By Sayed Zafar Hashemi a Capstone Project Submitted to Johns Hopkins

Home , Hotak, Ibrahimkhel, Mohammad Hanif Atmar, Popalzai, Wardak (Pashtun tribe)

PREVENTING ENCROACHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE (IS) GROUP IN AFGHANISTAN

by Sayed Zafar Hashemi

A capstone project submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Public Management

Baltimore, Maryland May, 2015

Abstract

The Islamic State (IS) group is making its way into Afghanistan to use the country as a route for penetrating the Central Asian Republics. This paper proposes a new policy option for the Afghan government to tackle the IS challenge in the country with a public awareness campaign instead of opening a new military front, since the government is already devoting its current military capabilities to fighting the Taliban insurgency. The

Afghan president has the authority and responsibility to tackle the threat before it becomes unmanageable.

Keywords: IS, ISIS, ISIL, Afghanistan, Terrorism, Militancy, Propaganda, Insurgency

Table of Contents ACTION FORCING EVENT ...... 1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ...... 3 HISTORY ...... 6 BACKGROUND ...... 14 POLICY PROPOSAL ...... 28 POLICY ANALYSIS ...... 34 POLITICAL ANALYSIS ...... 45 RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 54 SAYED ZAFAR HASHEMI (RESUME) ...... 56

iii

MEMORANDUM

TO: H. E. MOHAMMAD ASHRAF GHANI, PRESIDENT OF I.R. OF AFGHANISTAN

FROM: SAYED ZAFAR HASHEMI

SUBJECT: PREVENTING ENCROACHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE (IS) IN AFGHANISTAN

DATE: MAY 6, 2015

CC: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ULLEMA COUNCIL, MINISTER OF HAJJ AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS, MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE

ACTION FORCING EVENT

Speaking at the Afghan Parliament, National Security Advisor Mohammad Hanif Atmar acknowledged the severity of the security threats that the Islamic State poses.1 Atmar compared the Islamic State’s security threats to that of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In

April, the Islamic State group claimed responsibility for a horrific suicide attack in

Jalalabad, in which a suicide bomber detonated his suicide vest while standing in a line of people waiting for salaries near a local branch of the Kabul Bank.2 In the face of the ongoing conflict, the widespread lawlessness, and the lack of employment opportunities

1 Radio Free Afghanistan, Top Afghan Security Adviser Sees Menacing Islamic State Plans, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 7, 2015, Available at URL: http://gandhara.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-advisor-islamic-state-threat/26996583.html 2 Bill Chappell, Suicide Bombing Kills At Least 35 In Jalalabad; ISIS Reportedly Claims Responsibility, NPR, April 18, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo- way/2015/04/18/400582067/suicide-bombing-kills-at-least-35-in-jalalabad-isis-reportedly- claims-responsibi

for youth,3 Afghanistan remains highly susceptible to the infiltration and expansion of the

Islamic State.4

3 CIA Factbook, Afghanistan Unemployment Rate, CIA, June 24, 2014, Available at URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html 4 Marisa Porges, Radicalization Process in Afghanistan, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 18, 2012, Available at URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/radicalization-processes-in- afghanistan

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Reports of Islamic State’s (IS) infiltration of Afghanistan is alarming for the country’s current socioeconomic and political situation given IS’s rapid expansion in Iraq and Syria over the past two years.5

The majority of the foreign forces have departed from Afghanistan, and the Afghan security forces are shouldering the responsibility for providing security and fighting the insurgency.6 The United States and its allies financially support the 350,000 Afghan soldiers and police and have committed to continue training and advising them until

2017.7 However, the Taliban are making a strong resurgence and their activities have not only challenged the ability of the Afghan forces, but increased civilian casualties in

Afghanistan by 25 percent in 2014.8 Increased insecurity and the inability of the Afghan forces to hold territory and maintain control indicate the probability of a power vacuum making Afghanistan more susceptible to IS infiltration.

Afghanistan is especially appealing for the group’s global struggle for establishment of the Islamic caliphate, given that it has routes to South and Central Asia as well as the

Middle Eastern countries. For instance, Mohammad Mohaqiq, Deputy Chief Executive of

5 CFR, Iraq Conflict: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Council On Foreign Relations, January 12, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/iraq-conflict-islamic- state-iraq-syria-isis/p33793 6 NATO, Inteqal: Transition to Afghan lead, NATO Website, January 7, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_87183.htm 7 NATO, A new chapter in NATO-Afghanistan relations from 2015, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January/February 2015, Available at URL: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_02/20150203_150203-Backgrounder- Afghanistan_en.pdf 8 United Nations, In Afghanistan’s deadliest year, civilian casualties top 10,000 in 2014 – UN, United Nations News Center, Accessed on February 19, 2015 from URL: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50111#.VOZSd6OUV5E

Afghanistan, told a gathering of Afghans that IS wants to use Afghanistan as a base for infiltrating the Central Asian Republics.9 General John Campbell, commander of

American forces in Afghanistan, has also voiced concerns about the possibility of IS entering and expanding its presence in Afghanistan.10

Furthermore, the disenfranchisement and inability of the Afghan Taliban to topple the central government has caused their popularity to plummet, even in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan where their support base exists. This creates an opportunity for IS or its affiliated groups to fill the gap and take the extreme side of insurgency by using horrific tactics, as IS does in Syria and Iraq. The caveat, however, is that the

Taliban are more focused on Afghanistan and toppling the current government as opposed to the Islamic State, which has declared an Islamic caliphate, seeking a global reach by inviting all Muslims to pledge alliance.

Preliminary reports by the Afghan and US officials indicate that the IS has made its way into Afghan territory, with some rogue elements of the Taliban seeking recruits in southern provinces.11

The religious appeal of the Islamic State and its pronounced anti-Western stance can also be factors helping its infiltration of Afghanistan. Despite the fact that the majority of

Afghans condemn the Islamic State’s extreme interpretation of Islam, there may be small

9 Habib Qadiri, Afghanistan Wakes Up To Islamic State Threat, Gandahara RFE/RL, February 14, 2015, Available at URL: http://gandhara.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-islamic-state-threat/26849365.html 10 Jamie Crawford, Congress hears Afghanistan troop plans amid ISIS fears, CNN, February 12, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/12/politics/isis-afghanistan-u-s-fears/ 11 Associated Press, Afghan General Confirms ISIS is Active, Recruiting in South, Fox News, January 12, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/01/12/afghan-general-confirms-is-presence- in-volatile-southern-helmand-province/

groups within the country that would go along with that interpretation and pledge alliance to the group, thus paving the way for the expansion of IS presence in Afghanistan.

HISTORY

Foreign influence has always been evident in the sociopolitical life and structure of

Afghanistan’s history. From Alexander the Great’s wars to the rivalry of Great Britain to the tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union invasion in 1979, Afghanistan has been a frequent battlefield for foreign powers and proxy wars.12 Its geopolitical location and the role of foreign powers have affected indigenous social and political dynamics.

It is important to understand why young men from many Islamic countries marched in

Afghanistan and what it will take for them to choose a similar path once again. In modern times, Sayed Qutb and Mohammad Abdul Islam Faraj, two prominent Islamic scholars, promoted the ideas among Muslims of fighting disbelievers and non-Muslims for territorial gain and establishing an Islamic Caliphate.13 The idea was put into practice by

Muslim men only when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and Palestinian Muslim scholar Sheikh Abdullah Azzam issued a religious ruling (Fatwa) calling on the Muslim community around the world (Ummah) to join the fight against the USSR in

Afghanistan.14

12 Keith Mclachlan, Afghanistan: The Geopolitics Of A Buffer State, Geopolitics and International Boundaries, October19, 2007 (Pp-82-96) Available at URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13629379708407579#.VPy1G8b4_7U 13 Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, Returning Western foreign fighters: The case of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, June 2014 Issue, Available at URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-De-Roy-van-Zuijdewijn-Bakker-Returning-Western- Foreign-Fighters-June-2014.pdf 14 Ibid.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the breakout of the bloody Afghan civil war in the early 90s and the emergence of the Taliban in the late 90s were the latest episodes of proxy wars in Afghanistan. As early as 1979, the United States, the United Kingdom, and

Saudi Arabia (and many others) started providing military and financial support to the

Islamic militants through Pakistani intelligence to counter the advancement of communism in the country.

The militants (known as Mujahideen, or holy warriors), including members of Afghan factions, parties, and groups, emerged as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the establishment of a leftist radical communist government in Kabul backed by

Moscow.15

When the Cold War ended and civil war broke out in Afghanistan, the Pakistani military actively participated in creating the Taliban as a means of installing its handpicked government in Afghanistan.16 Pakistani support for the Taliban has continued and sustained the insurgency even to this day, resulting in the killing of thousands of Afghans and US-led coalition forces.

There are fears that history will repeat itself and that the IS militants will use the lawless tribal situation in Pakistan to infiltrate Afghanistan and move toward the Central Asian republics. 17

15 Global Security, Afghanistan 1979-1992, Global Security Covert Operations, Accessed on March 8, 2015 at URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/afghanistan.htm 16 GWU, Pakistan: "The Taliban's Godfather"?, National Security Archives, August 14, 2007, Available at URL: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/ 17 Najib Sharifi, ISIS Makes Inroads in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Foreign Policy, October 1, 2014, Available at URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/01/isis-makes-inroads-in-afghanistan-pakistan/

The presence of IS in Afghanistan is sketchy and perplexing, as conflicting reports surface narrating different accounts from different intelligence officials. For the first time, NBC reported on September 24, 2014 that an IS affiliated group beheaded 15

Afghans during a militant raid in the central province of Ghazni.18 According to the

Afghan police commander cited in the report, IS militants alongside the Taliban launched a brutal attack and set 60 residential houses on fire while killing over 100 people, including 15 members of local police families.19

The Islamic State group has an eye on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area as a fertile region to expand its reign beyond the Middle East. The group first started distributing propaganda pamphlets in the Dari and Pashto languages in the restive city of Peshawar and other lawless tribal regions of Pakistan. The pamphlets were given to Pakistani and

Afghan refugees who were vulnerable to extremism due to their low social, economic, and political standing.20 In Peshawar and its surrounding area, scores of undereducated and unemployed young Afghan refugees are always on the lookout for employment and a purpose in life.

