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3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the ph otographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the materi 4. The majority of users indiicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat Ijigher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essent al to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs' ' may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wishitiproduced. 5. PLEASE NOTE: Som4 pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 I 76-3459 HYMES, John David, Jr.,1942- THE CONTRIBUTION OF DR. GEORGE WASHBURN TO WORLD OPINION AND RELATIONS TOWARD THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1859-1903. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1975 j- History, modern Xerox University Microfilms,Ann Arbor. Michigan 4B106 © Copyright John David Hymes, Jr. 1975 THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. THE CONTRIBUTION OF DR. GEORGE WASHBURN TO WORLD OPINION AND RELATIONS TOWARD THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1859-1903 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By John David Hymes, Jr., B.A., M.A. ****** The Ohio State University 1975 Reading Committee: Approved By: Sydney N. Fisher, Advisor Robert Bremner Carole Rogel Advisor Department of History ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am deeply grateful for the help and inspiration given me over the past several years by many individuals. There were periods during the course of my graduate study when their assistance and encouragement were largely re sponsible for my perseverance. I especially desire to express my sincere apprec iation to my advisor. Dr. Sydney N. Fisher. Through his careful guidance I have broadened my understanding not only of Middle Eastern scholarship, but also of life in general. Throughout my graduate career he has been my primary source of inspiration and has always provided me with wise and understanding counsel whenever I needed it. I would also like to thank Dr. Richard V. Burks and Dr. Carole Rogel for their kindness and excellence in teaching during my graduate years. I shall always remember the clarity of their lec tures and the inspiration X derived from them. I am grateful to Mrs. Walter H. Page, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Robert College of Istanbul, and to Mrs. Catherine S. Rose of Robert College, Istanbul. Their generous hospitality and assistance enabled me to complete harmoniously a major portion of my research. To Mrs. Jane Ott, my typist, I owe an extra special note of thanks; it was due to her efforts in the final weeks that this study was completed. While all these people have made this dis sertation possible, I alone am responsible for errors which may remain in it. Most important of all, it should be noted that this study could never have been prepared, let alone brought to completion, without the encouragement, assistance, and understanding of my family— my wife, Michaele, and my children, Peter and Wendy. VITA June 2, 1942 Born - Manhasset Long Island, New York, New York 1962 .... A.A., The Principia College Elsah, Illinois 1964 . . . . B.A., Fresno State Col lege Fresno, California 1969 .... M.A., The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio 1968-1971. . Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1971-1973, Studies in Ottoman and Turkish Language and Ottoman History, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 1973-1975 Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Middle Eastern History Studies in Modern and Medieval Middle East pistory. Professor Sydney N. Fisher Studies in Eastern European History. Professor Carole R. Rogel Studies in the Slavery Controversy, civil Wpir and Reconstruction Professor Merton L. Dillon TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... ii VITA...... iv INTRODUCTION ...... 1 Chapter I. A MISSIONARY, AN EDUCATOR AND A DIPLOMAT . . 6 II. THE PHILOSOPHIES OF DR. GEORGE WASHBURN: PRAGMATIC STATESMAN— DEVOTED IDEALIST. . . . 28 III. A BEGINNING IN OTTOMAN POLITICS: 1859-1869...... 43 IV. THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN: OTTOMAN POLITICS, 1869-1878...... 69 V. THE RISE OF SULTAN ABD-UL-HAMID: OTTOMAN POLITICS, 1878-1880...... 103 VI. THE MOST DIFFICULT STRUGGLE: OTTOMAN POLITICS, 1881-1903 ...... 140 VII. MODERNIZATION AND REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1859-1903 ...... 178 VIII. THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1859-1903 207 IX. SULTANS AND OTHER PROMINENT TURKISH STATESMEN, 1859-1903 ...... 226 CONCLUSION...... 260 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RELEVANT MATERIALS INCLUDING GEORGE WASHBURN’S KNOWN WORKS ...... 266 v INTRODUCTION In the last decade the great interest shown in early American involvement in the Middle East has generated con siderable research and study of the subject. Books and articles written by David Finney, Joseph Grabill, James A. Field, John A. DeNovo, Merle Curti, A. L. Tibawi, Bayard Dodge, Robert L. Daniel'*' and others have dealt specifically with American political, social and economic contributions to the Middle East from 1776 to the present. As each new work is completed, the reader becomes more knowledgeable not only of the historic connection between the United States and Turkey but also of new evidence showing the significance of individual American contributions to Middle Eastern his tory. In light of this recent scholarship it seems worth while and relevant to investigate the life, ideas and activ ities of Dr. George Washburn, missionary, educator and diplo matic consultant who resided in Constantinople from 1858- 1908. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Americans knew very little about the Ottoman Empire and the inhabitants 2 of this area knew even less about America. Gradually, as more and more Americans went to the Ottoman Empire as active missionaries, traders or skilled educators., both 1 countries increased in their understanding of each other. While Ottoman Sultans and their ministers increased their contacts with American inventors, manufacturers and educat ors on all levels, Americans began to take notice of the conditions of the Ottoman Empire. As they fulfilled the promises of their original contracts and agreements, many stayed on to continue their work and spread more of what they felt to be the better aspects of the American way of life. While they became concerned with the necessity for the protection of the Ottoman Empire against traditional and what they felt were evil European pressures they found themselves also attracted to the plight of the many Ottoman nationalities and their desires for self-determination. What resulted was a curious interaction in which whatever American influence was available was deployed both on be half of the threatened Ottoman government and on behalf of the causes of the various nationalities against this same Ottoman government. If one can begin to understand this curious American dichotomy, perhaps one can appreciate the difficulties the historian encounters in comprehending and explaining the career of Dr. Washburn in Turkey. Dr. Washburn appears to have been a man who combined many of the varied American backgrounds into one experience. He began his career as a missionary with the American Board and later became President of Robert College, a unique American experiment in higher education in Constantinople. As his reputation for being knowledgeable on the Ottoman Empire, its government and the problems of its many nation alities grew, he established himself as an authority and consultant on its problems. Throughout his life. Dr. Wash burn vascilated in his apparently conflicting roles in an effort to improve the lives of the polyglot people of the Ottoman Empire. Differing from many missionaries. Dr. Washburn did not stay mired in a religiously narrow-minded attitude. Unlike many of his friends in the diplomatic corps, his long residence in the Empire did not turn his mind into a cynical repository of spite for the Ottoman government and its inhabitants. Rather there seems to have developed a curious mixture of one who was a practical statesman and who still was a warm humanitarian devoted to attaining his concept of justice for all peoples. This blend, however, was not an easy combination, for like the experiences of most early American workers in the Ottoman Empire, Dr. Washburn often found himself grievously tor mented over injustices in the Ottoman system. He lashed out against these forces in the best possible ways he knew. At times his criticism of Ottoman rulers and their government grew narrow-minded and harsh, bordering on anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim positions: but just as often, his criticism was impartial, resulting from a keen perception which pierced through the glaring flaws of Ottoman society and government as they existed during his lifetime. 4 The task then of this study is to attempt to present an unbiased view and recognize the strengths and weaknesses of deficiencies while assessing Dr. Washburn's role in Con stantinople as both a leading iSmerican citizen and a poten tial commentator and judge of Ottoman society at the time. 5 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION David H. Finnie, Pioneers East, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967. Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1971. James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World; 1776-1882,. Princeton, N.J., Princeton U. Press, John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East; 1900-1939, Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 1963. Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad; A History, New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1963. A. L. Tibawi, American Interests in Syria, 1800- 1901, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966. Bayard Dodge, "American Educational and Mission ary Efforts in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," The Annals of Political and Social Science, Vol. 401, May 1972, pp. 15-22. Robert L. Daniel, American Philanthropy in the Near East 1820-1960, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1970. 2 In this study the term "The Ottoman Empire" is used to designate both the political government and the geographical area ruled by the Ottoman Turks at the time George Washburn lived in Constantinople. This term, how ever, can become confusing, for Washburn, like many others of his time, often intermixed the terms "The Otto man Empire" with "The Turkish Empire." Writers had for some time used these two appelations interchangeably perhaps because the Ottoman sultans were Turkish and most of the high officials of the government and the army were Turkish-speaking Moslems. CHAPTER I A MISSIONARY, AN EDUCATOR AND A DIPLOMAT George Washburn was born in 1833 in Middleboro, Mass achusetts, into a family that had a long history of leader ship in that state's political, social, and economic af fairs. Washburn's relatives had been educators, diplomats, and statesmen, and his father, Philander Washburn, owned an established iron and steel manufacturing plant and was a man of comfortable means. As a young boy George received the finest education, attending Pierce Academy in Middleboro and Phillips Academy at Andover. Though he was often ill during his youth he proved to be quick and intelligent and, like his father before him, entered Amherst College in 1851. After his graduation in 1855, in the style of many of his * peers, he spent a year travelling through Europe and the Near East. Though he thoroughly enjoyed his wanderings in Europe, his first impression of Constantinople was not a pleasant one and "he made haste to leave it, changing his steamer ticket so as to get away earlier than he had planned."^ When he returned to the United States he decided not to enter the business world. Accounting for this decision 6 he later told his surprised parents, "I finally settled the question...that my life should never be spent in money making... If I dread anything, it is the prospect of being 2 a broken down good-for-nothing professional man." He decided instead to enter Andover Theological Seminary and become a minister. While there he came into contact with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and decided to join them in their work. When he learned that Constantinople's climate could perhaps be favorable to his poor health, he decided to serve in the city he had been so hasty to leave just a few years previously. He wrote his astonished parents that he had decided to go to Constantin ople since it offers a climate where consumption is almost unknown...where others who have gone out sick have been entirely cured or had their lives prolonged for many years. It offers a situation which for beauty and interest is hardly equalled in the world - all the beauties of the West collected in one place.3 With these thoughts in mind George Washburn embarked on what was to become a fifty year association with the capital of the Ottoman Empire. Trying to soothe the pain his parents must have felt when he left for Constantinople, he wrote them in 1858 that none in this world can ever know how deeply I realized the extent of the trials connected with this step - but I saw the path of duty before me as plain as God's Providence would make it...My only desire is that you may see it in the same light... 8 Since he was troubled with a chronic throat com plaint the Board felt that he could not withstand the rigors of daily missionary work. Instead, it appointed him as treasurer and head of the station's post office. Washburn, however, hoped that he might eventually be able to go into the full-time preaching and immediately took up the study of the Turkish language with this end in mind. In addition to the official duties assigned him by the Board he soon began preaching on an occasional basis by conducting a Sunday service in English in the chapel of the Dutch Lega tion in Pera. Four years after his missionary work com menced he returned to the United States to re-enter Andover Theological Seminary. In July, 1863, he completed his year of study and became ordained a Congregational minister. He returned to Constantinople the same year to resume his work with the American Board. These early years in Constantinople were important in helping to mold Washburn's future life. While filling the post of treasurer of the mission Washburn came into direct contact with every missionary stationed in the Ottoman Empire. Through necessity he became familiar with each of their prob lems and often was instrumental in aiding them. Handling not only their monetary problems but their correspondence as well, he also made associations with foreign diplomats and Ottoman state officials and gradually began to sense the method of operating in the Ottoman Empire. While it was natural for a man in his position with the Board to corres pond with all the missionaries in regard to business during these years, Washburn also helped to edit two newspapers and wrote frequently for the periodical press of England, and the United States. In addition to his official duties, he branched out into work more in line with what he felt to be pure missionary work. He became interested in the Turk ish missionary aid society and at one point he had the superintendence of all the native "helpers" in Constantinople. As his outside involvements became more pressing and his reputation and seniority among members of the American Board increased, Washburn began to fight to free himself of the many clerical duties he had inherited when he began his post. The records of the American Board in the 60's are re plete with Washburn's requests for assistants to aid him with the post office and treasurer's work. This aid would allow him time to carry out missionary business he felt to be of greater importance and enable him to become a full time preaching missionary. Because of his various contacts with the American Legation and the British Embassy in Con stantinople, he soon became known as a man who could assist in solving local problems. One such case in point involved Robert College. Already involved with the institution because he had married the president's daugher, Henrietta Hamlin, Washburn soon became a medium for the negotiations 10 between Hamlin/ the American Legation, and the Ottoman government concerning permission to build permanent struc- g tures for the new college. Early in the decade of the 60's Washburn had begun to act as a special correspondent for various public news papers in America, and word soon spread his reputation as one who knew the "inside track" of things in the Ottoman Empire. Undoubtedly this reputation was well deserved as a result of Washburn's activities; however, it was also just as likely the result of a calculated campaign on the part of Washburn himself to make sure his name was known in a variety of places. Thus when the American missionary community in Constantinople held a special religious service in memory of President Lincoln's death, the Reverend George Washburn 7 was selected to preside. In 1865 and 1866 the missionary community in Constantinople began to feel unusually heavy pressure from the Ottoman government against their activ ities with the Protestant civil community. When the mission aries needed a spokesman to "enlighten" the American and British diplomatic representatives as to the need to be properly concerned with the legal interests of the Protest ants, Washburn was chosen to present and to persist with 8 their case until they felt it was resolved. It appears that Washburn's early career as a mission ary with the American Board was a successful one. When he 11 returned from Andover in 1863 he decided to become actively associated with the small congregation in Pera. For years this post had been manned by the American Board ministers and its numbers had been slowly dwindling. In 1862 it had been temporarily abandoned. When Washburn took it over in 1863 its congregation numbered twenty-five. By 1867, the year before he resigned from his post with the American Board, the "congregation...averaged about 100...comprising English, Scotch, French, Dutch, Americans, Armenians, Greeks, etc. among whom are representatives of twelve or 9 fifteen different religious denominations..." When he retired from the Board, the members of this congregation held a testimonial dinner and awarded him a valuable gold watch and gave his wife a splendid tea service, the values of which were over three hundred dollars— no mean sum in those days.^ Though Washburn had become one of the leading members of the American Board in Constantinople and had been active in other affairs of the American community, in 1868 he decided to return to the United States to begin a career as a minister there. When he left Constantinople it was with the firm conviction that he would never see the city again. He very nearly accomplished this purpose. During the next year he travelled in the eastern United States, preaching at several different churches, and later in the year was offered two ministerial positions— one in Chicago and the other in New York City. Though he was seriously contemplating 12 accepting one of the offers, he was persuaded by Mr. Chris topher Robert, Chief Benefactor of Robert College in Con stantinople, to change his mind. At this time Robert begged him to return temporarily to Constantinople and as sist his father-in-law Cyrus Hamlin, with his work. During this early and critical stage at Robert Col lege, Hamlin, its first president, was heavily involved in directing the construction project for the college's first permanent structure. As a result, the instructional and organizational aspects of the college were rapidly deter iorating. Mr. Robert feared that, though the new college might end up with a handsome building, its instructional program would become so shoddy that the success of the col lege would be critically endangered. Far from being eager to accept the assignment to help his father-in-law, it is now known that Washburn had several reservations about the task. To begin with, he was apprehensive about his relation to the new college and about the danger of his coming into competition with his father-in law. Writing to Robert in 1869, he said, ...my work at Constantinople will be anything and everything I can do for the college includ ing care of the finances and teaching in any department, but nothing in my position will be understood to modify Dr. Hamlin's relation to the college nor detract from the supreme control he now exercises.11 Several letters were exchanged between Robert and Washburn pursuing this and other related points. The final result 13 was that Washburn agreed to postpone for two years the decision as to his ultimate place of employment in the United States so as to enable him and his family to return temporarily to Constantinople to assist the college and his father-in-law. In 1869 he returned to Constantinople, a prepaid return voyage guaranteed him at the end of two years by Robert, as a Professor of Mental and Moral Philos ophy. His salary was set at three hundred fifty pounds ster ling or roughly the same equivalent he had received as a missionary with the American Board. From the beginning of their association there were problems between Washburn and Hamlin. Each in his own way was a dynamic and brilliant individual. Cyrus Hamlin was gifted with remarkable vision and undaunted idealism that seemed to permeate all those around him. On the other hand, George Washburn was an excellent organizer and leader. While Hamlin remained fully occupied completing the College's first permanent structure— a tremendous task— Washburn was continually forced to take up the slack reins of leadership in running the day-to-day affairs of the college. It must have been a painful responsibility for him because he real ized that the more he exercised the needed responsibilities that beckoned to him the more he was encroaching on his father-in-law's official position. The realization that fate was forcing him gradually to assume a position he did not want must have weighed 14 heavily on his conscience during those first two years. Time and again he would write Robert and the trustees, re minding them of his original promise, made against his better judgment, to serve for only two years. Hamlin too realized what was happening and began to complain to Robert that his authority was being transgressed by his son-in-law. This only made the situation more difficult for all parties concerned. At one point in these proceedings Washburn wrote Robert, Whenever you have any evidence from any source or any complaint from Dr. Hamlin that I have forgotten my connection with the college is a subordinate one, I hope you will not wait for forums but recall me at once. So long as I remain here my work is a work of love. Neither necessity nor ambition could ever lead me to remain here another day.12 The decision to stay on or to leave at the end of two years, however, was taken out of Washburn's hands since the original structure was not completed and Hamlin had em barked on other building plans as well. Washburn was per suaded to stay on for a longer period. Each year that he remained on the campus, he found Mr. Robert and the trustees forcing him to make more and more daily decisions concerning the college. In 1873 he wrote Robert and asked him to give Hamlin the power he should have as president of the college and to relieve him of the burdens of authority he had been assuming. In one letter on this subject he asked for this power for Hamlin and concluded, "I would not stand in his (Hamlin's) way one hour here— my resignation is always in your hands to make way for him." 13 Mr. Robert responded in the same year by assigning Dr. Hamlin the task of return ing to the United States to raise endowments for professor ships for the College. By this time Robert and the board of trustees did not want to see Washburn leave; they were delighted with his work. Since he had arrived in 1869 they had seen the fledgling institution grow in size and stature. It had a larger faculty, stable courses of instruction and each year established firmer foundations. By 1876, seven years after his "temporary" assignment, Washburn found him self firmly attached to the college, identifying its pur pose with his own life's goals. In November, 1876, Wash burn wrote Robert a long letter describing the unique role the college could play in the Ottoman Empire and told him that there was a magnificent future ahead for the institu tion. "I am ready to give my life and everything I have 14 to this work." In 1877, four years after he had returned to the United States, Hamlin was informed by Mr. Robert that his services were no longer wanted as President of Robert College. "No explanation was vouchsafed and none was asked." On June 6, 1878, at a special meeting of the board of trustees, Washburn was formally appointed President of Robert College. He held this position until he decided to retire in 1903. But the price he paid for acceptance of 16 this position was a heavy one, for he and his father-in- law parted ways and never again were able to cooperate, so strong was this feeling of resentment over the college position. When Washburn and his wife returned to the United States to recruit for the college in 1880, Hamlin wrote his daughter, "I have no objection to his (Washburn's) coming with you on that one condition that he shall never broach any Turkish subject whatever nor make any reference to the college direct or indirect and he shall say nothing that I feel indiscreet that he and I have ever been in Turkey."1*5 For the rest of his life Hamlin.would oppose his son-in-law's activities and the feud between them alternately smoldered and then burst into flame publicly and privately. Washburn's life was permanently redirected and he spent the majority of his remaining years molding the new college and fighting with Ottoman authorities in his effort to develop new leaders for the empire and its polyglot nationalities. Because Robert College was so frequently identified as a Christian institution in its early years, none of its students were Moslem. But for what it lacked in the way of Moslem students, it made up for with others. Under Washburn's presidency Robert College rose to a recognized rank among the higher institutions of Europe. From a handful of students in 1869 it grew to over three hundred with a large faculty and nine permanent structures by 1903 when he retired. It came to be regarded as a model Christian College in the "development of manliness and the spirit of social service among its students..."'^ During the years of Hamlin and Washburn more than twenty-five hundred students had enrolled at the college, four hundred thirty-five of them graduated and played a prominent part in the life of their respected communities.^-® The influence of the college on the formation of Bulgarian character was so marked that its first parliament passed a resolution of thanks to Washburn for his service to the nation. In 1883, in an act of further gratitude to Wash burn, the Prince of Bulgaria conferred on him the order of St. Alexander. Years later at a memorial service, Washburn was honored by high officials of nearly all the nationali ties that had been so well aided during his term as Presi dent of Robert College. In addition to his activities as a missionary and a college president Washburn also established himself firmly in the role of an important political advisor. It is dif ficult to estimate when Washburn began to serve as a confidential advisor to diplomats, but one might assume it was something that increased more or less geometrically with his presence and the success of his activities in Constan tinople. As a man of strong will and character, it was logical for him to assume a leadership role in the community. Perhaps what furthered this importance was his natural 18 ability as a writer. Early in his career Washburn became a correspondent for many magazines and papers. Writing mostly anonymously using such noms de plume as "An Eastern Resident," " An Old Resident," or simply a paper's "regular" or "special cor respondent," Washburn regularly contributed spirited ar ticles to the New York Daily Tribune, The Contemporary Review, The Outlook, The Christian Union, The Independent, and scores of others. As he wrote, his contacts and his repu tation as an authority increased. Sir Edwin Pears, a noted English lawyer and journalist in Constantinople, felt that Washburn's writings exemplified sound judgment and reliable information in regard to all the races of the Ottoman Empire and said that "...he was trusted by all the competent British 19 Ambassadors during his fifty years in Turkey." In a sense, Washburn became an unofficial advisor to all British Ambassadors during his residence in Constantin ople. Often he would travel into town to lunch with offic ials and quite as often the college would be visited by high officials from many different nations, each seeking his own private consultation with Dr. Washburn. But should the ambassador dare to run the risk of arousing Washburn's anger over an injustice he had committed, this association could just as easily work to the embarrassment of the official. Such was the case when Washburn and his colleague, Dr. Long, 19 intervened in the Bulgarian atrocities in 1876. When Sir Henry Elliot, then British Ambassador, remained inactive during the massacre of the Bulgarians, Washburn not only upbraided him for his ineptness but became actively involved in spear heading a campaign to gather honest publicity about the incidents to force the British government to take some need ed action. Action was taken and Sir Henry Elliot's career in Constantinople was shortened. Washburn also came into frequent contact with other leading figures in Constantinople, working often with the heads of the several Eastern Churches in the city. He was active in the government of the Christian community, sitting, for example, as a judge in an Armenian murder case in 1880. 20 His friendships included numerous ambassadors from various nations as well as many Turks from a broad range of educational and occupational backgrounds. Though Washburn never accepted an official post in the United States Department of State, his presence in Constantinople bore tremendous weight on this nation's policy toward the Ottoman Empire. Much of his association with the diplomatic corps came through the utter necessity of protecting the interests of his professions— the mission aries and later Robert College. In 1872, for example, it was Washburn who led the American contingent's protest against the hiring of John Porter Brown's son David as Dragoman 21 at the Legation. He felt his previous associations with 20 the young man had shown him to be irresponsible and he was successful in stopping the appointment. Washburn was a self-appointed watchdog on the activities of his nation's spokesmen overseas, often seeing a Legation official two to 22 three times a week to "keep him up to the mark." Most of the time these associations were remembered by Washburn and his friends as pleasant ones; however, this was not always the case. Once Washburn felt a certain Amer ican diplomat, Ambassador Leishman, was spending far too much time in Paris and neglecting his duties in Turkey. Washburn threatened to write President Roosevelt and Secre tary of State Root to complain of the frequent absences. If Washburn himself did not have eminent personal connec tions with men in high places in Washington D.C., members of the Board of Trustees of Robert College did and their influences were at his disposal. John S. Kennedy wrote him once. Should any trouble arise at any time that neces sitates or makes advisable an appeal to the State Department, my relations with Mr. Root, Secretary of State, and Mr. Bacon, the Assistant Secretary, are such that I can go to them at any time and get a hearing, and even-to the President should it be come necessary.... In 1891 when the American Congress was working on a new United States - Turkey treaty, Washburn was given a secret copy of it in advance so that he could give the Sen ate a full memorandum to aid in its drafting. When he spent the summer of 1902 in the United States, he went to 21 Washington at the request of President Roosevelt to discuss United States relations with Turkey. Some twenty years ear lier, Lord Granville had asked him to call at the Foreign 24 Office in London to discuss affairs in the Middle East. Oscar Strauss, three times American Minister to Constan tinople once said he owed much of his diplomatic successes to the fact that he often consulted with Washburn and used his advice.^ Washburn's expertise in dealing with American poli tics and Washington business should come as no surprise. After all, the ultimate success of all his projects in Con stantinople depended upon his ability to perceive domestic and foreign political currents and forecast future trends. In any nation's capital this would be a monumental task; in Constantinople during the years 1858 - 1908 this was a superhuman accomplishment. One knows from historical hind sight that at times Washburn was wrong in his assumptions. However, one also can perceive that in many instances he was correct and his forecast enabled him to assure himself that the activities he was responsible for would prosper. What makes Washburn such an interesting figure is the scope of his interests and the breadth of his talents. In addition to his dedication to his religion, his commitment to Robert College, and his far-reaching correspondences— personal and public— Washburn had numerous other activities. His unique geological surveys of the Bosphorum region during 22 the early part of the 1870's are an example. He himself ad mits that at one point in his college career he had made an exhaustive survey, gathering a collection of fossils and minerals for the college and had thought of devoting his life to geology. When the Bosphorus study was completed and published it represented the first work of its kind in the 26 area. It covered the whole Bosphorus region and extended back nearly twenty miles on each side of the straits. Washburn was also the recipient of numerous awards. In 1875 he received the degree of Doctor of Divinity from Amherst and later in 1900 and 1906 he received honorary Doctor of Law degrees from Princeton, Michigan, Amherst, and the University of Pennsylvania. After he retired from the presidency and teaching staff of Robert College, he returned to the United States and worked at writing his impressions of his years in the Ottoman Empire and at reporting on cur rent problems of the Empire. In 1909 he published his book Fifty Years in Constantinople, and later in the same year served as a guest lecturer at the Lowell Institute in Bos ton. He continued to write and comment on the Ottoman Empire— its culture and religions— in his later years, but passed on February 2, 1915, before he could see evolve a complete solution for the Ottoman Empire. During his life in the Ottoman Empire Washburn in terested himself in everything which concerned the welfare of its many different nationalities. While he was never 23 in the forefront advocating revolution or sedition, and while he never held any official diplomatic position, he was gen erally regarded by those in power as an authority and force in the numerous changes which took place in the region. During his lifetime Constantinople was the actual breeding place of history's wars and intrigues and the meeting place of rival diplomats each eager to seek his nation's supremacy over the declining empire of the Sultan. George Washburn was one of the few men whose advice was equally sought by many and, as such, he became a strong influence for good for the whole empire. He was honored at his death by var ious statesmen all over the globe. Writing for the Man chester Guardian, Lord Bryce said, He had a firm grasp of Turkish History and of the character of Islam. He was broad-minded and tolerant in his views and policy. Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians all learned to trust him and Turks recognized the nobility of his aims and the honesty of his methods. 7 Bryce added "there were few among Europeans or Americans who equalled him in penetration or soundness of his judgments." 2 8 Another English friend. Sir Edwin Pears, compared him with Arnold of Rugby as one "whose magnetism seemed to embue those educated under him with the same kind of earnestness of capacity for seeing both sides of a question, of taking each man's censure, but of reserving their judgments as did 29 Arnold." At a memorial service held for him in Constantinople, speeches were delivered in the various tongues of the Empire's 24 nationalities by his friends— students, educators, diplo mats, and clergy. All commented on Washburn's desires to see all the races of the Ottoman Empire educated and living together equally in new-found unity and harmony. Resolutions were adopted by the Board of Trustees of Robert College honoring his statesmanship and his unselfish devotion to Robert College. They also praised his remark able management of the college and his influence in the Turkish capital and even in some of the capitals of Europe.30 Perhaps the obituary in the Times of London best summed up the feeling of his associates when it wrote about his passing, "He was a man of broad views and abundant com mon sense, kindly but firm in dealing with men, and ready to act whenever his service would benefit his fellow men." 31 25 NOTES TO CHAPTER I 1 An Appreciation in the Memory of Rev. George Washburn. ..DP, LLP. 1833-1915, printed not published by the Trustees of Robert College for private circulation, New York City, 1915, p. 19. 2 Letter from Washburn to his parents, March 9, 1858. Original document taken from Amherst College Archives, hereafter cited ACA. 3Ibid. 4 Letter from Washburn to his father, Philander Washburn, November 9, 1858. Original document taken from the Cyrus Hamlin Papers, Houghton Library Accessions, Harvard College Library, hereafter cited CHPHLA. 5 Half Century Record of the Class of '*55," Amherst College, 1855-1905, edited by the Secretary, Amherst, Mass., printed for the class, 1905. Carpenter and More house Printers, Amherst, Mass., 1905. P. 110. 6 An Appreciation in the Memory of Rev. G. Wash burn, DP, LLP, op. cit., p. 20. 7 New York Daily Tribune, July 7, 1865, p. 8. 0 Original document taken from the Archives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Harvard College Library, Western Turkey Mission, Vol. 1, 1860-1871, "Report from the Constantinople Station, 1865- 1866," hereafter cited AABCFM. Q Ibid.., "Report of the Constantinople Station," May, 1867. ^Letter from Washburn to his father, January 24, 1866. CHPHCA. 26 11Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, August 26, 1869. Original document taken from the Archives of the Trustees of Robert College, hereafter cited ATRC. 12 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, December 2, 1869, ATRC. 1 ^Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, March 14, 1873. ATRC. 14Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, November 3, 1876, ATRC. 15 In Memoriam. Rev. Cyrus Hamlm, DP, LLP, Boston. Published privately, 1903, p. 20. 16 Letter from Cyrus Hamlin to Henrietta Hamlin Washburn, August 30, 1880. CHPHLA. 17 Will S. Monroe, Bulgaria and Her People (Boston: The Page Co., 1914), pp. 331-332. 18 • Caleb Prank Gates, Not to Me Only (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), p. 168. 19Sir Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople: Recollections, 1873-1915 (New York: Appleton and Co., 1916), pp. 94-95. 20Letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, April 12, 1880, ACA. 21Dragoman is a derivation from the late Greek word Dragomanos referring to an individual who acted as an official interpreter. The Turkish rendering of the word is Tercuman. During Washburn's life in the Ottoman Empire, each Embassy or Legation had a Dragoman who acted as the official interpreter for the Ambassador or Minister when conducting any business with the Ottoman Government. ^Letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, February 10, 1896, CHPHLA. 23Letter from John S. Kennedy to George Washburn, August 29, 1906, CHPHLA. 24Profile of Dr. George Washburn, President, 1878-1903, by Herbert H. Lane, Robert College Archives, N.D.N.P. 25 Amherst College Archives, Collection of Washburn Memorial Services, N.D.N.P. 26George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople- (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), p. 61. See also, letters from Washburn to Christopher Robert, November 24, 1871, April 27, 1874. ATRC. 27 The National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XXVI (New York: James T. White and Co., 1937), p. 102. 28 An Appreciation in the Memory of Rev. George Washburn, DD, LLP, op. cit., p. 30. 29 Sir Edwin Pears, op. cit., p. 14. 30An Appreciation, op. cit., p . 8. 31The Times (London), March 18, 1915, p, 12, CHAPTER II THE PHILOSOPHIES OF DR. GEORGE WASHBURN: PRAGMATIC STATESMAN— DEVOTED IDEALIST A full evaluation of Washburn's observations and his role in influencing the ideas and attitudes of Americans and Europeans toward the Ottoman government and its peoples can best be made by analyzing his statements, publicly expressed or privately conveyed, with special attention being given to the audiences to whom the messages were being directed. Furthermore, being a sensitive man, he should be allowed some passion in his utterances, especially in his private letters to his family and close friends. Only in this manner is it possible to ascertain Washburn's true feelings and ideas about those matters on which he reported. Perhaps the most generally voiced complaints about Dr. Washburn's views have been that he was prejudiced by his blinding commitment to the Christian faith and its mis sionary cause. After all, critics assert, Washburn's pri mary introduction to the Ottoman Empire was as a missionary of the American Board— an appointment that certainly headed him down the narrow road of bias. Later on his perception was further clouded, they assert, by the fact that he was involved with a college which was classified as a Christian 28 entity, the purpose of which was to instill Christian values in young men. These vocations, they say, so channeled Wash burn's thinking that he became anti-Moslem and anti-Turkish in all his observations and reports. Therefore, critics would have one believe that these facts made Washburn's writ ings so biased as to be of little historical use. However, an examination of all of the known personal letters of Dr. Washburn and a careful study of his published and unpublished reports that are available does not justify the modern re searcher to adopt such a negative conclusion about the worth of Dr. Washburn's writings. Rather, much of what he wrote can be taken as a worthy portrayal of life in the Ottoman Empire during his residence. Like any individual in a dif ficult leadership role, one of Dr. Washburn's constant and pressing aims during his life in Turkey was to maintain credibility with the various forces with which he dealt as well as with his own principles. This was no easy task and, as such, involved a great deal of judicious effort and diplomacy on his part. Examining Washburn's precarious position one gains a better idea of the difficulties he faced. As a president of a privately endowed Christian college, he was required to keep in close contact with a board of trustees in the United States regarding the direc tion and activities of the college. Nearly all of the men on the board were successful business men and devout Christians. Few, if any, had any knowledge of Islam or of the Ottoman Empire and most were limited in their toleration of both by the common prejudices of their time. Writing to Dr. Washburn in 1876, Mr. David S. Dodge, a member of the board of trustees, perfectly illustrates this attitude when he stated, "Every day I look for the corner where Foreign news can always be found hoping some items will stand out saying that the Turks have been defeated and that attroc- ious government is about to borrow a pair of scissors for its own use."1 It is doubtful whether Washburn could have managed to keep his job if these strong-willed men would have had the slightest reason to suspect that he was soft on Christianity, and certainly this colored all reports he made to them. For the first ten years of his association with Robert College, Washburn was in direct contact with its co-founder and chief benefactor, Christoper Robert. During this time hardly a week passed when the two men did not correspond in great detail about everything pertaining to 2 the college and the Ottoman Empire. Like the men on his board, Mr. Robert was a devoted Christian who sincerely felt his college was serving a deep mission of good for the faith. Here, too, Washburn must have felt the need to construct his reports most carefully so as not to offend his superiors' preconceived notions and yet maintain flex- bility to perform the task he saw as his own service. 31 Washburn not only had strong American mentors with whom to deal but he also had daily contact with the Ottoman government during a time when it felt more and more be sieged and consequently suspicious of all foreigners and their activities. It must be remembered that Dr. Washburn's vocation, education, was in the area perhaps the most sen sitive of all to the government, and he and his institution were closely regulated and observed at all times during his stay in Constantinople. Every action that he took and every article that he wrote was suspect. This would explain why Dr. Washburn had to write anonymously when he made critical reports on conditions in the empire. It also explains why he signed his name to several articles which he felt to be truthful but at the same time were inoffensive to the Turk ish government. The important thing to consider in review ing Dr. Washburn's works is the fact that Washburn wrote many things for many different readers. It is true that Dr. Washburn was at times extremely critical of the Ottoman government and that he wrote with much righteous indignation. He was a committed idealist in all departments of life. He often made the mistake of allowing this idealism to overflow into his reaction to the daily horrors he witnessed, since he felt they could be easily corrected with governmental action. Washburn once said he believed in the White Man's burden and perhaps this admission makes it easier to understand his condemnation 32 of Ottoman practices. Rather than the petty squabbles and desperate power struggles among the governments and polyglot peoples, Washburn longed to see united action. At one point he described the Ottoman situation saying, "Christians and Turks alike...appeal....