128 th Bergedorf Round Table Power and Rules: Elements of a “New World Order”

March 5th – 7th, 2004,Wilton Park

CONTENT

Picture Documentation 1 Participants 20 Summary 21

Protocol

Welcome 22

I. Power and Cooperation 23 II. New Rules and Mechanisms 55 III. The Frontiers of a “New World Order” 89

Annex

Participants 123 Recommended Literature 132 Glossary 134 Index 150 Previous Round Tables 156 The Körber-Foundation 167 Imprint 168 INITIATOR Ambassador John Hirsch, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy, New York Dr. Kurt A. Körber Dr. G. John Ikenberry, Professor, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Colin Jennings, Chief Executive, Wilton Park Conference Center CHAIR Stefan Kornelius, Foreign Editor, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich Dr. Christoph Bertram, Dr. Stephen Krasner, Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Professor, Stanford University Berlin Dr. Nico Krisch, Hauser Research Scholar and Visiting Fellow, SPEAKERS New York University School of Law Dr. Charles Kupchan, Dr. Ghanim Alnajjar, Professor, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. Professor, University of Kuwait Lotte Leicht, Ambassador Avis Bohlen, Director of Human Rights Watch, Brussels Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center, Tod Lindberg, Washington D.C. Editor, Policy Review, Washington D.C. Heather Grabbe, Simon Lunn, Deputy Director, Centre for European Reform, London Secretary General, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones DCMG, Brussels Chairman, QinetiQ Holdings Ltd., London Ambassador Thomas Matussek, David Rieff, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Senior Fellow, World Policy Institute, New York Great Britain, London Dr. Michael Schaefer, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Political Director, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin President, the Politika Foundation, Moscow Professor Paul W. Schroeder, Ambassador Janusz Reiter, University of Illinois Head, Center for International Relations, Warsaw Prof. Dr. Thomas Risse, PARTICIPANTS Professor, Free University, Berlin Jan Roß, Dr. Gerald Chan, Staff Writer, DIE ZEIT, Berlin Senior Fellow, Centre of International Studies, Dr. Ulrich Schlie, Cambridge University Advisor on Foreign and European Affairs to the Dr. Patrick Cohrs, Minister-President of the State of Hessen, Berlin Research Fellow, Humboldt-University, Ambassador Shimon Stein, Berlin and German Historical Institute, London Israeli Ambassador to Germany, Berlin Dr. Elizabeth Economy, Karsten D. Voigt, Senior Fellow and Director of Asia Studies, Council on Co-ordinator of German-American Cooperation, Foreign Relations, Washington D.C. Federal Foreign Office, Berlin Dr. Antony Glees, Dr. Klaus Wehmeier, Professor and Director, Centre for Intelligence and Deputy Director of the Executive Board, Security Studies, Brunel University, Uxbridge Körber-Foundation, Hamburg Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, MdB, Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Member of the German Bundestag (CSU — Christian Former President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Social Union of Bavaria), Berlin Chairman of the Bergedorf Round Table, Berlin Dr. Amr Hamzawy, Dr. Samuel Wells, Assistant Professor, University of Cairo Associate Director, Woodrow Wilson Center, Professor Pierre Hassner, Washington D.C. Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales Dr. Katja Wiesbrock, (CERI-FNSP), Paris Member of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the Reinhard Hesse, United Nations, New York Commissary of the German Chancellor for the “Progressive Governance Network”, Berlin

20 SUMMARY

How can the international system be adapted to the challenges of the 21st century? Thirty-eight international experts, politicians, and journalists gathered in Wilton Park, England, to discuss “Power and Rules: Elements of a New World Order” at the 128th Bergedorf Round Table. Chaired by Richard von Weizsäcker and under the moderation of Christoph Bertram, the participants set out where the 124th Round Table on “Contours of a New World Order” left off. In that dialog, US de- fenders of unilateral pre-emption had engaged in heated disputes with European multilateralists. The Wilton Park session revealed that, with new security threats becoming apparent, the debate has moved onward to finding the right priorities, re-thinking alliances and new institutions, and expanding the regional focus of discourse beyond the transatlantic relationship. The Round Table first analyzed the present situation. Are the threats posed by non-state actors and failed states fundamentally new? Are they and America’s hegemony overwhelming the traditional system of rules and institutions, based as it is on national sovereignty? Some participants regarded the US National Secu- rity Strategy as an appropriate response. Others maintained that 9/11 was not a turning point in history, and that existing rules and institutions remained funda- mentally effective and the only way to achieve a peaceful international order. These voices said the US policy of pre-emption would entice other states to violate international law. Some participants considered poverty, disease, and environ- mental issues more urgent problems than terrorism. The Round Table’s second part turned to the instruments of a “New World Order.” Can rules influence reality and bestow legitimacy on political actions, or are the strategies and actions themselves all that count ? Is there a place for rules in a unipolar world? Substantive recommendations were put forward for reform- ing the UN, integrating the World Bank into UN decision-making structures, and the transatlantic relationship. The third session addressed the contextual and geographical frontiers of a “New World Order.” It was agreed that, increasingly, national sovereignty was be- ing encroached on throughout the world. Speakers asked whether effective mod- els of intervention would crystallize, and how the international community could muster sufficient resources. The debate focused on convincing concepts for nation building and the proposals of Arab representatives for including the region in these efforts. Participants also laid out strategies for adapting the international system to the changing role of states like Russia and China.

21 INTRODUCTION

Welcome

von Weizsäcker I welcome you all to Wilton Park in the beautiful English country- side and thank you for having come here. Looking outside at the peaceful sheep and reading in today’s paper that foreign polo play- ers are Britain’s main worry, one really gets the impression that the world is safe. However, in what could be considered the first presentation of our conference, Prime Minister Tony Blair gave a speech yester- day presenting a different view. He spoke on threats to international security and the need to confront them. Mr. Blair’s speech put him in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson’s vow shortly before the end of World War I, to “make the world safe for democracy.” Then, as today, the question was how could political power safeguard security. A corollary question must be whether this power has the will and wis- dom to define, implement, and respect basic rules. Conferences in Wilton Park have, since 1945, worked to preserve and animate the intellectual power of democracy, and I hope that our conference on power and rules in the global order will set forth this noble tradition. Whether that succeeds or not depends in large part on Christoph Bertram, who has generously agreed to moderate our discussion.

The Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the participants’ oral contributions.

22 I. Power and Cooperation

Thank you very much. We are grateful to be able to discuss a subject in Wilton Bertram Park which is even older than this building and which Paul Schroeder kindly ac- cepted to introduce us to: power and rules — elements of a “New World Order.”

I would like to offer a historical perspective on the changes in the international Schroeder system after the terror attacks of 9/11 and outline my understanding of the ground presentation rules we need for global policy in the 21st century. Important circles in the United States, including those in control of the New world disorder instead present administration, assume that the “New World Order” hoped for at the end of “New World Order” ? of the Cold War has proved an illusion. Recent history, so the argument goes, shows that a new world disorder marked by greater instability and danger has emerged instead. Failed states and rogue regimes give rise to escalating violence, ethnic cleansing and civil war. Persistent, dangerous conflicts between important states put international security at risk. Organized international terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction and secretly supported by rogue regimes pose new threats to international order. The American government’s answer to this challenge has been the Bush doc- trine. According to it, world security and order must rest on permanent, unchal- lengeable American military superiority. When deemed necessary, force can be used preventively to fight terrorism, stop weapons proliferation and promote de- mocracy and free markets throughout the world. Initial actions under that doc- trine have been taken in Afghanistan and Iraq. I believe that the assumptions underlying the Bush doctrine are wrong No ! That is why the Bush doctrine and misleading and propose instead to go “back to the future.” I am convinced is misleading that the “New World Order” did not fail. Even though some hopes attached to it were unrealistic and bound to be disappointed, most of its important results have endured and its basic working principles are still valid. The threats that have supposedly wrecked it are not new and have been exaggerated. In any case, regardless of how grave we deem them to be, they can in the long term only be met through rules and strategies that are part of the old “New World Order.” We need to examine which elements of this order still work and how they The Bush doctrine failed can be revived and applied to today’s challenges. The Bush doctrine, by contrast, in Iraq and Afghanistan has already shown that it cannot cope with even the existing threats to interna- tional security, much less those beginning to emerge. Its growing failure is al- ready clear enough that the administration itself has started to retreat from it.

23 Bertram | Schroeder By the standard of historical comparison, 9/11 was not a turning point in world history.

Schroeder

The failure of the Bush doctrine as a remedy for world disorder is best shown by the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan. The current signs of trouble there are too well known to need listing, but this appraisal would remain true even if these experiments in nation-building through armed conquest were somehow ulti- mately to succeed, or if the occupiers were to claim success while leaving. The Bush doctrine of using overwhelming military force to lay the basis for regime change, democratization and peace, even when implemented against two targets so ideal for the experiment in terms of their military weakness, political isolation, and general unpopularity as Iraq and Afghanistan, has already revealed such manifold risks and flaws that its further use to solve any serious problems is un- thinkable. It simply does not meet a rational cost-benefit or risk-utility analysis for any of the numerous remaining trouble spots of the world. 9/11 is not a turning point At the same time, the threats of terrorism, rogue states and the proliferation in world history … of weapons of mass destruction have not, in my opinion, rendered old security strategies ineffective. While history cannot tell us in absolute terms how danger- ous these current threats really are, it does offer a useful basis for comparison. By that standard 9/11 was not, as so often claimed, a turning point in world history. 9/11 was a spectacular act of terrorism and a tragedy for its victims that also did considerable but temporary damage to American society and the world political and economic order. But it does not compare in concrete impact to any number of events (wars, natural disasters, civil and ethnic conflicts, etc.) in past decades and centuries, including historic terrorist activities. The nature of terrorism has also remained the same, a weapon of the weak and fragmented against enemies too powerful to attack directly. … unless the United States’ reaction 9/11 could indeed become a historic turning point—but only if it were to be makes it a turning point followed by many more similarly sensational acts or (more likely) through the reactions and responses of those attacked. Organized powerful governments are more able and likely to make acts like that of 9/11 historic turning points than organized terrorists can. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo was a far heavier blow to the Habsburg monarchy than 9/11 was to the United States. But only the reactions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and other countries made it a turning point in world history. There is no “war” on terrorism Another mistaken and dangerous assumption of the Bush administration is that the struggle against terrorism constitutes a war and places the United States and its allies in a state of war with it. It does not. The fight against terrorism is an international campaign against a certain kind of international criminal activity,

Schroeder 24 carried on mainly by governments at peace with each other and cooperating through national and international agencies. It thus fits within the framework and constraints of normal international relations. Military force plays a role, but cannot be the decisive weapon. In Afghanistan, military action was necessary and universally supported, but it is clearly not sufficient to root out terrorism. In Iraq, military action created a dangerous center of terrorism where none existed before. In most places military force cannot be the main weapon against terrorism be- cause to use it would tear the fabric both of international relations in general and the struggle against terrorism in particular. Pakistan, for example, which for years has been a key player both in the support of terrorist groups and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cannot be either punished militarily for this or compelled to use its own military force in an all-out effort against terrorists be- cause it is a sovereign state, the cooperation of its government in combating ter- rorism is essential, and such pressure might bring it down. There are those who share my doubts about the Bush doctrine but may be The “New World Order” of the 1980s skeptical that we can go back to the “New World Order” of the 1980s. Can this is still a valid concept … “old New World Order” fit a world so changed, violent and apparently chaotic as that of today ? I think that it can, because at the end of the Cold War the prospect of a more … because today wars between nation-states peaceful and cooperative world order really did emerge. This was not just a eupho- are no longer inevitable ria quickly dashed by grim reality. The concept of a “New World Order” reflected genuine, profound changes in international politics. Over the last five centuries of international politics the major powers always expected that some vital issues sooner or later would lead them to a major war with rival powers and saw war as an inevitable aspect of international relations. This basic outlook and assumption has changed with the end of the Cold War, and that change has endured. As far as I can see, no major power today acts on the assumption that it is bound sooner or later to go to war with another major power. Even countries with serious ongoing conflicts like India and Pakistan no longer consider war as inevitable. This new situation is due to profound changes in international relations that Profound changes in the international were underway for centuries and rapidly accelerated in recent times. First, the system: costs of war, importance of the utility of major war as a tool of statecraft has declined and its risks and costs have economy, globalization and pluralization risen. Second, growing trade makes the survival of states less dependent on mili- tary power than on economic success. Third, globalization has brought about an exponential increase in the volume, speed, intensity and interconnectedness of

25 Schroeder transactions and communications all over the world. Fourth, the number and variety of international actors have increased dramatically, now including, along with states, international organizations, NGOs, multi-national corporations, pres- sure groups and the like. One might add as a fifth change the emergence of a wide consensus that liberal representative democracy and market economy are the only legitimate and beneficial models for organizing societies. Even the Bush doctrine rejects only the first of these arguments on the declining utility of war, while endorsing the others. The instruments of the “old New World Some examples show that the “old New World Order” has successfully mas- Order” still work: sanctions in Iraq … tered concrete challenges. Thus, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq proves that conventional means such as international sanctions can work for purposes of deterrence and containment even against ugly regimes like Saddam Hussein’s. This issue was the crux of the divisions at the UN, on it the decision for war was taken. Today we have to admit that it would not have been necessary for purposes of effectively containing the military threat from Iraq to abandon conventional strategies of containment under international authority, that is, the strategies of the “old New World Order.” … G 8 and the CSCE-approach … A second main reason for invading Iraq was the American claim that over- throwing Saddam by military force would transform the whole region, spreading democracy and civil rights throughout the so-called Greater Middle East. Today even the American government has abandoned or drastically revised that san- guine promise and has evidently changed its tactics and methods for achieving the goal. It now seeks the help of its G8 partners in a new campaign to promote democracy and civil rights in the region which, according to the New York Times, is based loosely on the Helsinki Accords of 1975—a return to the early formative stages of the “New World Order.” … influencing state behavior Another feature of the “old New World Order” I consider central for solving through integration and exclusion today’s problems is the vital role the principles of association and exclusion played in it. To be sure, the use of military force and international sanctions against overt aggression and ongoing ethnic cleansing was an option within this framework, as the first Gulf War and the NATO intervention in Kosovo demonstrate. But the main methods used for changing state behavior were the carrot of rewarding co- operating regimes with association in international institutions and their attend- ant benefits and the stick of punishing uncooperative ones with exclusion. Never has this time-honored principle of international politics been applied as thor- oughly, successfully and durably as in recent decades. It not only helped end the

Schroeder 26 It is naked hubris to believe that the international system will remain in a sort of limbo if the United States defies and undermines its essential rules.

Schroeder

Cold War, but proved successful in the expansion of NATO and the European Union and in meeting China’s quest for a most favored nation status and admis- sion to the WTO. This “old New World Order” principle of association and exclu- sion is currently being used for dealing with conflicts in Cyprus and problems with Libya, Iran and North Korea. Even the USA is being drawn more or less will- ingly into these efforts. I do not claim, of course, that simply returning to the 1980s to pick up there Utopian Machtpolitik is far more the needed rules for a “New World Order” will meet all threats to international dangerous than utopian idealism security. My outlook on international politics is in fact skeptical rather than opti- mistic. But while being fully aware of the dangers of utopian idealism, I am even more convinced that utopian Machtpolitik, the belief that given enough power resolutely applied one can do almost anything and get away with almost anything, has been far more prevalent and dangerous over the course of history. This deep- ens my conviction that we need not and should not try to devise a “new New World Order” from scratch. Centuries of slow, uneven and incredibly costly devel- We must reform the international system: opments have bequeathed us a working international system with a great body of It is the only one we have … rules, norms, conventions, institutions and shared practices for managing inter- national problems. It still works badly and needs reform and development in many ways, not simply because it is out of date or because criminals attack it, but especially because those that most benefit from it skew, manipulate and exploit it. Yet it is the only system we have. Its destruction would have incalculable and horrendous consequences. We need to use, develop and reform it to have a viable present and future. A final note of warning: Those who defend the Bush administration’s stand on … and it will not remain as world policy, which has been given a variety of names (“consultative unilateral- a fall-back position … ism,” “instrumental multilateralism,” “internationalism à la carte,” etc.) may insist that it does not ignore or discard the prevailing international system and its rules, but simply recognizes that these do not meet all current problems and that the United States cannot sacrifice its vital interests to them. Some have even suggested that this international system will remain as a fall-back position for the United States should its unilateral ventures fail or should its current world dominance cease with the rise of new world powers such as China. Let me put this starkly. It is sheer folly and naked hubris to suppose that if the … if we violate and erode it United States by its unilateral actions repeatedly defies and effectively undermines the essential rules of the international system, that system will still remain in existence in a sort of limbo, as a resource the United States or other countries can

27 Schroeder call upon in case of need. That particular error has been made many times in his- tory, often with tragic consequences. Once a state has wrecked a prevailing system of rules, expectations, norms and practices for the sake of its particular ends; once the ethos and incentives structure behind that system have been rendered inop- erative; then even the most powerful force and the cleverest policy may not be able to restore it and make it work again. Bismarck tried this. The “white revolu- tionary” of the 1860’s, once his goals had been achieved by power politics, tried to restore the sated pacific conservatism of the Vienna era. He was vastly more skillful and flexible than those in charge of policy in Washington or other capitals today, yet even he finally failed, ran out of expedients. … use it — or lose it The current world international system has proved itself remarkably durable and resilient, but it is not indestructible. Once wrecked, it will prove at best dif- ficult and terribly expensive to restore. Hence my advice is not merely, “Use it,“ but “Use it — or lose it.”

Bertram Thank you very much for this thoughtful and inspiring presentation running against the grain of most public and international discussion. While Tony Blair reminded us yesterday to relentlessly fight the mortal danger of a new kind of terrorism, you depicted a basically functioning international system providing, by and large, the necessary security. We are now looking forward to hearing Pauline Neville-Jones.

Neville-Jones Our topic emphasizes the question whether the existing system of rules must be Strategies and legitimacy as key elements changed or reformed, thus assuming that rules are the key element in guiding of international order international relations. While I agree that rules are helpful, some of them even essential, I think they can also get in the way of intelligent debate about what to actually do to master political challenges. I will therefore argue that two other concepts, legitimacy and policies, are at least as important for governing interna- tional politics and building a stable order. Let me start, though, with assessing the current state of affairs and the main challenges of our international system. 9/11 is in fact a historic turning point Paul Schroeder rightly pointed to the assumptions lying behind the ongoing discussion about a “New World Order.” First, 9/11 and the Iraq conflict changed the world and put some of the hitherto accepted precepts of international politics under challenge. Second, the order that prevailed before 9/11 was more desirable than the one we have today and we should return to it, if possible. And third, the framework now prevailing is inadequate and has to be changed. Mr. Schroeder

Schroeder | Bertram | Neville-Jones 28 Asymmetrical warfare is a fundamentally new method of the weak to use against the soft underbelly of the strong.

Neville-Jones

called into question two of these assumptions. Not a lot has changed, he said, since the secular trend of eliminating war between states is untouched by 9/11. There- fore, the precepts by which we have been guided since the 1990s are still adequate. I go along with that to some extent, as the major powers today are indeed no longer assuming they will sooner or later wage war against each other. But my analysis differs from Mr. Schroeder’s in one central point. What we Unprecedented challenge: have to deal with today is not conflicts between states. The Bush doctrine intro- asymmetric threats by non-state actors duces military force as a means of coping with quite a different threat, which is the emergence of new international actors and asymmetric warfare. This kind of terrorism is indeed a fundamentally new method of the weak to use against the soft underbelly of the strong. Terrorism is not only a direct threat to the West, but even more dangerous through the turmoil it might unleash in the Islamic world. Ultimately, terrorism can make life in Western societies extremely uncomfortable, but it will not bring us down. It certainly can, though, bring down regimes in the Islamic world. Islamic fundamentalists are the people really engaged in regime change, and it is they who are out to upset the existing world order. We ignore this threat to stability and to our economic and political interests at our peril. Particularly in the Gulf region, we are faced with a pre-revolutionary situation, regimes there will go down if they are not helped. The fall of the House of Saud will make the present state in Iran look like a ladies’ tea party, and it will have the profoundest repercussions all around the world. To deal with the challenge of terrorism, we have to go beyond the weapons Today’s threats demand … that have supposedly made the West strong. The Bush Doctrine seems to me right in stating that combating those who challenge our authority may ultimately have to entail a new definition of when to use force. I think we need to rethink the right to self-defense and to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Adapting these norms to the current situation will lead us to a new concept of sovereignty. Going beyond the traditional understanding of sovereignty is already widely … new concepts of sovereignty … accepted for interventions on humanitarian grounds. The intervention in Kosovo was conducted without a UN resolution to back it. Our liberal conscience accepts that human rights ultimately outweigh territorial sovereignty. In a similar way, the concept of sovereignty must change in the face of asym- … and a new definition of self-defense metric warfare. The right of states to use force to defend themselves has always been accepted and is embedded in Chapter 7, Article 51, of the UN Charter. But nowadays, we need a new definition of self-defense. Before and during the Cold War, visible threats to our homelands were launched by fully constituted author-

29 Neville-Jones Legitimacy is the basic precondition of acting efficiently in international politics.

Neville-Jones

ities. Today, terrorists operating from failed states, without formal territorial au- thority and without visible grievances to negotiate about, pose invisible, asym- metric threats. There are thus good arguments for a forward view of the right of self-defense. Territorial sovereignty has become a dogma in the case of failed states which cannot fulfil the obligation to offer their neighbours the necessary protec- tion. Therefore, we have a right and a duty to intervene in their affairs. But even though the right to defend ourselves might be widely accepted, the difficulty is determining the moment to use force. This is one of the really serious issues divid- ing people of honest opinion and good faith. Personally, I am convinced that you cannot wait for disaster to come at you before you have a right to take pre-emptive action. To my mind, one of the central tasks is to think about and try to build a consensus on when exactly it is legitimate to use force. Discussing rules was useless All this does not mean, though, that we have to first rebuild our system in the case of Iraq of international rules. Rules can help us to decide on the necessary actions, but gaining legitimacy and developing viable policies is much more important. The quarrel about whether the rules were obeyed in the case of Iraq has lead to noth- ing except bedevilling of the transatlantic debate. Rules will not help, either, to convince other countries of the legitimacy of the West’s political projects. Legitimacy as a key element Let me come to legitimacy first. Legitimacy, based on a consensus as broad as of international politics possible, is the basic precondition of acting efficiently in international politics. It is, though, essentially a political notion, certainly backed by rules but not only rule-based. The Kosovo intervention was my first example of how the interna- tional community agreed to changing the traditional concept of national sover- eignty to protect human rights. The key to success was that the intervention was widely considered legitimate — even though it did not fit the whole panoply of international rules. Concrete strategies: we must promote To acquire legitimacy, policies for concrete problems capable of commanding modernization outside the Western camp consent are instrumental. Let me therefore end with a few policies that might be useful to address some of today’s problems. First, we need to promote change, reform and modernization outside the Western camp as a means of preventing terrorism and revolutions provoked by dissident forces. To achieve that, we must no longer concentrate exclusively on sanctions. We need less punishment, and more seduction — let us have a bit of tough love. Keeping failed states or uncoop- erative states continuously out in the cold does not bring about reforms. Europe has realized very well recently that Libya is making some first steps to come in from the cold and has tried to encourage that.

Neville-Jones 30 The US sees matters differently, and it has a point, too. Encouraging reform, Credibility in the threat to use force of course, is not enough as long as it is not based on the power and capacity to intervene militarily. I think Europeans need to recognize the necessity of military power as much as the Americans need to comprehend that power alone is not sufficient. Kofi Annan recently spoke about the potency of diplomacy backed by the threat of the use of force. To coordinate the efforts of the Western camp, I suggest leaning on the Revive NATO as a steering mechanism mechanisms used to run the world during the Cold War. The classic steering mechanism of the West then was NATO, and within NATO the coordinated action of a few countries. Those mechanisms enabled the Western countries to stick to- gether inside the UN Security Council. I do think we need these mechanisms as much as ever. Therefore, I deeply regret that the arguments raging around the intervention Rebuild the transatlantic relationship in Iraq were essentially cross-Atlantic. They engaged the Western camp and caused a split among allies who had hitherto been responsible for the management of international affairs. The rest of the world remained interested observers taking sides if they wanted. We need to stop these quarrels inside the Western camp. As Mr. Schroeder said, the Bush administration is beginning to learn about the vir- tues of cooperation. But still, an effort by the US and by the Europeans will be necessary to rebuild the transatlantic relationship, which, to me, still is the basis for any successful management of international politics. I do not want to see the The UK between Europe and the US UK play the role of the bridge between the US and Europe, though. Bridges tend to become pontoons that sink. The British have a useful role to play in rebuilding the consensus, but they need to operate from a European base. My last suggestion is to take up some of the steam behind the desire to reform Amend the UN Charter: the UN Charter. One of the Charter’s major drawbacks is its focus on the relation- include the obligations of states ship between sovereign member states. Even though it deals extensively with the to respect individual rights rights of sovereign states and conflicts between them, it neglects the question of how states should behave internally and how this can be made into a legal obliga- tion vis-à-vis the international community. The UN Charter should therefore be amended to include the obligations of states to respect individual rights. What the Bush administration says about Helsinki contains a grain of truth in emphasizing the duties of states to their citizens and applying rewards and penalties to those states who fail to observe those duties. Reforming the UN Charter might help generate some international consensus about how to deal with them, eventually including the use of force.

31 Neville-Jones It is a sad reality of the post-colonial era that only a minority of the states that gained sovereignty are able to govern effectively.

Krasner

Krasner I would like to focus on the changing role of sovereignty which Ms. Neville-Jones National sovereignty can no longer raised very appropriately. The principles and practices of sovereignty which our be the basis of the international system: international system is based on have always been much more imperfect than failed states people realized. But today we have come to recognize that in large parts of the world, domestic governance as a central aspect of sovereignty is not working and will not work anytime in the near future. It is a sad reality of the post-colonial era after World War II that only a minority of the states that gained sovereignty are able to govern effectively. During the last 30 years, the situation has deteriorated in much of sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Latin America and in parts of Asia. Intrusion in nation-state’s domestic affairs I think the problem lies even deeper than the one Mrs. Neville-Jones described. in order to build up governing structures Intrusion in nation states’ domestic affairs to secure religious toleration and minority rights is not, as she supposed, a historically new phenomenon. It can be found in the Balkans in the 19th century or in the minority treaties that followed the First World War. Clemenceau in conveying the minority treaty to Poland after World War I, stated that it is a conventional practice of Europe to stipulate how minorities should be treated when territory changes hand. What is new today is that we have to build up governing structures in badly functioning polities, which will not be able to develop effective domestic governance on an indigenous basis.

Matussek I find it very difficult to disagree in theory with Mr. Schroeder’s statement that our international system is the best system available to meet today’s challenges. However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I would therefore like to assess the performance of the UN, NATO and the EU in the past few years. The UN’s failure in the Iraq crisis The UN clearly was not equal to the challenge of the Iraq crisis. Even though was partly a problem of rules lack of political will can never be compensated by rules, I think that inadequate rules also play a part. The present UN structure, including the composition of the Security Council, can sometimes be a temptation to members to sit back and resign themselves, for procedural and other reasons, to inaction as the only option. NATO does not work very effectively … NATO has not done much better. After 9/11, it was very quick to invoke the collective self-defense provisions of Article 5, but then immediately went back to business as usual. As a forum for consultation between equal partners, it did not play a great role. It is not just a question of the US trying to use NATO as a tool box or replace it by coalitions of the willing. The transatlantic partners need to rethink the role of NATO and perhaps agree on a new Transatlantic Charter.

Krasner | Matussek 32 What if the terrorists had used weapons of mass destruction ?

Kupchan

The European Union did not act very impressively, either. You can say what- … and the EU is only now trying ever you want about the “Bush doctrine”, but at least the US had a doctrine - Eu- to formulate a security strategy rope did not. The EU is only now trying to formulate a strategy for dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and terrorism. To sum up, my analysis of the existing international system in terms of its perform- ance is pretty bleak.

As a natural conciliator, I would like to bring together Paul Schroeder’s views with Hassner those of his opponents. Mr. Schroeder’s outstanding book “The Transformation of The civilization of international relations European Politics” describes how in a process of civilization international rules of is disrupted time and again warfare, diplomacy and cooperation are developed. I think that this secular devel- opment towards a “New World Order” is disrupted in irregular intervals by chal- lenges to the legitimacy of the international system and by new techniques of warfare. Napoleon, the two World Wars and the totalitarian revolutions of the 20th century are examples for such ruptures. The crucial question is whether the proc- ess of civilizing international relations or the drama interrupting this process time and again will prevail in the end. Today’s drama is that globalization produces its own counter-effects, leading Fundamentalist terrorism as those who feel excluded to adopt fundamentalism, and giving them access to a counter-effect of globalization weapons of mass destruction. The significance of 9/11 as a potential turning point of world history lies in hinting at this prospect, as did the Aum sect’s gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. The progressive inclusion of Russia or China into the international system will intensify the feeling of exclusion of those still left out. Fundamentalist terrorism thus has an unprecedented potential of harming the process of civilizing international relations.

What emerges from what was said is that while international rules have made the Bertram world of states and relations between them today safer than ever, states control The world of states becomes safer but less and less of the space from which violence emanates. states control less and less space

I agree with Paul Schroeder that the biggest danger of 9/11 is to overreact because Kupchan we think it demands a change much more fundamental than it actually does. The 9/11 as a warning shot: terrorists attacks, tragic as they were, were not a world-altering event. Nevertheless, Pierre with weapons of mass destruction Hassner rightly referred to their potential to become one. 9/11 was a warning shot indicating a fundamentally new threat to the international system. What if the terrorists had used weapons of mass destruction ? Given the proliferation by Paki-

33 Matussek | Hassner | Bertram | Kupchan stan and North Korea that we know about, this is a very real danger that must be addressed urgently. Failing states require us to adjust our concept of sovereignty. But I disagree with Stephen Krasner that we are facing a new phenomenon, in that many states have been failing to establish effective domestic governance for a long time. It is just because the spill-over effects affect us directly that we are now more worried about those states than we used to be.

Chan I want to make a case for talking about rules instead of, as Pauline Neville-Jones Rules do matter: suggested, policies. Our international system is unipolar, with the US as sole su- unipolarity or multipolarity ? perpower. The balance of power theory, though, postulates that the checks and balances of a multipolar system would serve international security better than unipolarity. I think that we should consider seriously whether a system with dif- ferent centers of power counterbalancing each other might not be an alternative which provides more stability. If so,we need to discuss which rules of the interna- tional system foster multipolarity, instead of developing policies for a unipolar system.

Ikenberry Paul Schroeder is right in emphasizing that we are not at a historical turning point We must preserve the where the international system’s basic rules are up for grabs. In the past, there international system … were such moments, mostly after great wars had broken apart the old order. New rules for the interaction of great powers and for preventing war were devised then. Today, as Paul Schroeder said, great power relations are not the main problem, and war between great powers is no longer imminent. We have created an interna- tional order generating more physical security and more wealth than any other in history. Therefore, we should be conservative in the sense of identifying and pre- serving the core elements of a system which represents decades of innovations. … but we have to adjust it But I also think that we have to deal with the new phenomenon of the priva- to the privatization of war tization of war. Small groups of intelligent, determined and resourceful people today can acquire violence capability of a magnitude that previously only a few states commanded. As Robert Cooper says in “The Breaking of Nations,” the 9/11 terrorists constitute 0,000001 percent of humanity. In the future, even smaller groups will acquire even greater violence capabilities. Donald Rumsfeld was right in directing our attention to the dangers he termed “unknown unknowns — things we don’t know we don’t know.” Terrorist groups, which we do not know about, could acquire weapons we do not think they could ever get access to, and attack

Kupchan | Chan | Ikenberry 34 us at a moment’s notice. All mature democratic societies really really need to worry about that. Therefore I agree with Steve Krasner that we need to put more emphasis on Terrorists emerge from failed states building societies governed by the rule of law and accountable governments. It is from failed states that terrorists emerge. You may build stable societies by trans- forming failed states into functioning nation-states through ambitious collective efforts. But you may as well, as Niall Ferguson and Robert Rockberg have argued, conclude that the nation-state is an inappropriate institution for large parts of the world. Maybe, Woodrow Wilson’s vision that every people should have its nation- state is flawed. Instead, many societies would have to be governed by mandates and other kinds of supervisory mechanisms. In either way, we need to find new ways to create stability and establish the rule of law in failing states.

Are we not too fast in extrapolating 9/11 into the nuclear age ? I doubt that terror- Bertram ist groups can really threaten today’s very powerful nation states. As Gerald Chan Are we overestimating the terrorist threat ? said, the United States is the sole superpower, and it can crack all sorts of nuts very easily.

We lack appropriate language to analyze the current world situation. Our notions Risse only describe parts of the reality. The term unipolarity, for example, catches the Our world is both uni- and multipolar overwhelming military power of the US. But it does not adequately describe the distribution of power in the OECD-world, embodying the vision described in Im- manuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” The OECD members who adopt the “Kantian triangle,” as Bruce Russett put it, of economic interdependence, strong institu- tions and liberal democracy, do not live in a unipolar world. Neither is there uni- polarity in the world of failed states that Stephen Krasner described. To describe the current state of the world more accurately, two German terms come to mind, Unübersichtlichkeit, complexity, and Ungleichzeitigkeit, non-simulta- neity. The distribution of power is complex and varies across different fields. I would object to giving a uniform assessment.

An optimist thinks that he lives in the best of all possible worlds, and a pessimist Nikonov is afraid that the optimist might be right. There are no more pessimists in Russia, because they all moved to the UK buying soccer clubs. Therefore I, as a Russian must be optimistic about the state of the international system. I am indeed, for several reasons.

35 Ikenberry | Bertram | Risse | Nikonov Our country cannot be intergrated into transatlantic or European structures, because we are too big and too Russian.

Nikonov

Almost all centers of power Never have there been fewer contradictions between the major centers of have accepted globalization … power. All of them have accepted the universal principles of globalization, with the possible exception of the world of Islam. Therefore, the probability of war between major powers is minimal, especially since these powers all have nuclear weapons. … and the US as sole I am optimistic also because the distribution of power is moving in the right super-power acts responsibly direction. The US as sole super-power determines and tackles the major challenges quite adequately, but at the same time is not omnipotent, as Iraq shows. America probably does not even want to take on the whole responsibility for global govern- ance, because it would then lose its freedom of action. Also, economic develop- ment will change the role of the US. According to all major forecasts, the fastest growing economies in the 21st century will be Brazil, Russia, India, and China. By the year 2050 the Chinese economy will be the largest in the world, America will be second, India third, Japan fourth, and Russia will compete with Brazil for the fifth place. Europe, united or divided, will also be one of the major centers of power. A harmonious concert of Thus, a more balanced international system will emerge. Something akin to powers on the global stage ? the European concert of powers of the 19th century will be played on the global stage, with one performer playing more solos than the others. This can turn into a harmonious symphony that I have nothing to object to. If Robert Kagan is right in saying that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus, Russia sees itself on planet Earth. Our country cannot be intergrated into transatlantic or European structures, because we are too big and too Russian. There is a growing understanding among Russian politicians that we are doomed to remain an inde- pendent center of power.

Bohlen As much as I agree with Paul Schroeder that our international system is not bro- The UN’s failure is partly due ken, as much I agree with Pauline Neville-Jones, the transatlantic rift seriously to the transatlantic conflict … hampers the system’s functioning and must thus be mended. It accounts for the failure of international institutions which Thomas Matussek spoke about. The UN as a collection of nation-states cannot possibly be effective when the states are not in agreement. We saw that during the entire period of the Cold War as well as during the Iraqi crisis. But as soon as there is a consensus, the UN can be very ef- fective. … now we need a transatlantic consensus We need a transatlantic consensus because the US, apart from its military superiority, cannot go very far in any other direction alone. It can certainly not

Nikonov | Bohlen 36 As every challenge is specific, there will never be a set of rules giving the right answers to all of them.

Bohlen

deal with the area which we have been talking about and which Brzezinski calls the “global Balkans.” To deal with this source of terrorism and violence threaten- ing our societies, we need not new rules, but a concerted transatlantic effort. Like Pauline Neville-Jones, I tend to be rather skeptical of rules. As long as the transatlantic consensus was working, we did not argue over rules or legitimacy. Our rule was that we agreed about the values we stood for and the model of soci- ety we wanted to promote. I am also skeptical about interpreting the Bush doctrine of pre-emption as a new system of rules. It was written very much with Iraq in mind. Now that Iraq is behind us, I doubt that the doctrine will have a very active and long life. We should be equally careful about making the doctrine of limited sovereignty a uni- versal principle, even though it might fit some of our current problems. As every challenge is specific, there will never be a set of rules giving the right answers to all of them.

Paul Schroeder made a very elegant argument in favor of the “old New World Schaefer Order,” pointing out that its structures are still suited for mastering today’s chal- Today we perceive the international lenges. I would like to focus not so much on the structures of the system, but on system as different … why we perceive the old system as being different from what we have today. We have had major transatlantic disputes for decades. I do not have to remind you how inimical these discussions, for example about installing middle range missiles in Europe, were during the early 1980s. I think what makes us so uneasy about the current rift are three perceived … because of Europe’s independence, changes. First, the end of the Cold War has made Europe feel less dependent on asymmetric threats, and US-unilateralism the United States in security matters. Second, 9/11 has not created a new strategic challenge, because no weapons of mass destruction were involved. Such threat scenarios that have been invoked as reasons to go to war against terrorism and states hosting terrorist organizations have, to date, proven wrong. But it has cre- ated an awareness that open societies are no longer challenged by states, but by asymmetric threats and, as Mr. Ikenberry said, the privatization of war. And we have not yet defined an adequate response to this new challenge. Third, the US is perceived by other governments and societies as having changed its ways. For many decades, America has defined and pursued its own interests. But today it seems that it has changed from a benevolent super-power into a rather paternal- istic rule-maker. This, to my mind, is the psychological background to the trans- atlantic rift.

