative, two assistants, and twenty clerks„

The Soviets were to ship oil, timber, and coal in exchange for meat, fats, hides, vegetable oil, and wool, Uruguay was also entitled to establish a trade mission in MoscoWo-^

The treaty was never ratified by Uruguay0

With the unfolding of the Gold War in 1947& the trend was reversed, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic severed diplomatic relations with the

Soviet Union.^ Uruguay did not follow suit, but her legation in Moscow was closed. The Soviet mission in Monte­ video remained open. Once again Brazil charged that com­ munist instructions were coming into that country from

Uruguay0 Brazil accused Luis Carlos Prestos, leader of the

Brazilian communists, of crossing the Uruguayan-Brazilian border to evade police and receive instructions from Moscow.

Uruguay later refused to give asylum to Eresteso-45

In 1950* the communist dominated Latin American

Labor Confederation (CTAL) met in Montevideo at the time of a serious wool strike. It was presided ever by the pro- communist Mexican, Vicente Lombardo Toledan©. The confer-

13o Mew York Times, August 1 0 , 1946, p. 6 .

14. Robert J . Alexander, "Latin America and the Communist Bloc," Current History, February 1963, p. 73=

15= Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairss 1947-1948„ (Londons Oxford University Press, 42 enee resolved to oppose the pending ratification of a

United States^Uruguayan trade pacto There was much ado

about the Mglorious wool strike" and the "Yankee imperialist

enemy o

Following along this line of thinking, the com­ munists demonstrated a few months later outside the United

States Embassy yelling for peace and for the United States

to get out of Korea* They were supposed to be demonstrating

in sympathy with the striking metal workers a1? A com­ munist sponsored international peace congress that was to be held in Montevideo was banned for fear of extending communist activities in Uruguay* A Moscow broadcast declared that it took place anyway*^®

In August 1952» Moscow Radio announced that the

Soviet Minister to Uruguay, M*V* Gorelkin, had been re­

lieved of his post under a decree of the Supreme Soviet*^

He was to be succeeded by Mr* V.Y. Yerofeev* A comment by

Drew Pearson that the new representative was being sent to direct communist propaganda in Latin America led to consider­ able debate in the Uruguayan Senate* Instead of opposing

the appointment, it was decided that if Yerofeev engaged

16* Mew York Times* March 29, 1950» P° 23*

17* Ibid** September 139 1950» P® 20*

1 8 * Ronald Hilton (ed*), Hispanic American Report* May 1952, p* 44*

19o Times (London), August 7, 1952, p* 4* 43 in 11 anti-nai?ionalM activities g he would be sent home® ^

The communists continued their activity0 They demonstrated against the military assistance pact that Uruguay signed with the United Stateso Students stoned the United States EmbassyB the pro=United States daily news­ papers „ El Dia and El Pals„ the Universityp and Hotel Victoria Plaza, which caters to American tourists, in protest of developments in Guatemalao

In 19539 Uruguay was suffering from an unfavorable balance of trade, Tourism was down because of the travel restriction PerSn placed on Argentinians going to Uruguay, Wool sales were down since the United States slapped an eighteen percent duty on Uruguayan wool, 21 Efforts to develop trade between the Soviet Union and Uruguay yielded significant results when a trade and payments agreement was signed in 195^» and heavy purchases of meat were made.

The industrial and economic planning set forth by the

Soviet bloc was appealing to an underdeveloped state.

Support for the trade overtures was also carried on through propaganda, pressure of local communist groups, cultural exchanges, fairs, and.exhibits. For example, the Soviet

Union sent two cultural delegations to Uruguay and held a film festival there at which some of the Soviet8s best

20, Hispanic American Report, September 1952, p, 37e

21, Ibid,o June 1953, P« 33, 44 films were shown0 22 But proving more destructive than any of the preceding were the United States restrictions on certain commodity imports and the downward trend of prices of raw materials and agricultural products0

Trade with the Soviet Union appeared attractive for several reasons0 A natural trading position seemed to exist since the Soviet Union was short on food and longer on capital goods while Uruguay was long on agricultural products and short on capital goods0 The appeal of an untapped market for her vast agricultural surpluses that had been accumulating because of the inelasticity of

Western markets had helped the Soviet Union make the agreemento

The pact signed in 1954- was an agreement between the Bank of the Republic and the State Bank of the UoSoSoRo and was to be good for two years with an automatic renewal unless disapproved by either countryo Uruguay was to im­ port ©il» eoal8 newsprint, chemical products, machinerye and lumbers and export meat* raw hidesg and w o o l 4^3 Doubt was expressed as to the Bank8s authority to sign such an agreement without the approval of legislation;,

Their trading arrangements usually take the form of barter or bilateral agreements specifying an exchange H I FT Bowen Ivans (ed0)s Worldwide Communist Propaganda Activities„ (New Yorks Macmillans 1955)» P° 2080

23» Slusser and Triska, Pc 315o 45 of goods and balancing at the end of the contract periodo

Bilateral agreements are preferred by non=>dollar countries since they rarely have actual cash payments„ Because the fixed trade agreements offered by the West left Uruguay with less and less foreign earnings for securing importsg a barter arrangement proved ideal since industrial com­ modities could be paid for with raw material (agricultural) surpluses so abundant in USmgu&y* Uruguay6s motives for trading with the Soviet Union are predominantly economic*

Finding new sources for exports and imports, conserving foreign exchange, obtaining credit on favorable terms, and alleviating the surplus problem are Uruguay8s main objectives* The UoSeS.B»;"8s motives are both economic and political*

Payments agreements may take the form of cash deal­ ings* A clearing account credit in favor of the Soviet bloc country must exist in the Uruguayan Mational Bank before that country will issue export licenses and only then up to the amount of the credit* Thus, at no time does Uruguay owe the bloc countries, and she exports to Ok them only what she owes them* The clearing' account sterling can also be used in third countries which is a good arrangement for Uruguay* What this actually amounts to is convertibility for the clearing account currency*

24* Robert Loring Allen, Soviet Economic Warfare* (Washingtons Public Affairs Press, i9 6 0 ),' p* 101* In an inter-bank agreement such as the 195^ pact p the account is maintained in sterling in the Uruguayan bank,, and Uruguay may debit the account for purchases or may pay in sterlingo Soviet deposits8 arising from her purchases, will be matched by Uruguayan import quotas but not necessarily imports0 Prices are usually quoted in free world currencies and are related to the world market or free world prices0 The degree they conform to world market prices depends on whether the Soviet bloc will offer special prices for political purposes or the bargaining strength of the free world trader

The Soviet Union extends credit at a very low interest rate of 2 05 percent per annum which is much lower than what the West offers0 Some say it is done to give the impression of making businesslike deals so it would appear as if no strings were attachedo^? Yet trade is more actively promoted than aid in Latin America by the

Soviet Uniono As of 1958, the UeSoSeB, had no known pro­ gram for providing technical training in Uruguay»

There are disadvantages to trading with the Soviet bloc e ©ne is that Uruguay8s exports are often underpriced

25o Ibidon p 0 102®

26® Raymond F 0 Mikes ell and Jack N 0 Behrman, Financing Free World Trade with the Sino-Sovlet Bloc, (Princeton, Hew Jerseys Princeton University Press, 1958), p 0 7©o

2?o U.So, Department of State, Communist Economic Policy in the Less Developed Areas, July I960, p 0 15o while imports from the Soviet bloc are overpriced* An example of this is that when wool shipments created a large export surplusp Uruguay wished to reduce the balance by buying Polish coal which was priced higher than the world market price0 This appeared to be a big advantage for the Communist bloc* but the coal was paid for with export surpluses which otherwise could not have been utilized at all* In the Uruguayan view, a usable com­ modity, coal, was secured in lieu of an otherwise unusable surplus * 28

28* Rudolf Ko Jansen, "Sino-Soviet Trade with Latin America," Some Aspects of Latin American Trade Policiess Three Essays, (Austins University of Texas PressT^19^Wr^T%3T"^ GHAPTKH 4

i m i s OF eaisis 1955-1966

Uruguay8 s Political and Economic Situation .Many problems have been blamed for Uruguay8 s economic and political woes in the past decade0 It became evident that the National Executive Cornell was an unwieldy piece of governmental machinery because it was characterized by a lack of discipline, cooperation, and dynamic leadership* It proved to be hampered by indecision and ineffectiveness because of its weak organizational structure0 In addition, the economy has been in a state of stagnation since 1955p and the government proved unable to cope with the situation*

Until 19589 the Colorados had been in power contin­ uously for ninety-four years * At that time, they were badly split, while the Blancos had undergone a number of changes„ Luis Herrera was joined by the Liga Federal de Acoi&i Rural or Mrural!stas1’ led by Benito Nardone* The Blancos won since the people were becoming impatient with the economic difficulties the country was experiencing* The Blanco coalition was inherently weak* Herrera died a month after the inauguration so a struggle for power ensued*^ 49 Adding to the problems» torrential rains hit at the same time destroying livestock and crops and flooding the hydro­ electric plant on the R$o Begro, the comitry8s main source of electricityo

Boasting a significant middle class» Uruguay was considered a relatively prosperous Latin American country for the first half of the twentieth century» Great econ­ omic growth was experienced up to the 1 9 3 ® rs "by stressing agricultural exports for English markets, The 19366 s to the 1 9 5 © 8s saw a reversal of the growth trend and a concen­ tration on "building up national industry0 A series of reverses since 1955 has stagnated the economy0

Marblet, building stone, gravel, and land are Uruguay®s main and almost only natural resources0 Of these, land is the most important0 Eighty percent of the low, gently rolling countryside is suited for agriculture and grazing®

Therefore, agricultural products make up ninety-seven per­ cent of her exports, and of that, ninety percent is livestock products such as meat, wool, skins, and hidesUnfortunately, after the Korean Mar, Uruguay became alarmed at her depend­ ence on Argentina for wheat and decided to produce wheat hers&lf, go production shifted to the inefficient growing of wheat at the expense of the cattle industry®