(for help). It is no mere question of Christian and Turk (though), it is 3 one of humanity." Although much has been said about Washburn's one sided animosity toward the Ottoman government, it must be pointed out that he was harsh in his criticism of all the European governments as well— and these were Christian governments. He described the situation of the Russian people in 1892 as becoming more and more brutalized and noted that they "have suffered from the blind and brutal 4 despotism of the government." Washburn prefaced many of his objections with the note that he was trying to apply the same principles of criticism to the policy.of the Sultan as he did to those of the European rulers. Commenting on this European influence he once said, "...the whole influ ence of Europe in Turkey has been adopted to hasten the downfall of the empire and add to the miseries of the Turkish population. They have made no serious efforts to 5 reform the government..." It seemed to him that European rulers were claiming the Ottoman Empire without any regard to the character, rights, or wishes of the people of this empire. Writing to his daughter about this very problem, 33 he said, "the only thing the European powers think of now is a market for their productions to enable them to keep g up their enormous military establishments..." Though he often expressed his bitterness at the Otto man Government's failure to reform, he also included the Powers in his denunciations. Washburn saw that, in addi tion to the ineptness of the Ottoman government, it was the greed of the powers to annex or at least to control all or parts of the empire that stirred up the passions and kept the nationalities forever enslaved in a system that he knew to be doomed. Europe..."neither allowed the Turks to rule in their own way with fire and sword as their ancestors did nor forced them to emancipate the Christians and establish a civil government in place of religious 7 despotism." It was natural for Washburn as an educator to take such an interest in reforming the empire. What was un natural was his insistence that true reform could come only from outside and mainly from Christian pressures. Washburn reviewed the long period of Turkish history and concluded that the Turks were basically unchanged from what they were when they first appeared in Asia Minor. "This immobility has undoubtedly come from the unchange- Q able character of Mohammedanism." Despite the fact that he conceded there was a possibility that the Turks, like the former Arab civilizations, might catch the inspiration 34 of foreign thought and develop their own civilization, he felt that the final result of true reform would come rad ically only under Christian and European supervision. This belief is what made it so very difficult for Wash burn the humanitarian, for on the one hand he felt that it was the duty of the Christian nations of the West to guide these needed reforms in the empire, and, on the other hand, as a knowledgeable statesman, he knew intrinsically that the foremost desires of these powers were adamantly against reforming the empire. Thus there existed the strange interaction in Washburn's writings of mixed emo tions— strong criticism for the evils of the Turkish- Moslem system, and yet a deep sympathy for these same peop les for the suffering they were being forced to bear by the world outside their empire. Rather than grow steadily more bitter at the Turks and their government as his years in the empire multiplied, Washburn became more sympathetic and understanding. His criticisms and anger at outrages never ceased, but he began to place more and more of the blame for these on the~fail- ures of the European governments who had encouraged so many of these troubles and who had so often failed to follow through on their many well publicized reforms. To Washburn in his later years it seemed that Turkey was being forced to stand alone without any sincere allies. She was forced to use her keenest statesmen's cunning to outwit her 35 rivals in her struggle against the inevitable— the down fall of a once mighty empire. And though he is harsh in his reporting of reforms and their failures, he is also fair in his portrayal of life in Turkey at the time. It is not accurate, however, to imply that Washburn was free from any bias or that one should de-emphasize this bias when analyzing his writing. It is only too clear that he was sincere in his belief that the true road to reform lay within a framework of a civilization based on Christian and Protestant doctrines. What should be under stood, however, is that this bias was not anti-Moslem or anti-Turkish. Washburn's views and doctrines conflicted not only with Islam but with some Christian practices that were in opposition to his religious training. In 1873 and 1874 he and Robert College came under severe fire from Armenian civil and religious authorities for attempting to "Protestantize" Armenian youth. This case offers a unique opportunity to test Washburn's zealousness and see his ability to survive within the framework of rules placed upon him by his superiors. The whole conflict arose over the issue of the weekly class of religious instruc tion. On the one hand, Mr. Robert and the board of trus tees in America demanded that the college offer definitive religious instruction. On the other hand, the local religious authorities deeply resented this intrusion into their domains by what they believed should be a purely educational institution. Caught in the middle was Pres ident Washburn. He handled the situation as simply as he could. Against the wishes of the Trustees he limited the religious class to one dosage a week, since increasing it would "arouse opposition on the part of parents of our own students, without adding anything to the actual religious instruction." 9 Better to have quality than useless quantity and the practical business instincts of the Trustees forced them to agree. The native religious authorities were also eventually soothed as was learned in later years from a report by Paul Monroe, then president of Robert College. He declared that "overt religious in struction had been a development of the Gates regime, not Hamlin's or Washburn *s...Washburn had read the scriptures, but always from the Psalms which were acceptable to Jews and Moslems alike."'*'® Rather than having blatant Protes tantism preached to their children, the parents were mollified by the knowledge that the Psalms, universal to nearly all faiths, were the main source of the lessons. One begins to sense that Washburn's zealousness, although definitely present, was, for better or worse, constantly balanced by a necessary pragmatism. In 1877 Washburn was approached about his feelings concerning a move to recall a certain American diplomat because he had consistently given receptions on the Sab bath. He dismissed such a charge as folly, stating, "Sabbath breaking is a serious offense against God, but it is universal in the diplomatic service and however much we may regret it it is certain that no official would be removed in such a charge. " ’*'1 Needless to say the offended individual was satisfied with the answer and Washburn survived the incident without having to involve himself in a righteous but- hopeless and embarrassing cause. Washburn was not always so practical and calm, how ever; as a matter of fact, ample evidence of his wrath at the Ottoman government can be found in his private cor respondence. This anger often led him to label incorrect ly the Ottoman government as a "Mohammedan Despotism." Possibly this fury was a natural consequence of the frus trations he felt at seeing the Ottoman government so con sistently deny equality to Christians. One of Washburn's foremost goals during his life in Turkey was to push for a genuinely democratic and secular government for the empire. He was never to see this hope materialize and undoubtedly this bitterness often surfaced in his writings. In 1874 in one of these moods of anger following a period of harsh Turkish pressures exerted on Robert College, he said, "I often get disgusted myself and feel that the best missionary work to be done here would be to organize a crusade to drive out the Turks - but it is a most short sighted view. It is not a good policy to burn down your house though it may be infested with rats, until you have 38 12 another to live in." Washburn realized in calmer moments that the whole problem was a multifaced one involving problems among Turks as well as the Christian populations. No Turk was ready to say that this should cease to be a strictly Mohammedan government. No Christian was honestly willing to serve in the Turkish army but somehow they expected to be put on an equality with Mohammedans and have no active part in the government. The Turks had no difficulty in understanding democratic equality between themselves. They had this already; but they could not conceive of equality with Chris tians which was contrary to their religion.^3 While it must be conceded that Washburn was a deeply religious man who believed that the final answer for all was to "give them the Gospel of Christ," he was by no means a bigot. He wrote later of his associations with people in the Ottoman Empire, "The more I have known the people personally— Turks as well as Oriental Christians... the more 14 I have found in them to admire and love." More often than not his overriding concern was for the immediate betterment of the lives of all people and this transcended any relig ious prejudices he may have harbored. This feeling, plus a deep sense of moral honesty, fully colors his writings and his demands for respect for individuals and cultures. He learned a great deal about Islam as a religion and, though he may have many times attacked the shallowness of its followers, he was a steadfast defender of its traditions. Once in 1894 he wrote an article about a secret society in the United States called "The Order of the Sacred Shrine of Mecca" which copied many of the sacred rituals of Islam 39 and used them for social purposes. He attacked them stat ing they "must be regarded by every true Moslem as an in sult to his religion, as great an insult as we should regard it if the Turks parodied the Holy Communion and Christian worship." 15 Later he condemned the society's activities as a fraud and a parody on Mohammedism and an insult to a great religion. Unlike many of his religious contemporaries who classified all Turks as Moslem fanatics, Washburn touched the heart of the problem when he concluded that the Turk was not a fanatic by nature but that these outbursts were the work of specifically organized political activities of the government. 1 7 He once concluded a lecture on the Turks by saying, "There are good men among the Turks; there are godly men among the Turks; there are spiritually minded men among the Turks; there are mystics among the Turks, whose writing you could not distinguish from the writings of Christian mystics." 18 It is this vacilation of Washburn from moralist to practical statesman that makes his works so difficult to deal with and so impossible for the historian to label. At times he appears as the Christian moralist, at others as the cool-headed pragmatist ever willing to understand and defend the many different people of the world societies. Yet in the final sense it is this dichotomy which in turn makes Washburn a worthy 40 source for study because in his vacilations he is a mirror of the complexities of the Ottoman Empire of his time. 41 NOTES TO CHAPTER II ■^Letter from David S. Dodge to Washburn, July 20, 1876, ATRC. Prior to this letter, Mr. Dodge knew that Sultan Abdul Aziz had been deposed and had died while in prison from wounds inflicted with a pair of scissors. 2 Letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, November 10, 1878. 3 An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Govern ment Do for Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 37, June, 1880, p. 899. Most of the articles written by Washburn for the Contemporary Review were submitted under a nome de plum. The author has identified these articles as Washburn's based on direct evidence of reference to these articles in Washburn's personal correspondence and from documentation in Wellesley Index to Victorian Pub lications . Vol. I. 4 George Washburn, "The Famine in Russia," The Independent. Vol. 44, January 21, 1892, pp. 2-3. Wash burn was also a regular contributor to the Independent, often signing his own name to the articles he submitted. 5 George Washburn, "Turkey and the Liberal Govern ment in England," The Independent, Vol. 32 (June 17, 1880), p. 1. ^Letter from Washburn to his daughter, Anna Wash burn, December 19, 1897. Letter from Washburn to Anna Washburn, December 19, 1897. At the Paris Peace Confer ence, March 1865, held at the end of the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire was recognized as a member of the "European Concert." This concert, composed of England, France, Sardinia, Austria and Russia came to be grouped together as a unit in European politics. Later at the Congress of Berlin, June, 1878, held to renegotiate the results of the Russo Turkish War, these same major European states, including Italy and Germany, conferred to settle European affairs. Hence in this study the use of the term "The Powers" will designate these major European states. 42 An Eastern Statesman, "Life in Constantinople Fifty Years Ago," The Contemporary Review. Vol. 36, (December, 1879) , p. 616. Q George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1901), p. xxviii. 9Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, December 31, 1872. ATRC. ^Robert L. Daniel, American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-1906, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1970, p. 232. Note: Caleb E. Gates succeeded Washburn as President of Robert College in 1903 and held this post until he retired in 1932. ■^Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, December 23, 1877. ATRC. ■^Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, June 23, 1874. ATRC. 13 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900. Unpublished manuscript, Robert College, Istanbul, Turkey, p. 67. 14 George Washburn, "The American Board," The Inde- pendent (November 17, 1881), Vol. 33, pp. 2-3. ■^George Washburn, "Mohammedanism in the United States," The Independent. Vol. 46 (April 5, 1894), p. 1. 16 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, pp. 230-231. 17 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 97. 18 George Washburn Papers, Amherst College Archives, "A Lecture on Robert College and the Turks," by George Washburn, unpublished manuscript, no date, p. 20. CHAPTER III A BEGINNING IN OTTOMAN POLITICS: 1858-1869 "The Ambassadors at Constantinople can never work together. They never have done so, and never will. Each one makes it his chief end to thwart the others and build up his own influence. George Washburn entered Constantinople in 1858 a young, idealistic political neophyte. While quite often his observations in this early period were blurred by an overflowing of emotional bias, they often contained keys to unlock many of the diplomatic moves of the period and to uncover much of the camouflage that was a trademark of Ottoman politics. Washburn discovered in his first decade in Turkey that Ottoman politics was so extremely difficult to com prehend because it was so complex. Though many tried to link these politics to a simple Moslem-Christian adver sary relationship, Washburn saw that such an approach was far too simplistic. He realized that quite often politics in the Empire also involved relations between Christians themselves, as was illustrated in the power struggles be tween the Protestants and their Jesuit rivals. Further- « more, he saw that attempts to solidify control in the 43 44 Empire often revolved around national ties as was the case in the battles between the British, the French, the Rus sians, as well as the Ottomans. Finally, he saw that there were often political struggles taking place within supposedly united alliances, as was the case in the strife between the American diplomatic and the American mission ary communities. In each of these aforementioned cases, Washburn saw influences being exerted that helped to shape the future course of the Ottoman Empire. When Washburn first arrived in the Empire in the service of the American Board, he found that the efforts of the missionaries were not yielding much success but that the overall climate appeared favorable to change. The Christian missionaries were then just beginning to assert themselves, and this represented a remarkable development from their first most humble beginning in the 1830's. A missionary wrote of his early experience in the Ottoman Empire, "the fact is our strength consists in being as quiet as possible. The less is said and known of our operations so much the better. A great deal can be done in a silent, harmless, inoffensive way . . . but nothing in a storm. We did not come here to quarrel with gover- 2 nors and pashas, nor with Patriarchs and bishops..." . For the most part the early missionary years were spent in establishing a base and "without power or influence or even permission they quietly seated themselves in the very city 45 3 of the Sultan." In those early years though the Chris tians had rights, a Turk was not bound or pressured to respect them. "They were sometimes shot down in their vineyards, like dogs, by passing Mussulmans who wished to try their guns. Their children were kidnapped with impunity. They were forced to wear a peculiar dress which marked them everywhere as an inferior race. They were insulted and abused in the streets and trembled at 4 the sight of a Turk." By the time Washburn entered the city of Constan tinople, however, these things had changed considerably. His early observations led him to believe that Christians— their lives, property, and families— were now more secure. They were seldom mistreated due to their faith and their fear of the Turks had been greatly reduced. Though the government was weak, it feared nothing from the people and left them very much to themselves. As the people of Christianity were theoretically the guests of the Sultan, there was no conscrip tion for the army and very few taxes of any kind. There was but little crime among the natives and the police did not interfere with their private life. There was great freedom of speech, any thing might be discussed in the bazaars or the coffeeshops, and as the Turks had not begun to read newspapers, there were no laws to limit the freedom of the press....There was a restfulness in life in Constantinople in those days...^ The Ottoman Empire in the decade of the 1860's, how ever, was not to be left alone in all its ancient charms. 46 During this time it was on the verge of becoming an open ground for the dissemination of new ideas and for estab lishing new areas of influence and power. At the same time these new openings were beginning to occur, though, the leaders of the Ottoman ruling establishment began to feel themselves with a more recalcitrant Moslem popula tion. These people anxiously eyed the many new changes that threatened their lifestyle and they soon came to feel that the power of Islam was waning and that progress and reform had perhaps gone far enough. Though many Ottomans and foreign powers were not enthused with the direction of some of the reforms, they found, for various reasons, it difficult to halt them. To prevent this backsliding to the old ways, the Powers found themselves choosing either a policy of reform or one of destruction for the Empire and it was obvious "that each nation at every crisis con sidered first of all what appeared to be for its own individual interests at the time without much regard for any general policy."6 The difficulty at this time for the Ottomans, the mis sionaries like Washburn, and the various ambassadors, was that each of them had so many differing interests and that so often these interests seemed to conflict with each other. Throughout the decade of the 60's the leading power among European states in Constantinople was France. With their supreme influence during these years the French actively protected their citizens, whether missionaries, businessmen, or educators. Seeing the preeminence of the French and the powerful protection their diplomatic representatives af forded them only further angered their American and British counterparts. Rather than remain contented with the many inroads they had made, the missionaries began to press their representatives harder and harder for more conces sions from the Ottomans so as to allow them an opportunity equal to the Jesuits to spread their beliefs. At first the diplomats reacted adversely to these new Christian mission ary pressures to force them to "perform" and the hostil ities in the foreign communities began to sharpen. At one point Mr. Morris, head of the American Legation, called the missionaries "illiterate and unchristian" and Mr. Goddard, the United States Consul General of Constantinople was in turn labelled by these missionaries as a "man without sense or honesty who contents himself with calling us Impudent 7 puppies." In 1862 the situation had deteriorated far enough for the missionary brethren to urge Washburn, a known newspaper correspondent, to "write Mr. Morris down in the newspaper." Washburn, however, held off feeling that as weak and inefficient as Morris was it would be better to attempt to work with him as long as he remained in Constantinople. What Washburn and his missionaries failed to realize at this time was that most often these diplomatic 48 representatives viewed the missionaries merely as pawns to be used to help further the interests of their respective J nations. Thus, at the same time these missionaries were clamoring for more religious freedom in which to operate, the American and British representatives were working quietly behind the scenes to gain recognition for their governmental interests or to gain a pre-eminence over the French. The American minister worked to convince the Porte that it was in its best interest to continue to recog nize Washington as the sole capital of the North American states; and the British Ambassador worked to lure the Sultan and his ministers into the British camp. To ob tain these objectives these representatives soothed the fears of the Turkish political leaders who worried about the consequences of too big a push by the missionaries on the polyglot peoples of the Empire. Though many of the ruling Turks were interested in seeing some modernization, they were afraid that if Christians and foreign elements gained too much freedom and power, Moslem reaction would be strong enough to force them from office and possibly endanger their lives. To stem the tide of progress, these Turks expertly played off one opposing side against the other. The missionaries refused to cooperate with their dip lomats' objectives and in June, 1864, at the annual meeting i of the American Board in Constantinople, George Washburn 49 engineered a resolution that called for the advancement of rights in the Protestant civil community so as to allow 9 greater freedom in preaching and Christian worship. The Turks watched these and other internal developments with growing anxiety and in August of that year made a sudden decision to act. They seized and imprisoned all converted Turks who could be found, though none were connected with active missionary work. Next they moved against the es tablishments of the American Board, the American Bible Society, The British Bible Society, and all the English Missionary Societies, and, despite the active resistance of the missionaries led by Washburn, seized the buildings by force and ejected all the occupants. Washburn wrote that ...all the treaties with Turkey make foreign residents responsible to their own embassies or consulates and a Turkish police officer has no more right to enter their doors than he would have to arrest a man in New York or London. If America and England do not compel the most am ple apologies for this outrage there will be no safety for their citizens in Turkey. A short time later it was learned that the imprisoned Protestant Turks were to be exiled and subsequently released. As a reason for its actions the Turkish Government put for ward some religious texts, privately introduced and pub lished exclusively by the English missionary society. The government claimed that these books, very harsh anti-Moslem texts, had excited fanatical Moslems to such an extent that 50 it felt pressured to move against all Protestant missions in order to retain its source of power and respect in the Empire. In addition to Protestant reformers in the city there were working at this time several Moslem reformers and the two different factions had proven to be an in creasing embarrassment to the reform ministry of Fuad and Ali and to the Sultan. "To save themselves from this odium and from inevitable disgrace, it became necessary for them to take some violent measures against the Protestants which would satisfy the Sultan, quiet the fanatical party and frighten those inclined to this new way." 11 Naturally the British and American missionaries loud ly denounced the violation of their rights and angrily de manded some action from their representatives; neither Mr. Morris nor Sir Henry Bulwar took decisive action. It was believed, furthermore, that Bulwer had actually received five days' advance warning from the Turks concerning this future move. Instead of the heads of the diplomatic com munity, it was a lesser official, the American dragoman John Porter Brown, who came and interceded on behalf of the mssionaries to persuade the government to allow them to reopen their offices. Even the head of the French Jesuit mission Mr. Bore ., an arch rival of the Protestants, was of more help to the missionaries and actually offered to pro tect some of the Turkish Protestants in his own house dur ing the crisis. 51 Sir Henry Bulwer explained his lack of action by saying that Certain missionaries, if I understand them correctly, contend that religious liberty is not merely a sanction for every one to crit icize and attack the religion of his neigh bor. The Ottoman Government does not give to religious liberty this last signification, and is disposed to repress every effort at conver sion which excites angry and hostile feelings amongst the different classes of the Ottoman community.12 Such statements, however, did nothing to prevent Protestant persecution, now a crucial issue to the missionaries, and led Washburn to complain to Lord John Russell that "it is already notorious in Constantinople and is beginning to be known in the most distant provinces, that the British Embassy no longer protects Protestants, as in former years." 13 Angry over this betrayal, Washburn and his as sociates relentlessly examined the embassies' positions to find a reason for this wholesale desertion in the defense of their rights. Writing in August, 1864, he concluded For political reasons he [Sir Henry Bulwer] seems to have thought it desireable to maintain the power of Fuad Pasha at any cost and he de vised this plan [the closing of the Protestant missions] to give him credit with the Sultan for fidelity to Islam...[he] has entered into a deliberate compact with the Porte, for the practical abolition of religious liberty in Turkey as far as it relates to Protestants. 4 Washburn fought this policy by using his columns in the Amer ican press to scorch Sir Henry for this betrayal. 52 He is shamefully immoral. His statesmanship is nothing but low intrigue in which he is generally outwitted by the French and the Turks and he holds his place to the disgrace of the very language he speaks because his wife is connected with the English aristoc racy in such a way that the government dare not turn him out. What a blessing to a nation is an aristocracy...15 Unfortunately for Washburn these were normal courses of action in the political manipulations of Constantinople during this decade. Sir Henry Bulwer was attempting to regain the domin ant force for England. This tilt toward the Ottomans was eventually carried so far by him that he even declared that the Hatt-i Humayun previously issued by the Sultan guaran teeing rights of the minorities had no binding force and that, on the contrary, its tendencies "have been pernic- 1 fi ious." The missionaries, led by Washburn, continued their efforts to force a change in British policy, writing often to various newspapers about the difficulties of the Protestants in the Empire and always attributing them to 17 the policies of Bulwer. It particularly angered Wash burn that Bulwer could be so arrogant and opposed to the missionaries' needs. Bulwer reacted to this criticism with verbal and written attacks against the American mission aries and at one point noted in the Levant Herald "that it is a piece of unparalleled impudence for Americans to pre- 18 sume to criticize the policy of a British Ambassador." By the latter part of 1865 the situation between the two had reached a point of complete hostility. Bulwer was criticized harshly as having "done nothing in Turkey but disgrace the English name. He has been outwitted in every important diplomatic question. He has sunk English in fluence to a lower point than it ever held before. He has been more of a Turk than the Turks themselves..." 19 while Bulwer served he represented a new position for English diplomacy and for missionary representation and the Turks artfully used his weaknesses and difficulties to their fullest advantage. Perhaps the combination of the facts that the influence of England failed to rise above that of the French and that the Protestants suffered greatly under his tour served to help evict him from office. By the latter part of 1865 Washburn and the mission ary community began to re-evaluate their original appraisal of Edward Morris as a weak individual. With the defeat of the Confederacy and with a new-found strength apparent in the American missionary community in Constantinople, Morris began to pay more attention to missionary desires. What actually began to transpire was a cautious sense of respect for each other's positions. Morris wrote Secretary of State Seward that "it is but just to the latter [American missionaries] to say their conduct is uniformly prudent and concilliatory but their profession necessarily exposes them 54 to danger and violence notwithstanding the wisest precau- tion." 20 Furthermore, Morris actively attempted to inter cede on behalf of the rights of the missionaries in the Empire. At one point he went so far as to meet with Ali Bey when the Turks threatened to confiscate all religious books of the American missionaries and persuaded him to release all books as harmless. Washburn soon realized that there were to be ups and downs in all activities in Constantinople and he learned that victories could be won in certain cases, but not in others, by diplomatic action. Once Morris protested the illegal seizure of a naturalized American citizen's ware house by the Turkish army and won his case. On the other hand, a Protestant colporteur had attempted to preach at an Armenian town of Murad Chai near Bursa and had been forcibly evicted and nearly killed for his efforts. After the eviction the local populace was told by a Turkish of ficial that the "Sultan had discountenanced and cursed Protestantism" and this was pirobably the reason for the swift action. No amount of political bickering on behalf of the evicted missionary could reverse such a decision. Later in 1866 a party of Americans with neither an inter preter nor knowledge of the Ottoman Empire began an over land trek from Smyrna to China. They were soon attacked, beaten, and robbed, and that ended their journey. Wash burn, though understanding that their rights had been 55 wrongfully violated, realized the dangers of travel for anyone in the interior and commented that they "...deserved some part of what they suffered as a punishment for their folly."21 Suddenly the Protestant community found its free presses closed down by an edict from the Porte. This pro hibited all publications hostile to the Turkish Government or any religions in the Empire. Washburn reported on the edict, "I suppose there are not three papers published in this empire which have not violated some provisions of this law in every issue..." 22 The editor of the Levant Herald was once accused of publishing false news about the Cretan policy of the Turkish Government. The government fined him L50 and refused to allow him any opportunity to prove his point since it claimed this would have been derogatory to its dignity. Washburn noted "...this is the law in Turkey and this is the freedom of the press in Constan- tinople." 23 It was also an indication of the limits of the foreign powers at the time. Far from being concerned merely with freedom of the press the Turkish Government in the mid-sixties was deter mined to maintain its power against the encroachment of foreign and what it believed to be hostile elements in its Empire. During this time it found itself besieged by threats of rebellion all over its Empire. To defend its position of eminence among its own native populations as well as among the Powers the government reacted in various 56 ways. To protect itself from a united opposition among the Powers, the Turkish Government deliberately adopted policies to keep the powers apart and to keep the situation tense. At times it would approve the Western-oriented reforms, while at others it would deliberately launch campaigns to curb the influence of foreigners. Naturally, the severity of the government's reaction depended upon the extent of its problems. Some modern historians point out that the period of 1866-1870 highlighted an era of many modern reforms under 24 the direction of Ali and Fuad with French backing. What one learns from Washburn's notes, however, is that, far from being an era of consistent reforms, it was really a time of confusing movements and much frustration to men of enlight ened Western concepts. In his reports in the New York Daily Tribune Washburn wrote often that the torrent of revolution seemed to be gathering strength from day to day and that "...although the final results of any outbreak would be doubtful, it is certain that it would be a signal for blood- 25 shed in many parts of the Empire." He felt there was bound to be a revolution despite the best intentions of the reforms, since "Turks, Greeks, Bulgarians, and slaves 2 6 can never live together harmoniously." Living among all this strife led Washburn to realize that no one seriously hoped for a true recovery of the "Sick Man." "The only question is whether he shall be allowed to die a natural 57 death or whether his end shall be hastened by interested 27 physicians." Washburn pointed to the war with Crete in 1866 as 28 the beginning of the downfall of the Empire. He felt that it offered the first real possibilities for change since at the time the Turks had neither money nor inclin- 29 ation to quarrel with England or America. Furthermore, the foreign powers, had the ability to move against the Turks at will, as when the English and Russian ships, contrary to Turkish orders, had taken on women and child ren refugees from Crete. But as was often the case, al though the Turks could not gain an outright military decis ion in Crete in the 1860's, neither could the Powers. Il lustrating this confusion Washburn once reported, Russia says decidedly cede Crete to Greece and take the consequences. France and the other continental powers say appoint a mixed commission to consult the people or hope for no sympathy from us. Greece is burning to declare war. England says I am neutral. I sympathize but take care what you do or you will get into trouble.30 The Turks, despite their weakness, saw this disharmony and ignored the various demands from the Powers which "made no more impression upon the Porte than rifle bullets on an 31 iron clad." Washburn even admitted that he did not blame the Turks for wanting to hold onto Crete and added that no matter what one's opinion was one had to admire the bold ness of the Turks in the manner they had scorned all the 58 advice of Europe. The reason for this lack of interven tion in Crete and united insistence upon solid reform was the fact that "no one finds it advantageous to itself to 32 take an active part now in the dismemberment of Turkey." The point of difference between the Powers at this time was simply who held the keys to the Porte. In 1867 the French were in supreme control. They not only got Abdul Aziz and members of the royal family to accept an invitation from Napoleon III to visit the Paris exhibition, the first visit made by an Ottoman Sultan for any purpose but war, but they also arranged later for Empress Eugenie to visit him at the opening of the Suez Canal. To try to make up for France's advantages during this period, Eng land often blindly supported the Turks. Noting this dif ference in British and French policies Washburn wrote "Turkey cooly rejects her [England's] advice, snubs her as she dare not do to France; treats Protestantism with excep tional contempt and wrong; allows France her own way in everything; but still England pockets her insults meekly, 33 and goes on with her policy..." Though American influence in the Ottoman Empire at this time was not as important as that of the great Powers, the Powers recognized that she could be of assistance if she joined their side. Early in the Crete uprising, for example, Russian agents were active in trying to encourage America into the Eastern Question. Seeing this intrigue 59 and noting all the incendiary articles on the Eastern Ques tion in the European press, Washburn wrote "it would seem as though Russia had half the journals of Europe in her pay, and she may succeed in this way in compelling England and France against their own will to take up the question." 3 4 At one point some of these articles daily reported that the United States Government desired to purchase an island on the coast of Turkey for a naval station. Washburn realized that the reason behind this proposal was simply that "An American naval squadron within a day's sail of the Marmora would today add fifty percent to the influence of Russia in the East, for Russia takes pains to have it understood here that she is in close alliance with the United States."35 The Ottomans themselves began to recognize the value of an alliance with the United States and though there were several points during these early years of Washburn's stay in the Empire at which he reported that the American minis ter and the Porte were on "very bad terms," the government made sure it never let the difficulties remain insurmount able. At one point during the Cretan affair an American consul office was raided by the Turks, his cavasses im prisoned and some records stolen— a most humiliating exper ience for an international power. Though the United States Government repeatedly demanded fullest reparations includ ing a ceremonious apology from an imperial commissioner, it was not until the heat of Crete increased dramatically that the Turks felt compelled to respond. The Turks concluded that "on the whole it was cheaper to order the Imperial Commissioner to eat dirt than run the risk of a quarrel with the United States" and the papers were returned and 36 apologies formally presented. In this same period the Turks opened a new embassy in Washington, though Wash burn himself felt this was due more to the Sultan's in terest in acquiring the new Henry rifle than to a desire to open relations with America and accept any ideas she had on reform. Though the United States had made many inroads, Wash burn did not fail to see the imbalance of power in the Empire between rivaling nations. During the years of French influences the Sultan was building palaces, buying iron clads for his navy, and making foreign loans to pay for them. Naturally there was a give and take in these deal ings. At one point in the 1860's Washburn wrote of a gift of a very valuable plot of land in the center of the city to French sisters of charity as a reward for their efforts during a cholera epidemic. Later the French Government planned for a large university supported by the Turkish Government and supplied with professors from French, Turkish, and various Christian sources. These favors were readily being granted at the same time the Americans were being routinely refused permission to erect a Protestant col lege on a tract of land for which they had already paid money. This refusal was despite the fact that American 61 diplomats and missionaries had worked "with more devotion and more success during the cholera epidemic than any other body of men in Constantinople." 37 Washburn viewed these concessions to the French as further proof of the political leverage of the French. These schools would be ...an asylum for broken winded spavined old Frenchmen. It would add to the French influ ence here but would educate nobody...The readi ness with which the plan was adopted when com pared with the treatment which Robert College has received is a good index of what Americans have to expect in Turkey when they stand in the way of French Catholics. The Americans must be crushed at any cost, although they ask no favors. The French must not only be supported, but helped to ride over everything which stands in the way of their supreme influence.38 Though he spoke out harshly against the injustices of the French influence and bribery, Washburn realized that this criticism should not be limited to one single power. In these early years he had turned towards Russia for influ ences for good but he soon came to see that Russia would be no less an enemy to Protestantism and reforms than the French or the Turks. 39 Furthermore, he saw that if Russia should gain ascendancy over the Powers that "the most that can be hoped for is independent principalities under the overshadow- n ing protection of Russia. They may be governed by Princes who have royal consorts bestowed upon them by the royal family of Russia; the provinces will become Russian and 40 Russia will finally rule Asia and Europe..." 62 As the decade of French influence and reform came to a close, Washburn concluded that, although reforms had been accomplished at times and much had been done to pull down the old supremacy of Islam in the Empire, it remained basically unaltered. The Turks themselves had no convic tion that their Empire really demanded reforms and Washburn felt they never intended to make any reform except as was 41 necessary to keep Europe quiet. Most of the reforms were merely accepted in form rather than in substance. In stead of taking a firm foothold in the country, these re forms "...have simply created a complicated system of ad ministration with an army of office holders to prey upon 42 the people." Reviewing the Vilayet reforms, the cabinet reorganization, and the pledges of religious equality and attempts to modernize the justice system, Washburn con cluded that corruption was too deeply embedded in the Em pire for cure, and that, like most Turkish reforms, they soon would be abandoned. 4 3 The main problem with the re forms was "...they were like machinery badly made and not oiled. The Turks are skillful in organizing on paper; their clumsiness in execution of these plans is wonder- 44 ful."** At the close of this decade, however, Washburn began to realize that this Turkish ineptness in carrying out western-type reforms in the Empire was the result of a determined plan rather than of clumsiness. Behind each reform proposed lay a basic belief that all subjects were equal and in this early period of his life in Turkey he realized that the present Turkish system of politics, des pite the numerous reforms passed, simply could not afford the luxury of giving in to this suggestion. Thus a compro mise was made. The equality was made to exist on paper and it was announced in Europe; however, when the European hopes threatened to get too buoyant, Turkish reformers quickly made their positions clear. In 1867, though Fuad Pasha declared that the Hatt-i Humayun had been fully car ried out, Washburn countered that he had "under my eyes a formal declaration from one of the Sultan's ministers that in case any Mussulman becomes a Christian, the law requires the government to take his children from him and bring them 45 up as Mussulman...he must be treated as an insane man..." At the close of the persecutions in 1866 Ali Pasha wrote to Lord Russell that the Turkish Government would never tol- erate any effort to convert Moslems to Christianity. 46 Washburn began to understand that when the Turks were pres sured they would exert themselves with renewed determination to demonstrate their power by strengthening the supremacy of Islam. At times in this decade this move by the Turks was limited to the cosmopolitan atmosphere of Constantinople, but quite often it spread all over Asia Minor too. During these periods it was hardly safe for Christians anywhere to 47 appear in the streets. Despite all the publicity of the new reforms of Fuad and Alif Washburn concluded that the old government still had much life left in it and "in general it may be said of the work of Christians among the Moslems that it is as yet more a work of faith than of 48 sights..." When Cyrus Hamlin wrote that "perhaps all told, the list of baptisms from Islam counting men, women, and children would amount to fifty during the last twenty years," he highlighted the fact that the only real danger of apostacy to the Ottoman Government was in a political sense of the word. 49 Washburn saw that this continued reliance on the supremacy of Islam to enable the Ottomans to continue in their past roles of supremacy was bound, sooner or later, to fail. Not only were all the Christians waiting for a favorable opportunity to "throw off the yoke," but also Arab Moslems, feeling the burdens of heavy taxation and conscriptions" r stood "ready to rise en masse in rebellion against the Turks." 50 The liberalism of the government prc.voked ridicule from natives and foreign elements alike and as the decade drew to a close Washburn concluded that the modern administration was a failure and that the Empire could last only so long as its opponents stood disunited. 65 NOTES TO CHAPTER III 1 An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Govern ment Do for Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 37, June, 1880, p. 900. 2 Edward Dorr Griffin Prime, Forty Years in the Turkish Empire (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1876), p. 175. 3William Goodell, The Old and the New (New York: New York: M. W.Dodd, 1853), p. 52. ^An Eastern Resident, "Life in Constantinople Fifty Years Ago," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 3 6 (December, 1879), p. 614. 5 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, pp. xvi-xvii; see also, An Eastern Resident, "Life in Constantinople Fifty Years Ago," loc. cit., Vol. 36, p. 615. £ George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question. 1100-1900. unpublished manuscript, no date, A.C.A., p. 138. 7 Letter from Washburn to Rufus Anderson, October 2, 1862, Western Turkey Mission, Vol. IV, item 269, AABCFM. Q Letter from Washburn to Rufus Anderson, November 4, 1862, Western Turkey Mission, Vol. IV, item 270, AABCFM. 9 "Report from the Constantinople Station, 1864, " June 4, 1864, Western Turkey Mission, Vol. I, AABCFM. ^ N e w York Daily Tribune, August 12, 1864, p. 8. During the decade of the 1860's Washburn regularly contrib uted anonymous reports to the Tribune. They were located in the section of the paper devoted to Foreign News and were simply dated "Constantinople, from our Special or Regular Correspondent." The author has tied these articles 66 to Washburn on the basis of occasional references to them in Washburn's personal correspondence and on the similarity of style of these articles to Washburn's known works. 11Ibid. 1 o Jean Haythorne Braden, The Eagle and the Crescent: American Interests in the Ottoman Empire 1861- 1870 (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1973), p. 177. 13Ibid.. p. 175. ^New York Daily Tribune, August 23, 1864, p. 6. ^•5N e w York Daily Tribune, August 12, 1864, p. 8. •^London Daily News, June 6, 1865, p. 5. 17Ibid.. p. 5. *| O New York Daily Tribune, February 3, 1865, p. 7. 19New York Tribune. October 3, 1865, p. 1. 20 Braden, op. cit., p. 199. 21 New York Tribune. November 17, 1865, p. 1. 22New York Daily Tribune, February 3, 1865, p. 7. 23New York Tribune, December 26, 1866, p. 1. 24 For more information, see: Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 119-128; see also, Roderic Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. 23New York Tribune, March 13, 1867, p. 1. 67 ^ New York Tribune, March 22, 1867, p. 2. 27 New York Tribune, October 4, 1866, p. 1. 28 Crete had long been a source of trouble for the Ottoman Empire. The fact that it was so remote and far removed often inspired rebellions and cries for reform. In 1841 an uprising occurred and in 1866 a full scale revolt opened with a demand for union with Greece. 29Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, January 15, 1867, ATRC. 30 New York Tribune. October 28, 1867, p. 1. 31 New York Tribune, July 26, 1867, p. 1. 32Ibid. 33 New York Tribune. August 1, 1868, p. 1. 34 New York Tribune, November 11, 1866, p. 2. 35 New York Tribune, November 7, 1866, p. 2. 36 New York Tribune. October 28, 1867, p. 1. 37New York Tribune, November 23, 1866, p. 1; see also, New York Tribune, October 3, 1865, p. 1. 38 New York Tribune. January 7, 1868, p. 1. 39 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, January 15, 1867, ATRC. 40 New York Tribune, May 7, 1868, p. 2. 41New York Tribune, May 31, 1867, p. 1. 42 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900. p. 23. 68 43 New York Tribune. November 23, 1868, p. 2. New York Tribune, July 13, 1868, p. 1. New York Tribune, July 26, 1867, p. 1. Our Own Correspondent, "Religious Liberty in Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 20 (November 12, 1879), p. 390. 47 New York Tribune, May 31, 1867, p. 1. 48 Report from the Constantinople station," May, 1867, p. 4, Vol. 1, AABCFM. 49 Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks (New York: R. Carter and Brothers, 1878), p. 91. 