37 Bohlen | Schaefer We need policies for acting legitimately Here, Pauline Neville-Jones’ preference for policies over of rules comes into within the legal norms play. I think that there is no need for new legal frameworks. But we need to develop policies that guarantee legitimacy when moving within the context of the existing legal norms created over the past 50 years. For example, Chapter 7, Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for individual or collective self-defense against immediate threats. We have to find a definition of immediacy suited to today’s challenges to allow legitimate actions within the existing framework of norms.

Wells Paul Schroeder is too optimistic in thinking that recent changes in US policy re- Because the Bush administration’s flect changes of attitude on the part of key administration officials. If the situation unilaterlism is deeply rooted … turns better in Afghanistan or Iraq, they will continue to pursue their basic beliefs reflected in the National Security Strategy. Some people hope that after a possible Bush re-election, there will be a different team in key positions that will be more open to multilateralism. But almost certainly, Secretary of State Powell, who was a chief advocate of a more international policy, even though with at best limited success, will leave the administration. … Europe needs real military power Because a fundamental change in the US policy is unlikely, I think the Euro- pean Union must establish real military power. The Rapid Reaction Force was scheduled to be operative in 2003. It is high time to implement this plan, because there will continue to be a need for intervention, whether in Haiti, Sierra Leone or Chad. As long as the Europeans can only deploy a headquarters and no effective forces, their role vis à vis the US in determining the course of action will remain marginal.

Stein 9/11 certainly was a wake-up call for the United States, but I agree with Paul We are still in the transitional Schroeder that we should hesitate to call it a turning point. I believe that the end period that started in 1989 of the Cold War started a transitional period which we are still in today. New rules of the game have not yet been set. Technological revolution of New rules will have to cope with two revolutions we have witnessed during warfare and non-state actors the last two decades. The technological revolution will no doubt have an impact on the nature of war. In addition, television now influences decisions much more than before. Equally importantly, future conflicts will no longer occur between states but between organizations and states. The fact that these non-state actors are motivated by ideological and religious factors to an extent hitherto unknown makes it much harder to bring about an end to a war. Also, containment and deter- rents no longer provide sufficient answers to conflicts. This will not only require

Schaefer | Wells | Stein 38 Al Qaeda is an exceptional, historically unprecedented phenomenon. It is the first non-state entity striving to rule the world.

Alnajjar

developing new policies, but also reforming the international system and interna- tional law.

I am glad that Paul Schroeder convincingly put 9/11 in a historical context. What Alnajjar must be put into context, too, are asymmetrical threats by non-state entities. Non-state entities have existed for centuries Frankly, I think they are being exaggerated. Non-state entities have existed in the developing world for centuries. They played a role in the Cold War, and, during the past fifty years, affected American interests mainly in Latin America. Al Qaeda, however, was an exceptional case, a historically unprecedented Al Qaeda, however, is a new phenomenon phenomenon. It is the first non-state entity striving to rule the world and not only fighting for national interests, or specific geographical gains. But its views are not shared by the majority of Muslims and even some extremists see Al Qaeda as something unusual and unacceptable. We should also remember within which historical context Al Qaeda was created: it is a leftover of the Cold War, created in Afghanistan and supported by the US, Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. And even if some say they did not create Al Qaeda, then, at least, they allowed it to be cre- ated with their approval, to say the least. It has become a problem only once it started to fight against the US. Let us not forget, though, that Al Qaeda and the “returnees from Afghanistan” inflicted massive destruction in a major Arabic state, namely Egypt, before attacking US goals. Al Qaeda is not only exceptional in the sense that they are outsiders in the Al Qaeda is enlarged into a structurally new Muslim world. I also think they are singular, because no non state-entity of similar threat because the US needs a new enemy magnitude will emerge within the foreseeable future. There are many examples from the region to support that. During the Cold war, Al Qaeda was slowly taking over Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan and nobody did anything against it — on the contrary, the Western world helped in the build-up of the organization. But now that the Soviet Union has disappeared, Al Qaeda is deliberately enlarged into the first embodiment of a structurally new threat because the US needs a new enemy. But Al Qaeda remains an exception in the Arab world, as most people reject its principles. The United States’ effort to combine the war against terrorism with the democratization of the Middle East is in fact disrupting the few promising democratization processes in the region, because the US entirely lacks credibility among the Arab peoples.

Could Al Qaeda not represent a trend ? How can you be sure that today’s circum- Bertram stances will not breed similar organizations again ?

39 Stein | Alnajjar | Bertram Alnajjar Because only the support of the US and regional powers during the Soviet occupa- Al Qaeda will not have any successors tion of Afghanistan allowed Bin Laden to create an organization of that magnitude. Other terrorist groups lack the facilities of Al Qaeda and its resources to go inter- national. They will only acquire the power to inflict damage within the limits of individual countries.

Guttenberg I quietly disagree with Paul Schroeder’s argument that 9/11 was not a turning 9/11 was a turning point point in history. One can find differing interpretations both in the US and the so- called “Greater Middle East.” There mere fact that the Americans are devising reforms based on the concept of a “Greater Middle East” shows how profound the effects of the 9/11 attacks really were. European and American threat Secondly, we should pay more attention to threat perceptions in the various perceptions differ … parts of the world. An abstractly perceived threat prompts completely different reactions than does the sense of vulnerability that follows a real attack. Europe and the United States, then, are perceiving the threat in very different ways, and therefore have almost no choice than to react differently. … as much as European We should recognize the varying interests as reality in a broader sense as well. and American interests After the fall of bipolarity, desirable as it might have been, interests and percep- tions no longer have to be identical, especially in the transatlantic relationship. Germany and the Europeans are often much too bashful to speak about these differences — although France might be an exception in that regard. On the other hand, I think that the bridging role that Mrs. Neville-Jones mentioned earlier would be an attractive option both for the UK and Germany, and should be seri- ously considered.

Glees Our opening statements, interestingly, reflected the core opposition between “the Policy-makers should dare philosopher’s approach” to this problem and “the approach of the king” — as de- to use their power … scribed by the great philosopher Immanuel Kant. The philosopher’s line has been put forward today by Paul Schroeder, that of the king — or the high policy-mak- er — by Pauline Neville-Jones. Both views were advocated brilliantly. Nevertheless, I tend to follow Kant in concluding that in the end, policy-makers should be people with power, who understand how to use it, rather than behave like academics, whose intellectual sensitivities cause them, in the end, to shy away from its pos- sibilities. … and that is what Bush and Blair did Mr. Schroeder implicitly expressed the view that the world would be safer without Bush and Blair. I was amazed to hear this and I think he could not be more

Alnajjar | Guttenberg | Glees 40 Sometimes a show of resolve and armed power can generate a new beginning.

Glees

wrong. Even if both have made mistakes, both have attempted to use their un- doubted power to impose peacefulness and democracy in the interests of making a better and safer world. 9/11 was an attack on an America which had withdrawn itself from acting in the world, the more bitter for having been unprovoked — and unimagined. But it was also an attack on the West in its European context, one which was so much at ease with itself that it made its people vulnerable to attack, and had lacked the courage to confront terrorism head on. Had Bush and Blair allowed UN resolutions to be overruled, Europe might have been content. But would the world, in the longer run, have become a safer place as a result ? I doubt it. It is appalling that it should be so, but sometimes a show of resolve and armed power can generate a new beginning. Let us hope it will be so in Iraq. Tony Blair decided in practice, if not in theory, to make Iraq’s alleged contin- The allegedly humanitarian sanctions ued possession of weapons of mass destruction the main reason for fighting. It is prevented thousands of certain that British intelligence but also that of other states believed there was a Iraqi babies from being born clear and present threat that Iraq possessed these weapons and would use them. But leaving this question to one side, intervention was important for other rea- sons. Professor Schroeder’s assertion that the sanctions against Iraq were “work- ing” seems peculiar when seen through the lens of human rights. Those sanctions prevented thousands of Iraqi babies from being born or from growing into adult- hood. The “oil for food” programs were benefiting the Iraqi leadership, not the Iraqi people. This failure was producing a humanitarian disaster but we in Europe never had a problem with these deaths. We liked to turn a blind eye to the terrible human rights abuses practiced in Iraq. Yet we were quick enough to protest against the armed intervention which stood a good chance of bringing them to an end. I fear that sanctions only managed to salve the conscience of those who were afraid to take their jackets off and get on with the work of removing a fascist dictator who would have liked nothing better than to carry on defying international wishes, giving way on details in order to protect his grand design for the whole Middle East. Similarly, I object to the observation that, in theory, occupation can not Interventions can lead to democracies, achieve beneficial regime change. This is, I think, contradicted by historical exam- as in 1945 in Germany ples. The success of the Federal Republic of Germany proves that occupation can lead to the establishment of liberal democratic regimes. It cannot be certain that this will happen in Iraq. But not to attempt it because the risk of failure is too great would be worse than attempting it and failing. To do nothing is always more dan- gerous than doing something, even if it is incomplete. The America of Bill Clinton

41 Glees was, in essence, an isolationist America. The dangers that this would produce are far more severe than those that will inevitably accompany the interventionist America constructed by George W Bush. This is a harsh message and it required an attack on American soil, for the first time in almost two hundred years, for it to be heeded. If it is not made to work, at least partially, in Iraq, the future looks grim indeed. To have done nothing would have sent the enemies of the West the clearest message to date that we have stopped wanting to protect our values and our democracy. Europe must stay close to American aims, however difficult it may be to do so. The French and German position may, indeed, have made war more likely rather than less.

Hesse I very much doubt that post-war Germany can be compared to what is happening Post-war Germany and Iraq in Iraq right now in the way Mr. Glees suggested. Let me put it a bit sarcastically: cannot be compared Germany was a democratically organized, though perhaps “failing” state before the Nazi rule, and it became a democratic state after 1945 that could build on the traditions of democracy. Iraq was a horribly despotic — but certainly not a “failed” state — under Saddam’s rule; and it is pretty much a failing state now. Let us hope we can prevent that from getting out of hand. 9/11 changed the agenda of world politics But I want to focus on something else, a contradiction I see in Paul Schroeder’s presentation. While you have said that 9/11 was not a turning point in world his- tory, your whole presentation is proof that it indeed was a turning point because it changed the agenda. The terrorist attacks might not have changed world history materially. Even privatized warfare and violence markets are not that new. A world map of conflicts including non-state actors, published in a magazine I edited in 1994, did not look much different from what it would now. But 9/11 was a turn- ing point not only because it was the first historical event happening simultane- ously on TV screens in every household from Burma to Illinois. More importantly, it changed our agenda: we do now have different approaches to the proliferation of weapons and to international hotspots. The new doctrine of regime change, though, might turn out to be an incentive to the wrong sort of people. To put it provocatively, if I was a war lord, I would now challenge my government to make the US stage an intervention and put me in the place of the crooks hitherto in charge. Take Haiti as an example. We have to address the issue Another danger of the new agenda is that it continues to address the issue of of weapons of mass destruction weapons of mass destruction on a very superficial level. Singling out the haves and have-nots is not enough; guaranteeing access to “peaceful use of Atomic en-

Glees | Hesse 42 It strikes me as terribly arrogant to say: “Be like us or we will put a mandate on you.”

Hesse

ergy” seems to be a double-edged sword. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the international legal mechanisms which apparently are not working. The proliferation network of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Quadeer Khan is the most prominent example, but others will follow soon. Here, the problems lie at the level of the state. I am sure that the connection was supported by the secret service and large parts of the government. It is comparatively good news that we can address these problems at the state It is problematic to prescribe states level, as governments and their agencies are easier to handle than non-state actors. how to behave internally … But by dealing with this question only as a security issue, we reach some dubious conclusions. We should be very careful when prescribing these states how to be- have internally. Apart from the fact that we may not have the right concepts, it strikes me as terribly arrogant to say: “Be like us or we will put a mandate on you.” Because this will produce more problems than it solves, we should rather follow the path of negotiating conflicts. Another point I’d wish to make: We will always have the problem of applying … especially when cooperating with double standards; for instance when dealing with despots which we need as part- despotic regimes at the same time ners or anchors of stability. We will apply them towards Pakistan because we do not want the country to implode. The same is true for Saudi Arabia. In the Israeli- Palestinian conflict it is fair to say that Western countries, and Germany especially, will always follow certain historical, moral and political obligations that might strike other actors as “unbalanced.” Here, the important thing is not to pretend you are following the path of “eternal righteousness,” but, yes, you are applying double standards for very clear reasons, and you are candid about it. That is what it takes for people to believe you. To implement a policy of double standards without loos- ing our partners in the world seems to me the major challenge for establishing a cooperative world order. Bill Clinton pointed to this shortly after 9/11 when postu- lating that the US must “make more partners and fewer terrorists.” I think at this point, the West is making less partners and that might lead to more terrorists.

I would like to follow up on Mr. Hesse’s remarks on the need for partners. The Hirsch main obstacle to achieving a cooperative world order is the marginalization and Marginalization and exclusion are exclusion of many peoples around the world. We assume that potentially danger- the greatest danger for stability ous non-state actors constitute a very small group which we can eliminate once we find the right military approach. But, as Christoph Bertram said, Al Qaeda will be followed by similar organizations as long as we do not tackle the underlying structural problems.

43 Hesse | Hirsch Western leaders talk only to Islamic politicians who dress Western style and speak English.

Hirsch

The South is excluded from Most of the world, especially the South, feels excluded from the international decision-making processes … decision-making processes. The US demands, for example, the assistance of Kenya or Tanzania in fighting Al Qaeda but it does not even give these countries a per- spective of being integrated into international policy-making in return. … and the West insist on the acceptance The problem lies not only with the West excluding developing countries from of Western concepts all over the world participation in key decision-making forums — i. e. the UN Security Council, the World Bank or the IMF — but also with the insistence on acceptance of Western concepts. Paul Schroeder suggested that the principle of liberal democracy is ac- cepted throughout the world today. I am not sure whether this is true with regard to the Islamic world or elsewhere. Robin Wright of the Washington Post, who for over two decades has covered conflicts in the Middle East, recently referred to Western decision-makers as living conceptually in “the green zone”, the “green zone” being the name of the Coali- tion Provisional Authority’s compound in Iraq which, according to Wright, key coalition leaders rarely leave. Thus, they do not see what is really happening in Baghdad city. In a similar way, she argued, Western leaders have restricted views of the Islamic world. They talk only to Islamic politicians who dress Western style and speak English. Those who do not speak English, wear traditional dress and are skeptical about Western political models are assumed to be enemies. This is an important point. We have to engage these people in dialog too, rather than just expecting them to adopt the Western model. Among over a billion Muslims, many feel that they have been mistreated by the West, especially by the United States, and left behind by the forces of globalization. Apart from finding ways to engage these people in constructive discussion, we have to think about changing the structures of the international system. The debate about the enlarge- ment of the UN Security Council is all about overcoming the profound perceptions of marginalization and exclusion.

Hamzawy If the West wants to enter into a dialog with the Muslim world, I suggest taking The West and the Islamic world lack up Thomas Risse’s remarks about our lack of language. We do not only lack de- a common political language … scriptive, but also normative language. Democracy or good governance are seen as globally valid and unambiguous concepts in Western discourses, but people in other parts of the world define these concepts differently. There is no consensus about the categories in which to express political ideals. … and the West is not even interested The West does not even want to integrate the Arab Islamic world. Western in integrating the Muslim world countries advocate the view that the Arab world puts itself outside the existing

Hirsch | Hamzawy 44 normative and conceptual consensus. The West, though, does not do anything to integrate Arabs or Muslims in a discussion about a normative consensus, but sim- ply ignores this part of the world. Western leaders present their model of democ- racy and offer us the choice to either follow it or be left out. As John Hirsch said, they talk only to the ruling, Westernized elites in the Islamic world, even though these elites play a very destructive role in their countries as the main obstacle to democratization. Double standards are applied, as Mr. Hesse said, as soon as Realpolitik comes into play. Because the West does not want to put at risk the stability of Saudi Ara- bia, Pakistan or Egypt, it ignores its own stated norms and cooperates with re- gimes that have persistently obstructed democratic transformations for the last 20 years. To find different partners in the region is seen as a difficult task by Westeners, The West should look for moderate because apart from the ruling elites, they tend to see only Al Qaeda. This is a dis- Islamists as partners torted perception. Even among Islamic fundamentalists, there is a large and diver- sified spectrum in which, as Ghanim Alnajjar said, Al Qaeda plays only a marginal role. Moderate Islamists could, I think, even be strategic partners for democratiza- tion. In Egypt, apart from the ruling party, they are the only agents of political transformation I can imagine. These people do have an understanding of democ- racy, they are embedded in society and relatively open to change. We thus have to overcome our simplified picture and find a language to exchange arguments with them.

You focused on the important question of whether the main threats to world se- Bertram curity can be localized or regionalized. Is the Middle East — however you want to Is the Middle East a cockpit in which define the region — a sort of cockpit in which the threats of social instability, des- the threats of today’s world are combined ? potic rule, lack of respect for human rights and availability of weapons to terror- ists are combined ? I think that we should come back to that later.

Great power relations are, as Paul Schroeder pointed out, no longer a problem Wiesbrock insofar as threats to international security today no longer arise from great powers Great powers disagree on how but from asymmetrical conflicts. Great power relations are a problem, however, to deal with asymmetric threats insofar as these powers disagree on how to cope with these new asymmetrical threats. A strategic and — in this I agree with Amr Hamzawy — foremostly an in- clusive dialog is needed. Not only must the transatlantic partners, Russia, China, and the Arab world, take part in the discussion, but also civil society. As long as

45 Hamzawy | Bertram | Wiesbrock The EU does not argue with the US over the need to use force, but over when to resort to force.

Wiesbrock

such a dialog is not established, initiatives like the Greater Middle East initiative lack the support they need and ultimately risk failure. The EU is no longer the soft guy As far as power politics are concerned, I want to challenge a stereotype of EU- US relations implicit in Anthony Glees’ remarks. The EU is often depicted as the soft guy who relies on diplomacy and containment, while the US, as the tough guy, relies on military intervention. But this stereotype dos not take recent devel- opments into account. For example, Germany started to deploy troops to NATO’s out-of-area activities only after a ruling of the Constitutional Court in 1994. Only six years ago the EU started to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Now it is considering establishing headquarters for its forces within NATO, and three EU countries are launching an initiative for “Battle Groups,” which are rapid reaction forces designed to intervene in crises within the UN context. The EU does not argue with the US over the need to use force, but over when to resort to force.

Rieff We have talked not so much about international order but about the transatlantic The transatlantic partnership relationship. It is imperative, though, to think comprehensively about a “New is not the main problem … World Order,” because Paul Schroeder’s sanguine picture of a functioning interna- tional system starts fraying as soon as you look beyond the Urals or beyond the Atlas mountains. … neither is terrorism — for most people, To develop new concepts we have got to stop gazing at our own navels, pre- it is globalization tending that if only Bonn, Paris and Washington agree everything will be fine. We must also widen our scope regarding threat perceptions. Instead of assuming that only terrorism threatens world order, we must realize that many people, espe- cially in the so-called global South, perceive globalization as the greatest danger. The view that the main agent of globalization and sole superpower, the United States, constitutes a major threat has many subscribers throughout the world, even in Western Europe.

Bertram Andrew Marshall, the head of the Pentagon’s internal think tank, has even sug- Climate change as the most dangerous gested that climate change is a more dangerous future threat than terrorism. future threat to security ? Maybe the most powerful countries are concentrating on the wrong issue ?

Rieff Another problem is our overstated confidence in rules. Even though we have wit- Guerilla forces have to violate nessed an explosion in rule-making during the past decades, material changes international law … have undermined these new norms. For example, because of the revolution in

Wiesbrock | Rieff | Bertram 46 military technology, every military formation fighting a Western army must flout the rules of war to have any chance of success. Night vision equipment precludes guerrilla forces from operating under the cover of night. Therefore, they abolish the distinction between civilians and soldiers, which in terms of international law means perfidy. We can not moralize out of existence the fact that people engage in wars to win them. Nobody will accept Western military superiority and so to … in order to have the chance speak commit suicide on the battlefield. American constitutional lawyers like to to win against a Western army point out that our constitution is not designed as a suicide pact — neither is inter- national humanitarian law. This tension seems to me much more central for our debate about a “New World Order” than our discussion about transatlantic rela- tions. Discussing the transatlantic partnership makes sense only if a Pax Ameri- cana supported by European auxiliaries is advocated, as by Niall Ferguson, as the basis of the “New World Order.”

I would like to come back to what Katja Wiesbrock has said about states not being Neville-Jones able to find a common strategy against asymmetrical threats. We can distinguish We have no common strategy functioning states, which obey international rules, from failed states and rogue vis-à-vis failed states … states outside the system. We have to ask ourselves, though, which of the now functioning states will be able to sustain stability in the long run. Non-state actors … and non-state actors are the third group, among which has emerged the new threat of networks of terrorists capable of obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Al Qaeda is constantly changing its structure, like a jellyfish able to sting even when broken. It is linked with cells inside Western societies and with regional movements as, for example, in Chechnya, thus tapping into the resources of separatists and other groups with longer term objectives, and I doubt very much whether Al Qaeda has been decisively weakened. Our problem is the lack of consensus among group one, the functioning states, about how to deal with failed states and non- state actors. Contrary to David Rieff, I think that focusing on the transatlantic relationship The transatlantic partnership is a key is justified, because it has hitherto been and still remains a central instrument of instrument of international politics world management. It is true, though, that when the US tackles threats by using military means, it tends to ignore issues of peace building. As Europeans realize, we also should palliate the grievances that give rise to support for or tolerance of terrorism. As to 9/11, I object to Anthony Glees’ assessment that America was attacked, 9/11 was not an attack on the United States even though the Americans themselves characterized the events in such a way. but on the international community

47 Rieff | Neville-Jones Resorting to the simple solutions of the nation-state structure endangers the highly sophisticated tools of international relations developed during the past decades.

Kornelius

But what we witnessed was an attack on the international community on Ameri- can soil. American leaders usually fail to mention it, but foreign nationals also died. It would have been cleverer politics to stress this aspect to increase world- wide solidarity. To me, the real importance of 9/11 was that it changed the inter- national climate from optimism to a sense that our civilization faces a real threat. We have not yet agreed on what the consequences of these changes are. New military technologies encourage The revolution of military affairs increases the temptation of those who are asymmetric warfare … not powerful to use asymmetric means of warfare. As David Rieff said, they do not see another way to attack the powerful. … but also military interventions At the same time, it also increases the temptation of the powerful to reply with military means, because the new military technology provides methods of warfare which minimize the loss of life on the side of the attacker. One might even be tempted to consider military intervention before having applied the full spectrum of sanctions that often include a lot of suffering. This is, I think, one of the most important points of disagreement between the transatlantic partners. The hard cop/soft cop debate between the Europeans and the Americans should be less dogmatic, more dissected and adapted to the various threats in various places. In some situations, it would be preposterous to declare from the beginning that one will resort to military force only as a last resort. Starting a real discussion about criteria for the use of force adaptable to concrete challenges could trans- form the transatlantic quarrels into a constructive debate.

Kornelius I would like to focus on the driving force behind the changes and dangers we Globalization as the driving force behind perceive in international relations. Symptoms like the increase of asymmetric the threats to our international system warfare and the decline of the classic nation-state are caused by decreasing social stability, which is in turn due to demographic changes. The central phenomenon from which these problems emerge is what we call globalization. Globalization and the multitude of problems it creates overburdens our tradi- tional international structures. The EU almost collapsed last year, the United Na- tions is a shadow of its past, and even single-issue organizations like NATO are having a hard time. Danger of retreating into I fear that the new political environment will lead to the simple solution of the safety of the nation-state retreating into the perceived safety of the nation-state. Take this example: All the talk of core Europe or of a Franco-German axis within the EU would have been unthinkable five years ago. This trend of resorting to the simple solutions of the nation-state structure and thus endangering the highly sophisticated tools of in-

Neville-Jones | Kornelius 48 ternational relations developed over the past decades is one of today’s greatest dangers.

I would like to ask a question to Mr. Hamzawy and Mr. Alnajjar in the spirit of Hassner David Rieff’s concern that we are ignoring the world outside the transatlantic What makes bin Laden so popular relationship. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda surely are exceptions which will not be fol- in the Islamic world ? lowed by a similar phenomenon in the near future. But polls in Jordan and the Palestinian territories showed that Bin Laden enjoys a huge popularity in these societies. He is admired for having forced the West to focus its attention on the Islamic world and for avenging those who feel oppressed by the USA. The longing for such a person by a significant part of mankind, even if that does not imply direct support for 9/11, out of an opposition to the West is a serious and lasting phenomenon. To overcome this loathing, I would like to follow up on Mr. Hamzawy’s com- Do Islamism and democratization ment about our lack of normative consensus. You pointed out that moderate Is- go together or not ? lamists are the best agents for democratization and liberalization. Could you elaborate on that, because democratization and liberalization are Western terms which you said are hard to introduce as meaningful notions into the language of the Islamic world. Ironically, Paul Wolfowitz, who was once ambassador to Indo- nesia, is obsessed with looking for moderate Islamists to enforce democracy. His actions, though, tend to radicalize the Muslim world and thus undermine the position of moderate Islamists. How can we avoid this trap ?

You are certainly right in depicting Bin Laden as a hero of the Islamic world. Con- Hamzawy temporary Arab political culture is obsessed with the search for a hero who will Bin Laden fulfils the Arab World’s free the Arabs from all sufferings. Bin Laden is perceived in Jordan or among the longing for a hero Palestinians as a hero because these people suffer so much and thus their longing for a hero is even more pronounced. You should also be aware that many Arab regimes are failed states in the sense that they are not functioning internally and not doing enough for their societies. Bin Laden, by contrast, is seen as somebody who does not only make promises, but delivers — at least he is doing something. By lack of normative consensus, I mean that Westerners talk to Arabs about The ruling elites of the Arab world democracy or human rights, ignoring that these labels do have different local at best build democratic façades meanings. I would suggest less labelling and naming and more discussion about what we really mean, i.e. functioning political systems and improvements in po- litical and civil rights. I do indeed think that moderate Islamists should be the

49 Kornelius | Hassner | Hamzawy 9/11 has provided a pretext for regimes interested in constraining human rights and suppressing dissident groups.

Economy

target group of such a discursive effort. Be it in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco or Bahrain, the governments and ruling elites are agents of the status quo. Western pressure at best causes them to build a democratic façade. The only agents for change embedded in society are moderate Islamists who have their own under- standing of democracy. We should therefore engage them in a dialog without prejudices and that does not rely on meaningless labels.

Alnajjar Bin Laden styles himself as a multi-millionaire who left his luxurious life to live Bin Laden as a modern Che Guevara: in caves and fight for his principles. He has thus managed to become a symbol for fighting against the United States many people, even though they disapprove of his killing civilians. The phenom- enon is comparable to Che Guevara, also in that it is linked to the perception of the United States as a danger to the world.

Economy I would like to offer a different perspective on what Pauline Neville-Jones said China acts increasingly self-confidently concerning the transatlantic partnership serving as the main tool for managing on the international stage international relations. We should take into account that you could have a very similar discussion about the “New World Order” in Beijing today. Chinese interna- tional relations journals are discussing issues of sovereignty, transatlantic prob- lems and post-9/11 or post-Iraq developments. At the same time, China’s activities on the international stage have increased considerably, not only in the United Na- tions, but also concerning North Korea and the political order in Southeast Asia. We should try to achieve as comprehensive a consensus as possible about interna- tional rules, listening to what China has to contribute to the discussion. Autoritarian regimes use 9/11 As to 9/11, I think it is too early to tell whether it was a turning point. I am to constrain human rights sure, though, that in Southeast Asia it has provided a pretext for regimes inter- ested in constraining human rights and suppressing dissident groups. Under the guise of combating terrorism, Malaysia, Thailand and certainly China have grate- fully seized this opportunity.

Schlie September 11 changed our perception of reality, not reality itself. Given the ups Integration and failure of states and downs of international politics since the early 1990s, it is becoming apparent that we are having difficulties in defining what the “New World Order” consists of. One is tempted during this transitional period to accept Golo Mann’s statement that “history is chaos that lurches into chaos.” Indeed, we are experiencing the conflicting processes of integration and failure in very close proximity to each other. Incidentally, failure is also threatening Europe, in Moldova and Albania.

Hamzawy | Alnajjar | Economy | Schlie 50 Some European states have been in a process of decay since the late 1980s. And examples including Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Haiti show us that this process can trigger positive developments. Throughout history, transformations in governments have always affected the Can nation-states still form the basis international system as a whole. Today we face the question of whether the foun- of the international system ? dations of our international law can be reconciled with today’s actual distribution of power. Stefan Kornelius already pointed this out in his elegant aside on the United Nations. That organization’s main weakness might be that it depends on the principle of sovereign member states. Rwanda and Srebrenica exposed the deficiencies of the UN’s system. The United Nations are, no doubt, far away from being a perfect system. The domestication of power through law is an old dream. Yet perhaps foreign policy and international law have developed in increasingly different directions, despite the spread of international law during the past 50 years.

Our discussion about whether 9/11 is a turning point in history and whether asym- Krasner metrical warfare constitutes a new threat lacks, it seems to me, something of How to decide whether 9/11 decisive importance: a cluster of criteria that allow us to validate or falsify this is a historic turning point ? claim. I would like to analyze and discuss that — and I do think that we are dealing with new threats — on a systematic basis. I would be grateful for suggestions.

I cannot offer you a means of systematically analyzing the significance of 9/11, but Reiter I would like to share an anecdote about it. In the 1980s, the director of a Polish Since 9/11 the feeling of institute in New York was asked when the contemporary Polish archive material safety in the US has gone in storage there would be moved to Poland. He answered, “Never. History shows that Poland is an unsafe place. Leave these important documents in New York.” 9/11 shook the faith of this man and many others that nothing could happen in the United States. The collapse of this myth was a shock for many, an encourage- ment for America’s opponents. On the rules and norms of international politics, I draw a parallel with reli- International politics must become gion. I grew up in a Catholic country and I learned much about the conflict be- more Catholic: Withstanding the conflict tween norms and reality in discussions between Catholics and Protestants. Protes- between norms and reality tants often agonize over the fact that norms and reality are often at odds. Catholics can accept this much more easily because they regard norms as guidelines that people can change through their own lives. I think that in global politics, we should adopt the Catholic, rather than the Protestant, approach.

51 Schlie | Krasner | Reiter We need solutions to real problems Similarly, I think successfully solving real problems is the best way to help establish a durable order and dependable rules. Giving good examples is more useful than creating a global order in theory. Kosovo and Serbia have been encour- aging steps, while the fates of Afghanistan and, even more so, Iraq, remain unsure. The story of Iraq can still be written to its conclusion by all participants. If it is a success story — and for that to happen, America and Europe will have to change their stripes and cooperate — then both countries will become attractive partners for other major countries. If China or Russia, for instance, are willing to discuss such approaches, then the foundation for a re-established or “New World Order” has indeed been laid.

Leicht One dramatic change caused by 9/11 and the reaction of the Bush administration After 9/11 the United States abandoned is the shift in the role played by the US in international rule-making. America their support of international law … developed from an at least partially constructive into a destructive force in the advancement of international human rights and humanitarian law. … and authoritarian governments Elizabeth Economy rightly referred to opportunistic governments around the gladly join in this disregard for norms world ignoring international law in the name of combating terrorism. Pointing to the American model, these governments say: “Rules aside, we have a real security problem.” They use the opportunity to frame the problem in a completely differ- ent way, defining, for example, separatism as terrorism. Dealing with political or religious dissent is much easier under the chapeau of terrorism that allows for the discrimination and marginalization of dissenters. In Uzbekistan, for instance, in- dependent Muslim groups have been a nuisance to the government for a long time. But only eight years ago, the US administration was willing to raise the issue of their rights vis à vis the government. Now, these groups are marginalized to an extent where some may take up arms and become a security threat. Labeling them terrorists becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The problem of governments using terrorism as a pretext leads me to the question of who might be our allies. Mr. Hesse quoted Bill Clinton’s appeal to find allies against terrorism. We need to clearly define whether those allies should be abusive governments or the people abused by these governments. I think we should not diminish our understanding for the plight of dissenting groups, and we should allow dissent to happen, whether we agree with it or not. My last point is that while we are sitting here talking about terrorism, most people in the world would say: “This is not the challenge we are faced with. HIV/ AIDS, Malaria and small arms are what we are dying from every day”. Therefore

Reiter | Leicht 52 There is a tendency in Western debates to consider post-modern imperialism as a potential model. This approach failed with dramatic consequences at the end of the 19th century.

Cohrs

it was so important what Mr. Hirsch said about the “green zone.” We can not now simply withdraw into our bunker mentality and solve problems we deem crucial, asking the world outside to just be patient. Neither the world nor its challenges will grant us such leisure.

I would like to stress the importance of seeing security issues as political issues, Krisch and of thinking about exclusion, alienation and about the views of other parts of the world. Let me also present a historical caveat. No doubt, failed states and the privati- Privatization of warfare is not zation of warfare are important challenges and perhaps something new for the a new phenomenon in history 20th and 21st century. However, similar problems were heavily debated in former times, too. For example, the Congo conference in 1884 debated the problems of failed states. Other conferences in the 19th century discussed the privatization of warfare, for example piracy. At the time, the West came up with an imperial solu- tion. Today, it has a similarly dominant position in the global order, and I would advise to carefully analyze the parallels between the former discourses and those we have today. That might help us avoid today some of the problems the imperial- ist approach created in the past.

To my mind, today’s main challenge is to prevent a further corrosion of the inter- Cohrs national system built up prior to 9/11. Therefore we must think about whether we need a radically new approach to rules made up by the present hegemon or whether we can use and evolve the rules developed during the past decades and make them more inclusive. Otherwise, the dominating powers will make up their rules as they go. Taking up what Nico Krisch said, I want to add a note of caution. There is a The West risks reconsidering the tendency in Western debates to consider post-modern imperialism as a potential 19th century’s concepts of imperialism model. The United States and European countries, in analogy to the 19th century, are supposed to take care of the rest of the world. This approach failed with dra- matic consequences at the end of the 19th century. I do not think that any new version could provide a recipe for achieving a more inclusive and stable world order today.

The very fact that my presentation stimulated a lot of discussion is reassuring to Schroeder me. I feel like having come off not unscathed but with acceptable collateral dam- age, and I agree with a great many of the points that you have made.

53 Leicht | Krisch | Cohrs | Schroeder The international system There is no question that asymmetric warfare and the proliferation of weap- provides the best resources … ons of mass destruction, Islamic fundamentalism and failed states, and a backlash from globalization are major problems. I certainly do not believe that the existing international system can master these challenges without being adapted to them. Some participants found my description of the international system too optimis- tic. Actually, the only optimism that I can entertain is that of Thornton Wilder’s “The Skin Of Our Teeth.” We can somehow survive, and the international system we have may not provide answers but resources for developing them. … also for mastering today’s threats One of these resources is the natural solidarity of states against terrorism, including some failed states that might be brought back into the international system. Historical experience shows that durable peace is achieved only through reaching a consensus among the actors that count. Today, there are more, and more complicated actors than in former periods. Nevertheless, we need a consensus on a definition of peace which these actors are willing to live with and tolerate. I do not see how it could be possible to achieve this goal without using existing institutions and rules. John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos show in their book “Global Business Regulation” how to reform and de- velop the international system and bring more people in. Especially small coun- tries can use the system in order to achieve greater justice within it.

Bertram I do think that it is very important to keep on questioning whether September 11 We must keep on questioning whether is a turning point and if it presents as great a danger as most people say. I am as 9/11 was a historic turning point … concerned as everybody else about the new phenomenon highlighted by Septem- ber 11, which is the globalization of insecurity. But I am worried about the fact that large parts of the international debate deal only with the terrorist part of this phenomenon, and would like to see a more strategic approach to these issues. … and conduct our threat Allow me one more observation: I have worked in the field of security policy analysis much more precisely now for more years than I can tell. But I have never lived in a period in which the analysis of security dangers has been as sloppy as it is today, even though we spend immense amounts of money on it. I learned in the Cold War that it is not enough to find out which scenarios are remotely possible but we also need to determine which are likely. Just to say: “We cannot exclude this or that” does not provide a basis for defining a sound security policy. It seems to me, though, that we are doing precisely that in our discussion on security. We need to be more precise and differentiate between different kinds of weapons and terrorisms.

Schroeder | Bertram 54 II. New Rules and Mechanisms

After our discussion about threat scenarios and about whether our international Bertram system is up to today’s challenges, we will now focus on possible new rules and mechanisms. Which are the appropriate instruments for coping with asymmetri- cal warfare, the current distribution of power and the danger that poverty and disease pose to the international community ? It is a pleasure to have David Rieff and Heather Grabbe introduce our session.

