CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE REGULAR MEETING City Hall Conference Room, 1000 San Pablo Avenue Thursday, May 15, 2014 – 7:30-9:00 p.m. *NOTE DATE CHANGE FROM REGULAR MEETING SCHEDULE DUE TO HOLIDAY

1. CALL TO ORDER

2. ROLL CALL

3. APPROVAL OF MINUTES

3-1. March 24, 2014

4. PUBLIC COMMENT

5. ANNOUNCEMENTS/COMMUNICATIONS

6. DISCUSSIONS AND POSSIBLE ACTIONS ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

6-1. Finalize review of election methods report and associated documents to forward to the City Council: a. Receive information from staff inquiry to Registrar of Voters regarding Ranked Choice Voting and At Large Ranked Choice Voting capabilities b. Review final draft report appendix regarding review of election methods (Jordan) c. Review consolidated responses to questions raised by City Council Member Thomsen

6-2. Resolution recommending development of a Draft Charter Amendment regarding a Transition to Use of Ranked Choice Voting at Large a. Discuss procedures for submitting items to the City Council

6-3. Albany Unified School District Board of Education request to eliminate Term Limits a. Review request from the AUSD BOE as received by the City Council and referred to the Committee b. Begin identifying process for developing pro/con analysis of potential impacts on the City Charter and possible language for Charter Amendment to present to the City Council

7. FUTURE AGENDA ITEMS

8. ADJOURNMENT

Attachments: 1. Report regarding review of election methods – revised appendices final draft (Jordan) 2. Consolidated responses to questions raised by Council Member Thomsen final draft 3. Resolution Recommending Development Of A Draft Charter Amendment Regarding A Transition To Use Of Ranked Choice Voting At Large 4. Email from City Council regarding Advisory Body Procedures 5. Excerpt from Advisory Body Manual 6. AUSD BOE Resolution 2013-14-09 Board of Education Term Limits

CRC 05/15/14 Attachment 1

Appendix: Albany Potential Election Methods Review Research

The Albany Charter Review Committee (“CRC”) selected the following four potential at large methods of electing Albany’s City Council and Board of Education. The Committee ruled out district-based methods owing to Albany’s small size.

1. Plurality at large (Albany’s current election method) 2. Cumulative at large 3. Limited at large 4. Ranked choice at large

The CRC selected the following criteria as most relevant to Albany for judging these methods.

• Low cost • High voter turnout • Diversity of viewpoints • More candidates/competitive elections • Simplicity/ease of use • Stable/effective government

These criteria were selected after gathering input from the City Council, the School Board, and the City Manager. The School Board suggested the “more candidates/competitive elections” criterion. This was motivated by the low number of candidates running for School Board seats typically. Former City Manager Beth Pollard suggested the “stable/effective government” criterion out of interest in maintaining consistent policy direction.

The research below regards how well each election method satisfies each criterion. There is a section for each criteria in the order listed above. Within each section the methods are presented from the most to least in accord with each criterion.

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Low Cost

Different costs may be associated with conducting elections by each method. One-time costs may also be incurred to switch to a new method. The cost of running an election using an alternate to the current method could be borne exclusively by either the City, the Albany Unified School District (“AUSD”) or split between them depending upon which adopts the alternative and if they adopt the same alternative.

Table 1 contains cost estimates for a first election and subsequent elections using each method. These are explained further below.

Table 1. Higher end cost estimates using the four methods under consideration. Implementation of ranked choice voting is dependent either on the Registrar acquiring a new system or the Secretary of State approving vote tallying by an outside vendor.

First Later Sources of cost Sources of cost increase Voting method election election increase compared to compared to plurality cost cost plurality plurality $ 35,000 $ 35,000 limited $ 45,000 voter education $ 35,000 cumulative $ 45,000 voter education $ 40,000 ongoing education ranked choice – $ 75,000 one-time equipment charge, $ 55,000 ongoing charge by Registrar with voter education, additional Registrar, ongoing tally by vendor work by Registrar, tally by education, tally by vendor vendor ranked choice – $ 65,000 one-time equipment charge, $ 45,000 ongoing charge by Registrar only voter education, additional Registrar, ongoing work by Registrar, tally by education vendor ($10,000 less if the count can be done by the Registrar)

Plurality

The City of Albany (“City”) contracts with the Registrar of Voters of Alameda County (“Registrar”) to conduct its elections. The Registrar currently charges $3-5 per registered voter to provide election services without regard to the number of local offices or measures appearing on the ballot1. Albany had 10,212 registered voters at the time of the fall 2010 election2, implying a $31,000 to $51,000 charge from the Registrar to conduct Albany’s elections. Albany’s budget allocated $35,000 for the 2012 election, which is the amount shown on Table 1.