50 New York Tribune. August 6, 1866, p. 3. CHAPTER IV THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN: OTTOMAN POLITICS, 1869-1878 My impression is that ... if left absolutely to itself the Turkish Empire would gradually dis integrate without any great amount of confusion or bloodshed, and that within twenty years European Turkey would be divided into four respect able Christian kingdoms... But I fear that non-intervention is not possible, and that we have before us nothing better than war, rebel lion, and general confusion until the Turks are crowded out of Europe.1 Less than two years after George Washburn had severed his connection with the American Board in Constantinople, he again returned to the city and became active in the for eign communities there. Unlike his early years as a fledg ling missionary in an unfamiliar land, in the seventies Washburn became an acknowledged authority on the "Eastern Question," though his primary occupation was in the field of education. He later wrote, I do not know how I got the reputation for I had written but very little and still less over my own name but the result of my having this repu tation was that information came to me unsought from all quarters and I made the acquaintance of many distinguished statesmen and others who came to Constantinople to study the Eastern Q u e s t i o n , 2 69 70 It was during this decade of the 1870's that this "Eastern Question" indeed came into being. No longer was French influence preeminent in the Ottoman Empire, forcing all other Powers into a second-rate status. Following the death of Fuad Pasha in 1869, Ali Pasha in 1871, and the terribly humiliating defeat of the French by the Prussians in the same year, the Ottoman reform movement, as weak and ineffective as it previously may have been, was now defin itely ended. In its place the Empire slid into a downward spiral of reckless extravagance, bankruptcy, rebellion, repression, wars and continual defeats. To buttress what remained of the once mighty Empire, Sultan Abdul Aziz, headstrong and willful, turned more and more towards the doctrines of traditional Islam to attempt to solidify his position and his control. In line with this trend, Wash burn and later others noted that government in the Empire was rapidly disintegrating as the many officials in power "did little but pander to his [the Sultan's] costly and 3 destructive whims." When the French influence in the Ottoman Empire fell, England and Russia eagerly moved forward to fill the vacuum, creating a new political situation for the Empire. Washburn noted on the one hand that the ruling Turks seemed determined to strike out on their own, while, on the other hand, the Powers were equally determined to take 71 advantage of the sudden possibilities opened to them due to the French collapse. Although the Ottomans displayed a sense of confidence based on what they felt their military strength to be (they were reputed to be the third strongest 4 naval power in Europe) they also had a deep fear of the Russian menace on their borders. Thus, while they wanted to be independent from foreign influences, these same in fluences at the time forced them to seek a new replacement for the French as a protection against the Russians. Through out the decade the Ottoman rulers attempted to create a solution of these problems, usually playing one power off against another. This policy was exemplified by Washburn later when he wrote that the Ottoman Empire "will go just so far in resisting Russian demands as England gives sup port ." 5 Realizing the possible new fluidity of the Ottoman political situation in the seventies, Washburn was actively trying to see American influence strengthened in the Con stantinople community. At this time Americans had no rights comparable to those of other foreigners, such as the right to hold land in their own names, and Washburn encouraged individuals to urge the American Government to adopt some form of protocol with the Ottomans to grant g these privileges. Unfortunately, the American Legation was often divided within itself with petty political power 72 plays. In addition to these internal disputes, the Rus sians had now become opponents to many American desires and at times seemed to Washburn to be doing all in their power to hinder American citizens' efforts in Turkey. For example, when Robert College asked permission to build additions to the college its efforts were continuously blocked. Although the reason given was simply that the additions would be too near the houses of the great pashas, Washburn felt other wise. He studied this decision and other decisions such as one which forbade the circulation of the Scriptures in any language, and concluded that these were basic manifestations of the Turkish Administration's hostility towards the threat of Protestantism. Furthermore, Washburn came to understand that this hostility was not due purely to religious causes since "the present Grand Vizier... a tool of the Russian Embassy, had been persuaded by General Ignatieff to come down on Protestantism and alienate England." 7 Thus, while Washburn was bothered by the discord within the American Legation, he realized that there were many outside causes behind the obstacles set up in front of any American activ ities . On the arrival of a new American minister in the seventies Washburn concluded, "I do not believe that he will do any more for us than Mr. Boker for however ready he may be to act, he must act through the same dragoman ... and g upon the same Turkish officials." 73 By the middle of 1875 Washburn began to feel that the disintegration process in the Ottoman Government had reached the point where some final action was needed whether to end the Empire entirely or to reform it completely. Noting that at the time the government was fully demoralized and in the hands of three old Turks aged seventy-five to eighty, he referred to the government saying “There is nothing left but 9 the thinnest shell— all within is rotten." As the demoral ization continued people lost confidence and the situation further deteriorated. Washburn observed in one letter that houses were attacked and plundered by large bodies of armed men in a way he had never before seen and that these attacks occurred in the center of the city as well as in out of the way places.10 Throughout all this confusion, however, Washburn realized that the main issue at stake was not whether there would be an overthrow of the government by the Powers but rather how long the government would allow things to deter iorate before it took some concrete action. When faced with a possible intervention by the Powers if it continued to do nothing, Washburn saw that the "government will do all in its power to prevent it."11 The difficult thing for men like Washburn to accept was the fact that during these times the efforts of the government to reform and stem the tides of violence were such weak ones. True to form the Ottoman 74 Government did issue several decrees in 1875 and, on paper at least, these promised extensive reforms. But Washburn reviewed them and concluded with much skepticism that they had been issued merely to halt an occupation of Constan tinople by the Powers. The majority of the population of the Empire was not fooled since they were so accustomed to unfulfilled promises of this sort that they were unim pressed. 1876 was perhaps the most critical year the Ottoman Empire had experienced since 1839. During this time there were revolutions in Constantinople, depositions of Sultans, the beginnings of war and massacres and the constant threat of intervention by the Powers with the resulting destruc tion of the Empire. As the year commenced many observers found the inhabitants of the capital in a state of panic, fearing a bloody revolution at any time. Though Washburn corresponded often concerning the dangers, especially to Christians in the city, he was quick to add that he did not share in the general feeling of panic. He firmly be lieved that the government still had too much control over the people and that consequently it knew beforehand of any plans for revolutions and so was perfectly able to control them. Washburn, however, did predict that there was a revolution brewing, and that rather than an uprising of Moslem against Christians it would be one of "Turks 75 against the Sultan and his ministers. If well managed we ought not to have more than twenty-four hours of general 12 anarchy and plunder." Though Abdul Aziz and his ministers did survive the gloomy days of the Kurban Bayram in January, 1876, the dif ficulties of the Empire increased rather than abated. As the government grew weaker financially it attempted to renew efforts to collect taxes and enforce laws more stringently. Unfortunately things continued to worsen. By April, Washburn wrote his father that "financially every thing has [gone] to destruction here— there is no recovery in the city and almost everybody is ruined— the government itself is bankrupt and pays nobody. The Sultan alone has plenty of money which he is hoarding in his palace." 13 Early in May, 1876, in Salonica a French and a German consul were murdered when they attempted to inter vene in a local dispute between Moslems and Christians. Ten sions between Christians and Turks and among the Turks them selves soon began to escalate in the capital as well. In May, Washburn reported that while the government slumbered there was a rush on all arms suppliers in the city and Christians as well as Turks armed themselves in preparation 14 for their defense. In such an atmosphere Washburn felt that Christians and foreigners needed to guard themselves with care, and despite guaranteed treaty rights accorded 76 them it was often the best policy not to be seen. In early May this was clearly emphasized when some English travel lers visited a mosque in Constantinople. Despite the fact that they had a legal permit and even the protection of a policeman, they were attacked by a "Turkish mob" and were rescued only with great difficulty by a strong escort of 15 government troops. As events like these began to mul tiply, the Powers began to react and moved their squad rons into areas adjoining Constantinople. This only further angered the Moslems and soon the city became the scene of angry mobs of thousands of men protesting not only the inaction of their government but also the actions of the Powers. The situation had become so critical by mid-May that Washburn noted ...all the steamers in the harbor kept up steam by order of the Consuls ready to secure foreigners and sail at a moment's notice. Tugs under steam were stationed at narrow points for the purpose of taking off foreign residents... The Consuls have organized men of their nationalities in Galata and Pera for defense.16 The English fleet was moved to Besicka Bay and was given orders to steam for Constantinople whenever telegraphic com munication ceased for over twelve hours. Even the United States sent ships to the area during the height of the political troubles shuttling in the Vandalia, the Despatch, the Marion, the Quinnebaug, the Gettysburg, and the Wyoming at various times. Washburn added, "their presence 77 here was an assurance of protection and it was a joy to see the American flag on the Bosphorus ... I have been a firm 17 believer in the navy ever since." By May 12, 1876, the situation was still worsening. The revolts in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria had not been quelled. The government appeared to be doing nothing and, at least to most Moslems, the Powers were in full view everywhere threatening the security of the Empire, After one particularly large meeting held in St. Sophia, an angry mob of Softas (religious students) demanded that the Sultan dismiss the Grand Vezir and the Sheyk ul-Islam. They also insisted upon immediate action and victory in the various conflicts with the infidels. According to Washburn this development was the turning point for the government. Either it could reform itself using the pressure and influ ence of the Powers nearby or else it could turn to the fanatical elements clearly emerging as dominant in the Moslem society to maintain its control. Abdul Aziz, however, attempted to hew a middle line and, though he ousted the aging Mahmoud Pasha, he refused to replace him with the candidate of the mob. Midhat Pasha. In the many subsequent letters written following these events Washburn reported that the government had not yet seen the end of strife. The city was in the hands of an ignorant, lawless mob which had only been somewhat appeased 78 18 and still shouted for further changes. Washburn returned from a meeting with his Turkish teacher on May 18 and des cribed the demands for reforms by the Softas as a desire 19 for reversion to "the good old times of Harum al Rashid." Included in these petitions were that the Sultan rid him self of those ministers who had associated with giaours and that the dress of Moslems be limited to traditional garb. On May 30 Abdul Aziz was deposed and replaced by Murad V. Washburn viewed the reforms and upheavals as a genuine reaction against all concessions made to the Powers. More specificially he considered the rebellion an expression of the mob's anger at government ineptness in halting Russian encroachments on the Empire. Washburn felt these changes in the ruler and ministers, however, would do little to improve the conditions in the Empire. He wrote ...the same men are now in power who have ruled for years and have made a muddle of everything. I do not see how a change of Sultan is to keep them from intriguing against each other as they have done all their lives— I do not see how it is to give them the brains which they lack— nor how it is to transform the Interior Administra tion of the country which has been its ruin, nor how it is to satisfy the Provinces' r e v o l t . 20 The real issue concerning the fate of the Empire was not which person or party governed. Rather, the government had to decide if it was willing and able to break away from ex clusive Moslem power and broaden the base of rule. 79 During the next few months the new Turkish government demonstrated its determination to retain its exclusive power. As proof of its intentions, during the summer months of 1876 the government issued calls for volunteers to carry out a Holy War against the infidels. It asked the support of shock troops— the Bashibozuks— fully believing that the only hope of survival for the Empire lay in arousing the fanati cism of the masses to put down the Christian revolts. These Bashibozuks were "...enlisted with the plain understanding that they are to receive no pay and no regular rations, but 21 are to live on the plunder of the country." Soon the streets of Constantinople were filled with the "savage ruf fians" singing their songs— death to the infidel— each moving about with a green scarf wrapped firmly around his fez, and daily threatening to begin the Holy War in the middle of the city rather than in Ottoman Europe. 22 This period of time must have been a trying one for the Christians and foreign residents of the city. These spectacles led Washburn to write that he was convinced that should the Sultan have ordered,the college’s own Moslem neighbors would have "killed us without mercy as a religious duty, though 23 with the most sincere regret I am sure." When the Bashibozuks finally did march out into the countryside the magnitude of their atrocities shocked all and prompted Wash burn to react saying "devils from hell could not do worse than 24 the Turks are doing." 80 Watching the daily sufferings among the Turks and Christian subjects of the Sultan mount over the summer months forced Washburn to exert whatever influence he had to try to alter the situation. Throughout the crisis Washburn and his colleagues worked to force the Powers into some form of action to intervene in the problem. Often Washburn received accurate and first-hand information from the Christian areas of revolt and he quickly passed it along to diplomats to im press upon them the need to intervene. When no action was taken, mainly because of the inability of the Powers to agree upon a common course of action, Washburn turned to the representatives of the foreign press stationed in Con stantinople and quietly but regularly supplied them with current and often the only accurate reports of the Turkish situation. "At that time we were responsible for all infor mation which had gone to England— although it was supposed then to have come from eight to ten independent sources— 25 each of these had got his information from us." Learning of these involvements, Robert often wrote to caution Washburn lest he harm the college. In answer to these warnings Washburn once replied "we have done it all as secret ly as possible ... I do not think that we have in any way compromised ourselves or done anything which the Turkish Government can complain of if it finds it out." 26 As Robert continued to worry about the consequences of his activities Washburn again soothed him saying "I beg of you not to 81 suppose that Dr. Long or X forget our work is educational and not political. We are extremely cautious not to compro mise the college or ourselves. We write nothing for the 27 papers— we do nothing publicly." And in 1877 came another assurance: "we here have steered the college through the storms of the last two years without writing a line to the newspapers in England or America." Privately, however, Washburn was quite active. For years he had been conducting the Sunday services at the British Embassy and had managed to become personally ac quainted with many of the diplomats who regularly attended 28 the services. One of these acquaintances during the summer of 1876 happened to be the new English ambassador, Sir Henry Elliot , with whom Washburn met and conferred frequently attempting to influence English policy in the Empire. Unfortunately, Washburn felt that, though Elliot was a gentleman and very kind-hearted, he lacked the suf ficient force of a Lord Stratford and was constantly being used by the Turks. At one point during that summer, seeing the English Government continue to do nothing to help the suffering populations, Washburn smuggled detailed informa tion to Mr. Baxter, a member of the opposition party in England. This information directly contradicted the avail able government information and, when used in debates in the House of Commons, so greatly embarrassed the Under Secre tary of State for Foreign Affairs that the latter asked for 82 the source. Mr. Baxter never divulged Washburn's name but 29 assured all it was "most authentic." In a further effort to prod the English Government to take some definite action on the Eastern Question, Washburn gave permission for copies of his detailed letters describing the situation to be sub- mitted anonymously to influential people in England. 30 When the full picture of the massacres and the severity of the strife became apparent, the English Government began to demand some form of action. Naturally Sir Henry reacted to this adverse criticism and struggled to maintain a hold on his power in Constantinople. This prompted Washburn to write that in his anger Sir Henry merely proved himself a "very 31 small-minded man." Washburn's reputation grew considerably during this time and he and Robert College were almost always the focal point for visits by high-ranking foreign officials desiring to learn more of the Eastern Question. At one point after a visit by Mr. Forster, head of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and the Marquis of Huntington, leader of the English Liberal Party, Washburn wrote that his English visitors "seem to look upon Robert College as the most important center of 32 information." Despite the fact that there had been a revolution and a new Sultan put on the throne, the situation in the Ottoman Empire worsened. Though Sir Henry assured him of the sin cerity of the Turkish reformers like Midhat and of the need for England to pursue a course which supported Turkish pol icies, Washburn remained opposed to this firm support. In stead of reform Washburn felt that the party of reaction rather than of progress was steadily gaining the upper hand in the government, and if anything, this fact should have been an indicator to England that her policy of cooperation 33 was failing. Washburn viewed these hints of reform and rumors of a constitution as the typical Ottoman ploy and as another example of "throwing dust in the eyes of England"— merely soothing and convincing her to continue to act as a Turkish supporter against the threats of the Russians. As was often the case in Ottoman politics of the nineteenth century, the issues facing the government at the time were clouded with complexities. Simultaneously the Ottoman ministers found themselves confronted by revolts actively encouraged by Russian intervention. They were also faced with the monumental decision of how to handle any and all reform at home among their own Moslem majorities. On August 30th, 1876, following a series of bizarre events, Murad became incapable of governing and he was deposed by Midhat Pasha in favor of Abd-ul Hamid II. While some leaders favored some form of a closer relationship with England to hasten modernization and lessen the danger of intervention from Russia, a great many others insisted that the Ottomans strike out on their own and cast off all foreign interven tion and gain true independence. Aware of these dichotomies Washburn noted in October, 1876, that many Ottomans began to view a war with Russia as the only way out of their dif ficulties. They considered this solution far less dras tic and painful than forcing through legislation that would guarantee equality for Christians— something that would have to be done if they were to be tied to an alliance with England. More and more these individuals began to view the traditional Moslem army launched in an all-out attack on the enemies of the Empire— Powers as well as revolting Christian populations— as the solution. Unfortunately for those reform-minded ministers who assumed power after the May revolutions, their base of power began to shrink as things worsened. With each succeeding defeat or setback they found themselves being forced to follow the simplistic solutions of the fanatical elements they had once led. By the time they should have been willing to settle for a reasonable peace with the Powers and their clients in Otto man Europe, the ministers realized that the fanatical Moslem elements in the Empire would never allow them to submit to this. More importantly, by this time the middle class— the beys and the effendis as well as the Softas— was now looking 34 favorably at the idea of a war with Russia. In an effort to provide a compromise solution to avoid the impending war, in December the English led a move to con vene an ambassadorial conference in Constantinople to attempt to secure peace and basic reforms for the Ottoman provinces. 85 At this time Abdul Hamid, who had been Sultan now for three months, appointed Midhat Pasha as his Grand Vezir, and this brought on a spirit of independence among Turkish states men— a feeling of independence from the Sultan as well as from the Powers— and the willingness again to resort to war. Once more the diversities of the Ottoman situation clouded the issue. The Ottomans themselves, far from being united at the time, were in the midst of a deep political crisis with a liberal minister vainly attempting to solidify power over a Sultan determined to reestablish the former supremacy of his throne. On the other hand the Powers too were fully disunited. Though they had agreed to assemble in Constan tinople, their jealousies and rivalries over future controls of the Empire prevented them from presenting a unified front to force the Ottomans to accept their demands for reform. Again these European divisions saved the Ottomans from absolute disaster. As the conference officially opened on December 23rd, it was interrupted by the roar of a cannon and a declaration by the Turkish president of the conference, Safvet Pasha, that a new constitution had just been promul gated. Safvet added, furthermore, that now "all the people of Turkey were to enjoy far more than the conference was prepared to ask for the European provinces." 35 Since the Powers could not unite and support the constitution their own drive for reforms for the provinces continued unabated. But 86 the Turks made clear that the ambassadors' alternatives were plain and that their business was finished. No progress was accomplished and by January 20th, 1877, the ambassadors left the city and the Empire was headed for a war with the infidels. From the moment of its declaration, Washburn felt that the new constitution represented nothing more than political manipulations on the part of various interests in the Empire. To begin with, he pointed out the connection between Midhat Pasha and Sir Henry Elliot. At this time both men, though each working in different political spheres, were in need of some outside impetus to bolster their weak political for tunes. For Sir Henry the constitution represented a last- ditch move to save his political career, forcing him to become "blind enough to sacrifice his career to his faith 36 in it." For Midhat, it represented his main attempt to break the stalemate with the Sultanate and those ministers opposed to him and force the Ottoman Empire to move ahead, hopefully under the secure foundation of his own leadership. For the Powers, however, the abrupt declaration of the con stitution represented a defiance of the objectives of the conference and an indication that one or all of them would sooner or later be forced into a state of war with the Ottoman Empire. Washburn even speculated as to the day 37 this declaration of war would be uttered. 87 Washburn considered the constitution with great inter est but was not the least bit hesitant to unveil what he felt to be its chicanery. It was cunningly devised to deceive Europe and do nothing for Turkey; it was only an Imperial Hatt in a new dress, and, like all such decrees it had no binding force upon the Sultan or his Ministers. To have force, a Constitution must be exacted froiri a sovereign by the people with the understanding that if he violates it, he loses his throne.38 Washburn saw clearly that the constitution did not fit irito that last category, but he pointed out that for what it lacked in substance it made up for in sonorous words and phrases heavily influenced by the constitution of the second French Empire. Its preamble contained numerous words such as "progress," "concord," "equality," "ministerial responsibil ity VI II independence of the judiciary," etc., and seemed to most enlightened liberals to be just the medicine the ailing Empire needed. Its framework provided for a democratically elected Chamber of Deputies, a Senate, and numerous intri cate plans for controls on the whole governing process. Unfortunately it lacked two main essentials which caused Washburn to write that "it was not in any way adapted to the country and it depended for its force upon the sole will of an absolute sovereign who had no thought of resigning any part of his authority." 39 Many other individuals besides Xtfashburn were wary of the new constitution. The first "election" was hastily 88 arranged to form an Assembly composed of Turkish notables and Christians. Many of the heads of various communities, when approached about being representatives in the new Assembly, often tried to separate themselves from any assoc iation with it. The Bulgarian Exarch, for example, refused to attend on the grounds that he was ill. The average man in the street, whether Turk, Christian, or Jew, puzzled about what was expected of him, was equally careful to express nothing but "joy" at the new constitution. 40 On March 19, 1877, the promised Parliament was con vened at the Sultan's palace by Abdul Hamid himself and a speech was read in his name. The Senate, appointed by the Sultan, was composed of a few Christian officials and a lot of old Turkish pashas. The lower house was three-fourths Turkish and the remaining quarter was composed of repre sentatives from other millets. Washburn wrote to Robert after the opening of the Parliament that The Christians in the Assembly are afraid to say much but a most unexpected spirit of inde pendence has been developed by the Turkish members who criticize and attack the govern ment unmercifully. There is no hope of this body doing anything for the Christians and thus far their opposition to the abuses of the government ended up in talk but it may after all prove a check upon some of the a b u s e s . 41 Despite the fact that in the beginning it had been an object of ridicule, the Parliament was soon an astonishing success. In explaining this Washburn observed that 89 "Mohammedanism is a democratic religion and the Turks took to the work of discussing their grievances with even more 42 zest than the Christians..." An example of this enthus iasm was relayed to Robert in a letter when Washburn des cribed an incident he had witnessed in Parliament between Ahmet Vefik Pasha and a green turbaned representative who continually refused to heed Vefik's call to order. Seeing that he was getting no results, "Ahmet Vefik Pasha roared at him 'sous esek' (shut up you donkey) and he (the repre sentative) dropped into his seat as though he had been shot. However by June 28, 1877, the Parliament had become far too independent for the Sultan and like its founder, Midhat, its role was dissolved. Though another was chosen six months later, it too made itself disagreeable to the Sultan and was terminated.^ But in the short time it had been in operation it had shown an amazed world that its concept was an idea to be reckoned with for the future. Not only did it inspire lively debate on the rule of the Empire, it went so far as to pass a vote of censure on the ministers and force their resignation. But in the end, Abdul Hamid was able to rebound from his temporary concession which had forced him to allow the Parliament to convene; leaders of the Parliament were either imprisoned or forced into exile.^ The Parliament had been allowed to live just long enough to convince the Sultan it was too dangerous an 90 experiment. Actually Washburn concluded that there was really no reason that so astute a man as Abdul Hair.id ever regarded it as anything more than a means of cajoling the liberal states of Europe. Originally decreed by an abso lute Sultan, never demanded by the people or adopted to the wants of the country, the constitution and Parliament were pieces of machinery far in advance of their time. The Sultan refused to carry out any reforms simply because no one could yet force h im.^ The Constitution, the Conference, the Parliament and its liberal tendencies all served to benefit Abdul Hamid as they gave him the time and impetus he needed to begin to solidify his power. On February 5, 1877, Midhat Pasha was summarily removed from office and exiled. By April 24, 1877, Russia, having gained the neutrality it desired from the Powers, "intervened for peace" in the Eastern Question. In response to the threats from Russia and the failure of the Powers to uphold what he felt to be the guarantees of the Treaty of Paris, Abdul Hamid turned to the fanaticism of the masses and again evoked a call for a Holy War against the infidel. Soon Constantinople was filled with a variety of troops ranging from twenty-five thousand sent from Egypt to "half savage recruits from Asia and Africa, who seemed to be in no hurry to get to the front and were not easily restrained from beginning their work here." 47 An individual's safety during these times was at best precarious and Washburn 91 once reported, "I knew a gentleman who was robbed of his top boots while riding in the daytime, across a bridge. They 48 were pulled off his feet by some Circassians..." Despite the calls for a Holy War, the flow of recruits to the front, and the early carnival-like atmosphere, things fared badly for the Ottomans at the front. By early June, the Russian army had passed through the Balkans literally unhindered. Now Constantinople was filled with a different type of Moslem— the mass of refugees fleeing the swiftly approaching Russian army. By July Washburn wrote that he expected the Russians within three or four weeks and that the Sultan was preparing to flee to Bursa. Washburn viewed the entire war as a tragedy for all parties. Although the war was complicated by a foreign invasion, he believed it was essentially a civil and religious one in which town and village often found themselves pitted against one another on the basis of religious as well as national aspirations. In these heated conflicts it grieved him to report to his son "the Bulgarians in many instances have retaliated on the Turkish population when they have had the chance." 49 Though it was true that Washburn had often expressed himself strong ly concerning oppression in the Empire, he had also been just as firmly opposed to encouraging revolutionists. Their plans often "seemed to me so childish and utterly hopeless that I could ... have nothing to do with them." He once 92 wrote Robert that "I can prove ... we are not revolutionists and have done all in our power to prevent this sad rebel- 50 lion in Bulgaria." Washburn's priiftary interest at this time was not the breaking of the Empire, though he felt it would take place at some point in time. He professed in stead a desire to see the general improvement of all the races in the Empire. This included Christians as well as Turks, though he said that "in the Turks I have a great interest ... but there is no hope of reaching the individ ual Turks so long as this Moslem power is unbroken."5^ Throughout the summer months Washburn remained active . in the cause of ending the strife in the Empire. Since he was again invited to act as a chaplain for the English Embassy during the summer months he took the opportunity to develop a friendship with the new ambassador, Sir Henry Layard. He wrote Robert concerning his summer activities that "it involves considerable Sunday work but I think it is in the highest degree desirable to maintain as intimate relations as possible between the college and the British C p Embassy at this crisis." He continuously pleaded with the British to take more definite action to end the conflict before it got out of hand. At one point in the summer, fearing a famine because of the tremendous increase of refugees in the city fleeing the oncoming Russians, Washburn hastily laid up a store of rice that would be enough to 93 enable him to feed five to six hundred people until the sit- uation had calmed down. 53 The disorderly conduct of the war brought out clearly to Washburn the deficiencies of the Ottoman Government at the time. Since Abdul Hamid had not yet fully grasped con trol the remaining powerful pashas quarrelled among them selves, "seizing houses, church and mosque ornaments and forcing extraordinary taxes out of the people." 54 So flimsy was the power structure of the government at the time that the sole claim of Redif Pasha, Minister of War, to his office lay in the fact that he had commanded the de tachment which had surrounded the palace of Abdul Aziz and had informed him that he was deposed. The difficulty was that there was no one that was yet able to grasp the reins of power firmly and, as a result, the many parties fought as much among themselves as with the Russians. The scenes of retreating, disbanded soliders and refugees deeply moved Washburn. Often plundering as they fled, they suffered beyond description. He wrote frequently describing the fact that multitudes froze and starved to death by the road, and that even if they were fortunate enough to reach safety, thousands died of epidemics. In some cases the Russians overtook them and in fits of panic they threw their children away or drowned them in nearby 55 rivers as they fled. The only reason that Constantinople 94 was not plundered by these masses was the fact that they were too exhausted to sack it. 56 As the Russians drew nearer to Constantinople and the magnitude of the defeat inflicted upon the Ottomans in creased, the government reacted. Abdul Hamid did not leave the city but instead began to clamp down on all his oppon ents. By late summer, 1877, nearly all newspapers had been suppressed for publishing "false war news." 5 7 Reflecting upon this crackdown, Washburn cautioned his son to be ex tremely careful about which information from his father's letters he allowed to be quoted in the American papers since "we need to be extremely cautious not to give this abomin- able Turkish government any chance to complain of us."58 These government regulations were enforced all over the city and Washburn noted that even the foreign communities were affected. He wrote Robert that presently it was not safe for any foreigner to talk with anyone on political affairs 59 unless one was a "Furious Philo Turk ..." Following the surrender of Osman Pasha at Shipka Pass on December 10, 1877, the Russian Army surged ahead and soon occupied Adrianople. By late January the only force able to halt the Russians from occupying Constantinople was the nearby presence of the British fleet. Faced with their continuous military defeats, the Turks were left with no choice other than to sign a truce and a few months later 95 agreed to a humiliating treaty signed at San Stefano, less than ten miles from Constantinople. At San Stefano the Russians obtained all they had desired and were hopefully preparing for more future inroads into Ottoman areas. How ever, in the euphoria of their triumph the Russians forgot that there were other powerful neighbors equally inter ested in the fate of the Ottoman Empire; this omission proved costly and England refused to recognize the treaty; others such as Austria were loudly voicing their disapproval of it. The Congress of Berlin was called on June 13, 1878, to soothe a troubled Europe and mutually to solve the issues concerning the Ottoman Empire. At this Congress, the Empire was irrevocably condemned and many of her provinces taken from her by statesmen of the Powers since "public opinion would not tolerate a Government which had deliber ately planned and executed the Bulgarian massacres."*’® Though the geographical map was greatly altered and many new areas of influence set up, Washburn realized that no one had emerged from the Congress truly satisfied. In addition to the dissatisfaction that the Congress raised among its members, it also created a confusion which was the result of the ambiguities of some of its deliberations. While at tempting on the one hand to establish the principle of the rights and reforms of nationalities in the Ottoman Empire, it also stated that it was the responsibility of the Powers 96 to assure the Sultan they recognized his absolute independ ence and would aid him in reform. The result was that Turk and Christian each interpreted the treaty in his own fashion and in accord with his own interests. ”... the Sultan sought to shake off the tutelage of Europe and the Christians imag- ined that Turkish rule was approaching its end." 6 X Thus, far from ending the problems in Europe concerning the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Berlin only reinforced them and made them worse for all parties concerned. Now ”... the Chris tians talked as though the reforms were already completed and their future happiness secured. The Armenians espec ially believed that they had been taken under the special protection of England and might hope for the creation of an autonymous province of Armenia." 6 2 However, having suffered through two humiliations, at Stefano and then at Berlin, the Ottomans were in no mood for concession. Actually Wash burn believed the Turks felt more outraged after Berlin than at Stefano since the wounds inflicted at Stefano were the result of the fate of the war. But "the Treaty of Berlin was a piece of deliberate injustice and the Empire was dis membered in the interest of the Powers who had no claim on Turkey."63 Like many of his predecessors in the decades of trouble before him, Abdul Hamid's early years of rule were plagued with difficulties. Following the Treaty of Berlin, 97 his Empire was ringed with foreign troops and warships, his own government was nearly bankrupt, his army in shambles and his cities full of starving refugees. To save his reign and his Empire he was forced to embark on the most treacher ous political journey a Sultan had ever undertaken. The Empire had to be reformed and several choices had to be made as to its route. In the immediate years after the treaty Abdul Hamid sought not only to increase revenues of the government but also to consolidate its power in the hands of those he could trust. Washburn reviewed these changes and commented that "the only change which has been made ... has been the appointment of a very large number of new offi cials and special pains appear to have been taken to make 64 it plain that the offices belong by right to the Turks." Once again the Empire's future course had been charted and Abdul Hamid embarked on the road of Islam to regain the once mighty empire of the Ottomans. 98 NOTES TO CHAPTER IV ^New York Tribune, February 14, 1867, p. 2. ^George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 29. 3 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 157-58. 4Ibid., p. 159. 5 New York Tribune, December 30, 1870, p. 2. ^Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, May 28, 1872, ATRC. See also Washburn to Robert letter, January 13, 1874, ATRC. 7 Letter from Washburn to Robert, June 23, 1874, ATRC. ^Letter from Washburn to Robert, May 13, 1875, ATRC. ^Letter from Washburn to Robert, March 24, 1875, ATRC. "^Letter from Washburn to Robert, December 6, 1875, ATRC. ■^Letter from Washburn to Robert, December 30, 1875, ATRC. See also letter from Washburn to Robert, December 15, 1875, ATRC. 12 Letter from Washburn to Robert, January 7, 1876, ATRC. 13 Letter from Washburn to his father, P. H. Washburn, April 14, 1876, CHPHLA. 99 14 Letter from Washburn to Robert, May 12, 1876, ATRC. Letter from Washburn to Robert, May 13, 1876, ATRC. See also letter from Washburn to Robert, May 18, 1876, ATRC. 17 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople. p. 113. 18 Letter from Washburn to Robert, May 13, 1876, ATRC. 19 Letter from Washburn to Robert, May 18, 1876, ATRC. 20 Letter from Washburn to Robert, May 31, 1876, ATRC. 21Letter from Washburn to Robert, July 15, 1876, ATRC. pp Letter from Washburn to Robert, July 21, 1876, ATRC. 23 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900. p. 56. 24 Letter from Washburn to Robert, June 12, 1876, ATRC. 25 Letter from Washburn to Robert, February 8, 1877, ATRC. 26 Letter from Washburn to Robert, July 5, 1876, ATRC. See also letter from Washburn to Robert, June 12, 1877, ATRC. 27 Letter from Washburn to Robert, September 28, 1876, ATRC. See also Washburn to Robert letter, April 4, 1877, ATRC. 28 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 122. 29 Letter from T. L. Trowbridge to George Washburn, July 17, 1876, CHPHLA. 100 30 Ibid. See also letter from Washburn to Robert, June 8, 1876, ATRC. 31 Letter from Washburn to Robert, September 28, 1876, ATRC. 32 Ibid. See also letter from Washburn to Robert, November 16, 1876, ATRC. 33Letter from Washburn to Robert, June 21, 1876, ATRC. 3<^Letter from Washburn to Robert, October 5, 1876, ATRC. 35 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 117. 36 George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question, p. 113. See also letter from Washburn to Robert, January 5, 1877, ATRC. 37Letter from Washburn to Robert, December 21, 1876, ATRC. 38An Eastern Statesman, 'Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 37, February, 1880, p. 346. 39 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 66. 40 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 118. See also letter from Washburn to Robert, February 2, 1877, ATRC. 41 Letter from Washburn to Robert, April 23, 1877, ATRC. ^ A n Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abdul Hamid," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 67, January, 1895, pp. 46-47. 43 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople. p. 119. 101 4 4 Ibid. 45Ibid.. pp. 130-131. 46 George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question, 1100-1900, p. 113. See also Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 131. 47 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 170, 48 Ibid. 49 Letter from Washburn to Robert, August 31, 1877, ATRC. See also letters from Washburn to his son, July 27, 1877 and July 20, 1877, ATRC. See also Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 82. cn George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900. p. 35. See also letter from Washburn to Robert, June 12, 1876, ATRC. axLetter from Washburn to Robert, June 6, 1877, ATRC. 52Letter from Washburn to Robert, May 18, 1877, ATRC. 53 Letter from Washburn to Robert, July 31, 1877 , ATRC. 54 .. Letter from Washburn to Robert, June 6, 1877, ATRC. See also letter from Washburn to Robert, June 13, 1877, ATRC. 55 Our Own Correspondent, "Some Startling Results of the Late War, " The Christian Union. Vol. 19, March 12, 1879, p. 242. 56 George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question. 1100-1900, p. 114. See also Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. xxii. 57 Letter from Washburn to Robert, August 7, 1877, ATRC. 102 CO Letter from Washburn to his son, George Hamlin Washburn, September 5, 1877, CHPHLA. 59 Letter from Washburn to Robert, September 12, 1877, ATRC. 60An Eastern Statesman, "The New Bulgaria," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 35, June, 1879, p. 511. 61 George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question, 1100-1900. pp. 117-18. ^George Washburn, Robert College. 1865-1900. p. 79. 63Ibid.. p. 76. 64Our Own Correspondent, "Religious Liberty in Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 20, November 12, 1879, p. 390. CHAPTER V THE RISE OF SULTAN ABD-UL-HAMID: OTTOMAN POLITICS, 1878-1880 There is not simply Christian opin ion and Moslem opinion, but each one of these is variously subdivided, and each party seeks its own interests without regard to the general good. For the Mohammedans the Palace is the great center of intrigue and conflict, while Christians and foreigners look with equal interest to the Embassies, each of which is exerting itself to secure its own supremacy and weaken the influence of its rivals.1 When Abdul Hamid became Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, he found his office greatly weakened in terms of political power as well as prestige. He had been given no real prepara tion for this new role and, as a matter of fact, was selected because politicians felt he was weak and manageable. Sir Henry Layard, the English Ambassador at the time, confirmed this first impression of Abdul Hamid saying that he was 2 "...a very weak man in constant fear of his life ..." He mentioned that the Sultan had no authority to carry out re forms and was afraid of his own ministers. Upon assuming the throne, Abdul Hamid found that his Empire was riddled with foreign intrigue and that its affairs were in the hands of a minister who, though supposedly in supreme control, was not able to take the drastic measures needed to consolidate 103 104 power. Thus the Empire, beset by monumental problems, wal lowed in a morass of stagnation, leaderless and heavy with indecision. In addition to these problems of leadership the early years of Abdul Hamid’s reign were plagued with foreign wars and .humiliating treaties that he was forced to tolerate often through no fault of his own leadership. In November, 1878, a few months after the Treaty of Berlin had been signed, Washburn commented on the confusion of Abdul Hamid's Empire, ... a great empire in ruins is a sad and pitiful sight. It stirs no feeling of joy or exultation, but rouses the deepest sympathies of the heart ... We who are here see and feel the misery, distress and anguish of those about us. We cannot help sym pathizing with them, whether they call themselves Turks or Christians.3 There was nothing hopeful about conditions in the Empire. To make up for the lack of unity and strength, Abdul Hamid had no other choice than to follow the time-honored Ottoman policy of attempting to bide his time with his foreign adversaries while solidifying his own base of power at home. In accord with this, he attempted to show the Powers his desire for reform and instructed his representatives at Ber lin to assure the Powers of the Sublime Porte's agreement on the reforms proposed. The Turkish delegate was instructed to read a statement which said in part, "In all the empire the most varied religions are professed by millions of the subjects, and no one is molested in his belief or in the exercise of his religion. The Imperial Government is decided to maintain this principle in all its force and to 4 extend it so far as it is necessary." The Powers were not willing this time to allow a jeweled statement to be read and the objects of reform to be forgotten. England now pressed the Sultan and obtained the right to have Consuls stationed in the Empire, especially in Asia Minor, to view the progress of the reforms. Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin was drafted to pressure the Sultan for reforms "which are demanded by local wants of the provinces inhab ited by the Armenians and to guarantee their security ... It will periodically make known the measure taken to this end to the Powers, who will superintend the application of 5 them." From this time on the Sultan was to have strong guidelines imposed upon him and the Powers fashioned an in strument with which to enforce their demands. Although the treaty cited no coercive force, it legalized and authorized "...that moral pressure which has already been so freely used since the Treaty of Paris."6 Actually, in 1878 few major Powers other than England and perhaps Russia were actively using this newly-formed principle to exert "moral good" on the Empire, and Washburn felt that England was the only nation that honestly desired to see the Empire significantly changed— either reformed or 7 abolished. He realized, however, that the primary reason for this interest on the part of England in the Empire was 106 simply that her own interests were too deeply involved with 3 the fate of the Empire to allow it to go to ruin. To sup port these interests she sent a number of military consuls into the provinces of Asia Minor and asked her ambassador in the capital to push as forcibly as he could for reforms. While Abdul Hamid may have had no sincere desire for reform along the lines envisioned by the English, he real ized that pressures would force him to acquiesce and at least give the appearance of complying with them in every move he made. Though he had disposed of Midhat Pasha, the liberal minister backed by England, Abdul Hamid soon soothed her by abolishing the office of Grand Vizier and appointing a President of a Council of Ministers, supposedly indicating a change from the absolutism of the past to a new efficient cabinet system. In October, 1879, he unveiled a plan for the reorganization of the Vilayets on the principle of decentral ization and local self-government. This measure did little to provoke interest because such an idea had existed pre viously. After reviewing the "new" proposals Washburn con cluded "if Aali Pacha could not execute the elaborate scheme which he proclaimed when the Vilayets were organized, there is not much probability that the new Hatt will be more ef fective. Washburn found most of the reforms neither new nor effective and he began to grow impatient with both the 107 inefficiency of the Ottomans and the weakness of the English policies. Neither one had yet been willing to force the other to come to grips with the issues behind reform, and instead only "moral suasion" had been applied. In line with these policies, "Sir Henry Layard had been constantly at the pal ace, and on the most intimate terms with the Sultan; and if good advice were as heavy as lead, he has given the Turks enough of it to sink all the navies in the world.Sir Henry was actually following the orders of his superiors in England, led by Lord Beaconsfield, who maintained that the Ottoman Government had to be retained. This policy required that it was the duty of England to cultivate the interest and loyalty of the Sultan, good or bad though he may have been. ^ Abdul Hamid astutely realized the benefits such a policy made available to him and was most innovative in fashioning new policies to deal with it. While Sultans in the past had been careful to remain aloof from foreigners in the palace, Washburn noted that Abdul Hamid had not merely invited Sir Henry to dine with him, but "sent for him at all hours of the day and night, even receiving him in the harem where there was no one but a woman to act as an in- terpreter." 