Janusz Reiter earlier on advocated a “Catholic” approach to international politics Rieff that allows us to live with the contradictions between our norms and the realities The distance between norms and realities is we face. My views in this respect, by contrast, are those of an unreconstructed the international system’s key problem Protestant. The ever widening distance between norms and realities seems to me the key problem of the international system and a main reason for the threats endangering it today. To close that gap, we have to acknowledge that norms alone seldom have the Norms are seldom able to change the world force to change the world. It is a mystification shared mainly by international rela- tions specialists and utopian reformers that once you set up norms reality will migrate towards them. In the United States, this claim’s authority derives from the Civil Rights era, when unpopular norms were established and eventually re- alities followed. But as the legitimacy of international law is much inferior to the legitimacy of national law, UN resolutions and international conventions will never have the same impact. Paul Schroeder and many others have argued that we have a large body of International law is no longer up to reality: international rules that evolved over time and that can adapt to present circum- Wars with non-state actors … stances. But are the UN system, international trade law and the laws of war still up to reality ? War today is no longer what the laws of war were written to deal with. Our system of international law was devised to govern inter-state war. To- day’s conflicts between states and non-state actors take place in an only partially regulated space, thus allowing for far-reaching interpretations. In Guantanamo, my own government has obliterated the distinction between crime and war by applying the term illegitimate combatant in a rather promiscuous way to detain people despite their unclear status. Also, during my long stays in Iraq and Afghanistan, another change in the … fading distinction between nature of war struck me as fundamental, namely a growing para-militarization of soldiers and civilians the CIA. It has been integrated into American military commands and has played a crucial role in the field. An American 2-star general in Iraq recently boasted to me about the “inter-operability” not only of CIA, Delta Force and regular forces,

55 Bertram | Rieff but also of humanitarian relief work. In Afghanistan, American military govern- ment officials acted as relief workers, armed but in civilian clothes, thus putting all other humanitarian workers at risk. If war, counter-intelligence, espionage, anti-crime, and humanitarian relief work are blended, how can the laws of war survive unscathed ? To reform the international system is useless To reform our system of rules seems to me utterly useless, because this system because it is out of touch with reality and … is too remote from reality to have any decisive impact, be it in its old or new form. I am, for example, deeply skeptical whether a reform of the UN would allow us to implement our norms more effectively. The UN today is clearly more useful for alleviating the negative results of peace and security operations than for influenc- ing and steering these operations. Moreover, it is an institution under attack, not least by my own government. … reforms of the UN Security Council Could new rules make the UN more powerful and efficient ? I think that any would not change anything comprehensive reform, for example of the Security Council, has a snowball’s chance in hell of being accepted. To talk about projects so utterly unreal seems to me a waste of time. Moreover, a Security Council reform, which would for reasons of justice have to bring a major Islamic state, India, Japan, and Lula’s Brazil in as permanent members, would not render the Council more efficient. An interven- tion like the one in Kosovo, for example, would not be any easier to authorize with Lula’s government, which has opposed all of these ventures as imperial wars. Even though the West is not unified … Three major obstacles stand in the way of overcoming the atrophy of the in- ternational system’s normative regimes. First, the United States and Europe have diverging interests but are at the same time perceived by the Global South as a group of neocolonialist states with only marginally different views. As for the US and Europe, we may have a transatlantic consensus in this room. But the polling data from Western Europe suggests that a considerable minority of people for the first time since 1945 view the United States as a clear and present danger. I believe that holds true for many elite sectors outside of the political elite. Thierry Meysson’s book “L’Effroyable Imposture” which denies the attack on the Pentagon has ever taken place, sold 350,000 copies in France in a very short time. … developing countries perceive Meanwhile, many governments in the developing world see no difference it as a colonialist block between the American and the European position. They see the Western consen- sus for military interventions on humanitarian grounds, not the differences on the modalities, as for example UN sanctions versus “with allies if possible, alone if necessary.” In the South, there is another consensus: that the so-called “hu- manitarian project” is in fact a project of re-colonization.

Rieff 56 One continent in our world is dying, which makes it slightly obscene to discuss only international security rules.

Rieff

The second problem concerns the distribution of power. Who makes interna- Golden rule: The man with tional rules and who will be bound by them ? I think that an international system the gold makes the rules based on one power doing what it likes is a very real option. An old Texan expres- sion, rather a definition of the Golden Rule, says: the man with the gold makes the rules. In international politics, the country with the gold and the 101st Air- borne Division at its disposal makes the rules. My government has been engaged in remaking rules over the last few years. In the context of the so-called “war on terrorism,” the Bush Administration has taken up and radicalized certain traditions of the Clinton era. It is thus not a ghastly anomaly, maybe ghastly, but not an anomaly. Some European and a number of East Asian governments have gone along with these changes, in the area of state repression, as Lotte Leicht has pointed out. Certain recent decisions about domestic spying in the Federal Republic of Germany for example would have been unthinkable before 9/11. New rules for a unipolar world created by the sole remaining superpower will not be made to limit this power’s own freedom of action. They will not be rules for the weak and the strong alike, but will bind the strong back together. I do not see anything particularly valuable in that enterprise, except making people in chancelleries sleep more comfortably. The third dilemma of international rules is whether they apply to the chal- Our system of international rules lenges we face today. Is it possible to make rules for crises occurring between states does not apply to today’s challenges and non-state actors ? Or will a change in rules basically focused on security mat- ters do anything to tackle the HIV/AIDS crisis ? One continent in our world is dying, which makes it slightly obscene to discuss only international security rules.

I want to present a European and thus much more rule-friendly perspective on Grabbe how international order should be built. Rules are popular in Europe, because presentation since 1945 integration through consensual rule-making has worked brilliantly for Europe loves rules because integration the European Union. Most recently, it has been successful in bringing post-com- through rule-making has worked brilliantly munist Europe into the EU after the end of the Cold War. Currently, the Union is thinking about extending the concept even further with a neighborhood policy, which might reach all the way to the Caucasus. The closing of the EU’s next step of enlargement this year will not change this fondness for rules-based govern- ance. The deepest divisions in Europe are about powerful states moving outside the Europe is critical of the existing multilateral framework of rules. The recent spats about Iraq and about whether large countries institutions but eager to preserve them

57 Rieff | Grabbe The right metaphor for the way Europeans solve problems is the screwdriver.

Grabbe

within the EU should develop policies outside the framework of the Union’s trea- ties are recent examples for that. Europe is not only rule-defined, but also very much in favor of multilateral institutions: even though we see a wide-spread dissatisfaction in Europe with old institutions, there is concern to preserve them. That might also be due to a lack of ideas for alternatives. In the debate on NATO, for example, Europeans are more conservative than many Americans. This became clear when US Senator Richard Luger outlined different scenarios for NATO’s future role in Brussels two years ago. Europeans spoke out in favor of his first scenario, which was the traditional role of preserving European security. Luger’s own preference, which was to use NATO as the policeman for non-prolif- eration regimes, was widely rejected. Similarly, Germany and other European states are cautious about using NATO outside Europe, accepting the Afghanistan campaign, but objecting to an engagement in Iraq. They do not want NATO to be used mainly for cleaning-up operations, as a sort of international dish-rag. Although conservative about international institutions, Europe is a rich source of experimentation with new mechanisms of building international order. Our primary method is the integration of states into legal frameworks and eco- nomic relationships. Robert Kagan eloquently criticized this approach in question- ing its effectiveness outside Europe. Europe may enjoy perpetual peace, he said, but Americans are concerned with the Hobbesian jungle that surrounds Europe. Similarly, Robert Cooper emphasizes that rules-based international governance is right for the “post-modern” West. But he questions its usefulness in the “pre-mod- ern” and “modern” areas beyond. There, force must be used to impose rules, and mandates of benign imperialism must be built to sustain them. The next 20 years will show whether EU methods work outside the traditional sphere, for example in North Africa. The first test will be the success of the Union’s “Wider Europe” concept — its neighborhood policy toward countries like Ukraine or Belarus. Europe has achieved a lot There are good reasons to defend the European approach to the use of force. without military force … Opinion surveys show that Europeans deem military force useful only as a last resort to enforce rules. Again, Robert Kagan wittily ridiculed Europe’s position in turning around the hammer and nail analogy. While it is usually said that if the only instrument you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail, Kagan said Europeans pretend that nails do not exist because they do not have a hammer. He thereby missed the right metaphor for the way Europeans solve problems, which is the screwdriver. Screwdrivers work with rather modest force over longer peri-

Grabbe 58 ods of time and, through gentle coaxing, eventually get quite a good hold on their object. Screws tend not to come out again if pressure is applied, while nails need a huge amount of force to get in and then they can still fall out. Let me present you a few of the screwdrivers that Europe has used to impose … for instance by exporting its international order. First, the EU has successfully exported its economic and po- economic and political models … litical models to Central and Eastern Europe, using economic integration to create political consensus and to encourage the convergence of political systems. The future will show whether this will work also for the Caucasus, North Africa or the Middle East, where no prospect of accession will be offered by the EU. Our second mechanism to promote European political ideas is conditionality. … with conditionality and … We apply it more than we used to, even though our actions are neither very con- sistent nor sufficiently tough vis-à-vis Russia or North Africa. European institu- tions besides the EU use conditionality, too. The OSCE and the Council of Europe have applied conditionality after accepting countries as members. For example, the Council of Europe allowed the Ukraine in and then persuaded it to give up the death penalty. The OSCE, to a certain extent, tries to do the same with regard to Russia. A final interesting “screwdriver” effect is the increasing interoperability be- …interoperability between military tween traditional military security means and policing forces. David Rieff criti- security means and policing forces cized the integration of the CIA in the US Army because of the fuzzy boundaries and the lack of legitimacy. But Europeans are increasingly and successfully using civilian forces in their mandates. The Bosnian Police Mission or the policing mis- sion in Kosovo are examples of how the EU builds local capacity and uses peace- keeping troops to allow countries to govern themselves better. These mechanisms, though, are only useful for building international order The EU’s mechanisms only work in limited areas. First, they only work for countries where the rules do rule. Order for cooperative states … through integration nowadays can only be applied to Europe’s immediate neigh- borhood, although in the long term this neighborhood could extend to Central Asia. Second, rules based on integration only work with cooperative states — those who want to come in from the cold. Europe has many carrots and very few sticks. Libya provides an example for how these carrots can be used effectively. When it declared its willingness to sign up to the EU’s Barcelona process, Libya implicitly accepted to recognize the right of the state of Israel to exist. This is an extraordi- nary success. Third, the EU’s attraction can help to sustain order during periods of regime change, as we might one day see in Belarus. What the EU is not very good at, though, is actually bringing about regime change.

59 Grabbe … and are useless in cooperation with The gravest restriction for the European “screwdriver” mechanisms is that non-state actors like companies they are hard to apply to non-state actors, like companies. This is a generic prob- lem of a rules-based order, which relies on nation states. The EU tries to engage economic actors, for example, by offering Turkish companies trade concessions, thus engaging economic actors in a state which has not yet been given an acces- sion perspective. What the EU still fails to do is to engage societies outside its immediate neighborhood. The lack of legitimacy which the Pew Global Attitudes Survey has shown not only for the UN and NATO, but for the European Union as well, is one of Europe’s central problems. It is a pressing problem, too, because the parts of the world where the EU does not enjoy legitimacy — those vast areas be- yond its immediate neighborhood — are coming closer. We cannot prevent those outside the During the Cold War and before the globalization of media, people outside Western sphere from coming to Europe the Western sphere were less free to move and less aware of global inequalities. Now they can vote with their feet by coming to Europe, and with their arms in turning to terrorism. We do not even have a concept for really integrating the 12 million Muslims already living in the European Union, much less for dealing with the Islamic world outside Europe. I disagree with Stephen Krasner’s statement that we have more corrupt regimes or failing states today than before 1989, but today the frustrations of the non-Western world do affect us more directly. There- fore, Europe has to engage these people. We have to develop tools for those areas where order through integration does not work, because states either do not func- tion or do not want to integrate. Our current strategy is to use our traditional mechanisms with those who want to cooperate, and to build high fences to keep out the rest. That is not going to work in the long run.

Ikenberry I want to talk about the hammer, not the screwdriver, because I think new rules Is rules-based international order are primarily needed to address the new reality of American unipolar power. possible in an era of unipolarity ? Whether rules-based international order is possible in an era of unipolarity seems to me a central question of the 21st century, finding new rules that fit the new realities is the central task. Never before could a single The current distribution of power is a historically unprecedented phenome- state act this autonomously non. For the first time in the modern era, one state can operate on the global stage without being constrained by counter-balancing great powers. Today, we are watching a geo-political adjustment process after a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power. To my mind, the subtext not only of our discussion but of most global political debates during the last 2 years is the question of American

Grabbe | Ikenberry 60 power. What are the rules of the new era, if there are rules ? What should the strategies of other great powers be, Blair’s binding closer to Washington by, for example, supporting the Iraq war, or rather Chirac’s counter-balancing ? Even more central is the question of whether the United States will use its How does the US deal with its power: power to disentangle itself from the outside world. Will it go down Undersecretary domination or integration of partners ? of State John Bolton’s pathway of reclaiming American sovereignty ? I think there are two potential logics of unipolarity in play today. Either the US will choose a unipolarity with liberal characteristics, corresponding to Paul Schroeder’s vision of enveloping the new realities into the old infrastructure of international politics with its norms and institutions, thereby preserving the genius of the post-war order. The alternative is a unipolarity with imperial characteristics, which entails more US detachment, unilateral domination, and the US standing above the law. Most discussions about US strategy have focused on George W. Bush and the The imperial temptation is not only due to National Security Strategy. Indeed, had several individuals not been appointed to George W. Bush, but to structural changes the Bush Administration, the US would not have gone to war in Iraq. This war was very much contingent on personalities and specific circumstances. Nevertheless, personalities do not adequately explain the struggle over the future logic of US unipolarity, and the imperial temptation is not simply due to the Bush Administra- tion. Structural changes are also responsible for that. We are at a historical transition point, as the Westphalian Order operating for The Westphalian Order is about over 500 years is about to give way to something entirely different. The basic West- to be flipped on its head … phalian concepts were the equilibrium of power among states and national sover- eignty, and the national government’s monopoly on the use of force within its so- ciety. There was a strict division between domestic issues like police law enforcement and international politics, defined in terms of wars between national armies. Today, the entire system is being flipped on its head. The US has a quasi-mo- … by US military dominance and the nopoly on the use of force at the international level; order is based on a single unbundling of national sovereignty center of power instead of an equilibrium of powers. At the same time, sovereignty at the state level is more contingent than ever. Liberal internationalism, for exam- ple Eleanor Roosevelt and the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, during the last 50-60 years has built obligations for states to obey within their societies or to come under scrutiny of the outside world. At the same time, a shift to popu- lar sovereignty makes hard state sovereignty more problematic as well. Sover- eignty is unbundling. Those double transitions are occurring at a moment when new threats of terrorism and the end of the Cold War leave the system much more ambiguous as to what the rules are.

61 Ikenberry Bush’s vision of American unipolarity: To float like a butterfly and sting like a bee.

Ikenberry

Bush: The US Leviathan solves The Bush Administration has grandly embraced this double transition. Its the Hobbesian problem National Security Strategy Report is radically new in its vision of the Hobbesian problem bound to be solved by a US Leviathan. In his West Point speech in the summer of 2002, George W. Bush said that very explicitly. The US would maintain peace, he said, allowing no peer competitors but seeking the support of “coalitions of the willing” if possible. In return other states would accord the US exceptional status with regard to rules, for example in the International Criminal Court. Mu- hammed Ali’s favorite description of himself as a fighter was that he floated like a butterfly and stung like a bee. In some ways, that is Bush’s vision of US unipolar- ity, floating up there above the rules, coming down to save stability and order. This will entail a growing role of special bilateral relationships with countries like Is- rael, Britain, Japan, Australia and other cooperative partners in the war on terror- ism. The US will shower these good lieutenants with trade pacts and security agreements, thus disaggregating the old system with its indivisibility of security and economic relations. To break up this system into bilateral hub and spoke re- lationships between the US and its partners allows the United States to use its power more effectively to reward and punish states. That is a very serious alterna- tive to basing international order on rules. We need new rules for the use of force … I think our challenge is to re-imagine rules to make sense of and accommodate this double transition from multipolarity and national sovereignty to unipolarity and contingent sovereignty. We have to find shared rules that avoid a fundamen- tal disaggregation and erosion of our system of rule-based international politics. To my mind, two specific types of new rules need to be imagined: We need rules about the use of force, because no stable world order is imaginable with a unipo- lar state enjoying an unbridled right to use force. We thus must develop legitimate international agreements about the use of force below the level of UN Security Council resolutions. … and a new bargain between the US and The second new set of rules should constitute a new bargain between the its partners: cooperation for autonomy United States and its partners over the terms of unipolarity. We need to reinvent what was the great genius of the postwar era: rule order despite asymmetric power distribution. The US will have to re-negotiate giving up some of its auton- omy in exchange for the cooperation of others.

Bertram Are you not describing a world that may have existed a year ago but no longer exists ? Today, the United States needs the United Nations, adjusts its domestic legislation in order to please the EU and calls for the help of NATO. I have the

Ikenberry | Bertram 62 impression that you presented a rather pure form of the Cheney/Wolfowitz paper of 1992 as a description of the real world.

I think that the European instruments of inclusion, exclusion and conditionality Hassner described by Heather Grabbe are quite effective tools for influencing other states. They are also applicable at the global level, as the case of Libya shows. A lot of hypocrisy may be involved, but as Jean de La Bruyère said, “hypocrisy is the hom- age which vice renders to virtue.” Nevertheless I want to concentrate on what John Ikenberry and David Rieff Norms between morality, legality, said about American power and its relation to rules. First, I would like to distin- social change and power guish norms from rules and legitimacy from legality. Norms emerge from the interplay of morality, legality, social change and power. They are contested and they are constantly changing, as Coral Bell’s article “Normative Shift” demon- strates. Ward Thomas, in his book “The Ethics of Destruction,” impressively de- scribes the changing attitudes towards strategic bombing and the assassination of foreign leaders. I do think that David Rieff is wrong in denying that norms influence reality. Norms influence reality by They do so by exerting moral pressure. My first example for that is slavery, which exerting moral pressure … used to be accepted as a norm and as a practice, for example, in Britain centuries ago. Now this norm has changed and while there still is slavery, no government around the world defends it any longer, it can no longer be legitimized. In a simi- lar way, the banning of war as an instrument of national policy in the Briand/ Kellogg-pact in 1928 did not end the use of war as an instrument of national policy. But no state any longer admits conducting a war of aggression, instead all aggres- sors claim to act in self-defense. Finally, the normative assumption that genocide is not an acceptable practice and that heads of states can be held responsible for the violation of individual rights has led to the intervention in Kosovo and has brought Milosevic to the Hague. It has been said that Osama bin Laden and Mullah … and restrict even the Omar were able to escape in Tora Bora because the US forces restricted their at- actions of the powerful tacks to avoid civilian casualties. Thus, while the US Army’s technological means allow attacks of hitherto unknown precision — neither Baghdad nor Belgrade look like Dresden or Hiroshima did in 1945 — , international law restricts its actions. Even the powerful who set the norms are restrained by the laws they have pro- claimed. Thus, reality to a certain extent does gravitate towards the norms. This leads me to John Ikenberry’s remarks about American power and legiti- Even the strongest needs macy. Rousseau famously said: “The strongest is never strong enough to be always legality to hold on to power

63 Bertram | Hassner the master, unless he transforms his strength into right, and obedience into duty.” France’s making an invasion in Iraq dependent on a UN Security Council resolu- tion and thus on the consent of partly tyrannical states was a doubtful strategy. But the present US position of resting legitimacy solely on the American constitu- tion and the American people, denying accountability to anyone else, is no less problematic. Norms must be based to a certain extent on intersubjectivity. They are not objective entities, but neither are they something completely arbitrary depending on the will of the powerful. My advice to the US: be a constitutional, The problem is which kind of dialog can be established between the US and not an absolute monarch of the the rest of the world about rules of the international system. I would submit that international system the US should not try to be an absolute monarch of world politics, but should in- troduce some elements of a constitutional monarchy. There has to be an element of consent, of giving other powers a stake, even if power ultimately rests with the United States. Western societies will not accept a new imperial rule, even if some people in the developing world may ask for it. A dialog about international rules, as Hedley Bull’s English School pointed out, will have to be conducted with powers not in favor of Western values, because history is moving from Europe to America and then perhaps to Asia. We might thus have to negotiate normative compromises. Should the West restrict its own Also, the West and especially the US has to decide whether it should base its sphere of action for moral reasons ? actions on reciprocity, restricting its own sphere of action only as much as others do. We might have to oblige ourselves not to do certain things even to people who would be happy to do them to us. Options like preemptive nuclear war might have to be banned not only on the basis of reciprocity, but for the sake of our own freedom and values. Domestic changes in the West are a Let me end by stressing the importance of domestic evolutions in the Western revolutionary force in the rest of the world world. Coral Bell rightly said that we are not dealing with a clash of religions or civilizations. But domestic changes in the West, for example in the status of women or of the individual, which are spread by globalization, trigger violent reactions from other cultures. Whether we like it or not, our own domestic evolu- tion is a revolutionary force in the rest of the world. It thus precludes us both from being indifferent to what happens in the outside world because these things will come to haunt us.

Voigt While Germany is crossing boundaries by sending troops abroad, the United States The US is damaging its good reputation is currently rediscovering the limitations of what military dominance alone can

Hassner | Voigt 64 achieve. After drawing its power from hard and soft power alike for decades, it has relied solely on military dominance during the past years. This has weakened the attractiveness of the American political model, its values and culture throughout the world. US radio and television stations broadcasting in Arabic will not solve this problem, which lies in the area of policy, not communication. The US has failed to acknowledge the benefits of adapting the international The US could gain from a reformed norm and rule system and international institutions to the challenges of today. system of rules as well Doing so would allow the US to preserve international legitimacy while tackling the new threats of terrorism. I disagree with David Rieff that international rules and institutions cannot be reformed effectively. On the contrary, the UN resolu- tions on Afghanistan created a new type of international law in stating an internal policy like harboring terrorists can legitimate an attack on a state. Similarly, invok- ing NATO’s Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks was an evolution of the international system — which the US did not take up. I understand that the US acts outside the boundaries of international law The US ignores international when, in cases of imminent threats, it cannot wait for the law to evolve. But the law without necessity present administration has followed a tendency of replacing the international system by American power. In Germany, we are fully aware that beside planet Venus, as the world of rule-based order, there is planet Mars, the world of fighting against those who do not play by the rules. Verrechtlichung, which means the in- creasing dominance of international law, exists at the same time as Vermachtung, the dominance of power. But the US is denying the very existence of international law outside of Europe, thereby saying that Mars, and only Mars, is here to stay forever. The loss of American prestige caused by its emphasis on military power will The US needs partners to establish be felt especially when trying to introduce democracy after regime changes. To democracy after regime changes build democracy in other regions of the world, the US, as every power, needs the support at least of its democratic partners. This will be impossible to achieve without a broad consensus on the evolution of international law and norms.

Although internationally agreed rules do not have a very good reputation in the Hesse United States, I will argue for more rules even more boldly than Karsten Voigt. To We need more, not less rules address the problems of international security, we have to think about rules not only for the use of military power, but also for governing globalization, global trade and development. As to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the first The Non-Proliferation Treaty step must be to amend the Non Proliferation Treaty, which at this point is not must be extended …

65 Voigt | Hesse We need “rules to break the rules.”

Hesse

working well enough. Improving the treaty would be more useful than incessantly discussing intervention against particular countries. … and we have to establish The most pressing task, though, is to define rules for the use of force, rules “rules to break the rules” for intervention. As the use of force is practically forbidden by international law, except, of course, in self defense, we need to take a close look at our international standards and check if they are up to the challenges of today’s world. Driven by the best intentions, experts from Canada, Australia, Algeria and elsewhere have even called for “rules to break the rules” when necessary. For obvious reasons: Just discarding the existing rules, the way the U.S. did in Iraq, cannot be an option on which to build broad alliances for a more responsible world. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty headed by Gareth Evans has presented a booklet on where protection against ethnic cleansing, massive human rights violations and genocide requires intervention. Apparently, it will be close to impossible to adopt these kinds of rules as international law at the level of the United Nations in the near future. As David Rieff said, governments like Brazil would outrightly oppose ever legalizing the use of force. Nevertheless, as even Brazil might agree that force was necessary in the case of Rwanda, maybe in the long run the UN Charter could be amended to authorize the use of force to prevent large-scale loss of human life. In the meantime, this very refined set of definitions should be used as a binding “code of conduct” by anyone, NATO, EU or other, who chooses humanitarian intervention to protect human lives and dignity. What exactly is terrorism ? What exactly To develop new rules for intervention, I think what we need first is more are weapons of mass destruction ? conceptual precision. International consensus on how to use force against asym- metric threats will never emerge without exact definitions. What exactly is ter- rorism, what is a weapon of mass destruction ? International legitimacy, which is a precondition to legality, will not be achieved without internationally acceptable definitions.

Bertram Will improving and extending the system of international rules do any good as long as the United States refuses to abide by the rules ? You said yourself that rules have a bad reputation in the US.

Hesse To make progress, you have to go beyond just opposing what somebody else is Many American decision-makers are doing. So, if Europe is not happy about the Americans refusing to play by the rules, interested in cooperating with Europe we have to offer them an alternative and then let them buy into that. It may look hard now, but it is not impossible. There are many American partners and friends,

Bertram | Hesse 66 I cannot help wondering if you Europeans would still talk this way if you had a big army.

Krasner

also within the current administration, that are eager to develop our partnership. So, let’s go and be more self-confident in suggesting what we can do together. As one of my dear American friends has it: “Stop ordering from the childrens’ menu !”

Stephen Krasner, would you buy into that ? Bertram

Americans and Europeans do have a fundamentally different perspective on rules Krasner and laws. Europeans see rules as embodiments of normative aspirations that can Americans agree upon rules in order ultimately be reflected in reality. This has worked surprisingly well in Europe, to achieve material goals … where the European Union has been an extraordinary success, more than any political leader could reasonably have predicted in the early 1950s. Americans, by contrast, have generally regarded rules as agreements designed to achieve certain goals most of which have been material. To them, norms are based on interests, not on normative aspirations. The WTO, for example, was very cleverly crafted to overcome domestic barri- … as for instance the WTO system … ers against free trade. The WTO like the GATT is based on reciprocity. Moreover, the WTO introduced mandatory dispute settlement procedures. Neither the United States, nor any other advanced country can introduce trade barriers with- out having specific export industries targeted in retaliation. No longer does inter- national protectionism provide specific benefits and impose diffuse costs on the whole population. Under the WTO, a state that engages in protection may secure benefits for specific industries but will also incur costs for specific export sectors. This makes protection less attractive than it has been in the past. For American presidents, who have generally favored openness, the WTO provides a set of rules that further a specific material objective. Obviously, Europeans also welcomed this approach to rule making in the case of trade. Such a rationale for rules based on interests is easy to understand. The rules … but Europeans seek rules to impose are self-enforcing because it is in the interests of actors to honor them. European a direct constraint on politicians discussions of rules and norms as if they imposed a direct constraint on the be- havior of political leaders leaves me confused. I cannot help wondering if you Europeans would still talk this way if you had a big army. It strikes me as utterly unrealistic to think that we can invent rules of international law, somehow get them into the politicians’ heads and wait for them to follow the prescriptions. Do you believe that if you let the rulers of the world read Kant, they will start imple- menting the categorical imperative ?

67 Hesse | Bertram | Krasner International law has an indirect impact: Nevertheless, I do think that international law can work in a powerful way. It it influences the electorates’ opinion has an indirect impact, because it influences domestic discourses, especially in Europe. The BBC’s comment on Prime Minister Blair’s speech yesterday focused on the question of whether American or British actions were legitimate under international law. This question matters for democratic electorates and thus mat- ters for the government. New models to improve governance International norms used to shape the opinion of domestic publics can also in badly governed states improve governance in badly governed states in a way that transgresses the tradi- tional borders of sovereignty. A golden opportunity for that presented itself when Exxon-Mobil considered developing an oil field in Chad in the mid-1990s. As the company feared accusations of violating human rights and harming the environ- ment, it involved the World Bank as a partner in the project. As a condition for a loan the Bank asked the Chadian government to pass a law that would commit about 40 % of the oil money for social welfare purposes. In initial planning there were proposals for an oversight committee including international as well as do- mestic representatives. This committee would not only have forced the Chadian government to abide by the rules, it would also have established norms of good governance for the Chadian population to refer to. Good governance in Chad Reality came out differently, though. The African executive directors of the World Bank objected (so I have been told verbally by several people, although I have no written evidence). As a result of these objections, it was agreed that the oversight group would be drawn entirely from Chad, although with civil society representatives. If the Europeans and the Americans had backed the World Bank’s initial proposal, they could have exerted real pressure on the Chadian government by establishing a set of norms about good governance for the population of Chad. I think that this model of shared sovereignty could have a great future — if the US and Europe decide to pool their resources to promote it.

Economy China is a striking counterexample for David Rieff’s notion that norms of the in- In China normative pressure ternational community do not influence reality. The 1992 Rio conference was led to the creation of NGOs instrumental in bringing about the development of Chinese NGOs. Because China was embarrassed to have no such organizations at the conference, the first envi- ronmental NGO was founded in 1994. Similarly, international pressure made China include domestic NGOs in addressing the AIDS problem. Otherwise, there would have been no funding from the international community. Norms set up by

Krasner | Economy 68 The European nation-states had power and very strong armies, and the result could be seen in the ruins of European cities after World War II.

Schaefer

the international community gave the existing domestic forces enough support to make remarkable progress. Steve Krasner mentioned that large projects of multinational corporations Multinational corporations could provide the opportunity to promote development and good governance at promote good governance the same time. Shell has done exactly that in its efforts to try to become involved in the West-East pipeline in China. It took great care to develop a board made up of international and domestic NGOs, and to think about how to redistribute the profits from the pipeline justly in order to give the local population a fair share of the profits.

Our discussion is moving to the heart of the current debate. I would like to reject Schaefer Stephen Krasner’s insinuation that only the weak need rules as well as Reinhard Do only the weak need rules ? Hesse’s case for more rules. What we need instead are mechanisms to create le- gitimacy and to allow us to act within the existing framework of rules. Stephen Krasner suggested that if the Europeans had military power, they The ruins of World War II are would and should stop thinking about laws. But the 20th century has proven the the result of power without rules idea fundamentally wrong that power does not need rules. The European nation states had power and very strong armies, and the result could be seen in the ruins of European cities after World War II. Reinhard Hesse, by contrast, called for new laws. But even though some new We do not need new rules but laws might be needed to deal with new challenges, shortage of laws is not our strategies for acting legitimately problem. Our problem is to find a legitimate course of action within the formal within our system of rules framework of international law, adapting our actions to the current challenges without resorting to unrestricted use of power. In referring to legitimacy, John Ikenberry has pointed to the central question Legitimacy as the key to acting successfully of international order. Let me give you some examples. First, the pre-emptive use within the international system of force, as laid down in the US National Security Strategy, is not a new idea. The United Nations Charter, Chapter 7, Article 39 allows exactly for that. That the Security Council has not decided to use force against an imminent threat from Iraq is not due to a lack of legal provisions. It is due to a lack of political will to use the UN mechanism on the part of the countries involved. The United States prob- ably could have made a case acceptable to all, but it did not do all it could to create legitimacy by consensus. In Kosovo legitimacy came about because a majority of countries accepted that a massive violation of human rights had to and, according to international law, could be stopped. We have to develop mechanisms to establish a broad consensus

69 Economy | Schaefer below the level of formal decision-making in the UN Security Council. This would allow circumventing the obstacle of veto, while creating legitimacy. The right of self-defense is always applicable at the end of the day, but building a body of legitimacy on a broad consensus including the regions concerned is by far preferable. The European and the American The question of how to operate within legal frameworks is also decisive in the approach to Iran case of Iran, which could turn out to be as divisive as Iraq for Europe and the US. The transatlantic partners share an identical analysis of the strategic threat posed by Iran’s nuclear military potential. But their approaches to addressing the prob- lem differ fundamentally. The American government believes that using the ham- mer and bringing the issue of Iran before the Security Council will solve the problem. But I predict that the US will end up without a decision in the Security Council, while Iran will drop out of the non-proliferation treaty, leaving us with- out any control mechanisms at all. The European approach, by contrast, tries to engage Iran. It establishes a number of preconditions and promises engagement in case Iran implements them. This course may entail risks in the second or third phase, but not at this point. I think that it is, even though difficult and lengthy, much more promising than consciously driving a country against the wall without any prospect of posi- tive results. The European approach allows us to use the legal framework to reach a strategic objective.

Bertram It might be useful to establish or keep legal frameworks even if they are not used Legal frameworks often prove useful at the time, because the time may come when you want to use them. A good ex- after having been ignored for a while ample for that is how the US is now trying to share the responsibility for Iraq with the United Nations.

Matussek David Rieff was wrong to say that norms do not make reality follow. Rules and Norms do influence reality norms which are equally valid for the powerful and for the weak, do create because they create legitimacy legitimacy. As even the most powerful nation, the US, cannot do everything alone, it needs legitimacy in order to find partners. Governments in democratic societies also need legitimacy to make the case to the public, as the discussion in Britain over Tony Blair’s role in the Iraq war shows. Thus, accepted rules and norms are an important means of influencing reality. As far as the UN Security Council is concerned, I would like to point out that often problems create their own fora in which to be dealt with. We have, for ex-

Schaefer | Bertram | Matussek 70 ample, the G 7, G 8 and the Middle East Quartet etc., each dealing with a different set of issues. It would be preferable to establish the Security Council firmly as the highest seat of legitimacy. But as long as it is not representative, this will not be possible.

When speaking about rules in international politics, David Rieff and Heather Risse Grabbe presented two different worlds. Both worlds do exist, because they repre- Two trends in international politics … sent two contradicting trends taking place at the same time. On the one hand, we live in the most legalized international system ever. … legalization versus decreasing compliance The number of international treaties is rising constantly, as well as the number of states subscribing to these treaties. Modern statehood and being a good international citizen are to some extent defined as ratifying treaties in the area of human rights and the environment. We thus do not have a problem of rules or rule recognition. But we do have the problem of decreasing rule compliance, and this is where David Rieff’s world comes in. I am not sure, though, whether we really have good data on compliance. The increase of treaty partners and the decrease in compliance might just balance each other out. Also, the increasing number of recorded rule violations may be due to better reporting. Christoph Bertram and Heather Grabbe pointed to another serious problem of the international rule system. We have to adapt the system, which is still based on the assumption that states are the main actors, to the fact that states cover less and less of the space where violence is happening. We Europeans have to recog- nize that the privatization of violence is a serious challenge to international law. We should not pretend, though, that the only non-state actors we have to deal with are terrorist networks. Multi-national corporations and NGOs also transgress the borders of the nation-state.

Even though non-state actors play an increasingly important role in international Bertram politics, states can still legislate the framework. This is something we have to keep Role of nation-states for establishing in mind. rules in a globalized world

I can think of five possible institutions of global order: the United Nations, NATO, Nikonov the United States, coalitions of the willing, and the G 8. All of these institutions Possible institutions of global order are … have their shortcomings, but they also have their specific problem-solving poten- tial. I would like to present a Russian perspective on these issues.

71 Matussek | Risse | Bertram | Nikonov NATO as a global rule-setter is problematic from our point of view — simply because we do not belong to it.

Nikonov

… the UN — in need of reform The Russian government is prepared to discuss a UN Security Council reform, the expansion of the Council. Introducing new members may not increase the Security Council’s effectiveness, but definitely its representative- ness. The UN system was invented by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt in 1945 and should thus not be considered as a sacred cow. We should also keep in mind that it has never been very efficient. The Soviet Union and the United States violated international law regularly during the Cold War. The only time they used force in accordance with international law was during the Korean War, which was possible solely because Russia was absent at the decisive vote in the Security Council. Therefore, we should be open to changing the UN Charter. Amendments to allow for humanitarian intervention and the pre- emptive use of force, also against non-state actors, would be something Russia could agree to. … NATO — looking for its role … NATO as a global rule-setter is more problematic from our point of view, not only because its old mission has become obsolete, but simply because we do not belong to it. It is hard to like a military alliance which you will never be part of, not only for Russia but also for many other countries. Nevertheless, NATO is here to stay. The role it is starting to play in Afghanistan is probably indicative of what it will choose as its future mission. … the US — not willing to take responsibility An even more problematic global government would be the United States. The for the rest of humankind … US claims freedom of action to defend its national security. What it does not do, though, is take responsibility for the rest of humankind. Coalitions of the willing will no doubt be an important instrument for solving international problems. Russia will probably participate in several of these coali- tions. Nevertheless, this model of international order suffers from a lack of struc- ture. Moreover, the unwilling will never regard the activities of the willing as le- gitimate. … the G 8 — lack of legitimacy Lastly, the G 8 might evolve into a serious international institution, especially if it expands to G 9 or G 11 and is institutionalized. I am quite sure this will happen. Those left out, though, will regard it as an oligarchy, not as a legitimate insti- tution. The number and significance of To my mind, in the near future a combination of these institutions will be nation-states is not decreasing used for governing international relations. This does not mean, though, that na- tion states will no longer play an important role. I dare to contradict Christoph Bertram’s observation that states and national governments control less and less space and loose their relevance. European nations might be giving up sovereignty

Nikonov 72 to supranational structures, and failed states may create regions where national governments no longer exert control. But I, for example, do represent a nation-state which emerged only in 1991, at the same time as 14 other countries, replacing the former Soviet Union. Those are not yet prepared to give up their sovereignty. Moreover, I am sure that during the 21st century the creation of nation-states will continue and accelerate outside of Europe. In 1945, there were only about 50 nation-states to become members of the UN. As of now, the United Nations has 190 member states, and there are 60 more countries outside the UN system. In 30 years, there will be 300 or 400 nation-states — a very complex international system which will require all available efficient institutions of global governance.

I want to warn against seeing the United States’ attitude toward a rule-based in- Kupchan ternational order as a strict dichotomy. John Hirsch described the choice as being The US will not simply return to the one between a liberal order and an imperial hegemony, suggesting that the US virtuous path of multilateralism only after 9/11 decided against following the path of multilateralism. According to him, if we could go back to that intersection and follow our previous path of championing international law, we would recover our common ground with Europe. But already under Clinton, the divergences not only between the US and the Europe and the US have been Global South, but also across the Atlantic increased. This is partly because Europe drifting apart for a long time matured and no longer always followed its American protector, since it needed it less. But also, although Clinton certainly had better style than Bush, he seriously disagreed with the Europeans over Kyoto, the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and many other issues. There was more trouble beneath the surface than our discussion indicates. Second, the erosion of liberal internationalism in the US is not just about Bush Demographic changes in the US erode the and Wolfowitz, but reflects deeper secular changes in American domestic politics. political basis of liberal internationalism While the population of the North-East declines and the liberal establishment erodes, the power of the agrarian South and the mountainous West with their populist attitudes keeps growing. This new structural Republican majority has a much harder conception of sovereignty than the traditionally Democratic East- Coast liberals. Getting the US back to a liberal brand of internationalism more conducive to rules-based order thus faces serious obstacles in terms of domestic politics.