The fluid situation has alarmed top Afghan and American officials about the consequences of IS presence in Afghanistan. On January 20, 2015, Mohammad Khan, an

Afghan National Army General, confirmed to CBS that the Islamic State is actively

18 Alexander Smith, ISIS-Allied Militants Behead 15 During Afghanistan Offensive: Official, NBC, September 24, 2014, Available at URL: http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-allied-militants- behead-15-during-afghanistan-offensive-official-n212166 19 Ibid. 20 Shamim Shahid, Spillover effect: ISIS making inroads into Pakistan, Afghanistan, Express Tribune, September 4, 2014, Available at URL: http://tribune.com.pk/story/757186/spillover-effect-isis-making- inroads-into-pakistan-afghanistan/

recruiting in southern and western Afghanistan.21 He is quoted saying that Mullah Abdul

Rauf, a former Guantanamo detainee, was leading recruitment efforts for the group in

Afghanistan. However, the United States reported on January 9, 2015 that a drone attack killed Rauf and five aides in Helmand province, four of them Pakistani militants.22 This became a huge success story as a means of preventing IS infiltration in Afghanistan, with both Afghan and Americans claiming credit for the attack.

However, in less than two weeks, an unknown group of armed men stopped vehicles on the Kabul-Kandahar highway and kidnapped 31 passengers. Witnesses riding with the kidnapped passengers on the same route gave details of the kidnappers as men masked in black and speaking languages not known to fit the description of IS.23

Reports indicate that the 31 passengers on the Kabul-Kandahar highway were handpicked because of their Hazara ethnicity and Shia religion. It is another characteristic of IS as an extremist group of Sunni-Salafi-Wahabi belief to regularly target Muslim minorities and non-Muslims in areas under its control in Iraq and Syria, according to Human Rights

Watch. 24 The Islamic State kidnaps, terrorizes, and forcibly converts non-Muslims to

Islam or gives them an ultimatum to leave IS-controlled territories. When the group captured Mosul, Iraq on June 10, 2014, it “seized at least 200 Turkmen, Shabaks, and

21 CBS, ISIS active in south Afghanistan, officials confirm for first time, CBS News, January 15, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-active-in-south-afghanistan-officials-confirm-for- first-time/ 22 Massoud Popalzai, ISIS recruiter, once freed from Gitmo by U.S., killed in drone strike in Afghanistan, CNN, February 13, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/09/world/afghanistan-violence/ 23 CBS, ISIS kidnaps dozens in Afghanistan, official says, CBS News, February 24, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-reportedly-kidnaps-30-hazara-shiites-in-afghanistan-zabul- province/ 24 HRW Report, Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities, Human Rights Watch, July 19, 2014, Available at URL: http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/19/iraq-isis-abducting-killing-expelling-minorities

Yazidis, killed at least 11 of them, and ordered all Christians to convert to Islam, pay

‘tribute’ money, or leave Mosul by July 19.”25

There is also an ongoing conflict between Al Qaida, the Taliban and the Islamic State, as each claims legitimacy and stewardship of Islam and the establishment of the Islamic caliphate. On June 30, 2014, the extremist Sunni rebel group known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant (ISIS-ISIL) declared the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate and vowed to broaden its areas of control beyond Iraq and Syria.26 Citing an online audio recording associated to an IS spokesman, the Associated Press reported, "The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organizations becomes null by the expansion of the caliph's authority and the arrival of its troops in their areas.” The taunting continued,

"Listen to your caliph and obey him. Support your state, which grows every day." The group also declared Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State group, as the new caliph, Amir ul Momeneen, or ruler of the Islamic State. This poses the biggest conflict that the group can have with the Afghan Taliban.

Mullah Mohammad Omar, the one-eyed Taliban leader, still calls himself Amir-ul-

Momeneen, or the caliph, and enjoys pledges of allegiance from numerous terrorist groups in the region, including the notorious Haqqani Network.27 There are reports that

Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi has called Mullah Omar an “illiterate warlord” who “does not

25 See Ibid. 26 Mark Tran, ISIS Announces Islamic Caliphate In Area Straddling Iraq and Syria, The Guardian Newspaper, June 30, 2014, Available at URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/isis- announces-islamic-caliphate-iraq-syria 27 CBS, Pakistan: U.S. drone strike targeting Haqqani network kills at least 16 in Waziristan, CBS News, July 3, 2013, Available at URL: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pakistan-us-drone-strike-targeting- haqqani-network-kills-at-least-16-in-waziristan/

deserve spiritual or political credibility.”28 This rift also showcases the differences and animosity between the IS and Al Qaida as the latter renewed its allegiance to the Taliban leader in Afghanistan. After reports of conflicts between Al Qaida and the Islamic State,

Al Qaida published its new online magazine stating, “The first edition begins by renewing the pledge of allegiance to [the] Emir of the Believers Mullah Muhammad

Omar Mujahid, may Allah preserve him, and confirming that al-Qaida and its branches everywhere are soldiers among his soldiers.”29

The Afghan government with the support of the international community has been struggling to persuade the Taliban to lay down arms and negotiate with Kabul. However, because of Pakistan’s meddling and pressure put on the Taliban leadership to avoid negotiation, the talks have produced almost no results over the past decade.30 Now that there seems to be momentum in the peace talks after the formation of the new Afghan

National Unity Government and an apparent shift in Pakistan’s policy, certain elements within the Taliban seem to be unwilling to commit to peace. For instance, Mullah Abdul

Rauf, killed by US drones, was said to have chosen to work for IS as the Taliban are becoming less popular among the general public. The fear is that once the peace talks start between Kabul and the Taliban, rogue elements within the Taliban that oppose the peace talks might switch sides from the Taliban to IS.

28 Khaama Press, Mullah Omar is a fool and illiterate warlord, al-Baghdadi says, Khaama Press, January 29, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.khaama.com/mullah-omar-is-a-fool-and-illiterate-warlord-al- baghdadi-says-9291 29 Thomas Jocelyn, Al Qaeda renews its oath of allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, The Long War Journal, July 21, 2014, Available at URL: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/07/al_qaeda_renews_its.php 30 Heritage Foundation, Solution 2014, Asia – Talking Points, The Heritage Foundation, Accessed on February 24, 2014, at URL: http://solutions.heritage.org/asia/

In addition, the security commander of the restive eastern Logar province says that rogue armed groups and thieves use the Islamic State’s flag to enter people’s houses at night and steal their jewelry and valuables.31 The hardest part for the Afghan government in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table was that many groups and factions, even criminal groups and drug mafia with no relations to the Taliban, all operate under the same name.

The withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan and the US redirecting its focus on

IS in Iraq and Syria have also paved the way for the group to infiltrate Afghanistan.

General John Campbell, Commander of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, told a Senate hearing that reports of IS recruitments in Afghanistan are alarming and that it has become an intelligence priority for him and the Afghan intelligence apparatus.32 However, on

December 31, 2014, the formal end of the US combat mission in Afghanistan (Operation

Enduring Freedom), US President Barack Obama declared the Afghan War ended and instead focused on targeting IS in Syria and Iraq under the new American-led coalition.33

The effective use of technology and propaganda and ransom money, as well as abandoned resources in Syria and Iraq are credited for the rise of the IS group over the past two years. However, the main reason, argues Martin Smith, PBS producer and filmmaker of “The Rise of ISIS”, is the systematic sidelining of Sunnis in Iraq by Nouri

31 BBC Persian, ISIS Fighters Raids People’s Houses in Logar Province, BBC Persian, February 23, 2015, (Persian article) Available at URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2015/02/150223_k04_isis_in_logar_afghanistan 32 Jamie Crawford, Congress hears Afghanistan troop plans amid ISIS fears, CNN, February 12, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/12/politics/isis-afghanistan-u-s-fears/ 33 Stephen Biddle, Ending the War in Afghanistan, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2013, Available at URL: http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/ending-war-afghanistan/p31305

Al-Maliki, the former Shia Prime Minister known for his hatred of Sunnis.34 The isolation of Sunnis by the Maliki government, the youth’s frustration about the lack of employment opportunities, and the existence of exploitative offshoots of Al Qaeda- related groups provided the fertile bedrock that enabled IS to grow and expand its reach to Iraq and Syria, to everyone’s surprise.

The Islamic State group wants to expand its reach to the South and Central Asian

Republics, and the most feasible route for doing so is through Afghanistan because it has many of the prerequisites to be utilized by the group.

34 Martin Smith, The Rise of ISIS, PBS Documentaries, October 28, 2014, Available at URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRGk-roXIkM

BACKGROUND

The latest Afghan and American intelligence reports indicate that the Islamic State is making its way into Afghanistan. Afghan government officials do not have an exact number of how many IS fighters are in Afghanistan. However, the Afghan President recently told a USIP gathering in Washington that over a million Afghan youth are unemployed and susceptible to IS recruitment, in addition to the 600,000 that were disqualified from entering higher education institutions after graduating from high school this year.35 There are numerous religious organizations (madrassas) as well as generous donations both from groups and individuals in the Gulf States that could be exploited to indoctrinate these frustrated, unemployed youth under the banner of religion and Islam.