2o U.S., Department of Commerce, Basic Data on the Economy of Uruguay, (Overseas Business Reports), December 1963a P= 2® 50

Uruguay has fallen behind in modern farming te®h- niqmeso Investments in machinery9 fertilizers» and pest­ icides have been inadequate8 consequently resulting in low yieldso Since land is inexpensive (one hectare equals the price of a steer)» it is often cheaper to buy more land than make technological improvements0 Howeverg ?4o4 per­ cent of the agricultural population is made up of landless rural workers.9 Efforts to introduce better grasses for grazing have been slow indeed® The need for far-reaching agrarian reforms has been recognized* and the Commission for Investments and Economic Development (GIBE) recently published the following proposals s

I® End existing inequalities in the size of landholdings®

2® Stabilize the currency and end inflation®

3® Pass administrative reforms in government and public corporations®

4® Enact financial reforms including the establishment of a central bank to regulate monetary expansion®^

But the weak political system has been unable to correct the situation® Profits of crop and cattle pro­ duction are siphoned off through the exchange policies and uneven taxation which penalizes investments in agri­ culture and livestock while giving manufacturing favored

3® Victor Alba* Alliance without Allies* (lew York a Praeger* 1965)» P® 42 ®

4® Socolow* p. 2?4® 51 treatmento5 Industries are highly protected at the expense of efficiencyj, productiveness „ and the consumer while business practices are conservative and antiquated0

Many of Uruguay’s industries and eoamiunications systems were developed by foreign investors„ largely Britishs

Half of Uruguay8s industrial output centers on processing agricultural and animal products„ In this land of cattle and horsesp leather is naturally a major producta The tourist trade provides for a substantial part of the national income with about eighty=five percent of the visitors coming from Argentinao

The government owns or controls several businesses such as public utilitiesp communications6 and entertainment0

There are autonomous administrations that control monopolies such as the AdministraciSn.Haeional de Combustibles„

Alcoholes» and,Portland (AHGAP;) which refines all the country8s imports of petroleum and has a monopoly on cement, alcohol* and other fuels0 -

An example of a large company free from state control is the Establecimientos Frigorlficos del Gerro* S.A.

When two United States companies* Swift and Armour* closed their meat-packing plants in Montevideo in 1957» they were acquired by the workers and put back into operation<, It has been fought by the communists and extreme right 0 It

5 o' David Go Bedding* ’’Economic Decline of Uruguay* ” Inter-American Economic Affairs * %%* Spring 196 7» P<> 58 o lacks working capital and does not have the necessary support

of the free world0 Even though It received an A-i rating from the United States Army Inspectorp the armed forces have not purchased a single pound of meat there while the

Soviet Union bought 20p000 tons from the Haclonal and Castro plants

Other industries include textiles, tires, building materials, metal working, electrical equipment, shoe manu­ facturing, and ceramicss -Their performance has been disap­ pointing with the exception of the tire industry 0 So failure to invest in and improve raw material production has limited Uruguay8s growth in the international market„

Her goods are further unable to compete with world prices because of rising labor costs and inflation#

Uruguay has been hard pressed by rapid price inflation, an increasing money supply and continual peso devaluation, foreign trade deficits, and a stationary GRP

(see Table 2 on the following page), not to mention floods, droughts, strikes, and unemployment0 Uruguay is hampered by expenditure levels which are politically irreducible and revenue levels that are difficult to expand07 The entire economic situation seems to one vicious cycle after another0

Government budget deficits are due to subsidization of public enterprises and excessive public personnel, Twenty-

*" 6 0 Alba, p 0 189o 53 five percent of all workers are in some branch of the govern- mento The legislature continues to approve budgets for state enterprises without having sufficient funds0

TABLE 2

URUGUAY°S GNP 1955-1963*

. 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963** bilo cur, 4,59 5ol5 6 = 10 606O 8 = 84 13.54 17.26 18o83 22.47 pesos bilo 1955 4=59 4=8? 5o02 4=62 4=45 4=89 5.10 5.03, 4=96 JBSsqg.

**The statistics for 1964, 1965o and 1966 were not available0

The high cost of welfare is a major economic internal problem0 To some extent the entire country de­ pends of the government which has committed itself more than almost any other to the welfare of the average Citizen,

There is no increasing taxable income or administrative machinery to collect and distribute it, yet the number of people eligible for the variety of welfare programs continues to grow. Retired persons currently make up eleven percent of the population,^ Obviously, attempts to readjust the

. ■ welfare laws are impossible due to political considerations.

In the 1962 elections, the Blancos were returned to office by a slim majority and without a majority in the

80 Soeolow, p'o 274, 54 Chamber of Deputies0 They had not been smecessful in solving the economic problems® Since 1962, the rate of

Inflation has been particularly severe (see Table 3)0

There has been an acute shortage of money, and the gold reserves became nonexistent6

TABLE 3

URUGUAY8S RATE OF INFLATION 1963-1966*

19%%— r rate of yearly 33o. 85$ inflation *These rates were compiled from Soeolow, p 0 274, New York Times (November 29, 1966) p® 42, and International Commerce (March 15, 1965) Po 39o

The government attempts to combat inflation through peso devaluation® For example, in 1955 there were four pesos to a dollar, but by 1966, it took sixty-four pesos to make a dollar®^ Especially critical was 1963 because of an industrial depression (see Table 4 on the following page)c

The year 1965 further stunned Uruguayans with a severe drought, a series of prolonged national strikes, and a sordid bank scandal®

Uruguay is greatly dependent on earning foreign exchange for necessary imports such as oil, iron, and steel through the sale of agricultural.exports ® But Uruguay has failed to realize her full export potential in the past decade® She turned inward and ceased to be a vigorous

9® Ibid®, pc 55 B©mpetit©r0 so naturally her competitors te'enefitted. De­ clining export earnings made it more difficult to pay for imported goods o How she is burdened with foreign exchange obligations running into hundreds of millions of dollars„

However,, the government successfully refinanced the foreign debt in If65 which has helped a little®

TABLE 4

THE SLUMP IS INDUSTHIAL ©UTPUT BETWEEN 1956 and If62*

1961=]LOO

Output of8 1956 1962

Textile plants** 140 o0 8f 0 0

Food products 115 08 101® 7

Shoes and garments 128® 4 8?®9

Construction 12612 86® 2

ew York"Times» January - 22® lf6^n p a 70® ♦♦Textiles, food, and clothing make up seventy- five percent of the industrial output®

Unrestricted importing has allowed luxury items such as televisions in to worsen the deficit® To help alleviate the situation, many so-called unnecessary imports like vacuums, refrigerators, and ears have been barred®

The state has clearly promised more than,it can deliver being increasingly unable to pay the high cost of its version of the good life® The tax system is irrational and incompetently managed® Labor is continually demanding

10® See Appendix G for bal&mee of trade chart® more through strikes while Uruguay already cannot compete for markets because she is a high cost producer* The burden falls on the cattle and sheep raisers because that is the only natural resource able to earn the foreign exchange the country needs to maintain its living standards* Probably in no other country does a city dominate a country as Monte­ video dominates Uruguayp but for the country8s true interests the focal point must be rural* H

That political and economic changes were needed was evident* Frustration was quite obvious in the last two rotating presidencies of Washington BeltrSn and Alberto

Heber respectively* Both of the major political parties agreed by this time that the collegiate system of govern­ ment was outmoded and unworkable* A proposal was made to return to a presidential type of government giving the Presi­ dent the power to dissolve Congress and institute urgent legislation if Congress does not act within thirty days*

The voters accepted the proposal in the November

1966 elections which took place in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy* So the Council disappeared for a second time because of economically difficult times* Perhaps» the disillusionment with the Council form will now finally be complete* Retired army general». ©soar D* Gestido* a Colorado was elected President*

11* Taylord p* 155°

1 2 * See Appendix D for election returns* The following steps have already been taken in an attempt to stabilize the economy8

lo Devaluation of the peso*

2 0 Simplification of the exchange system@

3o Restraint for wage increases0

& 0 Restriction on the growth of credito

5o Liberalization of imports9

It is too early to tell, if the reforms will be effectiveo At any rate* the economic and political problems will not be rectified in a matter of months0

Activities of the PSU

The eosmranists have been accused of adding to the political and economic difficulties by keeping the country in an almost constant state of turmoil through strikesD public demonstrations„ meetings 6 and protests over every imaginable national and international issue0 Ninety percent of the labor force belongs to the GonfederaeiSn Trabajadores de Uruguay (GTU) which was launched by the communists in

19^©,13 Yet most of the rank and file belong either to the

Blanc© or Golorad© Parties0 It seems to be a well- organ­ ized,, well-financed group supplied with funds not necessari­ ly originating in UruguayThe growing economic and politi­ cal crises in Uruguay aided the GTU in becoming dominant0

""" 1 % HoeolOWj, Po 275 a

lAo Alexander5 Organized Labor in Latin America8 Po 59o 58 Howeverp labor eontrlbmtes to the ecomomie problems because their wage demands are continually met adding to the vicious cycle of inflations and at the same time?- attempts to balance the budgets devalue the peso* and restrict credit have met sharp resistance through a rash of strikes0 The PCU drew an outsized vote in the 1958 elections as a protest party0

Beside strike agitation* the Uruguayan communists try to hit home politically by concentrating on the theme of nationalism blaming the United States for everything that has gone wrong in Uruguay® The Soviet Union demon­ strated appreciation and showed the importance of this objective by sending four delegates to the PGU®s Eighteenth

Party Congress held in Montevideo in July 1 9 6 2 ®^5 Alexei

Rumiantsev* a member of the Soviet Union8s Central Com­ mittee* declared in a speech before the Congresss

The PCU is one of the fighting detachments of the world army of com­ munists who struggle for peace* work* liberty* equality* fraternity* and the happiness of all the peoples 0 It realizes a consistent Marxist-Leninist policyo It determinedly fights against the revisionists* dogmatists* sectarians * and other opportunists ® Between the CPSU and PCU exist truly fraternal relations*^

The PCU is generally pro-Soviet although by 1963 pro-Chinese elements were reportedly active within the

1 5 o See Appendix E for a list of the delegates ®

16s Jules Dubois* Operation Americas The Com­ munist Conspiracy in Latin America* (Mew Yorks Walkerand Co 0 * 19^3)* p® 2 2 1 e 59 partye Jaime Perez and Bo&ney Arismendi of the Politburo are pro-Moscow, while Enrique Rodriguez, a Senator, and

Eduardo Viera, editor of the Communist newspaper, El Popular» are reportedly pro-Chinese or at least advocates of violent revolution,!?