73 Nikonov | Kupchan Today, more than half of humanity is suffering under conditions that cannot be solved militarily, and therefore never appear on the Council’s agenda.

von Weizsäcker

von Weizsäcker I would like to suggest that we speak more specifically about possible reforms to Let us discuss concrete reforms the international system of rules and institutions. I think the usual proposals on instead of abstract notions the table for reforming the UN Security Council do not go far enough and do not solve the underlying problems. Adding new, permanent members would only exacerbate the Council’s present structural difficulties. We should think about more basic changes. How to enable the UN When it was founded, the UN was designed to prevent World War III. Its sole to solve today’s problems ? institution with clout, the Security Council, is therefore restricted to addressing security and military issues. Today, however, more than half of humanity is suf- fering under conditions that cannot be solved militarily, and therefore never ap- pear on the Council’s agenda. Incorporating the IMF, the WTO, Could the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, or the and the World Bank in the UN structures World Bank not be incorporated into a more direct, obligatory relationship with the to fight poverty efficiently ? UN ? Given the right concept, why should they not be integrated into the UN as tightly as, say, the Security Council is ? These kinds of structural reforms would help many more people than recalibrating security policy institutions. Of course, they would be difficult to push through. Yet having the WTO, IMF, and World Bank merely provide occasional reports to United Nations institutions is clearly insufficient. Natu- rally it would still be important and legitimate to discuss the definition of self-de- fense in Article 51 of the UN Charter and, if needed, to adjust to new threats.

Neville-Jones I doubt whether the issues of security and American power we discuss will still The US cannot afford to go it seem that crucial in a year’s time. Even if the American voters re-elect George W. alone in the long run Bush, the American taxpayers will probably object to funding an American em- pire. In contrast to previous colonial peoples, the Americans are not really very interested in the “white man’s burden” as far as taxation is concerned. Therefore the US shies away from full governance responsibility in occupied countries. As it will not govern all on its own the countries whose regimes it brought down, oth- ers will have to help. However, as King George III learned and as King George W. will have to learn, there is no taxation without representation. Therefore, the Americans will have to be cooperative, return to consultations with their partners and introduce more multilateral aspects in their foreign policy. As American normalcy returns, the prospects of an American empire will wither away naturally. We do not yet understand the Things will not be the same as they were previously, though, because the nature of the terrorist threat world has changed. Today, threat-based analyses govern our policies as they last

von Weizsäcker | Neville-Jones 74 In contrast to previous colonial peoples, the Americans are not really very interested in the “white man’s burden” as far as taxation is concerned.

Neville-Jones

did at the beginning of the Cold War, when the conflict had not yet become ritu- alized. For the first time in decades, we fear a threat whose nature we are not sure we understand. The situation today is as uncertain as during the 1950s and 60s, and much more complex. Another change in international politics is that humanitarian and preemptive Humanitarian and preemptive intervention intervention will remain legitimate instruments of foreign policy. A central ele- will remain instruments of foreign policy ment of the Bush Doctrine will thus be preserved. I think that there will be two main justifications for intervention. Let me illustrate that with two recent examples. Humanitarian intervention in Kosovo appealed to the Europeans, and to the political left. Such intervention on hu- manitarian grounds will remain an option of international politics. Afghanistan, by contrast, is an example of extended self-defense. This inter- vention commanded a very broad consensus. While it had appropriate UN back- ing, its legitimacy derived from the shared perception that it was a necessary and proportionate response to Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks. It was widely accepted to invade the space called Afghanistan, which was actually a failed state, to deal with the terrorist threat. The United States’ detainee camp for alleged Al Qaeda fighters in Guantanamo Bay shows, however, how you can trip yourself up by acting in the name of freedom and then betraying your own values. Iraq, by contrast, will prove the exception rather than being exemplary for future American interventions. It happened under particular circumstances which are not likely to be replicated in the foreseeable future. Most interventions will not take the size of those in Afghanistan, Kosovo or Iraq. Intervention will go all the way from taking over a whole country through to small operations with special forces down to using an unmanned vehicle to destroy a car carrying terrorists. All these actions certainly must be legitimized, but surely they will not all be based on resolutions of the UN Security Council. The nature of the smaller operations, which will mostly be conducted by the US, does not allow for that. We thus need not form a new rule base, but must develop a set of conventions We need a set of legitimate about when such interventions are acceptable. We need a set of value-based, political strategies though not necessarily rule-based, policies, which command support. An effective development of international law will not be helped by formulat- ing laws in the abstract. Evolution will mostly happen by convention and practice. Afghanistan and Kosovo started a process of developing the right of intervention for humanitarian or security reasons. As international law is fed by concepts of

75 Neville-Jones what is legitimate and proportionate action, law will develop to support that le- gitimacy. It keeps on coming back to the definition that what reasonable people think is reasonable. We thus need a broad consultation of international public opinion, the core of which must be the Western powers and the Security Council members. Support weak states to address Two sets of policies should complement or prevent intervention. First, devel- the roots of terrorism oping economically and politically weak states to limit the appeal of terrorism. Second, where this has failed, rebuild authorities in these states and start a proc- Link economic development ess of economic development. Economic development has been a major goal of with good governance the international community for a long time, but we have to put much more emphasis on good governance. We must consistently apply the insights gained during the last 20 years and find an international consensus about what good governance is. Taking the lead in that would be an appropriate task for the US. The democratization of the Middle East and even the countries beyond might thus gain new momentum.

Chan To my mind, the question is who makes which rules, for whom and for what Who makes the rules ? Those victorious purpose ? International rules are mainly made by those victorious in wartimes to in wartimes and the major powers control the defeated. During peace, rules are mainly made by the major powers, namely Europe and the USA. The Global South rarely plays a role. Who has to comply with them ? On the other hand, to take up Thomas Risse’s allusion to rule compliance, who The defeated and the poor are the countries that have to comply with international norms ? The poor coun- tries in the South must comply to avoid being sanctioned through trade or other means. But how to make rich countries comply ? This seems to me a central issue. I do not know what kind of mechanism could work — perhaps the UN system ? Finding answers to that question would be a decisive step on the way to more justice in the international system.

Bertram The current quarrels about nuclear proliferation exemplify this problem. Who decides which country is supposed to possess nuclear weapons ? Should only rich countries have them, or only democratic countries ? Whence derives the authority for making rules, if not from a comprehensive consensus ?

Leicht Gerald Chan gave a pretty bleak picture about who is making the rules. As far as the development of international human rights and humanitarian law is concerned, I see things more positively. Not the big and the powerful, but the

Neville-Jones | Chan | Bertram | Leicht 76 Without NGO campaigns, there would not be a single human rights treaty today.

Risse

small and mid-sized countries are on the forefront in this area. The landmines NGOs and small countries play treaty was pushed through by the victims, countries that are suffering from a big role for the development of landmines, international and nations NGOs. Similarly, the International Criminal international humanitarian law Court was brought about by a remarkable coalition of small and mid-sized countries and NGOs, thus contributing to two important recent achievements of international law.

Lotte Leicht talked about the increasing importance of smaller countries in setting Alnajjar up rules. Actually, already the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was put together mainly by Lebanon, Cuba, Chile and Panama, which did not range in the Super Power spectrum in 1945 any more than they do today. Nowadays, NGOs are playing a central role in promoting international law. They were, for example, much more important for setting up the International Criminal Court than nation states.

I would even go further: without NGO campaigns, there would not be a single Risse human rights treaty today, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

I have been struck by an undercurrent of this discussion, which is that Europeans Lindberg have little influence on the United States. I think that is plainly wrong. There is a The US and Europe are working high degree of government to government cooperation across a whole range of together closely in many areas … policy matters which, of course, are not in the headlines. European governments, for example, cooperate successfully with the US in pursuit of Al Qaeda and other security threats. The assistance or resistance of Europe has very serious impacts on what the … and Europe does have US can do. Steel tariffs are a good example of how the EU reacts to pressure from a big influence on the US the US by pushing back — and the United States accommodates itself to that. Or, if you allow me to get into alternate history scenarios: I wonder what would have happened in Kosovo if the intervention had been a unilateral American exercise. Without European support and the framing of NATO, would the US have stayed the course when facing much stiffer resistance than anticipated ? In Iraq, the US acknowledged that it was not able to obtain as much legitimacy as it could have. I am aware that this is a contentious issue, but I am sure that insights like that do have an effect. Also, when the US refused to become a member of the ICC, it did not make a case in principle against an International Criminal Court. It raised specific concerns. If the European and American positions can be reconciled, the

77 Leicht | Alnajjar | Risse | Lindberg Whether the United States is a hegemon or a unipolar power or a hyperpower: it is lonely and it likes friends.

Lindberg

result might be an ICC that is worth having, because it includes the United States. The US is seeking agreement — Richard von Weizsäcker’s intervention notwithstanding, this discussion has more than you might think been a meta-analysis of rules, a search for a rule for making rules. I think that a practical norm is of central importance here, the norm to seek agreement. The United States is more in favor of this norm than you might think. When it comes to specific rules, you will find the US open to suggestions. In many areas, most of them related to the new terrorist challenge, the American government is grap- pling and very willing to listen to constructive ideas. Rather than rehearsing a set of complaints about the United States, suggestions for improving the procedures and rules might be more useful and will probably meet more openness than is sometimes supposed. To conclude, whether the United States is a hegemon or a unipolar power or a hyperpower: it is lonely and it likes friends.

Glees I think that it is very important to recall that the Iraq conflict began as a problem of rules and the British and American approach to the fact that the Iraqis refused to stick by the rules. Our Prime Minister made it clear in his important speech yesterday that the problem is about rules. As we are following his suggestion to discuss rules, I think we all agree that rules and lawfulness lie at the heart of try- ing to make terror and rogue states less of a threat than they are today. What to do when the international The big problem is, though, what to do when you can not achieve a consensus community’s consensus is to do nothing ? on what to do. It is easy for our Round Table to stress the importance of an inter- national or transatlantic consensus. But what if there is a consensus to do noth- ing ? Tony Blair and George W. Bush perceived exactly that amongst many Euro- pean Union states. There will always be circumstances in which big powerful states have to accept the responsibilities that go with power. Especially the Western governments Nevertheless, lawfulness and sticking to rules also applies to our own govern- must stick to their own rules ment and, in particular, to the agencies working for our security. We had a debate in Great Britain recently about whether it was acceptable that the government at the behest of the CIA spied on our European partners. If this happened, and I believe that it did, it was a dangerous thing to do and reminds us that what our intelligence services do — and what they believe they find out can often be not what it seems. A failure on the part of the West to stick to the details in the rules of humanitarianism and human rights, as the Guantanamo Bay detentions illus- trate, clearly undermines the general proposition which the West wants to up-

Lindberg | Glees 78 hold, namely that civic lawfulness and international lawfulness go hand in hand. We cannot seek to impose a law-based international order on states which are currently regarded as “rogue” if we do not adhere strictly to the laws of our own making, particularly in the field of human rights. Getting the Americans on board to accept this as the other side of the interventionist coin, would, though, be a far better way to foster lawfulness and the central importance of human rights than Bush-bashing.

I do not think that the international community’s consensus on Iraq was to do Wiesbrock nothing. An overwhelming majority of states wanted to continue with the inspec- Inspections were a viable tion regime. This majority had an opinion and presented a viable alternative on alternative to war in Iraq how to tackle the problem.

As a sort of legal fundamentalist, I agree that rules and international law are Leicht important. Nevertheless, we should talk more about enforcement mechanisms than about changing the rules, because the existing rules are not that bad. They even allow for non-state actors to be prosecuted for violating international humanitarian law. As to human rights violations that have not yet mounted to a security threat, As to the protection of human rights, I see serious institutional short-comings. We should consider establishing a there are institutional shortcomings Permanent UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, where ambassadors dis- cuss human rights violations and reports on a weekly basis. Such a permanent body would serve as an important “early warning” mechanism for the Security Council and it would indeed be more promising and effective than the repetitive effort in the current UN Human Rights commission session once a year, bringing about the same battles, the same resolutions and in the end, closing the shop to meet again next year. These problems must be tackled to bring about a real UN reform. I was provoked during the first session by the suggestion that Iraq was a Those calling the war in Iraq a humanitarian humanitarian intervention. My own organization, Human Rights Watch, and intervention are wrong, because … other humanitarian organizations have tried to define a threshold for humani- tarian interventions to prevent humanitarian law from being hijacked for other purposes. To begin with, we believe that the basic request, humanitarian intervention … it did not fulfil the basic conditions as, for without the consent of the country concerned, is only justified in the face of ongo- example, preventing imminent genocide ing or imminent genocide or comparable loss of life. If this threshold is met, at

79 Glees | Wiesbrock | Leicht I profoundly disagree with the claim that the intervention in Iraq was a humanitarian intervention.

Leicht

least four additional conditions must be fulfilled for the use of force to be charac- terized as humanitarian. First, military action must be the last option after all other means are exhausted to halt or prevent slaughter. Second, the intervention must be guided primarily by a humanitarian purpose. Third, every effort must be made to ensure that the means used to intervene themselves do respect interna- tional humanitarian law. I refuse to subscribe to the view expressed by some, that certain abuses are legitimate if they stop other abuses. Fourth, it must be reason- ably likely that the military action will do more good than harm. To add a proce- dural requirement, Security Council blessings should be there at least, or some kind of blessing by other legitimate international gatherings of countries. If you apply those criteria to the Iraq intervention, you will come to under- stand why I profoundly disagree with the claim that it was a humanitarian inter- vention.

Wiesbrock I would like to challenge David Rieff’s remarks on three points. First, if it is true Rules and norms can change reality … that norms do not shape reality but can at best reflect reality, then why do we need norms at all ? … and you need norms to govern Second, you have asked whether it is realistic to talk about rules when the conflicts with non-state actors, too main risks arise from non-state actors. In my opinion, the question should not be if there is a need for rules but rather what kind of rules are needed. There are international rules — supranational rules — that directly address citizens. For ex- ample, parts of humanitarian law directly address non-state actors. The ICC was built as an organ to implement this concept. A reform of the UN Security Council Third, I believe strongly that Security Council reform would be worthwhile is necessary and would be worthwhile because the Council in its current form lacks legitimacy, yet we urgently need a legitimate body. In Iraq, for example, insurgents refuse to talk to the occupying power but will speak to the UN envoy Brahimi. In a more abstract way, if hu- manitarian interventions take away sovereignty at the national level, this needs to be complemented by sovereignty at the international level. Therefore, we need a supranational body to which sovereignty can be transferred. Improve cooperation among Finally, I would like to touch briefly on a question Richard von Weizsäcker has the various UN organs raised. Is there a need for more comprehensive UN reform ? Should economic and environmental problems, diseases and overpopulation still be dealt with in the UN General Assembly or in ECOSOC ? I see a tendency to shift competences from these institutions toward the Security Council, but I do not regard this as a positive development. The international community does not accept rules imposed by a

Leicht | Wiesbrock 80 If humanitarian interventions take away sovereignty at the national level, this needs to be complemented by sovereignty at the international level.

Wiesbrock

body composed of 15, or maybe in the future, 25 states. We should consider other methods of creating international law on economic and environmental prob- lems. I propose first to optimize the cooperation among various UN organs, to let the President of the General Assembly and the President of ECOSOC talk in the Security Council and vice versa. This would create a linkage among the organs while keeping the topics in the appropriate organs.

This kind of discussion is just what I wanted to stimulate. What to do about the fact von Weizsäcker that the UN’s only powerful institution does not address questions of economic Concrete proposals for adapting justice and the fight against poverty ? How to give these major problems an appro- the UN’s structure priate forum in the international system ? I did not intend to offer a perfect or de- tailed solution, but to encourage concrete proposals for new rules and institutions.

When defining abstract rules for humanitarian or pre-emptive interventions, we Bohlen risk losing touch with reality. Legitimacy is a notion that can serve as an interface Legitimacy through between policymaking and rulemaking. International law and rules tend to follow comprehensive consensus legitimate actions, not to precede them. Therefore I agree with Pauline Neville- Jones that gaining legitimacy by associating as many powers as possible must be the first step. The UN becomes active and effective as soon as the major powers agree. The “Neville-Jones rule” or “what reasonable people find reasonable is le- gitimate” is a very convincing definition in this respect. If the international com- munity follows this guideline, rules will fall into place afterwards. Once set up, though, norms can matter a great deal even if they cannot always be effectively enforced. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is an important example. Even though several countries have violated it and others have refused to sign up, it has manifested the idea of a world where countries do not try to acquire nuclear weapons. This was a decisive step, although the treaty’s severe practical shortcom- ings must be alleviated. John Ikenberry rightly pointed out that our discussion is really about US There is a widening gap between the US power. During the run up to the Iraq war, we saw two different approaches by two and Europe — for structural reasons major European powers. While the UK went along with the US, France and others opposed it. Neither of them was successful in influencing what America did. I think that with the end of the Cold War, not only the constraint of Soviet power but also the influence of Europe on the United States vanished. While I agree with Tod Lindberg that Europe still matters as a partner, Europe has ceased to be a

81 Wiesbrock | von Weizsäcker | Bohlen strategic preoccupation for the US and thus lost a lot of influence. The joint inter- vention in Kosovo, when interestingly Europe urged the US to act, merely masked this fundamental trend. The US frequently resorted On the other hand, we must acknowledge that since 1945 the US frequently to a unilateral use of force resorted to a unilateral use of force without causing comparable outrage. Grenada, Panama, or even Vietnam were not as important to Europe as Iraq is; therefore the US was more or less free to act on its own. Pre-emption is not preventive war … To clarify two important notions — as Christoph Bertram rightly reminded us — I would like to note that the US doctrine of pre-emption is in fact a doctrine of preventive war. International law allows for pre-emption in the face of an im- minent threat, but the Bush Doctrine promotes preventive war against a sus- pected hostile intention. … and biological weapons are something Secondly, we have to clarify the term weapons of mass destruction. There is a different than atomic bombs world of difference between chemical or biological weapons and nuclear weapons. This would have been very important in the debate about whether Iraq was able to deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes. I doubt that the issue would have been this contested and influential, had leaders been obliged to specify that they were talking about chemical, not nuclear weapons.

Hirsch Notwithstanding the very understandable focus on Iraq, it might be useful to talk The UN has achieved a lot, for example … about the UN as the international system’s most important institution. I have spent the last five years at the International Peace Academy, an independent or- ganization supporting the Secretary-General and the Security Council. From my perspective, the UN started important reforms and has already achieved a lot dur- ing this time. … with the Landmines First, as Lotte Leicht mentioned, the Landmines Convention is a major success Convention and the ICC … of the UN. Second, the recently established International Criminal Court (ICC) will send an important message with its first case, prosecuting rebel forces responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Ituri province of the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo. Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are important steps toward establishing a culture of accountability. They demonstrate very clearly that the days of impunity for people who murder their own populations are over. … in conflict management and transitional Third, the UN has been running transitional administrations in Kosovo and administrations in crisis regions … East Timor — who else would or could have done that ? The role which the distin-

Bohlen | Hirsch 82 guished Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi played as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and as Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and now plays in Iraq shows the relevance of the UN in this area in a very concrete way. Fourth, Richard von Weizsäcker’s proposal about integrating the World Bank … and in its efforts to connect the World and the IMF into the UN system and putting more emphasis on poverty reduction Bank and the IMF to the UN system certainly makes sense. Secretary-General Kofi Annan undertook a big effort with James Wolffensohn of the World Bank and with IMF Managing Director Horst Köhler to develop closer connections. Even though this has proven very difficult, the UN is not oblivious to the problem. Also, the UN itself is trying to build closer linkages between its social/economic and political/security departments. The fo- cus of the UN’s work is to a significant extent shifting into post-conflict recon- struction these days. IPA’s program on “The Security-Development Nexus” aims at sustaining peace in countries emerging from protracted conflict. Once UN peace- keeping forces have left, there needs to be a strong focus on economic reconstruc- tion, job creation and related areas. The Security Council is and will remain the main forum for international se- Strengthening the Security Council curity policy. Certainly, there has been forum shopping, when for example the G 8 brokered the UN resolution on Kosovo. But this has not vitiated the Council’s centrality. Reforms should aim not at enlarging the Council per se (as this is a matter of considerable debate) but at enhancing its transparency and strengthen- ing its consultative procedures. A lot has already been done about this. All these countries critical of the Security Council‘s current composition and procedures nevertheless run for election on it. The Council can thus not be that useless, or illegitimate. Finally, the report on “The Responsibility to Protect” by Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun mentioned by Reinhard Hesse gives proof of the UN’s activ- ity in systematizing international norms. The report develops criteria not so much for legitimizing military intervention but for putting the responsibility on states and their leaders to protect their citizens. This important initiative follows on the debate which UN Secretary-General Annan opened up on Rwanda and Kosovo. I think the panorama I just sketched shows a broad array of important contribu- tions of the United Nations to virtually all aspects of the international system.

In our discussion about a New World Order, the Middle East, which is my research Hamzawy focus, is of great significance. When applying to the region what we said about The “New World Order” in the Middle East

83 Hirsch | Hamzawy In today’s unipolar world, the Gulliver US certainly does not have any practical interest in being bound by rules.

Kornelius

norms and rules, it seems to me that we have to distinguish two different perspec- tives. Rules can govern either what international actors should do or what they should not do. Norms for limiting actions, be it through institutions or through mechanisms of seeking consensus, are rather easy to find. Initiatives for promoting democracy What the players should do, though, is a much more difficult question, tran- in the Middle East ignore scending the realm of rules and touching the area of normativity. I see one major what the region has to say deficiency in the initiatives for promoting stability and democracy in the Middle East, be it the Greater Middle East initiative or the initiative that German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer recently proposed. These initiatives are based on the UNDP yearly reports and the Arab Development Report, which was praised for having been written by Arabs, even though its authors do not have any relevance in the region itself. Citing these reports not only does not help the region but excludes the people living there. You need to integrate regional perceptions and seek consensus within the region instead of developing Western solutions for people to either accept or have forced upon them.

Kornelius The recent events in Haiti demonstrated that simply sticking to the rules is not The intervention in Haiti enough to ensure legitimate interventions. On the one hand, there was a UN mandate for Haiti and everybody was happy with the outcome. On the other hand, Aristide complained that he was forced into exile by the US. We do in fact not know how he got on the plane that flew him out. In the end, it is not all about rules but also about politics. Rules: often a pretext for shying Germans carry a certain obsession for rules in their blood. But even as a Ger- away from political action … man, I understand the American concern that rules may be used as a pretext for refusing responsibility for political action. Reinhard Hesse said that rules for inter- ventions are rules to break the rules. This seems to me a very European perspective. Americans would probably say: let us get rid of the rules preventing us action which we perceive as legitimate. It would not occur to them to ask for rules for making exemptions from these rules. Furthermore, in today’s unipolar world, the Gulliver US certainly does not have any practical interest in being bound by rules. … and open to very different interpretations Lotte Leicht referred to the downside of rules. Their abstract and vague nature because of their abstract nature leads to very different interpretations and applications. Where does an interven- tion in the name of humanitarian rights promote these rights and where does it damage them ? Thus, the game of rules is a tricky one. Consensus is a valid basis for action, but consensus is not the same as rules.

Hamzawy | Kornelius 84 Heather Grabbe has vividly portrayed the impressive achievements of the EU with Reiter its high concentration of rules and norms. But the question remains of what these The EU has achieved a lot with its high rules and instruments can contribute to a new global order. The EU’s successes concentration of rules and norms … lie in fields such as minority policy, in which the Union has replaced power through mutual rules. The size, power, and prestige of a state no longer play as big a part as was earlier the case in Europe and still is in much of the rest of the world. After all, the EU was built up as protection against the disintegrating forces of power politics. The dark side of this on the world stage is that its mem- … but its rules sometimes lead to inaction bers are often content and eager to do nothing, perhaps because EU instruments are not directly applicable to global policy challenges. Still, they could provide valuable new ideas. Karsten Voigt rightly demanded a convergence between rules and power. I NATO as a synthesis of power and rules think the organization predestined to make this convergence happen is NATO. Despite all its problems, including those caused by the US, it provides a framework through which re-negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty could be adapted to new circumstances. The Europeans would be mistaken to pursue their global ambi- tions outside the NATO framework. Not morally mistaken, but politically: it’s simply unrealistic. At the end of the day, success and only success decides how legitimate such approaches are.

We have been lingering for some time in a strange dichotomy between either hav- Krisch ing international law or none at all. Thereby, we have missed the real question: Which international law which international law ? Even as the hegemon in a unipolar system, the US is in a unipolar system ? active in all kinds of international law-making to complement its foreign policies, as most former empires have been. Hegemons tend to use international law as a tool, pushing toward more hierarchical mechanisms, instead of merely staying out of international law. Thus, the US pushes for action through the Security Council, through the World Bank or through the IMF, and in all of them it enjoys a domi- nant position. I think it would provide helpful insights to inquire which mecha- nisms of international law the US tends to foster. One could then think about which of them are also beneficial for integrating the superpower into the inter- national system. On the other hand, Europeans like to talk about international law as a sphere of the good and right, but in fact they also use it as a means for governing others. They are fond of treaties because many of the recent ones are very much in their interest, and the Security Council is so popular because it is a useful tool for

85 Reiter | Krisch them — after all, Europeans are highly overrepresented in the Council. People in the Global South would probably contest that the US and Europe are very far apart on issues of international law, which indicates a major problem of legitimacy also for Europeans.

Hamzawy I doubt whether reforming the Security Council is the most promising way to increase the international system’s efficiency. A much more important mecha- nism that can be reformed, are the special procedures of the UN system. The in- dependent experts of these mechanisms are volunteers, they are not employed by the UN and can talk to most presidents of states without going through the bu- reaucratic procedures of the UN. Lately, they have been allowed to speak in the Security Council. The United Nations’ special procedures will enable it to play an important role in the future.

Neville-Jones What the Security Council and the UN will do depends, I think, very much on how What the UN will do depends the Council interprets and enforces the UN Charter. For example, will the Charter on its interpretation of international be interpreted as permitting preventive war in certain circumstances ? The US is law and the UN Charta not going to give up that particular bit of the Bush Doctrine. Homeland security will also include preventive intervention in the future. As US homeland security policies develop, they will prove to be a very extended concept. In the end, they will result in a large “protected zone” including foreign countries on whose behalf the US acts and, if deemed necessary, intervenes. A second forum beside the Security council Establishing a similar body beside the Security Council and thus two law-mak- would be useless, we need more UN agencies ers would lead to inconsistency and conflict. Activities beyond the competences of the Council are and should be covered by treaties establishing their own en- forcement mechanisms. I consider the rise of the UN agencies beside the Security Council as a very promising development. These have a virtual monopoly on ad- dressing crucial problems of international politics like humanitarian relief, refu- gees, reconstruction and policing. As far as I can see, they also have much better records on effectiveness and achieving international consensus than the Security Council. Regional commissions under I would propose taking up a model that worked successfully after the end of the auspices of the UN World War II: regional commissions under the auspices of the UN like the Eco- nomic Commission for Europe, UNECE, which was set up by ECOSOC in 1947. Reviving these and creating new ones for other parts of the world would give us a powerful instrument for including the inhabitants of the respective areas in the

Krisch | Hamzawy | Neville-Jones 86 Gross violations of human rights from Algeria to Zimbabwe have never made the EU suspend a single agreement.

Grabbe

solution of their problems. This could create a sense of responsibility and bring together economic assistance with issues of good governance.

While we have discussed the relation between rules and hard power at length, we Grabbe have neglected the role of soft power. Both Europeans and Americans are cur- Soft and hard power in the EU and in the US rently having problems with soft power, at the heart of which lies legitimacy. Ultimately, only legitimacy can sustain power and give security to the powerful over a long period. General Marshall said after World War II: “A security policy is not the same as a war policy. We are not fighting individual countries but poverty and want, which make them our enemy.” During the last extended unipolar pe- riod in world history, the Roman Empire sustained power for nearly 4 centuries because it established rules backed by force. This combination of hard and soft power permitted Rome to build such a great single market and to get the popula- tions of the conquered states to accept Roman rule. Europeans therefore have good reasons to be horrified by how the US is over- The US is overturning the institutions turning the institutions it so carefully nurtured, and indeed cajoled the Europeans it helped to build to build after 1945. American soft power in Europe has suffered serious damage from that change in approach. The reputation of the US and of the European pow- ers supporting it, like Britain, was damaged in the course of the Iraq intervention. First because they bypassed international law, second because they failed to achieve their stated war aims of making the world a safer place. There are serious doubts whether the war will reduce the threat of terrorism. Legitimacy, though, depends on whether policies actually serve their stated purposes. As opinion polls throughout the world show, the US lost a vast stock of its soft power. Europe’s image problems have other roots. Europeans are bad at soft power Europe is not tough enough because they rely too much on it. They are not tough enough about clearly defin- ing good governance or democracy and then enforcing their goals. For example, the human rights clauses attached to every European agreement with any third country have never actually been used. Gross violations of human rights from Algeria to Zimbabwe have never made the EU suspend a single agreement. We also tend to let Russia off the hook. Only the transformative effect of the accession process on Central Eastern Europe is an example of the EU using soft power ef- fectively. Both Europeans and Americans have to think about what gives rules legiti- The West must follow its own rules — macy. Lotte Leicht’s criteria for intervention and Amr Hamzawy’s demand to inte- because the Arab street notices hypocrisy grate those who are living in the region concerned show two important precondi-

87 Neville-Jones | Grabbe tions for legitimacy. It is not enough for the Europeans and the Americans to agree about rules, when these rules lack consistency and consensus. Because the Arab street does actually notice hypocrisy. Every time you go to Libya or Syria, people ask you: ”Why was there an intervention in Kuwait but none in Tibet ?” Latin Americans asked me last week why the US helped remove the elected leader of Haiti. We have to act consistently enough to convince those who are affected and thus base our actions on a broad consensus.

Rieff To add to the lovely quotes cited hitherto, I would like to invoke Sigmund Freud’s “Narcicissm of small differences” term “the narcissism of small differences.” Our discussion has shown that consid- between Europe and the US erably less divides Europeans from Americans than what divides both of them from the rest of world. As long as the countries accustomed to doing the law-mak- ing refuse to let others take part in the process, all new sets of rules will fail to engender consent. Our discussion about rules of a New World Order has been about how to cope with terrorism and rogue states. I think that is an important issue of national self-de- fense, and the dispute is not about its importance, but about modalities. Even my own dissent from the Bush Administration is about the threat posed by Iraq, not over whether my country has the right to defend itself. But responses to rogue states and terrorism cannot be the main building blocks of any world order, new or old. From the perspective of the Global South, terrorism and rogue states are not the principle threats. The basic problem of a “New World Order” is misery, all those people living on less than a dollar a day or dying from diseases like HIV/AIDS.

Grabbe | Rieff 88 III. The Frontiers of a “New World Order”

It is one of those days when Britain is at her most irresistible: Sunday morning, Bertram the sheep outside, the thinkers inside, and a captivating discussion ahead of us. Today we will focus on the practical consequences of our reflections about power, rules and the “New World Order.” Where will the international system with its new models of establishing order and enforcing rules be put to the test ? Have les- sons been learned from the Balkans, and have they been applied in Afghanistan or Iraq ? Are we thus seeing the contours of a model for intervention emerge ? Ghanim Alnajjar will start our session with an overview of recent interventions.

When optimists talk about an emerging “New World Order” and pessimists about Alnajjar a new world disorder, at least both of them agree implicitly that order is desirable. presentation How to build that order, though, is one of the major questions of international Small countries in international politics: politics. Sometimes small countries play an important role in that game. During objects of intervention the past decades, this in many cases led ultimately to interventions by the great powers. Somalia, for example, has experienced interventions twice under very differ- The interventions of the great ent circumstances. In 1977, Somalia’s invasion in Ethiopia to take over the Ogaden powers in Somalia and … region almost started the Third World War, when the Soviet Union interfered to support the Ethiopians. The second intervention occurred after the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. To be able to distribute food to the population, the UN asked for military assistance, and “Operation Restore Hope” was devised as a hu- manitarian intervention. It failed disastrously with the US withdrawing its sol- diers in 1993. The Somalis did not perceive the intervention as a benign attempt to liberate the country in the interest of the people — other than, for example, the Kuwaitis when the US and its allies drove out the Iraqi occupiers in 1991. Another left-over from the Cold War is Afghanistan. Here, the battle between … in Afghanistan the two super powers was fought. The US support for the resistance against the Soviet occupiers helped to bring about Al Qaeda and thus ultimately resulted in September 11. Today, the country has a constitution, which is not ratified yet and was developed on a tribal basis — it seems overly optimistic to me to talk about a functioning Afghan democracy. I would now like to focus on the intervention in Iraq, because I spent a lot of time there since the fall of Saddam’s regime. Can the Iraqi experiment become a model for future interventions ? There are reasons for doubt. Most Iraqis were happy to get rid of Saddam Hussein. But the situation on the Iraq as a model for interventions ? ground has been dominated by an incredible lack of planning since the coalition A bad idea if you consider …

89 Bertram | Alnajjar Many people think that this chain of mishaps is planned by the US because it wants things in Iraq to go wrong.

Alnajjar

forces took over. The Americans expected an influx of refugees and hundreds of … the lack of planning oil wells going up in flames after the invasion. But in the end, there were no refu- gees and only twelve burning wells. Most of these were put out by Iraqi engineers, for $ 20.000 each, two of them by the Halliburton subsidiary KBR for $ 1.500.000 each, paid by the American tax payers. So the Iraqis see two new things in their country after the intervention: military and foreign business which is connected to the military. Plus, the United States is incapable of bringing the electricity sys- tem back to work; we were melting in the hotel rooms. … and the deficiencies in security matters The handling of security matters was no better. Against all expectations, Iraq’s Baathists got a chance of reorganizing themselves after the allies’ victory. This was the first invasion I have ever seen that did not start with curfews, which allowed Baathists to meet undisturbedly. It was the Iraqi population that complained to the American and British military about these gatherings. Nobody listened until the attacks on the occupiers started. Things in Iraq are not as bad as they are de- picted in the media, but it is a very fragile situation that could explode anytime. Iraqis turn to conspiracy theories because they cannot believe such incompetence. Many people think that this chain of mishaps is planned by the US because it wants things in Iraq to go wrong. The experiment of regime The plans of Western leaders to bring about a “New World Order” by the inva- change in Iraq failed … sion of Iraq might be appealing in theory. But in reality, the experiment failed much too unambiguously for any planner in Washington to want to repeat it or to credibly threaten neighboring countries that they will be next. Also, getting support from other countries for that seems very improbable to me. Therefore, Iraq is only of limited value as a new model of intervention. … but the NGOs did a great job there There were also positive experiences, though. While the international com- munity, with its political battle in New York and in European capitals, forgot to help inside Iraq, international NGOs did a great job. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were the first to be there. They helped a lot, for example, in solving the prisoners of war issue. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers had been impris- oned. That was an absurd thing to do, after the allies had dropped all these leaflets asking the soldiers to surrender. After 3 months of tough negotiations, the NGOs convinced the military officials to start releasing them. Therefore, the idea of get- ting the whole world together to put Iraq back on its feet seems possible with the help of NGOs. They will also be instrumental in rebuilding civil society in a coun- try that had no such thing for the last 35 years. This is something we can learn from Iraq and apply in future similar cases.

Alnajjar 90 In the end, the success or failure of the Iraqi experiment from the view of the Success or failure of the Iraqi US and of Iraq will depend on which political system will be established. People experiment depends on the in Iraq are working on that very seriously now, but it will take time. Thus, another establishment of a functioning state experience from Iraq is the overwhelming importance of successfully building up a functioning state after bringing down the old regime.

You raised the question whether the invasion in Iraq could be a model for future Glees interventions. When judging the occupation of Iraq, we should keep in mind that Iraq will have to be a success it is still at an early stage. The military campaign began not even a year ago. Also, I doubt whether we are free to allow Iraq to fail, concluding that the West should stick to its own business. Rather, I would like to turn the argument around: Iraq will have to be a success because similar actions will have to be taken elsewhere. Ed Luttwak’s argument about despots that “He may be a swine, but at least he is keeping everybody under control, so do not touch him” was as wrong for Saddam as it would be for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nevertheless, in order to learn from current events in Iraq, a sober analysis of Insufficient preparation for the occupation the mistakes made is indispensable. As far as I can see, the central problem was that planning for the occupation period was not properly undertaken. It should have been. The chaos of the early days seems likely to degenerate in worse disorder and possibly civil war. This should have been foreseen and understood before inva- sion was decided on. In May, 2003, I wrote in the “Times” that neither the Amer- icans nor the British had contingency plans for taking over the documentation of Saddam Hussein’s regime. A fundamental step in building a new nation, though, is understanding the motives of the old nation. Another shortcoming of the American planning was their belief in “occupation ‘lite’.” True, you could topple Saddam’s regime with a relatively small force. But to provide security for ordinary Iraqis after victory, a much bigger force would have been needed. The occupation must succeed in making a free Iraq possible. At the same time, its occupiers must show they understand that their role is to liberate the Iraqis and end the abuses of human rights under Saddam. Anything less than this will not only add to the suffering of the Iraqis, it will give comfort to the European and American oppo- nents of intervention and cause the West to be seen not as a friend, but as an enemy as cruel as the Baathists.

Having spent a large part of the last year in Iraq, I would like to come back to the Rieff question of what has been and what could be learned from the Balkans for the

91 Alnajjar | Glees | Rieff Iraq war. I doubt that the situation in the Balkans and in Iraq is similar enough to allow for any learning effect. While Kosovo could be turned Kosovo could be and was turned quite effectively into a protectorate over into a functioning protectorate … which the occupying forces, NATO, the EU, and the US, had comprehensive con- trol. The so-called success in Kosovo might have its flaws. Washington and Brussels may have acted in some ways like US Senator George Aiken who wanted to end the Vietnam war by declaring victory and going home. But to a certain extent, control was established. … Iraq is much too big for that Iraq, though, is something entirely different. This time we are staying and declaring victory, but the victory is only partial, to put it charitably. Iraq cannot be turned into a protectorate like Kosovo, because it is too big, too well armed and its resistance is too well organized. In the Shiite South, American troops after the initial campaign simply stayed out of the Holy Cities and many villages. The British army backed off as well after losing six soldiers in an incident in a small city. They made no effort even to take any reprisal for the sensible reason that they knew it would have been a non-starter. The Sunni triangle is in no sense conquered and the US and other coalition forces in the South are proceeding very gingerly. That is often ascribed to the American wish to avoid casualties, but I think to some extent it is simply the reality of Iraq. Thus, the lessons of Kosovo and Bosnia could not be and were not applied to Iraq. The intervention in the Balkans was There is another major difference. What happened in the Balkans was rightly humanitarian, the one in Iraq was not called humanitarian intervention. Applying it to Iraq is a fundamental, though widespread misuse of the term. In the proper sense, there was no humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Development issues and humanitarian needs were certainly on the agenda, as they are in any poor country in a war zone. But if you look at it from the perspective of Kinshasa or Freetown, there was no humanitarian crisis. The UN specialized agencies and humanitarian NGOs were used by the coalition. They were supposed to provide the prestige of humanitarian action to justify political decisions. One may well be in favor of the American invasion and still acknowl- edge that the concept of humanitarianism was abused in this context. The result is that the humanitarian movement finds itself in a crisis and that many NGOs, for example “Enfants de la Terre,” have withdrawn because they think their re- sources are better spent elsewhere. Also, they do not want to lose their independ- ence and execute government policies. Lastly, I would gently disagree with Ghanim Alnajjar’s assessment that there is no civil society in Iraq. The Shia councils survived Saddam Hussein’s rule much

Rieff 92 Even though Saddam’s regime was evil, it was not a failed state.