In considering Table 1 and the discussion below, note that the expenses discussed are only incurred during the biannual election years. Consequently the annually amortized cost is half of the amounts presented.

1 http://www.acgov.org/rov/est_election_cost.htm 2 http://www.acgov.org/rov/documents/sovc2010-11-02.pdf

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Limited

The cost to switch to limited voting, or any other method, accrues from two potential sources: legal and election costs.

The cost to prepare any needed legal instrument is unknown. It depends primarily upon who prepares the instrument and the nature of the instrument. To the first, if the City Attorney (“Attorney”) can prepare the instrument, the cost to the City would be negligible presuming the Attorney had sufficient time available for the work. However if outside counsel is required, then there would be a direct cost to the City.

Regarding the nature of the instrument, three approaches were considered by the Committee – a request to the Registrar, an ordinance and a Charter amendment, as explained. In response to a Charter Review Committee inquiry, the City Attorney has offered the opinion a change of election method could only be accomplished by amending the Charter.

For the Board of Education (“Board”) election method, Charter Section 6.01a specifies election of the Board members “at large” and “in the same manner and time as for the members of the Council,” but does not further specify the method. Under this circumstance State Elections Code Section 10600 specifies use of plurality at large. It is unclear if there is latitude to select another at large election method for the Board. If there is this would appear to require a Charter amendment.

A cost would be incurred to put an amendment on the ballot and conduct the election. However this cost is characterized by the City as “very minor1” if the amendment is on the ballot during a regularly scheduled election. So this cost will not be further considered.

The Registrar currently conducts elections in Albany where voters may cast one vote each for one, two or three candidates depending on how many seats are to be filled. Consequently the County equipment can readily conduct an election in which voters have fewer votes than there are seats available. It is doubtful implementation of this method would incur any increase in the Registrar’s charge to the City.

It would be advisable to conduct voter education and outreach as part of the transition to limited voting. The minimum goal of this effort would be to reduce spoiled ballots due to the likely tendency to over vote based on the tendency of some voters to assume they still have the same number of votes. The effort could also set a goal of providing voters information to assist them in deciding how to cast their vote. City and/or Registrar staff time would be required to conduct voter education.

Costs for education are likely to be less than for education efforts associated with a switch to ranked choice as limited is less of a change from the current plurality method. Based on the costs regarding ranked choice below, an education and outreach campaign costing substantially less than $10,000 would likely be sufficient. So the first time election cost shown in Table 1 is the $35,000 for the current plurality method plus $10,000 for education. Because limited is so similar to the single seat methods used elsewhere, education of new Albany residents on an ongoing basis is not needed, so Table 1 does not show any continuing cost increase.

1 http://www.albanyca.org/index.aspx?page=1008#326

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Cumulative

Legally, changing to cumulative voting seems similar to limited voting and so the costs would be similar. Changing to this method for electing the Board would require an amendment if allowable at all.

The County’s current election equipment can likely conduct cumulative voting. This is achieved by listing each candidate’s name as many times as each voter has votes, which in turn is the number of seats to be filled. For instance in a three seat election, each candidate’s name would be listed three times. This allows a voter to mark all three instances of the name, thus casting three votes for that candidate. The method counts the votes cast for each instance of the candidate’s name. The totals for all the instances would be summed by the City Clerk to provide the vote total for each candidate. This would determine the winners.

The only additional cost would likely be for a voter education effort. This is estimated to be the same as the voting education effort of $10,000 for the transition to limited. In addition, an ongoing education effort of $5,000 is suggested because cumulative is not used in elections elsewhere in California and is not similar to methods used elsewhere in California. Consequently voters new to Albany would require education ahead of every election.

Ranked Choice

Changing to ranked choice voting for electing the Council would require passage of an amendment according to the City Attorney. Changing to ranked choice for electing the Board would require an amendment, if legally allowed at all. The legal costs to make this change would be similar to that described above for changing to limited voting by amendment.