12 If Sir Henry proved to be a difficult ob stacle, Abdul Hamid turned his attentions toward Lady Layard, "to drive her through his gardens, held her parasol, 13 took her down to dinner, and made her rich presents." 108 These personal attentions were also extended to ambassadors and their wives, to bankers and even to certain newspaper correspondents. In this way Abdul Hamid deceived many of his opponents by graciously receiving their advice, formu lated with much time and planning; in the meantime, using these activities as a buffer against any and all opponents, he succeeded in obtaining respite for his own efforts. When a year had passed since the completion of the Treaty of Berlin without yielding a single notable reform, Wash burn angrily lashed out against Beaconsfield and his philos ophies saying "that he could not do better than hang him self with the garter which was conferred upon him by the Queen of England At this time Washburn continued with gloomy predic tions portraying the Ottoman Empire as in a more hopeless 15 condition than ever before. In assessing the blame for this he noted that, though the Sultan might have had the best of intentions and had ministers who were intelligent and honest, they had failed to unite the government. Leaders still remained timid and motivated mainly out of fear for their personal welfares. Furthermore, foreign ambassadors continued to be involved with age-old jealous ies which prevented them from uniting to demand significant reforms from the Ottomans. When a Power would grow impat ient it would singly resort to threats to force the govern ment into some form of action. For example, 109 The fleet was once more ordered to be ready to sail at an hour's notice ... The Turks then did what they should have been wise enough to do before. They commenced issuing decrees for the most sweeping reforms. It was not necessary to wait for the composition of new ones. They only had to republish some that have been issued and reissued from time to time for years past.1® After one such English show of force the Turks approved a Colonel Valentine Baker to act as an Inspector of Reforms in Asia Minor, and this appointment was sufficient to calm England's quest for action. Washburn considered this move worthless, trusting neither the government's sincerity nor Baker's ability to lead reformers. These threats by the Powers and the various Ottoman responses led Washburn to conclude that genuine reform in the Empire was not possible. Instead, what had evolved was the fact that the Powers' presence had forced the Porte to direct its attention almost exclusively to foreign rela tions. He continued, "whatever was said or done about reform is intended solely to conciliate public opinion in Europe." 17 While Washburn agreed that the Powers' action had not aided reform, he also blamed the Ottoman Government for failing to secure by sincere action the prosperity and happiness of its own people. The people by this time had no faith in the numerous Hatts regularly issued by Abdul Hamid for "there is an old proverb current among the Turks which says, 'the decrees of the Sultan last three days— the day they are 1X0 made, the day they are kept, and the day they are forgot ten. ' " 18 Nevertheless, England continued to press for adminis trative reforms. The Ottoman Government remained divided between reform-minded factions and the faction which felt they had "won their empire by the sword and they must pre- serve it by the same means." 19 As a result of this differ ence of opinion among the Ottoman ruling elements, neither side was strong enough to consolidate power and both negated each other's influence. The Empire continued to decline into more and more chaos. Though this chaos was especially noticeable in Con stantinople, Washburn wrote that other areas such as the Turkish coast of the Black Sea were infested with brigands who plundered at will. These men were so well known and so immune from arrest that the solution for travel in those 20 parts was to obtain safe conduct from the leaders. Another such example of confusion was the district of Adapazar. Though less than one hundred miles from Constan tinople, it was at the mercy of nearly forty thousand Circas sians "who have robbed the people of all their horses and cattle and everything movable, prevented the cultivation of "21 the fields and murdered in cold blood ... Though Wash burn was critical of the Circassians' actions, he cited their case as a further example of the ineptitude of the government. While most of these Circassians had recently Ill fled from the advances of the Russians in Eastern Europe, Washburn noted that the resettlement of these people had been in process as far back as 1865 when the Russians had begun to drive them from their traditional homelands. From that time on their sufferings had been intolerable and little had been done by the Ottomans to help reintegrate them into the Empire. 22 The most recent solution of the government had been to arm the refugees and resettle them in Adapazar with instructions to fend for themselves. As a result Washburn wrote. They have nothing to eat; they have arms in their hands and they cannot be expected to sit down and starve so long as there is any thing for them to plunder. Even civilized men under such circumstances would be very likely to practically adopt the theory of survival of the fittest and judge themselves to be of that class who ought to s u r v i v e . 23 A government minister pointed to the Circassian problem and summed it up saying, "What can these Circassians do? They must plunder or starve to death and they naturally pre- 24 fer the former. What can we do about it?" Affairs in the Ottoman Empire had reached a desper ate point. Despite the fact that the government was ready and able to send out Imperial Commissioners to investigate and report on internal conditions (in compliance with the Powers' request) they did little to ameliorate the situa tion since Washburn noted that " ... good governors have almost always been thwarted by other officials or Turkish 112 beys, and commissioners have always failed to secure any 25 permanent improvement in the system of government." While conditions in the Black Sea area and in Adapazar were poor, Washburn pointed out to his readers that those in the in terior were worse. Despite the severity of its problems, the Ottoman Government saw little need for radical reforms to alter the situation. Washburn believed the reason for this was that "the empire had sunk too low, the government is too thorough ly disorganized, the people are too near starvation, the financial ruin is too complete for any sudden change for the better." 26 He concluded "it would take a Hercules to cleanse these Augean stables, but there is no Turkish Hercules to do 27 it." The solution according to Washburn was to begin put ting Christians on an equal footing with Moslems to unite the many peoples into a firmer, more cohesive unit. This, however, would have meant the end of the existing Moslem Empire and the Turks "perceive this and will do their best to resist it.” 28 The irony of the situation was that Wash burn felt this official Turkish attitude was not at all representative of the common Turks. These people were suf fering as much as Christians from the anarchy which had pre vailed since the Crimean War and they "did not share the 29 hatred of England which prevails among the Pachas." When Ottoman reformers in 1879 took up the issues of political freedom and religious equality, Washburn expressed his doubts about passage of such ideas. He noted at the time that there was no allowance for religious lib erty for any Turks and that any Moslem suspected of leaning toward Christianity could find no hope of escape from the inevitable punishment. 30 This fact was illustrated by the case of the Reverend Dr. Koelle. This minister, who was the sole representative of the English Missionary Society left in Constantinople, was arrested by the police and detained for several hours at headquarters where all papers found on him were seized by the authorities. The police were par ticularly interested in a Turkish translation of an article from the English Prayer Book entitled "Christ the Word." Though the article had probably been illegally smuggled into the country (it was strongly anti-Moslem in nature), the arrest and seizure of the English citizen was in direct violation of the capitulations. In addition to this affront, the police arrested a learned Turk, Ahmet Hodja, who had been aiding Dr. Koelle in translations. This Turk was also an employee of the government, but since he had received only two months' salary in the last two years he had agreed to perfect the Turkish translation from the Prayer Book for a small sum. While Dr. Koelle was threatened with expulsion, this Turk was sentenced to die for his actions. The most liberal Turkish newspaper in Constantinople, the Djeridie - Havadis, discussed the case and the conduct of Ahmet Hodja and said: 114 The abject author of this act of profanation had been drawn into his sin by Satan and by his own evil heart and has thus dared to commit a sac rilege, by which he is condemned to the curse of God and to eternal torture. We demand that the miserable creature may by his example deter others from selling their religion for a few pence.31 In addition to Ahmet Hodja, other Turks were ar rested for suspicion of apostacy and more pressure was placed on missionaries working in the city. Though Ahmet was never convicted of printing or circulating the religious material, he was condemned to death for assisting in the translation of a tract in favor of Christianity; his life was saved only by the vigorous intervention by Sir Henry Layard. Even more offensive to Washburn than the hypocrisy of religious lib erty was the fact that Abdul Hamid had chosen a certain Hafiz Pasha as his Minister of Police to arrest Dr. Koelle. This man's conduct during the Bulgarian massacres had been so notorious that the English had demanded his removal from any public office. Instead Abdul Hamid had promoted and decorated him with the highest class of the Medjidie, placing him in charge of the police to complete the affront to Eng- land 32 and further illustrate his determination not to give in to equality of the races. It was clear to Washburn by 1880 that the three years of Beaconsfield-type reforms that had been advocated by Eng land for the Ottomans were a failure. He concluded that "the reformation of a Moslem government on Christian principles 115 33 means simply its destruction." Though Beaconsfield had been careful to try to avoid recommending any reform offen sive to Moslems, the evidence showed that any reform sub mitted to the Turks by England was regarded as a humilia tion. "To submit to the fate of war is simply submitting to the will of God, but to yield to the dictation of Eng land is voluntary desertion of their faith— a recognition of the moral superiority of the enemies of God and the Prophet."^ The sole example of Christian emancipation to date had been the admittance of a few Christians to the military school. But Washburn noted that this would do nothing to "modify the essentially Mohammedan character of the govern ment, or make it less a religious despotism than it is 35 now." There were at the same time confirmed reports of Turks holding hundreds of Christian children as slaves completely free from any guilt of legal violation. This was possible, Washburn claimed, because in their eyes it still remained a meritorious act to retain these children and bring them up as Moslems. Though the government (at the insistence of the Powers) had abolished slavery, the people's attitude towards slavery was quite understandable since the government had continued to support it and main- 3 6 tained a palace filled with loyal slaves. The palace quite naturally served as a perfect example to the Moslem population in the Empire. 116 Despite the promised reforms of the past few years, the condition of Christians in Constantinople worsened. Washburn's private letters were filled with comments about Christians and he added once "... it is always Christians 37 who are murdered— no Turk has yet been hung ..." By May, 1880, the situation in Constantinople had reached such a dangerous state that Washburn wrote he was forced to use extreme caution in travel, taking care to keep away from the hills and from unfrequently traveled streets. So great were the dangers to foreigners and Christians that Hari- toon, a steward of Robert College, was murdered at noon less 3 8 than two hundred yards from the college. Washburn also wrote of the murder of a close English friend, again in the middle of the afternoon, just outside Pera. This continuous breakdown in law and order seemed to Washburn a natural con sequence of the inability of the government to unify itself and reform. Why should police officers risk their lives when "... officers are not paid, but most of them manage to 39 live on plunder of some kind and they submit to their fate." After viewing the continual decline of the Empire since the Treaty of Berlin and the consistent ineffectiveness of the government forces to halt anarchy in some of its provin ces, Washburn began to feel that some of this incompetence stemmed from a deliberate lack of effort. He pointed out that in those provinces where Christians had outnumbered 117 Moslems such as Van and Erzerum, the Kurdish populations had plundered and murdered at will without any steady at tempt by the government forces to stop them. As a result of these specific attempts to weaken Christian areas, he noted that large numbers of Armenians had been harrassed to such an extent that over half of them in these two 40 provinces had emigrated to Russia by 1880. The plight of the Armenians became an issue of great importance to Washburn in the early 1880's, as he consid ered it an indicator of the state of affairs in Turkey. Through his close connections with the English Embassy he had become familiar with the promises made to the Armen ians in the Cyprus and Berlin Treaties, and as he reviewed their plight he felt a deep sense of grief for them. It seemed to Washburn that the Armenians had been placed on a never-ending merry-go-round of suffering. In April, 1880, he illustrated their plight when he revealed what happened to them after they had requested aid from the government to control the Kurdish raids on their areas. The army is sent into the country which does little harm to the Kurds, who simply retire to the mountains with the plunder of years, a part of which they share with the Turkish Pashas. The army retires after having collected from the Armenians the whole tax of the province, in cluding what ought to have been paid by the Kurds. In its place it leaves a local militia ... under the command of the Turkish Beys, who proceed to collect the regular taxes over again, in addition 118 to three or four extra taxes, which often raise the amount collected to seven times the amount of ordinary years. The next year the Kurds return as before to their work of plunder, muti lation and murder . ..^1 All this was merely part of the longer story which "simply proves the inability of the authorities at Constantinople to protect either the Imperial Treasury or the subjects of the Sultan and unfortunately this represents the condition of the greater part of Asia Minor."42 Washburn wrote numerous articles about the methods used by the government in its efforts to slim down or elim inate Armenian majorities in certain provinces. Once, for example, the government issued orders demanding that a change in all title deeds be completed within a certain time span; care was taken not to publish this decree widely, es pecially so as to exclude Christians from knowledge of it. Subsequently large tracts of Christian lands were declared forfeited due to lack of a correct title deed and they were auctioned off to willing Turkish buyers. Though Christians appealed to the courts and their Valis (governors), it was in vain and large numbers emigrated to Russia. When the governor of Erzerum saw the wholesale depopulation of certain districts in his province, *he reported the trend to the Grand Vizier. Washburn reported that he received the follow ing reply: "It is not necessary for you to meddle in political affairs, or to consider things from this point of 119 view. A happy journey to the Armenians who wish to emi grate. I will fill their places with Circassians and 43 others." Events such as these led Washburn to proclaim that the latest "Question” (following a Greek and Bulgarian Ques tion) was the Armenian Question. Unlike the other Quest- tions, however, he believed that Armenians and Turks, under a proper government, Actually the Turks in these areas had everything to gain by a change to good government. "It is only a few wealthy Beys and a few Turks sent from Constantinople who profit by the present state of things. The great mass of people suffer 44 from them." While Washburn was pursuing his theories of the new Armenian Question, the government was loudly heralding the extent of its reforms and cited the fact that there were many Armenians employed in high places in the Ottoman govern ment. Washburn countered these ideas noting that these Armenians were powerless to do anything to protect them selves or their families if the Ottoman Government decided to act against them. "What hope can they have when a Mohammedan brings them before a Mohammedan court which will not listen to a Christian witness, and is constituted with a 45 special view to the maintainance of Mohammedan supremacy." The only hope for Christians and Armenians lay in attempting 120 to press the Powers to take some form of action and during 1880 they began to broadcast their grief to the world. Time and again the reforms advocated by England to improve conditions for Christians were failures. While the Porte accepted the idea of reforming its gendarmerie by placing it under the command of English officers— an idea that might have helped the Sultan secure order without interfering with his sovereignty, it was never carried out. Instead of sending these men out into the districts, "the officers may be seen any day hanging about the hotels and public offices in Constantinople and have thus far done nothing but draw their pay ... It is not their fault they 46 have done nothing— it was never intended that they should." This wasteful example of the gendarmerie served as a further example of the misguided actions of the Beaconsfield period in Turkey. When Beaconsfield1s policies were finally repudiated by England, Washburn replied, "I only wish that he might be doomed to spend the rest of his days in Asia Minor, which has been since 1878 under his special protection. He is a great, a wonderful man; I have no wish to deny this; but he 47 has been an unmitigated curse to the people of the East." The Gladstone Ministry which replaced Beaconsfield sent Mr. Goshen, a banker, on a special mission which was "as sort of a missionary tour to exhort the Turks to repent and do 121 works mete for repentence." 48 This policy of continuing to pander to the good will of the Sultan was again protested by Washburn and in the ensuing months he was active in attempt ing to influence English and world opinion to take other courses of more forceful action. In one of his articles on the Armenian Question, Wash burn was particularly outspoken about the Ottoman Government and the English policies' shortcomings. When parts of it were published in Constantinople papers a great deal of com motion resulted. About this uproar Washburn said "...the 49 Turks would run me out of the country if they could." The Turks were never able formally to charge him, however, and publicly Washburn maintained a neutral profile. But privately he seethed with anger at the injustices he wit nessed daily and "hoped for the speedy downfall of this wretched government. I am very thankful that I have been 50 able to give it some very hard knocks." Washburn always carefully continued to cultivate important political allies. Once he had invited the Persian Ambassador to Robert College since he is "very popular ... in the highest circles in Constantinople and will be sure to talk about his visit here to everybody."^ Washburn was also delighted at the fact that it was the Gladstone minis try which had obtained power since he had longstanding as sociations with it and felt that he would be able to exert 122 52 a larger influence over the destiny of Turkey. In reviewing the situation with the new English min istry,, Washburn counselled that, though it was perhaps too late to save the whole Empire, Asia Minor could be aided. He recommended that England act firmly and quickly to im press upon the Sultan that radical reforms be undertaken. He mentioned that the policy of the Beaconsfield Ministry— of advice without force— was simply the equivalent of send- ing a child on a fool's errand. 53 While he expressed no desire to see the Sultanate institution overthrown, Wash burn was determined to try to see it reformed and secular ized. He warned England that if it truly wanted the con ditions of the Christians in Asia Minor to be ameliorated, it must be prepared for at least a partial occupation of the area with troops. This, however, would be a worthwhile move diplomatically and morally since a decentralized and secular ized government in this area— under the Sultan but with European aid— would be better for the people, both Christians and Turks, than an immediate downfall of the Empire. 54 This immediate emancipation would be the first step in assisting the Empire to reform itself and was the only hope left for her. Washburn must have realized, however, that these plans were far too visionary to apply to Ottoman politics. When the reports of poor conditions in Asia Minor continued to reach him he concluded that the hopes that accompanied the 123 Treaties of Berlin and Cyprus were ended. In attempting to explain the failures, he at once turned to the fact that the Ottomans and many of the Powers had lacked sincerity from the moment of the negotiations. Washburn noted that the provision in the Treaty of Berlin regarding religious lib erty had been written previously in the Constitution of 1876 and had failed miserably. Furthermore, he added that the very fact that religious liberty was proposed by Turkey and approved by Russia, both of whom were mutual enemies . should have served as an indicator of the insincerity of the motion. 55 Washburn realized that the Treaty of Berlin had merely amounted to a token statement on behalf of the Armenians who had incorrectly interpreted this as a commitment by England for their freedom. In the period since the treaty, England however, had seen a strong bond developing between the Armen ians and the Russians who had been only too happy to welcome and absorb them. Washburn knew that however much England might have sympathized with the Armenians, she would do nothing to strengthen them if it might result in enhancing the power of Russia in Asia Minor. By 1880 it had become apparent to England that the only move in its interest con cerning the Armenians would be to attempt to promote a fully independent Armenia. This idea would prove useful to them as a thorn in the sides of the Russians and the Turks 124 as well as serve as a possible aid to them in a route to India. Washburn also noted that this interest in Armenia was not limited to England and Russia, since it was a "curious fact that since the existence of a coolness be tween Germany and Russia, Prince Bismarck has manifested a p great interest in the Armenians ..." As a matter of fact he pointed out that the German Embassy had gone so far as to rival that of England in its expression of sympathy for the Armenians. Unfortunately for the Armenians, they soon discovered that due to the intricacies of Power politics, the amount of pressure the English and the Germans agreed to put on the Ottomans for reform was quite necessarily limited. Thus while England was quite willing to send con suls into Asia Minor to aid in reform, they were given no power to accomplish anything more serious than to raise false hopes for the Armenians. " ... they were a positive evil as they raised hopes and expectations among the people which England was unwilling to support by force and which 57 the Sultan regarded as revolutionary." The Ottomans were quick to realize the limited position of England and came to the conclusion that England would be forced to defend Tur key, however much the Turks might despise her advice, be- 58 cause she had to protect her own selfish interests. Power politics further muddied the situation in 1880. As France at this time had no protectorate over Asia Minor 125 and had no commitments for reform of the Ottoman Empire, she was more than willing to content herself with doing anything in her power to thwart the English efforts for reform. Though France and England may have combined forces from time to time to keep Russian expansion in check, Washburn was quick to mention that they did so "... with the understand ing that each party reserves for itself the fullest liberty of action in regard to other questions ..." 59 Meanwhile the Austrians had maintained the theory that it was better to let the Empire die a natural death while they kept careful vigilance over the affairs, ever on the alert to make the proper move should the time prove right. In many respects these various conflicts among the Powers served to confuse the Ottomans for they were never sure whom to distrust the most— their friends or their ene mies. Soon Abdul Hamid came to realize that while England and the Powers proposed reforms for his Empire, they were eagerly eying areas for their own potential use. In most cases Ottomans realized that in their dealings with the Powers, they would be " ... imposed upon and plundered without mercy.They realized their sole hope for sur vival lay in their ability to keep the Powers at bay while finding a solution to their own problems. The previous years had fully illustrated to them that purely Western-type reforms could not work in the Empire and in response to the painful memories of these failures, Abdul Hamid found 126 power of the Ulema, they reasoned. However, instead of limiting the Sultanate, they proposed to issue a declara tion reaffirming the right of the Sultan to rule the Empire as a Caliph bound firmly by the Sheriat {sacred law) not to delegate any of his supreme authority to anyone. 61 With these guidelines there could be no such thing as civil government and the Sheriat would remain supreme in govern ing all legal questions. Washburn concluded that "it will be seen at once that any equality between Christians and Mohammedans is absolutely impossible under such a govern ment. A Christian may be tolerated, but he can have no rights ..." 62 Washburn believed the decision of the Ulema to return to Moslem supremacy to be an end to this hope for the survival of the Empire. He pointed out to his critics who approved the idea of a strong Sultan, that no matter how strong a sovereign appeared to be he could never be so absolute as to be completely free of his ministers. When Hairedin Pasha was removed from office, Washburn observed that he was replaced by a choice of the ultra-fanatical Moslem party whose control over him would end all hopes of reforms and make him especially difficult for Abdul Hamid 63 to manage. What most seriously disturbed Washburn about this turn of events was that he felt they represented the shallow hypocrisy of political opportunists. He wrote 127 himself inevitably drawn toward the solution of Turkish and Moslem supremacy. The Sultan was immensely aided in this drift by de cisions of the ruling Ulema made between 1878 and 1880. During this period the government, often through the inspir ation and advice of the Powers, was faced with several ministerial crises involving attempts to change the power of either the Sultanate or the Grand Vezir. At one point an attempt was made under the leadership of Ahmet Vefik Pasha to abolish the Grand Vizirate and to establish a Prime Minister (over other participating ministers) diminishing the overall power of the Sultanate. It was not until a proposal was submitted by Grand Vezir Hairedin to force the Sultan to relinquish power to himself and other minis ters that the Ulema fully came into action. This proposal was actively backed by French, English, and Austrian inter ests. When the Grand Council of the Ulema and the govern ing classes learned of this proposal they reacted at once to bolster the authority of the Sultan and, in a round-about way, their own. Though they recognized that the Empire was in peril and needed reforms, they determined that these should be done via a return to the traditional customs of the ruling establishment and not through principles of Western civilization. If the Sultan's power was to be limited, it would have to be because of an increase in the 128 I am satisfied that no such sentiment as patriotism exists in the nation. It is merged and lost in their devotion to Islam. This is not only their religion but their country. As for the many who are atheists at heart and re tain only the forms of Mohammedanism, the exist ing bureaucracy is their country, their relig ion, and their God. To talk to these men of decentralization and secularization as a means of saving their country is like talking to a blind man of colour. They cannot comprehend what you mean.64 Though a desire to protect the Moslem faith and customs was supposedly a key to the new-found unity, Washburn declared that "there is some truth in what is often said that with the Turk political considerations always outweigh the re- 65 ligious interests." The real spirit of all this public fanaticism was not genuinely religious but simply a less than honorable measure to hold the Moslem element together and enable some opportunists to strengthen their hold on the government. The new alliance of the Sultan and the Ulema spelled the end for any voluntary reforms and the idea of "equal rights and equal duties" would now come to mean little other fi fi than simple toleration. Though Washburn was disturbed to see the turn of events in the Empire, he was quick to point out that this new reinforcement of a policy of exclusion was not unusual in European empires and that the Sultan had as much right to defend his position as the Pope had to de- fend his secular powers in Italy. Furthermore, he ad mired his courage in defying Europe and in attempting to 129 make the position of Caliph a worthy symbol of unity for Moslems all over the world. Washburn viewed Abdul Hamid’s plans for becoming a strong leader of all Moslems and noted it was a purpose ",,, worthy of a great mind and there is something even of a sublimity in it ..." 6 8 What the Sultan had managed to do was to turn a dying dynasty, with long-standing traditions of the people's loyalty into a living force again. By labeling himself as the Sultan and Caliph, Abdul Hamid had been able to solidly link an identification of the dynasty 69 with the destiny of the Moslem religion. He noted that Abdul Hamid's claim as the supreme Caliph was supported by an ancient decision of the Arab doctors that "the author ity of a Prince who has usurped the Caliphate by force and violence, ought not. the less to be considered legitimate since the end of the perfect Caliphate, the sovereign power, is held to reside in the person of him who is the strongest, who is the actual ruler and whose right to command rests 'upon the power of his armies.'" 70 So long as Abdul Hamid was able to maintain his power against any other claimant, he could continue to use the title to strengthen his rule and prestige. Thus at the very time when most Moslem lands all over the world were falling under the control of the Colonial Powers the Ottoman Empire came to stand as a strong protector of the faith. 130 In the beginning, however, the Sultan's road was laden with many dangerous obstacles, none the least of which was a strong and well organized Ulema fully opposed to any re form at all. Washburn noted the difficulty in dealing with the Ulema as opposed to the Powers or the Pashas when he wrote that the Sultan "could invite the former [Sir Henry LayardI to dinner oftener than ever and give the latter [Hairedin Pasha] a pension. He had nothing to fear from either."^ The Sultan's problem was to ascertain how to handle the quarrelsome Ulema and yet maintain its enthusiastic support and his new-found unity. What Abdul Hamid decided to do in lieu of his decis ion to strengthen the Caliphate was to put forth the idea that the dignity of the office required him to strengthen his own household, what the Ulema failed to realize, how ever, was that in this process the Sultan began to tip the scales of power in his own favor as the palace household came to number in the thousands. In addition to their sheer numbers, these individuals had a never-ending chain of thousands dependent upon them as well. Abdul Hamid then shifted the management of the Empire from the Porte to the Palace. Soon the time-established civil hierarchy of the various ministries became nothing more than figureheads of the past. Gradually the officials in the provinces became 131 simple agents of the Palace. Referring to these moves by Abdul Hamid, Washburn wrote that "the government of the em pire was transferred to the palace where an irresponsible camarilla, made up of secretaries, chamberlains, mollahs, eunuchs, astrologers, valets, and nondescripts took the place of a responsible Ministry to determine the general policy of the government and every detail of the adminis- 72 tration." To Washburn it seemed as if the "Sultan had sacrificed a capital for a palace." 73 As he began to expand his Palace rule, the Sultan now became less and less available to outsiders for consul tation or petitions. The Powers were forced to deal with ministers at the Porte and soon found that these officials had no authority whatever and no influence. It became clear that the only route to a decision lay through the Palace. However, it was only the full ambassadors who ever obtained the right to an audience with the Sultan at the Palace and now they seldom got the chance to discuss anything. These ambassadors found that "it is only by bribing some of the camarilla that any business is accomplished. Russia keeps some of them in her pay all the time." 74 Furthermore, these ambassadors learned that the more important the business proposal the more people there were to be bribed before the proposal ever reached the Sultan's hands. 132 Abdul Hamid had decided to shut himself up in his palace and trust no one else to make decision concerning the fate of the Empire. Accordingly no minister had any power and all business passed through the palace before it was approved. Unfortunately this exercise in supreme control had brought the whole government to a deadlock. By mid May there were some four thousand items of unfinished busi- ness on hand and the number mounted each day. 75 Though Washburn admired the desire for a strong rule he complained that in his attempt to solidify power the Sultan had no idea what items were most important. Once an ambassador "found him carefully working over the police negotiations for the Cafe Chantants in Pera, while the most pressing affairs of state were neglected." 7 6 Washburn wrote often in the year 1880 of the changes in leadership in the Empire. While it seemed to him that the fanaticism was a terrible danger to all the people in the Empire, he agreed it had enabled Abdul Hamid at least to emerge supreme. And though he despised the evils of the new system of Palace rule he could not but admire the determined obstinacy and cunning of the ruler who had out witted the diplomats of Europe to establish himself in this position. 133 NOTES TO CHAPTER V ^\An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 35, July, 1879, p. 740. 2 Letter from Washburn to Robert, January 8, 1877, ATRC. See also letter from Washburn to Robert, June 1, 1877, ATRC. Article by Our Own Correspondent, "The Situation in Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 18, October 30, 1878, p. 354. 3 Stamboul, "How the Treaty of Berlin Works in European Turkey," The Independent, Vol. 30, November 14, 1878, p. 2. 4 George Washburn, "The Treaty of Berlin and Religious Liberty," The Independent, Vol. 31, March 6, 1879, p. 1. 5 An Eastern Statesman, "The Armenian Question," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 37, April, 1880, p. 547. g George Washburn, "The Treaty of Berlin and Religious Liberty," loc,. cit., Vol. 31, p. 2. 7 Our Own Correspondent, "England and Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 20, December 31, 1879, p. 570. 8 Letter from Washburn to Robert, October 9, 1878, ATRC. 9 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 36, October, 1879, p. 338. 10Our Own Correspondent, "English Moral Suasion in Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 20, September 3, 1879, p. 186. Our Own Correspondent, "England and Turkey," loc. clt., Vol. 20, p. 570. See also letter from Wash burn to Robert, May 18, 1877, ATRC. George Washburn, Robert College 1865-1900, p . 85. 12 Our Own Correspondent, "Sultan Abdul Hamid,” The Christian Union. Vol. 22, November 3, 1880, p. 370. 13Ibid.. p. 370. 14 Stamboul, "How the Treaty of Berlin Works in European Turkey," loc. cit.. Vol. 30, p. 2. 15 Our Own Correspondent, "The Situation in Turkey, loc. cit., Vol. 18, p. 354. See also Our Own Correspon dent, "The Third of May in Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 19, June 11, 1879, p. 528. 16 Our Own Correspondent, “England and Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 20, p. 570. 17 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. clt., Vol. 36, p. 340. 18 Ibid., p. 338. 19 Our Own Correspondent, "English Moral Suasion in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 20, p. 186. 20 An Eastern Statesman, “Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 36, p. 339. 21 Our Own Correspondent, "English Moral Suasion in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 20, p. 186. 22 The New York Daily Tribune, April 30, 1864, p. 9 23 Our Own Correspondent, "Terrible Condition of Asiatic Turkey," The Christian Onion. Vol. 21, May 5, 1880, p. 413. 24 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review. Vol. 37, Feb., 1880, p. 342. 25Ibid., p. 341. 26 George Washburn, "Turkey and the Liberal Govern ment in England," The independent. Vol. 32, June 17, 1880, p. 1. 27 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 346. pO George Washburn, "Turkey and the Liberal Govern ment in England," loc. clt., Vol. 32, p. 1. See also George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 153. 29 George Washburn, "Turkey and the Liberal Govern ment in England, loc. cit., Vol. 32, p. 1. 30 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey, loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 345. 31 An Eastern Statesman, "Life in Constantinople Fifty Years Ago," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 36, December, 1879, p. 614. See also Our Own Correspondent, "Religious Liberty in Turkey," The Christian Union. Vol. 20, November 12, 1879, p. 390. An Eastern Statesman "The Impending Crisis in Turkey," The Contemporary Review Vol. 38, September, 1880, p. 509. Our Own Correspondent, "England and Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 20, p. 570. 3 2 Our Own Correspondent, "The Armenian Question, The Christian Union, Vol. 21, March 3, 1880, p. 197. See also Our Own Correspondent, "Religious Liberty in Turkey, loc. cit.. Vol. 20, p. 390. 33 Our Own Correspondent, "English Moral Suasion in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 20, p. 186. 34 Ibid., p. 186. Q C An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. clt., Vol. 37, p. 338. 136 36 Our Own Correspondent,"Christian Children Held as Slaves," The Christian Union, Vol. 18, December 25, 1878, p. 560. 37 Letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, May 17, 1880. ACA. 38 Letter from Washburn to Dr. Coe, June 24, 1880, ATRC. See also George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constan tinople, p. 154. Letter from Washburn to his father. May 15, 1880, CHPHLA. 39 Our Own Correspondent, "Terrible Condition of Asiatic Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 21, p. 414. See also An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 35, p. 752. 40 Our Own Correspondent, "Some Startling Results of the Late War," The Christian Union, Vol. 19, March 12, 1879, p. 242. See also An Eastern Spokesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit.. Vol. 35, p. 749. 41 An Eastern Statesman, “The Armenian Question," loc. cit.. Vol. 37, p. 539. 42 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 35, pp. 751-5?.. 43 An Eastern Statesman, "The Armenian Question, loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 540. 44 Ibid.., p. 547. 45 Ibid., p . 5 40. 46 Ibid,., p. 541. See also An Eastern Statesman, "The Impending Crisis in Turkey," loc. cit.. Vol. 38, p. 514. Our Own Correspondent, "Terrible Condition of Asiatic Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 21,'p. 414. 137 48 George Washburn, "Turkey and the Liberal Govern ment in England," loc. cit.. Vol. 32, p. 1. 49 Letter from Washburn to his son George H. Wash burn, April 28, 1880, ACA. See also letter from Washburn to Mr. Booth, June 2, 1880, ATRC. Letter from Washburn to his son George H. Washburn, April 25, 1880, ACA. 50 Letter from Washburn to his son George H. Wash burn, May 17, 1880, ACA. See also letter from Washburn to his father. May 15, 1880, CHPHLA. 51 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, October 25, 1878, ATRC. 52 Letter from Washburn to his son George H. Wash burn, April 28, 1880, ACA. See also letter from Washburn to his son George H. Washburn, April 12, 1880, ACA. 53 An Eastern Statesman, What Can a Liberal Govern ment Do for Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 37, June, 1880, p. 899. 54 George Washburn, "Turkey and the Liberal Govern ment in England," loc. cit., Vol. 32, p. 1. See also An Eastern Statesman, "The Impending Crisis in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 38, p. 511. An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Government Do for Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 32, p. 902. 55 George Washburn, "The Treaty of Berlin and Religious Liberty," loc. cit., Vol. 31, p. 2. 56 An Eastern Statesman, "The Armenian Question," loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 543. See also Joseph Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1971), pp. 48-49. 57 George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question 1100-1900. p. 117. 138 58 An Eastern Statesman# "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 336. 59 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 35, p. 754. See also An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Government Do for Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 898. 60 An Eastern Statesman, "The Impending Crisis in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 38,p. 514. See also Our Own Correspondent, "The Third of May in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 19, p. 528. Our Own Correspondent, "The Situation in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 18, p. 354. 61 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 36, p. 335. See also An Eastern Statesman, "The Impending Crisis in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 38, pp. 508-509. George Washburn, Robert College 1865-1900. p. 96. 62 Our Own Correspondent, "Religious Liberty in Turkey,” loc.; cit., Vol. 20, p. 390. 63 Ibid. 64 An Eastern Statesman, The Armenian Question, loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 542. 65 George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question 1100-1900. p. 107. 6 6 An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Govern ment Do for Turkey," loc. cit.. Vol. 32, p. 901. See also Our Own Correspondent, "Religious Liberty in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 20, p. 391. 67 George Washburn, Robert College 1865-1900. p. 87, see also p. 100. Our Own Correspondent, "Sultan Abd-ul- Hamid," loc. cit.. Vol. 22, pp. 370-71. An Eastern Statesman, "The Impending Crisis in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 38, p. 509. George Washburn, Fifty Years in Con stantinople, p. 160. 139 68 Our Own Correspondent, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit.. Vol. 22, p. 370. ^George Washburn, Robert Colleqef 1865-1900. p. 197. See also Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 124. 70 George Washburn, Robert College. 1865-1900, pp. 94-95. 71 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 36, p. 336. 72 George Washburn, Robert College 1865-1900. p. 93. See also An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Govern- Do for Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 896. George Washburn, "The Outlook in Turkey," The Independent. Vol. 66, May 16, 1909, p. 949. 73 An Eastern Statesman, "The Armenian Question," loc. cit.. Vol. 37, p. 542. 74 George Washburn, Robert College 1865-1900, p. 94. See also An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid,” The Contemporary Review, Vol. 67, January, 1895, p. 45. 75 Our Own Correspondent, "Terrible Condition of Asiatic Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 21, p. 414. See also Our Own Correspondent, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit., Vol. 24, p. 370. An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Government Do for Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 32, pp. 895-96. 76 Our Own Correspondent, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit., Vol. 22, p. 370. < CHAPTER VI THE MOST DIFFICULT STRUGGLE: OTTOMAN POLITICS 1881-1903 The one purpose of the Turk is to defend and strengthen what remains of his Empire and he has no faith in any of his old allies. He may, at some time be driven into a new alliance with some of them, he may try to play one against another, but he will trust none of them. Any policy which is based upon winning the hearty confidence of the Sultan is fore doomed to failure. Late in 1880 George Washburn returned to the United States to spend the next two years raising funds for Robert College. While he was, of course, inactive in Ottoman pol itics during this time, at home he began to press for Ameri cans to take more of an interest in the destinies of the people of the Ottoman Empire. During this period he wrote an article in which he commented ''Now or never is the time to mold and direct ... We feel at Constantinople ... immeas urable opportunities surround and overshadow us. America has the opportunity to influence the East which she can never 2 hope to have again if it is neglected now." Washburn found, however, that Americans were none too eager to assume the lofty goals he prescribed for them. As he toured the States 140 141 requesting funds for the college and asking people to be concerned with the work going on in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, he met with much resistance. "I have been told constantly by Christian men during the past two years that they did not feel the slightest interest in the people of 3 Turkey or care what became of them." Confronted wxth these attitudes, Washburn's fund raising activities met with lit tle success and he returned to Constantinople in late 1882. He reassumed direction of the college, determined to see it grow, but with an honest realization of its handicaps that the college would have to work within the limitations of a restricted budget. When he returned to Constantinople he noticed that the problems resulting from increasing governmental centraliza tion which had been slowly developing under the reign of Abdul Hamid- had not lessened during his absence. While he had previously admitted that he felt there was much good that could come to the Empire from strong centralization, he noted the increased confusion and disarray in the government and concluded that they were the result of the Sultan's poor judgment in regard to questions of state and of what Wash burn felt to be his inability to make wise decisions.