Rieff

better than either the proponents or the opponents of the invasion had expected. When the looting started right after the fall of Saddam, they made themselves felt in an extremely effective and coherent way. The West should not commit the common mistake of presuming that the occupiers will have to create civil society and recreate the state from scratch. Iraq has elements of a civil society, and even though Saddam’s regime was evil, it was not a failed state.

The question whether Iraq is a model for future interventions seems to me only Bohlen of limited use. There is no “one size fits all” model in international politics. Nei- There is no “one size fits all” model ther the problems of the Balkans, nor Afghanistan, nor the Greater Middle East in international politics are the same as Iraq’s. Thus, I encourage everybody to abandon the search for one perfect set of rules for intervention and one infallible model for nation-building. We must accept that ad hoc approaches for individual cases are indispensable in international politics. This will give the international community freedom to act in the real world, diverse as it is.

Iraq and Afghanistan manifest several developments relevant for international Bertram order. It has become clear that interventions remain dependent on the UN; and the US is now trying to recruit as many countries as possible for building up Iraq. NATO is moving into a global role which it still has to digest. To what extent are the circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan specific, and to what extent is a model for international interventions emerging ? Michael Schaefer worked in the Balkans for the German Foreign Office for many years and, as Political Director, is now coordinating much of the policy towards Iraq. What, if any, lessons from the Balkans did the international com- munity implement in Afghanistan ? What experiences should we keep in mind for Iraq or for future similar cases ?

I see Iraq as unique in so many aspects that it is difficult to even think about it as Schaefer a model for future interventions. From the outset, the international community Iraq is too unique to learn from it, but … was more in disagreement about Iraq than it was or will be about any other issue I can think of in the recent past or near future. A similar constellation is not likely to arise again soon. Other cases, it seems to me, provide more insights and more reason for optimism for future challenges. I do indeed think that lessons can be and have been learned in the Balkans — … lessons have been learned in not so much for Iraq, but for Afghanistan. We went through different phases in the Balkans for Afghanistan

93 Rieff | Bohlen | Bertram | Schaefer the Balkans, starting with Bosnia, then Kosovo and finally Macedonia. In every phase, we tapped into different resources of the international community. The experiences taken from the Balkans were then, to a certain extent, implemented in Afghanistan. Learning process in the Balkans: from Bosnia Let me first sketch out our learning process in the Balkans. Our first campaign, and Herzegovina to Kosovo and Macedonia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was characterized by a mess of international organiza- tions acting without any coordination. The Office of the High Representative had hardly any links with NATO or the UN, the OSCE and a plethora of other organiza- tions. None of these actors was connected to any of the others. The structure im- proved in Kosovo with the establishment of UNMIK and the four-pillar approach. That was a lesson successfully learned from Bosnia, even though we are far from success in Kosovo and the most difficult political phase still lies ahead of us. The international community’s next sphere of activity in the Balkans, Macedonia, is an underestimated success story. We were on the ground early and acted in a co- ordinated fashion. The military’s role was restricted to stabilizing the political process, acknowledging that security forces cannot do nation-building but only provide a framework of relative stability. Nation-building from the bottom up, with the assistance of the international community, was undertaken successfully with the Ohrid process. What has been learned for Afghanistan … Afghanistan, of course, is a more difficult case. It is not only bigger than the Balkan countries, but also divided into several warlords’ and local governors’ spheres of dominance which are beyond the reach of the weak central govern- ment. Nevertheless, the international community’s approach to Afghanistan has successfully been based on lessons learned in the Balkans. Nation-building there is assisted through the international community but built mainly on Afghan ini- tiative. We combine it with a small military security presence. The military is very helpful and successful in cooling off the situation and thus providing room to build security structures, even though the Southern area remains a problem area. … and what has been done wrong The international community’s biggest mistake was to concentrate the sta- bilization efforts on Kabul. We ought to have moved into the provinces earlier, as we have done belatedly during the last nine months with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. That might have at least contained some of the currently growing problems, especially the drug problem. Also, to successfully complete its task in Afghanistan, the international community must improve the genera- tion of funds and civil assistance drastically. NATO, I think, should concentrate on Afghanistan as its first campaign in distant areas. Engaging additionally

Schaefer 94 NATO’s central problem is simply a question of resources. Does the Alliance have the capabilities to match its political aspirations ?

Lunn

in Iraq would overstretch NATO’s resources and thus jeopardize success in Afghanistan.

Michael Schaefer was right to characterize the international community’s ap- Guttenberg proach in Afghanistan as a successful model — in theory. In practice the friction Afghanistan as a successful model ? in certain areas is only too obvious. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, espe- There are obvious frictions in practice cially, have to greatly improve their coordination if we want such missions ever to become a success story to be applied in other international operations. In this context, I’d like to return to the possibility of a new, more broadly-de- We have to reformulate the NATO strategy … fined role for NATO. Calls for reformulating the NATO strategy of 1999 are right- fully growing louder. Without going into whether a term like “Harmel 2” was wisely chosen, it is in fact of paramount importance for the alliance to define its place between the European Security Strategy and the Americans’ National Security Strategy. Should NATO move toward a hinging function or should the key elements of both be integrated in a new, overarching strategy ? Above all, I believe we must urgently develop concepts for a global role for … and develop concepts NATO without taking up the role of world policeman. How, for example, could for a global role for NATO NATO become more effective in the Greater Middle East ? I use this geographic term, which I am very critical of, in a broad sense to encompass the region be- tween Morocco and Pakistan. I think the idea of a “NATO-Plus,” meaning with associated states below the level of full membership, would be very productive in improving effectiveness and acceptance. Russia could participate like this, and so could, in other circumstances, China or India. Just as important, the strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union has to be based on comple- mentarity, not duplicity. NATO should definitely include fighting terrorism and preventing WMD proliferation much more explicitly as objectives and implement them with concrete strategies.

NATO’s central problem is now showing in Afghanistan. We should not allow the Lunn operation in Iraq to distract us from the situation in Afghanistan, which is the real In Afghanistan, NATO’s problem test case for the Alliance and in which so much political capital has already been is showing … invested. NATO’s central problem is simply a question of resources. Does the Alliance have the capabilities to match its political aspirations ? Providing a security umbrella for nation-building in Afghanistan, as Michael … because resources are lacking Schaefer outlined, stretches NATO’s capability to the limits. These are extremely as far as material … personnel-demanding operations in terms of sustainability, rotation, and in pro-

95 Schaefer | Guttenberg | Lunn viding certain types of capability, particularly airlift. But the member states have thus far been extremely reluctant to recognize their commitments and to increase their contributions. For example, at the December Ministers of Defence meeting in Brussels, NATO’s Secretary General George Robertson allegedly had to almost blackmail the nations for new helicopters. Finally, he was promised seven - many fewer than he wanted. Even those seven have not yet been delivered. At least one member country even asked the United States to pay for the transport. … and troops are concerned The number of useable NATO forces that are readily available for new opera- tions is a story of scarcity, too, and, of course, for several key countries, Iraq is a drain on badly needed resources. There is no quick solution to this question of overstretch. Most Alliance countries are in the process of restructuring and reor- ganizing their armed forces — some have already done so — to provide capabilities more appropriate to the new security environment. But these changes take time - and even then, demand may continue to strain supply. In the meantime, we will have to be as imaginative and flexible as possible in implementing peace support operations and in drawing in non-NATO contingents. Approaches to draw on other countries’ resources, as for example, New Zealand’s Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, should be encouraged. The suc- cess of these PRT’s and the difficulties they will face in Afghanistan remain an open question. However, there is no doubt that their ability to extend the influ- ence of the central government beyond Kabul and provide reassurance to the local population will be crucial to providing long-term stability and security in Af- ghanistan. The model established in the Balkans in both SFOR and KFOR of includ- ing units from different countries, such as Morocco or Egypt, could also be re- viewed. Whatever means or methods are considered, it will be crucial for NATO to prove in Afghanistan that it is able to commit the resources and deploy the forces needed to fulfil its goals.

Nikonov Russia does not and will never belong to NATO, and this military alliance is ap- NATO is the least liked international proaching our borders despite our objections for decades. Therefore NATO is the organization in Russia … least liked international organisation in Russia. Seen as a legacy of the Cold War still searching for its new mission, its raison d’être still remains entirely unclear to us. Our relations to NATO’s members are better than those with NATO. … and the NATO-Russia Council Will the NATO-Russia Council or “NATO at 20” change that ? Certainly not in will not change that its present form. At the NATO headquarters in Brussels, Russian representatives get briefings, but no discussions and even less say in decision-making. Talking

Lunn | Nikonov 96 China takes more responsibility for stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Economy

about proliferation or terrorism with countries like Iceland and Denmark, and soon also with Estonia and Bulgaria, might be interesting and great fun. But any serious Russian politician would prefer to discuss these issues bilaterally in Wash- ington or London. As my predictions for the NATO-Russia Council are bleak, I think that Russia will remain in an isolationist mood. Our major problems are domestic. Therefore, Russia will try to avoid being involved in international campaigns like those in Iraq or Afghanistan. We do not see them as Russian problems, even though we would certainly not like the West to fail, because that would increase instability on our borders.

Let me give you an assessment of what could be China’s role in the emerging new Economy international framework of institutions and alliances. China is becoming increas- China’s role in the international ingly active within the United Nations and takes more responsibility for stability community is changing in the Asia-Pacific region, for example in bringing North Korea back from the nuclear brink. But we are still far from a “NATO plus China,” even though there have been some initial discussions. The idea of China becoming a force for build- ing democracy is even more remote and brings with it a certain irony. At the mo- ment, China has its own set of priorities within the UN. To preclude Taiwan from gaining international recognition, for example, it refuses to support peace-keep- ing missions in places that recognize Taiwan, most recently in Liberia. Nevertheless, in terms of its domestic political and economic development, Within 10 years, it might even be China is moving in the right direction. A confluence of international pressure and an anchor of international stability domestic developments may well lead to China playing an important role for in- ternational stability within 10 years. All these positive developments and good long term prospects for democratization in China will lead the country toward a more positive role in the international community. The path to this goal, though, will be a long and messy one.

Gerald Chan, NATO is active in Afghanistan, which is practically on the border of Bertram China; American forces are in Uzbekistan. It seems that China is suddenly sur- rounded by the military presence of the West. Does the country regard that with suspicion or with interest ? I understand that recently a high NATO official has been invited to China to talk about possible contacts.

97 Nikonov | Economy | Bertram Chan I think that two contradicting schools of thought are at work within China’s for- China’s foreign policy between suspicion … eign policy community. On the one hand, China is suspicious of encroachment by the USA or by NATO, advocating an almost royalist view of sovereignty that pre- cludes any form of intervention in domestic affairs. This derives from its historical experiences of being repeatedly invaded or humiliated by foreign countries. … and a tendency to open up On the other hand, the Chinese are keen to develop better links with the outside world. They initiated the Shanghai Cooperation Council with six countries in the Central Asian region to promote regional cooperation on counter-terrorism, trade and other issues. To promote stability in the Asia-Pacific region, China has deepened its relationships with various countries within ASEAN. As a huge developing nation, China also strives to lead the Third World. At the WTO meeting in Cancun, it successfully rallied countries like Brazil against American and Euro- pean farm subsidies. With some European powers, China is united in its desire to promote a multilateral international system to counter US unipolarity. The Chinese are closer to the French and the Germans in that than to the British. France even declared 2004 “the year of China” to deepen the relationship with China as a means of advancing a multipolar international system based on the balance of power. China has a checkered relationship with the USA. But even that has warmed up recently, because the Chinese realized that the US is instru- mental in many of its fundamental foreign policies, for example toward Taiwan or North Korea. Lack of trained diplomats China’s tendency to open up and develop closer relationships with foreign powers will be limited by one restraint — among others — within the next years, though. The country still suffers from a lack of trained diplomats and of experi- ence in international forums. But China is evolving and learning at a remarkable pace.

Bohlen The American perspective on the New World Order is divided into at least two presentation camps. There is a much more serious debate going on in the United States than one year ago, and which view will prevail in another year’s time remains an open question. Serious debate in the US about The radical world view of the so-called neocons is known to have inspired the foreign policy between the neocons … views of the Bush administration, even if they are not identical. It finds its most extreme expression in Richard Perle’s and David Frum’s book “An End to Evil.” This unabashed argument for the US to use its power makes very entertaining reading: Force should be used to bring about regime change in Iran and North

Chan | Bohlen 98 Korea, while secessionists in Eastern Saudi Arabia are to be supported to secure the oil reserves if the House of Saud does not overcome its difficulties. Europeans will be forced to choose between France and the US, with dire penalties for those who make the wrong choice. On the positive side, establishing a democracy in Iraq will serve as a flagship for the democratization of the Middle East. The opposing, more traditional, liberal internationalist approach was outlined … and the liberal internationalists by Paul Schroeder in his presentation. It bases international order on the reality of US power deployed in cooperation with its European allies, making extensive use of US soft power and the international organizations that the US helped create. The United States’ dominance is not taken for omnipotence, and legitimacy plays more of a role than in the first model. Today, the Bush Administration takes a position between the two. Without a The Bush Administration’s heart belongs doubt, its heart still belongs to the “go-it-alone school.” It still justifies the Iraq to the “go-it-alone school,” but … war, if for other reasons than a year ago, stands by its right to unilateral preventive war and regime change and continues to advocate the “with us or against us” ap- proach. Thus, at the level of ideology the transatlantic split still seems very wide. But the situation on the ground has brought a more realistic outlook. The … it recognizes the need for partners reality of the invasion of Iraq had the sobering effect to demonstrate the limits of military force. To date, the world’s most powerful military machine has been un- able to put down an insurgency that does not even enjoy broad support within the Iraqi population. The US occupation has proven quite inept at dealing with post-war reconstruction, due to a really breathtaking lack of planning and com- placency about the malleable nature of Iraqi society. Belatedly the Bush adminis- tration had to recognize that it could not go it alone or with just a coalition of the willing. It has thus turned to the UN to mediate the stalemate over elections and to confer legitimacy on the transfer of power. Despite the continuing resentment of France, there is a quiet effort to mend fences with the Europeans and to involve NATO in Iraq. Once sovereignty has been returned to the Iraqis, the US will cer- tainly have to rely even more on others for resources. The overwhelming difficulties and costs of the intervention in Iraq have also reduced the appetite for further pre-emptive wars. In any case, force was always the least attractive option for dealing with the other “axis of evil” countries, Iran and North Korea. Today, both sides want to put the disputes of last year behind them, although Europe and the US must leave no one has changed his or her mind about the war. But Schadenfreude from the the disputes behind them … European side is an unaffordable luxury, because we cannot risk letting Iraq and

99 Bohlen We have to leave those quarrels unresolved and move ahead.

Bohlen

the surrounding region descend into chaos. The recognition is spreading in Eu- rope that sitting back, criticizing American bellicosity, and resorting to inaction is not an option. The way ahead does not lie in trying to agree on lessons to be drawn from Iraq, because we would be condemned to argue for the next decade. We have to leave those quarrels unresolved and move ahead. The German/French/ British protocol with Iran about its nuclear program is an encouraging sign, even though Washington does partly disagree with the approach. Also, all major Euro- pean powers are willing to take part in the so-called “Proliferation Security Initia- tive” that allows interdiction on ships carrying prohibited materials, despite the lack of a clear basis in international law. … because transatlantic cooperation is This cooperation is good news because there can be no viable international the basis of any viable international order order that is not rooted in a US-European partnership. Of course, the US will con- tinue to be the dominant partner, the unchallenged military power and main exporter of security, as it has been for the past 50 years. But it will have to rely again on the transatlantic partnership and associate with other powers like Russia, China, or India, and the more traditional partners like Japan, Australia and New Zealand. This mutual desire to move on despite much bitterness offers a reason- able prospect for resuming common action. There are many areas in which the dispute over Iraq never interrupted the war against terrorism and the endeavor to define a common agenda. Structural differences between We should not delude ourselves, though, that this will be easy. Even without the US and Europe falling into Robert Kagan’s facile categories of “Mars and Venus,” one must recog- nize that the ready consensus of the Cold War — which had its moments of great division, too — is gone for good. Europe and the US have been drifting apart in many ways for the last 10 years, including our views on the use of force, the will- ingness to push Israel on the Palestinian issue, and our ongoing trade disputes. An increasing number of voices in the US question the value of a united Europe. The common European defense policy as well as the approach to Iran will remain troublesome issues. These differences are of a structural nature and will not fade away with the end of the Bush Administration. What Europe has to contribute: concepts But the costs of continued division are just too high and the common interests, for the Greater Middle East Initiative … from combating terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons to addressing the problems of the Greater Middle East, are too comprehensive to keep on quarreling. Everybody in the US agrees on how important the Middle East is, but America is in need of partners who contribute conceptual input. Our president’s Greater Mid- dle East Initiative has many weak points. For example, it fails to offer viable con-

Bohlen 100 cepts for the Palestinian/Israeli problem. It also lacks ideas for democratizing the Middle East without de-stabilizing those regimes which used to be our friends and sources of stability, but which nowadays are the main obstacles to change. We also have to join efforts to adapt existing institutions to new challenges. … and the cooperation of NATO and OSCE Simon Lunn is right in diagnosing that NATO’s capabilities are being stretched. But once we recognize that we need peace-keeping forces only for a limited number of places, whereas in most instances we face rather a demand for nation- building capabilities, a combination of NATO and OSCE might be able to master these tasks.

Last year, the preponderant perception was that the US could shape the world, or Voigt at least the US acting in accord with the Western powers. Today, not only the US Today, we see the limitations of what the US is discovering the limitations of what it can do alone. We come to see that even if and the international community can do all major powers act together, there remain financial, political and psychological limitations, and there will always be resistance. If there are more problems than we can solve, we need a debate about priorities. In the context of the transatlantic relationship, that means a debate about strategy not only on the European but on a global scale. We also need a transatlantic debate about the balance of power. The US Con- Transatlantic debate about stitution balances a strong president with a strong congress and judiciary. Simi- the balance of power larly, in an alliance of democratic nations it is a legitimate desire of the weaker powers to be able to balance the stronger power. During the last year, the US seemed to lose its traditional strength of being open toward outside influence. This increased the European desire to establish a multi-polar international system. If the two sides of the Atlantic do not renegotiate their relationship, we will not be able to establish a functioning global system that eventually includes even China or Russia. There will be no consensus in the UN, and common actions, for example with NATO in Iraq, will end in conflict unless a transatlantic strategy is defined. The negotiations of this strategy will have to take into account that not only the US is less dependant on Europe today, but Europe also depends less on the US. The relationship is not defined by one side becoming weaker and the other becoming stronger, but by a qualitative change on both sides.

First of all, to analyze our situation, the conflict over Iraq, which is both transat- Schaefer lantic and intra-European, has prompted a new discussion on the chances and presentation limits of transatlantic cooperation. Future of the transatlantic partnership

101 Bohlen | Voigt | Schaefer The days of a Europe occupied mainly with itself are over.

Schaefer

Columnists such as Charles Krauthammer speak of “the end of NATO”; Atlan- ticists like Ivo Daalder of “the end of Atlanticism.” And two years ago, Robert Kagan topped them all when he wrote in his article “Power and Weakness” that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus, and should finally stop act- ing as if Europe and America have any common ground. There are structural differences, And indeed, there are major structural differences between Europe and the as for example … United States. In our capabilities, in our perceptions, in our strategies. Yet have they not always existed? What is causing all this insecurity all of a sudden? … Europe’s independence, I believe three factors played a role: First, the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 and US unilateralism resulting decline of European feelings of dependence on the US. Second, what I call the trauma of 9/11. It made real the new quality of threats to security, which no longer emanate primarily from states, but as an asymmetrical terrorist threat, to which the international community has yet to find an adequate response. And thirdly, we see today an America that, in this time of global political realignment, no longer just defines its interests alone, as it used to do, but implements them alone or together with a handful of partners. The once-benevolent superpower has adopted a new, paternalistic understanding of order. The transatlantic partnership is still The present transatlantic crisis is therefore not based purely on Iraq. Its roots supported by a broad consensus of values lie deeper. One thing, however, is certain. All their differences notwithstanding, Europe and America still constitute the largest zone of peace and prosperity the world has ever seen. Despite some divergent interests, we are still supported by a broad consensus of values that can be harnessed for longer-term policy. However, the present disagreements cannot be just superficially patched up. They must be analyzed objectively and the mutual scope for adjustment defined more clearly to each side than it has been. A deeper transatlantic strategic dialog is essential for implementing needed reforms to the international system, upon which a new agenda of international cooperation could be erected. Key elements of a new global agenda: I would like to discuss five key elements of this kind of global political agenda. a strategic dimension for the EU First, the EU must develop its strategic dimension. The European Community was founded on the catastrophic experience of two world wars. It was built up prag- matically according to mainly economic interests, yet it had a historical dimen- sion: reconciliation among wartime adversaries, especially Germany and France; Germany and Poland. What should have been clear after 11/9/89 was comprehended only after 9/11/01: that the EU is on the threshold of a fundamental paradigm change. We realize that the days of a Europe occupied mainly with itself are over.

Schaefer 102 We stand before new tasks that will determine our 21st century. With our population of more than 420 million, we must help politically shape globalization. And we must prevail over asymmetrical threats. The EU has gained a strategic dimension, something which has profound consequences. We will master these only if the European Union manages to become an effective agent of security policy. To do this, the EU must command the appropriate weight internationally. Concepts such as that of a “core Europe” cannot do justice to the new strategic dimension. New approaches toward enhanced cooperation may be helpful, but a “small European” solution would be the wrong response to the great challenges we face. If this strategic dimension extends into European unification, then the EU’s acceptance of a Turkey that meets European standards takes on a completely new significance. The evolution towards an EU with a strategic dimension can, however, succeed only with more integration and stronger institutions. The Common Foreign and Security Policy requires new and resilient buttresses. With the European Security Strategy we have taken an important step in the right direction. It strengthens inner coherence and sends a powerful signal to others of Europe’s willingness to act. This must also be anchored in the EU’s structures. The European Constitution points the way toward greater effectiveness for the EU. It is flexible, dynamic, and has development capabilities. The intergovernmental conference was postponed, not broken off. I am confident that it will yet come to a positive conclusion. In an EU of 25 we need more leadership. The European Foreign Minister, sup- ported by a full diplomatic corps, will be key to a more effective Europe in foreign and security policy. And last but not least, as important as European soft power is, the EU cannot do without significant improvements in its military capabilities. The widening role of the EU in security policy matters can be fulfilled only with the appropriate military capabilities that complement its civilian ones, not through wishful think- ing. The French-German-British initiative to establish battle groups for missions under UN Security Council mandates is an example of improving operational capabilities. My second thesis is that global security will require a new transatlantic part- Renewing the transatlantic partnership nership. The USA is the sole power with global reach. It will remain the leading Western power for many years to come.

103 Schaefer A Europe that defines itself in opposition to America is doomed to fail. Multipolar European thinking directed against third parties leads into this dead end. Europe can gain effectiveness only as an actor in a global political system constructed around effective multilateralism. Yet the external ring of transatlantic cohesion, the East-West conflict, no longer exists. The threats we now face have become more diffuse and are not as easy to pinpoint. The overcoming of the East-West conflict holds dangers, but also opportunities. Firstly, there is the danger of unilateralism by the hegemon. The US is tempted to seek out partners to push through its national interests and use multilateral instruments à la carte. If it became the rule, this “tool box” approach would wind up destroying NATO and other multilateral organizations. That is not in Europe’s interest and cannot be in America’s either. Postwar Iraq proves this. We have a much greater interest in a viable and effective alliance. NATO as a two-pillar model The ramifications of this are obvious: the old NATO has served its purpose, with a European caucus while the new NATO can be imagined only as a two-pillar model with the US as the senior power and the expanded EU as a fully-fledged partner, with a division of labor, complementary, but at the same level. First with a European caucus, later with the EU as a NATO member. Encouraging this process means leading the EU more rapidly and effectively than in the past towards international conflict management. The operations Con- cordia and Artemis were the initial, successful steps. The replacement of SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be the real acid test for the EU’s new viability in safe- guarding security. The European Security Strategy complements existing transatlantic security structures through a credible catalog of political action. It sends a clear signal of transatlantic solidarity and European willingness to shoulder responsibility. An effective EU takes pressure off the United States and strengthens the transatlantic partnership. Strategic partnership of the EU with Russia My third thesis is that the transatlantic relationship must be expanded by establishing a strategic partnership with Russia. Effective answers to the new threats are imaginable only through close cooperation with Russia. This is true especially for stability in and around Europe, but also for the critical zone of the Middle East. Russia is presently going through a difficult transformation process. Domestic developments that some like to describe as “democtatorship,” the image of hu-

Schaefer 104 man rights displayed by the conflict in Chechnya, and hegemonic behavior in the post-Soviet zone all give cause for concern. Yet this enormously complex and, in a country as huge as Russia, heterogene- ous paradigm change demands patience and moderation. Both sides must be ready to discuss issues, including disputed ones, unconditionally, openly, and fairly. Chechnya and media freedom in Russia must be subjects of debate together with the treatment of ethnic minorities in the EU. The goal must be to continually expand the foundation of our mutual convic- tions and values. That applies for direct relations between Russia and the EU as much as with, for example, the OSCE, where we both carry direct and mutual responsibility. Problems such as those in Moldova can be resolved only through incorporating all interests concerned and not through unilateral action. Fourth, the Middle East can become the test case for a new global political The Middle East as test case for a cooperation. This crisis area, with the strategic threat of Jihad terrorism aimed at new global political cooperation all open societies, constitutes the most serious challenge of the early 21st century. One central problem is to reconcile modernization and democratic participation so as to deprive fanatical nationalism of a fertile base. We can succeed in whittling down this threat only of we act on a global scale and harness all instruments we have available. America and Europe must tackle these enormous challenges together with Russia, Japan, and other partners. The series of summit meetings this Spring — G 8, EU-USA, and NATO — gives us an opportunity to do so. This is the reason that For- eign Minister Fischer has put forward a suggestion for a “Transatlantic Initiative.” Most importantly, this initiative cannot be allowed to become perceived as a paternalistic, top-down dictation. It must listen to the concerns of all affected countries in the region and develop solutions together with them. Analyses from the region, such as the UNDP’s Human Development Report, have already done valuable preliminary work. This is not a matter of establishing institutions or structures, but of using the ones we have more effectively and achieving synergies through division of labor. Still, we must acknowledge that without significant progress in the Israeli-Palestin- ian conflict and in Iraq, Arab cooperation with the West will be tentative at best. And finally my fifth thesis: Global political cooperation can be based only on International law must remain the power of law, not on the law of the most powerful. The European Security the basis of the international order Strategy states that the UN Charter constitutes the fundamental framework of international relations.

105 Schaefer The treatment of the United Nations, and especially the role of the Security Council, has taught us two things: First, that even for the world’s sole remaining superpower, the UN remains the most important source of international legiti- macy. And second, the UN must adapt to the new global challenges. What spe- cifically does that mean? This may be a banal statement by now, but the makeup of the Security Coun- cil reflects the power constellation of the postwar era. It can therefore not do justice to the new challenges of the 21st century. Regional powers that must shoul- der responsibility — such as Japan, India, South Africa, Egypt, or Brazil — constantly have to be incorporated into the process of making and implementing decisions. This applies without a doubt for Germany as well. Without a broader basis of deci- sion-making, the Security Council’s legitimacy will erode even further. Just as decisive is the issue of the legitimacy of acting upon security policy. The discussion over the pre-emptive use of force, an important aspect of the US National Security Strategy, is an expression of widespread insecurity over the question of what instruments the international community can use in responding to terrorism or proliferation. Using force within the limits The basic question is: when does international law permit the use of force? of international law This question is far less difficult to answer than some would believe. In any case there is no need for new international standards. Chapter VII of the UN Charter contains an exception-to-the-rule mechanism. As long as the Security Council remains inactive, Article 51 governs the right of individual or collective self-defense. It is narrowly constructed and requires an imminent threat of attack to justify the use of force. In an age of advanced tech- nologies, weapons of mass destruction, and very long range ballistic delivery sys- tems, there must be an understanding of how to interpret what “imminent threat” of attack means. The case regulated in Chapter VII is much more broadly defined. The Security Council can legitimize the use of force whenever it ascertains a “threat to world peace according to Art. 39.” The use of force, then, is always possible if the Security Council agrees that it is necessary, and without having to wait for an actual viola- tion of the peace or an attack. We can conclude, then, that it is not the Charter that is at fault, but the lack of political will to implement it. We therefore have to develop benchmarks for cases in which international commitments must be upheld. The issue of material application of the veto cannot remain a taboo.

Schaefer 106 We must clearly acknowledge that there is no alternative to multilateralism, nor to the United Nations, nor to NATO.

Schlie

We can hope that the blue ribbon commission appointed by Kofi Annan after Reform of the UN structures the Iraq war will find concrete answers to these questions. Personally, I believe the United Nations and only the United Nations can be taken seriously as the basis for effective global political cooperation. Iraq was the best example for this. We are currently experiencing that the Iraq file is landing precisely where it was in the beginning: in the Security Council. Mr. von Weizsäcker was right. The constitution of the Security Council no longer corresponds to the reality of today’s distribution of power, but that cannot be our sole driving force. In the future, the Security Council must be prompter in discussing the defense of international commitments. Violations of human rights, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and other cornerstones of international law must be tackled, and not only when there is no more alternative to deadly force. The Security Council must become more an instrument of preventive foreign policy.

As far as the strategic dialog is concerned, I see the problem less in the analysis Schlie than in the political will to implement what we think is right. I am quite pes- The problem is not analysis, but political will simistic on this point. In the descent to the Iraq war, we pulled away from each other farther than we had to, and we carelessly damaged the institutions we depend on. We must clearly acknowledge that there is no alternative to multilateralism, nor to the United Nations, nor to NATO, and we must act accordingly. I also wish to gently caution against trying to play off a “European caucus” within NATO against the American claim to hegemony. And the transatlantic division of labor means that it is not an alternative to partnership, and partnership can also mean taking on unpleasant tasks. Mr. Schaefer may have been right when he described the experiences in the Europe and the US must be willing Balkans and how they were applied in Afghanistan. But the political lesson of the to restore their partnership Balkans is that we Europeans could restore a lost peace only together with the US. These are precisely the premises that we violated in the lead up to the Iraq war, and in doing so did sustained damage to our relationship with the United States.

I was not arguing in favor of a European caucus within NATO acting against the Schaefer United States. But the integrating EU with its new European Security and Defense Policy will, I am sure, develop a common voice. This will find its expression in the NATO structures.

107 Schlie | Schaefer If there were no transatlantic rift, if we all agreed on Iraq and if we had all the resources we needed — would we know what to do? I do not think so.

Krasner

Krasner It seems to me that we have been asking the wrong question in large parts of our Let us stop talking about security matters discussion. We should not only think about how to use the UN or NATO, but about and international institutions … what to actually use them for. If there were no transatlantic rift, if we all agreed on Iraq and if we had all the resources we needed — would we know what to do ? I do not think so. Even though the international community agreed on how to act in Haiti, the long-term outcome of this intervention might be no better than in Iraq. … because the main challenge today is to To my mind, the main challenge today is to find models for effective nation- find models for effective nation-building … building. How can the international community improve domestic governance structures in poorly functioning states ? Many interesting questions have been raised in our discussion: Has the EU, with its incredible success-story of nation building, a formula to offer ? Which of its instruments can be applied in other parts of the world ? How do things look from the perspective of the targets ? What should be the role of non-state actors like NGOs or multinational corporations in changing governing structures ? We know virtually nothing about this. … and viable alternatives Nation building also requires viable alternative structures to conventional to conventional sovereignty sovereignty. Even if we had enough resources and could get to act together, we should not try to reconstruct conventional sovereignty in all failing states. It is much more useful to think about, for example, the problems and opportunities of establishing de-facto or de-jure protectorates. The international community must find a set of rules for nation-building and new models of sovereignty that the Americans and the Europeans can agree on as well as the Chinese, the Japanese, the Russians and the developing countries. All the major powers are interested in creating a more stable international envi- ronment by improving governance in weak states. Making progress in this area is more important than thinking about a more stable balance of power. Thus, our problem is not so much the input side and the institutional structure, but what to do if we had all the inputs that we can dream of.

Leicht Let me offer some observations about the challenges of post-conflict rehabilita- Checklist for post-conflict rehablitation: tion and peace-keeping. First, security on the ground must be improved. There- rapid demobilization … fore, demobilization and the disarmament of armed forces must be prepared much better and tackled much faster after an intervention than hitherto. In Af- ghanistan, troops of local warlords which had been disarmed were rearmed by operation “Enduring Freedom,” and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams have added to the problem by ignoring it. That has frustrated many of ISAF’s operations

Krasner | Leicht 108 International troops going into a country must make sure not to become part of the problem.

Leicht

and more generally the efforts to deal with security in Afghanistan. In Bosnia disarmament and demobilization were handled better, but in Liberia the problem is not being tackled at all. In Congo, demobilization started only to then be dropped and people were recruited again — now we see the conflict reemerge. Second, as you can not oversee security in a country indefinitely, you have to … training of police and security forces … train local police and security forces. In that context, we must put much more emphasis on vetting those we train. In Afghanistan, local warlords send their people for training to Kabul, and when they come back they engage with their warlords again. We could learn from Cambodia at least one thing: people sent by local masters were not sent back to them after training but somewhere else to take them out of their usual environment. Third, intervention troops should let independent parties like the UN protect … protecting evidence by evidence. In Iraq, a lot of evidence has disappeared and the trust of the remaining independent parties … evidence is extremely low because it has not been protected by an independent actor. In Kosovo, a lot of evidence was lost after the arrival of NATO troops because NATO was so absorbed with its own security. First-hand information about abuses of the Kosovo Liberation Army was not filed in a way that would allow investiga- tors to use it. Investigation of crimes therefore risks becoming a pretty one-sided affair. Fourth — and this is my main point — international troops going into a country … establishing internal safeguards must make sure not to become part of the problem. For example, trafficking in against abuses by the internationals women rises whenever internationals arrive, be it Bosnia, Kosovo or Africa. We are now seeing Bosnian women trafficked into Iraq, because the demand there or in Afghanistan is so high that you need women from outside. Those running the brothels are entrepreneurs who know that the presence of internationals means a rising demand. In most of these countries, prostitution is illegal. There- fore, every soldier who visits a brothel adds to organized crime, which is a major obstacle for long-term development. There are very few internal accountability mechanisms, and often the worst that can happen to a soldier is to be shipped home during the night. You can not even prosecute the criminals because the witnesses/soldiers involved are gone. I have just attended a historical meeting on trafficking at NATO. NATO understands now that a “boys will be boys”-attitude means supporting organized crime. There is a willingness to tackle the problem, but much more remains to be done to establish internal safeguards in NATO and elsewhere.

109 Leicht Hirsch I believe that the insistence on identifying a model, a single globally applicable We should not seek to identify a single approach to the problems the international community — and the West in partic- model, but find individual approaches ular — confronts is misguided. The idea of a mechanistic formula for bringing the major centers of the world (US, Europe, Russia, China, India) into a single para- digm is not fruitful. Nor is the demand for a single agenda (“what is this all leading to ?”, as one participant asked.) By setting such arbitrary high parameters for “suc- cess,” we both denigrate how much has been achieved and circumvent the need for more careful case-by-case analysis of what needs to be done to build a safer world, e.g. in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are our current preoccupations — but also in much of the developing world. The West has made great progress in bringing peaceful relations to a wider Europe, through the endorsement of NATO and the European Union and by draw- ing the Russian Federation into dialog, albeit incomplete and often frustrating, on the requirements for a more peaceful and stable world. The consensus at the United Nations on the condemnation of 9/11 and all terrorist acts and the manda- tory obligation to enforce international conventions against terrorism (UNSC Reso- lution 1373) is also a big step forward — even if there is no agreed definition on the definition of terrorism (given the argument over wars of national liberations). Integrating the Islamic world Therefore, we should not be quite so gloomy or pessimistic. That said, what we still profoundly lack is a way to empower those billions of people mainly in the Islamic world but also in the global South so that they also will have a sense of inclusion and a stake in building a more peaceful world. The West cannot win “the war on terror” by military means alone, or by the eradication of Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders. As long as their grievances and anger find wide reso- nance, more Al Qaedas will arise. Hope for people in crisis regions What about nation-building (or state-building), also known as post-war recon- struction ? This is the major challenge in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in the so-called failed states in Africa — Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) etc. We have gone through a process of trial and error in the 15 years of the post-Cold War era. Here again there is no single magical formula. But we can draw certain preliminary observations. People need hope; they need to be- lieve that a better future for their children is possible; people need to have a sense of participation, not imposition by outsiders in rebuilding a destroyed country. The use of force, or the presence of peacekeepers, is often necessary to restore order and hold back or defeat warlords; but reconstruction cannot be done by soldiers.

