“Lebanon at the Crossroads”
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Statement before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs “LEBANON AT THE CROSSROADS” A Statement by: Aram Nerguizian Senior Fellow, Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) February 25, 2014 419 Dirksen Senate Office Building Iran VIII: Lebanon at the Crossroads 02.25.14 ii Table of Contents US Policy Towards Lebanon & Iran’s Response ................................................................... 1 The Hariri Assassination and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon ....................................................................... 3 New Patterns in US Military Aid to Lebanon ................................................................................................... 4 Paradoxes of Building Lebanese Military Capabilities ..................................................................................... 6 Lessons from Iran’s Military Support for Hezbollah ...................................................................................... 12 Addressing Refugee Pressures from the Syria Conflict................................................................................... 12 The Lebanon-Syria Insecurity Nexus .................................................................................... 13 Lebanese Sunni-Shi’ite Competition in Syria ................................................................................................. 13 Assessing Communal Dividing Lines ............................................................................................................. 14 Hezbollah’s “Necessary War of Choice” in Syria ........................................................................................... 18 Hezbollah’s Shifting Military Posture in Syria ............................................................................................... 18 The Mainstream Sunni Response to the Syria Conflict ................................................................................... 22 Northern Poverty & the Sunni Militant Response to Hezbollah ...................................................................... 22 Assessing the Impact of the Syria Conflict on Lebanon .................................................................................. 24 The Search for a Stable Middle ....................................................................................................................... 32 The Lebanese Military Response to Syrian Instability ......................................................... 33 LAF National Security Priorities in 2014 ........................................................................................................ 34 Policing an Uncertain Border Region: Challenges & Opportunities ............................................................... 35 The 2013 Capabilities Development Plan ....................................................................................................... 39 The U.S., Saudi Arabia & the Politics of Military Aid .................................................................................... 41 Syria & the Future of US-Iran Competition in Lebanon ...................................................... 43 Iran VIII: Lebanon at the Crossroads 02.25.14 iii Figures and Maps FIGURE VIII.38: THE IMPACT OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON 2004 TO 2014 ........................... 8 FIGURE VIII.39: BREAKING DOWN “SECTION 1206” ASSISTANCE TO THE LAF 2006-2014 ........................... 9 FIGURE VIII.40: LAF PERSONNEL RECEIVING U.S. TRAINING 1998-2011 ....................................................10 FIGURE VIII.41: ASSESSING RELATIVE RISK AND INSECURITY IN LEBANON: LAF GROUND FORCE DEPLOYMENT IN FEBRUARY 2014 ........................................................................................................11 FIGURE VIII.42: LEBANON AND REGIONAL PUBLIC OPINION I ......................................................................16 FIGURE VIII.43: LEBANON AND REGIONAL PUBLIC OPINION II .....................................................................17 FIGURE VIII.44: HEZBOLLAH’S UNCERTAIN SYRIA DEPLOYMENT IN 2014 ...................................................21 FIGURE VIII.45: THE SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF NORTHERN LEBANON...............................................................24 FIGURE VIII.46: THE LONG TERM CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC STABILITY IN LEBANON ................................26 FIGURE VIII.47: LEBANESE SOCIO-ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY TO THE SYRIA CONFLICT: SYRIAN REFUGEES BY COUNTRY ........................................................................................................................................27 FIGURE VIII.48: LEBANESE SOCIO-ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY TO THE SYRIA CONFLICT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON DEMOGRAPHICS .................................................................................................................28 FIGURE VIII.49: LEBANESE SOCIO-ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY TO THE SYRIA CONFLICT: THE SCALE OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS ...................................................................................................................................29 FIGURE VIII.50: LEBANESE SOCIO-ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY TO THE SYRIA CONFLICT: POVERTY & THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SYRIAN REFUGEES .............................................................................30 FIGURE VIII.51: THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIA CRISIS ON LEBANESE SECURITY: SUICIDE ATTACKS, VBIEDS, IEDS, ATTACKS ON SECURITY FORCES & INFRASTRUCTURE 2011-2014 .............................................31 FIGURE VIII.52: THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES COMMAND & CONTROL STRUCTURE IN 2014 ...................34 FIGURE VIII.53: POLICING AN UNCERTAIN BORDER REGION .........................................................................38 FIGURE VIII.54: PLANNING FOR A PRECARIOUS FUTURE: THE 2013 LAF CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT PLAN .............................................................................................................................................................40 FIGURE VIII.55: TOTAL INTERNATIONAL AID TO THE LAF 2006-2013 .........................................................42 Lebanon has been the chronic problem child in US foreign policy in the Levant since the Eisenhower Administration. However, given the country’s centrality to regional security politics and Iran’s support for the Shi’a militant group Hezbollah, the US cannot avoid looking at Lebanon as yet another arena of competition with Iran in the broader Levant. There is no single set of Lebanese interests and imperatives in how to approach foreign policy-making, be it on the Syria conflict or any other set of issues. In the wake of the 1975-1990 civil war and the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005, official state institutions are not the epicenter of political power. Instead, competing sectarian factions caught in a “zero sum” struggle for power have regained their primacy as the true center of political gravity and decision-making in Lebanon.1 With none of Lebanon’s leading communities or factions able to shape events on their own, partnering with competing external patrons across a range of geopolitical contests is seen as one way to tilt the scales in the quest for power in Beirut.2 Time and again since independence in 1943, Lebanon’s internal divisions and attempts to leverage this “two level game” have drawn countries that include Egypt, France, Iran, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia the US and others.3 In the post-2005 period, Iran and Syria have continued to back key factions, while others sought the support of the US and the Southern Gulf states. Syria’s civil war has complicated this pattern of competition in ways that neither the Lebanese nor their regional and international allies seem to have fully accounted for. In terms of the impact of regional unrest and the Syria conflict on security, inter-factional or inter-communal violence, socio-economic and demographic pressures, few countries in the region face as many challenges at the same time as Lebanon. Despite all of the risks and uncertainties surrounding Syria, however, Lebanese factions – divided in part along pro and anti-Assad lines – continue to maneuver in a bid to leverage the conflict to reshape the internal balance of power in their own country. US Policy Towards Lebanon & Iran’s Response While Lebanon’s warring factions may think that the US and Iran have their core interests at heart, it is important to remember that US-Iranian strategic competition is not driven by the internal political goals of any faction in regional states. In the post-Iraq invasion period, US policy focused on denying US regional opponents, such as Syria and Iran, the means to undermine US strategic interests in the region. As was mentioned throughout this report, these include preserving a regional order that favored broader US interests in the region and second that safeguarded Israel’s national security. When it sensed an opportunity to reshape the regional balance of power in the Levant in 2003, the US began to call for Syria’s exit from Lebanon. In the wake of the popular upheaval of 2005 following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon and the balance of power within the country began to tip in favor of the West and the US. Since 2005, the US has sought to consolidate its gains by trying to ensure that Lebanon following Syria’s exit would not become an arena for proxy competition yet again. After Syria left in 2005, Iran