If Albany asks the Registrar to implement ranked choice voting, the memorandum of understanding between Berkeley, Oakland, San Leandro and the Registrar indicates Albany need to make a pro-rated contribution to the cost of the ranked choice voting capable equipment upgrade. The size of this cost is not known. The amount contributed by each city1 divided by the number of registered voters in each city2 yields a one-time charge of about $3.20 per registered voter, which suggests the one-time charge to Albany would be around $32,000 This “included necessary hardware, firmware, software upgrades, voter outreach, voter education, training for poll workers and special mailings.” In other words the charge included equipment upgrade, election worker training and voter education. Most of these are one-time costs.

There are some ongoing costs included in the charge for the initial election. These are for producing the ballot card, which is separate from those for the other races being conducted in the same consolidated election, and for administration, which includes counting and auditing the extra cards. Berkeley estimated

1 http://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=1208037&GUID=520CDD2A-FF98-41C8-87B2-2FD4DEDF0E61 2 http://www.acgov.org/rov/documents/sovc2010-11-02.pdf

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this ongoing cost as $80,000.1 As Albany has about 9% as many registered voters as Berkeley, this implies the ongoing additional charge by the Registrar for ranked choice would be about $7,000.

The County’s current election equipment can collect the vote data for a multi-seat ranked choice election, but cannot count the data. However, the current system produces data files, known as “ballot image files,” that records each ranked choice vote.2 The votes as represented in the ballot image file can be counted by a third party vendor. For instance, the vendor TrueBallot estimates its cost to count a multi-seat ranked choice election for Albany using data produced by the County’s system would be $5,000 to $10,0003. TrueBallot currently conducts the multi-seat ranked choice election for Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the single seat ranked choice elections in Portland, Maine, and Takoma Park, Maryland. TrueBallot would perform the count both its software and provide a verification count using another method (such as a spreadsheet). This approach would require the Secretary of State’s approval.

Dominion, the vendor of the election system currently used by the County, has new products undergoing Federal certification that provide for multi-seat ranked choice voting, as well as increasing the number of rankings from three to 11. It is unknown if and when Alameda County would acquire and deploy these one of these products. Continued use of ranked choice voting in other cities would provide an incentive to do so because the new system would substantially reduce problems related to the limitation to three rankings. If the County acquires this system, the additional cost to have a third party vendor count the votes would be eliminated. This is reflected on the last row on Table 1.

1 http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/uploadedFiles/Clerk/Level_3_-_City_Council/2010/02Feb/2010-02- 09_Item_16a_Council_Findings_for_Ranked_Choice_Voting.pdf 2 For an example, see http://www.acgov.org/rov/rcv/results2010-11-02/BerkeleyCouncilD7/ballot_image.txt. This shows the ranked choice votes for the District 7 Berkeley City Council election in 2010. A document explaining the content of the ballot image file is available at http://www.acgov.org/rov/rcv/results2010-11- 02/ballot_image_help.pdf. 3 Email correspondence from Caleb Kleppner of TrueBallot on 22 July 2012

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High Voter Turnout

The percentage of the potential electorate choosing to participate in an election may vary from method to method.

Ranked Choice

Single seat ranked choice voting has been used to elect the San Francisco Supervisors since 2004 and the Berkeley, Oakland and San Leandro Council members since 2010. Each city used the two-round runoff method previously, although the threshold to trigger a runoff in Berkeley was 40% of the vote rather than 50% as in the other cities.

Comparing registered voter turnout in the instant runoff versus previous elections provides an opportunity to determine if the choice of method had any effect on turnout. Oakland and San Leandro conducted their primary elections in June as compared to conducting the ranked choice elections in November. Consequently results from these elections are not considered due to the substantial difference in turnout between June and November elections. San Francisco and Berkeley conducted their primaries in November, affording comparison with the subsequent ranked choice elections conducted in November.

San Francisco initiated district elections in 2000 during a presidential election. District primary elections were subsequently conducted in 2002, providing a 1:1 ratio of district primaries conducted during presidential and non-presidential elections. Turnout in these elections was compared to turnout in the ranked choice district elections from 2004 to 2010. The 2012 elections results were not included so that the ranked choice election results considered also had a 1:1 ratio of presidential to non-presidential elections. Data for two San Francisco mayoral and city attorney elections prior to the use of ranked choice voting and two after its implementation were also included in the analysis for completeness.