Deep divisions occurred within many of the Latin

American Communist Parties after the Cuban crisis in 19620

Three distinct tendencies appeared among the extreme lefts

ls Party-liners loyal to Moscow0

20 Castroite nationalists or the Jacobin left disappointed in Moscow and having pro-Chinese sympathies but not willing to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the Chinese cause,

3, The Maoists,!®

That the PCU8s goal seems to be promoting chaos in

Uruguay and thus hampering the constructive policies the government might formulate was evidenced at the Nineteenth

Party Congress held in Montevideo in August of 1966, The meeting, coinciding with the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Uruguay and

U,S,SoRo, was jubilantly opened by Jaime Perez who extended official greetings to. Ho Chi Minh? the Vietnamese people; the Latin American communists; the Soviet delegates,

17o Tad Szulc, Minds of Revolution, (New York; Praeger, 1 9 6 5 )» M.,

18, Erast Halperin, ’’Latin America,M Interaational Communism after Khrushchev, Leopold Labedz (ed,)~ (Cambridge; MIT University Press, 1965)d P° 162, Vasslli Tolstlkov and llizar Kmz©v$ the Ombaa revolutionaries;

Fidel Castro? and the workers6 organizations0 The ©onferenee denoianeed what it ©ailed United States intervention in katin imeriea and other parts of the world and deelared the Al­ liance for Progress a failure0 Rodney Arismendi ©ailed for widespread labor demonstrations and work stoppages in Sep­ tember* He urged more agitationg more propaganda in making every factory a ©itadel®^ The congress closed with shouts of "long live the international proletariate Cuba Si's Viet­ nam Sip solueiones sSp and golpes no*"2©

The PCU received 6©05^1 votes in the 1#66 elections gaining one Senate seat for a total of two and four Chamber seatso This represents a 20»000 vote increase over l#62g but was short of the PCU6s hopes to double that total; They received about five percent of the total vote cast*

Communist Strategy

Soviet interest in Latin America is political and has increased greatly since Stalin6s death* Latin America used to be thought of as being in the hip pocket of the

United Statesg but it is now considered as the great new OT front of the national liberation movement0 The revolution

ip „ Copley News Service * September 2 g 1966g p8 S®

20® La Prensa* August 15o 1 9 6 6 g p® 2 0

21o J® Gregory Oswald, "Soviet Image of Contem­ porary Latin America," (Unpublished manuscript), University of Arizona, 196?0 61

need net be violent particularly in countries like Brazil»

Argentinap Uruguayp Chile, and Mexico where there is a

relatively high.level of political sophistication and stan­

dard of livings There the road to communism is to cooperate

with the “progressive bourgeoisie1’ and exploit the rising

sentiments for nationalism and against economic imperialisms

This means cooperation with all political organizations g

labor unions, and social classes which oppose United States

imperialism®22 This has taken place recently in Uruguay

particularly in the labor movement®

The Kremlin also prefers a step by step approach

encouraging diplomatic, trade, and cultural relationsQ She

seeks to mobilize political and public opinion in Latin

America in favor of close relations with the Soviet bloc

through the propaganda media of press, radio, films, liter­

ature, exchange programs, and friendship societies0 It

appears that the communists do not believe they can take

over Latin America by revolution and even if they could,

Moscow has learned by experience with Cuba how much it costs

to support an underdeveloped country.

The communists have tried to capitalize on all of

the following components of social revolutions

I, Economic development®

20 Glass realignmento

3o Political democracy,

22o Ibid® ko Nationalism0

The eomniUBists tried to bring a new radieal brand of negative nationalism to Latin America» the nature of which is Isolationistg autarchist, separatist, antiquarian, and symbolisticIt was largely anti=>imperialistic and resentful of foreign ownership® Negative nationalism has only aggravated unsolved economic, cultural, and social problems, so it is losing its appeal particularly among the new generationo

The goals of the Soviet Union now are to increase trade by showing the Communist bloc as a limitless market, establish diplomatic relations wherever possible, and take advantage of any unrest so as to loosen ties with the United

States and lead the Latin American country to neutralism and then hopefully, pre-Commumist policies0

Uruguay*8 Trade Relations with the Soviet Union.

Trade between the Sino-Soviet bloc and the rest of the world is both a political weapon and an aspect of peace­ ful e©=ezistemeeo The Soviet Union uses trade and economic aid, helped by two m o d e m methods of economic infiltration, advertising and propaganda, in the drive to win political influence® The propaganda themes are predominantly anti-

23® -Victor Alba, “Communism and Nationalism in Latin America,” Problems of Communism, (Washington: Govern­ ment Printing Office, VII, September-Oeteber 1958), pp® 24- United States0 For example, some of these might he that the United States controls export prices and keeps hatin

American products artificially depressed, that the United

States spends more on economic aid in Europe than in Latin

America, and that the United States exploits natural re- s o u r c e s s 24 The Soviet plan is also comprised of credits, technical aid, trade agreements, and commercial penetration in order to weaken ties with the West and demonstrate Soviet goodwill®

Bilaterally planned trade with the Soviet bloc is subject to more erratic fluctuations than mon-plamned trade between free world countries0 For example, in a statistical comparison between target trade values stipulated in trade and payments agreements and actual trade values for 1953°

1956 with Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, the percentage of actual Soviet imports was forty-nine percent and exports forty-seven percent®25

In 1956, Uruguay signed a three-year inter-govern­ ment most-favored-natiom trade, commerce, and navigation pact with the Soviet Union® The account was to be maintained in United States dollars in the central bank of each country®

In case of a $2,6©0,OOO balance for a period of one year, measures would be taken to liquidate within thirty days, or

*" 24® WTSo Information Agency, Communist Propagandas A Fact Book, (Washingtons GPU, 1959)» P* 97®

2 5 ® Mikesell, p® 79® 6k

if ever $4»©©O»©60» within ninety days® Sums in the account

could fee used to pay other countriesp and the final balance would fee liquidated in convertible currencies 0 ^ The agree= ment called for balanced trade with no quotas® Uruguay was to export feutterfl beefp wools muttons and hides» and the

Soviets were to export petroleum and petroleum products» coals and industrial equipment0 This coincided with the opening of a Soviet trade bureau in Montevideo0

It appears that the Soviet offer was premature because the agreement was never ratified fey Uruguay0 How- evers trade continued under the non-governmental lf$k agree­ ment between the State Bank of the UoSoSoBo and the Bank of the Republico Uruguay must expand her agricultural and raw material exports in order to finance essential imports such as oils ir©n9 steels and industrial equipment<, The Soviet bloc capitalized on the situation by making a number of well-publicized offers to take surplus commodities in return for imports needed by Latin American countries0 By

1958s Uruguay had six trade agreements in force with the

Soviet Union in Addition to agreements with Czechoslovakia0

Romania» Bulgaria9 East Germany0 Hungary, and Poland (see

Table 5 ®b the following page)0

©11 has beedme an important factor in Soviet com­ mercial and political relations with Uruguay since she has increased demands for oil and less ability to pay in cash*

z 6 0'" Allens p 0 102® The United States» Venezuelap and the Middle East have been reluetant t© sell ©il exeept fer dollars0 So in 1 9 $ 8 v the

Soviet Union offered oil and refining equipment at discounts below international prices with an attractive payment pro- vision* The contract was for lt255»-®0® barrels o^? In effect» this deal was a barter because the Soviet Union agreed to buy

Uruguay8s wool crop* Shortly after the agreement was con­ cluded » the Uruguayan tanker, ANGAP III, arrived in Monte­ video with a shipment of crude oil from the Soviet Union*

TABLE 5

ESTABLISHED NUMBER OF TRADE AMD PAYMENTS AGREEMENTS IN FORCE BETWEEN URUGUAY AND THE SOVIET BLOC* 1957 ____ lumber of 3 5 5 6 7 agreements *¥0800 Department of State» Slno-Soviet Economic Offensive in Less Developed Countries* May 1958, pe 4-0o

Purchasing oil from the Soviet Union has been justified in the following waysa

I* Oil shortages are eased*

2* Dollars are conserved for other im­ portant items since the oil is usually obtained by barter*

3* Markets are found for existing surpluses of raw materials * 2°

2 7 o Hispanic American Report* August 1958» P* 3^2*

28* Clifford F* ©wen, %U*8 * and Soviet Relations with Underdeveloped Countriess Latin Americas A Case Study,M Imter-Amerioan Economic Affairs, (I960, XIV), P* 89* As a consequence of the oil dealings0 the Soviet

Union replaced Great Britain as Uruguay8s principal pur­

chaser of wool in 19580 Wool production had reached a

peak in 195^ that has never been matched, probably because

of the change to wheat production* The lagging wool sales

in western markets helped provide the Soviet Union with a

basis for making economic approaches 0

Considerable publicity was given to the Soviet

Union®s becoming the main wool buyer* Soviet Deputy For­

eign Minister, Vassily V* Kuznetsev, visited Uruguay in lay 19580 At a press conference, he noted the friendly

feelings of the Uruguayan people to the Soviet people* He

said that the Soviet Union wanted to expand political,

cultural, and economic ties with Uruguay, and that the

UoSoS.Bo could supply Uruguay with industrial machinery0

He outlined the several direct contacts the two countries

have had in cultural exchanges, sports (soccer), and

trade* He continued that the only interest the Soviet

Union has in Latin America is peace and friendship and a

long, firm friendship with the liberty loving Uruguayan

people*2^

At the same time, an article appeared in a Soviet

newspaper urging further trade and navigation treaties and

payments agreements between the two * 3® However, when the

29* El Fais * lay 11, 1958, p* A*

30* Current Digest of the Soviet Press, June 18, 1958, P* 31* 67 Buss ism government offered a $120 (,000 p 000 trade agreement to supply industrial and transportation equipment in ex­ change for agricultural products and semi-mamufaetured itemsp Uruguay turned it down0 Also rejected on the grounds that current traffic did mot justify it was a re­ quest for Aeroflot to conduct regular service between Mos­ cow and Montevideoo