- In stead of the increased centralized control resulting in more stability, Abdul Hamid saw potential opposition mounting. His fear of such opposition eventually forced him to leave 142 the grand palaces on the Bosphorus and move to Yildiz Palace high on a hill above the Bosphorus which was surrounded with strong fortifications and defended by a large garrison. Washburn noted that he seldom ventured beyond the garden of the palace and that at times he shut himself up in one room carefully guarding against everything from assassination to poison in his food.^ Washburn felt that the evils in this centralized system were a direct result of the Sultan's dependence upon a select group of personal palace advisors. His fear of assassination# for example, was carefully fostered by the camarilla as their "chief stock in trade" and caused what may once have been a minor problem of opposition to his rule to become a major obstacle requiring an army of spies to keep track of all opposition activities. Consequently, most modern-thinking, intelligent Turks were, by the middle of the 1880's, either in exile or living under constant surveil lance unable to move anywhere within the Empire without a 5 specially granted Hatt. While Washburn had originally approved of the Sultan's desire to solidify power, he was dismayed when he returned to see that it had resulted in his tying his power to the . figurehead of the Caliphate, backed by an ever growing ring g of Moslem fanatic supporters. The Sultan had commenced put ting down Christians and limiting the rights of foreigners 143 and all missionaries. "He had made it clear that no Moham medan would be allowed to change his religion and that no 7 criticism of Islam would be tolerated." Washburn reported on these policies to the board of the college and said that "so long as the present Sultan is on the throne and fanatic ism rules, we cannot hope for many Turks [to attend Robert College]. Washburn had long hoped for a civil government in the Empire with an ever broadening base of support among the many nationalities. Instead he now saw Abdul Hamid becom ing a prisoner in his own plan, surrounded by men determined not to lose their power gained as a result of the new fanati cism. Washburn felt that the Sultan probably would have been killed if he had attempted to legislate equality which might have resulted in better government for Turks and Christians alike. He concluded "The Mohammedan prefers to live under the worst Mohammedan government rather than under the best q Christian rule." The government had become more fanatical and corrupt and the country suffered increasingly as the decade continued.. Along with the changes in the internal affairs of the Empire Washburn began to notice a distinct change in exter nal affairs also. What he discovered was that the Ottoman Government had begun more and more to ignore the stipulations of the various capitulations and former treaties, and amaz ingly enough the Powers allowed these violations to pass 144 unheeded. Although the reasons for these violations were varied, Washburn attributed this primarily to the steady decline in the ability of the Powers to coordinate any of their activities. Thus while the English Government recog nized the many flaws in the Turkish government, one of the major thrusts of their foreign policy was to maintain the Turks solidly until England could come up with some alter native solution other than Russian domination.^"0 Far from the vigilant policy of Stratford Canning of earlier decades, "The policy of England in the East, then is neither anti- Turkish nor anti-Russian in any aggressive sense. It is a policy of peace and not of war, just so long as peace is pos sible. This neutralist policy must have troubled Washburn with his ideas of progress and justice. During these years he maintained his close ties with high-ranking British of ficials and attempted to encourage a more activist policy. He was quite close to Sir William White, an English Ambassa dor to the Porte, and met with him often to review policies and options. So close became this friendship that the two would meet to consult about political affairs, each knowing he could confide in the other with complete trust. Washburn mentioned these conferences later and added, "he did not want advice. He wanted the opportunity to say all that he had in his mind to someone, who knew the situation and whom he could trust not to betray him. He told me this was a 145 great help to him. To me it was at once an education and a delightful recreation." 12 Washburn had several oppor tunities to visit England and while there he would often visit with various high officials at their homes. In 1886 he revealed the intimacy he had had with a Colonial Secre tary William E. Forster when he wrote a eulogy on the lat ter' s death and commented at great length about the many facets of his character he had uncovered in numerous visits with him at his ministry as well as at his private home in the country.13 By the mid-1880's Washburn began to make mention of the rapidly growing German influence in the Ottoman Empire. He speculated that the main reason for this early dramatic increase was that Germany remained the only European power which had not seized upon some portion of the Empire. Con sequently, Abdul Hamid, anxious to reform the Empire in his own way free from any unnecessary foreign entanglements, began to incorporate large numbers of Germans into the ser vice of the Turkish Government and armed forces. In addi tion, numerous contracts and concessions were awarded to Germans and trade with Germany rose substantially. Perhaps the most stunning among these triumphs was the German control of the Asiatic railways. Washburn noted, however, that these achievements came at great cost to true reform for "... Ger many has adopted the policy of supporting the Sultan in 14 everything, not that she in any way controls his action." The Turks were quick to realize the potential of a strong German ally, uninterested in obtaining from them anything other than business concessions and yet able to free the Turks from fear of the Concert of Europe. Over the next decade the Turks encouraged German enterprises in the Em pire. Perhaps this influence reached its peak with the visit of the German Emperor in 1898 to cement an alliance with the Ottoman Empire. Although the Germans were able to derive great material benefit from their associations with the Ottoman Empire, Washburn noted that they had done noth ing to foster reform or aid the many nationalities. While the Powers were persistent in giving a good deal of advice to Abdul Hamid, Washburn increasingly observed that it was seldom backed up with armed force and thus was rarely fol lowed . Though Washburn may have been disappointed in the government's failure to push through widespread reforms and grant equality to its population, he was nonetheless under standing of the Sultan's position. He knew that the Empire had experienced a steady international decline since the Crimean War and that the foreign adversaries of the Sultan were anxious to complete the destruction. He felt, however, that at the time it would be in the best interests of all for the Sultan to remain. "There is no one to take his place and if he follows a wise and an enlightened policy in dealing with his Christian subjects he will be stronger twenty years hence than he is now."1^ The Sultan's immed iate policy of resorting to Moslem fanaticism stemmed in large part from the continuous threat of war hanging over the Empire. Washburn argued "If he had a fair chance, he would no doubt conduct his home policy in a way to merit the approval of the world." 16 While many of his contempor aries only degraded the moves of the Turkish government, belittling its efforts for survival, Washburn often pointed out the intelligence of its policies. A specific case in point was the Ottoman handling of the impending war between Russia and Turkey over Bulgaria. Realizing he could not afford a conflict with his Russian enemy, the Sultan care fully walked the diplomatic tightrope, taking special care never to sever cordial relations with the enemy. Washburn reported, "this long period of uncertainty has tried the Ottoman patience, exposed them to great danger and cost them much money? but they have never lost their heads or fallen into any of the traps laid for them by Russia." No country in Europe has met this crisis more calmly and skillfully than Turkey."1^ By the latter part of the decade of the eighties Wash burn had come to the conclusion that the most powerful threat to the Empire was Russia, whose desire was to expand south ward. The Turks realized this and at this time in their dealings with the Russians they remained most cautious. 148 Washburn contrasted the English influence with the Russian and noted, "more than one English ambassador had found him self powerless against Russian influence because the Turks felt it was perfectly safe to put off England, but very un- 18 safe to resist Russia." Washburn, however, recognized the current danger of the encroaching Russian power to the Empire as well as to the many Christian minorities and energetically wrote about it. Though he was cautioned about writing too much about Russia, he said "I risked everything to see the truth about the Turks eleven years ago and I do not intend to keep silent on the designs of Russia— let the world understand them." 19 While the Powers had been attempting to gain footholds in the Empire, Abdul Hamid continued his attempts to build support for his rule. In this effort he was partially backed by the men in his palace camarilla. But the cooperation be tween these two parties did not extend very far, for while the Sultan had envisioned plans for certain reforms, more often than not the camarilla had no interest along the same lines. "They made the Sultan believe that his schools were fostering sedition, and that the officers trained by the Ger mans were not to be trusted. They organized a.system of es pionage which employed thousands of spies and created a 20 reign of terror for all intelligent Turks and Christians." Though there were often Turks during this period who advo cated opposition views, who wanted to encourage developments 149 on a broader scale than the Sultan's and who welcomed foreign influences, they were effectively silenced. These men had no faith in any great Moslem revival or in the Ottoman abil ity to resist Russian pressures alone, and they wanted to see the government broaden its internal and external policies to ensure its survival. The camarilla considered these in dividuals threats to their positions and they saw to it that hundreds of such thinkers were eliminated and many thousands more exiled or forced to escape secretly from the Empire. As the camarilla pressed against their opposition they more actively fostered the general Moslem revival. Dur ing this time numerous mosques were built and countless others repaired at government expense. Washburn wrote, "ex ternal forms are more carefully observed, and the Turkish press is more vigorous in its attack upon Christianity7 but whether there is really any revival of faith and zeal among the people it is not easy to say. As far as my obser- 21 vation goes, it is purely a governmental movement ..." This government action worried Washburn for he felt that its implications were far greater than a revival of Moslems' faith. It was "an effort to deprive Christians and for eigners of equal rights which must in the end deprive Turkey of the sympathy of Europe."22 To help foster this program of revival of Moslem faith the government also began to institute a rigorous program of censorship which extended to all material disseminated in the 150 Empire; as a result, no written criticism of the Moslem faith or the Moslem government was tolerated. Washburn recalled "No books are allowed to enter the country in any language which speaks disrespectfully of the Prophet or the faith. Dante, Byron, Voltaire and Palez are specimens of forbidden 23 authors." Washburn illustrated the totality of the government's control when he wrote of his protest at the seizure of some French text books intended for grammatical instruction at the college. Though he could determine noth ing derogatory in the books to warrant their seizure, the government official refused to release them since he "could admit nothing which mentioned the Turkish Government or the 24 Mohammedan religion favorable or unfavorably." Washburn related that when he persisted in arguing with the individual that under such rules dictionaries, encyclopedias, and a great deal of literature would also have to be barred, he was politely but firmly dismissed. During the next decade the more insecure Abdul Hamid felt, the more stringent became the rules. Soon nothing could be printed without his approval, and quite often the original censor's approval would be countermanded. Certain words, hundreds of them— are forbidden altogether, such as dynamite, assassination, anarchy, all astrological terms which might apply figuratively to the Star (Yildiz) Palace in which the Sultan lives. All words which might be construed to imply the truth of any thing religious or political which the Sultan does not approve.25 151 This censorship of the press branched out further to include any activity of which the Sultan disapproved. Washburn noted in January, 1895, that despite the influence of the whole of Protestant Europe, the government had con sistently refused to allow the erection of a Protestant church in Stamboul, Constantinople's oldest section which was predominately Moslem. Furthermore, Christian schools continued to see increases in regulations and were constant ly harassed in their operations by government decrees. Actually, this climate of censorship was so broad that Wash burn's Turkish friends complained to him that it included them as well. The spy system had expanded so far that at one point no one dared to speak in public on any issue lest what he said be misconstrued and used as damaging evidence against him. Washburn attacked this problem in a humorous article in which he described the new art of public conver sation : Why don't they talk on politics? Tut! Don't mention the word even. That way danger lies ... education, art, history? No it is not safe to touch one of them. A palace spy is very possibly within earshot! Your opinion has given him the opportunity he sought to oust you from your of fice in the Board of Censors and get a favorite put in your place. Well why not introduce some social question ... You cannot make any refer ence to your interlocutor's family without offense. There is the weather, but when there is an endless succession of warm cloudless days, with a gentle breeze blowing down the Bosphorus for a whole 2c month together, the weather topic is soon exhausted. 152 Washburn's only conclusion as to the reason for the policy of censorship was that it enabled the government to reduce foreign, Christian, and native influences, increase its power, and help the revival of the Moslem faith. As this disarray of the Empire increased, so did the hostility of the Sultan toward many elements which varied from his Moslem ideal. The major casualty of this growing hostility was the Armenian people, torn between various loyalties— both to the Empire and to their ideas of nation alism influenced by Power politics in the Empire. Perhaps this was the most cruel twist of all the changes the Empire was being forced to undergo, since the Armenian people had been regarded for centuries with more favor than any other Christian nationality in the Empire and as some of the Sultan's strongest Christian backers. Now, due to the ever- increasing fears of the Sultan that the Armenians had come under the direct influence of the Powers and were about to break away, the former trust had given way to distrust and fear. Furthermore, once the Sultan had uncovered the dis loyalty he felt most Armenians represented, Washburn re ported that it seemed as though the government was doing all it could to further this mutual distrust for the purpose of bringing about a conflict to enable it to move forcibly against any and all dissident elements. By the decade of the 1890's the Sultan's wishes for an open rebellion were to become a reality, because those 153 Armenians who believed the Powers1 promises to support their desire for independence began to foment active revolutionary disturbances inside the Empire. It was the hope of these revolutionaries that such conflicts between defenseless Armenians and the Turks would eventually force the Powers into intervention as had been the case in the past with Greece and Bulgaria. The problem with the Armenian case, however, was that it in no way resembled that of the Bulganians. To begin with, Armenians were scattered all over Asia Minor and in most provinces were in a minority. Secondly, Russia, the only Power ready to fight for the Bulgarians in 1877, was an enemy of the Armenian nationalists and was bitterly opposed to their desires for an autonymous Armenia. Thirdly, while England sympathized with their plight, many Armenians felt that the English were also opposed to forceful revolutionary 27 movements. As most of the Armenians were not, according to Washburn, flaming radicals but sober-minded individuals, when faced with these facts they "... had no sympathy with the revolutionists and saw plainly that the hope of their people scattered all over the country was not in rebellion, 28 but in the peaceful progress of enlightenment." Unfortunately, as the Sultan's fears of revolt by the Armenians and of the possible increased dismemberment of his Empire into autonymous areas grew, his anxieties about these dissident elements also mounted and be began to take specific actions to halt their spread. Washburn believed that the Sultan had begun to halt these movements by establishing special Kurdish cavalry units called the Mamidie. These and other armed Kurds' responsibility came to be to harry the Armenian population without mercy. But rather than end the political problems these sorties only increased them and the situation became more inflamed. By 1893 Washburn noted the mounting difficulties of the govern ment and the governed and added "this is really the most des picable government that can be imagined. How long can it 29 last." Increasingly he wrote of his disappointment with the failure of the Ottoman Government. He pointed out that at the very time when the Sultan needed to emancipate him self from the self-imposed isolation of the palace with its crew of harpies he had increasingly tied himself to this entourage of " ...chamberlains, moolahs, eunuchs, astrol- ogers and nondescripts ... supported by the secret police." 30 Instead of opening up his government to satisfy the desires of the diverse elements, the Sultan had adopted the theory that the way to preserve the Empire was to strengthen Moslem elements at the expense of the Christian population. Natur ally as the Armenians were the strongest, most prosperous and progressive of his Christian elements, they stood to be treated the most severely. In August, 1894, as the Armenian revolutionary commit tees became more active, the problem flamed into international limelight. At the town of Sassun near Mush the first large 155 scale massacre of Armenians took place and nearly four thou sand people were killed. While Washburn reported that this was the first major massacre ever committed by Turkish troops and Kurdish Hamidie regiments, he was quick to point out to his readers that these attacks on Armenians had been occur ring on a lesser scale for years. Although Armenians living in the city of Constantin ople never fully backed the revolutionists, the situation had deteriorated to the point that the Sultan now acted on the principle that all Armenians were to be treated as natural enemies and crushed by force. In September, 1895, a group of Armenians attempted to present a petition to the Sultan stating their grievances. In the tension of the moment, perhaps, troops watching the protest opened fire and several hundred Armenians were killed. Washburn felt that far from being an accident, this incident was a testing exercise on the part of the government to sense the reaction of the Powers to harsh action against dissident Armenians before entering upon a general slaughter throughout the Empire. He added, "if it proved that such things could be done with impunity, in face of Europe, under the very eyes of the Ambassadors, it would be safe to go on without fear of inter- vention." 31 As nothing was done by the Powers following the first Constantinople incident, there followed a,series of massacres throughout the Empire. 156 Since much of the criticism of modern historians has been vented at the emotionalism and inaccuracies of biased Christian reports concerning the massacres, this study will, for the most part, refrain from citing any of the eyewitness reports sent to Washburn from individuals directly involved in the massacres. Instead, it will concentrate on the re percussions felt directly by Washburn. It must be remembered, however, that Washburn's main role in the Empire was as a president of a largely Christian college whose students and staff were often directly connected to the massacres. Fur thermore, Washburn still maintained many close connections with active missionaries and thus was the recipient of many of their letters of grief regarding their parishoners and their life's work among the natives. Quite naturally these must have influenced his conclusions. After piecing together reports he had received from Asia Minor in the fall and winter of 1895 and 1896, Wash burn was sure that Abdul Hamid had made plans to reduce the Armenian population in Asia Minor to an insignificant minor ity and to cripple economically, politically, and culturally all those who had survived the massacres. At one point in December, following a series of letters and reports from missionaries in Asia Minor, he wrote "The missionary work ... is destroyed as far as we can see." 32 He later reported that it appeared that nothing could save the Armenians from either death or conversion to the Moslem faith in all the 157 region east of a line drawn from Samsun on the Black Sea south 33 to Alexandretta. While Washburn was emotionally grieved to see the destruction, he maintained as honest a sense of reporting as he could. He himself admitted he had no exact knowledge of how many Armenians had perished. He noted this fact once when he wrote his son, "I wrote the other day to England that 10,000 men had been murdered in three weeks but today I should say that very likely it is 50,000 for it ap pears they are destroying all the villages as well as kill ing in the larger towns. During the height of the massacres in 1895 no one anywhere in the Empire was able to escape from the accompany ing tensions. Foreigners especially were careful to watch what they said and what they wrote. As Robert College at this time had a great number of Armenian students, the Wash burns were placed in an unusually precarious situation— not only was theirs a Christian college, but a lot of the Chris tians enrolled were Armenians. Mrs. Washburn at one point became fearful enough that the college would be attacked that she dared to write her children " ... I have put what silver and jewelry I have together with a linen bag on the shelf where I can easily put them and throw them into the 35 cistern." As the panic in the city increased she wrote again with exact details of her plans: I want to tell you now that my Mother's watch with my engagement pin and a few other little things are in a small tin box in one of the 158 dolaps under the eaves on the NW side of the house and the miniature of my mother I intend to hang behind the book case in the study ... and the silver will be in the cistern if we have time to throw it in before we have to run ... if we should be killed I should like to have you know where those things a r e . 36 Things had become so tense in Constantinople that Washburn reported in December that a street quarrel between two Ar menians which resulted in some shots being fired actually touched off a panic that closed the shops and led to people filling all the embassy grounds fearing for their lives. Though Washburn had attempted during this time through private letters and publicly written articles to draw the Powers' attentions to the plight of the Armenians, he real ized that there was little hope for any action. He watched as Abdul Hamid, by now a skilled diplomatist, carefully stalled any plans for united action of the Powers. On the one hand the Sultan professed sincere intentions for reforms, but on the other he resolutely refused to accept any kind of foreign control with which to insure the reforms' ful fillment. Consequently, Washburn felt that any scheme of reforms proposed was turned into a farce. Assessing the causes for these failures Washburn pointed a finger at the Sultan and the palace camarilla as well as at the Powers. He noted the fact that England, Russia and France had proven to be much more interested in humiliating each other than in helping the Armenians, and "... between the three the Sultan has had his own way and is carrying death and destruction everywhere." 37 Washburn believed that the mas sacres had been carefully planned and organized by the Turkish Government nearly five years prior to their occur rence. Also, he felt that the representatives of the Brit ish Government in Asia Minor had duly noted the approaching danger and warned their government but to no avail; "all the Christians asked for was protection; but this was the 3 8 one thing the [English] government failed to provide." To attempt to combat this ineffectiveness, Washburn wrote countless "savage" letters pleading with various represen tatives of the English Government to take some action. He regularly met with Lord Salisbury to discuss the situation and though his advice may not have always been followed, Salisbury appreciated it and thought highly enough of it that the "single piece of advice a new ambassador received 39 from Lord Salisbury was 'cultivate Dr. Washburn.'" Washburn placed a great deal of moral pressure upon the English Government concerning the situation in Asia Minor, for he believed that the British Consuls sent into the area via the provisions of the Cyprus Treaty had been largely responsible for raising the hopes of the Armenians to believe they might attain independence. To Washburn the first Con stantinople massacres were the turning point in the whole Armenian affair, for it was here that the Powers might have taken a stand and halted the Sultan's plans. He felt that if England had sent her fleet to Constantinople at this time 160 the other Powers would have followed suit. Unfortunately, the English Parliament was not in session and the ministers were vacationing. Since it was several weeks before the gravity of the situation was understood and action contem plated, nothing was done. When the Powers finally did propose action they could not come to any agreement. Furthermore, Russia in formed England that she would not tolerate the use of force at Constantinople and would do all in her power to back up the Sultan. 40 Russia had now set herself firmly against any intervention by the Powers with France closely following her lead, so the alliance of the Powers against the Ottomans was shattered. Washburn concluded that "Russia is now supreme here and will probably use her influence to drive the mis- 41 sionaries out of Armenia and Asia Minor." He added, "The Powers are afraid to take any serious steps lest they fall to quarrelling between themselves. They have a great iron clad fleet in the Aegean besides the Russian fleet in the Black Sea— and they ought to bring them all here, at any wish and make an end of this Sultan." 42 This disunity among the Powers only increased the Sultan's will to resist any attempts by any of the Powers to intervene in the affairs of the Empire. When some of the Powers requested formal permission to bring up gunboats it was denied along with a strong note warning them that if the boats were brought up there would be a danger of a Turkish massacre of Christians 161 and foreigners. This was an awful humiliation for the Powers, especially England, to have to endure and Washburn forecast that there were great calamities in store for the future due to the divisiveness and the "rottenness of European civil ization. " When Washburn saw that the Powers could do nothing to aid the Christians in Turkey, he turned to America to fill the void. He realized, however, that American concerns were equally limited at the time and that the United States would do little other than protect its missionaries. In the decade of the 1890's United States policy was to protect the right of Americans "to teach and worship in the dominion of Turkey without interference or molestation." 43 Though this pro tection was reason enough for the missionaries to be grateful, it represented no major change in United States policy towards the Ottoman Empire. In 1896 the Sultan realized that he had nothing to fear from the limited actions of the Powers or from the rising strength of the United States. The Sultan thus reasoned that "all turned upon the action of Russia, his chief enemy, France would follow her blindly; Germany would do anything to cultivate her goodwill; Austria cared nothing for Asiatic 44 Turkey; England and Italy could not act alone ..." Wash burn realized that the Sultan knew perfectly well that Russia would do nothing to aid the formation of an autonymous Armenia on her borders and that the fewer reforms there were 162 in Asia Minor the better Russia like it. Washburn con cluded "...The Great Powers are guilty of all this blood as well as Turkey and I fear that they are also bound to suffer for it." 45 Little did he know that in less than twenty years his prophesy would be more than fulfilled. By January, 1896, it appeared that the worst of the massacres were over; but Washburn noted that the activities of the revolutionary Armenians continued despite the recent sufferings of their people. He wrote in February of a plot by these revolutionists to kill the Sultan and concluded "they will probably make a mess of it for they seem to me to be a stupid lot ... The danger to us is that they may try and fail— in which case a massacre in this city would be pretty certain." 4 6 The more Washburn studied the actions of these revolutionists, the more he became certain that they were serving as pawns in the hands of the Turkish Government. He felt that these revolutionists were deliberately encour aged by the government in the hopes that they would succeed in provoking "... the Armenians into some show of resistance that might furnish the government with an excuse for mas- sacring them." 47 As proof of the government's complicity, he cited the case of a revolutionary Armenian who had been allowed to move about and speak freely of revolution for nearly a year before being arrested by the secret police. Though he was arrested he was pardoned and allowed to pursue his efforts again. 48 Washburn also suspected that many of 163 these Armenians were Russian subjects and agents hired delib erately to stir up trouble so as to give Russia the excuse 49 to come into the Empire to preserve order. The final result of the revolutionists' efforts came to the surface in Constantinople in August, 1896, when Wash burn reported that "the streets literally ran with blood and in three to five days from five to ten thousand Armenians were massacred in cold blood and whole quarters of the city pillaged. This was followed by months of frightful perse- cutions." 50 Following this episode Washburn cautioned the Armenians about continued rebellion against either the Sultan or Czar. "... if they will improve their opportun ities as individuals and have the patience, the genius I might say of their ancestors to suffer and wait, their time will come some day to realize once more a national existence, either in the breakup of the Russian or the Ottoman Empires or both."51 Sultan Abdul Hamid had managed to change the pattern of the Ottoman Empire with his new spirit of religious fanat icism. Washburn concluded that its rise was not due to the fact that many ... have tasted blood and filled their houses with plunder, or that others envy their good fortune, but that the people generally have got back to the old idea that Christians are their natural enemies and the cause of all misfor tunes which have befallen them. Then they have taken heart from the successes of the Sultan ... They believe that all Europe is trembling before 164 him ... This newborn fanaticism meets us every day whenever we come into contact with the common p e o p l e . 52 The Sultan had seen his desires fulfilled to make Constantin ople, Asia Minor, and the old area ofArmenia into mainly Moslem centers of population.Washburn noted that in the last twenty-five years the Moslem population in Constantin ople, once a minority, had increased to nearly double that of the Christian elements. Every effort had been made to encourage Moslems of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Rumania and the Caucasus to emigrate and settle in Asia Minor. By the latter part of the 1890's the Sultan had succeeded in completely changing the characer of many provinces which were formerly mainly Christian, so that Asiatic Turkey was now overwhelmingly Moslem. Though Washburn readily admit ted that the Sultan had obtained his objective in Asia Minor, he concluded that it had been done at the cost of untold miseries to all his subject populations. Further more, "the administration has rapidly deteriorated in every department until it has become almost unendurable, so bad that is doubtful whether it can ever be restored to its former condition." 53 Finally Washburn pointed out that, although the Sultan may have achieved some success with his ideas of Moslem supremacy inside the Empire, his hopes of fostering a Pan-Islamic movement throughout the Moslem world to boost his support had failed. 165 By the latter part of the 1890's the Sultan found that there still remained opponents to his rule. After near ly twenty years of continued privileges being accorded his supporters in the palace, the old pashas found they could not continue to look with "equanimity upon the enormous fortunes accumulated so rapidly by the favorites of the Palace, and some of them at least honestly believed that in destroying the responsible Government of the Porte, alien ating Christian Europe, and setting up a personal Govern- 54 ment, the Sultan was destroying the Empire." In addition to opposition from the old pashas, the Young Turk movement with its desires for a return to a constitutional and par liamentary government had risen dramatically. To combat these influences the Sultan was forced to renew his efforts against all dissident elements, and he increased the vig ilance of his secret police and spy system. Consequently, most of the old pashas were forced into exile, the younger malcontents disappeared, and Washburn reported that Con stantinople had become a very unpleasant place of residence for all enlightened Turks. The foreign influences of the Sultan also began to change. Americans, for example, were pressing him to pay indemnities he had promised to the missionaries several years earlier. While several American ministers had attempted un successfully to obtain these, most had failed for fear of exciting the Sultan's anger. Washburn chastised the timidity of the ministers and said the Sultan "does not love us that is certain, but I do not believe that he is thinking about us at all these days. He has plenty of other troubles much nearer to hxm than we are." 55 Washburn exerted all of his pressure on American representatives to persist in this issue and partially due to his influence it was finally set- tied. 5 6 It should come as no surprise that Washburn could exert this influence, for by this time he was a well known figure in the Constantinople foreign community and he was often visited by various American and foreign ambassadors from all over the continent. Not all, however, were graced with the Washburns' friendship. In 19 01, for example, the new American Minister and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Eddy, were described by Washburn as "... very gay people, who have suddenly become very rich and want to make a sensation. Naturally they are not very much interested in us, but they are civil and try to make themselves agreeable when we see 57 them, which is very seldom." Near the close of his career at Robert College, Wash burn again began to urge the United States to assume a greater role in the affairs of the world. To him this was a logical step since "we have no millstone of a vast colonial empire tied about our necks. We have no traditional ambition 58 to rule the wordl. We have less temptation to do evil." He felt that the United States needed to comprehend world politics since it had reached a state of such power that in order to continue its growth it now had to learn to protect 167 its interests against traditional European powers. He con tinued along these lines, "there is no choice for any nation now but to be a world power knowing how to defend its own interests or to be dominated by the Great Powers of Europe and exploited in their interests."59 As a result of his many years of dealing with the Powers, Washburn had lost much of his original hope that the Powers were interested and able to reform the Empire. He realized, moreover, that the sole reason the Empire still existed was because it was temporarily in the interests of the Powers to allow it to do so? but he saw the increasing intensity of the Powers' rivalries and concluded that they would be forced to dismember the Empire rather than war among themselves. He theorized that there would be many separate kingdoms carved, that the Sultan would be pushed back into Asia Minor and that the Straits would be opened for free passage to all.^ These facts did not trouble him for he felt that "This is simply the order of nature, the great powers must have room for expansion, the higher and more advanced races must dominate the low and finally destroy and replace them."^1 In accord with these thoughts Washburn's views of Otto man reform and politics had changed greatly. He had come to accept the fact that the Turks were to be classified neither as Christians nor as Europeans and consequently could not be expected to act or think along similar lines. Rather than 168 view them as obstacles to be removed, he felt they were the most important factor in the question of reform in the Empire. "They have their own ideas of reform and they are doing what they can under adverse circumstances to carry them into prac tice ... the least we can do is to wish them well, and give them such aid and encouragement as we can. They understand as well as we that it is a question with them of reform or destruction."6 2 As a result of the many years in dealing with Ottoman politics Washburn formulated several theories on how to sur vive in the Ottoman system. Unlike many of his contemporary educators and diplomats, he realized the importance of ac cepting the Ottoman methods in solving its problems. Second ly, he understood the Ottoman tactic of delay. "How not to 6 3 do it is the perfection of Turkish diplomacy." He once remarked that it took over thirty years to obtain permission to build, at the college's own expense, a sewer from the college to the Bosphorus. In almost every instance he related that building permits were never finalized until the struc tures had been completed. Rather than wait for final ap proval, however, the college had learned to gamble that in the end the inexorable delays were not due to hostility but rather were a simple manifestation of the way of life in the area. To combat these delays Washburn mentioned "I have found invariably that unceasing and patient pushing always succeed in the end with the Turks."64 169 The difficulty in analyzing Washburn's concept of Ottoman politics is that, far from being a nonpartisan obser ver, he was intimately involved with so many facets of the Ottoman situation and often in the heat of anger he would comment emotionally. In 1866, for example, he wrote "No Turk ever looks beyond his own nose or has any real idea 65 of statecraft." But at other times he was able to per ceive the expertise Turkish diplomats had developed in dealing with their opposition. Often he marvelled at the consummate skill with which the Turks were able to play off one enemy against the other. He discovered, furthermore, that despite religious and cultural differences he had many friends inside the Turkish Government. For example, while the official policies of the government called for an end to any building activ ities by Christian institutions, Robert College was often allowed to complete structures while officials allowed writ ten communications forbidding this work to lie for weeks in their office drawers. By the time these notices were delivered to the college, having been shuffled endlessly from one official to another, the structure would have been com pleted. The final proof of the friendly spirit of the govern ment thus was not that officials had never written a negative order, but the fact that they delayed its arrival to the con- 6 6 struction site for so long that its arrival was meaningless. This was more in keeping with the Ottoman spirit for by 170 writing the order they maintained official policy, but by delaying it they kept open the channels of friendship. Another lesson that Washburn had to learn when deal ing with Ottoman politics was the proper place of backshish in society. He illustrated the extent of this custom in Ottoman circles saying once: For example the Grand Vizir must give L1000 to the Chamberlain who brings him notice of ap pointment, L500 to the Sultan's scribe who en graves the order, and some 2 or 3000L in smaller presents. So on down to the lowest official. All give and receive these complimentary presents. Nothing can be done without them. They are re garded in the light of legal fees and in many cases are regulated by custom as actual as they could be by l a w . 67 Later, as the government weakened, more and more salaried of ficials were forced to resort to the use of backshish in the everyday routines to obtain a form of salary. For many for eigners and missionaries this practice proved to be an insur mountable obstacle for them to accept. After reviewing the difficulties Robert College experienced in its early attempts to obtain permission to build, Washburn realized that the col lege had made a serious mistake. "I believe there would have been no trouble if the original inspector sent here had re- 6 8 ceived a good backshish." Washburn came to accept the use of backshish as a proper tool to solve any remaining obstacles in the course of long drawn out negotiations. Though he might not have approved the principle of the practice he recognized the 171 causes for its use and realized it would have been imprac tical to fight it. In the middle 1870's when the college was again attempting to expand its physical plant, it had encountered serious difficulties in obtaining permissions. At one point the college received an approval to build a single house though it had applied for two. To overcome this a plan was devised to build both houses but to unite them as "one" via a passageway as high as the first story enabling two houses to be built under the one permit. Wash burn noted "Any fool who comes here can see, unless his eyes are covered with liras, that we are to build two houses and not one kiosk. Still it may be that the Turks are tired of the thing and ready to accept this way of getting out of it . " 69 Thus the interesting paradox of Washburn's work. While admitting that the Ottoman Government was often rotten, contemptible, and corrupt, as well as progressive, he had come to realize that over the years it had devised a unique formula for its own survival. While more often than not Washburn disapproved of this formula, he realized that the Ottoman Empire's only hope for survival was to maintain flexibility in following what had to be at times a narrow and contemptible course. NOTES TO CHAPTER VI An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 48, October 1885, p. 586. 2 George Washburn, "Professor Phelps on Home Missions, " The Independent, Vol. 33, July 14, 1881, p. 4. 3 George Washburn, "Foreign Missions," The Independent, Vol. 34, June 15, 1882, p. 1. ^Our Own Correspondent, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," The Christian Union, Vol. 22, November 3, 1880, p. 370 5George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 93. g George Washburn, History of the Eastern Ques tion, 1100-1900, p. 118. 7 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople pp. 160-161. Q Letter from Washburn to Dr. Coe, June 1, 1882, ATRC. Q George Washburn, History of the Eastern Ques tion, 1100-1900, p. 99; see also, Letter from Washburn to Dr. Coe, January 25, 1884, ATRC. ■^An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 50, October, 1886, p. 592. 11 An Old Resident, "The Fate of the East," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 61, June, 1892, p. 854. 173 12 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900. p. 129; see also, letter from Washburn to his mother, Mrs. E. H. Washburn, November 5, 1886, CHPHLA. 13 George Washburn, "William E. Forster," The Independent, Vol. 38, May 13, 1886, p. 2. 14 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 98; see also, George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question. 1100-1900, pp. 123 and 136. l5George Washburn, "The European Situation," The Independent, Vol. 39, August 18, 1887, pp. 1-2. 16 An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 53, April, 1888, p. 623. •*~7 Ibid.. p. 612; see also George Washburn, "The Impending War," The Independent, Vol. 40, March 8 , 1888, p. 1 . •^An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 48, p. 588. Letter from Washburn to his son, George Hamlin Washburn, December 4, 1886, CHPHLA. 20George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, pp. xxiv-xxv; see also, An old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit.. Vol. 48, p. 587. 21An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 53, p. 620. 22 Ibid. George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, pp. 218-219; see also, George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 105. 174 2^An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," The Contemporary Review. Vol. 67, January, 1895, p. 47. 2^An Old Resident, "The Art of Conversation," The Independent, Vol. 47, May 30, 1895, p. 6 . 27 George Washburn, History of the Eastern Ques tion, 1100-1900. p. 128. 28 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, pp. 219-220. 29Letter from Washburn to his son, George Hamlin Washburn, March 19, 1893, ACA. 30 An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit., Vol. 67, pp. 44-45. 31 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, pp. 238-239. 32 Letter from Washburn to his daughter Anna Wash burn, December 14, 1895, CHPHLA; see also, ______, "The Sultan and the Powers," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 71, May 18975, pp. 626-627; also Letter from Wash burn to his son, George Hamlin Washburn, November 24, 1895 .and November 3, 1895, CHPHLA; also letter from Washburn to his mother Mrs. E. H. Washburn, December 28, 1895, CHPHLA. 33 Letter from Washburn to his daughter Anna Washburn, December 14, 1895, CHPHLA. 34 Letter from Washburn to his son, George Hamlin Washburn, November 10, 1895, CHPHLA; see also letter from Washburn to his mother, Mrs. E. H. Washburn, November 17, 1895, CHPHLA. 35Letter from Mrs. Henrietta Washburn to George H. Washburn and Anna Washburn, October 19, 1895, CHPHLA; 175 see also letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, October 7, 1895. CHPHLA. 36 Letter from Mrs. Henrietta Washburn to her son George Hamlin Washburn, November 20, 1895, CHPHLA. 37 Letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, November 3, 1895, CHPHLA. oq ______, "Armenia and the Powers from Behind the Scenes," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 69, May, 1896, p. 631. 39 Lloyd C. Griscorn, Diplomatically speaking. The Literary Guild of America, Inc., New York, 1940, p. 135; see also, Letter from Washburn to his daughter Anna Washburn, December 14, 1895, CHPHLA; also letter from Lord Salisbury to Washburn, July 8 , 1895, CHPHLA. ^°George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question, 1100-1900, pp. 129-130. 41 Letter from Washburn to his son, George Hamlin Washburn, February 2, 1896, CHPHLA; see also letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, December 22, 1895, CHPHLA. 42 Letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, November 24, 1895, CHPHLA. 43 Edward M. Earle, "American Missions in the Near East, '* Foreign Affairs, Vol. 7, April, 1929, p. 404. 