US officials have also acknowledged that the Islamic State group is making its way into

Afghanistan. Major Bradlee Avots, a spokesman for the US Department of Defense, told the Hill that they are concerned about the spread of IS in Afghanistan or Pakistan, but are determined not to allow either of these countries to become a safe haven for the terrorist networks to attack the US or its interests.36 General John Campbell, commander of the

American forces in Afghanistan, recently told a US Senate committee that the presence of

IS in Afghanistan is “nascent” but that the group is gaining ground in the country.37

35 Ashraf Ghani, A Conversation with Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, March 25, 2015, Available URL: http://www.usip.org/events/conversation-he-mohammad-ashraf-ghani 36 Kristina Wong, Pentagon acknowledges ISIS spread to Afghanistan amid US troop drawdown, The Hill, February 2, 2015, Available at URL: http://thehill.com/policy/defense/232588-pentagon-isis-nascent-in- afghanistan 37 Jamie Crawford, Congress hears Afghanistan troop plans amid ISIS fears, CNN, February 12, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/12/politics/isis-afghanistan-u-s-fears/

Reports of foreign fighters joining the IS ranks in Afghanistan are still preliminary and insignificant, but have the potential to pose a major security threat to Afghanistan and its surroundings. For instance, a senior commander of the Afghan National Army claims that in a disputed exchange between reported Taliban and the IS insurgents in Zabul province seven Islamic State fighters were killed.38

America’s top military officer in Afghanistan told US senators that Afghan President

Ashraf Ghani has also expressed concerns about the presence of IS in his country, adding

“you do have some of the Taliban breaking off and claiming allegiance toward” the

Islamic State.39 This is because dissidence among the midlevel and high-level ranks of the Taliban has increased because of the peace process with the Afghan government.

The new Afghan government has been making a great effort to persuade Pakistan to help bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiation table. Since the formation of the new Afghan

National Unity Government, President Ghani has rigorously approached Pakistan in

Islamabad (mainly the country’s powerful military establishment) to persuade the Afghan

Taliban to join the peace process. Despite constant attempts by the former Afghan

President Hamid Karzai and the backing of the international community, the process was fruitless during the thirteen years of Karzai’s presidency. The new Afghan government

38 Naseem Hotak, Taliban kill 7 ISIS fighters in Zabul clash, Pajhwak News Agency, March 5, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/03/05/taliban-kill-7-isis-fighters-zabul-clash 39 Ibid. note 35, CNN Article above.

policy and its soft tone and nature have increased “cautious optimism” that the Taliban will finally join the peace process.40

The attempts of the new Afghan government, despite the cynicism of naysayers, have increased prospects for a peace deal with the Afghan Taliban. If a deal is broken, numerous factions within the group would oppose the settlement and join the Islamic

State, as General Campbell of the Resolute Support mission had warned American senators.41 If the current course of action against IS remains unchanged, the group’s presence in Afghanistan can intensify as it seeks ways to enter Afghanistan and make it a safe haven and base for infiltrating other Central Asian Republics.

Current Policy and Laws

Article Seven of the Afghan constitution tasks the government of Afghanistan with preventing “all kinds of terrorist activities, cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and production and use of intoxicants.”42 Similarly the newly ratified law against money laundering has clauses that define criminal networks and terrorism-related activities. For instance, Article Four in Chapter Two of the law prohibits any kind of financial

40 Jon Boone, Ashraf Ghani visit may mark new chapter in Afghan-Pakistan relations, The Guardian, November 14, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/14/ashraf-ghani- visit-pakistan-afghanistan 41 Jamie Crawford, Congress hears Afghanistan troop plans amid ISIS fears, CNN, February 12, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/12/politics/isis-afghanistan-u-s-fears/ 42 Afghan Government, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ratified January 26, 2004, Accessed on March 8, 2015 at URL: http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf

transaction or activity that can aid terrorism or terrorist activity in or outside

Afghanistan.43

The Afghan National Security Forces conduct anti-terror (now anti-IS) operations with verbal and often vague directives and edicts passed on to them on a case-by-case basis in the National Security Council meetings (the council serves as “essentially the war cabinet”).44 The National Directorate of Security (NDS) is the leading organization in combating terrorism, with a sophisticated network of operatives in and outside

Afghanistan trained and supported by the United States. The US-Afghan security, intelligence and military and technical cooperation was formalized when the two countries signed the controversial Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA).45

However, Afghan security forces face a dilemma in defining terrorism as the civilian government attempts to reach out to the Taliban for peace talks, since the Taliban has committed acts of terrorism by any international standard. The NDS is giving the order to

“kill and capture” members of the Islamic State in Afghanistan since it is officially listed as a “terrorist group.”46

Before the UN Security Council mandate and US-led “Operation Enduring Freedom” concluded in December 31, 2014, the Afghan government secured security and military pacts and agreements with numerous regional and global countries and organizations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, India and NATO. Such arrangements

43 Central Bank of Afghanistan, Law Against Money Laundering and Terrorism Sponsorship, Ratified On November 2014, and available in Persian at the URL: http://www.centralbank.gov.af/pdf/AML_Law_Dari.pdf 44 High-ranking official of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in discussion with author on March 8, 2015. The interviewee spoke on condition of anonymity. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.

will benefit Afghanistan to seek out help and support in combating IS in its territory, since the Islamic State will not stop its adventures in Afghanistan to make strides north, west and south of the country to the Central Asian Republics, Iran and Pakistan, respectively.

Key Players and Stakeholders

The National Ulama Council, the powerful independent council of Islamic clerics from across the country, has always been careful and cautious in its tone when condemning

Islamic militants fighting in Afghanistan. The council, created by former Afghan

President Hamid Karzai over a decade ago, serves as a forum for the government and other institutions to have a say in religious affairs. The council holds monthly and quarterly meetings and issues communiqués on every issue that relates to Islam.

Given the high credentials of its members, the role of the council is vital in delivering pro-government messages to counter Taliban and IS propaganda in Afghanistan.

However, the council cautiously takes sides when it comes to controversial issues such as condemning violence, suicide attacks, and the killings of Afghan or foreign security forces by insurgents. The council backs the Afghan government-led peace talks with the

Taliban. However, it has not yet publicly stated its stance on the activities of the Islamic

State in Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan.

The Afghan Government

There is general agreement in the leadership of the Afghanistan’s National Unity

Government when it comes to tackling insurgency and countering terrorism. There might be some differences in logistics and methods, but the overall impression is that both

President Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah share a similar vision of the improvement

of security and the deterrence of foreign terrorists from gaining a foothold inside

Afghanistan. Despite heavy partisan politics and the existence of a unity government as a result of an election crisis, the Afghan security sector comprised of the Defense Ministry

(army), Interior Ministry (police) and the NDS (intelligence) is in a good position to combat the Islamic State in Afghanistan.

The Afghan Taliban

The Afghan Taliban generally has viewed the IS in Afghanistan as a rival and irreconcilable force, given their different ideologies and causes. The Taliban in

Afghanistan want to control the country and impose the group’s version of Sharia without any grand scheme of promoting global jihad. Alternatively, the Islamic State has already declared a global Islamic caliphate that in theory reconciles and consolidates the community of believers (Ummah) across the world under its banner.

Fissures in the Afghan Taliban because of grievances with the group’s leadership also seem to be a source of recruitment for the Islamic State in Afghanistan. Over a decade of fighting Afghan soldiers with the backing of international forces, there are reports that

Mullah Mohammad Omar, the elusive leader of the Afghan Taliban, is “driving discontent” within the group’s ranks.47

There are also reports of fighting between the Afghan Taliban and militants claiming to represent IS in Afghanistan in two different provinces. However, the commander Mullah

Abdul Rauf Khadim, a former Guantanamo detainee who claimed to be commander of IS

47 Timor Shah, Taliban Fissures in Afghanistan Are Seen as an Opening for ISIS, New York Times, January 21, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/world/asia/taliban-fissures-in- afghanistan-are-seen-as-an-opening-for-isis.html?_r=0

in Afghanistan, was killed in a drone attack soon after the quarrel.48 The peace talks with the Afghan government can help detach some of the Taliban members who might want to join the Islamic State.

The Islamic State and Its Ambitions

From a historical perspective, Afghanistan is a vital geographical location for the Islamic

State. The group promotes a narrative that the world will end. Afghanistan’s geographical location and its former name, Khorasan, are key elements in the IS narrative for two reasons. First, modern-day Afghanistan was the birthplace of two Islamic caliphates, the

Abbasid Caliphate in the years 566-653 CE and the reign of Abdul Jafar Al’Mamon from

813 to 833.

Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, has named Afghanistan, the surrounding areas in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian Republics as

Khorasan, and has appointed a governor as well as a deputy governor for the region.49

Khorasan is an old name for Afghanistan and is a word that carries mythical overtones for some Muslims after an ancient prophecy that black flags would once again fly in

Khorasan before the end of the world.50 The narrative goes on to claim that the final fateful fight will start in Khorasan and spread all the way to Dabiq (the small town in Iraq

48 Timor Shah, Taliban Fissures in Afghanistan Are Seen as an Opening for ISIS, New York Times, January 21, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/world/asia/taliban-fissures-in- afghanistan-are-seen-as-an-opening-for-isis.html?_r=0. 49 LWJ Staff, Islamic State appoints leaders of ‘Khorasan province,’ issues veiled threat to Afghan Taliban, Long War Journal, January 27, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/islamic_state_appoin.php 50 David Loyn, Islamic State 'recruiting Afghan fighters,' BBC, January 12, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30777565

after which the Islamic State has named its propaganda magazine) where Muslims and crusaders will fight face-to-face until Jesus descends as a Muslim and saves the world.51

The Islamic State operates in four stages: organize, orient, decide, and act. IS establishes its operating units in territories where the majority of ordinary people feel that they have been excluded from and abandoned by social, political and economic development and opportunities in their countries, which is especially widespread in the South and Central

Asian regions. For instance, 36 percent of Afghanistan’s 30 million people live below the poverty line. For the past five years, no significant improvement has been reported and to make matters even worse, northeastern Afghanistan has a poverty rate of 50 percent.52

Pakistan and its Taliban

Before reports about Afghan Taliban pledging alliance to the IS in Afghanistan, Pakistan did not take the threat of IS seriously, despite its history of having terrorists and militants in its tribal areas. However, after certain divisions of the Pakistani Taliban announced that they were siding with Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and

Syria, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United Nations took the podium of the Security

Council and called on the international community to come together and fight the common threat. On October 11, 2014, Masood Khan told the UN body, “We must all,

51 Michael Ryan, Hot Issue: Dabiq: What Islamic State’s New Magazine Tells Us about Their Strategic Direction, Recruitment Patterns and Guerrilla Doctrine, Jamestown Foundation, August 1, 2014, Available at URL: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42702#.VRhv_8b4_7U 52 Ashraf Ghani, A Conversation with Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, March 25, 2015, Available URL: http://www.usip.org/events/conversation-he-mohammad-ashraf-ghani

collectively, oppose and defeat its evil ideology of ‘hate, murder and destroy’. We must remain united in our fight against this new face of terrorism and violent extremism.”53

Under the leadership of the new Afghan National Unity Government, new trust-building mechanisms are underway between Kabul and Islamabad. After a bloody terrorist attack on a school in Peshawar, for the first time Pakistan declared that there are no good or bad

Taliban and that enemy of Afghanistan is the enemy of Pakistan.54 If the current trend of trust-building and spirit of cooperation continues between Afghanistan and Pakistan,

Islamabad can play a vital role in assisting the Afghan government to curb this new security threat that has potential fallout for Pakistan as well.

In addition, Pakistan is home to numerous Islamic madrassas and an army of influential

Islamic mullahs. Through this nexus, Pakistan can help Kabul to promote an anti-IS campaign. Cooperation through this particular mode can be very challenging, given that the majority of these networks and Islamist groups publicly support the Afghan Taliban and oppose the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan.

Northern Neighbors and Iran

The presence and expansion of IS in Afghanistan threatens the security of Iran. The

Islamic Republic of Iran is a Shia-dominant country with firm opposition to the hardliner

Sunni extremism of the Islamic State. US Secretary of State John Kerry told a Senate hearing that even though the Islamic Republic does not publicly support or oppose the

53 Jamie Scharm, Now Pakistan cares about ISIS, New York Post, October 11, 2014 Available at URL: http://nypost.com/2014/10/31/now-pakistan-cares-about-isis/ 54 Omer Farooq Khan, No distinction between good Taliban and bad Taliban: Sharif, Times of India, December 18, 2014, Available at URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/No-distinction- between-good-Taliban-and-bad-Taliban-Sharif/articleshow/45555979.cms

American-led coalition’s strikes against IS targets in Syria and Iraq, Tehran feels relieved every time an American fighter jet hits an IS target.

Iran and Afghanistan were on good terms under former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who maintained an independent foreign policy despite the fact that his government depended on American aid. The new Afghan government under Ghani and Abdullah has yet to take a stance on its relationship with Iran. However, even if Iran does not support the Afghan government’s efforts to curb the IS threat, it will not oppose or derail any effort by Kabul.

The Central Asian Republics (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan) are under the heavy influence and reign of Moscow and its security umbrella. Russia has always been worried about infiltration of Islamic militants in the former Soviet

Republics, which would allow the militants to easily enter mainland Russia.

The Central Asian Republics have most of the trappings that can attract an Islamic group such as IS. These Republics “are Muslim-majority, slung under dictatorial regimes, and suffering through busted economic models.”55 The gap between rich and poor, the lack of inclusion in society, and the suppression of political opponents are key factors that drive ordinary people away from the mainstream – a scenario in which IS can easily recruit disenfranchised youth.

Afghanistan and its northern neighbors have developed coordination and working relationships over the years to stop militant border crossing in both directions. Afghan

55 Casey Michael, The Media Is Misinterpreting the ISIS Arrests in Brooklyn, New Republic, February 27, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121161/central-asian-countries-are-mostly- immune-isis-overtures

intelligence agencies also report that there are militant groups from these republics in

Afghanistan.

United States and its allies

The United States has signed a strategic partnership and a bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan that ensures that Afghanistan receives long-term military and technical assistance for defending its security. In addition, the US has conducted military operations against IS in Iraq and Syria and asked the broader coalition of countries to fight against the militant group. There is no specific agreement between the United States and Afghanistan in regard to IS; however, General John Campbell, commander of the

American troops in Afghanistan, has indicated that based on long-term military agreements between the US and Afghanistan, America will help Afghanistan tackle the

IS challenge. In addition, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, recently told a US Senate hearing that he is aware of the IS threat in Afghanistan and that if left unchecked, activities of the group in Afghanistan can threaten America’s security interests.

Public Perception

Public perception of the Islamic State group in Afghanistan ranges from very low to mixed across different geographic areas.56 In major cities and populated areas where people have access to multiple sources of information (such as radio, television, and even the Internet), people view the IS as brutal, Taliban-like, and aiming to impose its version of Islam on them. The fact that many IS fighters in Iraq and Syria come from other

56 Shoaib Sharifi, Presence of Daesh/ISIS In Afghanistan, Rumi Consultancy, February 1, 2015, Survey of the Afghan People About ISIS in Three Vulnerable Provinces: Badakhshan, Kunduz and Ghazni

countries counts against the group’s standing in Afghanistan, given the sensitivity of

Afghans to foreigners’ presence in their country.57

Scattered protests against the Islamic State have been reported in and around Kabul as the news of the group’s kidnapping and killing of foreign journalists and aid workers have surfaced in the media.58 In addition, a recent survey of the Afghan people’s perception of the IS in three susceptible provinces indicates that the majority of respondents held a negative view of the group in cases where they had sufficient information. Those with limited access to information declined to comment. 59 However, lack of knowledge and information about the group’s activities can create sympathy for the group in the more rural conservative pockets of Afghanistan.

Despite the inability of the Afghan government to provide basic services and eliminate endemic corruption and nepotism both in the judicial and executive branches, over 50 percent of the Afghan people still trust the government.60 The Afghan National Security

Forces, especially the Afghan National Army, have a better reputation as providers of security and protectors of the land against its enemies.61 Even though the emergence of IS in Afghanistan is a relatively new phenomenon, the majority of Afghans supports the

Afghan government in talking to the Taliban as long as that the gains of the past thirteen

57 Shoaib Sharifi, Presence of Daesh/ISIS In Afghanistan, Rumi Consultancy, February 1, 2015, Survey of the Afghan People About ISIS in Three Vulnerable Provinces: Badakhshan, Kunduz and Ghazni 58 Yuri Kageyama, Death of Kenji Goto, journalist killed by ISIS, sends Japan into shock and mourning, Haaretz Newspaper, February 1, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.640063 59 See Ibid. Rumi Consultancy. 60 Abdullah Ahmadzai, Survey Reveals 2014 Election Major Driver of Optimism in Afghanistan, The Asia Foundation, November 19, 2014, Available at URL: http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2014/11/19/survey- reveals-2014-election-major-driver-of-optimism-in-afghanistan/ 61 Ibid.

years are not compromised. However, a general tendency of anti-IS feeling can be seen among Afghans in light of the group’s brutality in Iraq and Syria.

The current government’s approach to tackling the IS threat in Afghanistan remains weak and focused only on the military component. The Afghan government does not have a specific strategy to confront the IS narrative when the group begins to focus more on

Afghanistan either in the form of actively sending more men from abroad, recruiting from within the country, or launching a propaganda campaign in Afghanistan.

The emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan is the latest development with the potential to threaten its security, to derail any conceivable success of the peace talks with the Taliban, and to radicalize vulnerable youth in Afghanistan. Like the Taliban and other insurgent groups, IS engages in systematic and organized propaganda against the government of Afghanistan to defame its democratic and Islamic credentials.

Takfir, an excommunication and defamation method, was first introduced and utilized in modern-day Saudi Arabia by Muhammad Abd-al Wahab, an 18th-century Sunni Muslim scholar whose teachings promoted orthodoxy and “purification” of Islam. Under this doctrine, fellow Muslims (and governments) can be deemed as “infidels should they engage in activities that in any way could be said to encroach on the sovereignty of the absolute authority,” i.e., a king, president or a ruler.62

Utilization of this technique has a long history in Afghanistan, from the modernization efforts and reform programs of King Amanullah Khan in 1921 to the reconciliation

62 Alastair Crooke, You Can't Understand ISIS If You Don't Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, Huffington Post, August 27, 2014, Available at URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair- crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html

efforts by the late President Najibullah with the Mujahideen factions in the late 1990s to the Taliban’s denunciation of President Karzai’s administration as a “puppet government” controlled by infidels.63

Efforts to jumpstart peace talks with the Taliban are underway, and the expectation is that the Afghan government will soon be able to start formal talks with the militants.