Prior to the Cuban revolution, Uruguay committed a higher percentage of her trade to the Soviet bloc than any other Latin America#' nation«'3^ The level of direct trade had been five percent, but it rose to ever sixteen percent in 1$§8 and 195f when the Soviet Union purchased large quantities of wool® Indirect purchases made the total well over one-fourth=33 This was a time of declining world markets for Uruguay, but by 1959» she was becoming concerned with the trend and began resisting Soviet overtures®

Trying to force Uruguay to agree to exchange pet­ roleum for wool, the Soviet Union refused to buy any

Uruguayan wool in 1960, All other Communist bloc countries reduced purchases, too. This action cut the level of bloc trade to ten percent of Uruguay9s foreign commerce, making

Communist China the principal bloc trading partner that

gAseanic American Report, July 1959c P« 291=

3 2 e See Appendix F for Uruguay8s trade with the Soviet bloc from 1938 to 1958®

33® Poppino, p® 201® yeareIneidentlyp the Gommtmist Chinese had established a commercial office in Montevideo in October 195?» Uruguay being the first nation in the western hemisphere to recog­ nize Chinese emissaries®35

The fact ls» however» that the Soviet Union received

Uruguayan wool in I9 6 0 , not directlyp but through indirect purchases by buying Uruguayan goods from the Netherlands as they had done a few years earlier (see Table 6 ) 0

TABLE 6

URUGUAY8S WOOL EXPORTS*

In mill:Lons of pounds

Country 1955-1956 1956-1957 1957-1958 1958-1959

United States 33o0 8.7 2.7 0.5 Netherlands ^3.2 31.9 12.7 0.3 UoSoSoR. 3oO 0 = 3 23 = 6 2?.5 Satellites 3.9 2.3 5 = 6 13 = 5

Others 67,9 44.1 51 = 9 57 = 8

Total 151.® 87.3 96.5 99.6

*©wen0 p ® 9

It has been suggested that this was done at Soviet initiative for the following reasonss

lo To exert pressure on the government0

W > Ibid.

35o Survey of International Affairs. 1956-1958» p» 311< 69

To avoid embarrassing trade deficits0 The Soviet Union has generally imported more from Latin America than exported0 (Table 7 shows this was reversed through indirect trade in 1960)0

To obtain contracts for oil imports from the national Administration of Petroleum0 Alcoholp an# Cementp the state owned refinery03©

TABLE 7 URUGUAY8S BALMCE OP TRADE WITH THE U„S = S=Ro*

1958 1959 I960

*KL4®6 +. 2 ® 0 -11® 2

*Pendleg p 0 1 0 9 °

Uruguay was able to resist communist pressure in

this instance because of a rise in the world wool market and modification of the United States tariff regulations

that had barred much Uruguayan wool from that country0

Meat is another major Uruguayan e x p o r t 03? In 1962t

the Soviet Union signed a contract to purchase 20,000 tons

of beef and mutt©n038 A $ 1 5 »0006 000 barter agreement was

signed between the two in 1963o The Soviet Union was to buy meat for cash in British pound sterling in 1963 and deliver oil in 19640 and Uruguay would have eight months

"©wen, p® 95® 37® See Appendix G for commodity trade breakdown®

38® Hispanic American Report» July 1962, p® 458® t© pay for it in limited "States dollars

Uruguay is the only Latin American country whose trade with the Soviet bloc has amounted to as much or more than ten percent of the total trade with the exception of Guba

(see Table 8)0 However* the United States is still Uruguay8s chief supplier followed by Western Europe* but the market is diminishingo As of 1 9 6 3 * Great Britain was still Uruguay8s best customer buying thirteen percent of her exports0 The

United States was second with twelve percent* and close behind was the Soviet Union with eleven percent*'40

Table 9 on the following page)0

TABLE 8 PERCENTAGE OF URUGUAY8S TRADE WITH THE COMMUNIST BLOC* I96I-I965**

(excluding China) "*1961 1962 _ 1963.. 1964 . 1965 % lOoO IS* 7 8*5 9o7 6*5 #Da Premsei* January 3* 1966* Po 2o **Percentage for 1965 is through the month of Sep­ tember*

Uruguay has been hard hit by the European Common

Market and has shown a tendency to favor a policy of "buy- ing from those who buy from us®"^3- Meanwhile* Uruguay is

39» Ibid** September 1 9 6 3 * p* 7 2 6 *

AO* U 0S 0» Department of Commerce* International Commerce0 February 4* 1 9 6 3 * p® If*

41® U 0S 0* Department of Commerce* Foreign Trade of Uruguay* December 1963» (Overseas Business ' * P 0 1 ( 71 TABLE 9 URUGUAYAN TRADE WITH SELECTED COUNTRIES 1955-1964*

In millions of U.S. dollars

Exports 1955 1956 1957. 1958 1959 11960 1961 1962 1963 1964

USSR 4.64 0.45 1.78 16.27 8.41 1.52 0.92 12.81 3.72 0.17

USA 16.43 24.62 12.46 10.67 11.64 19.79 24.59 24.38 19.23 15.09

KETH 42.72 51.55 30.04 14.10 9.35 17.04 19.97 15.26 18.56 24.27

Inmc rts 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 196l 1962 1963 ...1964 _

USSR 0.09 3.21 0.28 1.67 6.38 12.74 0.94 0.29 0.20 0.27

USA 43.57 32.79 55.72 16. 42 32.0665.22 46.78 43.87 27.2830.57

SETH 8.28 4.50 4.71 1.78 3.10 5.03 4.49 3.15 2.69 3.70

*Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1964. p. 805. receiving some financial assistance from the United States.

In 1961, she received $30*000,000 from the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development, and $25,000,000 in

credits. The Development Program of the United Nations has

contributed $2,000,000. United States private investment 42 totals about $65*000,000. The Peace Corps is active there.

Aid from the Alliance for Progress for 1962-1965 totaled ^2 ] Gunther, p. 237• 72

$38e3@©»0®® (only #22,200,000 was aetually disbursed)0^3

Only Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay received less, Uruguay

is also a member of the Latin American Free Trade Association headquartered in Montevideo* The Soviet oppose partici­

pation in such organizations saying they exist only to benefit monopolies from the Unites States

It appears- that Uruguayan trade with the Soviet

Union has come about by default. Their exchange has been

erratico There are certain obstacles to doing business with

the Soviet bloc. Transactions are handled by about 150

separate state trading monopolies (the Soviet Union has twenty-two) which creates rigidities and inefficiencies.

This also makes negotiations highly impersonal. The Soviet bloc has few widespread service facilities which hampers the sale of industrial and agricultural machinery, Since the

Soviets very often use trade as a political weapon, signing a pact gives them an excuse to unleash their agents upon that country ostensibly to act as commercial emissaries.

Further trade expansion seems to lie with Soviet

initiative, Uruguay would probably not refuse Soviet

efforts to expand trading arrangements and markets since

she is eager for development, mindful of overdependence on

the United States, and hopeful of developing diversity in

“TK3T Simon G, Hanson, "Alliance for Progress,M Inter-American Economic Affairs, Autumn 1966, p® 28,

44, Pd Ivashchenko, "LAFTA," International Affairs, September 1963o p, 117, 73 export eommodities and stability in export earnings 0^5 In

trade relations between the tw©0 the Soviet Union has been

an initiatoro ©nee in awhileD Urmgmay refuses to ratify a

trade agreementp but generally trade eontinueso Uruguay8

in her present economle state, ©an ill-afford to be to©

selective in choosing trading partners <,

Uruguay8s Diplomatic Relations with the Soviet Union

In the latter part of 1955p Uruguay decided to reopen its mission in Moscow that had been closed in 19^7o

It was announced that Moscow and Montevideo would exchange full-fledged ministers0 Juan A 0 Lorenzi was sent as am­ bassador to Moseowo Early in 1956, Sergei So Mikhailov, who was the Director of the Latin American Institute of the

UoSoSoRo Academy of Sciences, 1 9 6 1 -1 9 6 6 , and presently serves as ambassador to Brazil, was assigned as ambassador to

Uruguay0 Arriving in Montevideo, he said he wanted to

encourage Latin-American-Soviet trade and diplomatic relations b

He continued that there is "no danger of political infil­ tration with tradeo Revolutions are not exported®The other Communist embassies in Uruguay are the Romanian and

Czechoslovakian, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and China have trade missions there,

4-5, Jansen, p, 7 6 ,

46, Mew York Times, January 2, 1956, p, 9.» 74

The Soviet Embassy reportedly had a staff of fifty

while the Urmgmayaa Embassy in loseow had a staff of two0^

Latest estimates are that the Soviet Embassy has grown to

eighty while the Uruguayan Embassy has grown to siXo^® The

Argentine newspaper» La Prensa* feels that these figures are

probably exaggerated0 It declares that the United States has twenty=seVen diplomats registered while the Soviet

Union has eight registered,, Howeverp the true number is

forty-eighto^

Periodicallyo Uruguay expresses indignation and

outrage at the over-sized Soviet Embassy which carries on wide propaganda activities* The matter became serious in

December 1961 when the government placed travel restrictions

equal to those placed on the Uruguayan staff in Moscow* The

Soviet diplomats were limited to staying in a twenty-five mile radius of Montevideo when customs officials reported holding five tons of communist propaganda* 5® Once the Com­ munist Party newspaperP El Popular* tried to stir up resent­ ment against the size of the United States Embassy* They

said the Soviet Embassy only had nine members p and all the rest were clerks and technicians®-^