44 George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question, 1100-1900, pp. 130-131. 45 Letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, November 24, 1895, CHPHLA. Letter from Washburn to his family, February 23, 1896, CHPHLA. 176 47 ______, "Armenia and the Powers: Prom Behind the Scenes," loc. cit.. Vol. 6 8 , pp. 631-632. 48 Ibid,., p. 633. 49 Letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, February 2, 1896, CHPHLA. 50 George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question. 1100-1900. p. 130. 51 George Washburn, Robert Collecre. 1865-1900, p. 210. 52 ______, "The Sultan and the Powers," loc. cit., Vol. 71, pp. 622-23. 53 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900. p. 101? see also Ibid,., p. 100; also, ______, "The Sultan and the Powers," loc. cit., Vol. 71, p. 623. 54 Ibid.. p. 624. 55 Letter from Washburn to his mother, Mrs. E. H. Washburn, December 10, 1899, CHPHLA. r /- In 1901, The Ottoman treasury compensated the American Board an amount in excess of $80,000.00 for damage done to American mission and educational properties during the period of 1894-1896; see also, Edward M. Earle, "American Missions in the Near East," loc. cit., Vol. 7, p. 405. 57 Letter from Washburn to his mother, Mrs. E. H. Washburn, July 7, 1901, CHPHLA? see also, Lloyd C. Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, p. 161? see also letter from Washburn to his mother Mrs. E. H. Washburn, October 27, 1901, CHPHLA. 58 George Washburn, "The Present State of Europe," The Independent, Vol. 48, February 6 , 1896, p. 178. 177 eg George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 259; see also George Washburn, "Europe and the United States," The Independent, Vol. 50, June 9, 1898, pp. 747- 748. 60 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, pp. 208-209; see also, Ibid., pp. 87-88. 61Ibid., p. 201. 60An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 53, pp. 611-612; see also George Washburn, Robert College. 1865-1900, p. 20. ^ 3G e o r g e Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 11. See also George Washburn, Robert College and the Turks, unpublished lecture, p. 8, ACA. 64 Letter from Wasburn to Christopher Robert, July 8 , 1867, ATRC. ^ New York Daily Tribune, July 6 , 1866, p. 7. ®6Letter from Washburn to his mother Mrs. E. ,H. Washburn, July 2, 1901, CHPHLA; see also, George Wash burn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 194. 67Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, January 17, 1873, ATRC. 6R Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, November 5, 1872, ATRC; see also letter from Washburn to his mother, Mrs. E. H. Washburn, November 29, 1900. CHPHLA. 69Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, March 4, 1874. ATRC. v CHAPTER VII MODERNIZATION AND REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1859-1903 I do not think that their (Ottoman Turks) failure to carry out the schemes of reform forced upon them by Europe is to be condemned; it was not in their nature to under stand them much less to apply them; they were not adopted to the conditions of the country. What it is responsible for is its own internal administration. It need not be European in order to be good government, but it should be wise and just after its own fashion. •*- George Washburn was greatly concerned with reforms throughout the period of his stay in the Ottoman Empire; his role as an educator as well as an advisor to diplomats demanded this. Unfortunately, in comparison to modern his torians who have done a great deal of research about these reforms with Turkish sources and who have written much on their organizational apparatus and planning, Washburn's reflections often seem to be lacking in accuracy or perspec tive. While he devoted much space in his early years to commenting on the need for some reforms, his comments seem, with the benefit of hindsight, to be a bit out of focus in certain instances. In other cases, however, his comments 178 179 are valuable as accurate observations of the overall effect many of these glamorized reforms had on the total society. Perhaps Washburn correctly saw that the Turk1s need for reform was in order to maintain his independence. He recognized that history had proven the worth of previous Ottoman governments and he sympathized with their desires to continue to rule. "If the Turks had not possessed some sterling qualities the Ottoman power would have disappeared a hundred years ago. No nation in Europe has had greater difficulties to overcome and their indomitable courage is 2 worthy of all honor." While Washburn may have acknowledged the past great ness of the Ottoman Empire, his early experiences illxistrate clearly that he was beset with confusion as to the proper course of reform for the Empire. Perhaps this difficulty stemmed from the fact that his primary associations in these years were with foreigners of those whose best interests were not necessarily in line with the Turks'. These individuals quite naturally deprecated any reforms the Turks may have attempted. Their primary interest was in financial and political stability to protect their own rising inter ests in the Empire. Thus the weakness of so many of Washburn's criticisms is that he does not exemplify a well- informed base from which to launch meaningful criticism about many of the technical reforms attempted. As Wash burn's experiences forced him to broaden his acquaintances 180 to include Christians and Turks as well as foreigners, a parallel broadening of toleration for many of the attempts of the Turks can be noted. In one of his later treatises he manifested this broadmindedness when he explained the difficulty of reform in the Empire. The only thing that all the various elements in Ottoman society could agree on concerning reform was that in general a change should be something "which would reduce the taxes, put an end to hard times and make everybody comfortable after his own fashion.1,3 During his early years in the Empire Washburn was extremely critical of the ineptitude of Turkish reformers. It must have been terribly frustrating for him to watch the Ottoman Government maintain its previous habits of ineffi ciency; he often wrote critically of the government's weak attempts to reform a faltering situation. In his later years he came to realize, however, that if any reforms were to take root they would be "those which are in their 4 essence Turkish or Mohammedan." He later developed a much more tolerant attitude towards Turkish injustices. Maybe this came from experience or maybe it was the result of his slow realization that even those grand Western Powers he had so fondly admired early in his career were at times as inefficient and weak and corrupt as the Ottomans. In any case, though he was still harsh in his criticism he became much more appreciative of the efforts that the government made. 181 Early in his stay in the Empire, Washburn realized that one of the most pressing needs was the reform of the Empire’s financial system. Undoubtedly many of his views were influenced by the wealthy foreign bankers and investors who had so heavily invested in the sale of Turkish bonds or Consols as they came to be called. The shortcoming here is that Washburn's Turkish sources were most likely not well informed or nonexistent so that the reader is left with little to balance the negative aspects of his criticism. When, for example, in 1866 the Ottoman Government refused to pay interest on the consolidated loan payable at London, Paris, and Frankfort, Washburn criticized the default on the grounds that "Turkish consols will now probably rank in Europe with Mexican bonds." 5 Little space is devoted in his columns to the plans of the Turkish reformers which led to the need to borrow these sums. Instead Washburn chastised the government for borrowing in the first place and continu ing to borrow, since he felt that most of the sums were being recklessly squandered. Washburn preached that the government's only hope for survival was financial retrenchment and reduction of expenses. The difficulty here is that Washburn realized that those officeholders in power, from ministers to pro vincial governors, felt no need to reduce their salaries simply to benefit the "infidel bondholders."® To illustrate 182 further the multiplicity of officeholders in the government and their crippling expense Washburn wrote: There are more than forty officers of the Govern ment in Constantinople with higher salaries than the President of the United States, and it is a moderate assertion to say that half of these officers are sinecures. This multiplication of offices goes through the whole government. One would suppose that the Turk was born for nothing but office. The Empire is weighed down by offices from one extremity to the other.^ What Washburn failed to realize is that, to the Turks, this multiplicity of offices was the key to their system at the time. To the Turk the convenience of the foreign bonds must have seemed a natural solution. The bond money enabled the Turkish government to survive and it placated their enemies since it offered them the opportunity to reap either an exorbitant commission from the bond sales or potential high interest on their money. To Washburn the system was corrupt and inefficient and poorly managed, for instead of attacking the source of the problems the government merely skirted the issue. A further aggravation to Washburn was the government's practice of raising money from forced levies in the interior. It angered him that these "loans" were never taken in Constantinople where he saw all the wealth of the country concentrated, since it "would cause a Q commotion and would bear too heavily on the rich Pashas." Instead, the monies were raised by officials in the interior who "according to his judgment or caprice assigns to each man the amount of money which he is to pay over ..." 183 While Washburn never stopped attacking injustices such as these, in his later years he came to feel much more sympathy for the Turks as he witnessed the avarice of European bankers and investors who, along with others, continued to keep alive the practice of speculation on foreign loans. As much as he disdained the Turks' ability to pay what they owed on these international debts and criticized them for this, he did note that the Turkish Government generally fulfilled its commitments. The fact that these bonds were especially vulnerable in times of political convulsion was no fault of the government; ’*... it is just the penalty paid for high interest. An example of the speculation involved with these bonds occurred in 1876 at the time of great internal insta bility in the Ottoman Empire. When the government found itself caught in the midst of financial difficulties, it simply announced that it would pay only half the interest on all loans and that the rest would be remunerated in bonds at later dates. As a result of this announcement the consols dropped nearly fifty percent in market value.^ Unfor tunately, when the government faulted on its payment it found it could borrow no more money and was forced to issue paper money and declare bankruptcy. What Washburn notied, however, was when the bonds faltered and values collapsed, this affected not only wealthy foreigners but also the complete spectrum of Ottoman society from the millionaire 184 pasha to the common Turkish laborers who had invested their life savings in the foreign loans. It was no surprise then that their disenchantment with Mahmoud and the Sultan ended 12 in a revolution. Despite the attempts of the new administration of Abdul Hamid to reform the Empire's finances, Washburn watched the funded debt rise to over one billion dollars following the Russo-Turkish War of 1878. As the debt rose and the interest payments continued to be defaulted, the confusion spread even further so that at one point in 1878 the government stopped paying its officials' salaries. 13 Washburn placed the blame on Ali and Fuad for it was they who had first begun the prac tice of depending upon foreign loans for running the Empire. The money which they had so easily obtained was just as easily squandered."^ Despite the efforts of the government to adopt some stopgap measures, Washburn concluded that the system needed to be completely altered. By 1879 Washburn actively began to campaign for some sort of foreign guidance in clearing up the Turkish debts. He felt that the only solution was for the government to stop borrowing money from Europe, to reduce its expenses, and live upon only that which it could raise from its own 15 sources. His frustrations at the Turks' waste and unsuc cessful attempts to modernize their financial base led him to write: The truth is that the whole financial system is hopelessly corrupt and however it may be patched 185 or mended, it will be rotten still. There is no hope for the Turkish government until it is ready to put its finances into the hands of competent Europeans who shall have absolute control over everything connected with expenditure as well as collection ... It would be most interesting to speculate how much Washburn influenced the representatives of the European bankers, especially British Ambassador Goschen, who negotiated the agreement (the Decree of Muharram) with the Ottoman Govern ment on December 20, 1881, to set up the Council of the Public Debt. This council, directly controlled by and responsible to the foreign creditors, was to take charge of certain state revenues to help eliminate the debt. In later years this organization did much to stabilize the economy and the finances of the government and end the debt. 17 Though Washburn had no inside connections to feed him accurate information on the exact amount available in the Turkish government budgets of the 60's, he did his best to study those publicly published and to enlighten his readers as to their organization and message. Thus when Fuad Pasha brought out his "modern" budget in 1864 proclaiming that there was to be a surplus in the Treasury, Washburn noted that certain conditions contradicted this. To begin with he showed that the interest on certain portions of the public debt remained unpaid. Furthermore, he added that clerks and employees of almost all grades in the various departments of government had not been paid for months. As a matter of fact the actual financial condition appeared to Washburn to 186 be so shaky he wrote that every time the Sultan appeared in public he was beseiged with petitions. "In short they have 18 literally 'dunned' him for months." A few years later, despite Fuad's promises of improved financial conditions, Washburn pointed out that all the pensioners and civil and military employees of the government had been forced to contribute one month's pay to help out with the diffi- 19 culties. The situation was so precarious that even foreigners in the employ of the Ottoman Government suffered; Englishmen at the mint told him they were generally seven to ten months behind in their pay. 20 Rather than aid in improving financial conditions, budgetary planning, and more equitable tax collection, Washburn found that the reforms left the government deeper in debt and the total population suffering. Naturally the government attempted to tighten its tax collection methods and increase its income. But Washburn noted that all gains were eaten up by the increasing army of officeholders and that businesses and individuals who were taxed suffered so much that both their own source of income as well as the government's was drying up. In 1868 Washburn reported a decline in production. Referring to the once profitable olive business as an example, he wrote that some farmers "have cut down their olive trees because.the tax is first upon the tree and then upon the salt for covering the olives and then upon the olives cured, a source of no profit what- ever unless the tree were very fruitful." 21 187 Nearly ten years later Washburn wrote again of the financial plight of the population and noted the evils of excessive taxation on Turkish as well as Christian farmers. He specifically described the condition of the Bosphorus vineyards, adding that fifty years ago "... it was profit able to cultivate them, to exchange 8 okes [1 oke = 2 8/1 0 1 b] of grapes or 2 okes of wine for one of bread. Now it is unprofitable to raise grapes at eight times the former price and the vineyards have almost all disappeared. They have been destroyed by unwise and vexatious taxation." 22 This example may have been atypical since the government at the time was heading toward stricter practice of Moslem ideals and wine making was definitely not considered a necessary profession for the faithful. But it should be noted that Washburn wrote often declaring that the evils of this taxation had permeated everywhere, affecting even the 23 simplest laborer and farmer, Turk or Christian. Following the Russo-Turkish War, the upheaval in the Sultanate, and the early chaotic years of Abdul Hamid, Washburn continued to give written attention to the finan cial plight of the Empire. While he now had many more sources of information available to him, his reports do not indicate much sympathy for the positions the government took during these years. Instead he was increasingly moved by the sufferings of the native populations and the indebted ness of the government. During these years the government debased the coinage to such an extent that at one point the official coinage, called a metalique, was reduced to half its former value. 24 After such continued devaluations, many business activities, with which Washburn was more than familiar, came to a standstill. Again, whether this busi ness depression was due primarily to the economic inadequacies of the government or rather to the general political instability as well, the reader of Washburn's works cannot know. One thing Washburn did emphasize, however, was that he felt the urban populations were extremely discontented with the government’s mismanagement of finances. In 1880, for example, he reported that the Minister of Finance, Edib Effendi, "has not dared to visit the Imperial Treasury, lest he should be torn in pieces by 25 the mob which constantly surrounds it." Washburn's main weakness during these times was that he concentrated much of his reporting solely on the plight of the people, ignoring any of the reforms. As he con tinually received reports of their suffering he commented woefully, “the long suffering Moslems accept the decrees of 26 fate and calmly starve to death." So involved was he in the picture of the misery that he might have lost sight of the intense political struggle the Ottoman Government was being forced to endure. While the government desperately expanded its operations and its cadre of officials to stem the tide of anarchy, Washburn saw these efforts as 189 continually wasteful and described the activities of the newcomers "... whose chief business appears to be to watch each other." 27 Even in his later years, though he reported favorably on the activities of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration and credited Abdul Hamid with beginning to restore the credit of the Empire, he could not accept what he felt to be the excessive size of the government. 28 Up to the last days he wrote about the Empire he blamed many of the financial inadequacies on the officials of the palace "who had no idea of finance other than filling their pockets with the plunder of the people, so that while the foreign Public Debt Commission manages its revenues in the interest of the people and at the same time keeps up the credit of the state in Europe, the general condition of the country is 29 pitiable." Perhaps Washburn's outlook was the correct one to take regarding the financial reforms— that they never were possible under the old Ottoman system because it was not wise and efficient government. Reform in the Empire was concerned with far more than economic and financial considerations, however. While the Empire was forced to suffer continuous deprivations on account of its monetary and fiscal difficulties caused by foreign debts, it must also be pointed out that these loans, while an obstacle to independence, were a tremendous impetus to modernization. Here again Washburn's degree of accuracy proves difficult for the reader to analyze. On the one hand 190 he reviewed many of the reforms in the areas of communica tions and road building and concluded they were a bane to society and were often faultily constructed projects. In this sense his criticism appears to be narrow-minded and harsh for in what appears to be his carping he has missed what led to the beginning of the industrial technology which was to do so much to change the future of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, his criticism can prove to be a most helpful tool when used to balance the reports of some modern Turkish historians. To the average reader perusing these modern treatises it would seem that roads, railroads, agri cultural improvements, etc., were made in a steadily mounting geometric progression for the constant betterment of the total population. Washburn's writings reveal that, though these projects were attempted and sometimes completed, they were done at a tremendous cost to the populace and that more often than not the improvements were not well planned or completed and did not always amount to a real benefit to the society. In his early years, for example, his business instincts made him oppose the huge debts that the government was forced to incur for so little benefit to build the new railroads. 30 Washburn noted that most of these railroad concerns built poorly constructed roads and that their programs seemed to be based upon greed rather than any definite plan of the government. Of this corruption he 191 wrote, "Government officials and English contractors have vied with each other in cheating the stockholders. Inefficiency of management, contradiction of powers, mutual accusations of non-fulfillment of conditions of contract between government and contractors have accompanied every 31 railroad enterprise in Turkey." He concluded that in their early years the railroads were badly managed and brought grief to all— those who invested in them as well as those forced to use them. As in the case of the railroads, Washburn’s views in regard to the government's extensive road building program were also colored by what he felt to be gross mismanagement. While he should have been more charitable in his comments on the■road making plans that were undertaken, he concentrated instead upon corruptness and inefficiency. To Washburn's thought the roads simply offered the many greedy officials another opportunity to bleed the inhabitants along the route of the new surface. So harsh was the taxation and the forced labor system imposed, he noted that in case after case the people involved ended up hating the idea of road construction and angry at the government's plans rather than grateful to it for its efforts. In 1868 he reported that it had taken nineteen years to complete a road from Gemlik to Bursa though it was only twenty-four miles long. Each year the whole province was taxed enough to pay for the construc- 32 tion of the entire road. Another example he reported was 192 of a road made from Nicomedia to Adabazar; it was planned to be completely macademized with a culvert-supported surface over its entire distance. After Washburn had had an occa sion to use the road he reported his journey as follows: It has ten culverts, or small bridges broken down, sunk in the mud, and they have been in this state for six months without an effort at repair. The province through which it passed was exhausted by terrible extractions for three successive years in building the road and now if one attempts to use it he is driven into the mud just where he most needs a firm road. The old route was passable after a fashion until the new one cut it in two at various points and having deep ditches a carriage cannot pass. They now have fragments of two roads and no road at all.33 Washburn also wrote of Abdul Hamid's attempts to build roads. He recognized this time that the Sultan was inter ested in improving the communication system of the Empire and had issued orders detailing an intensive road system. In some cases the roads were completed, but he also noted that the same evil— oppressive officials who overtaxed the people— still existed. Furthermore, he pointed out that while the roads may have been completed, more often than not they were not maintained so that once fine roads soon went . 34 to ruin. Modernization and reform in industry also received much of Washburn's attention during his early years in the Empire. Once again though in his early reports, the reader uncovers Washburn's bias in his interpretation of the things needed to be accomplished. He observed that the country had great natural resource deposits and that there were mines 193 for copper, silver, iron, lead, and meershaum in existence, but that they were all run on an unprofitable basis. To him the logical answer to the problem was to open these mines to anyone who would work them, and this naturally meant allowing in foreign concessions. The dichotomy is that while Washburn realized that the government was already suffering from its many concessions given to foreigners in the way of loans, he felt only foreign technology and expertise could develop industrial and commercial produc tions to strengthen the economic vitality of the Empire. In so doing he failed to account for the Turks' fear of increasing foreign intervention. It seemed at this time to the Ottoman Government that its gains from this foreign assistance might make the "cure" more deadly than the "disease." 35 But to Washburn this reticence was not justi fiable and was holding up the progress of the Empire. He believed that foreign enterprise carefully admitted and regulated, something the government needed to learn to do, would aid both the foreigner and the Turk to reap a profit. Unfortunately, Washburn's works are lacking in information on industrial progress; instead, he most often noted that "... the industry of the country is not increasing. In the interior with some few exceptions, poverty and taxation are increasing together, almost the only things that really flourish in Turkey. While Washburn may never have reported much on Ottoman industry and its development, he did devote much time to its 194 agricultural potential and growth. Perhaps this stemmed in part from his interest in the people and from his numerous connections with the missionaries and diplomats stationed in the interior where most of this work was accomplished. In either case he often reported the changes which occurred in agriculture and the government's attempts to increase production. During the ravages of the locusts in 18 64 he noted that the government had begun a unique program of hiring people to destroy locusts. In exchange for one oke of locusts turned in the government would grant an oke of wheat. "The official accounts show that last year more than ten million pounds of these locusts were thus destroyed." 37 During the 1860's the introduction of cotton into Turkey provided a huge increase in agricultural prosperity. While the Civil War in the United States temporarily halted the formerly lucrative market for the Americans, this enter prise soon was firmly established in the southern portion of Turkey. In 1864 in the district of Adana alone, more than 300,000 bales of good quality cotton were exported and Washburn noted "the whole population of Southern Asia Minor is going mad on the subject [of cotton] . " 38 The introduc tion and cultivation of this cash crop of "white gold" rapidly transformed these regions into potentially enormous yield areas. Washburn once wrote of the Ottoman Empire's grain producing capacity that "at almost any time of the day I can count at least a dozen well-laden ships passing down 195 under sail by my windows. I have seen seventy-five at 39 once." Perhaps it was this conviction of his that agri culture could make such a valuable contribution to the prosperity of the society that prompted him to take such a strong stand against what he felt was governmental inactivity in this area. He realized that its growth would never continue unless the government halted the rising anarchy and brigandage throughout the interior. He once reported that no one could be certain his investment would be protected; several well-equipped and profitable farms had been abandoned by their owners specifically because of continual harassment by brigands. ^ 0 He also lamented the government's inability to aid its farmers in times of natural disasters. Once in 1874 fol lowing a severe snowstorm that lasted over two weeks, conditions were such that wolves from the Balkans came into Constantinople. Due to the severity of the storm and the herds of wolves no meat could be shipped into the city from the interior. Prices soon doubled in the space of a few weeks, yet Washburn pointed out that the Ministry of the Interior of European and Asiatic Turkey in situations like these did nothing to aid the problem while the people suffered.^ The most difficult situation for Washburn to accept was the callousness of the government towards the people in Asia Minor. While a recent historian may comment favorably 196 on the success of the Ottomans in weathering the diffi culties of the 1860's and 70's, Washburn reported the suffering and famines which yearly occurred in these areas among Turks and Christians alike. In 1875 he wrote: ... The Turkish government is doing almost nothing and what is more is trying to show that there is no famine. But for the American missionaries and two or three English merchants— I have no doubt that at least 250,000 people would have died of hunger this winter as more than half that number did last year. More than fcl0,000 sterling has been raised in Great Britain, Scotland, especially Switzerland and America ... Nearly all this sum has been sent to the American missionaries, who have left all their work to care for the starving. At this time, however, it must be considered that the Otto man Government's foremost priority lay in protecting its very existence and it felt that the danger to its people from invasion was far greater than from starvation. This attitude only served to anger Washburn further and when he learned that the government had purchased 800,000 rifles from the Providence Tool Company instead of spending the money for aid to its interior populations, he wrote, "The Turks have plenty of money for guns and ironclads but none 43 to help their starving subjects in Asia Minor." Neither did this picture of confusion and starvation in the interior change readily after Abdul Hamid first took over. Washburn received continual accounts from the interior on the suffer ings of the Turks and Christians. It particularly aggravated him to see these injustices. He mentioned, for example, that the government spent $40,000 a day to give free bread 197 to the poor in Constantinople, a potential revolution- producing area. Yet at this same time the government did nothing to aid the interior, though the entire population was suffering from the same conditions. Despite these hard times the people, especially those of the interior, had been crushed by unbearable taxation. "Everywhere there is greater oppression, heavier taxation, more misrule and less pro tection than ever before and everywhere people are starving. 1,44 In the latter years of Abdul Hamid's reign Washburn noted, however, that conditions were improving. He was especially heartened by the fact that the Sultan was attempting to halt the brigandage which sponsored so much of the anarchy in the interior. 45 He felt real progress had been made in the development of agriculture and commerce and that, in addition to the increase in land under culti vation, there was a marked rise in exports helping to improve the overall posture of the economy.4^ He also kept his readers aware of the suffering of the people due to natural disasters, particularly Constan tinople^ susceptibility to fire. In 1865 there was a disastrous fire that swept through miles of the city's poorer quarters and he reported that the only thing that saved the city was the mercy of nature, for when the wind shifted the fire gradually burned itself out. At this time he wrote: ... the whole fire department of Constantinople is almost worse than nothing. Their engines are mere 198 squirt guns or rather small garden engines and the supply of water is utterly inadequate. This fire was stopped by pulling down buildings, and in all large fires this is the only alternative. It is to be hoped that this awful calamity will arouse the Turks to do something better in the future.47 Though the government talked of establishing commissions to regulate the rebuilding of the city and to design homes other than wooden structures, nothing was done and fires again visited the city in destructive capacities. In 1870 Washburn wrote: The most terrible fire ever known in this city of fires broke out Sunday PM in Pera and burned until Mon. AM consuming over 8,000 houses— valued with their contents at some $40 million and destroying the lives of more than 1 , 0 0 0 persons— the whole city is paralyzed ... At least 75,000 persons are homeless....4* This time Washburn reported that the government did reform and carefully laid out the burned districts on a completely 49 new pattern before allowing anyone permits to build. Unlike the government's inability to act quickly concerning the danger of fires, Washburn felt that in the case of cholera the government was actively attempting to remedy the situations. In July, 1865, when the threat of a cholera epidemic loomed over the city, he wrote that "the Authorities are taking all sorts of precautions against it, some of them very necessary and others very absurd. Immense quantities of fruits and vegetables of all kinds are seized 50 every day and thrown into the sea— good and bad together." Actually Washburn wrote very sympathetically about the 199 government's efforts. He described in detail its actions to thoroughly cleanse the city, appoint physicians with free medicine to all quarters to serve in free cholera hospitals opened due to the epidemic. He added "the government has displayed more energy and spirit at this crisis than it ever did before on anything. No money has been spared; no time has been lost in taking every conceivable precaution." 51 Even despite these valiant efforts there were more than one hundred thousand cases of cholera in the city which had changed during this period from a busy mart of trade to a 52 city of dead or dying. Washburn's own family fell victim to cholera as his youngest son passed away in the height of the sickness. Perhaps this is what spurred him on to aid others. He wrote a great deal about this crisis and the extent of the damage: I took pains after it was over to investigate, as well as I could, the number of deaths in several quarters and I am satisfied that in the whole city there could not have been less than 70,000. After the epidemic about 700 houses were found to be without owners ... When the cholera appeared at a house, families left their sick to their fate and fled. In Therapia at one time dead bodies were found in some 40 deserted h o m e s . 53 While cholera epidemics returned to the city several times in later years, Washburn noted that they were not as severe as in times past. The Turkish doctors and government attempted to utilize modern medical principles and in this they were fairly successful. By the latter part of the century they had developed a strict system of quarantine 200 regulations and most often succeeded in isolating the ill nesses. As a matter of fact, the quarantines were so strict in later years Washburn several times found himself moored, neither able to get in or out of the city. 54 What makes it so especially difficult to trace Wash burn's feelings on reform and modernization is that he himself appears to have been confused on the issue. He was first and foremost a Christian and a western-oriented individual and, as such, was quick to point out what he saw to be flaws in Ottoman management that were halting future growth. At first his patience in understanding the Turks faltered. On the other hand, he later became broadminded enough to realize that the Empire was a Turkish one and that it could never be reformed or modernized along the line of Christian thought. After his retirement from the Ottoman Empire he reflected and commented that he knew individual Turks and Christians who were intelligent and patriotic who deeply wanted to transform their government and enlighten their people. At this time Washburn concluded that the Empire should be criticized only on the grounds that the government had not been wise or just. He realized that there was very little truth in the observation that the Turk had changed little, adding that he had been changed and modified by the circumstances in which he had been placed. "There is probably no more important city in the world ... which had been so radically changed during the last fifty 201 years as the capitol of the Turkish Empire. The dress, the customs, the people, the government, have all been trails- 55 formed ..." And, in a sense, Washburn too had been transformed from his early opinions on reform and moderni zation. 202 NOTES TO CHAPTER VII ^"George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 196. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 65. 4 George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question, 1100-1900. p. 99. 5 New York Tribune, August 7, 1866, p. 3. ’ibid. > New York Tribune, November 23, 1868, p. 2 . !New York Tribune, October 4, 1866, p. 1 • 'ibid. 'New York Tribune, December 30, 1870, p. 2 . Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, October 12, 1875, ATRC; see also letter from Washburn to Robert, February 22, 1876, ATRC. 12 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900. pp. 41-42; see also Letter from Washburn to his mother, Mrs. E. H. Washburn, May 13, 1876, CHPHLA. 13 Our Own Correspondent, "The Situation in Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 18, October 30, 1878, p. 354. 14 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 35, July, 1879, p. 753. 15Ibid., p. 754. 203 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 36, October, 1879, p. 339? see also An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey, *' loc. cit ■, Vol. 35, p. 748. 17For more detailed information on the Ottoman Public Debt Association refer to: Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 453. Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East, pp. 327-328 and Donald C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, New York, Columbia University Press, 1929. 18 New York Daily Tribune. March 5, 1864, p. 4. ^ New York Tribune, October 16, 1866, p. 2. 20 New York Tribune. August 1, 1868, p. 1. 2 1 Ibid. 22 An Eastern Statesman, "Life in Constantinople Fifty Years Ago," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 36, December, 1879, pp. 613-614. 23 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, November 18, 1875, ATRC? see also An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 35, p. 749; also New York Tribune. May 25, 1867, p. 1 . 24 An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Govern ment do for Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 37, June, 1880,pp* 896-897; see also George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, pp. 71-72; also Letter from Washburn to Mr. Vermilye, May 5, 1879 ATRC. 25 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 37, February, 1880, p. 339. Our Own Correspondent, "Terrible Conditions of Asiatic Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 21, May 5, 1880, p. 413; see also An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary 204 Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit.. Vol. 36, p. 340; also, George Washburn, "By Rail to Constantinople," The Independent, Vol. 40, October 11, 1888, pp. 2-3. 27 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 339. 28 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 102; see also An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul- Hamid," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 67, January 1895, p. 50. 29 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, pp. 102-103; see also, ______"The Sultan and the Powers," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 71, May, 1897, p. 624. 30 In one article written for the New York Daily Tribune, April 2, 1864, Washburn noted that the government had just negotiated a foreign loan of $1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . 0 0 at 6 8 percent interest for the nominal purpose of building a railroad. 31 New York Tribune. August 1, 1868, p. 1; see also New York Tribune, January 2, 1869,p. 2. 32 New York Tribune, August 1, 1869, p. 1. 33 New York Tribune, January 2, 1869, p. 2. 34 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, pp. 103-104; see also An Eastern Resident,"Sultan Abd-ul- Hamid," loc. cit.. Vol. 67, p. 50. 35 New York Tribune, August 19, 1867, p. 2; see also New York Tribune. November 28, 1868, p. 1; also, An Eastern Statesman," Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 341. 36 New York Tribune. May 7, 1869, p. 1. 205 37 New York Tribune, July 14, 1864, p. 7. 38 Ibid. 39 New York Tribune, November 17, 1866, p. 1. 4.0New York Tribune, November 23, 1868, p. 2. 41Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, February 2, 1874, ATRC; see also, Letter from Washburn to Robert, February 13, March 11, 1874 and March 29, 1875, ATRC. 42 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, February 15, 1875, ATRC. ^3Letter from Washburn to his son, George Hamlin Washburn, February 11, 1875, CHPHLA; see also, letter from Washburn to his father, Mr. P. H. Washburn, May 12, 1875, CHPHLA. 44Our Own Correspondent, "Terrjble Condition of Asiatic Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 21, pp. 413-414; see also, Letter from Washburn to his father, Mr. P. H. Washburn, May 15, 1880, CHPHLA; also, letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, April 12, 1880 ACA; also letter from Washburn to his son George H. Washburn, April 28, 1880, ACA; also letter from Washburn to his father, Mr. P. H. Washburn, April 21, 1879, CHPHLA. 45 An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 53, April, 1888, pp. 622—623. 46 An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," The Contemporary Review. Vol. 67, January, 1895, p. 51. 47 New York Tribune, March 30, 1865, p. 8 ; see also George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900. p. 27. 48 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, June 8, 1870, ATRC. Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, June 30, 1870, ATRC. 50 Letter from Washburn to his mother, Mrs. E. H. Washburn, July 20, 1865, CHPHLA. 51 New York Tribune, August 25, 1865, p. 8 . 52 New York Tribune, September 18, 1865, p. 8 . 53 George Washburn, Robert College. 1865"1900, p. see also, New York Tribune, September 18, 1865, p. 8 . 54George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 231. ^ A n Eastern Statesman, "Life in Constantinople Fifty Years Ago," loc. cit., Vol. 36, p. 601. CHAPTER VIII THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1859-1903 There were schools of theology, but, otherwise education was un known. The highest officials were often unable to read and write their own language.1 So far as decrees could go, he (Sul tan Abdul Hamid) accomplished his object. Schools were established, buildings erected, students col lected and teachers appointed not only in Constantinople, but in the provinces.2 The role of education in the process of modernization cannot be emphasized strongly enough; it is the schools which induct youth into the changes of society and also train them to help improve it. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire's educational system underwent a complete transformation. Modern historians have analyzed and dissected these changes in great detail as to the actual formation of a Ministry of Education as well as to the philo sophical and ideological changes in the role of education in 3 Ottoman society. These various authors illustrate first of all how the educational system was transformed from a three pronged division of the mekteb, the medrese, and the Enderun Mektebi, (the Palace School) each with specific clientele and specific purposes, to one more nearly suitable for the 207 208 4 entire society. They have shown the chronological and philosophical developments of the educational movement in the Empire which changed it from an extensively conserva tive function to one which would inspire the necessary in novations to enable the Empire to enter and compete in the modern world. George Washburn occupies a special place with these modern historians in that he lived in the Empire precisely during the times these changes were being carried out. Also Washburn's primary responsibility during these years was to guide Robert College in developing a radical educational alternative for the students of the Empire. While it is apparent that much of Washburn's writings lack detail con cerning the many educational reforms and are often slanted toward an overemphasis of the importance of Robert College, they are most useful as a general observation of the growth of education and the regulations broadcast by the various education reform ministries. While tracing Robert College's growth and development through the stormy years of change, one can find a different viewpoint as to the extent and nature of the well-publicized reforms modern historians have so vividly described. At the time Robert College was envisioned by its first president, Cyrus Hamlin, French influence reigned supreme in the Ottoman Empire. The most modern schools were those under the influence of the French Jesuit missionaries who were 209 none too anxious to see their power usurped by a former Protestant missionary now aglow with non-sectarian educa tional ideas. Though Robert College had already purchased a plot of land, for nearly seven years from 1861-1869 political intrigue was sufficient to halt any permission to allow it to build. Washburn himself later reviewed these difficulties and asserted that "it was doubtless done through French influence started by Mr. Rone, the head of the 5 French College." It was during these early years of the 1860's that educational reforms were beginning to take hold in the Empire. The fight to establish Robert College as an institution free from political or religious influ ences was merely the first seed of educational liberalism being sown, for in the fight for buildings and a charter, attention was focused on education itself. Washburn later wrote, "There were scores of Turks who were educated by the influence of the college before any Turks ever came into g the college as a scholar." When Robert College finally did formally open its doors it offered a uniquely different concept of education to the public. Most Turkish schools in existence at this time were either primary or theological and most other Christian schools were under missionary influence— that is, they placed little importance on purely academic work. Robert College, on the other hand, though Christian in moral character, concentrated its efforts on the scholastic rather 210 7 than the theological. In line with the recent developments made by Robert College's foundation and the opening of the French influenced Galata Saray Lise, the Ottoman Government, in 18 69 passed a comprehensive law, the Maarifi Umumiye o g Nizamnamesi (Regulations for General Education). Among other things this law emphasized the need for the reorgan ization of all education, for compulsory primary schools, for increasing types of higher education, and education for women as well as men. While Washburn agreed that the reform was needed since he felt that Christian populations at the time generally had more schools and textbooks than Turks, he was skeptical of the chances for the new reforms to take root. He pointed out that despite the fact that some of the leaders in the new ministry, Ahmet Vefik for example, were intelligent and dedicated workers, the people were not prepared for such a gigantic step. Furthermore, local authorities, keys to instituting many of the ideas in this reform, "were not sufficiently (intelligent) or loyal g to put them into operation." While the 1869 reform law did not modernize the edu cation of the Empire as it was originally intended, Wash burn noted that it did begin the momentum for greater reform later. In his report to the Trustees of the College in 1873 he commented that the state of Turkish education, though improving, was suffering from a lack of clear-cut guidance and direction. "Perhaps...they are making progress; but it 211 is very slow and everything about their institutions suffers from the constant changes which take place in the govern ment. " ^ 0 A specific case in point was the formation of the celebrated Galata Saray Lise in 1868. This school, estab lished after Sultan Abdul Aziz returned from Paris, repre sented the zenith of French influence in the Empire since it was patterned after French models and staffed mainly with French instructors. This school was also a notable triumph for the Ottoman modernizers led by Fuad and Ali Pashas since it was hoped it would be merely the first of many more schools to follow. Unfortunately, while the first few years of the school were notable, it receded in importance as French influence declined and the school's former supporters died or passed from political spheres of influence. By 1873 Washburn wrote to his Board of Direc tors that this institution which had cost the Ottoman Government L20,000 annually to run had ceased to be of 11 importance and was to be merged with other Turkish schools. Actually Washburn's comment here should be taken more as a public relations statement issued to the Board of Directors of Robert College in his Annual Report. It is true that in 1873, Galatasaray Lise, which was originally under heavy French influence, was undergoing changes and was in the process of moving to different quarters, but it is completely wrong to follow Washburn's line of reasoning and to assume that the school had ceased to be of importance. 