However, any progress can be easily undone if deviant members of the Taliban “rebrand” themselves and pledge allegiance to the Islamic State.

63 Horia Mosadiq, Reconciliation in Afghanistan: Can the UN right some wrongs?, Afghanistan Analysts Network, October 31, 2010, Available at URL: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/reconciliation-in- afghanistan-can-the-un-right-some-wrongs/

POLICY PROPOSAL

This section is intended to propose a policy to launch a national campaign against the

Islamic State group and its presence and ideology in Afghanistan. The policy will develop specific and targeted messages by the relevant government and outside entities to be used by imams in mosques during prayer sessions so people are exposed to the activities of the Islamic State and how its ideology, actions and expansionist agenda are contradictory to the peaceful teachings of Islam.

Currently there are an estimated 150,000 to 160,000 mosques in Afghanistan, but only around 50,000 are registered in the government’s database.64 Of the registered mosques, only 3,700 imams receive a monthly salary from the Afghan government.65

Policy Authorization

Specifically, this paper proposes that the President task the National Security Council, the

Ministry of Hajj and Islamic Affairs, the Ministry of Information and Culture, the

National Security Committee of the Afghan parliament and the Council of Afghanistan’s

Islamic Ullema to do three things:

1. The Ministry of Hajj and Islamic Affairs should register all mosques in its

database and, in concert with the security sector ministries, establish a

communication network to communicate with Imams in mosques and follow what

64 Numerous sources had different figures about the number of mosques in Afghanistan. This is the most precise and exact number provided by the Ministry of Hajj and Islamic Affairs. 65 Faiz Mohammad Osmani, Afghan Hajj Minister in discussion with author arranged by 8am Daily, April 14, 2015.

they preach in their sermons. The ministry has departments in all 34 Afghan

provinces that can help its central office in Kabul with a quick registration

process.

2. A special committee, formed and tasked by the president and comprised of the

Afghan Ullema Council, the Ministry of Hajj and Islamic Affairs and the National

Security Council should develop specific targeted messages to be used in

religious sermons by imams in mosques as well as radio broadcasts, television

networks, newspapers and mobiles as mass text messages.

3. The Ministry of Information and Culture should distribute and broadcast these

messages via state-controlled radio and television networks and allocate a special

budget to buy airtime on major radio stations, television stations and in

newspapers across Afghanistan for broadcasting these messages. The ministry

will also work with major telecommunication companies to distribute bits and

pieces of these messages in the form of SMSs and MMSs (cell phone text and

multimedia messages) to Afghans across Afghanistan, with a focus on susceptible

areas and populations.

Policy Implementation

Under the Afghan constitution, the President has the authority to form special committees to address special matters related to security, economy and overall wellbeing of

Afghanistan.

Implementation of the three components of this policy will be conducted simultaneously as soon as the President agrees and allocates the needed legal and financial authorizations to the designated entities and people. The President can task the Hajj and Islamic Affairs

ministry to start the mosque registration process in coordination with district governments across Afghanistan. The special committee will start working on the specific messages and start dispatching them to the mosques for the 3,700 imams currently on the Afghan government’s payroll.

Over 90 percent of Afghanistan’s population has access to cell phones, making coverage almost nationwide, even in areas where insurgents are active.66 In the first phase, the

Ministry of Information and Culture can take the messages and give them to the state-run radio stations and television networks as well as newspapers. In the second phase, the ministry can start working with private radio and television networks. The ministry can also simultaneously contract with communication companies to send bits of these messages in SMS and MMS form to regions of the country highly susceptible to IS infiltration.

According to the Hajj and Islamic Affairs Minister, local communities decide and make the final call as to whom to nominate and approve as imam for a local mosque.67 This proposal will enable the Afghan government to establish a communication line with every mosque in every community at the local, district and provincial levels. For instance, local governments at the district level in consultation with community leaders will vet the nominee and appoint him to be the imam.

66 Mohammad Hassan Khitab, 90pc of Afghans get access to telecom services, Pajhwak News Agency, January 1, 2014, URL Available at: http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2014/01/01/90pc-afghans-get-access- telecom-services 67 Faiz Mohammad Osmani, Afghan Hajj Minister in an interview with author arranged by 8am Daily on April 14, 2015.

Local governments will also offer topics to be discussed by imams in mosques at the district level. This has precedent; the Afghan Ministry of Hajj and Islamic Affairs has previously asked mosques to discuss certain issues with the congregation after prayers.

For example, the National Directorate of Security asked imams across Afghanistan to deliver sermons in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), whom the

Taliban portray as mercenaries working with American forces in Afghanistan.68

However, the process is weak and enforcement has always been a problem because often even imams who are on the payroll of the Afghan government not only criticize the government but also side with the Taliban and other extremist groups. This is because of their religious beliefs in some cases, or the fear of retaliation in areas with poor security or that are under control of the Taliban in other cases.

The content of the messages to be used in sermons and mass media campaigns will be based on Quranic verses and teachings of Islam as stated in Hadiths, the sayings of the

Prophet Mohammad. The messages, approved by the Ullema Council, the largest network of Islamic scholars in Afghanistan, will have a positive tone and will emphasize those verses of the Quran and Hadiths that promote peace and denounce violence. For instance,

God forbids anyone to kill believers at numerous points in the Quran, including Sura Al-

Nisa:

68 Craig Whitlock, Afghan Election Mess Aiding Taliban's Propaganda, Washington Post, September 21, 2009, Available at URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092000995.html

But whoever kills a believer intentionally - his recompense is Hell, wherein he will abide eternally, and Allah has become angry with him and has cursed him and has prepared for him a great punishment.69

Apart from verses of the Quran that strictly prohibit the killing of innocent people,

Prophet Mohammad has also commanded his followers not to harm civilians. For example, he is quoted to have said that no Muslim is allowed to harm or kill another fellow Muslim,70 and the majority of the victims killed by the Islamic State have been

Muslims. The messages will focus on brutalities and atrocities committed by the Islamic

State under the banner of Islam. President Ghani has stated that the Islamic State is un-

Islamic and all Muslim nations and their leaders should loudly and clearly denounce the group’s actions.71 Through these messages, imams will boost the Islamic credentials of the central Afghan government and counter the extremist narrative questioning its legitimacy.72

The Ministry of Information and Culture funds and controls a nationwide, 24/7 radio and television network as well as five daily newspapers in the Dari, Pashto and English languages at an annual cost of $430,000.73 The ministry will dedicate a team to adopt the messages/sermons into television, radio and print formats and include them in their daily programming via radio, television and newspapers.

69 Verse number 93, Chapter 4, (Sura Al-Nisa), Quran. 70 Prophet Mohammad Quoted in Abu Daoud Hadith #5005. 71 Eric Brander, Afghan president: 'Terrorists neither recognize boundaries nor require passports', CNN, March 25, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/25/politics/afghanistan-ghani- congress-speech/ 72 Nick Paton Walsh, Taliban Will not Talk Peace With Karzai Government, CNN, February 14, 2012, Available at URL: http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/14/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban/ 73 Ghani Modaqiq, Head of Radio Operations of RTA in discussion with the author on April 15, 2015.

Operatives and field officers of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), local police and members of the local government will be tasked to monitor and report on the compliance of imams. The committee, assigned by the President, will conduct follow-up meetings to monitor effective implementation of the policy.

POLICY ANALYSIS

This proposal is intended to institutionalize the disorganized structure of over 150,000 mosques in Afghanistan so that the government can send specific anti-IS messages to ordinary people through these mosques. Considering that Afghanistan is a conservative and religious country, mosques and Imams play a vital role in shaping people’s opinions and lifestyles.

We believe this policy proposal will not only tackle the existing IS threat in the medium term, but will also institutionalize and bring mosques under government control over the long run. Mosques are important pillars of Afghan society that serve as a driving force in shaping people’s opinion. For decades, mosques have been used by extremists and fundamentalist groups to recruit young people and train them as terrorists, but this policy can help to turn the page and change the mosques into an effective and legitimate anti- extremist loudspeaker for the Afghan government. For instance, the Taliban has created a sophisticated communication apparatus to attract and exploit nationalism, create ethnic divisions, and highlight the failures of the Afghan government and its international partners.74 This is the same strategy the Afghan Mujahidin used against the Soviet Union and its puppet government during the 1970s and 1980s in Afghanistan.

Mosques and religious schools (Madrasas) have been an effective recruitment and training ground for the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other Islamic extremist and terrorist groups

74 Nang Durrani, Af-Pak 2013: Inside the Taliban media machine, Afghanistan Today, December 20, 2012, Available at URL: http://m.afghanistan-today.org/article/?id=617

in Pakistan and Afghanistan.75 It has also served as a legitimizing tool for the actions and decisions of local and regional warlords. For instance, in northern Afghanistan warlords pay imams to deliver sermons in their favor or confer religious legitimacy on their otherwise immoral or illegal actions. Foreign intelligence agencies also use mosques and pay imams to advance foreign agendas in the restive parts of Afghanistan.76

Implementing this portion of the policy will face certain obstacles. First and foremost, there is the problem of effective implementation. The Taliban controls many districts in

Ghazni, Zabul, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, and Badakhshan provinces.77 This will make the registration process very difficult since in a number of districts, central government virtually does not exist. Out of 34 provinces in Afghanistan, nine are under high-security threat and 11 under medium-security threat while the remaining 14 are relatively peaceful.78 While the Taliban might not harshly react to implementation of a policy aimed at getting rid of the Islamic State group, it is possible that they will oppose it and do all it takes to prevent registration of mosques in the territories they control.