”* 47* Ibid*

48® Hispanic American Report* lay lf6©8 p* 20?®

49= La Prensa* January 3p l f 6 6 9 p® 1*

Slo Ibid®'* lovember 1 9 6@ p p* 647* Montevideo has long "been the Soviet8s chief propa­ ganda center in Latin America* This dates back to 1$Z§ when the Soviet Trading Agencyp Yuzhamtorgp opened a branch office thereo It is ho secret that large quantities of propaganda are being disseminated from the Soviet Embassyi>

The main distribution agency for communist propaganda is

Edieiomes Pueblos Wnidos„ a publishing plant in Montevideo0

That it is subsidized is evident in the below-cost prices of both foreign and domestic publications listed in its catalogThe high cost of publishing in Uruguay would preclude its usefulness as a publication center if it were met for the freedom from restrictions which the communists enjoy there 0 Some of the favorite propaganda themes are listed belows

1* The United States imposes or tries to impose an alien culture on Latin Americao

2* Latin American foreign policy should be based on a neutralist approach0

3o Increased diplomaticp culturalp and economic relations with the Soviet bloc will help Latin American countries free themselves from United States domination,)

5o The United States discriminates against dark skinned Latin A m e r i c a n s

'52® Evrom M . Kirkpatrick (ed„)p Year of Crisisn (lew York8 Maemillamp 1957)o P° 2^9o

53e Communist Propaganda0 p0 97® Postal authorities report constant bulky arrivals from abroado Public attention was focused on the situation when■eighty=four boxes arrived9 and one broke open revealing the contents to be propaganda0 Another incident occurred when a box labeled aquatic supplies that was headed for the

Soviet Embassy was intercepteda In contained gas masks* guerrilla training texts * and records telling how to form opposition groups® The Soviet Embassy declined comment®

Large sums have been spent on commercial and political activity* fostering trade agreements and strikes * distri­ buting communist Span!sh-language periodicals®- There are ever forty of these printed in Uruguay0 ^

Uruguay had been agitating for a break in relations and criticizing the activities of the Soviet mission* but the collapse of wool exports * the disastrous effects of a

United States duty on wool tops* and a consequent near paralysis in foreign trade * resulted in a change of heart®

The agitations for a break or curbing of the activities of the embassy are particularly strong on occasions of inter­ national importance®

The Senate urged a break in relations when the

Soviet Union invaded Hungary in 1956® On November 7* 200 youths carrying sticks and torches stormed into the Soviet

Embassy* destroying the furnishings and setting the build­ ing on fire in protest of Soviet repression in Hungary®

5^o See Appendix H® 7? Mikhailov protested this action to the Foreign Minister0

The following nightp the embassy was stoned to mark the thirty-ninth anniversary of the Bolshevik Bevolntiono

Cultural exchange was rather small-scale in Latin

America, but since the death of Stalin has been increasing steadilyo By 1956p several cultural fronts had been estab- . lished in Uruguayo The Slav Union; the Uruguayan-Soviet

Cultural Institute, located on a principal street in Monte­ video and giving lectures, conferences, film showings, books, and magazines to those who want them; four Maxim Gorki Insti­ tutes offering film showings and instruction in Russian and dancing; were available to the publicSome of the best

Soviet artists and composers such as Konstantin Simonov,

Ilya Ehrenburg, and Leonid Kogan, the violinist, visited

Uruguay in 1957°

In the same year, Jacob© Arbenz, whose pro-communist government in Guatemala was toppled in 195^, was granted" asylum in Uruguay as a Swiss eitizen0

As 1958 opened, Latin America was in a mood of negative bitterness due to the recession which had reached serious dimensions0 With the growing foothold of the

Soviet Union coupled with Vice President Richard Nixon®s stormy reception and Kuznets@v$s amicable one, the United

States was compelled to reappraise its relations with Latin

America, but as the recession was drawing to a close, the

55o Kirkpatrick, pi 2^60 United States became less willing to change the p©lieieso56

In spite ©f Kuznetsovas peaceful reception (see page

6 5 ) in May» antl=eommunist demenstrations with rock throwing» placards0 and shouting greeted Alexei F e Gorkinp Chief

Justice of the Soviet Union8s Supreme Court, and a group of

Soviet parliament members who were visiting in August0

The nation was shocked a few months later when a

Carmen Foreadel de Mesutti filed for divorce charging her husband, Oscar, a Foreign Ministry worker, with espionage for the Soviet Union0 At first, the government confirmed that an employee was under arrest for stealing documents0

Later, spokesmen said Oscar Mesutti was being held for trial on charges of supplying classified information to a foreign embassyo The newspaper, 21 Pa#s„ identified it as the Soviet 2mbassy057

In the Soviet Union in January 1959c scientists, cultural workers, and representatives of workers and farmers set up a Society for Friendship and Cultural

Cooperation with Latin American Countries, A, Khaehaturyim, a famous Soviet composer and deputy to the Supreme Soviet, was elected president of the organization, Juan A, Lorenz1,

Uruguay9s Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenip©= tentiary to the U,S,S,R,, expressed appreciation and said

560 Survey of International Affairs, 1956=1958, p,

57® Mew York Times, September 1958, p, 3 = that Wruguay would greet the mew organization with interest0

The Blancos (elected the majority in 1958 for the first time in ninety-four years) were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with relations with the Soviet Wnion due to agitation in labor problems and the flagrant use of diplo­ matic privilege to make the Soviet Embassy a propaganda mill® Lorenzi returned to Uruguay to advise on future policy toward the Soviet Union® The newspaper» El Dla« agitated for a break in diplomatic relations a The Soviet

Embassy apparently thought a break was so imminent that tons of documents were evacuated on a Russian fishing vessel®^ At the same time® the Soviet Union had become

Uruguay8s number one wool customer and had also offered a

$100„000,©0© loan to aid in the recovery from disasterous floods® No action was taken toward severing relations®

With the inauguration of Benito Nardene in i9 6 0 ,

Uruguay began reviewing her relations with the Soviet

Union® A number of things undoubtedly prompted this such as the lagging trade relations with the U®S®@oJU9 the need of United States aid in carrying out the proposed monetary reform program® and President Eisenhower1s visit in March®

Eisenhower emphasized two themes on this trip® ©me was the improvement of material conditions in Latin America which came to be stressed by Latin Americans® and the other

48® Current Digest of the Soviet Press® March A® 19590 Po 34® 8© was the principle of non-intervention which came to tee

stressed tey Eisenhower«, Bizeable anti-American student demonstrations greeted Eisenhower in Montevideo6 Irmguay requested a loan of $137o0@@p©@@ while President Eisenhower praised Uruguay on her part in the Latin American common market and for her democratic traditions^® In response,, the P€U began soliciting a half million pesos for a “peace campaign” against the United States®

A significant amount of activity occurred in lf6l» and things got off to a quick start early in January® The

United States had broken relations with Cuba on January 3®

In a series of pro and anti-Castro demonstrations in Monte­ video 9 an anti-Castroite was killed® The death of Serafim

Bilotto was reported in a highly emotional manner and was accompanied tey a picture of the son kissing his father6s corpse® The newspaper held the communists responsible for the death of this “true defendant of the cause of democracy and republican principles®Police arrested 139 persons at the Communist Party headquarters ® Among them were Jos#

Luis Masserap a deputy member of the Communist Party g and

Alberto Swires0 Secretary of the Communist Party® They uncovered small arms and propaganda pamphlets at leftist headquarters® Firearmsp rocksg sticks9 and bloody clothes were confiscated®

60® Survey of International Affairs® 1959“6Cb P® ^85®

6l® El Pais® January 12g 1961® p® 1® 81

The National Executive Council was divided on the issue of breaking relations0 and it was decided to follow the lead of Argentinap Brazil* and Chile who were not will- ing to take action at the tlme0^ Instead* the Cuban Am­ bassador, Mario Sargla Imehaustegui * and the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy* Mikhail K 0 Samilev* were declared persona non grata and expelled by a vote of six to two*^3

About the expulsion, the Council said that it was a “sen­ sitive problem and one of personal conviction* We do not

/ have to justify our action in this matter* The Cuban Am­ bassador is notorious for his intervention in the internal matters of the country*

The Soviets viewed this incident as being typical of a “traditionally rightist government*“ It was reported to have occurred because 1©@*@©0 people marched on the government house yelling Cuba SS* Yankees No* The article further declared that 1©*®0@ well-wishers went spontaneously to see Dr* Inehaustegui off at the a i r p o r t *^5 After the expulsion, Inehaustegui was promoted by his government and sent as ambassador to the Wnited Nations*

A new Soviet ambassador* Sergei R* Striganov* arrived in the spring of 1^61 and asked for further trade

62* "New York Times« January 13, 1961* p* 8.

63* Hispanic American Report„ March 1961* p* ?60

64* 11 Pais* January 13» 1961* p® 5°

65° New Times* July 21* lf6l* p* 14* relationso His proposal of a Russian goodwill mission to

Uruguay was tentatively rejected® Relations seeme# strained®

Adlai Stevenson visited Uruguay in June and prior to his arrival» the Matiinal Executive Council met in a secret session to vote on a proposal to break relations with

Cuba and the Soviet Union® It was defeated six to three®

Ultimatelyj, diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba were broken on September 80 1964 when the Council decided to comply with an ©AS resolution®

In August If6 1 0 the Inter-American Economic Con­ ference met at Pwnta del Este® It was attended by Douglas

Billon and Ernesto "Che" Guevara® Just before the confer­ ences police entered the GomitS Central de la Uniin de la

Juventud Comunista confiscating subversive literature and a few weapons® Several pro and anti-Castro demonstrations were touched off when "Che" Guevara spoke at the University of Montevideo® A teacher was killed in the ensuing riot®

The Soviet explosion of a massive nuclear bombp

©etober 30, stiired renewal of a continuing Uruguayan campaign to break relations® The greatestaction taken, however, was to request an extraordinary meeting of the

©AS to denounce the Soviet Union for creating a fallout hazard® The Soviet action hurt the communists in Uruguay as the socialists, the Federation of Uruguayan University

Students, and the New Basis Movement broke with them 83 protesting the "crime against humanity*

Demonstrating enormous pro-French sentiment, the

Uruguayans were warned by a visiting Charles deGualle in

1964 to avoid being caught in a Moseow-Washington struggle0

Uruguay signed a technical and cultural treaty with France0

One of the most serious threats to break relations with the UoSoSoBo occurred at the end of If65 following two months of labor unrest and particularly after forty-eight newspaper workers struck, virtually isolating Uruguay from the rest of the world* The government charged that the

Soviet Embassy was involved in labor agitation, and the walkouts were a systematic attempt to disrupt the nation8s trade causing an economic crisis* The armed forces had to take over operation of public services* The surprise move to break relations was authored by Alberto Heber Usher, scheduled to become President of the Council on March 1,

1966*6?