Hirsch 110 The international community can help with financial and technical assist- ance, restoring infrastructure, training police, encouraging transparency in gov- ernance, and establishing parliaments and effective oversight mechanisms. All this requires money, time, patience — and knowledge of local values, traditions and leaders. Here is where the United Nations becomes indispensable. It is the only body The UN as a source of legitimacy which can confer legitimacy on an international intervention. The experience of for interventions UNMIK in Kosovo and UNTAET in East Timor as transitional administrations may be exceptional. In these two cases, the UN functioned as a de facto colonial admin- istrator. More recently, in Afghanistan, the United Nations adopted a “light foot- print” supporting the embryonic Karzai government. In Iraq, the UN is proving indispensable — needed by the U.S. to legitimize the transition from an unpopular occupation to a viable Iraqi political structure acceptable to the Iraqi public and its various community leaders. The UN should have an integral role in Iraqi’s post- war reconstruction — but as advisor to a new Iraqi leadership. In sum, the West should not seek to establish an impossible new single “global Accepting diversity in framework.” We need to accept more rather than less diversity of opinion (we are the international system not yet at “the end of history”); to look beyond hard threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and hard power to the soft threats of population explosion, globalization, and the sense of exclusion. We need to harness the soft power of multilateral cooperation and dialogue to create broader prospects for the emerging arenas of peace and prosperity. Much can be done not at the level of grand ideas but by focusing on the patient, long-term reconstruction of countries and societies emerging from conflict, and giving people new hope of a better fu- ture for themselves and their children.

The problems of state-building indeed make some of our discussions about inter- Grabbe national organizations seem somewhat narcissistic. The debate about NATO’s role The debate about NATO’s role in Iraq is to some extent deceitful, because it is not so much about NATO as an in Iraq is about the future of NATO, instrument for state-building in Iraq, but about NATO’s future. Will a failure of not about the future of Iraq NATO in Iraq jeopardize the possibility of NATO peace-keeping in Israel/Palestine, for example ? Will involving NATO in Iraq, even though it has not been involved from the beginning, create more international legitimacy for countries like Poland who have domestic problems with their engagement in Iraq ? Is it a prom- ising way to bring in Germany and France ? The debate is about what is good for NATO and the relations between the allies, not what is good for Iraq.

111 Hirsch | Grabbe But the key issue is how to conduct successful state-building in Iraq. I avoid the term nation-building, because the nations in Iraq are there. The question is how to build institutions to keep Iraq from failing and make it a sustainable state. Except for the international community’s experiences in the Balkans, the Euro- pean Union is the only international organization competent for state-building. It has successfully built states in the course of its expansion process. If Iraq could conceivably be a member of the Union in the future, the EU could use its tools for building states, particularly in building administrative capacity. Since Iraq is no potential candidate for EU membership, we have got to think about a comprehen- sive program of state-building. It is not enough to deliver a constitution, prepare for elections and then say: Bye bye !

Kupchan To my mind, such an ambitious agenda of state-building carries a certain danger. We should concentrate on preserving One of the issues circulating beneath the surface of our discussion is whether the the transatlantic relationship … transatlantic relationship is an end in itself or a tool to achieve common objectives. I think that it should at least not be jeopardized without good reasons. … because state-building Therefore, I am worried that the agenda of state building might endanger the is an elusive objective preservation of the transatlantic relationship. It is dangerous to predicate its fu- ture on common efforts in state-building. Bringing peace to Iraq, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia and bringing pluralism to the Islamic world are very elusive objectives. If we reach out for them we should also ensure that the Atlantic system remains intact. We ought to be sober and realistic about how difficult the tasks of state building are.

Kornelius Michael Schaefer mentioned an important point about state-building: Our ap- Any approach for state-building proach to the crisis regions of the world is all too often top-down, imposing solu- must be bottom-up tions without listening to what those concerned have to say. As we have to address the problems reaching beyond the transatlantic agenda, we have to learn modesty. We can use the tools we developed, but to unleash change in the world’s instable regions, one must mobilize the societies. European and American approaches In that regard, I see a growing gap in the transatlantic relationship, because for state building the European approach to state-building differs fundamentally from the Ameri- can approach. One of these approaches is very top-down, the other probably a little bit too much bottom-up. When I recently visited Kosovo, American helicop- ters took us to the German troops. While the Americans soldiers were geared up to full battle, with metal jackets and loaded weapons, in the German camp you

Grabbe | Kupchan | Kornelius 112 When you lay down rules and norms, who are you trying to convince ?

Hamzawy

could see officers with berets and rolled up sleeves, talking to local citizens about separating waste into reusable and disposable waste.

I am very glad that you want to listen to the people in the regions where you want Hamzawy to continue state-building. Yet during the discussion I have heard mostly that the Listen to those concerned when you Europeans and Americans are dependent on each other and should deal with each make plans for state building other as equal partners. What does that have to do with us, in the other regions of this world ? When you lay down rules and norms, who are you trying to con- vince ? You want to grant the UN a bigger role ? I must tell you that, within the Arab world, the UN has no great credibility. You proudly note that the reclusive and frail Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has requested talks with the UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. Yet the opposite is true. Brahimi must seek out Sistani, whose influence among Shiites is so great that he is, simply, indispensible. When we do include the region in our discussion of a New World Order, it You listen to Arabs only as an alibi will look like this: First, numerous representatives of the US, Europe, China, and Russia will lay out their views. Only afterwards, and our discussion has been no exception, are two Arabs permitted to say something on behalf of the “Greater Middle East.” This term suggests a geostrategic entity that has no relation to reality. Morocco and Indonesia are completely different, but you include them in one region, give this region your Western plans to solve its problems and ask about the opinion of the “Greater Middle East.” Besides the fact that this conduct is as much of a problem as the term itself, it is clear that no one identifies with this artificially spawned region. I consider myself a part of the Middle East, or the Arab world, but certainly not the “Greater Middle East.” Similarly, in regard to institutions that might help resolve regional issues, we NATO, EU, USA — what about have heard participants refer to the old NATO, the new NATO, relations between the Arab League ? the EU and NATO or the US and NATO, but not about the region’s own structures. We have not mentioned the Arab League at all. I would be eager to hear how Michael Schaefer assesses its role. I would also like to know what you think of the region’s increasing need to build up regional structures that are mainly economic. The politicized agenda and hot-button words devised by the transatlantic partners, like “democratization,” are far less popular among this region’s governments and civil societies. The EU also started out as an economic community, something that was a very wise decision.

113 Kornelius | Hamzawy Bertram Why don’t you use this kind of discussion as an opportunity to state the opinions of those on the receiving end ?

Hamzawy That is exactly the problem. This Round Table is another example of the region We are given merely the role of the receiver being given merely the role of the receiver. The very choice of categories and in- stitutions makes it impossible for us to get out of this.

Risse Mr. Hamzawy, to my mind you are a representative of the region’s developing civil Especially the representatives of the societies, meaning precisely the target group we want to reach. I consider hope- Arab region should see the importance lessly naive your statement that the transatlantic relationship is irrelevant for the of the transatlantic partnership region. One year ago, the big US elephant fundamentally questioned the region’s status quo and sent out signals that its support for the Saudi royal house was history. How can you say the transatlantic discourse does not interest you ? I also think your attitude is dangerous not only because US conduct has major and potentially damaging consequences for the region, but also because the EU has been so unsuccessful with its Barcelona Process.

Hamzawy I did not mean that the transatlantic relationship was irrelevant ! What I do think is that formulating a major normative-political, and socio-economic design cannot be based primarily on the transatlantic relationship. This is a matter of ownership. One cannot merely listen to the region’s voices on the sidelines or afterward. You must take them seriously as a primary dialog partner.

Stein As Amr Hamzawy said, the UN does not play a central role in the Middle East. I, as an Israeli, do not see how it has contributed or will contribute to sorting out the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Israel is not very interested in getting the UN involved. I also agree that the vague term Greater Middle East, which is a geographical term and nothing else, does not help the West at all in conducting a dialog with the region. The EU plans to develop a concept for the Middle East in its upcoming three summits. I strongly recommend consulting those concerned extensively before coming up with an agenda and then asking the region to follow suit. At least, Europeans and Americans In spite of all the conflicts about the intervention in Iraq, Europeans and recognize that the status quo Americans agree that the status quo in the wider Middle East is untenable. This is in the Middle East is untenable an important step away from the previous Western deterministic attitude to let the region remain like it is for the foreseeable future. For example, the US was quite reluctant to engage Saudi Arabia in any kind of critical or constructive dialog

Bertram | Hamzawy | Risse | Stein 114 If the region had solved its problems at any time during the last 50 years, we would not be sitting here talking about the Greater Middle East.

Hesse

because of its interests in the country. Charles Kupchan is right in stating that we should be realistic in setting our goals, but I recommend setting ambitious goals and then pursuing them in a realistic and pragmatic fashion. As to NATO, I do not think that it should be involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at this stage. The situation is very different from Iraq. In an attempt to stabilize the Mediterranean region, the EU has launched the Barcelona process to promote the modernization of the region. After nine years of failure, the Union should have learned that words must be followed by deeds to be of any use. Over- all, in the Greater Middle East one has to find individual approaches and tailor- made solutions for each country.

If a Martian had listened to what Shimon Stein and Amr Hamzawy said, he would Hesse have the impression of a thoroughly imperialistic endeavor. People in the Middle The representatives of the Middle East com- East are at peace with each other and have the solutions for all their problems — plain about the West’s imperial behavior … but NATO and the Western powers ignore them and impose some foreign concept on them. That is nonsense. If the region had solved its problems at any time dur- ing the last 50 years, we would not be sitting here talking about the Greater Middle East. To my mind, the Greater Middle East Initiative is a big step forward. Tony … and are unable to recognize Blair’s or George Bush’s agenda of threat presented the region merely as a source positive Western contributions of security dangers that must be eliminated by military means and top-down approaches. Now we have a comprehensive approach addressing the political, normative and socio-economic conditions and including civil society. People from the region have always asked us to follow this kind of approach. Now they reject the initiative even though it fulfils all their requirements. It is also too easy to declare the Barcelona process a European failure. I think it is the Middle East that needs Barcelona. The emergence of the Greater Middle East Initiative out of the Iraq conflict represents an enormous window of opportunity. But if people in the region prefer to shut this window immediately, I do not see Europe being able to slip through.

I am happy that somebody cares and thinks about the Middle East. But the first Alnajjar test for the Greater Middle East Initiative, to my mind, was a complete failure. The Greater Middle East Initiative: When one of the region’s dictators recently visited the White House, there was no once again nothing but words pressure exerted on him, but he was encouraged to keep on acting like he does. Any initiative will justly lack credibility as long as it is only put on paper but not

115 Stein | Hesse | Alnajjar implemented. The West must bring fourth some substantial actions to gain a reputation as credible source of change, after it has supported the status quo and corrupt governments for so long. Spending 2 % of what is spent on defense on international dialog might also be a step forward.

Schaefer You probably noticed that I did not use the term Greater Middle East, and I am not Europe’s role in the Middle East going to use it because I do not deem it very useful. I prefer to talk about the Mid- dle East region. I must say, I do not see this as a merely transatlantic initiative. Europe has a substantial interest in stabilizing the Middle East because its con- flicts threaten Europe in the first place. The EU wants a real partnership Therefore, we are interested in a real partnership, not in a top-down approach by the G8 or by NATO in Istanbul. The Tunis summit of the Arab League will have major importance. We are working towards Tunis with the representatives of the Arab world. Hopefully, they will provide a first statement on how to go about this generational task of reforming their societies. The different initiatives on the Mid- dle East, if combined in the right way, offer a roadmap for the next 10 to 20 years to tackle the greatest threat to our stability since the two World Wars.

Bohlen I agree very much with Shimon Stein that we have to address the issue of the Middle East because the status quo is untenable. The problems that we have been dealing with since 9/11 and that the US thought it was dealing with in Iraq, ema- nate in part from this untenable status quo. The US relationship with Saudi Arabia, for example, is a source of much of our difficulties. Amr Hamzawy gave us a very important reality check not to use the Middle East for reconciling the transatlan- tic partners but to develop a concept that starts in the region.

von Weizsäcker The term Greater Middle East probably really is more useful for transatlantic com- munication than as part of a solution for the region’s problems. As much as I support improving the transatlantic relationship, we cannot raise the impression that this itself would be a concept for a “New World Order.” In his speech the day before yesterday, Tony Blair provided us with a transat- lantic agenda. His agenda is called “threats.” We must reach a transatlantic agree- ment over present threats and then return to the old NATO concept of a defensive alliance against an external enemy. Of course, this is no solution to the Arab world’s problems. We can move forward in this area only if we examine the real problems point for point. That includes analyzing what we did wrong in Iraq.

Alnajjar | Schaefer | Bohlen | von Weizsäcker 116 Civil rights activists in Minsk or Rangoon need a single point of reference and an ally in their struggle for freedom.

Roß

Iraq’s neighbor Iran is evidence that a division of labor within NATO is not at all as problematic as Mr. Schlie said earlier. Iran, that isolated giant with endless problems, is not yet at the epicenter of global politics because we have to extin- guish other fires. Yet accompanying this country step for step towards a global order is an extraordinarily urgent task. I think that the Americans have more reason to be grateful than to be angry at the Europeans’ work with Iran that Mr. Schaefer has discussed. The US is eager to bring the matter of Iran before the Security Council, much against Iranian wishes. Here, the Europeans could contrib- ute something the Americans cannot, in full transatlantic loyalty. If one can come to terms, then a division of labor is both sensible and useful to NATO. I am also very grateful for the contributions from the Chinese and Russian perspectives. I was once again deeply impressed by India during a recent visit. Domestic and external political developments there have been very encouraging, and there is close economic, technological, and academic cooperation. Yet India naturally has no intention of standing idly by should NATO move into the South Asia region as a kind of global policeman. The only reason there are no protests to be heard is that the Indians consider the idea completely implausible. In our abstract discussions on the future we should keep in mind that the world’s two most populous countries, China and India, base much of their relations with the West on the confidence that NATO will remain cautious with its plans in the “Greater Middle East.”

I would like to defend the idea of a unified West and urge the transatlantic part- Roß ners to leave behind their narcissism of the small difference, as David Rieff quoted The West must act as a unified block Freud. The West is perceived as an entity not only by its critics in the Global South, but also by regions and people who place their hopes in the West. Civil rights activists in Minsk or Rangoon, for example, are not interested in European and American quarrels, or their being two poles of a multi-polar world. They need a single point of reference and an ally in their struggle for freedom. We should not forget this. The West still commands a lot of moral authority, and it still has a historical mission. It is not China that will come up with new ideas for humanitarian inter- vention in the UN. Nor is it Russia that will take the lead in international develop- ment aid. The West, even though it has to find a consensus with the other powers, is still the center of these activities.

117 von Weizsäcker | Roß Ikenberry I have been wrestling throughout this conference with whether to think big or Re-conceptualize international small. Thinking big would mean re-conceptualizing international order around a order around a new project ? new project like the Greater Middle East. Thinking small would mean to be con- servative, to try to hold on to existing aspects of international order which you do not want to lose because without them the old order would fall apart. Richard Haass made an argument for thinking big. The great struggle to engage the Arab-Islamic world, he said, would reunify the West like the conflict with the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. I disagree, because it seems to me that we do not know how to deal with that part of the world. We ignore its complexities and end up alleviating the damage caused by our own mistakes. Also, to come to terms with the Arab-Islamic world requires not only deploying assets to the region, but rethinking the architecture of the nation-state itself. For me it is one of the most important points of this conference that we have to think about alternative political formations in large parts of the world. Let us restrict ourselves to reviving At the same time, thinking small, in trying to keep intact or restore the Atlan- the transatlantic partnership, because … tic order, is virtuous. We often forget that the international order itself is anchored in this Atlantic order. If we find a transatlantic consensus on rule-based order and multilateralism, we can draw other parts of the world into that structure. The basic characteristic of the Western political system, its modernist norms, are at- tractive to non-Western powers. My travels to India and China gave me the impres- sion that their vision of international order is integrating themselves into the Western order. They want to have seats at the table and be a part of this Western world, not to create new institutions of their own. … it can be the basis of a “New World Order” The Cold War was won by maintaining unity within the West. This Western world unified against the Eastern bloc was a container for the most expan- sive economy and politically stabilizing order in history. As a massive innovation machine for wealth and creativity, it was integrative and absorbent on the outside because countries wanted to join. Therefore, protecting the Atlantic order ultimately means to provide an anchor for the integration of a larger system into it.

Bertram It has turned out that we are still grappling with the extent to which our world Lack of resources and the gap has changed. Thinking in the old context, in terms of the resources that we have between words and deeds: so far devoted to the issue, is no longer enough. We create a credibility gap be- we must think more ambitiously tween what we supposedly care about and what we do, a gap between words and deeds, as several of us have pointed out. If today’s challenges are as serious as we

Ikenberry | Bertram 118 There is no way around a courageous and fundamental reform of the UN system. von Weizsäcker

around this table think — not just the security threats, but the interconnectedness of our globalized world in which things that happened elsewhere hit home — we have to think much more ambitiously. Extending organizations and making great declarations will no longer be enough. We will have to follow this up with serious sacrifices. It seems to me that we are still far from that.

May I add a few words of thanks to our moderator ? Christoph Bertram has been von Weizsäcker very concentrated, strict and at the same time quite liberal. A discussion with so many learned persons is much harder to guide than a parliament’s plenary ses- sion. Thank you very much for always leading us back to the real subject. Our Round Table has shown how much a possible New World Order is still Is a “New World Order” evolving evolving. Even though we agree that the threats and the distribution of power and what will it look like ? have changed, we differ in our assessment of how much they have done so. There is also a broad array of ideas about how to react to these changes. Which rules, policies and institutions should be used to address today’s challenges, and which should be reformed, abolished or reinvented to be up to that task ? Our debate painted a comprehensive picture of the current positions and offered some very interesting new ways of thinking. To my mind, there is no way around a courageous and fundamental reform of Petty reforms are no longer sufficient the UN system and its relations to other international actors. We tend to confine our thinking to petty reforms that seem politically feasible. This will not be suf- ficient to adapt the structures and rules of the international system to the chal- lenges of the 21st century. I hope some of the bolder analyses and ideas developed during our discussion will find their way in the broader political debate. I look forward to meeting again in the future and seeing which elements of a New World Order have turned out to be the decisive ones.

119 Bertram | von Weizsäcker ANNEX

Participants

Dr. Ghanim Alnajjar Ambassador Avis Bohlen Professor, University of Kuwait; Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow editor of the Gulf Studies Series Wilson Center, Washington D.C.; Journal. UN Independent Expert former Assistant Secretary of appointed by Kofi Annan on Hu- State for Arms Control, U.S. De- man Rights in Somalia; member partment of State; former U.S. of the Amnesty International De- Ambassador to Bulgaria; former legation and other UN and humanitarian mis- Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in sions in Iraq since April 2003. Paris; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Selected writings: “Human Rights in a Crisis: The for European Affairs; served on the Policy Plan- Case of Kuwait After Occupation,” Human Rights ning Staff and as Executive Director on the U.S. Quarterly (2001); “Challenges Facing Kuwaiti De- Delegation for Nuclear and Space Talks in Ge- mocracy,” Middle East Journal (2002); The Univer- neva. sal Declaration of Human Rights: A Western In- Selected Writings: “The Rise and Fall of Arms Con- vention ? (2003). trol,” Survival (2003). Pages: 39, 40, 50, 77, 89, 115 Pages: 36, 81, 93, 98, 116

Dr. Christoph Bertram Dr. Gerald Chan Born 1937 Senior Fellow and Coordinator of Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft the “China Project,” Centre for und Politik (SWP) — German In- International Studies, Cambridge stitute for International and Se- University; Senior Lecturer in In- curity Affairs, Berlin; former Di- ternational Relations, Victoria rector, International Institute for University of Wellington, New Strategic Studies (IISS), London; former Foreign Zealand; former Visiting Professor at several uni- Policy Editor for DIE ZEIT. versities; numerous publications on China and Selected Writings: Europe in Balance: Securing the Japan in The China Quarterly, International Rela- Peace Won in the Cold War (1995); Inspection Not tions of the Asia-Pacific, etc. Invasion (2003). Selected Writings: Chinese Perspectives on Inter- Pages: 23, 28, 33, 35, 39, 45, 46, 54, 55, 62, 66, 67, national Relations (1999); China’s International 70, 71, 76, 89, 93, 97, 114, 118 Relations in the 21st Century (co-ed., 2000). Pages: 34, 76, 98

123 Dr. Patrick O. Cohrs Dr. Anthony Glees Born 1972 Born 1948 Research Fellow, Humboldt Uni- Professor, Director, Centre for ver sity, Berlin and German His- Intelligence and Security Studies, torical Institute London; former Brunel University, Uxbridge; sen- Post-Doctoral Fellow, Center for ior politics chair; 1988 – 89 adviser European Studies, Harvard Uni- to the UK governments on War versity; D.Phil. at Lincoln and St. Antony’s College, Crimes; 1998 – 99 adviser to BBC Television on in- University of Oxford. telligence and subversion; Board Member Wilton Selected Writings: “The First ‘Real’ Peace Settle- British-German Forum; adviser to City University- ments after the First World War,” Contemporary ESCP-EAP European Management Programme, European History (2003); The Unfinished Peace. publications in The Times, The Daily Mail, The Britain, the United States and the International Observer, regular commentator on intelligence Stabilisation of Europe, 1919 –1932 (2004). matters on BBC TV, BBC Radio (all stations), for Pages: 53 Reuters, Sky TV and Swiss, Austrian and German national and local radio. Dr. Elizabeth Economy Selected Writings: Reinventing Germany: German Born 1962 Political Development Since 1945 (1996); “Britain, Senior Fellow and Director of Germany and the Problem of Russia,” German Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Politics (1999); “Rechtsstaatlichkeit under chal- Relations, Washington D. C.; mem- lenge in the Berlin Republic: The Kohl Affair and ber of the National Committee the Stasi Legacy,” in: E. Kolinsky/M. Dennis, on U.S.-China Relations; former United and Divided — Germany Since 1990 (2002); Co-chair of the Woodrow Wilson Center Working Spinning the Spies: Tony Blair and the Manage- Group on China and the Environment; former ment of British Intelligence (2004). professorial lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, Pages: 40, 78, 91 former research fellow at Columbia University. Selected Writings: The Internationalization of En- Heather Grabbe vironmental Protection (co-ed., 1997); China Joins Deputy Director, Centre for Euro- the World: Progress and Prospects (co-ed., 1999); pean Reform, London; member The River Runs Black: The Environmental Chal- of the Council of the Royal Insti- lenge to China’s Future (2004). tute of International Affairs, the Pages: 50, 68, 97 British Königswinter Committee, the Wilton Park Academic Coun- cil, and the Governing Body of the British Asso- ciation for Central and Eastern Europe.

124 Selected Writings: Enlarging the EU Eastwards Professor Pierre Hassner (with Kirsty Hughes, 1998); Germany and Britain: Senior Research Associate and An Alliance of Necessity (with Wolfgang Mün- Research Director Emeritus, Cen- chau, 2001); The Constellations of Europe: How tre d’Etudes et de Recherches In- Enlargement Will Change the EU (2003). ternationales (CERI-FNSP), Paris; Pages: 57, 87, 111 Visiting professor for Sources of Violence in International Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Ad- Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, vanced International Studies (SAIS), Bologna MdB Center. Born 1971 Selected Writings: Violence and Peace: From the Member of the German Bun- Atomic bomb to Ethnic Cleansing (1997); United destag, Berlin (CSU — Christian States: The Empire of Force or the Force of Em- Social Union of Bavaria); member pire ? (2002); Visions d’empire: anthologie du dé- of the German Bundestag’s For- bat américain de politique étrangère (2003); eign Affairs Committee and the sub committee Washington et le Monde. Dilemme d’une super- for disarmament and arms control; member of puissance (2003); America and the Use of Force the German Council on Foreign Relations. (forthcoming). Pages: 40, 95 Pages: 33, 49, 63

Dr. Amr Hamzawy Reinhard Hesse Born 1967 Born 1956 Assistant Professor, Department Commissary (“Sherpa”) of the of Political Science and Deputy German Chancellor for the “Pro- Director, Center for European gressive Governance Network” in Studies, University of Cairo; for- the Federal Chancellery, Berlin; mer Assistant Professor, Otto- journalist and editor (taz, Trans- Suhr-Institute for Political Science, Free Univer- Atlantik, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Woche, Merian, sity, Berlin; expert on Middle Eastern politics for Geo), columnist (openDemocracy.net); as of 1998 the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation head speech writer for Gerhard Schröder. and Development. Selected Writings: Tatort Wort (1983), Reifeprü- Selected Writings: The Tension between Continu- fung — Reformpolitik am Ende des Jahrhunderts; ity and Change in Contemporary Arab Political Und weil wir unser Land verbessern … 26 Briefe Thought: Intellectual Debates of the 1990s für ein modernes Deutschland (1993 and 1998, (2002). with Gerhard Schröder); Der ganz vernünftige Pages: 44, 49, 83, 86, 113, 114 Wahn. Sieben Gegendarstellungen zum Islam-

125 ischen Fundamentalismus (1998), Ground Zero — stitutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding Der Westen, die islamische Welt und der globale of Order after Major Wars (2001); Reinventing the Djihad (2002). Alliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era Pages: 42, 65, 66, 115 of Change (co-ed., 2003). Pages: 34, 60, 118 Ambassador John L. Hirsch Born 1936 Stefan Kornelius Senior Fellow, International Born 1965 Peace Academy, New York; Ad- Foreign Editor, Süddeutsche Zei- junct Professor, Occidental Col- tung, Munich; former political lege, Los Angeles; formerly correspondent in Bonn and cor- United States Ambassador to the respondent in Washington D.C.; Republic of Sierra Leone, Political Advisor to the former Deputy Director of the Commander of UNITAF (Somalia); and U.S. Con- office of Süddeutsche Zeitung in Berlin; co-founder sul General in Johannesburg, South Africa. and chief editor of Medium Magazin, contribu- Selected Writings: Somalia and Operation Restore tions to Stern magazine and BBC. Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peace- Pages: 48, 84, 112 keeping (with Robert Oakley, 1995); Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy Dr. Stephen Krasner (2001). Born 1942 Pages: 43, 82, 110 Professor of International Rela- tions, Stanford University; Senior Dr. G. John Ikenberry Fellow and Deputy Director, Stan- Born 1954 ford Institute for International Professor of Geopolitics and Glo- Studies and Senior Fellow, Stan- bal Justice and Director, Mortara ford Institute for Economic Policy Research Center for International Affairs, (SIEPR). Georgetown University, Washing- Selected Writings: Sovereignty — Organized Hypoc- ton D. C.; former Professor at risy (1999); Exploration and Contestation in the Princeton University and the University of Penn- Study of World Politics (co-ed., 1999). sylvania; former Senior Associate, Carnegie En- Pages: 32, 51, 67, 108 dowment for International Peace; former mem- ber of the Policy Planning Department, U.S. State Department. Selected Writings: New Thinking in International Relations Theory (co-ed., 1997); After Victory: In-

126 Dr. Nico Krisch Peaceful Change of International Order (2001); Hauser Research Scholar and Vis- The End of the American Era (2002). iting Fellow, Institute for Interna- Pages: 33, 73, 112 tional Law and Justice, New York University School of Law; former Lotte Leicht Research Fellow, Max Planck In- Director of Human Rights Watch stitute for International Law in (HRW), Brussels; Member of the Heidelberg, Germany . International Humanitarian Law Selected Writings: “Unilateral Enforcement of the Committee of the Danish Red Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Cross; former Program Director, Council,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations International Helsinki Federation Law (1999); Selbstverteidigung und kollektive for Human Rights; former staff member of the Sicherheit (2001); “More Equal than the Rest ? Danish Center of Human Rights; numerous pub- Hierarchy, Equality and U.S. Predominance in In- lications on human rights issues in Wall Street ternational Law,” in: M. Byers/G. Nolte (eds.), Journal, International Herald Tribune, Libre Belgique, United States Hegemony and the Foundations of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, DIE ZEIT, Diplo- International Law (2003); “Amerikanische Hege- matic Review, Humanitarian Affairs Review. monie und liberale Revolution im Völkerrecht,” Selected Writings: “Monitoring Human Rights in Der Staat (2004). Europe: Comparing International Standards and Pages: 53, 85 Mechanisms” (co-ed., 1993); “Droit de l’Homme & Démocratie: relativité ou universalité” (1998). Dr. Charles Kupchan Pages: 52, 76, 79, 108 Born 1958 Professor of International Rela- Tod Lindberg tions, Georgetown University, Editor, Policy Review; Research Washington D.C.; Senior Fellow Fellow, Hoover Institution; mem- and Director of Europe Studies at ber of the Council on Foreign the Council on Foreign Relations; Relations; member of the Board former Director for European Affairs on the Na- of Visitors of the Institute on tional Security Council; former member of the Political Journalism, Georgetown Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of University, Washington D.C.; columnist for the State and Assistant Professor of Politics at Princ- Washington Times and contributing editor to the eton University. Weekly Standard; former commentator for Com- Selected Writings: Atlantic Security: Contending mentary, National Review, Wall Street Journal, USA Visions (1998); Civic Engagement in the Atlantic Today, and the Los Angeles Times. Community (1999); Power in Transition: The Selected Writings: “Service and The State,” The

127 Brookings Review (2002); “September 11 & Sep- Dame Pauline Neville-Jones tember 10,” Policy Review (2001). DCMG Pages: 77 Born 1939 Chair, QinetiQ Holdings Ltd., Simon Lunn London; International Governor Secretary General, NATO Parlia- of the BBC with special responsi- mentary Assembly, Brussels; bility for the BBC World Service former Deputy Secretary Gen- and BBC World; Chair, Information Assurance eral, NATO PA; former Head of Advisory Council; former Deputy and then Chef the Policy and Plans Section of de Cabinet to the Budget and Financial Institu- NATO; former advisor on foreign tions Commissioner at the European Commis- policy to the President of the European Parlia- sion; former Head of Defence and Overseas Secre- ment; former Research Fellow, Royal Institute of tariat of the Joint Intelligence Committee; former International Affairs and Research Analyst, Con- Political Director in the Foreign Commonwealth gressional Research Service, Washington D.C. Office; former career member of the Diplomatic Selected writings: “Relations between the Euro- Service with postings in Rhodesia, Singapore, pean Union and NATO,” European Quality Publi- Washington and Bonn. cations (2001); Oversight and Guidance: The Rel- Selected Writings: “Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Re- evance of Parliamentary Oversight for the lations in Bosnia,” Survival (1996). Security Sector and its Reform (co-ed., 2003). Pages: 28, 47, 74, 86 Pages: 95 Vyacheslav Nikonov Ambassador Thomas Matussek President of the Politika Founda- Born 1947 tion, Moscow; President of Unity Ambassador of the Federal Re- for Russia Foundation; Editor-in- public of Germany to Great Brit- chief of “Russia’s Strategy” jour- ain, London; formerly responsi- nal; Dean of History and Political ble for the organization of the Science at International Univer- UN talks on Afghanistan in Bonn sity in Moscow; former Member of the State in 2001; former Head of the Minister’s Office Duma and Chairman of the Subcommittee for under Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher International Security and Arms Control; former and Klaus Kinkel; former Deputy Chief of Mission, political advisor to Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov German Embassy Washington; former Director and to former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov; General for Political Affairs, Federal Foreign Of- former assistant to the Chief of Staff, Office of the fice, Berlin. President of the USSR; former Senior Fellow of Pages: 32, 70 the “Reforma Foundation.”

128 Selected Writings: Современная российская поли- Prof. Dr. Thomas Risse тика — Present Russian Policy (co-writer, 2003); Born 1955 Эпоха перемен Россия–х глазами консерватора — Professor, Free University, Berlin; Russia in the 90’s From a Conservative’s Perspec- former Joint Chair in Internatio- tive (1999); “Belarus in Russian Foreign Policy,” in: nal Relations, European Univer- S. Garnett/R. Legvold (eds.), Belarus at the Cross- sity Institute, Florence; former roads (1998). Professor of International Politics, Pages: 35, 71, 96 Konstanz University; former Visiting Professor at Yale and Stanford; member of the Working Group Ambassador Janusz Reiter on Peace and Conflict Research, Planning Staff, Born 1952 German Foreign Office. Head, Center for International Selected Writings: Bringing Transnational Rela- Relations, Warsaw; former Polish tions Back In (1995); Cooperation Among Democ- Ambassador to Germany; regular racies — The European Influence on U.S. Foreign contributor to “Rzeczpospolita”; Policy (1995); Die Macht der Menschenrechte (co- former expert on Germany for writer, 2002), Handbook of International Rela- Solidarnosc and Gazeta Wyborcza. tions (co-ed., 2002). Selected Writings: Die deutsch-polnischen Bezie- Pages: 35, 71, 77, 114 hungen: Eine Interessen- und Wertegemein- schaft ? (co-writer, 1999); Das Weimarer Dreieck. Jan Roß Die französisch-deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen Born 1965 als Motor der Europäischen Integration (2000). Staff Writer, DIE ZEIT, Berlin; Pages: 51, 85 former Staff Writer, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. David Rieff Selected Writings: Die neuen Staats- Senior Fellow, World Policy Insti- feinde (1998); Der Papst: Johannes tute, New York; journalist, writer Paul II, Drama und Geheimnis (2000). and policy analyst. Pages: 117 Selected Writings: Los Angeles: Capital of the Third World (1991); Dr. Michael Schaefer Exile: Cuba in the Heart of Miami Born 1949 (1993); Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of Political Director, Federal Foreign the West (1995); Bed for the Night: Humanitarian- Office, Berlin; former Special En- ism in Crisis (2002). voy for Southeast Europe; Head Pages: 46, 55, 88, 91 of the Western Balkans Task Force, Foreign Office; Head of the

129 Political Department, Permanent UN Mission, Royal Historical Society; former member of the Geneva; Head of Training for Senior Civil Serv- Advisory Council of the German Historical Insti- ants, Foreign Office; Permanent Representative, tute, Washington D.C. . Embassy Singapore; Adviser at UN Security Coun- Selected Writings: Austria, Great Britain and the cil Division, Foreign Office; Political Advisor, UN Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Permanent Mission New York; Office of the State Concert (1972); “Did the Vienna Settlement Rest Secretary, Foreign Office. on a Balance of Power ?” American Historical Re- Pages: 37, 69, 93, 101, 107, 116 view (1992); The Transformation of European Politics, 1763 –1848 (1994). Dr. Ulrich Schlie Pages: 23, 53 Born 1965 Advisor on Foreign and European Ambassador Shimon Stein Affairs to the Minister-President Born 1948 of the State of Hessen, Berlin; Israeli Ambassador to Germany, member of the board, Carl Jacob Berlin; former Deputy State Sec- Burckhardt Foundation; Lecturer retary, Foreign Ministry, Jerusa- at Erfurt Uni versity; former Alfred-Grosser-pro- lem; former Director of the De- fessor, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sci- partment for Arms Control and ences Po); former Visiting Fellow Peterhouse/ Disarmament, Foreign Ministry; former Attaché Cambridge. at the Israeli Embassy in Washington D.C.; former Selected Writings: Kein Friede mit Deutschland. Deputy Director, Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem; Die geheimen Gespräche im Zweiten Weltkrieg former member of the Israeli delegation to the (1994); Albert Speer — Alles was ich weiß (ed., CSCE, Mediterranean Section. 2000); Die Nation erinnert sich. Die Denkmäler Pages: 38, 114 der Deutschen (2002); Ulrich von Hassell, Rö- mische Tagebücher und Briefe 1932 –1938 (Hg., Karsten D. Voigt 2004). Born 1941 Pages: 50, 107 Co-ordinator of German-Ameri- can Cooperation, Federal Foreign Professor Paul W. Schroeder Office, Berlin; former President, Professor (emeritus) of History NATO Parliamentary Assembly; and Political Sciences, University former Member of the German of Illinois; former Fellow at the Bundestag and Foreign Policy spokesman of the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Parliamentary Group of the German Social Dem- United States Institute of Peace; ocratic Party (SPD); former Member of the Execu- Corresponding Fellow of the tive Committee of the SPD and of the Social

130 Democratic Parties of the European Union (SPE); Dr. Samuel Wells Member of the Board of the German Council on Associate Director, Woodrow Wil- Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin; Member of the son Center, Washington D.C.; Board of Trustees of Atlantik-Brücke e.V. and of former Director of the Wilson the Aspen Institute, Berlin. Center’s Working Group on Glo- Selected Writings: Conventional Defence in Eu- bal Finance and International Se- rope: A Comprehensive Evaluation (1985); Mehr curity Studies Program; former Vertrauen, weniger Waffen (1987). Consultant to the Office of the Secretary of De- Pages: 64, 101 fense; former Associate Professor of History, Uni- versity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker Selected Writings: The Helsinki Process and the Born 1920 Future of Europe (1990); New European Orders, Former President of the Federal 1919 and 1991 (1996); The Quest for Sustained Republic of Germany (1984 –1994); Growth: Southeast Asian and Southeast Euro- former Governing Mayor of West pean Cases (1999). Berlin (1981 –1984); former Vice Pages: 38 President of the German Parlia- ment (1969 –1981); former member of the Federal Dr. Katja Wiesbrock Executive Board of the Christian Democratic Born 1971 Union (CDU); former President of the German Member of the Permanent Mis- Lutheran Church Council; Winner of the Hein- sion of Germany to the United rich-Heine (1991) and Leo-Baeck Awards (1994); Nations, New York; former mem- Chairman of the Bergedorf Round Table of the ber of the Planning Staff, Foreign Körber Foundation. Office, Berlin; former Research Selected Writings: Die deutsche Geschichte geht Assistant, Institute for International Law, Göttin- weiter (1983); Von Deutschland nach Europa gen. (1991); Richard von Weizsäcker im Gespräch Selected Writings: Schutz der Menschenrechte vor (1992); Vier Zeiten. Erinnerungen (1997); Drei Mal Verletzungen durch Privatpersonen (1999); “Test- Stunde Null ? 1949 –1969 –1989 (2001). fall Irak – Von den Vorzügen abgestimmten mul- Pages: 22, 74, 81, 116, 119 tilateralen Verhaltens,” Zeitschrift für die Vere- inten Nationen (2003). Pages: 45, 79, 80

131 Recommended Literature

Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, London: Knowledge Society 2003. http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/ The European Common Foreign and Security David Armstrong, “Dick Cheney’s Song of Amer- Policy (CFSP). ica,” Harper’s Magazine (October 2002). http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp ?id=248&lan g=en&mode=g Coral Bell, “The Normative Shift,” The National Interest (Winter 2002/2003). Gareth Evans/Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibil- ity to Protect, Report of the International Commission Tony Blair, Speech on the Threat of Global Terrorism, on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa: Sedgefield: March 5th, 2004. 2001. http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page5461.asp http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report- en.asp John Braithwaite, Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation, Cambridge: 2000. Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power, Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice, New York: 2004. New York: 2004.