75 Crisis Group Report, Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?, International Crisis Group, 24 July, 2008, Available at URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/158- taliban-propaganda-winning-the-war-of-words.aspx 76 Sabrina Tavernise, Pakistan’s Islamic Schools Fill Void, but Fuel Militancy, New York Times, May 3, 2009, Available at URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/world/asia/04schools.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2& 77 The Long War Journal, Taliban control 3 districts in Afghan provinces of Wardak and Kunduz, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Accessed on April 20, 2015 from URL: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/10/taliban_control_3_di.php 78 Shakeela Ibrahimkhel, Local Badakhshan Officials Accused of Collusion in Attack on ANA, ToloNews News, April 16, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19097-local- badakhshan-officials-accused-of-collusion-in-attack-on-ana

To overcome implementation challenges in the Taliban-controlled territories, there are two options, each with a different set of consequences. The first option is focusing implementation in the areas that are under Afghan government control. This will be an effective way of dealing with vulnerable areas to prevent IS infiltration. Also, the rivalry between the Taliban and the IS group in Afghanistan over dominance and identity will benefit the Afghan government in the short run. For instance, if the Afghan government launches its anti-IS campaign in mosques in the Taliban-controlled territories, the Taliban might not react as strongly or might even extend its support. However, since the messages will indirectly harm the Taliban cause of using terrorism to pursue political goals, the group might just as likely get irritated and try to stop the campaign.

The second option will be to focus the anti-IS campaign only in the areas where the

Taliban has territorial control. This will affect the registration of mosques and the portion of the campaign in which Imams deliver sermons in the mosques. However, airing radio and television commercials as well as text and multimedia messages can still be done in these territories. The downside to this option is that the Taliban might attack cellphone and television towers; however, the group’s reliance on social media and the Internet for its propaganda purposes makes this possibility very unlikely.

Doing the Numbers

The annual salary cost for the 3,700 imams is $2,664,000 (average monthly salary of

$60).79 If all mosques are registered and Imams come on the government’s payroll, the annual cost of gaining full control of all mosques in Afghanistan will be $152,000,000.

79 Faiz Mohammad Osmani, Afghan Hajj Minister in discussion with author, arranged by 8am Daily on April 14, 2015.

This will be a significant investment for the Afghan government to have control over mosques across Afghanistan, aimed at preventing infiltration of extremists and indoctrination of Afghan youth.

The annual budget of the Afghan government is $7.65 billion. The current budget of the

Afghan National Security Forces (including police, army and intelligence) is $4.1 billion a year—90% of which comes from NATO countries, particularly the United States.80 If training and maintenance costs (which accounts for 40% of total defense expenses) are not considered, Afghanistan spends $6.7 million on the fight against the Taliban on a daily basis.

Messaging the Campaign

These messages will cultivate and promote anti-IS sentiment among ordinary Afghans by highlighting the group’s brutality and violent behavior against civilians and minorities in the territories under their control. The policy proposal intends to boost these sentiments among ordinary and susceptible Afghans, utilizing every influential medium and platform for maximum reach.

Emotion-provoking clips and messages are the core of extremist propaganda that attracts attention and helps them recruit new members. The same technique can be used by producers of the PSAs proposed in this policy paper. The 30-second clips used in every medium such as radio, television or mobile phones can start with scenes of an IS attack on civilians, followed a short and catchy statement by an imam condemning IS’s actions.

80 Ministry of Finance, Afghan National Budget for 1393 Solar Year, Afghan Ministry of Finance, Accessed on April 20, 2015 available at URL: http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/images/stories/DGB/BPRD/National%20Budget/1394/Dari%20Citizens%20 Budget.pdf

The clips can end with a verse from the Quran inviting Muslims to live in peace and harmony.

These messages will be delivered to all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces via mosques, radio and television, the Internet, and print media where available. State-run radio and television stations (RTA) as well as print media will entail no cost, since they have daily broadcasts and are currently operational. The state-controlled radio and television networks have local stations in every province, so the committee can increase or decrease the frequency of these ads/messages depending on the severity of the IS threat and the possibility of infiltration in a specific area. For instance, as of now there have been no reports of IS camps in northern Afghanistan, but active recruitment has been reported in

Helmand and Ghazni provinces.

Sending the Messages

Like private companies, presidential candidates or the international coalition forces in

Afghanistan, the Afghan government can use radio and television networks to spread anti-IS messages throughout the country. A number of major radio and television stations have a popular reach throughout Afghanistan, but commercials on popular networks are very expensive. This approach should be used selectively because of its cost. Also the government already has state-run radio, television and newspapers at its disposal free of charge.

Radio remains the most popular and easy-to-use media in Afghanistan for commercial advertisement.81 For instance, the average rate for broadcasting in the peak hours (6pm to

9pm) on national television is $600 per minute while radio costs $30 per minute.82 Two

30-second Public Service Announcements (PSAs) per night for television in the peak hours will cost $18,000 a month per station, while the same clips for radio will cost $900 per month. Since the target audience is more in the rural areas where radio is still the dominant medium, the frequency of broadcasting the PSAs can be increased to three to four times per 24 hours.

The sharing of slick and catchy audio and video clips as well as text messages is a popular trend among Afghan youth, even in the rural areas. Extremist groups such as the

Taliban have already figured this out and send their propaganda clips to the youth, who then share it with peers using the Internet or Bluetooth technology – a domino effect in full force.83 According to Rumi Consultancy’s survey, 50 percent of the youth with smartphones in Kabul and 62 percent of the same group in Kunar share extremist clips with each other through their cell phones.84 Demand for these clips in certain provinces is high to such an extent that young groups (between ages of 20 to 30) even purchase them at kiosks.

The Ministry of Information and Culture can contract with a major telecommunication company to distribute text and video clips to selected audiences in provinces susceptible

81 Freedom of Press, Afghanistan Press Freedom Report 2013, Freedom House, accessed on May 6, 2015 at URL: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/afghanistan#.VUogYsb4_7U 82 Najib Sharifi of Rumi Consultancy provided the numbers to author. The Company has worked with candidates during the 2014 Afghan presidential elections. 83 Najib Sharifi, National CVE Mobile Media Campaign, Rumi Consultancy, February 1, 2015, P. 6, 84 See Id. Rumi Consultancy Survey, p. 6, Graph 1.

to the IS’s influence. The average rate for distributing 50,000 to 100,000 thousands messages (text or multimedia) is 1.75 Afghanis ($1 = 58 Afghanis).85 Telecommunication companies will provide telephone numbers for the target audience in different provinces as part of the services.86 Sending 100 thousand messages per 24 hours will incur a monthly cost of around $3,000.

The Taliban used to shoot down and burn cellphone, radio and television towers if the companies sent out anti-Taliban text messages or radio and if television networks broadcast programming against them. Competition among media and telecommunication companies has increased over time, and now at least six nationwide telecommunication companies and over 70 television networks operate in Afghanistan.

However, the Taliban now uses the same telephone networks for their propaganda operations. This indicates that utilizing mass telephone messaging campaign will reach every corner of Afghanistan at little cost, while at the same time posing no major threat to the security of communication infrastructures. The only downside will be precision and communicating important issues in limited characters – like the 140 characters on

Twitter. But demand for smart phones with video capturing and playing capabilities is on the rise.

Effectiveness of Propaganda

The United State has been effectively using propaganda across the globe since the beginning of World War II. In 1942 the US first launched the Voice of America, its foreign broadcasting arm, to counter Nazi propaganda. America’s foreign broadcasting

85 Najib Sharifi of Rumi Consultancy in discussion with author on April 20, 2015. 86 Ibid.

has been targeting communist and dictatorial regimes around the world, including militants and terrorist networks in the Middle East and North Africa. Even though there are mixed feelings about the effectiveness of propaganda as a policy tool, the latest phenomenon is IS’s use of social media and the Internet to advance its goals. Using fear, glorification and hope for the marginalized, the Islamic State group has penetrated youth in every society and every country.87

Military Not An Option

Given the fact that the Islamic State fighters are emerging in different parts of

Afghanistan, alternative strategies can be considered. However, under the current circumstances in which the Afghan forces are in full command of the security situation with the departure of the coalition combat forces, Afghanistan cannot afford opening a new military front or sitting idle in the face of this threat.

The Islamic State group has named Afghanistan and its surrounding regions as Khorasan, a biblical reference to the area from which crusaders will attack Muslims in the final days of the world.88 The group also has its eyes on the Central Asian republics, since youth in those Islamic states are susceptible for recruitment because they have been oppressed and marginalized in their societies run by dictators under the influence of Russia. Expansion of the IS presence in Afghanistan and its surrounding areas is predictable, which mandates that Kabul should tackle the issue before it becomes unmanageable.

87 Emerson Brookings, The ISIS Propaganda Machine Is Horrifying and Effective. How Does It Work?, Council On Foreign Relations, August 21, 2014, Available at URL: http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/08/21/the-isis-propaganda-machine-is-horrifying-and-effective-how- does-it-work/#cntnt 88 Ashraf Ghani, A Conversation with Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, March 25, 2015, Available URL: http://www.usip.org/events/conversation-he-mohammad-ashraf-ghani

Religious appeal is one of the most effective techniques that the Islamic State and likeminded groups has been using to promote their agenda, while degrading the Afghan government as un-Islamic and a puppet regime installed by the United States. The messages will portray the Islamic State group as an extremist Salafi group that not only uses violence for political means but also contradicts the Hanafi belief system, an Islamic sect that the majority of people in Afghanistan follow.