A spokesman for the United States State Department was perplexed that the Soviet Union was singled out as pro-

Moscow laborltes rather than pro-Chinese labor!tes were tending to be more moderate and avoiding pressing the government over strikes* But he added that if Uruguay believes the Soviet Union is mixed up in internal affairs, that is for Uruguay to decide* The Soviet Ambassador,

36* Hew York Times* November 2, lf6l, p* 11*

6?* El Dia„ December 12, lf65, P» 4* 84

Igor Qo b s tantInovieh K®los©vsky» was also surprised and bewildered by the move®

Many saw the charge as a man e w a r to head off a strike by the communist dominated CTWo The announcement did have an effect on the trade union leadership which began hurried meetings to seek a compromise with the govern­ ment* . If the threat were a maneuvar* it was successful because the unions called off the general strike0 At the same timep the government set aside the proposal to sever relations saying the Soviet Embassy was only vaguely impli­ cated,, and the government also called off emergency measures which imprisoned 5^5 strikers*^®

Many charges and protests appeared in Soviet articles concerning the above* They reported that the government measures which included suspending the Consti­ tution p arresting trade union leaders» and banning demon­ strations were a concession to the United States who has been pressuring Uruguay to reverse her stand in the United

Nations and OAS for protesting armed intervention in the

Dominican Republic*^? They charged that the IMF0 a tool of the United States imperialistsp demanded that the govern­ ment prevent any protests that were against the implemen­ tation of economic measures favoring foreign capital and the latifundia owners * All this shews the alarm of the

68* New York Times* December l4p l#6^p p* 17*

6 9 » New Times * ©etober 27» 1965p P= 15o United States at the seale of national movements in Latin

America against Yankee imperialism0 The official news agency TASS blamed ‘'reactionary forces that are active in

Uruguayo The intention of breaking relations with the

Soviet Union seems entirely pressure excercised (sic) by the United States and is against the true national interests and interests of world peaceP Latin American countries ought to double their efforts to liberate themselves from

Yankee yoke0

But what has actually been Uruguay's record, and is she really a tool of the United States and her agencies?

Let us look now at a few crucial United nations and ©AS votes in which Uruguay opposed United States policys

lo In a UoH, vote in 1957 concerning self-determination for Cyprus, eight Latin American nations in­ cluding Uruguay voted for self- determination along with the Soviet Union®

2 0 In 1959s a question arose as to whether Turkey (U.So) o# Poland (UoSoSoBo) should fill a seat on the Security Council0 Uruguay voted against Turkey®

3® Uruguay refused to go along with the UoS® in supporting W#Se opera­ tions in the Congo in 1961®

4® Uruguay east the deciding vote in the ©AS to expel Cuba from that body in 1962 but refused to agree to the resolution of severing diplomatic relations® Relations were later broken in 1964®

70® El D#a® December 14® 1965® p® 2® 5# Uruguay was one of the leaders In condemning U0Se Intervention In the Dominican.Republic0 71

Prior to the inauguration of Alberto Heber Usher*

Uruguay began to take a harder line toward the Soviet Union and communist activity® Three North Koreans were ousted and their trade mission ceased to exist in an attempt to reduce communist influence in Uruguay after they made a token purchase of hides and proceeded with the business of making propaganda® 72

After the Tri-Continental Conference which resolved that Havana would be the base for supporting national liber­ ation movements and fighting colonialism in Asia* Africa* and Latin America and that the Latin American delegates would form a Latin American Solidarity Organization dedicated to "uniting* coordinating and impelling the struggle against

UoSo imperialism*’1 Uruguay became worried about communist activity in the labor movement and the Student Federation at the University and decided to begin investigating the activities of the Bed diplomats®

El Dia stated that the Conference declared war on the rules of international law and coexistence by deciding to promote violent revolution®73 La Prensa said the reso­ lutions were "the permanent language of the groupings which

71® Gunther* p® 138®

72® New York Times* February 11* 1 9 6 6 * p® 9®

73® Communist Affairs* January-February 1 9 6 6 * p® 12® are trying to demolish tire repmbliean institutions of Latin

America, to replace them by regimes of collectivist dictator^ ship o’17^

Wruguay decided to back Perm at an extraordinary meeting of the ©AS in denomneimg the participation of the

Soviet Union in the plan of subversion and sabotage which was approved in Havana on January 3-15o In addition, Uruguay asked the Soviet Union to clarify the statements made at the

Conference® The Soviet Ambassador, Igor Kolosovsky, declared the Soviet delegate to the Conference, Shafar Bashidov, did not represent the opinion of the Soviet government at that meeting which considered only social and economic problems and not political problems® He insisted that the Soviet

Union respects the sovereignty and independence of nations and is against exporting revolution, but it will help vic­ tims of imperialist aggression. He blamed the United States for twisting the policies of the Soviet U n i o n , The

Uruguayan Ambassador In Moscow, Yirgilio Sampognaro, also asked for explanations, and he got the same response®

Uruguay replied that she did m t want to create misunder­ standings but felt a grave situation had been created at an international meeting in which irregular decisions were made to aid subversive activities in other countries®

Since Uruguayan policy is one of non-intervention in the

74, El Pia, January 2?, 1 9 6 6 , p, 2,

75o La Prernsa, February 16, 1966, p, 2, 88

internal affairs of other-countries, the Soviet Union amst also go along with that if she wants to maintain diplomatic relationso

At the same time, a new economic offensive by the

UoSoSoHo was reported in El Popularo The Soviets offered a loan of $3©,@00,©00 for five years to be paid with Uruguayan products Officials have given no information about this 0

0m a lighter note, Soviet whale boats docked at

Montevideo on May 5 after a fishing trip to Antarctica,,

The Sovietskava Ukraine and twenty-two smaller ships stopped for provisions and Obtained 27,000 tons of fat, 7,00© tons of frozen meat, and 5,000 tons of flour,The captain,

Boris Morgtm, said they caught 2,673 whales 0 The last time

Soviet whale boats stopped in Montevideo was in 196k-„

Occasionally, there are expulsions of diplomatic personnel. One such incident occurred when four members of the Soviet Embassy, Nikolai Y, Ivanov, the Second Secretary of the Embassy, Sergei A 0 Yamgaykim, Alexei A 0 Zudin, and

Vladimir Shvetz, were expelled for intervening in labor affairs and inciting strikes. The decision came at a time when eleven strikes totally paralyzed transportation and gas service in Montevideo0 It carried by a six to two vote,

Kolosovsky happened-to be in Moscow so there was no comment from the Soviet Embassy, The decision was made on the basis

"" 7 6 o La Prensa, January 28, lf66y p, 1,

77o Ibid*, May 5, 1966, p, 3, 89 of information of the Minister of the Interiorp Hicolas

Storaee Arrosa, who said the four were officials of the

Security and Intelligence Service of the tloSdSoHo^S

As a result„ Uruguay was considering cancelling the invitation made to Foreign Ministerg Andrei Gromyko s to visit Uruguayo The proposal had been made on September 2 7 o when Uruguayan Foreign Ministerp Luis Vidal Zagliog met with him at the United Nations 0 At that time Baglio reported that Gromyko was satisfied with Uruguayan-Soviet relations and particularly with the commercial exchange between the two® He offered Uruguay a credit of 2 0 »000»000 rubles0^

The latest incident occurred when police issued a citation to four Soviet citizens whose visas had expired®

Ambassador Kolosovsky declared they did not know of the special visa requirements since they worked as administrative personnel at the embassy® Uruguay countered that they were businessmen® The head of trade between the Soviet Union and Uruguay told the immigration directorff Luis Varga

Garmendiap that he would ask Moscow to have the whole

Soviet Embassy sent home if the four were expelled® Need­ less to say, however» the Soviets complied with Uruguayan visa regulations®

78® Ibid®® ©ctober 5t> 19660 p® 2®

79o Ibid®® October 8 #.1966, p® 2®

80® Ibid®® October 31® 1966» p® 2® CONCLUSION

In the early If208s the Soviet UnionD isolated dipiomat1 eally» was in diffieult straits domestically, yet she had high hopes for a worldwide communist revolution®

The Soviets were eager to establish as many outside contacts as possible® They pressed hard for the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations® Uruguay® being a liberal- minded nation® agreed to mutually beneficial relations®

The Soviet Union was elated at this recognition and hoped it would have an influence on other South .American countries®

Uruguay was to become a base of political and economic operations for the Soviets in South America®

Trade and diplomatic relations reached a high point in the early 1 9 3 0 °s® bolstered for a time by the inter­ national response to Popular Front activities® But the

Soviet advances ground quickly to a halt by the end of 1935 and continued steadily downward® General Terra aggressively repressed communist activities® There was growing awareness and antagonism toward the Soviet8s increasing use of Uruguay as a center for propaganda and subversive activities®

Coupled with this was the revolt in Brazil which led di­ rectly to the 1935 break in relations between Uruguay and the Soviet Union® 91 The first half of the 19^0 $s was very smeeessfml for

the Soviet Union In view of the widespread sympathy for her

role In World Mar II0 Uruguay sought to re-establish re­

lations with the U 0S 0S 0R 0 Fifteen other Latin American

republics did the same® The PGU also made great gains in

the elections of 1946.