Ian Buruma/Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: The Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: West in the Eyes of Its Enemies, New York: 2004. Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, Ithaca: 2003. George W. Bush, Graduation speech at West Point on the Role of the US in World Politics, 2002: Judith Goldstein et al. (eds.), Legalization and http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/ World Politics, Cambridge/Mass.: 2001. 20020601-3.html Pierre Hassner, “Puissance et légitimité,” Com- Michael Byers/Georg Nolte (eds.), United States mentaire (Winter 2002/2003). Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, New York: 2003. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, New York: 1982.

Charter of the United Nations Human Development Report 2003: Millenium Devel- http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html opment Goals http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/ Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies, New York: 2004. Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite, Toronto: 2003.

132 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory, Princeton: 2000. Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton: 2003. G. John Ikenberry, “Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order,” Foreign Affairs (March/ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, New April 2004). York: 1993.

Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, New York: Paul W. Schroeder, “Iraq: The Case Against 2003. Preemptive War,” The American Conservative (Octo- ber 21st, 2001). Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace, Cambridge: 2003. Anne Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, Princ- eton: 2004. Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era, New York: 2003. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, New York: 2002 David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Are Some So Rich and Others So Poor ?, New Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction, Ithaca: York: 1998 2001.

Thierry Meyssan: 9/11: The Big Lie, Chatou: 2002. Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to National Security Strategy of the United States Kant, Oxford: 1999. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf Paul Wolfowitz, “Bridging the Centuries,” The Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, Ox- National Interest (Spring 1997). ford: 2002. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: 2004. Richard Perle / David Frum, An End to Evil, New York: 2003.

Pew Global Attitude Survey: http://people-press.org

Francois de la Rochefoucauld, Maximes et Reflex- ions Diverses, Paris: 2001.

133 Glossary

Afghanistan cluding on passenger trains in Madrid and targets In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, an alli- in Iraq. During the US-led invasion of Afghani- ance led by the United States invaded Afghanistan stan, many of its fighters were killed or taken to destroy the radical Islamist Taliban regime and prisoner. Yet according to experts the group re- eliminate the country’s network of Al Qaeda ter- mains viable and, thanks to its decentralized or- rorist training camps. The Taliban was toppled ganization, can survive even without bin Laden. and replaced in January 2002 by the “Afghan Transitional Authority.” UN Resolution 1386 man- Arab League dated the establishment of an international secu- An association of 22 states in Africa and the Mid- rity force (ISAF) for the capital Kabul and environs, dle East founded to promote regional relations so that a grand tribal council or Loya Jirga could and independence for the Palestinians. The Arab safely appoint an interim government, of which League’s work is often obstructed by conflicting Hamid Karzai became interim president. Smaller national interests. Its summit in March 2004 in forces of “International Reconstruction Teams” Tunis was supposed to demand democratic and provide security and promote reconstruction in human rights reforms, as well as an Arab contri- more outlying areas. The rebuilding effort (re- bution to the → Greater Middle East Initiative. form of the police, army, and judiciary; demilita- The meeting was postponed and, after reconven- rization; fighting drugs production) is coordi- ing in May, produced only vague results with nated by the five “lead nations,” Germany, Italy, scaled-down attendance. the US, Britain, and Japan. www.arableagueonline.org www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html ASEAN Al Qaeda The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Arabic for “the base.” Islamist terrorist network (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Ma- founded by Osama → bin Laden during the 1980s laysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Between in Afghanistan, supported by the US. Expanded 1984 and 1999, the Association was augmented by its structures during the 1990s in weak or failed Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. states such as Somalia and Yemen. Fights the US Its purpose is to promote economic, social, and and seeks to remove US military presence in Mus- cultural cooperation among its members, and lim states and overthrow Muslim regimes it con- thereby peace and security in the region. Efforts siders degenerate, such as Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda toward economic integration on the pattern of is held responsible for the attacks on the World the EU were derailed by the 1997 Asian economic Trade Center of 2001 and 1993, the US embassies crisis. A closer union is also being hindered by in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam in 1998, and on the deficits in mutual trust, differing values, and Saudi National Training Center in 1995. It is also conflicting national interests. suspected in connection with recent attacks, in- www.aseansec.org

134 Aum Cult the southern and eastern Mediterranean. The On March 20, 1995, members of the cult Aum process seeks to establish a common space of Shinri Kyo (today “Aleph”) carried out a nerve gas democracy, human rights, and free trade, with attack on the Tokyo metro system, killing 12 peo- cultural exchanges and promotion of civil society. ple and injuring 5500. The attack was directed at The unstable situation in the Middle East and the state, the emperor, and the police. As of Feb- stalled democratization in states such as Tunisia ruary 2004, cult leader Shoko Asahara and eleven have laid doubt on the Barcelona Process’ chances cult members have been sentenced to death; for success. none of which have been carried out. The Aum http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/ cult’s attack was the first extensive terrorist at- tack using weapons of mass destruction, and is Bin Laden, Osama (born 1957) thus considered as having ushered in a new era of Leader of the Islamist terrorist network → Al terrorism. Qaeda. Scion of a wealthy Saudi industrialist fam- http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3504237.stm ily, bin Laden joined the Afghan anti-Soviet resist- ance (→ Taliban) in 1979. He rose to a leadership “axis of evil” position in the US-supported guerrilla conflict Expression used by US President George W. Bush with the Soviets by providing financial support in his State of the Union Address in January 2002 and establishing a chain of camps where thou- to characterize North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as the sands of fighters were trained. These provided countries that most threaten global security by the manpower pool for bin Laden’s subsequent proliferating weapons of mass destruction and terrorist activities. support terrorism. During World War II, Winston http://observer.guardian.co.uk/focus/story/0,, Churchill used the term “Axis” for the alliance of 582138,00.html Germany, Italy, and Japan. US President Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union “the evil empire” Bolton, John (born 1948) in the 1980s. US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002 International Security. He has vehemently op- 0129-11.html posed the → International Criminal Court, which he claims threatens to impair US sovereignty. Barcelona Process Bolton maintains that the US must be able to de- Founded at the 1995 EU Foreign Ministers’ Con- fend its interests in the world in an unrestricted ference in Barcelona, it cemented the partner- and sustainable manner. In 2003, Bolton consid- ship between the EU and Mediterranean states. ered expanding the “axis of evil” to include Syria, The Barcelona Process, as it has come to be Libya, and Cuba. known, is meant to expand political and techni- www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/2976.htm cal cooperation between the EU and ten states in

135 Bush Doctrine → National Security Strategy Council of Foreign Ministers. Institutionalized in 1999 in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU’s senior Chechnya diplomat is the High Representative for the Com- Guerrillas in this North Caucasian republic of the mon Foreign and Security Policy (since 1999 Russian Federation have been fighting since 1991 Javier Solana), who is also Secretary-General of for independence, something which Moscow has the Council of the EU. The → European Security refused. Full-scale war broke out in 1994 and Strategy was developed under his leadership, and ended temporarily with a compromise in 1996. within the framework of the European Security Russian troops invaded Chechnya again in 1999 and Defense Policy, he coordinates the expansion and have since been engaged in a low-level con- of the EU’s military capacities (→ Rapid Reaction flict there with Chechen rebels. In recent years, Force). The EU’s foreign policy is also the reponsi- rebels have also carried out terrorist attacks else- bility of the European Commissioner for External where in the Russian Federation, notably in Mos- Relations. Once the European Constitution takes cow, to which the Kremlin has responded with effect in 2007, Solana will become European For- increasing pressure in Chechnya itself. Russian eign Minister with the office’s own diplomatic conduct there has been criticized for its brutality service. and countless human rights violations (esp. tor- http://ue.eu.int ture and rape) that have mostly gone uninvesti- gated. The Russian government, on the other Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty hand, calls Chechnya a → failed state and the 1996 agreement that bans its 71 signatory states rebels part of a network of international Islamist from conducting nuclear tests. It supports and terrorists. The recent hostage taking in a school complements the → Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Beslan, which ended in a massacre, has intensi- Treaty. The CTBT has not yet taken effect because fied both the Kremlin’s rhetoric and international important powers, including the United States criticism of President Vladimir Putin’s policy to- and China, have not yet ratified it. The treaty also ward Chechnya. provides for a watchdog agency, the International http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/rus-summary-eng Monitoring System in Vienna. It has taken up work despite the lack of ratifications. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) www.ctbto.org of the EU The CFSP, established by the Treaty of Maastricht Congo Conference 1884 – 85 in 1993, coordinated the foreign and security In a conference called by German Chancellor policies of the EU’s member states, promoting an Otto von Bismarck, representatives of the US, increasingly unified European profile and en- Turkey, the European powers, and Russia agreed hanced European influence in foreign policy mat- in Berlin on the division of Africa into colonies. ters. The decision-making body of the CSFP is the The final document, the Congo Act, included the

136 following provisions: Congo became the private of Local and Regional Authorities, and the Secre- property of the Belgian King, the power that first tary General. Its staff comprises some 1800 civil occupied a territory had the right to claim it as a servants. colony, and the slave trade was banned. www.coe.int/DefaultDE.asp

Core Europe CSCE → Helsinki Final Act of 1975 The concept of a “core Europe” refers to a group of states within the European Union pursuing ECOSOC deeper and accelerated integration. Such a Euro- The UN Economic and Social Council coordinates pean avant-garde prevent, say its supporters, eu- the activities of many of the world body’s sub- rosceptic member states from determining the sidiary organizations. The Council is meant to tempo of the integration process. The term first improve living standards, increase employment, appeared in an essay written by the German CDU and find solutions to economic, social, and health- parliamentarians Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl related issues. ECOSOC works closely with univer- Lamers. It gained renewed popularity in 2003 in sities, the economic community, and NGOs. The the wake of the failure to agree a European con- various continents are represented according to stitution. Lands widely considered predestined their populations in the 54-seat Council. for a core Europe include Belgium, France, Ger- www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc/ many, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether- lands, Portugal, and Spain, since these are all European Security Strategy members of NATO and the Schengen Agreement, Passed by the European Council in December and have adopted the euro as their currency. 2003 in response to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, and → failed Council of Europe states. The strategy meets these new threats of Institution based in Strasbourg that monitors and the 21st century with steps to safeguard security promotes the rule of law and human rights in its among Europe’s neighbors and promote a multi- 45 member states. Since the fall of the Berlin lateral global order. One point of emphasis is on Wall, the Council has pursued this goal particu- prevention. Civilian actions have priority, but the larly in Central and Eastern Europe, so as to make military option is not ruled out. The ESS is meant possible the close association of all European to give the → Common Foreign and Security Pol- states in the longer term. The Council of Europe icy a clear direction for the 21st century, and is consists of the Committee of Ministers (foreign understood as an answer to the US → National ministers of member states), the Parliamentary Security Strategy. It also emphasizes the EU’s Assembly (626 parliamentarians from the mem- partnership with the United States and their com- ber states and accession candidates, not identical mon analyses of global threats. The ESS seeks to with the European Parliament), the Congress expand cooperation between the EU and NATO

137 that was decided in the so-called BerlinPlus will have a single foreign minister beginning in Agreement of 1996, which stated that European 2007. military missions such as that in Kosovo can take http://europa.eu.int/abc/index_en.htm advantage of NATO planning capacity. The ESS is considered the work of the EU High Representa- Failed States tive for Foreign and Security Policy and desig- Nominal political entities such as Sierra Leone or nated EU Foreign Minister Javier Solana. Critics Somalia, where fundamental integrating forces point out that it fails to provide approaches to such as governance and education have either resolving conflicts in the Mediterranean, the new ceased to exist or verge on collapse. Additionally, EU states, and the Middle East. multiple and conflicting interest groups, extreme http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf poverty, high violence thresholds, and ready www.aicgs.org/c/vanham.shtml availability of weapons help create a power vac- www.aicgs.org/c/schroerc.shtml uum in which organized crime and clan-based regimes gain ascendancy. Failed states are often European Union threatened by humanitarian catastrophes. The The European Union emerged from the European UN often intervenes to prevent this from happen- Community for Coal and Steel, founded in 1951 ing. In Somalia in 1995, a three-year UN mission and consisting of Germany, France, Italy, Bel- was abandoned after US soldiers had been killed. gium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Since its eastward expansion on May 1, 2004, it counts G 8 25 member states. The EU has five organs: The The Group of Eight (G 8) is a forum in which the European Council of state and government heads, heads of state and government of the eight most which meets at least twice annually to lay down powerful industrialized nations meet to exchange political objectives; the European Commission, views on ways to approach global problems. Be- as the “engine of European integration,” promul- sides the annual economic summits of govern- gates legislation and, as the “guardian of the trea- ment heads, foreign, finance, and environmental ties,” implements EU law and treaties throughout ministers also meet within the framework of the the Union. In the European Parliament, 625 di- G 8. Senior government officials (“sherpas”) pre- rectly elected representatives exercise legislative, pare the meetings in a complicated procedure. budgetary, and supervisory rights over the Com- G 8 resolutions are non-binding, yet set the tone mission. Additional organs are the European for member states in other multilateral organiza- Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. To tions. Founded in 1975 by Germany, France, Brit- enhance its foreign policy effectiveness, the ain, Italy, Japan, and the US, the group added Union established the → Common Foreign and Canada in 1976; Russia became a full member in Security Policy. According to the European Con- 1997. The European Union is also represented in stitution agreed in 2004, the European Union the G 8. The organization is heavily criticized by

138 anti-globalization activists, who staged violent key. → G 8 states, in collaboration with politicians protests at the G 8 summit in Genoa in 2001. and civil society, are to promote transformation www.guardian.co.uk/G 8/0,13365,967228,00.html in this region. Criticism from partners in the re- gion and alternative suggestions (→ Arab League) GATT → WTO led to changes of important passages (e. g. empha- sizing the region’s responsibility for itself). At the Globalization G 8 summit in June 2004, the “Broader Middle This relatively unselective term is used to denote East and North Africa Initiative” was resolved on the expansion of international economic rela- this foundation. Throughout this process, critical tionships and the integration of markets, espe- voices have argued that the geographical defini- cially with the help of modern technologies, tion of a “Greater Middle East” and the Initiative’s which have greatly facilitated the exchange of content are actually detrimental to peace. goods, services, ideas, and people compared with www.meib.org/articles/0407_me2.htm the past. It has been accompanied by growing www.meib.org/documentfile/040213.htm international competition and global problems www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/33375.htm that are causing national governments difficul- www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/2004 ties in addressing the issues autonomously. Glo- 0609-29.html balization also means the expansion of Western values and lifestyles throughout the world. The Haiti destruction of long-established societal models In 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide became the Carib- and the negative economic effects of globaliza- bean country’s first elected president, after dec- tion are considered by some a cause for the fun- ades of dictatorship. In the hope he would en- damentalist tendencies in poorer countries. courage democratization, the US supported his http://observer.guardian.co.uk/global0,10786,52420 election and returned him to power after a coup 8,00.html in 1994. Early in 2004, anti-Aristide unrest in Haiti grew so widespread that he was forced into Greater Middle East Initiative exile in February. The former president of the In November 2003, US President George W. Bush supreme court, Boniface Alexandre, became in- presented a plan to promote freedom, democracy, terim president. The US, France, and Canada sup- and prosperity in the Middle East. Political, social, ported Aristide’s fall; he accuses them of directly and economic reforms would complement the removing him from the country. military war on terrorism (→ National Security Strategy). The initiative expands the definition of Helsinki Final Act of 1975 the Middle East into the “Greater Middle East,” In 1973 the Conference for Security and Coopera- which in addition to the Arab world includes tion in Europe (CSCE) was founded as a forum of Islamic states such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Tur- communication between the Cold War’s two

139 power blocs. States in East and West Europe, Hobbes, Thomas (1588 –1679) Canada, and the USA discussed three issue com- English philosopher and theorist, presents a pes- plexes (“baskets”): security policy, the economy, simistic view of humanity (“homo homini lupus”) and human rights. CSCE conferences were some- in his main work “Leviathan,” he argued that times the only confidence-building forums be- man is basically a selfishly individualistic animal tween the two camps. In 1975, participants at constant war with others. Fear of violent death signed the Helsinki Final Act, a non-binding dec- is the principal motive for man’s surrender of laration of intent to promote peace and free ex- his natural rights to the absolute sovereign, char- change of ideas. After the end of the East-West acterized as the Leviathan, a mythical monster. conflict, the CSCE committed itself in 1990 in the Hobbes’ political philosophy marked a watershed Charter of Paris to the values of democracy, rule in that it stated that all power is derived from the of law, and the market economy. The conference people instead of by divine right, and that its became an international organization (→ OSCE). arguments were laid out on the basis of reason. www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/ helfa75e.htm House of Saud www.osce.org/docs/german/1990-1999/summits/ Arab aristocratic family that proclaimed the King- helfa75g.htm dom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. King Fahd ibn Abd www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front ?pagename=OpenMark al-Aziz (born 1921) has been official monarch et/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029393816 since 1982. In fact, his half-brother Abdallah exercises governmental power. Other important HIV/AIDS; Malaria positions in the country are also filled by members In 2002, nearly 3 million people died of AIDS and of the family, which numbers about 5,000 people 1.2 million of malaria, making both diseases and bases it power on oil revenues. It governs as among the world’s five chief causes of death. In an absolute monarchy on a religious foundation, 2003, nearly 5 million people became infected without parties or a parliament. An advisory body with HIV; by 2010, at least 10 million additional to the king is the Madjlis al-Shura, an assembly of infections are expected in the Asia-Pacific region 120 members appointed by the king. Crown prince alone. Despite the epidemic’s enormous dimen- Abdallah is considered the most reform-friendly sions and its devastating economic toll, the member of the clan, which is often denounced as United Nations’ anti-AIDS program UNAIDS says corrupt. Saudi Arabia has been censured for finan- that governments worldwide have yet to take ad- cially supporting terrorist organizations. However, equate measures for prevention and treatment. Islamists also criticize the ruling family as US pup- Currently, 90 % of all people infected with HIV do pets and decry the stationing of US troops on not receive proper treatment. Saudi territory. Recently the country has been the www.who.int target of repeated terrorist attacks. www.unaids.org/en/default.asp www.guardian.co.uk/suadi/0,11599,641778,00.html

140 International Criminal Court are the US, Japan, Germany, France, and Britain. The statute of the International Criminal Court Anti-globalization activists criticize the IMF, (ICC) was initiated by the UN General Assembly claiming that its criteria for granting credits, i. e. and drawn up by its Human Rights Convention, privatization and spending cuts, cause social up- and passed in 1998. At present, more than heavals in the receiver states. The IMF is also of- 140 states have signed on, but only 94 have rati- ten made partially responsible for the Argentine fied it. The statute came into effect in 2002, and financial and economic crisis since 1991. since 2003, 18 judges have been active at the ICC www.imf.org in the Hague, charged with prosecuting genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It be- Iraq Conflict comes active when national courts fail to prose- In January 2002, US President George W. Bush cute such crimes or when prosecutors or the UN named Iraq as part of the → “axis of evil.” On Security Council require its investigations. It March 19, 2003, an alliance of US, British, Polish, thereby complements the International Court of Spanish, Danish and Australian troops among Justice in the Hague, which rules on international others (coalition of the willing) invaded Iraq in disputes. Although it is not part of the UN as a “Operation Iraqi Freedom”— the third Iraq war person of international law (in contrast to the after the 1980 – 88 Iraqi-Iranian War and the 1991 tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia), US-led liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation the ICC is bound to the UN through an interna- (Operation Desert Storm). The US’ stated war tional treaty. The US refuses to ratify the statute aims were to remove President Saddam Hussein and instead seeks to gain exceptions for its sol- from power, transform Iraq into a democracy and diers. market economy, and to pre-empt the threat of www.icc-cpi.int/ Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (→ also Na- tional Security Strategy). The US government also International Monetary Fund believed Iraq had links with → Al Qaeda. On The Bretton Woods Conference of 1994 founded May 1, 2003, President Bush announced the con- the World Bank and the International Monetary clusion of major combat operations. The UN has Fund (IMF). Under its present managing direc- been taking part in the rebuilding of the country tor, Rodrigo Rato y Figaredo, the IMF includes since June 2003, but pulled out its foreign work- 184 member states. Its purpose is to coordinate ers after a terrorist attack that killed its chief monetary policies and promote global trade, sta- envoy in Iraq. A coalition led by US, British, and bilize exchange rates, and make credits available Polish forces under US supreme command has to member states in financial trouble. Voting been trying to safeguard public security. The within the organization is weighted according to “Coalition Provisional Authority” under US and the wealth of, and membership dues paid by each British leadership provided an interim adminis- member. Presently the wealthiest member states tration in the country until it was replaced in

141 June 2004 by an interim Iraqi government under Kagan, Robert Iyad Allawi. Elections have been scheduled for Neoconservative academic and publicist who January 2005. Terrorist bombings and attacks on calls for the imposition of democracy and human US troops have become commonplace, as have rights by military means throughout the globe. kidnappings of foreigners and intellectuals in His essay “Of Paradise and Power” coined the Iraq. In Spring 2004 it became known that Iraqi phrase that “Europeans are from Venus; Ameri- prisoners had been tortured in US-run jails. US cans are from Mars,” i.e. Europeans use power intelligence services have since concluded that only according to internationally recognized Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. norms and agreements, while Americans mis- www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/war.tracker/ trust international agreements and recognize the right of the most powerful nations to defend and propagate their own ideas of order and security. ISAF www.bbc.co.uk/bbcfour/documentaries/profile/ The “International Security Assistance Force” was robert-kagan.shtml established at the Bonn → Afghanistan Confer- ence in 2001. The force under UN mandate was Kant, Immanuel (1724 –1804) meant to establish and safeguard security in German philosopher considered to have both Kabul and its environs while supporting the work consummated and gone beyond the Enlighten- of the “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” under ment, and to have paved the way for German ISAF command elsewhere in the country. The Idealism (see Hegel). His main oevre are the three force was initially under British command until “critiques” (Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of June 2002, then Turkish, then Dutch-German, Practical Reason, Critique of Judgement). In his then NATO, and finally, since August 9, 2004, has smaller work “On Eternal Peace” (1795), currently been under the command of the Eurocorps, con- much discussed in the context of the debate on sisting of German, French, Belgian, Luxembourg, global governance, Kant identifies three essential and Spanish troops. The work of ISAF is supposed conditions for a durable international peace. The to end with the first free elections in Afghanistan. actors must be republics (today mostly inter- The force currently totals about 6500 soldiers. preted as democracies), for sovereign people are Twenty-seven had been killed as of May 2004. Es- less disposed to waging war than are despots. pecially in rural areas, ISAF soldiers are often These republics must establish a league of na- powerless against conflicts between various eth- tions to place international relations on a legal nic groups and private armies. basis, and finally, a world citizenry must be estab- www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm lished. Kant leaves the question of implementa- tion open and refers disparagingly to the “nice dreams” of philosophers.

142 Khan, Abdul Qadeer (born 1935) troops were unable to stop the violence. The Pakistani nuclear scientist and “father of Paki- NATO operation to end the civil war in Kosovo stan’s nuclear weapons program,” which culmi- took place without Security Council backing. nated in successful tests of nuclear devices in May NATO’s activities in Kosovo have sparked a debate 1998. Khan’s work made him a national hero. In over whether NATO’s role as a purely defensive February 2004, Khan admitted to having sold nu- alliance should be reconsidered. clear material and technology for years to North www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Map/0,3942,206602, Korea, Iran, and Libya. President Pervez Musharraf 00.html stripped Khan of all titles and offices, then par- doned him. Many analysts suspect that, from the Kyoto Protocol beginning, Khan’s activities were known to the After their third conference in Kyoto in 1997, the highest Pakistani political and military circles. signatories to the UN Climate Framework Con- http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/ vention approved a protocol that has been called 3343621.stm a “milestone of global climate protection.” The Protocol obligates industrialized nations to cut Kosovo Intervention their CO² emissions between 2008 and 2012 to In February 1998, the government of Serbia five percent below the level of 1990. The docu- launched a crackdown on Kosovo-Albanian guer- ment represents recognition by industrialized rillas (KLA). In response, NATO initiated a military states of their responsibility for global warming campaign from February to June 1999 to prevent and towards developing nations, which are obli- a humanitarian catastrophe in the form of “eth- gated to begin cutting their emissions beginning nic cleansing.” On June 10, 1999, NATO ceased its in 2012. The Protocol can take effect only if 55 bombing campaign and the UN Security Council industrialized nations accounting for at least 55 % passed Resolution 1244, which established the of global greenhouse gas emissions ratify the Kosovo protection force → KFOR and an interim Kyoto Protocol. Yet the decisive countries, the civilian administration, → UNMIK. In 2000 and United States (accounting for 36.1 % of all emis- 2001 elections were held in Serbia and Montene- sions) and the Russian Federation (17.4 %) refused gro; in 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to ratify, which threatened to prevent the Proto- became the State Union of Serbia and Montene- col from ever taking effect until Russia changed gro. In the province of Kosovo, ethnic Albanians its mind in September 2004. In addition, many predominate both demographically and politi- industrialized nations have failed to reach their cally, and many demand that Kosovo be annexed emissions reduction targets. by Albania. The situation on the ground remains http://unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html tense. Albanian pogroms against Serbs in the Spring of 2004 left 19 people dead and destroyed many Orthodox churches and monasteries. KFOR

143 Land Mine Treaty / Ottawa Convention NATO Treaty concluded in 1997 in Ottawa that 143 states The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a collec- have ratified. Through ratification they obligate tive defense alliance prompted by the perception themselves to stop developing and producing anti- of a direct threat from the Soviet Union, was es- personnel mines and to destroy existing stocks so tablished in 1949 by Belgium, Britain, Canada, that only a small amount remain for research Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the purposes. However, the US, Russia, and China, Netherlands, Portugal, and the United States. three of the world’s biggest producers of land Other states joined in subsequent years. The revo- mines, have yet to sign the treaty. They justify lutions of 1989 caused a strategic transformation their stances by claiming the necessity of deploy- of NATO that continues to this day (e. g. missions ing mines along the border between North and in → Kosovo and → Afghanistan). Its collective ac- South Korea (US), in the Chechen conflict (Russia), tion clause, Article 5, was invoked for the first and along the Russian-Chinese border (China). time after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. www.icbl.org www.nato.int

National Security Strategy (NSS) Neoconservatives The National Security Strategy of September 2002 School of political thought that emerged during integrates the various foreign- and security policy the Vietnam War. Its exponents gained political priorities of the Bush Administration. Its stated influence during the Reagan Administration objective is to promote freedom and “American and have made a comeback under George W. values” (i. e. human rights and democracy). Bush. The best-known “neocons” include Robert Throughout the world, the US seeks to encourage → Kagan, Michael Gerson, William Kristol, Paul democracies based on the US example while → Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle. They consider fighting international terrorism and tyranny. Pre- the US social and political systems exemplary and emptive use of force is permissible against both, support their dissemination, and that of “Ameri- according to the strategy. Terrorism should be can values,” throughout the world. The emphasis deprived of its social roots by promoting prosper- on a “missionary” US foreign policy in the → Na- ity, health, and education through development tional Security Strategy indicates the strong influ- aid and market economics. The Strategy’s detrac- ence of neoconservative ideas in the Bush Admin- tors criticize its interchangeable use of the terms istration. “preemption” (military action against imminent www.ipsnews.net/focus/neo-cons/index.asp threats) and prevention (action against future threats), as well as its slant toward unilateral ac- NGO tion outside of international institutions. Non-Governmental Organization. Groups from www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf civil society (as opposed to states and private cor- www.usembassy.de/policy/nss.pdf porations) that are active predominantly in social,

144 humanitarian, ecological, and development pol- trade, and development policies and ensuring icy fields. NGOs differ from citizens’ initiatives price stability and low inflation. The organization and movements in that they have durable, yet also seeks to promote economic growth by ex- often loose organizational structures. Today, panding and liberalizing global trade. Each mem- groups such as Greenpeace and Amnesty Interna- ber state is represented with one seat in the OECD tional operate effectively against human rights Council; its General Secretary since 1996 has been violations and environmental pollution through Donald J. Johnson. The OECD cannot issue bind- public pressure. In development policy they are ing directives, but exercises considerable influ- even sought-after partners for states and corpora- ence through its reports and recommendations. tions because they have expertise and competent www.oecd.org personnel in the field. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Europe (OSCE) International agreement concluded in 1970 and Successor organization to the → CSCE promoting signed by 43 states to prevent the spread of nu- domestic and external security, democracy, and clear weapons and encourage international coop- rule of law in the Eurasian area. Its fields of eration in peaceful uses of nuclear technology. operation include arms control, monitoring hu- The treaty was extended indefinitely by all signa- man rights and peacekeeping missions. With a tory states in 1995. States without nuclear arse- 2000 budget of € 208 million, the OSCE has about nals agree to forego attempts to acquire them. 4000 workers. Decisions are made at summit The US-Soviet arms race during the Cold War, the meetings of government and state heads, ministe- entries of Pakistan and India to the “nuclear club” rial-level talks, in the Senior Council, and in the in the late 1990s and, most recently, threats in- Permanent Council of OCSE ambassadors. The volving North Korea and Iran have raised doubts organization is based on the principle of consen- over the NPT’s effectiveness. North Korea with- sus; therefore it is restricted to taking action drew from the NPT in January 2003. India, Paki- against a member state only in cases of “clear, stan, and Israel have yet to sign the treaty. gross, and ruthless violations” of OSCE agree- www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/ ments. www.osce.org/ OECD The Paris-based Organization for Economic Co- Power — hard and soft operation and Development comprises 30 mem- Distinction coined by Joseph S. Nye. Soft power is ber states in Europe, the Americas, Asia, and a state’s capacity to influence other states and Australia. The OECD seeks to increase employ- political conflicts through the attractiveness and ment and thus improve the standard of living in persuasiveness of its culture, values, and political its member states by coordinating economic, system, often with the help of international or-

145 ganizations. Hard power is conventional military ire, fearing Tutsi reprisals. The role of the inter- might. national community and its representatives in Rwanda shortly before the conflict is still dispu- Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ted. Six months before large-scale massacres be- President George W. Bush announced this new gan in April 1994, the United Nations Assistance proposal for international cooperation against Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) began attempts to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on stabilize the country, yet remained inactive dur- the seas and in the air. Seventy states have indi- ing the carnage. In 1996 the UN admitted the cated readiness to join this informal agreement mission had failed and disbanded UNAMIR. to train joint operations for seizing suspected www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html WMD shipments at sea or at airports. Existing laws governing customs regulations remain unaf- Rumsfeld, Donald (born 1932) fected. US Defense Secretary since 2001, held the same www.armscontrol.org/pdf/psi%20at%20a%20glance.pdf office under President Ford (1975 – 77), then worked in the private sector and as US special “Rogue States” envoy to Iraq, co-founded the conservative think Term coined by the Clinton Administration used tank “Project for a New American Century.” to describe those states that violate interna- Rumsfeld is considered a hardliner in the Bush tionally accepted rules of conduct, and support Administration. In January 2003 he famously dif- international terrorism. A rogue state possessing ferentiated between “old” and “new” Europe: Es- weapons of mass destruction is considered a par- sentially, those European states that opposed the ticularly acute threat. Since September 11, 2001, US invasion of Iraq, i.e. Germany, France, Bel- the threats emanating from such regimes are be- gium, etc. belonged to the former. He made clear ing taken so seriously, at least by the United States, that the US would seek stronger ties to “new” that they have been regarded as sufficient cause Europe, which supported the US in Iraq. for military intervention, as in the case of Iraq (→ Iraq Conflict and National Security Strategy). Rapid Reaction Force http://usinfo.state.gov Joint European military force established at the 1999 EU summit in Helsinki as a component of Rwanda the → CFSP. Numbering 60,000 troops, it is sup- From 1990 to 1994, the Rwandan civil war be- posed to take action when NATO either cannot or tween ethnic Hutus and Tutsis claimed the lives will not do so. For financial reasons and to avoid of some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. In the impression of undermining NATO, the force 1994, Tutsi rebels overthrew the Hutu regime. uses NATO planning and command staff. Plans to Nearly two million Hutus fled the country to have the Rapid Reaction Force in place by 2003 neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Za- could not be kept. In February 2004, Germany,

146 France, and Britain announced the planned estab- Taliban lishment of a highly mobile reaction force of Arabic: “students,” literally “seekers of the Islamic seven to nine “battle groups” of 1500 troops each sciences.” Word for “religious students.” The Tali- for deployment in jungle, desert, or mountainous ban were mainly Afghan refugees trained reli- areas, preferably under UN mandate. Even with- giously (and often militarily) in madrasas or Is- out these structures, the first European military lamist schools in Pakistan. During the Soviet operation has already begun: European troops occupation of Afghanistan (1979 – 89) they took have been monitoring the peace agreement in part in the armed Islamic resistance (muhaji- Macedonia since March 2003. deen). After the Soviet withdrawal, the Taliban gained control over increasing parts of Afghani- SFOR (Stabilisation Force) stan, and marginalized the Russian-supported In 1995, NATO received a UN mandate to restore Northern Alliance. They established a radical Is- and safeguard order and security in Bosnia-Herze- lamist regime that welcomed fugitive terrorists govina. In 1996, the Implementation Force there (e. g. Osama → bin Laden and his → Al Qaeda net- (IFOR) was replaced by a Stabilization Force work). After the 9/11 attacks, the US destroyed the (SFOR), which consists today of some 7000 troops Taliban regime through air strikes while the from Europe and elsewhere. At the end of 2004, Northern Alliance reconquered Afghanistan on SFOR is to be replaced by a purely European force the ground. (EUFOR). www.nato.int/sfor/ UNDP The United Nations Development Program was Srebrenica founded in 1965 to advise countries in building The name of this eastern Bosnian city became the up and reforming their governmental systems, in byword for perhaps the worst tragedy of the Bos- fighting poverty, preventing conflicts, and envi- nian War. On July 11, 1995, Bosnian Serb troops ronmental and health care policy. One focus of under General Ratko Mladic (see also SFOR) en- the UNDP and its 1300 staff is to bring together tered the UN-designated safe area of Srebrenica representatives of various sectors. Innovative and massacred approximately 8,000 Bosnian Mus- projects receive financial support. The UNDP lims. Dutch UN troops in the city remained pow- helps developing nations make the best use of UN erless during the massacre because they had only and other aid programs, thereby helping these a limited mandate in which use of their weapons countries to help themselves. The organization is was permitted only in self-defense or after prior financed exclusively through the voluntary con- announcement. tributions of donor countries (2001 budget: $ 672 www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_ million). b.htm www.undp.org www.srebrenica.nl/en/a_index.htm hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/

147 UNECE UN Security Council The United Nations Economic Commission for One of a total of six chief UN bodies including the Europe, founded in 1947, is one of five regional General Assembly, the Economic and Social UN commissions (together with ECA, ECLAC, ES- Council (→ ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, CAP, ESCWA), which are all part of → ECOSOC. the International Court of Justice, and the Secre- The 55 member states of UNECE include some tariat. The Security Council consists of five per- non-European nations; basically, all states have manent members with veto rights (Britain, China, the right to observer status. Through its seven France, Russia, and the US) and ten non-perma- committees (e. g. for environmental policy or nent members elected every two years by the domestic transportation), UNECE provides a plat- General Assembly. The UN Charter gives the Se- form for European concerns at the UN. More than curity Council primary responsibility for main- 70 nongovernmental organizations (→ NGOs) ad- taining international security. Its resolutions, vise UNECE, which has about 220 staff. The or- which are binding for all states in the UN, require ganization also conducts economic and environ- the approval of all permanent members and at mental analyses. least four non-permanent members. During the www.unece.org/ Cold War, tensions among the Security Council’s permanent members largely paralyzed the or- UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administra- ganization, prompting the US, Britain, France, tion Mission in Kosovo) and other Western states to found → NATO in In 1999, the UN Security Council empowered the 1949. The UN Charter permits member states to Secretary General to establish a UN-led transi- form regional alliances for collective self-defense. tional authority in → Kosovo. The United Nations Since the end of the Cold War, there have been Interim Administrative Departments were foun- repeated calls for a UN reform. International ded in January 2000, regional elections were held military operations by individual or several UN in October, and in May 2001, a framework docu- members without the Security Council’s ap- ment for a new constitution was passed. UNMIK’s proval, including in Kosovo and Iraq, spread four pillars are humanitarian aid, civil adminis- doubt in much of the world regarding the UN’s tration (both under UN leadership), democratiza- effectiveness. Reform recommendations include tion and building up of institutions (in collabora- expanding the number of permanent and non- tion with the → OSCE), and reconstruction and permanent members in the Security Council. economic assistance (in cooperation with the EU). www.un.org/Docs/sc/ Four years after UNMIK began its work, Kosovo is still the scene of attacks and riots. World Bank Special organization of the United Nations based in Washington, founded in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference. The World Bank is a multilat-

148 eral institution that seeks to help poorer coun- Treaty of Westphalia tries develop their economies by providing cheap The Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ loans. Political reforms are often prerequisites for War in 1648 and established a new political sys- such credits. The World Bank is financed through tem for Europe. It confirmed and extended to the membership dues from its 170 member states. It Calvinists the principle “cuius regio, eius religio” has been criticized for not acting in the people’s (“the territorial ruler determines the religion”) of interest in poorer states because its leading con- the Peace of Augsburg. It ended the conflict be- tributors, of whom the United States is by far the tween Catholic and Protestant forces by deter- largest, largely determine its policies. Questions mining the sovereignty of individual states, and regarding the World Bank’s effectiveness and restricted the power of the Holy Roman Emperor, necessity persist to the present day, both from thereby creating a power vacuum in the Empire anti-globalization activists and political conserva- that would last until its final dissolution in 1806. tives in the United States. In the theory of international relations, the www.worldbank.org/ “Westphalian system” signifies an international order based on sovereign states that are solely World Trade Organization (WTO) responsible for their domestic policies (“principle The Geneva-based WTO was founded in 1995 as of non-intervention”). the successor institution to the “General Agree- ment on Tariffs and Trade” (GATT). Its fundamen- Wolfowitz, Paul (born 1943) tal tenet is that free trade promotes economic Deputy US Secretary of Defense since 2001; lead- growth, which, in turn, improves living stand- ing representative of the so-called neoconserva- ards. In 2001 in Doha, the WTO’s member states tives (neocons) in the administration of George W. opened a new round of negotiations meant to Bush. benefit developing nations by abolishing agricul- tural subsidies of the Western industrialized countries. After temporarily stalling at a meeting in Cancun, Mexico, an agreement was reached in Geneva. It was hailed by the “Group of 20” devel- oping nations (G 20), led by Brazil, as the begin- ning of the end for agricultural subsidies. Critics say the WTO largely ignores the development, environmental, and health care policy ramifica- tions of world trade. www.wto.org/