212 It must be remembered that at this time Robert College was in direct competition with Galatasaray Lise for Turk ish Moslem students. By this time it was safe to say that Washburn realized he had lost the race for these students to Galatasaray and perhaps he was using the temporary set back of Galatasaray and the decline of French influence to soften this blow for his Board of Directors. In either case it should be realized that Galatasaray soon recovered and prospered though it had its ups and downs in later years. In 1876 its original French Director, DeSalve, re turned to his homeland and during the Hamidian period the institution became more Turkish in character. Latin was dropped from the curriculum and the proportion of Turkish students rapidly increased. It soon became the favorite place of education for the sons of the ruling classes. Kazamias states that a breakdown of a random sample of the graduates of the Galatasaray Lise showed that until the opening decades of the twentieth century the majority of them (60-70%) entered careers in the military, diplomatic and civil bureaucracies. It was not until the early part of the nineteen thirties that Robert College's Turkish Moslem student body reached a majority; by this time Robert College had also become a preferred school for the sons of many influential Turks and it too produced numerous offic ials. 213 Though this decline of the Galata Saray Lise, Robert College's closest educational competitor, must have pleased Washburn somewhat, he did realize that the College had a responsibility to work with the government and its various regulations and, more importantly, to maintain the respect 12 of the communities surrounding it. Accordingly, Wash burn and all officials of the college were careful to be cordial to all who inquired of its existence? while many of these visits were by officials of the government sent to check that the college was following regulations, there were pleasant occasions too. Once in 1874 he wrote Mr. Robert of a visit by a class of students from a newly established Turkish school to watch a demonstration in electricity and optics. The Turkish pasha and his students were enter tained for half the day and Washburn made a note of the occasion that "everything of this sort adds to our reputa- 13 tion and prestige." while Washburn may have been pleased at the progress made by the college during its early years and gratified by an occasional admiration expressed by an influential Turk of its educational system, he realized that it was not attracting Turkish students. It was clear that as long as the college persisted in offering a short class weekly in non-denominational religious instruction along with its scholastic courses, no Turk would ever attend and the college's real aid to the modernization movement would have to come by serving as an example. 214 Actually the college, like nearly all other foreign and Christian institutions, had experienced several diffi cult times in its dealings with the government. Especially during the revolutions of 1876 did Robert College undergo severe trials. It was during this time that the idea of educating a people who were not necessarily Moslem or even of the ruling Turkish class came under most severe fire for the Empire itself was under fire. Washburn wrote in the midst of the confusion that "the government is violently opposed to us. They do not mean to have a single Turk in the college and they do what they can to keep out all the Bulgarians.” 14 At this time the Bulgarian students enrolled in Robert College were very nearly in the majority and the college came to be associated quite naturally with the revolution. Several times local Turkish boys, ably backed by their elders, marched through the college grounds in sulting students and attempting to provoke disturbances. In each instance, however, Washburn and his faculty suc ceeded in removing them without occasions of violence. At other times, Washburn reported of the government's at tempts to trick the college administration into committing some error so as to provoke a confrontation to enable them to close the college or damage its reputation. In October, 1876, Washburn wrote of the general situation between the government and the college: "There is no change of feeling that I am aware of. They have hated us and opposed us 215 in every possible way for a dozen years and probably they think no better of us now. There is no evidence that they think any worse of us either— no doubt they respect us more. Washburn's point was that while the Turkish admin istrations were interested in educational reform at the time and while these reforms were described on paper as universal to include all segments of the Ottoman society, in practice they were something else. In its early stages the government attempted to utilize these reforms to strengthen its own national and Moslem elements and to re strict those which it felt to be the more advanced Chris tian and foreign elements. Many historians have pointed to the years of 1876- 78 as the time period when Robert College turned its back on the possibility of extending its influence into Turk ish society. Critics argue that under Washburn's direction the college instead chose actively to support the minor ities ' causes in the Empire and that the college thus was branded as a proving ground for political agitators rather than as a place of leavening for new ideas to permeate Turkish society. Furthermore, they argue it was only the good graces of the Ottomans which prevented the closing of the college and the deportation of its president and professors for conducting activities against the state. As a result, they conclude, no Turkish student entered 216 the college and "its influence on Westernization movements within the Turkish society was to be practically nil." 16 While Washburn readily admitted that the college had limited itself because it had insisted in retaining the principle that its education should be a two-pronged effort, scholastic as well as moral, he disagreed that the college had ever turned against the Ottoman Government or had conspired against the Turks. He pointed out that he and his administrations had respected the laws of the country first and foremost. Secondly, though he admitted that he had been active in assisting political changes in the Empire, he steadfastly denied that the Turkish Govern ment had ever made or had occasion to make a complaint against him for his activities. 17 While the college may have been described as a type of missionary enterprise, those familiar with its work, as the Turkish officials most certainly were, knew that the men who taught there "for swear any connection with religious propaganda and devote themselves exclusively to their education." 18 Washburn wrote that the American Minister to the Porte reported to him a conversation with the Grand Vizir about American missionary efforts. The Vizir had complained bitterly about the missionaries and their never-ending criticisms of the Turks. When reminded that Robert College, also a Christian institution, had counselled its students to be loyal to the Sultan and the government, the Vizir had 217 replied, "Oh yes...that was Robert College. That is alto- gether different...Robert College is alright..." 19 Wash burn was also informed during the crisis year of 1876 by British Ambassador Layard that in his personal conversations with the Sultan and the Grand Vizir he had been repeatedly assured that neither the college nor any of its students had ever done anything to encourage rebellion in Bulgaria. 20 As a matter of fact, Washburn noticed that during these years of the Bulgarian conflict while most Bulgarians in the city of Constantinople were imprisoned, students and faculty of the college were left unmolested. 21 The reason for this was either the political strength of the United States Government or the confidence of the Turkish Govern ment in the college's work. Since the United States' influence at this time bore little or no weight, one must assume that the government trusted Robert College's educa tion and had nothing to fear from what was being taught. Perhaps part of this confidence was earned by the college's attempts to hew the narrow line of full compliance with government regulations and by its attempts to show respect for government causes. In November, 1876, when the government sent old clothes to its villagers asking that they mend them for its soldiers, Robert College was also included in the request. At this time Mrs. Washburn and Mrs. Long, though both supportive of the Bulgarian Rev olution, mended a lot of clothes. Washburn wrote "These 218 are little things, but I mention them as evidences of our friendly relations with the Turks about us and the fact that while we are deeply sympathetic with the Christians our sympathy does not end there." 22 Later in the year 1877 the government attracted attention to Robert Col lege when it sent a large police force to its graduation ceremonies. As Washburn felt that no more than two or three officers were needed, he concluded that "it was undoubtedly intended more as an honor than as a protec- 23 tion." It might be argued that this action was taken by the government to halt the graduation or show disap proval, but the ceremony was well attended and took place without any incidents. Under the reign of Abdul Hamid, Turkish education received a tremendous increase in attention resulting in the construction of numerous schools and the active recruit ing of teachers and students to fill them. While these new schools were officially to be open to all segments of Ottoman society, regardless of nationality or religion, Washburn noted otherwise. Though the Sultan was increasing educational opportunities among his subjects, the increase was for the Moslem population and most of the time resulted in a hindering of Christian education. To pay for the in creased costs, the government began a rigid taxation of all property holders in Turkey— a most natural solution. However, in addition to the increased taxation, in April, 1888, the 219 government issued another new education law further tighten ing all regulations on non-governmental schools. These two edicts greatly disturbed Washburn since he knew that Chris tians would not or could not attend these new governmental schools despite the fact that they were being taxed to spon sor their development. This, plus the added pressures of the new government regulation, led him to believe that these new laws would close nearly all foreign schools within six months and that they were "intended to be prohibitory and 24 not regulative." These regulations merely seemed to confirm Washburn's suspicions that the government was trying to hold the superior Christian education in check until the Moslems could catch up. By 1888 Washburn and others had concluded that Robert College, at least under the reign of Abdul Hamid, would remain primarily a Christian dominated school. He felt that this was not necessarily the result of the one weekly class in non-denominational religious instruction, but was the direct result of the Sultan's decree prohibiting Turkish boys from attending foreign schools rather than those which he had himself provided for their benefit. This assault on non-Turkish schools, aside from limiting its Turkish students, did not affect Robert College. Unlike other Christian schools it was protected by an Imperial Irade signed by Sultan Abdul Aziz and this decree was generally respected by the Turks. 220 Those schools which were primarily affected by the new regu lations were those suspected of fostering seditious notions against the government and against the Moslem faith— namely the mission schools. Washburn was always most careful "to respect the laws of the country, to keep within our treaty rights and to give the Government no occasion to complain 25 of u s . 11 Later when he learned that the Turkish Government was soon to ask for courses of instruction in the Turkish language and history he accepted the ruling and added "it is reasonable and we have no desire to denationalize our stu- 26 dents and unfit them to be leaders of their own people." While Washburn may have been critical of the injus tices of the Sultan's new educational codes, he was compli mentary of his attempts to improve his educational system. In 1895 he wrote as follows: ...As far as Mohammedan schools are concerned we live in a new era. The Sultan believes in educa tion as a mighty power for the uplifting of his people. He has not only filled Constantinople with schools of every kind known in European capitols, but he has established a regular system throughout the Empire and all real estate is taxed to support them.27 Though most of these early schools were mere shells built on the "unflagging zeal" of the Sultan, their influence was felt all over the country. As a result of the Sultan's backing they stood as the first official schools ready to challenge 28 the supreme authority of the age-old medrese and mekteb. Abdul Hamid sincerely attempted to consult with the highest 221 authorities in Europe and was lavish in his expenditure of money in order that his people should lack nothing possessed by any other nation. While Sultan Abdul Hamid was at first most impressed by education and did more than all other sultans in founding schools, in the latter years of his rule, when the effects of this new era of enlightenment were just beginning to be come apparent, Washburn reported that he began to fear the new schools he had created. The Sultan discovered that as Turkish students began to think for themselves they began to question the basic premises of their society. 29 Thus, rather than serve as bridges to close the technological gaps between Europe and Turkish culture, these schools soon be came centers of dissatisfaction with the inadequacies of government and with the lack of opportunity in the Empire. Though the Sultan clamped down harshly against all the new dissidents {sometimes taking scores of liberal students at a time out of schools and imprisoning, exiling, or execut ing them), he found it impossible to stop the new trend he had begun. 30 In addition to the youth Washburn noted further more that many wealthy and influential Turkish families no longer were satisfied with traditional methods of education and that these individuals, despite the orders of the Sultan, continued either to send their children to foreign schools or to employ tutors to educate their children. « 222 The point Washburn makes is that, though the newly- founded Turkish schools never reached their full potential under the reign of Abdul Hamid, their creator, they, along with other educational forces, paved the way for the tremendous progress that was soon to follow. Not only did the new officers, doctors, and government workers demand more liberties, they began successfully to tackle many of the problems which had been crippling the Empire for years. A rising sense of pure Turkish nationalism spread through out the newly educated classes of the land. 223 NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII ■^George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinpole. p. xvi. 2 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 105. 3 A partial list of some of these works would include: (1) Osman, Ergin, Turkiye Maarif Tarihi (History of Turkish Education), Vol. 1-5, Istanbul: Osmanbey Matbaasi, 1939- 1943; (2) Andreas Kazamias, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966 (see especially pp. 1-114; (3) Niyazi Berkes, The Devel opment of Secularism in Turkey, Montreal, McGill University Press, 1964; (4) Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London: Oxford University Press, 1961; (5) D. A. Rustow and Robert E. Ward, eds. Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964; (6 ) Roderic Davison, Reform of the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. (7) Sherif Mardin, The Genesis of Youncr Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. ^A description of the three major schools is as follows: (1) Generally speaking, the basic MEKTEB schools were attached to the mosques and instruction was essentially limited to learning the Koran. This education was not the responsibility of the State but was run by local religious authorities and performed for most, a terminal type of education. (2) The MEDRESE was also attached to a mosque and provided a more advanced religious instruction which included such subjects as grammar, syntax, logic, rhetoric, metaphysics, geometry and arithmetic. It trained the teachers and all the Ulema of Ottoman society. (3) The ENDERUN MEKTEBI (Palace School) was attached to the Palace and run by the Sublime Porte. Its aim was to train the most talented children of the Empire for leadership positions in the Ottoman body politic either in a military capacity or as administrators in the Sublime Porte or Provinces of the Empire. It represented the acme of the educational system, in that only the finest students were ever allowed to enter. For more details on the above, see Kazamias, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey, pp. 25-42. 224 ^New York Tribune, November 23, 1869, p. 2. George Washburn, Unpublished lecture on Robert College and the Turks, c 1908, ACA. 7 ______, Robert College, Constantinople: Its Work and Its Needs, Printed pamphlet published by the Gillis Press, 1904, p. 9. Q Andreas Kazamias, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey, p. 63. ^New York Tribune, May 7, 1869, p. 1; see also New York Tribune. January 2, 1869, p. 2. While Washburn used the word intelligent in his article, the author feels a better choice would have been "sufficiently trained." Whether Washburn himself meant to imply lack of intelligence or lack of training is not clear. ^°George Washburn, Report of the Director of Robert College to the Trustees, May 28, 1873, ATRC. •^Ibid.; see also letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, November 10, 1875. ATRC. For more information on the Galatasaray Lise, see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 122-123, 182 and Andreas Kazamias, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey, pp. 85, 103. 12 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, April 1, 1873, ATRC. ■^Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, May 28, 1874, ATRC. ■^Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, March 6 , 1876, ATRC. 15 Letter from, Washburn to Christopher Robert, October 2, 1876, ATRC; see also letter from Washburn to Robert, May 22, 1876 and November 10, 1875, ATRC. 1 6 Keith Greenwood, Robert College. The American Founders, unpublished doctoral dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1965, pp. 266-267. 225 17 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 100; see also, ibid., p. 151. 1 0 °Evelyn Schuyler Schaeffer, Eugene Schuyler: A Memoir. New York: Scribners, 1901, p. 64. 19George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 227. 20 Ibid.., p. 122. 21 George Washburn, Robert College, 1S65-1900, p. 71. 22 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, November 16, 1876, ATRC. 23 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, July 21, 1877, ATRC. 24 An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 53, April, 1888, p. 622; see also, ibid.., p. 621; also, George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 104. 25 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 106; see also, Letter from Washburn to Dr. Coe, February 14, 1888, ATRC; also, George Washburn, Fifty Years in Con stantinople, pp. 180, 299. 26 George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 223. 27 An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 67, January 1895, pp. 51-52; see also, George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 104. 2ft George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900. p. 104; see also. An Eastern Resident, "Sultan-Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit., Vol. 67, p. 52. 29 Ibid.., p. 105; see also, ibid., p. 106. 30 George Washburn, Lecture on Robert College and the Turks. NP, ND, pp. 18-19; see also George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, pp. 105-106. CHAPTER IX SULTANS AND OTHER PROMINENT TURKISH STATESMEN, 1859-1903 During Washburn's stay in the Empire, no fewer than four Sultans and scores of other high ranking ministers held public office while attempting to govern the Empire. It is natural then for the historian to be interested in any spec ific thoughts of Washburn's on the many personalities with whom he had occasion to associate, either personally or via other contacts. This chapter's study will touch upon the lives and personalities of Sultans Abdul Medjid, Abdul Aziz, Murad V, and Abdul Hamid, and four other high officials dur ing the same period— Fuad, Ali, Midhat, and Ahmet Vefik Pashas. While it is true that during his early years in the Empire (1858-1865) Washburn lacked the needed knowledge, ex perience and insight to report accurately or, for that matter, to recognize and evaluate the varied characteristics of these rulers and official Ottoman servants, in his later years he was capable of grasping confusing situations and outlining strengths and weaknesses of the various person alities as he daily saw them. Though at times his criticisms of these individuals seem to be excessively stern, he is 226 227 also just and remarkably kind. Long before Abdul Medjid assumed the throne, several important changes had taken place in the nature of rule in the Ottoman Empire. The most important of these Washburn noted occurred during the reign of Mahraoud, immediately prior to Abdul Medjid. It was at this time that the Sultan made a decision to call upon European intervention to save his throne from the interference of his enemies, Moslem as well as Christian. Though the dynasty and throne of the Ottomans was saved, by the time Abdul Medjid assumed the throne Wash burn noted the fact that "it was by the favor and under the protection of Europe and from that day Turkey ceased to be l the Old Empire of the Ottoman Turks." Washburn along with many historians had realized that despite the fact that in 1856 in the Treaty of Paris the Ottoman Empire had been formally recognized as a European state with her integrity guaranteed, she was to remain weak and under the influence of the major Powers. In part this Ottoman weakness stemmed from Abdul Medjid who was "feeble in mind and body and the government was in the hands of his ministers ... who recog nize the necessity of at least appearing to yield to the 2 influence of England and France." Thus under the reign of Abdul Medjid there was a new era of open door policy estab lished in the Ottoman Empire and, at least in conversation, reform was the most popular topic of the day. 228 Abdul Aziz, a man of totally different character, became Sultan at the death of Abdul Medjid in June, 1861. Unlike his weak but well-intentioned brother, Abdul Aziz was described by Washburn as strong-willed and a genuine Turk of the old school, determined to take control of the Empire. Washburn was later to write, "Whatever else might be said of it [his rule of the Empire] it was no longer weak. It soon became a strong government, whether for good or 3 evil." Fot years prior to his ascension to the throne, Abdul Aziz had been held captive in his mother's house and had associated only with dervishes and exegetes of the Koran. Thus when he assumed command he had been given lit tle training but was filled with the high hopes of restor- 4 ing dignity to the Empire again. Though he attempted to dissolve his brother's costly harem and restrict the court, he found that the entire capital was tied to these expend itures and he was gradually pushed into accepting the same evils. Much has been written concerning the feeble mindedness of Abdul Aziz and his eccentricity. While Washburn wrote that he had never met the Sultan personally, he commented that he had received illustrations from acquaintances who regularly dealt with the Sultan and found his behavior puzzling. One such example occurred when Washburn was in formed by Edward Joy Morris, the American Minister, of a 229 meeting he and his officers were given by the Sultan, Wash burn wrote: The Sultan received them in a pair of soiled white pants and with hands that were not by any means as clean as they could have been made by the use of soap. He listened gloomily to a short speech from Mr. Morris and then apparent ly forgot that any reply was needed until re minded of it by the dragoman of the Porte who was present. He then mumbled a few words ... and then waved them out. This was compared to some others a brilliant reception and the half crazy Padishah was as cordial as could have been expected.^ While the Sultan's behavior may have been somewhat ir regular to men like Washburn, his attention to a series of frivolous pleasures was normal for royalty, and was often noted by Washburn in his columns. He took up the amusement of horseracing and spent a great deal of time in this en deavor. No other Turks seemed to have been too keen in the sport, though, as Washburn wrote "The winning horse at each of the principle races belonged to the Sultan himself and won the race according to instructions."^ Washburn also described the Sultan's fondness for cock fighting, relating that he decorated a successful cock with the first class of the Order of the Medjidie. He was also fond of constructing grand palaces and once had an aviary built for him at the cost of a quarter of a million dollars. On another occasion he spent L40,000 for a circumcision party for nearly twelve thousand Moslem families at a time when it was doubtful that 230 the government could even afford the interest on its acquired 7 debt. These indicated to Washburn that perhaps the Sultan was wiser than his critics believed him to be, for by spon soring these grand fetes the people became more quiet and contented. Though Washburn was often cynical at the opulence and disgraceful waste of Abdul Aziz, he did credit him with at tempting to maintain a responsible ministry and trying to en act some reforms. Foremost among his ministers were Fuad and Ali Pashas whom Washburn later described as "sincere re formers as they understood reform and they recognized the right of the European Powers to watch over their interests O of the Christian populations." Mostly, however, Washburn criticized these two reformers for he could never forgive them for drastically increasing the foreign debt and for en couraging Abdul Aziz in his wasteful extravagance. While he credited them with being shrewd politicians responsible for temporarily saving the Empire, he concluded "They were not statesmen. Their only policy was to live from day to day and Q trust the future to Kismet [fate]." In his early years as a missionary when he helped Robert College, Washburn regularly came into contact with Ali Pasha. While at first he mistakenly believed Ali to be fanatical, by 1867 he recognized the fact that the Pasha was if anything judicious and understanding in attempting to aid in the settlement of Robert College's claims. 231 With Fuad Pasha, however, Washburn was not as charit able for he felt that the Pasha was motivated in far too many instances by personal greed. As he was a favorite of the Sultan, he continually received gifts; once Washburn noted that he was given a portrait from the Sultan that was set in diamonds and worth L17,000 sterling. 11 Later in 1865, following the destruction of his home by fire, Fuad was given two houses completely furnished as well as an allow ance of five hundred pounds a month. "Who wouldn't be the Grand Vizier of a Sultan whose purse had no bottom and whose mind had no balance." 12 Washburn came to believe that al though Fuad had many fine ideas for reform, he had become greedy in his later years and could be approached only by bribery. Perhaps this was a normal way of functioning in the Ottoman ruling establishment at the time. To Washburn, who had close ties to the missionary communities, it must have appeared callous and immoral. When he reviewed Fuad Pasha's many reforms of the Treasury he came to the conclusion that they had done little immediate good for the Empire. 13 Furthermore, he believed many of Fuad's ideas for centralization to be failures. In 1866 he reviewed the failure of the vilayet system as pro posed by Fuad and noted, "We are to return to the old system of Pashaliks— everything coming up for final decision to 14 Constantinople." To Washburn, however, Fuad Pasha was a 232 useful minister for the reform of the Empire. He recognized the Pasha as a man of the new school who was familiar with European ways and who aided the Empire. "He is not a great statesman but he has few equals in diplomatic intrigue ... His great effort ... will be to conciliate Europe ... to raise money and to keep the Empire alive ..." 15 Though he did not approve of the two men personally, he did recognize that through their efforts the conditions of most of the people— Moslem as well as Christian— had improved, and that there was more respect for individual rights and even more order in government. While Washburn most often deprecated the efforts of Sultan Abdul Aziz, he did credit him with the establishment of a genuinely modern army and navy and with trying to bring these up to European standards. In 1864 he wrote that every day the Sultan was to be seen at the cannon foundry or at the navy yard personally inspecting the work in progress. 16 But here again Washburn criticized the Sultan because al though the army and navy were furnished with modern equipment at great cost to the Treasury, the administration of these forces was most often very corrupt and the officers lacked proper instruction. 17 By 1876, after nearly fifteen years of continued mis management of the Empire's funds, the discontent of the people and the anger of the leading Pashas could be contained 233 no longer. On May 31 Washburn reported the deposition of the Sultan by these dissident elements. They surrounded his palace with four thousand troops and reportedly demanded his abdication. He threatened, cried, wept, tried to bribe— finally offered to abdicate in favor of his son— finally they told him the people had sur rounded his palace to murder him and that his only safety was to escape to an ironclad lying before the palace. He went at once ... Later in the day he was taken to a place of confine ment at.Seraglio Point with his immediate family. A short time later Abdul Aziz was found dead. Although the official investigating committee labelled the cause of his death a suicide as the result of self-inflicted wounds from the opening of the artery of the arm, Washburn disagreed. He pointed out that many of the officials of the government, though unhappy with conditions in the Empire, had disapproved of the "underhanded intrigue" used to depose the Sultan. These men he pointed out would probably have been willing to accept the Sultan back. While he admitted that the Sultan was a man subject to fits of violent passion amounting to near insanity, he believed his death was the result of murder. Washburn continued, "There was a strong reaction among the Turks in favor of Abdul Aziz and I have good reason to believe that had he lived a few weeks longer he would have been Sul- tan again." 19 The conspirators realized that had Abdul Aziz ever reached the throne again it would have meant cer tain death for them. 234 The individual who replaced Abdul Aziz was Murad V, the eldest son of Abdul Medjid# who was described once by Washburn as a "dissipated, stupid, good-natured man ... not unlike his father." Washburn sympathized with the fate of this poor Sultan for since childhood he had been a pawn in the hands of Ottoman politics. Though he had travelled with his uncle to Europe, for the most part he was not allowed to do anything but destroy himself. With his brothers he was kept in a sort of confinement allowed to do little other than drink and enjoy the desultory pleasures of his quarters in the palace. 20 ..Thus when he was placed upon the throne he had been given little or no education or exper iences to prepare him for the task. Washburn wrote "the most that can be hoped from him is that he will content him self with the pleasures of the palace and not interfere with 21 the government." While all realized Murad V's weaknesses, it was hoped that he might be able to serve as a new symbol of unity for the Empire and he was prodded by the ministers who had placed him upon the throne to assume the position of healer of the nation's wounds. Washburn realized this and reported Murad's early efforts to open the once tightly closed palace doors 22 to all, communicating a sense of freedom to the people. However, at the same time he wrote of Murad's public attempts at stability, Washburn also realized the difficulties present 235 in such a solution for he noted that the Sultan was in fact controlled by three men of widely differing political opin ions— Mehmet Rushdi, Hussein Avni and Midhat Pasha— all old public functionaries who had never worked together harmon iously and probably wouldn't be able to now. As a result Murad never was able to assume power but instead was buf- fetted from one extreme to another until he was "frightened into a state of imbecility by the violence of their pro ceedings ..." and was forced to be deposed and kept in 23 confinement. In later years Washburn expressed much sym pathy with Murad's fate. Abdul Hamid never had him put to death but kept him a prisoner and guarded him from all outside influences lest he become a rallying point for opposition to his reign. Thus "for no fault of his own [he] is doomed to 24 spend his life as a prisoner of state." One of the ministers who helped to engineer the var ious coups of 1876 was Midhat Pasha, long a well known figure in the Empire. Washburn himself had had occasion to meet Midhat and had followed his career closely, commenting over the years on his abilities and reforms. While many histor ians have since praised Midhat as a liberal thinker and an honest and able administrator, Washburn was far more crit- ical of his accomplishments. 25 He first met Midhat while he was traveling on an Austrian steamer and happened to notice a Turk reading a French translation of Herodotus. Curious as to who this person was, he struck up a conversation and 236 discovered it was Midhat Pasha being sent into exile; the two conversed throughout the remainder of their voyage. Washburn writes that he left this first meeting with the im pression that Midhat had "more enlightened ideas of govern- 26 ment than any Turk I had ever met." Much later, however, Washburn concluded that while Midhat was a very clever man and a remarkable conversationalist, he felt that much of his knowledge was superficial and he did not seem to be much less corrupt than other pashas, taking advantage of his 27 high position to enrich himself at the expense of others. Midhat is revealed in Washburn's writings as an able administrator devoted to public improvements. Under his term as Governor of the Danube Vilayet, for example, Wash burn noted he "was successful so far as he built many good roads at the expense of the Bulgarians and that he main tained tranquility by hanging and imprisoning a large number of men without a fair trial, but it was as corrupt and op- 2 8 pressive a government as the Vilayet ever had." As a result of these harsh deeds many of the common people came to distrust him. Washburn also noted that Midhat was more or less isolated from high ranking Turkish pashas. He was descended from the Pomaks or Bulgarian Moslems and through out his career he surrounded himself with Bulgarians rather than important Turks. What made Midhat an important leader was not his political association with Turkish leaders but rather his intimate relations with the British Embassy. 237 "It was no small thing for a Turkish Pasha to have the Brit- 29 ish Mediterranean fleet at his disposal." While many historians have recognized Midhat's dream to establish a Turkish republic, Washburn expanded these ideas a step further. He believed that Midhat was a man of vast ambition and meant eventually to rule the Empire by himself. His dream was to establish a Turkish republic with himself as President and the Sultan as his tool, but Washburn early forecast that Midhat was doomed to failure and a violent death.^ Midhat had correctly judged the eagerness of England to support him in pushing for reforms along west- y ern lines of thought and he had attached this desire to a firm support of his policies. What Midhat had misjudged, however, was his ability to control his Turkish allies once he had gained power over the Sultan. To obtain this power he first had to align himself with Hussein Avni Pasha and then the Sheik ul Islam and the Softas. Though the English as sumed Midhat would be able to control this unwieldy trium virate of conspirators, Washburn saw that it was only a matter of time until the parties of reaction engulfed Midhat as they had the previous sultans. The simple fact was that Midhat's Turkish power base was far too small and weak to keep him in power. 31 Midhat did unveil a constitution and establish a par liament and for this Washburn credited him with setting in motion the eventual forces which helped to modernize Turkey. 238 Unfortunately, by these same acts Midhat convinced Sultan Abdul Hamid that he {Midhat) was far too dangerous a polit ician to have in a position of power. Wary of the man who had deposed two sultans already, Abdul Hamid used one of the very provisions written in the constitution by Midhat to seize and deport his potential rival in disgrace. Midhat was later tried on trumped up charges for the murder of Abdul Aziz and eventually sentenced to life imprisonment at Taif, Arabia; he remained there until he was murdered on April 26, 1883. In an article written about Midhat before his death Washburn concluded: There is certainly nothing in his public life which entitled him to the rank of a great states man or the sympathy of Europe. He was a bold conspirator and took a prominent part in the de position of two Sultans. He was a man capable of devising a constitution and calling together a Turkish Parliament. He was brave enough to defy all Europe at the Conference (December, 1876) and plunge his country into a disastrous war. He believed in himself and was ambitious to rule. He had many liberal ideas. So far as I kne^hi™ he was a very attractive and agreeable man. Washburn wrote a considerable amount on Abdul Hamid; perhaps this was due partly to the fact that he was now adequately familiar with Turkish politics and co*uld intel ligently observe the various political figures of the time. Although he wrote that he could not speak from any personal knowledge of Abdul Hamid, it must be remembered that his information came from reliable sources who not only knew the Sultan personally but dealt with him on a day-to-day basis. 239 Washburn described Abdul Hamid's personal appearance as slight and feeble with a sad expression on his face and added "He looks far more like an Armenian than a Turk." 33 As internal conditions became worse and problems mounted for the Sultan, Washburn noted he became pale and care-worn and one had a feeling of pity for the pathetic man who seemed to be so "solitary and friendless, trembling for his life in the midst of a brilliant retinue . .."^ When Abdul Hamid first assumed the throne little was known about him, even by the Turks. Washburn wrote that those who had placed him in power felt he was a quiet, unob trusive man with little knowledge of political affairs, who would serve nicely as a maleable tool for them. 35 This general assumption should have proven correct, for as a younger son of Abdul Medjid he had little hope of becoming sultan. For thirty-five years he had been kept in semi confinement with little education other than religious read ings. Washburn noted later that even when Sultan he "reads ... books but they are of little value, as he had to take whatever comes his way in the Turkish language or whatever he may chance to hear of and have translated for his special 36 use." His only knowledge of Europe was gained when he was taken to visit Paris and the other capitals by his uncle Abdul Aziz. The main reason he went on this trip was his uncle's fear that he would be replaced by his nephew if he dared leave him behind. 37 He had the reputation of being 240 a pious and sincere Moslem, "an economical and not an avar icious man and one who interested himself but little in the affairs of state. Washburn noted that Abdul Hamid's early years were thus spent in the palace harem surrounded by thousands of women, slaves, astrologers, fanatics, sycophants, and de pendents of every description. As he was taught by the Ulema he adopted the solemn belief that should be become Sultan- Caliph, his will would be the only law and he could not dele gate his authority to anyone. Naturally suspicious and of a timid disposition, Abdul Hamid became especially distrust ful of foreigners and formed about him a tight circle of as- sociates whose fidelity he was ever willing to secure. 39 As a result of this suspicion Washburn came to feel that the chief obstacle to reformation in Abdul Hamid's government was the Sultan himself who had so carefully surrounded him self with forces he could trust— the fanatical and reaction- ary forces of the Empire. 40 Though the Sultan may have appeared to be a narrow minded man, Washburn discovered that he was a skilled master of diplomacy. He wrote "He has never failed to win the heart of any European who has been admitted to any degree or in timacy with him. All find in him noble and attractive qual- 41 ities which they cannot help but admire." This other side of the Sultan's character revealed a man who demonstrated 241 " ... acts of thoughtful kindness to individuals and a human interest in things which did not immediately concern Tur- 42 key." Washburn wrote that the Sultan had established a reputation in the foreign diplomatic community for being fond of argument and very capable of gaining his point in debate. He impressed most people with his desire to improve the government and also gave the appearance of being open to advice from all quarters. However, "... the Turks who know him best say that his real advisors, the o n l y ones who he trusts, are his astrologer and some of the lower and more fanatical of his servants. This seems to be the fact. He deceives his ministers and acts contrary to their advice 43 just as he flatters and deceives the ambassadors." While Washburn was generally a neutral observer in his columns, his private letters were sometimes filled with emotion. Abdul Hamid's case in 1896 offers an example of this emotionalism and Washburn's subsequent efforts to cor rect the record publicly. In the heat of the Armenian mas sacres of 1896, Washburn wrote his family that Abdul Hamid was "... a fiend in character, drunk with the blood of 44 saints and slaves ..." When he reviewed the situation he must have realized the Sultan's tremendous fears of the activities of the resolutionists, for he wrote that the "Sultan seems to be half mad with fear of the various revo- 45 lutionists." In his recollections, however, Washburn publicly stated that "he is no more blood thirsty than his 242 grandfather Mahmoud II was, to whom European historians have 46 given the title of Great." He continued with the compar ison adding that there was not another sultan in the last two hundred years (excluding Mahmoud II) "whom he does not 47 surpass intellectually and morally." Abdul Hamid was an honest, able man who was simply overworked and oppressed by the task he was forced to undertake. Abdul Hamid first showed his skill as a politician when he was approached by Sir Henry Elliot and Midhat Pasha. Realizing their leanings toward liberal ideas, he agreed with them in everything and was more liberal in his ideas than they were. As a result both men were completely deceived. After Abdul Hamid assumed full power, Washburn took note of his Empire— a bankrupt treasury with no credit available, his richest provinces lost, his army defeated, and his Moslem subjects badly demoralized. Some years later Washburn reassessed the condition of the Empire and, while acknowledging that it had many unsolved problems, wrote "It is now as firmly established as it was after the Crimean War, and although reduced in extent it is more powerful for 48 defense." Clearly then, Abdul Hamid must have had a much better understanding of the possibilities before him than anyone realized, as he fashioned a program of restricting foreign intervention and developing a strong base of loyal Moslem subjects. 243 So successful was Abdul Hamid’s foreign policy that Washburn wrote he "has proven himself to be one of the bold est and most skillful diplomatists in Europe; and his point of view is so totally different from that of.Christian rulers that no one can calculate in what direction it will lead 49 him." In 1896, for example, when the Powers formed the Concert of the Six Powers (a mutual agreement that no power should act independently in regard to the Ottoman Empire) the Sultan skillfully kept clear of all entangling alliances, resisting the pressures of friends and enemies alike. He was shrewd enough to see that it was not in his interest to favor one over the other. "He has laughed at the threats of the Ambassadors and watched the gathering of the fleets in the Archipelago with perfect equanimityThe Sultan real ized that Europe was divided at this time into two hostile camps and the success of his policies showed that he had indeed a far more accurate knowledge of European politics than any of his adversaries. Abdul Hamid's internal policies, however, gave Wash burn a mixed impression. On the one hand Washburn was angered at what he felt to be their inherent weaknesses while on the other he was forced to sympathize with the Sultan's plight. He watched as the Sultan gradually concentrated all power into his own hands. Far from being master of the situation, however, he noted that the Sultan had become a self-constituted 244 prisoner in his own palace. Since it was impossible to govern totally by himself, and since he trusted a few indiv iduals, the Sultan surrounded himself only with lesser ele ments he felt he could control. Though some notable progress was made the results of this policy was that the internal affairs were generally in a state of decline. This in turn disturbed Washburn for he felt that Abdul Hamid was honestly striving to improve internal conditions but that he was betrayed by his ministers he had entrusted to carry out his reforms. Washburn's dichotomy was that he felt the Sultan's wisdom was praiseworthy: "It is a new thing in the world to see a Turkish Sultan attempting to cleanse his Empire from filth and disease and rivaling the most advanced countries in the world in his efforts to care for the health of his 51 people." On the other hand, Washburn often chastised the Sultan for building a structure that rested so exclus ively upon his own personality. He trusted no one and went to extremes to be certain all dissident elements were under control. No one escaped the Sultan's suspicions— neither his ministers nor his generals— and he undertook to direct 52 all activities himself. To continue his rule unchallenged the Sultan built an extensive system of espionage utilizing secret police and an all-encompassing censorship. Washburn noted "This ‘ police system spares no one from the Grand Vizier down. Nothing is too insignificant to escape its notice. It 245 searches the letters in the post. It searches every telegram. It notes every word spoken. It fills every place with spies and men are exiled, imprisoned, or disappear without any trial." 53 Once the Sultan advised a certain Moslem official to halt eating garlic three times a day. Shortly thereafter he died and when the Sultan sent his consolations he admon ished the mourners that the death was because the official had persisted in eating garlic three times a day. Not even eating habits went unnoticed! 54 In another instance Washburn told of an incident regarding the secretary of the American Legation. This individual had taken a house for the summer at Candili on the Bosphorus and had hired a boat for the sum mer to transport him to work. When his new Turkish neighbor discovered the American official had no boathouse in which to store the boat, he offered him the use of his own. With in twenty-four hours an order came from the Sultan ordering the neighbor to withdraw his offer and to have nothing to do with foreigners. 