With the advent of the Gold Warp the tide turned

against the Soviet Union® Relations between Uruguay and

the UoSoSoRo were almost absent until the end of 1955° In

that yearp economic and diplomatic missions were exchanged

by the two countries®

A few years after the death of Staling the Soviet

Union offered attractive commercial contracts and sought

-to re-establish diplomatic relations based on the policy of

peaceful co-existence® These offers were inviting to

Uruguay whose economy was now in a state of stagnation®

The high point of trade relations occurred in 195® and 1959*

The Soviet Union believed the road to communism could be

achieved peacefully by gradual transition®

The i9 6 0 8s found Uruguay reviewing her relations

with the Soviet Union® The communists had made gains in

the labor movement through their control of the central

labor organization® bi|t it seems they have aggravated their

relations with the Uruguayan government by their constant r- striking® The government becomes perturbed when labor

agitation develops® and in retaliation.threatens to sever €iploiaatie relations with the U 0S 0S 0R 0 This usually allevi­

ates the problem o

With the disintegration of intermtiemal oommunist

unity, Soviet poliey im Latin America became more cautious 6

This was even more true after the Cuban missile crisis of

1 9 6 2 o Professor Herbert S 0 Binerstelm of Johns Hopkins

University describes recent Soviet foreign policy as more

limited and more realistic0 Efforts appear to be directed

toward encouraging Latin American nationalism and isolating

United States influence by portraying this country as an

imperialist aggressore®* Binerstelm notes that the Soviet

Union does not seek another Cuban-type revolution in Latin

America, nor would it be likely to extend massive assistance

to one or mere underdeveloped countries of that region,,

Evaluating communist influence in Latin America is

a difficult task. Certainly there must be some who support

but do not understand communism0 Another dilemma is sepa­

rating anti-Yankeeism and anti-imperialism from pro-communism0

According to Rodney Arismemdi, the First Secretary of the

Uruguayan Communist Party, it is mere important to mobilize

the Latin American people against the United States than it

is for social revolution,,®2 This seems to follow the current

81o Herbert S„ Binerstelm, “Soviet Policy in Latin America,M The American Political. Science Review, larch 196?, Po 900

820 Stefan Go Stolte, “Latin America in the Danger Zone,** Bulletins Institute for the Study of the UoSoSoRoo November 1 9 6 6 , p 0 18, ~ Moscow line which the FGU has done since its inception in 1920 0 The PGU remains small and for many reasons has never

been a major factor in Uruguayan polities0 First of all,

no group has found it necessary to seek communist backing*

Social reforms have been brought about peacefullyD and modern Uruguay is a democratic state with a relatively high

standard of living* Howeverp the distribution of wealth has become so extensive that it has outrun the productivity

of the economy*

Uruguay is a society that has a socialist or wel­

fare state, but is, nevertheless, somewhat conservative*

She is provincial yet seems to have an intelligent picture

of herself* Uruguayans are passionately anti-colonial*

They are nationalistic but not extremely so* The PGU does

everything possible to maintain its legality so it can con­

centrate on the theme of nationalism® Students, radical

labor, and intellectuals are often sympathetic to the com­ munist cause*

Uruguay8 s diplomatic and trade relations with the

Soviet Union are characterized by fluctuations * Because

Uruguay has been economically unbalanced in recent years,

the Soviet Union uses this as leverage, to gain increased

relations® On Uruguay8s part, the key to relations is

economies, while for the Soviet Union, the primary reason

is political, and economies is secondary* At the same time. Uruguay fears increased communist activity0 The main pur= pose that Uruguay serves for the Soviets is as the distri­ bution center for communist propaganda in Latin America

This condition has existed* by nature of Uruguay8s free and democratic society* since the 1920*8. Democracy and social progress have served as Uruguay8s best defense against communism o APPENDIX A

COMPARISON OF SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST ELECTION STATISTICS 1922-1966*

Year______Socialists # seats______Communists #seats

1922 997 —— 3,179 ——

1925 1,794 —— 4,838 2 d

1928 2,931 1 d 3,911 1 d 1930 —— -- 2,291 ——

1931(D) 5.630 2 d 6,235 2 d 1932(3,D)** 5,826 —— 5,227 —

1933(Const. ) — — 4,950 —

1934 5,849 2 d 3,634 1 d

1938 13,152 3 d 5,736 1 d 1942 9,036 1 d 14,330 2 d

1946 15.731 2 d 32,677 5d,ls 1950 17.401 2 d 19,026 2 d

1955 28,704 3d, Is 19,541 2 d 1958 35.478 3d, Is 27,080 2 d 1962 40,886 2d, Is

1966 60,541 4d,2s

*Taylor, p. 150#

**s = Senator d = deputy

95 APPENDIX B

URUGUAY»S IMPORTS AND EXPORTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION 1927-1938* ______In pesos______Imports % Total Year Exports % Total

—— 1927 2,182,000 2.3

159,000 0.2 1928 1,344,000 1.3 919,000 1.0 1929 2,775.000 3.0

1,199,000 1.3 1930 1,037,000 1.0

1,741,000 2.1 1931 912,000 1.2

2,857,000 5.4 1932 865,000 1.5 4,288,000 6.7 1933 195.000 0.3 3,888,000 6.2 1934 806,000 1.2

1,266,000 2.1 1935 1,950,000 2.0

476,000 0.7 1936 304,000 0.3 61,000 0.1 1937 — - 4,000 — 1938 -

♦League of Nations, Memorandum on International Trade and Balance of Trade, 1927-1938, Geneva,

96 APPENDIX C

URUGUAY8S BALANCE CP TRADE 1930= 1964*

Year Im'ports Exports Balanee 1930 9.3 o 9 100.9 * ?o0 1931 n4ol 78o3 - 3508 1932 , 55,5 5 8 o3 + 2 08 1933 6348 6 6 e? * 2,9 1934 61.4 6908 + 8,4 1935 59=5 95=4 t 35=9 1936 6 6 0O 90=2 * 24,2 In millions of W,8, dollars 1938 61,6 62,1 ©,5 1939 52,1 62,9 + 10,8 1940 54,9 66,4 + 11,5 1941 63=1 70,8 + 7,7 1942 63=7 57=8 - 6,9 1943 63=8 100,0 + 36,2 1944 . 72,4 97,6 + 25,2 1945 93=7 122,0 4 28=3 1946 147,4 152,8 4 5,4 1947 215=3 162,5 - 52,8 1948 200,5 179=0 = 21,5 1949 181,7 191=7 4 10,0 1950 200,9 254,3 4 53,4 1 9 5 1 315=7 236=3 = 79=4 1952 246,8 208,9 - 37=9 1953 194.5 269,8 4 75,3 1 9 5 4 274,5 249:0 - 25.5 1955 225=9 183=6 = 42,3 1956 205=7 211,0 4 5,3 1957 226,4 128,2 - 98,2 1958 134:6 138,6 4 3,0 1959 213=9 97=8 -116,1 1960 242,8 129,4 -113,4 1 9 6 1 205=8 174,7 - 31=1 1962 230,4 153=4 - 77=0 1963 176=8 165,2 - 11,6 1964 197=9 178,9 - 19=0

*U,No, Yearbook of International Trade Statisticsfl 1955 & 1964g (New York) , " ' *" ' 97 APPBMBIX B

ELBCII0N ,BB!P0BBrS-lf66*

Vote Total

Colorado 528,069

Gestido 22?p113

Jorge Batlie 18#,936 GO Miehelini' ca

Vascoheeilos 69p613

3,929 "

Blaneo #19,653

Echegoyen 198,971

Gallinal 1#1,3#3

leher 79,#59

PIB1L** 6®,5#l

Unipm Popular 2,613

Christian Bemoorats 31,9#6

Civic Christian Movement 3,762

TCTAB 1,059,52#

For constitutional reform 675,109

*LaPrensa9 1ovember 29; ap p® 3o *^Erente I^quierda de •a movement of left- wing groups imeluding the APPENDIX E

FOREIGN DELEGATES TO EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF PCU*

Country Cuba Bias Boca Jos# Naranjo Pedro Romero

Brazil Jacob Gorender Joao Surella

Argentina Rodolfo Ghioldi Alberto Ferrari

Peru Alfredo Abarea

Paraguay Jos# Jara

Bolivia Mario Monje Mario Molina

Columbia Hernando Hurtado

Ecuador Herman Acevedo

Chile Jos# Gonzalez Manuel Cantero

France Raoul Galas

Italy Renzo Trivelli

Spain Antonio Guardi©la

Soviet Union Alexei Rumiantsev Evgueln Bugayev Vladimir Ti jmemev Nikolai Mostoyetsl ^Duboisp ppo 220=221c APPENDIX F

URUGUAY«S TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE*

Exports

In millions of U.S. dollars 1938 j 1948 1952 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 Total 61.6 178.9 208.9 249.0 183.7 211.1 128.3 156.2

Total to 3.3 2.5 1.1 22.6 10.5 7.8 7.8 24.6 bloc

S.U. 19.9 4.6 0.4 1.8 15.2 Bulgaria — — — — — — — — —— 0.1 0.1 0.5 Czech, 1.6 0.6 0.9 1.8 2.4 3.4 2.7 3.5 E. Ger, m m m m w m m —— M M 1.8 1.6 2.7 Hungary 0.4 m m m m —— 1.2 0.8 0.3 0.8 Poland 1.3 1.9 0.2 0.9 2.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 Romania m m m m — m m MM MM ———— 0.4

Imports Total 61.6 201.4 257.2 274.5 226.0 205.8 226.4 104.4

Total 1.9 1.3 0.9 1.3 2.5 10.5 4.9 4.4 from bloc

S.U. 0.1 3.2 0.3 0.4 Bulgaria —— —————— —— ———— 0.1 Czech, 0.7 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.5 3.8 1.5 0.9 E. Ger. * ■ m m m m MM 0.2 2.6 2.0 2.3 Hungary 0.9 0.7 0.7 —— 0.3 Poland 0.3 — — — — 0*1 —— 0.2 l.l 0.4 Romania —— — — —— — —• —— —— —— — ♦Alien, p. 15•