149 Index

9/11 → September 11, 2001 Bush doctrine → National Security Strategy Afghanistan 24 – 25, 38 – 40, 55, 58, 75, 83, 89, Cambodia 109 93 – 97, 108 –109, 110 –111 Chad 38, 68 Albania 50 Chechnya 47 Al Qaeda 39 – 40, 43, 47, 49, 75, 89, 110 Cheney, Dick 63 → glossary Chile 77 Amnesty International 90 China 27, 33, 36, 45, 50, 68 – 69, 97 – 98, 101, Annan, Kofi 31, 83 108, 117–118 Arab Human Development Report 84 Chirac, Jacques 60 Arab League 113, 116, → glossary Churchill, Winston 72 Arab world → Greater Middle East, Islamic world civil society 45 Asia → China, Japan, Taiwan civil war 23 asymmetric warfare 29, 37 – 39, 45, 47 – 48, Clemenceau, Georges 32 51 – 54 climate change as a security threat 46 association / exclusion 26 – 27, 33 Clinton, Bill 41, 43, 57, 73 Aum sect 33 coalitions of the willing 62, 72 Australia 62 Cold War 29, 36, 38, 40, 60 – 61, 75, 81, 102, 104, authoritarian regimes 43, 45, 52 118 Baath Party → Iraq, Baath Party colonialism, renaissance of → imperialism, Balkans 30, 52, 89, 93, 107, 112 renaissance of Belarus 59 communication technology 25, 38, 42, 60 Bell, Coral 63 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 73 bin Laden, Osama 49 – 50, 63, → glossary Congo Conference 53 bipolarity → Cold War consensus 30, 54, 76, 78 – 79 Bismarck, Otto v. 28 Cooper, Robert 34 Blair, Tony 22, 28, 40 – 41, 60, 78, 115 – 116 corporations, multinational 26, 60, 71 Bolton, John 61 Council of Europe 59 Bosnia and Herzegovina 94 CSCE 26, 31 Brahimi, Lakhdar 80, 83, 113 Cuba 77 Brazil 36, 56, 66, 106 democracy 22, 26, 44 – 45 Bruyère, Jean de la 63 economic assistance 25, 36, 76 – 77, 83, 87 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 37 ECOSOC 80 – 81, 86, → glossary Bull, Hedley 64 Egypt 39, 45, 106 Bush, George W. 40 – 42, 61 – 62, 78, 115 Enfants de la Terre 92 Bush Administration 23 –24, 31, 38, 57, 61– 62, English School 63 88

150 equilibrium of powers → international order, Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria 24 unipolarity/multipolarity free trade 67 EU 48, 57, 66, 113 Freud, Sigmund 88 – and Iran 70, 100, 117 fundamentalism 38, 54 – and Iraq 57 G 7/G 8 26, 71–72, 83 – and Libya 30, 59, 63 GATT 67 – and the Middle East 115 –116 genocide 66, 79 – and NATO 95, 104, 107 Germany 40 – 42, 46, 64, 102, 111 – and rules 57, 67 globalization 25, 33, 36, 46, 48, 54, 60, 65, 103 – and Russia 59, 87, 104 –105 – reactions to 33, 46, 48 – and Turkey 60 good governance 44, 68, 44, 68, 76, 87 – and the US → transatlantic relationship Great Britain 31, 40, 62, 78, 81 – core Europe 57 – 58 Greater Middle East 26, 40, 100, 113 –114, 116, – Barcelona process 59, 115 118, also → Middle East, Islamic world – European Security Strategy 33, 95, 104 –105, – Greater Middle East Initiative 46, 84, 100, → glossary 114 –115 – Common Foreign and Security Policy 46, “green zone” 44, 53 100, 103, 107, → glossary Guantanamo Bay 55, 75, 78 – in the Balkans 30, 92 – 94, 107 Guevara, Che 50 – instruments for influencing other states Habsburg monarchy 24 58 – 59, 63 Haiti 38, 42, 51, 84, 108 – instruments for state building 59, 108, Halliburton 89 112 –113 Helsinki Final Act of 1975 26, 31 → glossary: – integration of Middle and Eastern European CSCE states 57, 59, 110 HIV/AIDS 52, 57, 68, 88 – military capacities 38, 46, 67, 69, 103, also Hobbes, Thomas 61 → EU, Common Foreign and Security Policy human/civil rights 26, 30, 49 – 50, 66, 77 – 78, – soft power 48, 87, 103, → glossary 84, 91 – strategic dimension 102 Human Rights Watch 79, 90 – Wider Europe 57, 59, 110 humanitarian relief work 56 Evans, Gareth 66 illegitimate combatant 55 failed states/failing states 23, 30, 32 – 34, 47, 51, IMF 44, 74, 83, 85 53, 60, 73, 93, 108, → glossary imperialism, renaissance of 47, 53 ,56, 61, 64, Ferguson, Niall 35 74, also → protectorates Fischer, Joschka 84, 105 India 25, 36, 56, 106, 118 France 64, 81, 98 – 99, 102, 111

151 International Commission on Intervention and international organizations → IMF, NATO, UN, State Sovereignty 66, 83 WTO International Criminal Court 62, 73, 77–78, 82 intervention International Criminal Tribunal for the Former – in Afghanistan → Afghanistan Yugoslavia 82 – in the Balkans→ Balkans International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 82 – in Iraq → war in Iraq international order – in Kuwait → Kuwait – after the Second World War 61, 86 – humanitarian 29 – 30, 32, 56, 69, 75, 79 – 80, – development of 33 – 34, 55 81– 83, 86, 88 – 89, 91, 99, 106 – international law 47, 51– 52, 54, 63, 65, – models for 91– 93, 110 67– 69, 71, 75, 78 – 80, 85, 105 – preemptive/preventive 23, 29 – 30, 37– 38, 48, – integration of people in the Southern sphere 62, 66, 69 and in the Islamic world 43 – 45, 53, 56, 84, Iraq 87– 88, 110, 113 – Baath party 90 – integration or disintegration ? 50 – civil society 90, 92 – 93 – legitimacy 28 – 30, 33, 60, 63 – 64, 66, 69, 77, – Iraq conflict 24, 26, 28, 32, 36 – 37, 41, 52, 55, 81, 85, 87 57, 66, 69, 75, 77 – 78, 80 – 81, 87, 89, 91– 93, 99, – liberal internationalism 61, 73, 99 107, 109 –110, 116 – norms 46 – 47, 51, 55, 63 – 64, 68 –70 – reconstruction 41, 52, 89 – 91, 109, 111–112 – norms: do they influence reality ? 55, 63, – sanctions against 26, 41, 79 68 –70, 80 Iran 70, 98, 100, 117 – policies 28, 30, 38, 75 – nuclear program 70, 100 – preservation of 27 – 28, 34, 36, 49, 54, 62 ISAF 108 – rule compliance 71 Islamic world 39, 49, also → Middle East, – rules 22, 28, 30, 34, 37 – 38, 46 – 47, 52, 57, Greater Middle East 61– 63, 65 – 67, 69 –70, 76 –77, 79 – 80, 84, 108, – democratization 24, 39, 44, 49 – 50 113 –115 – dialog with the West → international order, – sanctions 26, 30, 41 integration of people in the Southern sphere – suited to the new threats ? 23, 25 – 27, 29, and in the Islamic world 37– 39, 54 – 55, 57, 64, 69, 106 – instability 29 – threat perceptions 22 – 23, 40, 75, 102, 116 – modernization 30, 49 – 50 – unipolarity/multipolarity 34 – 35, 57– 58, – political elites 44 – 45, 50 60 – 62, 64, 84, 101 islamists as agents of democratization 45, 49 – US hegemony 23, 35 – 36, 46, 53, 57, 60 – 64, Israel 59, 62 66, 74 – 85 Israeli – Palestinian conflict 43, 49, 100 –101, – Westphalian Order 61 105, 115

152 Japan 36, 56, 62, 106 – costs 25 Jordan 49 – guerrilla forces 48 Kagan, Robert 36, 58, 100, 102 – laws of war 48, 55 – 56, 63 Kant, Immanuel 35, 40 67, → glossary – privatization of warfare 34, 37, 42, 53, 71 Kellogg – Briand pact 63 – technological innovations 38, 48, 63 Kenya 44 Moldova 50, 105 KFOR 96 monopoly on the use of force, nation states Khan, Abdul Quadeer 43 → sovereignty of nation states Köhler, Horst 83 Muslim world → Islamic world Kosovo 30, 52, 56, 69, 75, 77, 82 – 83, 92, 94, 111 nation building → state building Kuwait 89 nation states Kyoto Protocol 73 – disintegration → failed states Landmines Convention 82 – role of 33, 48, 55, 71 – 73, 85 Latin America 39 – national sovereignty → sovereignty legitimacy → international order, legitimacy National Security Strategy of the US 23 – 24, 29, Leviathan 61 33, 37– 38, 61– 62, 69, 95, → glossary Liberia 51, 100 Nuclear Non – Proliferation Treaty 43, 65, 81, Libya 30 107 Luger, Richard 58 NATO 46, 48, 58, 62, 65 – 66, 71–72, 85, 92, Lula (Luiz Inacio da Silva) 56 94 – 98, 101, 104, 110, 113, 117→ glossary Malaria 52 – and Russia 95 – 97 Malaysia 50 – as a steering mechanism 31 – 32 Macedonia 94 – European caucus → EU and NATO Marshall, Andrew 46 – in Afghanistan 94 – 97 Middle East 41, 44 – 45, 83, 100, 105, also – in Iraq 95, 99, 101, 111 → Greater Middle East, Islamic World – NATO – Russia Council – democracy 84, 105 – “NATO plus China” 95 – 97 – economic integration 113 “New World Order” 23 – 28, 88 – 90, 113, 119 – Middle East Quartet 71 NGOs 26, 68, 77, 90, 92, → glossary – political elites 44, 45 North Korea 50, 98 military force OECD 35 – as an instrument of foreign policy 23, 25, OSCE 59 29, 31, 34, 36, 38, 46, 48, 62 – 64, 65 – 66, 69, Pakistan 25, 39, 43, 45, 95, 112 80, 83 Palestine → Israeli – Palestinian conflict – interoperability with policing and Panama 77 humanitarian forces 55 – 56, 59 Perle, Richard 98

153 piracy 53 sovereignty 29 – 30, 32, 34, 43, 51, 61– 62, 68, 98, Poland 32, 51, 102, 111 108 Powell, Colin 38 Soviet Union 39, 72, 81, 89, 118 power 22, 40, 65, 69 Stalin, Joseph W. 72 power and rules 22 state building 32, 35, 76, 91, 93 – 94, 101, pre – emption/prevention → intervention, 108 –112 premptive/preventive terrorism 23 – 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 39, 43, 46 – 47, privatization of warfare → military force, 52, 54, 61, 64, 77–78, 88, 105 privatization of warfare – war against 24 – 25, 37, 39, 43, 57, 110 Proliferation Security Initiative 100, → glossary Thailand 50 protectorates 92 threats, new → failed states, rogue states, regime change 24, 26, 41– 42, 59, 90 terrorism, asymmetric warfare, climate Rio Conference 68 change Rockberg, Robert 35 threat perceptions 22, 48 rogue states 23, 47, 79, 88 trafficking 109 Roosevelt, Theodor 72 transatlantic relationship 31– 32, 36 – 38, 40, Rousseau, Jean Jacques 63 46 – 48, 50, 52, 56, 62, 66 – 67, 73, 77–78, 81– 82, Rumsfeld, Donald 34 87– 88, 99 –103, 107, 112, 114, 116, 118 Russet, Bruce 35 unilateralism → United States, unilateralism Russia 33, 36, 45 71–72, 96 – 97, 101, 104 –105, United States 108, 117 – constitution 47 Rwanda 66, 83 – foreign policy 23 – 28, 39, 41, 52, 57, 73, 92, Saudi Arabia 29, 39, 43, 45, 99, 112, 114, 118 98 – 99 self – defense 29, → intervention, preemptive/ – homeland security 86 preventive – image in the Islamic World 49 – 50, 56, 65, September 11, 2001 23 – 24, 28, 32 – 35, 37– 38, 87– 88, 91 40 – 42, 47– 51, 54, 56, 65, 75, 89, 102, 110, 116 – military superiority 36, 46, 57, 63 – 64, 99, – as pretext for suppressing human rights 50, 101 52, 57 – neocons 98 SFOR 96, 104 – unilateralism 27 – 28, 37, 61, 64, 66 – 67, 73, Shell 69 77, 87, 102 Sierra Leone 38, 51, 110 UN slavery 63 – Security Council 29, 32, 36, 41, 44, 50, 51, Somalia 39, 89 56, 62, 64, 69 –76, 79 – 83, 85 – 86, 93, 99, 101, South Africa 106 106 –108, 113, 116, 119 – Charter 31, 38, 66, 69, 74, 86, 106

154 – Universal Declaration of Human Rights 61, 77 UNECE 86 UNMIK 111 Vienna era 28 warlords 42, 108 –109 wars → military force weapons of mass destruction 23 – 24, 33 – 34, 37, 41– 43, 47, 54, 65, 82 – proliferation of 23 – 25, 42, 54, 65, 76 Western values 37, 64 Westphalian Order → international order, Westphalian Order Wilson, Woodrow 22, 35 Wolfowitz, Paul 49, 63 World Bank 44, 68, 74, 74, 83, 85 World War I 22, 24, 32 World War II 69, 86 WTO 27, 67, 74 Yemen 39

155 Previous Round Tables*

Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

1961 1 Schwächen der industriellen Gesellschaft Prof. Dr. F. W. Schoberth Dr. H. B. Tolkmitt

2 Kulturkrise in der Prof. Dr. Erik von Sivers Prof. Dr. Fritz Voigt industriellen Gesellschaft

3 Glanz und Elend der Entwicklungshilfe Prof. Dr. Fritz Baade, MdB Dr. Günther Buch

4 Welche Fragen stellt uns die Prof. D. Helmut Gollwitzer Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im Osten ?

1962 5 Die Fragwürdigkeit der Bildungspolitik Dr. Rüdiger Altmann Josef Müller-Marein

6 Die Erziehung zum Europäer Stéphane Hessel François Bondy

7 Die Bewältigung des Preis-Lohn-Problems Prof. Dr. Theodor Pütz Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach

8 Die Preis-Lohn-Dynamik in der Dr. Hans-Constantin Paulssen Prof. Dr. Fritz Voigt Bundesrepublik Deutschland

1963 9 Maschine — Denkmaschine — Prof. Dr. Pierre Bertaux Prof. Dr. Arnold Gehlen Staatsmaschine

10 Kybernetik als soziale Tatsache Prof. Dr. O. W. Haseloff Dr. h. c. Freiherr von Stackelberg

11 Die westliche Gesellschaft und Winfried Martini Prof. Dr. Th. Eschenburg die kommunistische Drohung

12 Wohin treibt die EWG ? U. W. Kitzinger, Roland Delcour Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon

1964 13 Planung in der freien Marktwirtschaft Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach

14 Wohin Deutschland in Europa ? Prof. Alfred Grosser, François Bondy Karl Theodor Frhr. zu Guttenberg, MdB

15 Entwicklungshilfe — Mittel des Aufstiegs Dr. Walter Rau Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin oder des Verfalls ? Dr. E. F. Schumacher

Industrielle Gesellschaft — Prof. Dr. Raymond Aron Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf 16 menschlich oder unmenschlich ?

1965 17 Vermögensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand Prof. Dr. Helmut Meinhold Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon Prof. Dr. H. J. Wallraff

* a complete list of all participants since 1961 is available at www.bergedorfer-gespraechskreis.de

156 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

18 Hemmen Tabus die Demokratisierung der Prof. Dr. Alexander Mitscherlich Prof. Hellmut Becker deutschen Gesellschaft ?

19 Automatisierung — eine gesellschaftliche Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Prof. Dr. Hans Wenke Herausforderung ? Dr. Günter Friedrichs Dr. Kurt Pentzlin

20 Ein Dilemma der westlichen Demokratien : Prof. Dr. Leo H. Klaassen Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin Kurzfristige Soziallösungen contra langfristige Regionalpolitik

1966 21 Die “unterentwickelten” Prof. Dr. Friedrich Heer Prof. Hellmut Becker hochin dustrialisierten Gesellschaften

22 Muss unsere politische Maschinerie Dr. Rüdiger Altmann Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon umkonstruiert werden ? Joseph Rovan

23 Wissenschaftliche Experten und politische Prof. Dr. Helmut Schelsky Prof. Hellmut Becker Praxis — Das Problem der Zusammenarbeit Dr. Ulrich Lohmar, MdB in der heutigen Demokratie

24 Ist der Weltfriede unvermeidlich ? Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich Prof. Dr. Edgar Salin Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

1967 25 Bedroht die Pressekonzentration Prof. Dr. Helmut Arndt Prof. Hellmut Becker die freie Meinungsbildung ?

26 Neue Wege zur Hochschulreform Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, Ph. D. Prof. Hellmut Becker

27 Beherrschen die Technokraten Alfred Mozer Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon unsere heutige Gesellschaft ?

1968 28 Freiheit als Störfaktor in einer Prof. Dr. Jeanne Hersch Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich programmierten Gesellschaft v. Weizsäcker, Frhr.

29 Fördern die Bündnissysteme Prof. Wladimir Chwostow Prof. Alfred Grosser die Sicherheit Europas ?

30 Haben wir im entstehenden Europa noch Dr. Hans von der Groeben Prof. Dr. Hans Peter Ipsen eine Chance für die freie Marktwirtschaft ?

31 Mögliche und wünschbare Zukünfte Dr. Robert Jungk Prof. Hellmut Becker

1969 32 Die Biologie als technische Weltmacht Prof. Dr. Adolf Portmann Prof. Dr. Hoimar von Ditfurth

33 Verstärken oder verringern sich die Prof. Dr. Friedrich Hacker Prof. Dr. Eugen Kogon Bedingungen für Aggressivität ?

157 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

34 Welchen Spielraum hat die Prof. Alfred Grosser Dr. Theo Sommer Entspannungspolitik ?

1970 35 Zugänge zur Friedensforschung Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens Frhr. v. Weizsäcker Prof. Dr. Richard Löwenthal

36 Europäische Sicherheit und Möglichkeit Prof. Alfred Grosser Nikolai E. Poljanow Leningrad der Zusammenarbeit Nikolai E. Poljanow

37 Demokratisierung der Demokratie ? Prof. Joseph Rovan D. Klaus von Bismarck

1971 Arbeitsgespräch : Aufgabenstellung und — Dr. Franz Karasek Verfahrensfragen einer inter natio nalen Konferenz für Europäische Sicherheit

38 Infrastrukturreform als Innenpolitik — Ministerpräsident Dr. Helmut Kohl D. Klaus von Bismarck Möglichkeiten, Grenzen, Prioritäten

39 Globalsteuerung der Wirtschaft ? Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch

40 Der bevollmächtigte Mensch — Kann Prof. Dr. Dennis Gabor D. Klaus von Bismarck sich die freie industrielle Gesellschaft zur Stabilität und Reife entwickeln ?

1972 41 Sprache und Politik Kultusminister Prof. Hellmut Becker Prof. Dr. Hans Maier

Arbeitsgespräch : Prof. Dr. Richard Löwenthal François Bondy Demokratie und Nationalbewusstsein in der Bundesrepublik

42 Das erweiterte Europa Prof. Dr. R. Dahrendorf Bundesaußenminister zwischen den Blöcken Jean-Pierre Brunet Dr. Rudolf Kirchschläger Sir Con O’Neill

43 Wo bleiben die alten Menschen Prof. Dr. Helge Pross D. Klaus von Bismarck in der Leistungsgesellschaft ?

1973 44 Die “neue Mitte” : Dr. Richard v. Weizsäcker, MdB D. Klaus von Bismarck Schlagwort oder Strukturwandel ?

45 Umsteuerung der Industriegesellschaft ? Bundesminister Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel Dr. Hugo Thiemann

158 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

46 Neutralität — Wert oder Unwert für die Bundesaußenminister Prof. Dr. Olivier Reverdin Vienna europäische Sicherheit Dr. Rudolf Kirchschläger Außenminister Gaston Thorn Vizeaußenminister Jósef Czyrek

1974 47 Revolution der Gleichheit — Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf D. Klaus von Bismarck Ende oder Beginn der Freiheit ?

48 Rohstoff- und Energieverknappung Prof. Dr. H. B. G. Casimir Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Dr. Manfred Schäfer

49 Entwicklungshilfe — eine Illusion ? Prof. Dr. Peter T. Bauer Dr. Max Thurn Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Sohn

1975 Arbeitsgespräch : Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Dr. Kurt A. Körber Moscow Entspannungspolitik, wirtschaftliche Dr. H. Ehrenberg, MdB Lew Tolkunow und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit Dr. Theo Sommer Prof. Dr. C.-F. Frhr. v. Weiz säcker Prof. Dr. G. Arbatow Prof. Dr. O. Bogomolow Schalwa Sanakojew Georgij Shukow

50 Kooperation oder Konfrontation — Stürzt Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt, Ministerpräsident Gaston Thorn die Wirtschaft in eine weltpolitische Krise ? MdB

51 Welche Zukunft hat die parlamentarische Ministerpräsident Gaston Thorn Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Bonn Demokratie westlicher Prägung ?

52 Ordnungspolitik oder Verteilungskampf ? Prof. Dr. Kurt H. Biedenkopf Dr. Theo Sommer

1976 53 Die Berufsgesellschaft und ihre Bildung Staatsminister Prof. Dr. Hans Maier Prof. Dr. Hellmut Becker

54 Nach der Wahl ’76 : Welchen Spielraum hat — Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf die deutsche Innenpolitik ?

55 Entspannungspolitik nach Helsinki Prof. Dr. G. Arbatow Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Leonard H. Marks Dr. Theo Sommer Ryszard Wojna

1977 56 Ein anderer “Way of Life” — Ist der Dr. E. F. Schumacher Prof. Dr. Hans K. Schneider Bonn Fortschritt noch ein Fortschritt ?

57 Europa und die Weltwirtschaft Claude Cheysson Ministerpräsident Gaston Thorn Luxemburg Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch

159 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

58 Energiekrise — Europa im Dr. Guido Brunner Prof. Dr. Hans K. Schneider Belagerungszustand ?

1978 59 Terrorismus in der Prof. Walter Laqueur Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf demokratischen Gesellschaft

Arbeitsgespräch : Joachim Gretz Prof. Dr.-Ing. Werner H. Bloss Alternativenergien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sonnenenergie

60 Europäische Arbeitslosigkeit als Bundesminister Dr. Volker Hauff, Prof. Dr. Gottfried Bombach Dauerschicksal — oder brauchen wir MdB einen anderen Arbeitsmarkt ? Prof. Dr. Gerhard Fels Prof. Dr. Erich Streissler

61 Wachstum und Lebenssinn — Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Alternative Rationalitäten ? Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

1979 62 UdSSR und Bundesrepublik Deutsch land — Staatsminister Dr. K. A. Körber Moscow wirtschaftliche und politische Dr. Klaus von Dohnanyi Boris A. Borrissow Perspektiven in den 80er Jahren Alexander E. Bowin

63 Jugend und Gesellschaft. Chronischer Univ.-Prof. Dr. Leopold Rosenmayr Staatsminister Konflikt — neue Verbindlichkeiten ? Prof. Dr. Hans Maier

64 Weltrezession 1980 ? Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch Prof. Dr. Hans K. Schneider Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen Bundesbankpräsident Karl Otto Pöhl

1980 65 Der Westen und der Nahe Osten — Krise im Dr. Arnold Hottinger Dr. Udo Steinbach Zeichen der islamischen Revolution ? Prof. Dr. Hans A. Fischer-Barnicol M. A. H. Hobohm

66 Europas Sicherheit Dr. Christoph Bertram Dr. Theo Sommer Dr. W. R. Smyser

67 Voraussetzungen und Ziele der W. A. Matweew Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Entspannung in den 80er Jahren Prof. Dr. Stanley Hoffmann

1981 68 Der Ausbau des Sozialstaates und das Prof. Dr. R. Dahrendorf Prof. Dr. Armin Gutowski Dilemma des Staatshaushaltes Parl. Staatssekretärin Anke Fuchs

69 Europe and America facing the crises Prof. Dr. R. Dahrendorf Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Washington of the 80’s Prof. Dr. Stanley Hoffmann

70 Was bleibt noch vom staatsbürgerlichen Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Grundkonsens ? Prof. Dr. E. Noelle-Neumann

160 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

1982 71 Repräsentieren die Parteien Minister Dr. Werner Remmers Dr. Hans Heigert unsere Gesellschaft ? Prof. Dr. Richard Löwenthal

72 Wirtschaftspolitik in der Krise ? Zur Prof. J. Tobin Prof. Dr. Herbert Giersch Bonn Situation in den Vereinigten Staaten, Prof. M. Feldstein Großbritannien, Frankreich und der Sir Alec Cairncross Bundesrepublik Deutschland A. A. Walters Prof. P. E. Uri Prof. P. Salin Prof. A. Gutowski Dr. H. Schulmann

1983 73 Die politisch-kulturelle Heraus forderung Präsident Gaston Thorn Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Zurich Europas — Ein Weg zur Erneuerung der Industriegesellschaft

74 Die deutsche Frage — neu gestellt Regierender Bürgermeister Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Berlin Dr. Richard v. Weizsäcker

1984 75 Zukunft Europas : Probleme der politi schen Ministerialdirektor Horst Teltschik Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Moscow und militärischen Entspannung. Wadim W. Sagladin Juri Shukow

76 Ist die Spaltung Europas das letzte Wort ? Franz Kardinal König S. E. Botschafter Prof. Rome Bundeskanzler a.D. Luigi Vittorio Graf Ferraris Helmut Schmidt

1985 77 Neue Strukturen für die soziale Sicherheit ? Prof. Dr. Helmut Meinhold Fides Krause-Brewer Senator Ulf Fink Senator a.D. Olaf Sund

78 10 Jahre Helsinki — Botschafter R. Burt Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf Bonn die Herausforderung bleibt Prof. Dr. S. Tichwinskij Dr. M. Szürös Botschafter Prof. L. V. Graf Ferraris Prof. Dr. M. Dobrosielski MinDir. H. Teltschik

1986 79 Findet Europa wieder die Kraft, eine Rolle Präsident Jacques Delors Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Brussels in der Weltpolitik zu spielen ? Gen.-Sekr. Lord Carrington Bundeskanzler a. D. Helmut Schmidt

80 Bürger und res publica — Staatsminister Prof. Dr. Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf die Zukunft der Verantwortung Hans Maier

161 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

1987 81 Die Beziehungen zwischen der Volker Rühe, MdB Valentin Falin Moscow Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Wadim W. Sagladin Dr. Theo Sommer Deutschland Egon Bahr

82 Die Modernität in der Industriegesellschaft Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübbe Botschafter Geneva — und danach ? Prof. Luigi V. Ferraris

83 Zusammenarbeit als Mittel zur Dr. M. Szürös Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Budapest Vertrauensbildung Bundeskanzler a.D. Helmut Schmidt Prof. Dr. R. Bogdanow Prof. Dr. H. Sonnenfeldt

1988 84 Systemöffnende Kooperation ? Prof. W. Leonhard Jürgen Engert Berlin Perspektiven zwischen Ost und West Prof. Dr. Harry Maier

85 Die ökologische Wende — Dr. H. Frhr. v. Lersner Staatsminister a.D. Munich hat sie noch Chancen ? Staatss. Alois Glück Prof. Dr. Hans Maier

86 Das gemeinsame europäische Haus — Wadim W. Sagladin Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Bonn aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion und der MinDir. Horst Teltschik Bundesrepublik Deutschland

1989 87 Globale Umweltproblematik als Prof. W. Mundt Prof. Dr. Max Schmidt Dresden gemeinsame Überlebensfrage Prof. Dr. W. Haber

88 Auf dem Wege zu einem neuen Europa ? Stellvertr. Außenminister Sir Ralf Dahrendorf Bonn Perspektiven einer gemein samen Lawrence Eagleburger westlichen Ostpolitik Bots. Sir Christopher Mallaby MinDir. Horst Teltschik

89 Chancen für die europäische Kultur Dr. Valtr Komárek Dr. Hans Heigert Prague am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts Prof. Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf

1990 90 Wie geht es weiter mit den Bundeskanzler a.D. Willy Brandt Sir Ralf Dahrendorf Dresden Deutschen in Europa ? Konsistorialpräsident Dr. Manfred Stolpe Ministerpräsident Dr. Lothar Späth

91 Europa im Aufbruch — auf dem Wege zu Wadim W. Sagladin Staatssekretär Moscow einer neuen Friedensordnung MinDir. Horst Teltschik Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut

1991 92 Perestrojka : Kontinuität, Prof. W. Wladislawlew Sir Ralf Dahrendorf Moscow Ende oder Wende ? Dr. F. W. Christians

93 Nach dem “Sozialismus” : Ministerpräsident a.D. Prof. Dr. Hans Maier Berlin Wie geht es weiter mit den neuen Tadeusz Mazowiecki Demokratien in Europa ? Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

162 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

1992 94 Wege zur inneren Einheit Ministerpräsident Dr. Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt Dresden Prof. Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf Wolfgang Thierse, MdB

95 Welche Antworten gibt Europa auf Bundeskanzler a.D. Willy Brandt Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Paris die neuen Einwanderungswellen ? Präsident Jacques Delors

96 Zwischen Integration und nationaler Jim Hoagland Staatssekretär Tallinn Eigenständigkeit : wie findet Europa Dr. Krenzler Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut zusammen ? Präsident Lennart Meri Botschafter T. Örn Staatsmin. B. Schmidbauer

97 Energiesicherheit für ganz Europa ? Dr. Hermann Krämer Staatssekretär Kiev Min. Prof. W. Skljarow Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut Helga Steeg Prof. Dr. Y. Rudenko

1993 98 Orientierungskrise in Politik und Dr. Antje Vollmer Jürgen Engert Berlin Gesellschaft ? Perspektiven der Demokratie Prof. Dr. Wolf Lepenies

99 Will the West survive the Senator Bill Bradley Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Ditchley disintegration of the East ? Dr. W. F. van Eekelen Park Dr. H.-G. Poettering

100 Wieviel Gemeinsinn braucht Ministerpräsident Prof. Dr. Dieter Grimm Dresden die liberale Gesellschaft ? Prof. Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf Prof. Dr. Albert O. Hirschman

1994 101 Russland und der Westen : Internationale Minister A. A. Kokoschin Staatssekretär St. Sicherheit und Reformpolitik BMin. Volker Rühe Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut Petersburg Bürgermeister Prof. A. A. Sobtschak

102 Zukunftsfähigkeit von Politik, Dr. Lothar Späth Jürgen Engert Friedrichs roda Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Leo A. Nefiodow

1995 103 Die Verfassung Europas Prof. Jean-Claude Casanova Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Oxford Timothy Garton Ash Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble

104 Europa — aber wo liegen seine Grenzen ? Prof. Bronislaw Geremek Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Warsaw Anders Björck Senator J. François-Poncet

105 Ein neuer Gesellschaftsvertrag ? Bundesminister Horst Seehofer Prof. Dr. Hermann Korte Munich Prof. Dr. Barbara Riedmüller

163 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

1996 106 Europe and the Future of the Dr. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi Prof. Dr. Michael Stürmer Jerusalem Middle East — an Agenda for Peace Hanan Bar-On Prof. Leonard Hausman Jean-Paul Jesse Staatsminister Helmut Schäfer

107 Medien — Macht — Politik Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Donsbach Thomas Kielinger Senator Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem Dr. Theo Sommer

108 Was bewegt Russland ? Sergej Baburin Staatssekretär a.D. Moscow Sir Rodric Braithwaite Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut

1997 109 At the crossroads of geo-politics — Turkey Ilter Türkmen Prof. Dr. Curt Gasteyger Istanbul in a changing political environment Morton Abramowitz Hans-Ulrich Klose

110 Wege aus der blockierten Gesellschaft Dr. h. c. André Leysen Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Berlin Bundesminister Dr. Jürgen Rüttgers

111 Wie ist Europa zu sichern ? Dr. Ulrich Cartellieri Prof. Dr. Michael Stürmer Amsterdam Sir Christopher Mallaby Wolfgang Ischinger Marten van Heuven Frits Bolkestein Prof. David P. Calleo Max Kohnstamm Elmar Brok

1998 112 Wachsende Ungleichheiten — Ministerpräsident Prof. Dr. Barbara Riedmüller Leipzig neue Spaltungen ? Prof. Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf Prof. Dr. Heinz Bude Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Huber

113 Energie und Geostrategie Dr. Terry D. Adams Staatssekretär a.D. Baku im kaspischen Raum Botschafter Vafa Goulizade Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut Paul Haseldonckx Staatssekretär Dr. Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz

1999 114 Welche gesellschaftliche Wertigkeit hat Prof. Dr. Hans Lenk Prof. Dr. Hermann-Anders Korte Magdeburg der Sport ? Herbert Riehl-Heyse Prof. Dr. Jürgen Palm

115 Neue Dimensionen des Politischen ? Prof. Dr. Antonia Grunenberg Prof. Dr. Jutta Limbach Berlin Herausforderungen für die Bundesministerin a.D. Sabine repräsenta tive Demokratie Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, MdB

164 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

116 Russland in Europa : Wolfgang Ischinger Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut Moscow Zehn Jahre nach dem Kalten Krieg Oleg Morosow Dr. Ulrich Cartellieri Andrej A. Kokoschin Dr. Klaus v. Dohnanyi 2000 117 Modell Deutschland : Dr. Henning Scherf Berlin Reif für die Globalisierung ? Prof. Dr. Carl Christian v. Weizsäcker

118 Ein föderatives Europa ? Sylvie Goulard Prof. Dr. Rudolf von Thadden Berlin Prof. Dr. Klaus Hänsch, MdEP Dr. Jerzy Kranz

119 China : Prof. Yang Qixian Präsident Mei Zhaorong Beijing Partner in der Weltwirtschaft Minister Zheng Silin Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser Minister Wang Chunzheng Vice Minister Shen Jueren Prof. Dr. Zhu Min Shi Mingde Song Jian Dr. Konrad Seitz Dr. Horst Teltschik Dr. Martin Posth

2001 120 Verhandlungsdemokratie ? Politik des Prof. Dr. Dieter Grimm Prof. Robert Leicht Berlin Möglichen — Möglichkeiten der Politik Dr. Annette Fugmann-Heesing

121 The Baltic Sea — a Region Minister a.D. Bertel Haarder Minister Dr. Jaako Iloniemi Helsinki of Prosperity and Stability ? Botschafter Dr. Artur J. Kuznetsov Alar J. Rudolf Olljum Hans Olsson Timo Summa Außenminister Dr. Erkki Tuomioja Staatsminister Dr. Christoph Zöpel

122 Russia’s European Dimension — Sergej W. Jastrschembskij Moscow Dr. Sergej A. Karaganow

2002 123 The Future of Southeast Europe Andy Bearpark Martti Ahtisaari Belgrade Dr. Erhard Busek Dr. Erhard Busek Nebojša Čović Bozidar Djelić Dr. Alexandra Jovičević Dr. Herwig Kempf Gerald Knaus Dr. Wolfgang Petritsch Goran Svilanović

165 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

124 Contours of a “New World Order” ? Prof. Dr. Egon Bahr Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Berlin Prof. John L. Hirsch Dr. Peter W. Singer Prof. Paul W. Schroeder Prof. Georges-Henri Soutou Karsten D. Voigt Prof. Dr. Norbert Walter Prof. Samuel F. Wells Jr.

125 Reinventing Europe — Cultural Dimensions Prof. Dr. Hélène Ahrweiler Otto von der Gablentz Hamburg of Widening and Deepening Prof. Dr. Üstün Ergüder Monika Griefahn MdB Prof. Yudhishthir Raj Isar Hywel Ceri Jones Prof. Dr. Karl Schlögel Dr. Gary Smith Gijs de Vries Roger de Weck 126 The Future of Democracy — European Per- Henri de Bresson Florence spectives Prof. Andrea Manzella Prof. Dr. Gesine Schwan Prof. Larry Siedentop Gijs de Vries Prof. Helen Wallace

2003 127 The Middle East and Western Values: A Dr. Gilles Kepel Dr. Christoph Bertram Isfahan Dialog With Iran Dr. Michael McFaul Dr. Homayra Moshirzadeh Dr. Ahmad Nagheebzadeh Giandomenico Picco Dr. Johannes Reissner Dr. Hossein Salimi

166

The Bergedorf Round Table

Chairman Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, former President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Coordinator Dr. Klaus Wehmeier (Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors) Dr. Levin von Trott zu Solz (Managing Director until December 31st, 2003)

Managing Director Dr. Thomas Paulsen

Program Assistant Karen Pehla, M. A.

Program Manager Dr. Patrick O. Cohrs Dr. Thomas Weihe

Address Bergedorf Round Table Berlin Office of the Körber Foundation Neustädtische Kirchstraße 8 D -10117 Berlin Phone : +49-30-20 62 67-60 Fax : +49-30-20 62 67-67 E-Mail : [email protected] www.bergedorfer-gespraechskreis.de

Imprint

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http ://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.

© edition Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg 2004

Editors Julia Steets Horst Rödinger Dr. Thomas Weihe Translations Nicolas Kumanoff Pictures Marc Darchinger, Sandra Ost (cover) Design Groothuis, Lohfert, Consorten | glcons.de Printed in Germany by Offizin Andersen Nexö Leipzig

ISBN 3-89684-357-5 All rights are reserved. These minutes may be reproduced upon request.

The Bergedorf Protocols are also published in German. Both versions are available for download and research at www.bergedorfer-gespraechskreis.de