55 It was well documented that during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid secret police were all over and had extensive channels of information on all subjects. While Washburn may have pointed out that extreme mistrust so evident on the surface, he did not go so far as to maintain that there was mass hatred of the Sultan's reign. As a matter of fact he often disregarded many of the reports of extensive dissatisfaction with the Sultan which were relayed to him from his foreign diplomatic 246 sources. In 1899 he noted the inaccuracy of these Turkish reports, stating that while the reports of revolutionary plotting and discontent seemed correct to the ambassadors, he himself did not place much faith in them. "They are all liars and they say to the ambassador what they think he C C would like to hear." As if to bear out his point he wrote that despite the prognostications, the twenty-fifth anniver sary of Abdul Hamid's reign occurred peacefully and quietly, 57 no one daring not to pledge his loyalty to the Sultan. In addition to his establishment of numerous hospitals and medical training facilities for the use of his subjects, Washburn noted that the Sultan had established many schools for men and women. He realized the need for training the officers of his army and navy and he personally induced the German Emperor to loan a number of distinguished officers for this purpose; he also secured German doctors for his hospitals and medical schools. He worked diligently to strengthen his army and navy and the fortifications along the Dardanelles and the Bos phorus. In 1897 Washburn commented that these fortifications were twice as strong as they had been two years previously and that other fortifications had been well armed with new Krupp guns. He concluded, "It has been the aim of the Sultan to avoid war and carry out all his designs by diplomatic 58 skill; but he is ready for any emergency ..." Though the 247 Sultan had expended large amounts of money to build an iron clad fleet, it was apparent to Washburn that it had been allowed to decay. For eighteen years it had lain at anchor in the Golden Horn. The only time it ventured out was in 1897 when the Sultan felt tremendous pressure to stem public anger in the war against Greece. Washburn wrote that five ironclads left the Golden Horn (adding that he did not be lieve they would go outside the Dardanelles) amidst the wild enthusiasm of thousands of cheering Turks praising the 59 Sultan. While it may have saved the day for the Sultan and proved that the Turks indeed had a navy, Washburn and other strategists knew perfectly well that it was far too weak to fight; the ships were in bad repair and the sailors and officers lacked training. Although the Sultan had expended a great deal of money on equipping his armed forces and was in the process of building training schools for his new forces, Washburn criticized these forces for their lack of proper training. Only the Sultan's special Hamidie cavalry, composed of Kurdish regiments totaling about thirty thousand men, had had any military exercises to speak of, and Washburn angrily reported that these regiments "will add nothing to the strength of the army in case of war and they are a curse to the country in time of peace.Washburn pointed out that most of the armed forces were staffed by officers chosen from palace favorites and that in general the armed 248 forces had had no maneuvers or instruction for years in the use of the new weapons. This was not the first time that Washburn had looked dimly upon a Sultan’s failure to com plete the modernization process. In each instance, though he had applauded the Sultan’s efforts to formulate a plan, he had criticized him for lacking the overall capacity to train enough leaders to carry it out. Washburn reached this same conclusion concerning a great many other facets of Abdul Hamid's efforts to reform. While he often respected the Sultan for his efforts, he pointed out that they were all destined to failure. The very elements Abdul Hamid depended upon to sustain his rule— Moslem fanaticism, strict Sultanate control, and absolute concentration of power in the Sultan's hands— he felt would all eventually combine to end the Empire. Though Washburn personally knew many high-ranking Turkish officials, none was closer to him than Ahmet Vefik Pasha— diplomat, educator, politician, and linguist (familiar with sixteen languages and their literature). He lived very near the college and over the years he and Washburn fre quently conferred with each other though often differing in their opinions. Much of the original plot of land on which Robert College was built was purchased from Ahmet Vefik Pasha. Washburn once honored him saying he was "...without 6X exception the most remarkable man in Turkey." In his lifetime he had held a variety of governmental posts ranging 249 from Ambassador to Paris to Grand Vizier and Minister of various agencies. In each of these offices he had disting uished himself by his activities and his supreme honesty. Washburn was most impressed with the depth of his knowledge and the remarkable toleration of the man. One evening when he went to visit him he found him discussing , the inspiration of the Bible with Dr. Dether, a German in charge of a museum in Constantinople. For a whole evening, he relates, the two argued, with Ahmet Vefik defending the Bible as if he had been a professor of Christian theology. When asked where he learned this theology, Ahmet Vefik replied that he had lived next door to Renan in Paris and had learned it from his discussions at that time. 6 2 While Washburn wrote that Ahmet Vefik was a liberal man, an admirer of England, and a friend of reform, he noted it was a reform Vefik felt only Turks could understand. Thus Vefik did not believe in Midhat's constitution or parliament although he agreed to preside over the unique assembly. Washburn felt that Ahmet Vefik's concept of an ideal govern ment would have been Harun al Rashid’s absolutism and total control over his people with resultant peace in the land. He would have reformed the Empire but along Turkish lines with an "absolute Sultan and a responsible ministerial G 3 government." He would probably have given the nation a simple constitution guaranteeing security of life and 250 property to all with total equality before the courts of justice. In his early years in the Empire Washburn reported on Ahmet Vefik's activities with something less than sympathy. In 1864 Vefik had been assigned as Special Commissioner to Bursa with unlimited powers to reform the province. He ap pointed a number of young men who had some French education and began his work. Washburn later described this activity and said that "...he reformed abuses with such vengeance that he made enemies of almost every man, Turk or Christian, 64 in the province." He made ex post facto laws without num ber. Once when he found the town of Yenishehir's business decayed he attempted its recovery by compelling the inhab itants to rebuild an immense han which had originally gone to ruin due to lack of business. The net result was that this expense destroyed the little remaining wealth. Deter mined to build roads, Washburn noted he cut streets through the most populous parts of the city of Bursa leaving many families homeless and without compensation.^ At the con clusion of his term Washburn described Ahmet Vefik's work: "As a reformer he is somewhat like Nero the Roman Emperor and somewhat like Don Quixote of La Mancha. No Roman Emperor ever more utterly ignored -the rights of his subjects and Don Quixote himself never conceived of more absurd plans for reforming the country. 251 In later years Washburn came to understand Ahmet Vefik better, but he still remained at odds with his methods. In 1877 Vefik was appointed Governor General of Adrianople, an area greatly troubled with disturbances and in need of reform. When he learned of Vefik's appointment Washburn wrote, "I am afraid he will not improve the state of the country— I expect him to hang and shoot Bulgarians by the hundreds ... Still you never can tell which way he will jump. He may take the whim of hanging Bashi Bozooks and protecting the Bul- g a n a n s . ..67" Washburn concluded that the chief fault of Ahmet Vefik as an official was that he did not have a very high opinion of the ability or the honesty of many of his associates in office. More often than not he refused to compromise with them and they looked upon him at times as arbitrary and haughty. 6 8 This utter honesty and abruptness of the Pasha was illustrated in an article of Washburn's in 187 8 where he described how Ahmet Vefik was asked to preside over a grand council of dignitaries of the Empire convened to dis cuss the reform of the country. When asked what he thought was the first thing to be done the Pasha replied, "In my opinion if we would save the state the first thing to be done is to hang half the members of this council. " ^ 9 At another time Ahmet Vefik was appointed to head the ministry of indirect taxes. The first thing he did to reform was to 252 call in a high official and turn out him and all his assoc iates in disgrace. This may have saved the Empire much loss of taxes formerly stolen but it did not win the Pasha any life-long friends. Though Ahmet Vefik was not tactful, Washburn wrote fondly of the Pasha's great enthusiasm for the Turkish lan guage and of his desire to educate the Turkish people. Washburn wrote that he had been told by Vefik that when he was Minister of Education he had opened forty thousand schools, which was probably true on paper. He continued saying that Vefik "has probably spent more time and money in preparing school books than all the other Turks in Constan- tinople combined." 70 His pride lay in his garden library containing seven or eight thousand choice books and manu scripts in twenty different languages— the only valuable private library in Constantinople. As would be expected of an outspoken patriot in the Ottoman Empire, Ahmet Vefik differed from Sultan Abdul Hamid. In his last few years in service to the Empire he found the Sultan in a constant state of nervous excitement and often incapable of transacting any business. He was dismissed from his office as Grand Vizier in 1879 because he insisted in exercising the authority which he had been promised. Perhaps his most valuable service to the Empire came during this time when he prevented the flight of the 71 Sultan to Bursa when the Russian Army reached San Stefano. 253 He was rewarded for his efforts by being exiled to Bursa where he continued his attempts to promote reform in the way he knew best. He died a poor man without any remaining members of his family. Washburn noted that his home was pulled down and sold for firewood and his magnificent li brary was scattered— partly stolen and partly sold to pay debts.72 As this chapter has hopefully shown , Washburn's writings offer the reader an opportunity to visualize many of these Ottoman predecessors of modern Turkey. This insight comes not in the form of hero worship from the view point of an author writing a half century later, but from the writing of a man who lived and worked among these indiv iduals. As such, Washburn's writings give at times a unique perspective of these men. At other times one realizes, part ly as a result of modern scholarship, that some of his view points are far too biased. The object of the historian is to be willing to accept the best of both conclusions— that these men were gifted as well as corrupt, and that they per formed valuable services as well as misdeeds. NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 1 An Eastern Statesman, "Life in Constantinople Fifty Years Ago, 11 The Contemporary Review, Vol. 36, December, 1879, p. 616? see also, George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. xv. 2George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, pp. 1 -2 . George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 1 0 . 4 Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples (translated by Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlmann), New York (Capricorn Books)1960, p. 369. 5 New York Tribune, October 26, 1866, p. 6 ? see also, letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, September 27, 1874. ATRC. £ L New York Tribune, June 11, 1864, p. 9. 7 New York Tribune, May 31, 1867, p. 1; see also, New York Tribune. April 24, 1867, p. 1? also George Wash burn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. xviii. 8 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 8 . 9 An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Govern ment Do for Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 37, June, 1880, pp. 897-898; see also, New York Tribune, April 30, 1864, p. 9. 10 Ibid.; see also, letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, September 24, 1867, ATRC; also, Roderick Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslim Equality in the 19th Century," American Historical Review. Vol. LIX, 1953-54, p. 850. ^New York Tribune. March 30, 1865, p. 8 . 12 New York Tribune, February 3, 1865, p. 7. 254 255 13 New York Tribune, July 6 , 1866, p. 7. 14 New York Tribune, August 6 , 1866, p. 3. 15 New York Tribune, March 22, 1867, p. 2; see also, George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question, 1100- 1900, p. 99. 16 New York Tribune, April 2, 1864, p. 4. 17George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question, 1100-1900, p. 99? see also, New Yorlc Tribune, April 2, 1864, p. 4; also, George Washburn, Robert College, 1865- 1900, p. 10. 18 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, May 31, 1876, ATRC. 19 An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought m Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 5 3, April, 1888, p. 610; see also Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, June 8 , 1874, June 1, 1876, and June 4,1876, ATRC; also George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 44. 20 New York Tribune, March 30, 1865, p. 8 ; see also, New York Tribune, August 8 , 1865, p. 5. 21 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, May 31, 1876, ATRC. 22 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, June 4, 1876, ATRC. 23George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, pp. 45-46; see also. Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, June 2, 1876, ATRC; also George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question, 1100-1900, p p . 109-110. 24 An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 36, October, 1879, p. 337. 256 25 For more information on the life of Midhat Pasha see: (1) Ali Haydar Midhat, The Life of Midhat Pasha, (London: J. Murray),1903; (2) Robert Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period, a Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. 26George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 38. 2^George Washburn, "The Exile of Mithad Pasha," The Independent, Vol. 33, August 25, 1881, p. 31; see also, George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, pp. 38-39. 28An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 53, p. 610. 29 George Washburn, Robert Ccilege, 1865-1900, p. 39; see also, George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. xx; also, George Washburn, "The Exile of Mithad Pasha," loc. cit., Vol. 33, p. 1; also George Washburn, History of the Eastern Question, 1100-1900, p. 109; also, An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey,“ loc. cit., Vol. 53, p. 609. ■an George Washburn, Robert College, 1865—1900, p. 39. 31 Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, May 22, 1876, ATRC; see also, Letter from Washburn to Christo pher Robert, June 4, 1876, June 12, 1876, ATRC. 32 George Washburn, "The Exile of Mithad Pasha," loc. cit., Vol. 33, p. 1; see also, An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Government Do for Turkey," loc. cit., Vol. 37, p. 901; also, George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 118; also An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," loc. cit.. Vol. 53, p. 611. 33 Our Own Correspondent, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid, " The Christian Union. Vol. 22, November 3, 1880, p. 370. ^George Washburn, Robert College. 1865-1900, pp. 88-89. 257 QC George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople. p * XX5 * 36 Our Own Correspondent,"Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit.. Vol. 22, p. 370. •^George Washburn, Robert College. 1865-1900, p. 89. 38 Our Own Correspondent, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit., Vol. 22, p. 370. 39 George Washburn, "Turkey and the Liberal Govern ment in England," The Independent, Vol. 32, June 17, 1880, p. 1 . 40 George Washburn, "The Outlook in Turkey," The Independent, Vol. 6 6 , May 16, 1909, p. 949. ^ A n Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 67, January, 1895, p. 43. 42 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 6 8 . 43 Our own Correspondent, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit., Vol. 22, p. 370. 44 Letter from Washburn to his family, February 23, 1896, CHPHLA. 45 Letter from Washburn to his mother Mrs. E. H. Washburn, December 10, 1899, CHPHLA,* see also, letter from Washburn to his mother Mrs. E. H. Washburn, April 28, 1901, CHPHLA. 46 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865—1900, p. 89. ^ Ibid ., p. 8 8 . 48 Ibid.., p. 101? see also, ibid.., p. 46; also, George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. xxviii. 258 49 George Washburn, "International Politics at Constantinople," The Independent, Vol. 48, March 5, 1896, p. 302; see also, An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul- Hamid, " loc. cit., Vol. 67, p. 52. 50George Washburn, "Turkey and the Balance of Power in Europe," The Independent, Vol. 48, December 3, 1896, p.1637; see also. An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul- Hamid," loc. cit.. Vol. 67, p. 48; also, George Washburn, "International Politics at Constantinople," loc. cit., Vol. 48, p. 302; George Washburn, Fifty Years in Con- stantinople, p. 2 2 0 . 51 An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit., Vol. 67, p. 51; see also, George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, pp. xxiii-xxiv. 5 2 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 69. 5 3An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit., Vol. 67, p. 47. 54 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 69. 5 5 Ibid. C Letter from Washburn to his daughter Anna Washburn, April 16, 1899, CHPHLA. 57 Letter from Washburn to his mother Mrs. E. H. Washburn, September 1, 1901, CHPHLA; see also, George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 264; also, Letter from Washburn to his daughter Anna Washburn, December 19, 1897, CHPHLA. 58 ______, "The Sultan and the Powers," The Con temporary Review, Vol. 71, May 1897, p. 623; see also,. George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p.xxiv. 59Letter from Washburn to his daughter Anna Wash burn, November 22, 1897 CHPHLA; see also, An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit., Vol. 67, p. 46. 60 An Eastern Resident, “Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," loc. cit., Vol. 67, p. 46; see also, ______, "Armenia and 259 the Powers from behind the Scenes, " The Contemporary Review, Vol. 69, May, 1896, p. 632. 6 X George Washburn, "Achmet Vefik Pacha, " The Independent, Vol. 30, February 14, 1878, p. 4. 62 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 21. 6 3 Ibid., pp. 2 1 -2 2 . 6^New York Tribune, March 22, 1867, p. 2. ^3New York Tribune, May 14, 1864, p. 4. 6 6 Ibid.. ^Letter from George Washburn to Christopher Robert, August 31, 1877, ATRC; see also, letter from Washburn to his son George Hamlin Washburn, August 20, 1877, CHPHLA. 68 George Washburn, "Achmet Vefik Pacha," loc. cit., Vol. 30, p. 4. 7 0 Ibid. 71 George Washburn, Robert College, 1865-1900, p. 74; see also, Letter from Washburn to Christopher Robert, February 1, 1872, ATRC. 72George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, p. 56. CONCLUSIONS In line with the recent re-evaluation of the past activities of Americans in Ottoman History, a review of Dr. George Washburn's contributions was in order. When Washburn first arrived in Constantinople in 1858 most Amer icans knew little about the Ottomans other than that these people were either heathen or despicable Moslems, depend ing upon the "liberal" thought of the informer. During his fifty years in the Empire his activities as a mission ary, an educator, and a diplomat provided Washburn with a wide range of acquaintances and enabled him to familiarize himself with the total spectrum of Ottoman society, its potential and its problems. Most often his reports reflect the insight of an impartial and honest observer and were braced with a keen perception that enable him to point out glaring weaknesses as well as enormous potentials for good in the Ottoman Empire. It was during his first decade in the Empire that Washburn began to understand its complexities. Though at first involved only with missionary work, his strong leadership soon put him in the forefront of the problems which confronted the American community at the time. These problems involved not only his small Protestant missionary 260 261 community but also the efforts of a particular man, Cyrus Hamlin, who was determined to establish a new Christian educational institution. Though many individuals attempted to link all dif ficulties to a religious factor, Washburn realized that politics in the Ottoman Empire was interwoven on a much more complex base. He recognized, for example^ that while there was quite necessarily a natural inclination for mis trust to develop between the Christian and Moslem popula tions , there were several other important irritations at hand as well. He discovered that among the various Chris tian sects themselves there were deep and time-created hatreds that had a great deal to do with any problems and, for that matter, any solutions. Furthermore, it gradually dawned upon him, unlike many of his peers operating in the Empire at the time, that the influence of the Powers was not always for the best in solving Ottoman domestic prob lems or their relations with other powers. In his later years he lashed out angrily just as often at the failures of the Powers as he did at the shortcomings of the Ottoman Government. It was a painful trial for him to have to write that in many instances he felt the problems of the Empire stemmed from the internal difficulties of the Powers as well as from jealousies among themselves. Finally, he realized that often the troubles which beset the Empire stemmed from the hatreds among supposedly 262 homogeneous national groups. Such was the case, for exam ple, within the tiny American community when he reported the hostilities between the American missionaries and their diplomats appointed to represent them. Again, it was the case in the violent Armenian situation in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Though much of the world press at the time portrayed the Armenian people as a unified symbol, Washburn early illustrated the gaping differences among Armenians according to nationality— Turkish and Rus sian, religion — Orthodox and Protestant, and geography— urban and rural population distributions. And it was the case with many of the problems among the Turks themselves. Forced into changes by external threats, the various fac tions struggled among themselves to attain a unified stance against those forces determined to end the Empire. In each of these cases Washburn understood the dif ferent influences at work. He conveyed this understanding regularly over the years through his articles published in the press in the United States and Europe and, as such, helped to shape public opinion toward the Ottoman Empire. During his early years in the Empire (1862-1870), Washburn contributed frequently to the New York Daily Tribune as their Special Correspondent from Constantinople. During this period he averaged at least an article a month. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, he continued to 263 write regularly, contributing an average of four to five articles a year to various journals and periodicals such as The Contemporay Review, The Christian Union and The Independent. After he retired from the Presidency of Robert College in 1903, he devoted a large portion of his time to the work of a major book on his life in the Ottoman Empire. In 1911, Houghton Middlin Company published his widely distributed work, Fifty Years in Constantinople; through the years this has continued to remain a respected and frequently cited source. In 1904 he finished a draft of a major manuscript on the History of the Eastern Question, 1100-1900. Later he completed another manuscript, Robert College, 1865-1900. Neither of these two works, both quite substantial undertakings, were published however. As an educator Washburn became concerned with reforms and modernization. This was a difficult task for Washburn since his western and Christian orientation at times put him at odds with the prevailing lines of thought among the early Ottoman reformers. He often reported of the Ottomans' inex cusable waste of funds and their apparent ineptness to come to grips with what he saw as the root causes of so many of their problems. Today's scholarship has begun to trace the development of the many Ottoman reforms attempted during this era, placing a great deal of emphasis upon the various plans, their financial outlays, and bureaucratic organiza tion. Washburn's writings provide a useful complement to 264 these studies. Though he did not have at his disposal the more definitive governmental information of the modern scholar, he had an extensive network of communication ties among the various people— Turkish Moslems and Christians— who were directly affected by these reforms. His writings reveal that, for the most part, these early reforms were accomplished at a tremendous cost to the people and they did not always amount to a benefit to the society as they were intended. Moreover, it now becomes apparent that in many cases these reforms, though largely responsible for the ultimate progress to a modern Turkish state, were not carried out on an impartial basis for all the citizens of the Empire as was claimed on paper. Washburn illustrates how many of these reforms, in practice, were utilized to strengthen Turkish and Moslem elements and to restrict others in the polyglot Ottoman society. As President of Robert College Washburn lived in a somewhat isolated location. His main source of information came from the opinions he gathered from his relations with the many men with whom he dealt during his lifetime. His writings illustrate, however, that neither this isolation nor his previous religious training and western background served to limit his impressions. Contrary to previous opinion, Washburn's viewpoints are not typical of the early Christian evangelicals who placed all Ottomans and, for that matter, Oriental Christians in the category of "heathen.” Though he was a Christian, devoted to giving the living word of Christ to mankind, he was by no means a bigot. In a speech delivered to the Congress of Relig ions in Chicago in 1893 he made this philosophy clear when he said "No missionary ever made a convert by avoiding him, refusing to listen to him or cursing his religion. If I wish to reveal Christ to a man I must not only treat him as a brother but feel that he is a brother and find some common ground of sympathy." Each year of his stay in the Empire Washburn discovered more and more common ground with a greater number of people of varied religious and national backgrounds. He learned to respect these individuals for what they were regardless of their back grounds. With this respect he sought to create for his reading public a new understanding of the Ottoman Empire. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MATERIALS CITED ARCHIVAL COLLECTIONS Amherst College Archives. George Washburn Papers. Amherst College Archives. George Hamlin Washburn Papers. Harvard University. Houghton Library, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Archives. Harvard University, Houghton Library, Cyrus Hamlin and George Washburn Papers. Archives of the Trustees of Robert College. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS Jean Haythorne Braden, The Eagle and the Crescent: American Interests in the Ottoman Empire, 1861-1870. Unpub lished Doctoral dissertation, Department of History, The Ohio State University, 1973. Keith Maurice Greenwood, Robert College: The American Found ers . Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Department of History, The Johns Hopkins University, 1965. Cyrus Hamlin, A Memorandum for my Children and Personal Friends. Private 10-page letter in the Robert College Archives. Herbert Lane, Profile of Dr. George Washburn, President, 1878-1903, original document in the Robert College Archives. MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ______. "The Ottoman Constitution, Promulgated the sev- enth Zilbridge (six) 1293 (12/23/1876)" American Jour- nal of International Law, Supplement II, 1908, pp. 367-387. The Chautauquan The Christian Union The Congregationalist and Christian World 266 267 The Contemporary Review Davison, Roderic H. "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian- Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," The Amer- ican Historical Review, Vol. LIX (1953-1954), pp. 844-864. Dodge, Bayard., "American Educational and Missionary Efforts in tne Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 401, May, 1972, pp. 15-22. Ec.rle, Edward M., "American Missions in the Near East," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 7, April, 1929, pp. 398-417. Efimenco, N. Marbury, "American Impact Upon Middle East Leader ship," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 69, June, 1954, pp. 202-218. Elliot, Sir. Henry, "The Death of Abdul Aziz and of Turkish Reform," Nineteenth Century and After, Vol. 23, 1883, pp. 276-296. Field, James A., Jr., "Trade Skills, and Sympathy: The First Century and Half of Commerce in the Near East," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 401, May, 1972, pp. 1-14. Hamlin, Cyrus, "America's Duty to Americans in Turkey," North American Review, Vol 163, Sept., 1896, pp. 276- 281. Howard, Harry N. "The United States and the Problem of the Turkish Straits: The Foundations of American Policy: 1830-1914." Balkan Studies, Vol 3, No. 1, 1962, pp. 1-28. Lybyer, Albert H. "America's Missionary Record in Turkey," Current History, Vol 19, Feb. 1924, pp. 802-810. The Independent Journal of Race Development London Daily News New York Daily Tribune New York Tribune 268 The Outlook Stillman, W.J. "Our Diplomatic Service in the Levant," The Nation, Vol IX, Oct. 7, 1869, pp. 209-291. The Times (London) Ward, William Hayes, "The Amherst Illustrious, George Wash burn Amherst '55'," The Amherst Graduate Quarterly, June, 1951, pp. 293-298. BOOKS Anderson, Rufus. History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches, Vol. I and II. Boston: Congre gational Publishing Society, 1872. Anderson, Rufus. Memorial Volume of the First Fifty Years of The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Fifth Edition, Boston: American Board of Commissions for Foreign Missions, 1863. Berkes, Niyazi. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964. Birge, John Kingsley. A Guide to Turkish Area Study. Wash ington: American Council of Learned Society, 1949. Blaisdell, Donald C. European Financial Control in The Ottoman Empire. New York: Columbua University Press, 1929. Bliss, Rev. Edwin Munsell. Turkey and the Armenian Atroc ities . N.P.: Edgewood Publishing Co., 1896. Brockelmann, Carl. History of the Islamic Peoples (trans lated by Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlman, New York, Capricorn Books, 1960. Creasy, Edward S. History of the Ottoman Turks. London: Richard'Bentley and Son, 1877. Daniel, Robert L. American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-1960. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1970. Davison, Roderic H. Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856- 1876. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 269 Devereux, Robert. The First Ottoman Constitutional Period. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. ______. Dictionary Catalog of the Missionary Research Library, New York. Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1968. Dwight, Henry Otis, Constantinople and Its Problems, Its Peoples, Customs Religious and Progress. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1902. Elliot, Sir. Henry George. Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic Experiences. London: J. Murray, 1922. Ergin, Osman. Turkiye Maarif Tarih (A History of Turkish Education) Istanbul: Osmanbey Maatbasi, 1939-1943. Vol. 1-5. Field, James A. America and the Mediterranean World, 1776- 1882. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Finnie, David H. Pioneers East. Cambridge:Harvard Univer sity Press, 1967. Fisher, Sydney Nettleton. The Middle East, A History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2nd edition, 1969. Frye, Richard, editor. Islam and the West, The Hague, 19 57. Gates, Caleb Frank. Not To Me Only. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 40. Gibb, H.A.R. and Bowen, Harold. Islamic Society and the West 2 Vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1950-1957. Goodell, William. The Old and The New. New York: M.W. Dodd, 1853. Gordon, Leland James, American Relations with Turkey, 1830- 1930: An Economic Interpretation. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932. Grabill, Joseph L. Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971. Griscom, Lloyd C. Diplomatically Speaking. New York: The Literary Guild of America Inc., 1940. Hamlin, Cyrus. Among The Turks. New York: R. Carter and Brothers, 1878. 270 Hamlin, Cyrus. My Life and Times. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 6 th edition 1924. Kazamias, Andreas M. Education and the Quest For Modernity in Turkey. Chicago: The University of Chicago. Press, 1966. Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press, 1962. Lewis, Geoffrey. Turkey. New York: Frederick A. Prager, 1965. Mardin, Serif. The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. Mishew, D. America and Bulgaria and their Moral Bonds. Bern: Paul Haupt, Akademische Buchhandlung, 1918. Monroe, Will S. Bulgaria and her People. Boston: The Page Co., 1914. ______. The National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XXVI. New York: James T. White and Co., 1937. Patrick, Mary Mills. Under Five Sultans. New York: the Century Company, 1929. Pears, Sir Edwin. Forty Years in Constantinople. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1916. Turkey and Its People. London: Methusen and Co. Ltd., 1911. Pinkney, David H. and Theodore Ropp. A Festschrift for Fred erick B. Artz. Durham, No. Carolina: Duke University Press, 1964. "Two Centuries of American Interest in Turkey," by Syndey N. Fisher, pp. 113-138. Prime, Edward Dorr Griffin. Fourty Years in the Turkish Empire. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1876. Richter, Julius. A Histfrry-of Protestant Missions in the Near East. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1910. Robert College Herald Board of 1931-1932. Dr. Caleb Frank Gates, President of Robert College, 1903-1932. An Appreciation. Istanbul: Tsitouris Brothers. N*D. 271 Schaeffer, Evelyn Schuyler. Eugene Schuyler: A Memoir. New York: Scribners, 1901. Secretary, Amherst College, Half Century Record of the Class of ”55"-Amherst College, 1855-1905. Amherst, Mass. Printed for the class, Carpenter and Morehouse, Printers, 1905. , In Memorium Rev. Cyrus Hamlin P.P., LLP, Boston, Published privately, 1903. Sousa, Nasim. The Capitulatory Regime o.f Turkey— Its History Origin and Nature. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933. Strauss, Oscar S. Under Four Administrations. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1922. Strong, William Ellsworth. The Story of the American Board. New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969. Trustees of Robert College, An Appreciation in memory of The Rev. George Washburn P.P. LLP, 1833-1915. Printed, not Published by the Trustees of Robert College for Private Circulation, New York City, June, 1915. Strong, William Ellsworth. The Story of the American Board. New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969. Ward, Robert E. and Dankwart Rustow eds., Political Modern ization in Japan and Turkey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. ______. Who Was Who in America, Vol I, 1897-1942. Chicago: The A.N. Marquis Co., 1943. . Who's Who in America, Vol. VIII, 1914-1915. Chicago: A. N. Marquis and Co., 1914. Wilson, James Grant and John Fiske, eds. Appletons' Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. V I . New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1889. II. KNOWN WORKS OF GEORGE WASHBURN ARCHIVAL COLLECTIONS Amherst College Archives. George Washburn Papers: These con tain about fifty different letters from Washburn to his son, George Hamlin Washburn. They also contain 272 numerous unpublished manuscripts and religious sermons of Washburns. Harvard University. Houghton Library, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Archives. Self explanatory. These contain several of Washburn's early reports as a missionary and have detailed re ports on his various jobs and duties. Harvard University. Houghton Library, Cyrus Hamlin and George Washburn Papers. In addition to numerous letters written by Cyrus Hamlin this collection also contains approximately three hundred fifty letters written by Washburn to various individuals over a fifty year span of time. Also contains about 50 letters of condol- ances sent to Mrs. Henrietta Washburn in 1915 when George Washburn passed on. Archives of the Trustees of Robert College. These contain approximately 610 letters written by Washburn to Christopher Robert and others. It also contains num erous letters written by Cyrus Hamlin. Also contains all annual reports, reports of special meetings, directives etc. concerning affairs of Robert College from its first year to the present. There are sev eral files also containing miscellaneous clippings, articles and papers by George Washburn. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS George Washburn. History of the Eastern Question 1100-1900. N.P., N.D. Now an original document in the Amherst College Archives, 139 pp. George Washburn. Probable Influence of the Turkish Revolu tion on the Faith of Islam N.P., N.D. Now an Original document in the Amherst College Archives. 16 pp. George Washburn. Report of the President of Robert College of Constantinople for the Fourtieth Year, 1902-1903. Aug. 1, 1903. Original Document on file m the Archives of the Trustees of Robert College, 19 pp. George Washburn. Robert College and the History of the Turks (a lecture delivered c. 1908) Now an original docu ment in the Amherst College Archives. George Washburn. Robert College, 1865-1900. N.P. N.D. Orig inal Document Archives of the Trustees of Robert College, 213 pp. 273 George Washburn, Notes on the World Missionary Conference, 1910. N.P. N.D. Now An Original document in the Amherst College Archives, 45 pp. MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS George Washburn, "Mohammedan Power in the Orient," The Chautauquan Oct., 1909, pp. 251-257. Our Own Correspondent," The Situation in Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 18, Oct. 30, 1878, p. 354. Our Own Correspondent, "Christian Children Held as Slaves," The Christian Union, Vol. 18, Dec. 25, 1878, p. 560. Our Own Correspondent, "Some Startling Results of the Late War," The Christian Union, Vol. 19, Mar. 12, 1879, p. 242. Our Own Correspondent, "The Third of May in Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 19, June 11, 1879, p. 528. Our Own Correspondent, "English Moral Suasion in Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 20, Sept. "3, 1879, p. 186. Our Own Correspondent, "Religious Liberty In Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 20, Nov. 12, 1879, pp. 390-1. Our Own Correspondent, "England and Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 20, Dec. 31, 1879, p. 570. Our Own Correspondent, "Terrible Condition of Asiatic Turkey," The Christian Union, Vol. 21, May 5, 1880, pp. 413-14. Our Own Correspondent, "The Armenian Question," The Christian Union, Vol. 21, Mar. 3, 1880, pp. 196-197. Our Own Correspondent, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," The Christian Union, Vol. 22, Nov. 3, 1880, pp. 370-1. An Eastern Statesman, "The New Bulgaria," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 35, June, 1879, pp. 503-519. An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Tur key," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 35, July, 1879, pp. 740-755. An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Tur key," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 36, Oct. 1879, pp. 334-349. 274 An Eastern Statesman, "Life in Constantinople Fifty Years Ago," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 36, Dec., 1879, pp. 601—616. An Eastern Statesman, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 37, Feb. 1880, pp. 334-356. An Eastern Statesman, "The Armenian Question," The contem porary Review, Vol. 37, Apr. 1880, pp. 533-547. An Eastern Statesman, "What Can a Liberal Government Do for Turkey," The contemporary Review, Vol. 37, June, 1880 pp. 893-904. An Eastern Statesman, "The Impending Crisis in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 38, Sept., 1880, pp. 508-517. ______. "Panlslamism and the Caliphate," The Contem porary Review, Vol. 43, Jan., 1883, pp. 57-68. An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 48, Oct., 1885, pp. 585-595. An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 50, Oct., 1886, pp. 583-593. An Old Resident, "Is Constantinople Worth Fighting For?" The Contemporary Review, Vol. 51, Jan., 1887, pp. 45-56. An Old Resident, "Contemporary Life and Thought in Turkey," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 53, Apr., 1888, pp. 608- 624. An Old Resident, "The Fate of the East," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 61, June, 1892, pp. 842-854. George Washburn, "Christianity and Mohammedanism— their points of Conflict and Contrast," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 64, Nov., 1893, pp. 654-669. An Eastern Resident, "Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 67, Jan., 1895, pp. 43-53. 275 ______. "Armenia and the Powers: From Behind the Scenes," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 69, May, 1896, pp. 628- 643. ______. "The Constantinople Massacre," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 70, Oct., 1896, pp. 457-465. ______. "The Sultan and the Powers," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 71, May, 1897, pp. 622-630. George Washburn, "The Coming of the Slav," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 73, Jan. 1898, pp. 1-14. George Washburn, "The Early History of the Turks," The Con temporary Review, Vol. 80, 1901, pp. 249-263, George Washburn, "Achmet Vefik Pacha," The Independent, Vol. 30, Feb. 14, 1878, p. 4. George Washburn, "Bulgaria and the Congress," The Independent, Vol. 30, June 27, 1878, pp. 1-2. Stamboul, "How the Treaty of Berlin Works in European Tur key The_JLnde£endent, Vol. 30, Nov. 14, 1878, p. 2. George Washburn, "The Treaty of Berlin and Religious Liberty," The Independent, Vol. 31, Mar. 6, 1879, pp. 1-2. George Washburn, "The Present Condition of the Russian Empire," The Independent, Vol. 32, Jan. 22, 1880, pp. 3-4. George Washburn, "Turkey and the Liberal Government in England," The Independent, Vol. 32, June 17, 1880, p. 1. George Washburn, "Montenegro," The Independent, Vol. 32, Sept. 30, 1880, p. 2. George Washburn, "Every Medium a Fraud," The Independent, Vol. 32, Nov. 18, 1880, pp. 5-6. George Washburn, "Every Medium a Fraud," The Independent, Vol. 32, Sec. 23, 1880, pp. 1-2. George Washburn, "Professor Phelps on Home Missions," The Independent, Vol. 33, July 14, 1881, pp. 3-4. George Washburn, "The Exile of Mithad Pacha," The Independent, Vol. 33, Aug. 25, 1881, p. 1. 276 George Washburn, "The American Board," The Independent, Vol. 33, Nov. 17, 1881, pp. 2-3. George Washburn, "The Mohammedan Messiah," The Independent, Vol. 33, Dec. 22, 1881, p. 1. George Washburn, "Horace Maynard," The Independent, Vol. 34, May 11, 1882, pp. 4-5. George Washburn, "Foreign Missions," The Independent, Vol. 34, June 15, 1882, p. 1. George Washburn, "Troubles in the Western Turkey Mission," The Independent, Vol. 34, Nov. 30, 1882, pp. 3-4. George Washburn, "The Inspiration of the Koran," The Inde pendent, Vol. 35, Mar. 8, 1883, p. 1. George Washburn, "Religious Liberty in Bulgaria," The Inde pendent, Vol. 35, May 3, 1883, p. 2. George Washburn, "The Turkish Missions," The Independent, Vol. 35, June 28, 1883, p. 1. George Washburn,"The Turkish Missions," The Independent, Vol. 35, July 5, 1883, p. 1. George Washburn, "The Turkish Missions," The Independent, Vol. 35, July 19, 1883, pp. 2-3. George Washburn, "An Outside View of Co-operation at Constan tinople," The Independent, Vol. 36, July 17, 1884, pp. 4-5. George Washburn, "Baptism in the East," The Independent, Vol. 36, Aug. 7, 1884, p. 1. George Washburn, "The Kingdom of Heaven and Its Law," The Independent, Vol. 36, Oct. 30, 1884, p. 1. George Washburn, "The Patriarch Nurses," The Independent, Vol. 36, Dec. 11, 1884, p. 1. George Washburn, "The Revolution in the Balkan Peninsula," The Independent, Vol. 37, Oct. 29, 1885, pp. 1381- 1382. George Washburn, "Bulgaria and Europe," The Independent, Vol. 37, Dec. 1.0, 1885, pp. 1589-1590. 277 George Washburn, "Bulgaria and Servia," The Independent, Vol. 37, Dec. 31, 1885, p. 1703. George Washburn, "Christianity and the Labor Question," The Independent, Vol. 37, Oct. 22, 1885, pp. 1350- 1352. George Washburn, "England and the East," The Independent, * Vol. 37, July 16, 1885, p. 2. George Washburn, "William E. Forster," The Independent, Vol. 38, May 13, 1886, pp. 2-3. George Washburn, "Bulgaria and Europe," The Independent, Vol. 38, July 1, 1886, pp. 2-3. George Washburn, "The Triumph of Russia in Bulgaria," The Independent, Vol. 38, Oct. 7, 1886, p. 1. George Washburn, "Bulgaria After the Abdication of Prince Alexander," The Independent, Vol. 38, Nov. 4> 1886, p. 1. George Washburn, "Peace or War," The Independent, Vol. 39, Mar. 24, 1887, p. 2. George Washburn, "The Situation in Bulgaria," The Independ ent, Vol. 39, Apr. 7, 1887, p. 1. George Washburn, "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Russia," The Independent, Vol. 39, May 19, 1887, pp. 1-2. George Washburn', "The European Situation," The Independent, Vol. 39, Aug. 18, 1887, pp. 1-2. George Washburn, "English Politics," The Independent, Vol. 39, Dec. 29, 1887, p. 1. George Washburn, "Mohammedan Doctrine," The Independent, Vol. 40, Feb. 9, 1888, p. 1. George Washburn, "The Impending War," The Independent, Vol. 40, Mar. 8, 1888, p. 1. George Washburn, "Bulgaria and Europe," The Independent, Vol. 40, Apr. 19, 1888, pp. 1-2. George Washburn, "By Rail to Constantinople," The Independent, Vol. 40, Oct. 11, 1888, pp. 2-3. 278 George Washburn, "The Famine in Russia," The Independent, Vol. 44, Jan. 21, 1892, pp. 2-3. George Washburn, "Mohammedanism in the United States," The Independent, Vol. 46, Apr. 5, 1894, p. 1. George Washburn, "The Congress of Religions," The Independent, Vol. 47, Jan. 24, 1895, pp. 1-2. An Old Resident of Constantinople, "The Art of Conversation," The Independent, Vol. 47, May 30, 1895, p. 6. George Washburn, "The Present State of Europe," The Independ ent , Vol. 48, Feb. 6, 1896, pp. 9-10. George Washburn, "International Politics at Constantinople," The Independent, Vol. 48, May 15, 1896, pp. 301-302. George Washburn, "Turkey and the Balance of Power in Europe," The Independent, Vol. 48, Dec. 3, 1896, p. 1637. George Washburn, "Bishop Potter on England and America," The Independent, Vol. 50, Feb. 24, 1898, pp. 238-239. George Washburn, "Europe and the United States," The Independ ent , Vol. 50, June 9, 1898, pp. 747-748. George Washburn, "England and America," The Independent, Vol. 50, Aug. 11, 1898, pp. 381-383. George Washburn, "Russia and Macedonia," The Independent, Vol. 55, Nov. 19, 1903, p .272. George Washburn, "Imperialism," The Independent, Vol. 57, Nov. 3, 1904, pp. 1001-1003. George Washburn, "The Outlook in Turkey," The Independent, Vol. 66, May 6, 1909, pp. 948-951. George Washburn, "The War in the Balkans," The Independent, Vol. 73, Oct. 31, 1912, pp. 991-994. George Washburn, "Probable Influence of the Turkish Revolution on the Faith of Islam," Journal of Race Development, Vol. I, Jan., 1911, pp. 302-315. Our Special Correspondent, New York Daily Tribune, 1862-1864. Our Special Correspondent, New York Tribune, 1865-1871. 279 George Washburn, "The New Turkey," Outlook Vol. 91, May 15, 1909, pp. 114-117. BOOKS George Washburn, The Deaconesses of Kaiserwerth on the Rhine, Boston: Deaconess House, May 27, 1869. George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911. George Washburn, Pamphlet Series, Woman's Work in the Church, New York: Sanford, Cushing and Co. Printers, 18 69. George Washburn, Robert College, Constantinople,Its Work and Its Needs. : Gilliss Press, 1904.