Results from Berkeley’s 2002 election onward are available from the Alameda County Registrar’s web site. The pre ranked choice elections in this set have a presidential to non presidential election ratio of 1:1 as do the ranked choice elections. Turnout data for these elections are presented in Table 2. Turnout data for these Berkeley elections and the 1999 to 2010 San Francisco elections are presented in Table 2.

San Francisco reports the percent of registered voters that cast a ballot. This statistic counts all voters that cast a ballot, even if it was blank for some of the contests, such as those for city council or supervisor. For instance a voter that only casts a vote for president would be counted as turning out in the election. Table 2 shows these reported turnout values. Alameda County commenced reporting this same statistic several elections ago, also shown on Table 2. For prior elections on Table 2, the percent turnout shown was calculated from the total number of registered voters and total number of ballots cast, both reported by the Registrar.

Because reported turnout is not specific to the local elections, Table 2 also lists the number of registered voters reported for each election and the number of voters that cast a vote, and so participated in the city contests, by summing the votes for all those candidates. The percent of registered voters participating in each contest was calculated by dividing the number of participating voters by the number of registered voters. Earlier elections did not report the number of overvotes in each context, so these were discounted from the total reported in later elections.

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Table 2. Voter turnout and contest participation in select San Francisco and Berkeley elections

San Francisco Board of Supervisors Berkeley City Council # year year district turnout # reg. # part. % part. district turnout # reg. part. % part. Mayor 42.47% 464380 194211 41.82%

2011 Attorney 42.47% 464380 183238 39.46% 2 62.41% 46359 24030 51.83% 2 73.11% 9354 5797 61.97% 4 58.94% 39182 17179 43.84% 3 68.41% 9574 5174 54.04% 6 54.49% 45982 20269 44.08% 5 80.76% 10855 7976 73.48% 2010 2012 8 71.59% 53851 34892 64.79% 6 77.67% 10226 5952 58.20% 10 71.70% 39796 17705 44.49% Mayor 73.68% 82194 52750 64.18% 1 78.40% 40428 28686 70.96% 1 68.04% 9444 5685 60.20% 3 77.31% 38916 27067 69.55% 4 57.74% 9885 4740 47.95%

4 77.32% 40907 29316 71.66% 2010 7 46.83% 10383 4177 40.23% 5 79.67% 51683 35513 68.71% 8 49.86% 10696 4593 42.94% 2008 7 80.88% 45337 30986 68.35% 9 79.27% 36437 26387 72.42% 11 74.58% 36083 24537 68.00% Mayor 35.62% 419598 143359 34.17%

2007 Attorney 35.62% 419598 114561 27.30% 2 62.76% 42788 20,458 47.81% 2 77.60% 9124 5528 60.59% 4 60.79% 36660 19,814 54.05% 3 77.29% 9526 4654 48.86% 6 55.94% 36119 17,941 49.67% 4 75.01% 11038 6158 55.79%

2006 8 70.90% 50323 31,343 62.28% 2008 5 86.16% 11017 8197 74.40% 10 49.77% 34037 14,094 41.41% 6 83.50% 10831 7182 66.31% Mayor 77.54% 86020 54396 63.24% 1 74.63% 42552 28,787 67.65% 1 71.96% 8580 4872 56.78% 2 82.24% 49772 34,308 68.93% 4 64.31% 8492 4355 51.28% 3 74.11% 39672 25,771 64.96% 7 54.17% 8608 3989 46.34% 2006 5 75.25% 54056 35,109 64.95% 8 55.84% 9463 4311 45.56% 2004 7 79.68% 45050 31,639 70.23% Mayor 66.16% 69780 40729 58.37% 9 73.83% 36562 24,733 67.65% 11 69.40% 36713 23,039 62.75% Mayor 45.67% 459213 208008 45.30%

2003 Attorney 45.67% 459213 196892 42.88% 2 52.69% 45974 19,899 43.28% 2 73.04% 8424 4933 58.56% 4 52.97% 38613 18,078 46.82% 3 74.83% 8593 5170 60.17%

6 43.55% 35541 12,977 36.51% 2004 5 86.86% 10598 7751 73.14% 2002 8 58.88% 54182 27,101 50.02% 6 83.07% 10397 7261 69.84%