100 APPENDIX G

SOVIET COMMODITY IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO URUGUAY* Exports Values (In millions of rubles) ______1954 1956 1958 1959 Chemical products- - 7 9 7 l 1*4 Cotton fibre*..#,#.*.*....# — 8.1 4,3 2.5 Crude oil.— — 7.6 20.5 Petrol...... •••••••.. —— —— 1.8 1.1 Diesel fuel... — — 3*6 4.8 Mazut...... —— —- 1*7 4*7 Total Exports...... *...... 1 11.4 22.1 37•4

Quantity (In tons)

Cotton fibre...... — 2,700 1,400 900 Crude oil.*.*...*.#...... -- — 11,100 325,100 Petrol...... — — 15,600 10,000 DljB^el^^USijLJLl-JLlJLl-JLlJLJL^-SJt^-S— ZLIl— 525 Imports Values (in millions of rubles)______Fine wool...... ~ 4 0 9972 5579 Wool tops...... —— 4,6 —— —— M eat••••••••••••••••••••••• —— 1.3 —— —— Large raw hides...... — .4 — 4.6 Total imports...... 116.2 49.2 99.2 60.6 Quantity (in tons)

Fine wool...... 4,200 4,600 11,100 8,500 Wool tops....*..*...... — 500 — 129,000 Meat...... 31,000 1,000 —— —— [Large raw hldes(Pleces)... .75.250 14.400 — *Evgeny Glovlnsky, "Economic Relations of the U.S.S.R. with Latin America," Studies of the Soviet Union. (I, 1962), p. 72.

101 AFPEMDIX H

COMMUNIST PARTY AND FRONT PERIODICALS IN URUGUAY*

11 Popularn Official daily of the party0 although it does not state so on the masthead0 Circulation about 5»©0©o Adelante n Student Union publicationo Aero^Carriln published by communist group of Malv£n0 Aguadan publication of the Aguada group0 11 Barmann publication of employees of stores and bars* Barricadao semimonthly newspaper of the party in Carmelo> Boletin^Ihformativo "Cultural ICUSn monthlya Cal Viva, publication of the construction workers of the Sanchez Quinta0 El Carburedoro publication of the Mechanics Union* La Chisnao publication of the Funsa groupo Combaten organ of the communist bank employees8 group® BL Combate„ monthly party newspaper in Fray Bentos® La Comuna® publication of the Municipal Workers® 11 Grisol® published by the EGAM Group® Cruz del Bur® published by the Maritime and Transport Workers8 Union® ' Barbas» a biweekly published in Lithuanian® Del Pueblon weekly publication of the party8s departmental„ committeein Soriahd® Estudiosn bimonthly political and cultural review of the party primarily for intellectuals® FPL® published by'the wool workers union® La Fortaleza® semimonthly newspaper published by the Packing Plant Workers of the Gerro Bone® Frente Qbrer©® a monthly® Impulse® organ of the UGT® Jornada* published by the Water Works® Federation of Civil Workers® ■ Justicia® a weekly published by Albert© Slarez ® Circulation about Aj>©00o Juventud® central organ of the Communist Youth® La Lanzadera* published by the Textile Workers of the Twentieth Section® Liberacifn* party newspaper in Camelones ® Municipal® published by the Municipal Workers® Union® Nosotras® official organ of the Feminine Union of Uruguay® affiliate of the Moscow-operated federation® 102 103 Nuestra Tierran periodical for farmers and rural workers0 Nuevos Hori2ont»esn published by the Women8s Commission of the party o Southern Section,. Mu c t o s lumbosn published by the Port Workers8 section of the partyo 11 Obrero de ILDUn published by a labor group0 Orientaclino party semimonthly in TaeuarembS0 QrientaclOn y Lucha0 published by the Office Workers8 Unions 11. Biel, published by the Railroad Workers8 Uni on 0 11 Sonleteo published by the Ninteenth Section of the General Electric Workers8 Unions Summan published by the Mechanics and Steel Workers8 Unions 11 TaladrOn monthly newspaper published for the Transpor­ tation Workers8 Unions Taladro y Plataformafl published by the Municipal Transport Workers8 Unions ______published by the Departmental Council of Rocha," Tribuna Laneran monthly newspaper of the Wool Workers0 Unidads published by the Artigas group of the party0 URSSp semimonthlyo La Verdads monthly newspaper of. the Textile Workers a La Voz Islavao published irregularly 0 La ¥oz Grafica0 published by the Graphic Arts Workers®

©THER NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED IN URUGUAY** . Name Party Circulation

Aeclfa (Batllista) Colorado 2 0 o00© 11 D#a (Batllista) 6 0 o00 © 11 Diario (Independent) Colorado 135,000 La Manana (Independent) Colorado 30,00©

11 Debate (Ultra-eons®) Blanco 20,000 1005 000 11 Plata (Independent) Blanco 100,000

11 Bien Pdblice (Cath0) UniSn GSsiea 5.000

11 Sol (Emilio Frugpni) Socialist 3.000

Marcha (Julio Castro) Independent 15,000

^Compiled from Dubois and Kirkpatricks

Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958), P® 98® SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Public Documents

Alba, Victoro ’’Communism and Nationalism in Latin America®” Problems of Communism» Vol II0 Sep.tember=Oetober

Rubottom, RoRo ”International Communism in Latin America0” UoSo Department of State Bulletino July 11, I9 6 O 0

U 0N 0 Direction of International Trade0 International Monetary Fund; 19620 "

U 0N 0 International Economic Assistance to the Less Bevels oped Countries® Department of Economic and. Social Affairs0 1961®

D 0N 0 Yearbook of International Trade Statisticss 196ko Department of Economic and Social Affairs0 19660

WoSo Department of Commerce0 Basic Data on the Economy Id Overseas Business Report® December 19^30

UoSo Department of Commerce0 Foreign Trade of Uruguay2 Overseas Business Report® November 1958°

UoSo Department of Commerce® Foreign Trade Regulations 1® Overseas Business Report® December 1963°

UoSo Department of Commerce® International Commerce® Bureau of International Commerce® February 1963 and March 15» 1 9 6 5 »

UoSo Department of State® Communist Economic Policy in Areas® July I9 6 0 ®

UoSo Department of State® Slno^Soviet Economic Offensive in Less Developed Countries® May 1958®

UoSoIoAc m A Fact Books 1

U 0S-0.S0R 0 Dokumentii SSSRo Moskvas Izdatelstvo politiehskoi literaturii, 1 9 6 6 , V® 6=12®

Wright, Roberto UoS, Department of State Bulletin0 ’’American Diplomacy and the Soviet Bloc®” December 8 , 1958®

10A 105 Bfcoks

Alba, Victoro Alliance without Allies0 Hew York; Praeger0

Alexandero Robert J 0 Coimaunism in Latin America0 Hew Bruns= wiekp New Jersey; Rmtgers University Press6 1957»

6' < ’’Latin Americao” Sino-°Soviet Rivalry Q Clement Zablocki (ed0)o Hew York; Praeger0 1 9 6 6 0

Organized Labor in Latin America0 Hew York; Free Press0

Allenp Robert Loringo Soviet Economic Warfarea Washington; Public Affairs Press0

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Barghoornp Frederick G 0 The Soviet Cultural Offensive* Princeton; Princeton University Press® i960 ®

Degrasp Jane® Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy0 V® III® 1933”19^1o London; ' Oxford University Press® 19530

Duboisp Jules® Operation America; The Communist Conspiracy in Latin America® New York; Walker & Co® 1963®

Embry p James G® ’’The Soviet Union and Diplomatic Relations p Communist Party Activitiesp and Reference to Trade with Uruguay; The Early Years; 191?=1955o” Unpub= lished seminar paperp Department of Historyp Univer­ sity of Arizona, Spring 1 9 6 7 ®

Evansp F® Bowen® Worldwide Communist Hew York; Macmillan Go

Fitzgibbonp Russell H® Uruguay; Portrait of a Hew Brunswickp New Jersey; Rutgers University Press<

Guntherp John® Inside Beuth America® Hew York; Harper & Row® 19^60 ——

Halpbrihp Ernst® ’’Latin America® ” International Communism af ter -Khrushchev® Leopold Labdez Massachusetts; . BIT Press® 1 9 6 5 d Hans on i, Simon Go Utopia in Pruguay0 Hew York*Oxford University Presso 19380

Jansen, Rudolf K 0 Some Aspects of Latin American Trade Polieieso Austin8 University of Texas® 19640

Kirkpatrick, Evron M 0 Year of Crisis0 Hew Yorks- Macmillan Coo 195?o

MacDonald, Austin F »• Latin American Politics and Government 0 New Yorks Thomas Y„ Crowell Go® 1954o

deMadariaga, Salvador0 Latin America Between the Eagle and the Bear® Hew Yorks Praeger® 1962®

Masur, Gerhard® Hationalism in Latin Americao Hew Yorks Praeger® 1966® ~

Oswald, Jo Gregory® "Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America®51 Unpublished manuscript® University of Arizona® 196?®

Fondle, George® Uruguay® Londons Oxford University Press®

Pope® Arthur Upham® Maxim Litvinoff® New Yorks Louis B® Fischer® 1943®

Poppino, Rollie® International Communism in Latin America® Londons Free Press of Glencoe® . 1964®

Reidy® Joseph® Strategy for the Americas® New Yorks McGraw Hill® 1966®—

Shapiro® Leonard (ed®)® Soviet Treaty Series® Vol® II® 1929-1939® Washingtons Georgetown University Press

Slmsser® Robert M® and Jan F® Triska® Calendar of Soviet Treatiess 1917-1957® Stanfords Stanford Univer­ sity Press® 196inr

Spalding® Hobart A® "Factors Influencing Soviet Imperialism in Latin America®" Threat of Soviet Imperialism® C® Grove Haines (ed®T% Baltimore* Johns Hopkins Press® 1954®

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