The Islamic State will not have the capacity to react as actively to this policy. For instance, the communication technique that has been effective in other countries is utilization of the Internet, particularly social media.89 However, access to the Internet still remains very limited in Afghanistan, especially in rural areas. Foreigners comprise a greater number of the IS fighters in Iraq and Syria. It will be challenging for the group to bring foreigners inside Afghanistan, given the fact that Afghans are sensitive to and have grown frustrated with the presence of foreigners in their country. In the past, Afghans have been receptive to foreigners when the issue was focused solely on Afghanistan instead of a global agenda such as the one that the Islamic State group now pursues.

Since the emergence of the IS fighters’ presence in Afghanistan, the Taliban have been at odds over the situation with the group in different ways. For instance, IS has become a platform for defecting and marginalized groups within the Taliban. In addition, reports have surfaced that the Taliban did not want the IS group in different provinces of

Afghanistan, and that Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, has called the

89 Steve Rose, The Isis propaganda war: a hi-tech media jihad, The Guardian, October 7, 2014, Available URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/07/isis-media-machine-propaganda-war

Taliban leader Mullah Omar an illiterate man despite the fact that Mullah Omar is the self-proclaimed leader of all Muslims, known as “Amir ul Momeneen.”

The peculiar relationship between the Taliban and the Islamic State can have positive effects in implementation of this policy in two ways. First, one possibility is that a number of imams will not agree to deliver the sermons in the Taliban-controlled territories. If the Taliban opposes the IS and its emergence in areas under its control, then they will not retaliate against the imams for delivering anti-IS sermons in mosques.

Second, the Afghan government’s peace talks with the Taliban have been futile for years.

If the IS expands its presence in Afghanistan, the Taliban will feel their threat more than any from the Afghan government. Feeling the pressure of potentially losing territory and control, the Taliban might finally come to the negotiating table.

However, implementation of this policy will face some challenges because a number of imams might not comply with the policy for different reasons. Out of the 160,000 mosques in Afghanistan, the government does not control over 156,300 of them. Many of these mosques are either in areas under Taliban control are simply heavily influenced by religious beliefs and sentiments, or are influenced by the Pakistani and Iranian intelligence agencies supporting their proxies inside Afghanistan.90 Numerous imams, former warlords and members of factional groups disapprove of the presence of the

United States in Afghanistan and the support that it provides to the Afghan government, and some of them even want to wage war against the US whenever possible.

90 The Long War Journal, Taliban control 3 districts in Afghan provinces of Wardak and Kunduz, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Accessed on April 20, 2015 from URL: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/10/taliban_control_3_di.php

POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Implementation of this policy proposal will have political implications and consequences not only for the president and his reputation, but also for the credibility of the entire

Afghan government and of the religious community in Afghanistan. Judicious planning and execution of this process is vital since it involves religion and religious sentiments of a conservative society in the face of an enemy that uses the same religion in pursuit of its goals.

Extremist groups use religion to their advantage in conservative societies with low literacy rates. Implementation of this policy requires meticulous coordination between the people and the agencies involved in the process. For instance, providing material and financial support to imams for implementation of the policy increases the chance that the

Afghan religious community might lose its credibility in case the Islamic States group launches a counter-campaign. Every time the Afghan government launches a campaign, whether military or media, the Taliban respond with their own counter-measure to portray the government and its efforts as un-Islamic.91

A Risk for the President

Involvement of the Afghan president in the formulation and creation of a committee to launch an anti-IS campaign can have political consequences. The Taliban and other extremist groups have accused former President Hamid Karzai of being a puppet of

Washington installed by the United States to harm Islam and Muslims and pursue

91 Emma Graham, Afghanistan's Taliban embrace the power of video propaganda, The Guardian Newspaper, June 4, 2014, Available at URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/afghanistan-taliban-video-propaganda-bowe- bergdahl

Western interests in Afghanistan.92 President Ghani can be the target of the same kind of campaign and rhetoric by the extremist groups, including the Islamic State and its affiliates inside and outside Afghanistan. He’s spent most of his life abroad, married a

Christian woman, studied in the United States and does not have (or depend on) a political or tribal affiliation in Afghanistan.

Support in the Parliament

A majority of the MPs in the Afghan parliament have voiced concern about security threats posed by the Islamic State group in Afghanistan when members of the IS claimed responsibility for the bloody attack in Jalalabad on April 18, 2015.93 Immediately after the attack, high-ranking security officials were summoned by the parliament to assure them that the Afghan security forces were prepared to counter threats posed by the

Islamic State group in the country. Apprehension within the legislature indicated that the parliament would help the Afghan government curtail encroachment of the IS group in

Afghanistan. There are some members of the Afghan parliament that could create an obstacle if the Afghan government decides to provide material and resources for mosques and imams in pursuit of a policy goal. However, the overwhelming support as evidenced in the aftermath of the attack in Jalalabad and showcased by the parliamentarians’ intention to rid Afghanistan of the IS, will outweigh the voices opposing the campaign against the Islamic State.

92 Nick Paton Walsh, Taliban Will not Talk Peace With Karzai Government, CNN, February 14, 2012, Available at URL: http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/14/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban/ 93 Bill Chappell, Suicide Bombing Kills At Least 35 In Jalalabad; ISIS Reportedly Claims Responsibility, NPR, April 18, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo- way/2015/04/18/400582067/suicide-bombing-kills-at-least-35-in-jalalabad-isis-reportedly- claims-responsibi

Safety and Sanity of Imams

Imams and any member of the religious community involved in implementation of this campaign will require extra physical protection and safety. Imams will be at a high risk for physical or political attacks if they decide to promote anti-IS messages. It’s plausible that the Islamic State group, its affiliates or even its sympathizers will attack imams for spreading anti-IS messages, given the fact that numerous groups and individuals own massive amounts of ammunition and a lot of unregistered weaponry across Afghanistan.

Targeted assassination and killing of anti-Taliban figures has become a trend in

Afghanistan’s recent history. For instance, over the past decade a number of well-known military commanders and political figures, as well as those advocating against peace talks with the Taliban, have been assassinated.94

Imams can also create problems while implementing this policy proposal for a variety of reasons. Some imams, either the under influence of warlords, that of foreign intelligence agencies (such as those of Iran and Pakistan who pursue their interests inside

Afghanistan), fear of the Taliban or their sincere religious beliefs might cause them to protest the campaign.95 They might claim that the Afghan government, financed by the

United States, is taking over mosques – a side effect with possible consequences given the sensitive nature of Afghans with respect to religion.

Other Factors and Actors

94 Abdul Matin Bek, Finishing the Work of Afghan Peace, New York Times, January 26, 2012, Available at URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/opinion/finishing-the-work-of-afghan- peace.html?_r=0 95 Ron Moreau, How Pakistan Helps the Taliban, Newsweek, July 31, 2010, Available at URL: http://www.newsweek.com/how-pakistan-helps-taliban-74299

Launching this campaign will help people get a better sense of the IS’s brutality and how the group’s violent approach stands in contrast to the teachings of Islam. However, there are factors and problems that have created a rift between the people and the Afghan government. For instance, Afghans have lost family members and friends in NATO and

Afghan government airstrikes.96

Corrupt government officials ask for bribes in return for the most basic governmental services across Afghanistan. In addition, the Afghan judiciary has not been able to provide justice for the victims, making the swift but brutal open court system of the

Taliban appealing.97 The national unemployment rate is still at 35% percent, while the

Taliban and Islamic State are willing to pay people an appealing and steady source of income to fight the Afghan government.98

In addition, any political, informal or extremist group that benefits from the current status of unregistered mosques in Afghanistan will react negatively to implementation of this policy proposal. Mosques coming under control of the government will hamper the recruitment machine of the Islamic State (or any extremist group, for that matter); it will also debunk the IS claim that the central government is not Islamic and that their jihad is just. This is because imams can debunk their argument and because their weapons of war such as suicide attacks, roadside bombs that kill civilians and use of civilians as shields are contrary to specific verses of the Quran and Hadith. Warlords might also resist the

96 Ahmad Nadem & Ahmad Haroon, Afghans urge U.S. exit after killings; US says timetable unchanged, Reuters, March 12, 2012, Available at URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/12/us-afghanistan- civilians-idUSBRE82A02V20120312 97 See ID, New York Times Article 98 CIA Factbook, Country Profile: Afghanistan, CIA Website, Accessed on April 20, 2015 from URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

idea that mosques in the areas under their control, or at least influence, come under scrutiny and command of the central government. Such a process will weaken their hold on power and negatively affect their income sources.

Current news reports from around Afghanistan indicate that Afghans are worried about the presence of the IS in the country, in contrast with the situation in Iraq and Syria. In

Iraq, a major reason for rapid expansion of IS was the marginalization of the Sunni population under the government of Noori Al-Maliki. In Syria, the civil war was a major driving force for IS expansion.99 Even though there is an active insurgency inside

Afghanistan, what distinguishes Afghanistan from Iraq and Syria is that the majority of

Afghans support the current government and its peace talks with the Taliban.100

Previously many Afghans, including high-ranking officials in the government, were skeptical about peace talks with the Taliban. The national behavioral change, which reflects public fatigue with the war and prolonged insurgency, indicates that people in

Afghanistan want peaceful solutions to their problems after 35 years of war. This national mode also puts members of the Afghan parliament as well as the President at an advantage when seeking public support for implementing this policy.