10 38.39% 39290 9,977 25.39% 1 69.80% 40413 24,211 59.91% 1 64.47% 8389 4627 55.16% 2 69.80% 54716 27,070 49.47% 4 56.53% 8318 4187 50.34% 3 65.10% 38210 21,066 55.13% 7 46.90% 9465 4061 42.91% 2002 4 70.10% 39814 24,617 61.83% 8 50.48% 10048 4755 47.32% 5 63.90% 56500 30,125 53.32% Mayor 58.94% 70184 40142 57.20% 6 53.50% 43797 18,738 42.78% 2000 7 74.70% 45354 30,229 66.65% 8 74.50% 52087 34,178 65.62% 9 66.00% 36000 20,972 58.26% 10 57.20% 41776 19,764 47.31% 11 65.90% 37969 21,409 56.39% Mayor 44.90% 453151 129863 28.66%

1999 Attorney 44.90% 453151 179013 39.50%

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For comparison, the same data is presented for Albany’s City Council elections on Table 3. For all but the 2004 election, the number of participating voters is not available in City Council and Board of Education races. For the 2004 election, the Registrar reported the number of blank ballots for each contest, which allowed calculation of the total number of voters participating in the Council election that year.

Table 3. Election turnout in select Albany elections (and participation in 2004).

voters year turning participating note seats registered out # % 2012 3 79.51% 10,747 2010 2 70.96% 10,212 2008 3 83.27% 10,672 2006 2 73.19% 9,207 2004 3 81.25% 10,128 7,063 69.74% Registrar reports "blank voted" 2002 2 63.89% 9,089

The average turnout and contest participation in Berkeley and San Francisco are shown on Table 4. Average turnout in San Francisco increased and voter participation in the Supervisor contest increased more. Average turnout in Berkeley declined, but voter participation in the Council contest declined less. The average turnout in Albany is shown for comparison.

Table 4. Average from Table 2 of election turnout and contest participation in Berkeley and San Francisco prior to and after ranked choice with average Albany turnout from Table 3 shown for comparison

Average voter Average voter Participation Number of turnout for participation relative to City elections election in contest turnout prior after prior after prior after prior after Albany 6 75.3%

Berkeley 19 9 69.2% 66.2% 57.1% 55.9% 82.5% 84.4% San Francisco 20 28 57.9% 66.1% 48.8% 57.3% 84.2% 86.6%

Election method is only one factor that can potentially affect turnout as defined by the Alameda Registrar and San Francisco Board of Elections. While turnout in Berkeley and San Francisco changed after the implementation of ranked choice, this may not be causal because ranked choice is used in only some of the local races that likely drive only a small part of the turnout. From this perspective turnout can be considered a control with voter participation the variable. This leads to the final column on Table 4. This shows the participation in the local contests as a percent of the election turnout. Voter participation in Berkeley and San Francisco, as a percent of turnout, increased similarly (1.9% and 2.4% respectively). This suggests moving to ranked choice in Albany would increase voter participation in its elections of representatives. However this analysis regards single-seat ranked choice whereas it would be multi seat in Albany.

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Multi-seat ranked choice voting has only been used consistently to elect a city council and school board in one location in the United States over the last decade, or indeed the last forty years: Cambridge, Massachusetts. Table 5 compares voter turnout in Cambridge to demographically similar cities using traditional methods in Massachusetts, with Somerville the most similar, Medford slightly higher income, and Worcester becoming slightly lower income during the study period.1

Table 5. Average turnout in four Massachusetts cities (% of registered voters) City 1961-1969 1971-1979 1981-1993 Cambridge 67% 59% 54% Somerville 68% 64% 46% Medford 59% 55% 44% Worcester 64% 51% 45%

Cambridge’s form of government during the period and continuing until today is council-city manager, like Albany’s. At the beginning of the study period, Medford and Worcester had the same form of government, but Somerville had a strong mayor form of government. Turnout in Cambridge at that time was similar to Somerville and a bit higher than Medford and Worcester, suggesting ranked choice voting caused a modest increase in turnout in Cambridge.

Turnout in all the cities declined with time in accord with national trends. In 1987, Medford and Worcester switched to a strong mayor form of government. This corresponded to a short term boost in turnout in those cities compared to previous elections. Still, turnout in those cities as well as Somerville, which had a strong mayor form of government throughout the period, declined much more than in Cambridge during the study period. This resulted in a Cambridge turnout about 10% higher than the other cities at the end of the period.

While this is the single finding that could be identified specific to the effect of ranked choice voting on turnout in a municipal context in recent decades in the United States, it does comport with research on turnout in proportional representation versus non-proportional methods at the national level. Farrell (2011) found the former had 3% higher turnout in the most recent election prior to 20102 while Lijphart (19943 and 19994) found turnout was 9% greater in more comprehensive surveys.

Limited and Cumulative

Comparative voter turnout information for limited and cumulative voting could not be identified. However as there is a recognized relationship between proportionality and voter turnout as described above, this can inform a rough estimate of the likely effect of these methods on turnout. As these methods are semi-proportional as explained under in the diversity of representation section below, it is likely they

1 http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=254 2 David M. Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction, 2nd Edition (Palgrave Macmillan: Great Britain, 2011), pp. 224-226. 3 Arend Lijphart, 1994. Democracies: Forms, Performance, and Constitutional Engineering. European Journal of Political Research 25: 1-17. 4 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Governmental Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (Yale University Press: New Haven, Connecticut, 1999), pp. 284-286.

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would increase turnout as compared to plurality , but not as much as the more proportional ranked choice voting method.

Plurality

As shown above, voter participation in Albany City Council elections averaged 62.4% using the current plurality at large method. This is higher than in Cambridge using the multi-seat ranked choice method. Consequently changing to a more proportional election method might not increase turnout as much in Albany as has been found elsewhere.

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Diversity of Viewpoints

Different electoral methods can result in different portions of the electorate succeeding in electing a candidate supported by that portion of the electorate. Methods that result in each portion of the electorate electing a nearly equal portion of the governing body are termed proportional. Methods that result in some portions of the electorate electing a much larger or smaller portion of the governing body, even to the extreme of electing the entire governing body or no members of the body, are termed non- proportional.

Because proportional methods result in a greater range of the electorate successfully electing a candidate, they result in a diversity of perspectives on the governing body that more closely matches that in the community, given the limits of representative government. Non-proportional methods can result in the perspectives of large segments of the electorate being under or, in the extreme, un represented. These outcomes are shown schematically on Figure 1 for the four methods considered and for a situation of two predominant perspectives among the voters.

Figure 1. Outcomes of the different methods given optimal versus bullet or split voting by voters holding two predominant perspectives.

Ranked Choice

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“Votes optimally” on Figure 1 means voters with a shared perspective cast all their votes for the same candidates. “Split votes” means voters with a shared perspective cast all their votes but for more candidates than there are available seats. Ranked choice ameliorates split voting by the vote transfer process during counting. “Bullet votes” means voters with a shared perspective do not cast all their votes. This occurs when these voters vote for fewer candidates than there are seats to be filled. One reason voters bullet vote is to minimize the risk of a second preferred candidate gaining election over the most preferred candidate. Ranked choice ameliorates this reason for bullet voting by allowing the voter to rank second preferred candidates second such that the voters vote only accrues to that candidate if the first preferred candidate is eliminated.

Ranked choice voting, when used to elect multiple candidates at the same time, is a proportional method as shown on Figure 1. It results in like-minded voters electing a proportion of the governing body equal to their proportion of the electorate, as long as this proportion is larger than a certain minimum amount. This minimum is dependent on the number of seats to be filled. In the case of Albany’s staggered two/three seat elections, the proportions to elect a candidate would be a third (approximately 33.3%) and a quarter (25%) plus one vote, respectively. Because of these thresholds, ranked choice voting in Albany would result in a minimum of 75% of the electorate participating in electing members to the governing bodies, and so a greater diversity of perspective on those bodies.

It is perhaps easiest to understand how ranked choice produces these results through a visual demonstration. Such is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNxwMdI8OWw.

The potential of ranked choice to increase the diversity of representation is borne out by historical results. For instance detailed studies of five cities in Ohio that used multi-seat ranked choice in earlier decades of the 20th century found it did result in members of racial and ethnic minority groups being elected for the first time under the method, or such members occupying a larger share of seats.1 This effect was featured in the repeated repeal campaigns in each city, which were typically pursued by the group that had been in power before ranked choice was implemented.2

More recently multi seat ranked choice provided for the election of the first Asian American to the City Council of Cambridge.3 This candidate was the last to gain office in 2009 as the tally proceeded. In the 2011 election this candidate was the first to gain office.4 Cambridge elects a nine-member Council simultaneously every two years, so the election threshold is 10%. The population of Cambridge was 15% Asian American in 2010 according to the U.S Census.