No comprehensive research or surveys have been conducted to gauge perception of the

Afghan people of the Islamic State group. However, there are many reasons for ordinary, uneducated Afghans – especially in the rural areas – to harbor anti-government sentiments and join the cause of insurgents, especially since the central government

99 Stephen Wicken, Iraq’s Sunnis In Crisis, Understanding War, Accessed On April 20, 2015 at URL: http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iraqs-sunnis-crisis 100 The Asia Foundation, Annual Survey of The Afghan People for 2014, TAF, November 7, 2014, Available at URL: http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2014-poll.php

mired is corruption and nepotism, is unable to provide basic services. Government officials are corrupt and the justice system is non-existent, paving the way for groups like the Taliban or the IS to come in and fill the gap.101

Given the reluctant public sentiment in the West about future investment and military engagement in Afghanistan, it’s unlikely that the international coalition supporting the

Afghan government will open another war front, given the country’s wavering economy and exhausted military capabilities. Since the presence of the IS in Afghanistan is in its early stages, the situation does not mandate constant and regular military operations but rather targeted, sporadic and situationally dictated attacks. For instance, if Afghan security forces discover an IS cell somewhere in the country, they have the capacity to engage with such groups as part of their current counterterrorism strategy and capabilities.

Foreign Actors

The United States has pledged that it will sustain the current level of funding for the

Afghan security forces as well as maintain other support for Afghanistan as part of the strategic partnership deal and the bilateral security agreement (BSA) signed between the two countries.102 In addition, the US has already launched a major campaign against the

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and has asked other nations, particularly Islamic countries,

101 Azam Ahmed, Taliban Justice Gains Favor as Official Afghan Courts Fail, New York Times, January 30, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/world/asia/taliban-justice-gains-favor-as- official-afghan-courts-fail.html 102 Declan Walsh, Mending Alliance, U.S. and Afghanistan Sign Long-Term Security Agreement, The New York Times, September 30, 2014, Available at URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/world/asia/afghanistan-and-us-sign-bilateral-security- agreement.html?_r=0

to join its anti-IS coalition.103 However, there has not been any formal announcement from Kabul or Washington on overcoming the IS challenge in Afghanistan.

The Islamic Republic of Iran supports the international campaign against the Islamic

State group. Joseph Campbell, commander of the American forces in Afghanistan, told a

Congressional hearing that even though Iran might not agree with the American approach, it would not mind Americans bombing IS targets in neighboring Iraq and

Syria, given the fact that the Islamic State group poses a security threat to Iran as well.104

It’s not clear yet how Islamabad will cooperate with Kabul in curtailing the Islamic State group’s threat in Afghanistan. Some of the insurgent groups in Pakistan have pledged alliance to the Islamic State group and its leader.105 These are the same groups that

Pakistan has been accused of using as its arm to pursue its foreign policy goals in India and Afghanistan.106 There are reports that Pakistani officials are worried and taking precautionary measures to prevent expansion of the IS presence in Pakistan.107 However,

Islamabad has yet to make any concrete move to eradicate the IS threat. Given the precarious Pak-Afghan relationship over the Taliban and other insurgent groups along the

103 Julie Davis, Obama Urges Global United Front Against Extremist Groups Like ISIS, New York Times, February 18, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/us/obama-to-outline- nonmilitary-plans-to-counter-groups-like-isis.html 104 Jamie Crawford, Congress hears Afghanistan troop plans amid ISIS fears, CNN, February 12, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/12/politics/isis-afghanistan-u-s-fears/ 105 LWJ Staff, Pakistani Taliban splinter group again pledges allegiance to Islamic State, Long War Journal, January 19, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/video_pakistani_tali_2.php 106 Jason Burke, Pakistani spy agency’s relations with militants blamed for school massacre, The Guardian, December 17, 2014, Available at URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/17/pakistan-spy-agency-isi-relations-militants- blamed-school-massacre 107 Mujeeb Ahmed, ISIS Has Master Plan for Pakistan, Secret Memo Warns, MSNBC, November 10, 2014, Available at URL: http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-has-master-plan- pakistan-secret-memo-warns-n244961

countries’ borders, it is unlikely that Pakistan will pledge to cooperate with Afghanistan in implementation of this policy proposal.

Infiltrating the Central Asian republics is a key motive for the Islamic State group to enter Afghanistan. Leadership of the group has indicated that it aims to destabilize the

Muslim countries in central Asia as well as in the Russian mainland.108 Reports also indicate that a number of youth from these former Soviet republics have been fighting alongside the Islamic State fighters in Syria and Iraq, and that the IS aims to tap the youth in these republics for more recruits.109 The policy brief sums up problems of the republics that make them a hotbed for the Islamic State to infiltrate:

Each suffers from poor governance, corruption and crime. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan resemble authoritarian police states. Kazakhstan has some wealth, but its regions are in disrepair, and its political system is autocratic. All five fail to deliver quality social services, particularly in rural areas. Their security services – underfunded, poorly trained and inclined to resort to harsh methods to compensate for a lack of resources and skills – are unable to deal with a challenge as intricate as radical Islam.110

The Afghan government can negotiate with these republics to expand the scope of public awareness by turning it into a regional campaign. These countries can improve border control and increase people-to-people interaction between the youth as preemptive measure to supplement this policy proposal’s effectiveness.

However, the scope of this policy is focused inside Afghanistan and the role of foreign countries will not be vital in its implementation. The Islamic State group sees

108 Danil Kislov, Is Central Asia Afraid of ISIS?, Russia and Beyond, November 11, 2014, Available at URL: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/daniil-kislov/is-central-asia-afraid-of-isis 109 Crisis Group, Syria Calling: Radicalization in Central Asia, International Crisis Group Policy Brief, January 20, 2015, Available at URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central- asia/b072-syria-calling-radicalisation-in-central-asia.pdf 110 Ibid.

Afghanistan as a foothold for penetrating the central Asian republics. Certain regional insurgent and terrorists groups have pledged allegiance to the IS, while others like the

Afghan Taliban see the group as a rival with the potential to replace them. While there is not much the regional countries can do to help the Afghan government implement this policy aside from providing monetary assistance—or, in the case of Pakistan, pressuring the Taliban to not disturb the registration process of mosques—these countries can have a destructive role in implementation of this policy proposal. For instance, given Pakistan’s leverage on the Afghan Taliban groups, Pakistani military and intelligence can fund a counter-campaign to defame the Afghan government, or particularly the measures suggested in this proposal.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the geopolitical and historical significance of Afghanistan, the Islamic State is investing resources to expand its influence in the country. Afghanistan is the heartland of the biblical Khorasan as well as in the immediate vicinity of the central Asian republics - the group’s potential recruitment center for further expansion. The situation necessitates taking immediate actions for the short- and long-term effects.

Three of the steps presented in this paper will serve these purposes with minimum financial cost, even though the level of threat posed by the Islamic State group has been gradually escalating. These steps include: 1.) registration of mosques across Afghanistan in the governmental database; 2.) immediate launch of the anti-IS campaign through the

3700 mosques already registered and the media; and 3.) a full-scale launch of the campaign once registration of the remaining mosques is complete.

The above steps will enable the Afghan government to monitor sermons and prevent radicalization of youth in the immediate term by the IS and in the long term by other extremist groups. Mosques play an important role in the decision-making process as well as the daily lifestyle of Afghans. If registered, mosques will serve as an effective arm of the Afghan government to thwart radicalization and sabotage efforts of extremist groups both inside and outside Afghanistan.

The IS threat is at its early stages in Afghanistan and necessitates an effective and nationwide public awareness campaign. Afghan people have grown tired of continued fighting and of the presence of foreigners in Afghanistan. The Islamic State group and its fighters wants to a.) impose a harsh Salafi version of Islam on Afghans, and then b.) penetrate the central Asian republics via Afghanistan as a proxy ground. The majority of

the Afghan people in every walk of life oppose this, and the campaign proposed for this policy will echo this sentiment even among those who are not well aware of the IS’s goals.

A campaign against the Islamic State group from mosques to cellphones to radio and television networks will not only feed anti-IS sentiments but also boost the Islamic credentials of the Afghan government and its security forces. It’s a cost-effective measure to counter the security threat posed by the Islamic State group. Sporadic military targeting is necessary and sufficient, but launching a full-scale military operation against the Islamic State in Afghanistan at this stage is expensive and premature.

Sayed Zafar Hashemi

[email protected] • Mobile: +1.202.340.2747 • Twitter: @Zafarhashemi

EDUCATION, LANGUAGES & TRAININGS

Johns Hopkins University, DC – 5/2013 – 5/2015 Master of Arts (M.A.), Public Management University of Maryland University College, MD – 1/2009 – 12/2012 Bachelor of Science (B.S.), Political Science & Journalism

AWARDS & TRAININGS:

• Gold medal award for exemplary achievement, Voice of America – 2010 • Recognition certificate for teamwork and program development, Voice of America 2009, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015 • Deans list for 3.9-4.0 GPA in College 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 • Recognition certificate for excellent performance in NATO HQ, (2003) • Leadership and Management Skills for Young Leaders, Baku, Azerbaijan, 2006 • Advance journalism training (writing and reporting), Kabul, Afghanistan, 2005

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Presidential Palace, Office of the Afghan President, Kabul, Afghanistan Deputy Spokesman and Directorate of Public Relations, 5-2015 – Present

Voice of America, Afghanistan Service, Washington, DC International Broadcaster, 9/2007 – 5/2015

Afghanistan Stabilization Program (ASP), Kabul, Afghanistan Media Monitoring & Public Relations Officer, 7/2006 – 1/2007

Saba Media Organization, Radio Nawa, Kabul, Afghanistan Radio Broadcaster & Producer, 2/2005 – 6/2006

Awaz Media Group, Kabul, Afghanistan Director and Producer (radio & TV), 12004/1/2005 – 1/2007

International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF)/NATO, Kabul, Afghanistan Linguist & Cultural Advisor, 2/2003 – 1/2004