The above histories focus on ethnic and racial representation outcomes from ranked choice. This should not be taken as implying that the Charter Review Committee’s focus is on such representation. Rather the Committee’s focus is diversity of perspective. However historical data regarding diversity of perspective, given that all instances of municipal ranked choice have been non partisan, is not readily available.

1 Kathleen L. Barber, A Right to Representation: Proportional Election Systems for the Twenty-First Century (Ohio State University Press: Columbus, Ohio, 2000), p. 121. 2 Ibid., p. 117. 3 http://www.wickedlocal.com/cambridge/news/x1972893063/Cambridge-election-results- announced#axzz29j2SaA00 4 http://www.cambridgeday.com/2011/11/22/analysis-of-cheung-reelection-campaign-wow/

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Consequently the histories above are relied on to discern if ranked choice does result in an increase in diversity.

Cumulative

Cumulative voting is a semi-proportional method1. Under this method voters have a number of votes equal to the number of seats, like plurality, but may cast as many votes for a candidate as they like. Because of this smaller groups of like-minded voters are more able to elect a representative than under plurality by focusing all their votes on that candidate.

This method is semi proportional though because the outcome is highly dependent upon how many candidates run on what positions and how like-minded voters concentrate or distribute their vote among them, as shown on Figure 1. For instance if numerous candidates run to represent a small but still substantial proportion of voters, and those voters cast votes uniformly for all these candidates, those voters may not elect a representative at all due to splitting their vote. Consequently the diversity of the resulting representation will be significantly less than the diversity of perspectives held by significant groups of voters in the community.

A study of cumulative outcomes indicates it resulted in the election of racial minority candidates as compared to the previous plurality methods in these locations.2

Limited

Limited voting, like cumulative, is a semi-proportional method3. The diversity of representation resulting from this method is likewise dependent on the number of candidates that run on particular positions and how like-minded voters concentrate or distribute their vote among them as shown in Figure 1. In this sense limited voting could result in less diversity of representation than cumulative.

A study of limited outcomes indicates it resulted in the election of racial minority candidates as compared to the previous plurality methods in these locations.4 The study was inconclusive regarding whether limited or cumulative resulted in more diversity of representation.5

Plurality

Plurality voting provides each voter a number of votes equal to the number of seats and requires voters to cast only one vote for each of their preferred candidates. In this manner plurality voting expresses that some voters can expect to elect 100% of the representatives and others none. For instance, if a like- minded group of voters constitutes a majority of the electorate, and only as many candidates supported by those voters as there are seats available run, then it is impossible for any other group of like-minded

1 Douglas J. Amy, Behind the Ballot Box: A Citizen’s Guide to Voting Systems (Praeger: Westport, Connecticut, 2000), p. 108. 2 Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and David Brockington, Electoral Reform and Minority Representation: Local Experiments with Alternative Elections (The Ohio State University Press: Columbus, Ohio, 2003), p. 95-96. 3Amy, p. 108. 4 Bowler, Donovan, and Brockington, p. 95-96. 5 Ibid., p. 102

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voters to elect a representative, as shown on Figure 1. As a result up to just less than half the electorate can fail to have any member that it supported on a governing body.

Because plurality does not require a candidate to receive any specified proportion of the vote in order to win, it is also possible for a like-minded group of voters that is less than a majority to elect all the representatives as shown on Figure 1. This can occur if there are three or more prevailing groupings of voters and/or if voters in some groups split or bullet vote more than do voters in other groups.

These effects are well demonstrated by the history of racial representation under plurality at large, which is why this method has been overturned in numerous jurisdictions under the Voting Rights Act as described above under cumulative voting, and more recently under the California Voting Rights Act.

The California Voting Rights Act (CVRA) specifically recognizes that plurality at large can reduce the diversity of representation with regard to groups protected under the Federal Voting Rights Act.1 This has led to numerous jurisdictions abandoning plurality at large in response to legal action brought under the CVRA due to a lack of historic representation of numerically significant racial minorities in those jurisdictions. For instance the City of Modesto (population 200,000) ultimately settled when an appellate court sided with plaintiffs, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case, and Modesto voted to switch to district elections.2 The City had to pay plaintiff’s $3 million in legal fees to settle.

Numerous jurisdictions have since abandoned plurality at large under court direction, as a result of legal action, or the threat of legal action, and many more are currently considering abandonment under similar conditions. The cities of Escondido (population about 145,000), Compton (population about 100,000), and Tulare (population about 60,000) have switched from plurality at large to districts.3, 4 The City of Madera (population about 60,000) changed from plurality at large to district elections in response to a citizen’s advisory committee recommendation,5 although this followed Madera Unified School District switching from plurality at large to district elections by court order.6 Recently, the City Council of Santa Clarita (population about 180,000) voted to switch from plurality at large to cumulative voting for the 2016 election to settle a CVRA law suit.7

Additional cities are in the process of potentially being legally compelled to make a change, including Anaheim (population about 340,000),8 Santa Clarita (population about 180,000),9 Palmdale (population about 155,000),10 Visalia (population about 125,000)11, and Whittier (population about 85,000)12.

1 http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=elec&group=14001-15000&file=14025-14032 2 http://www.modbee.com/2008/06/06/320510/settlement-in-latino-voting-case.html 3 http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-local-elections-20130915,0,295413.story#axzz2oC2LStrg 4 http://www.cvlawblog.com/2010/08/city-of-tulare-sued-for-ca-voting.html 5 http://ballotpedia.org/By-District_Election_of_Madera_City_Council_Members,_City- Wide_Election_of_Mayor,_Measure_E_%28November_2010%29 6 http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/04/local/me-madera4 7 http://www.signalscv.com/section/36/article/116048/ 8 http://www.voiceofoc.org/oc_north/article_b18471c2-6663-11e3-9e3f-001a4bcf887a.html 9 http://www.signalscv.com/archives/101790/ 10 http://hometownstation.com/santa-clarita-news/palmdale-voting-rights-act-ruling-could-change-political- landscape-39256 11 http://www.visaliatimesdelta.com/article/20131221/NEWS01/312210019/Visalia-sued-over-voting 12 http://www.scpr.org/blogs/politics/2013/08/28/14605/latino-activist-pressure-whittier-city-council-to/

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Palmdale recently followed Modesto in failing to successfully defend its use of plurality at large in court, leading more recently to a court decision that will mostly vacate Palmdale’s current City Council ahead of the next regular election.1 The cities of Turlock (population about 70,000)2 and Woodland (population about 55,000) 3 are seeking a switch to districts to preempt possible lawsuits.

The geographically closest instance of a change compelled by action under the California Voting Rights Act is San Mateo County. The County was sued for its use of the from-district method. Under this method, candidates for Supervisor must live in a particular district, but are elected by the entire County. During the suit, the Board of Supervisors voted to put a charter amendment switching to by-district elections on the ballot. By-district elections are what most people think of as district elections, which entail a candidate both living in and being elected by the voters of a district.

The Supervisors put the amendment on the ballot even though they had turned down the recommendation of the County’s Charter Review Committee for such a measure two years previously. In putting the amendment on the ballot, the Supervisors stated they opposed making the switch even though they were compelled to put it before the voters.4 The amendment passed last November with 59% support.5

1 http://hometownstation.com/santa-clarita-news/palmdale-voting-rights-act-ruling-could-change-political- landscape-39256 2 https://turlockcitynews.com/news/item/2408-turlockers-talk-switch-to-district-voting-potential-maps 3 http://www.dailydemocrat.com/breakingnews/ci_24755579/switch-woodland-district-elections-go-november- ballot 4 http://www.mercurynews.com/peninsula/ci_21161087/judge-resets-trial-san-mateo-countys-besieged-voting 5http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/San_Mateo_County_Election_of_Supervisors_Charter_Amendment,_Meas ure_B_%28November_2012%29

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More Candidates/Competitive Elections

The Board of Education expressed interest in an election method that results in more candidates because some of its past elections have been uncontested.

Ranked Choice Versus Plurality

Ranked choice, as applied to multi-seat elections, results in representation approximately in proportion to views held by the electorate. Surveys of results from national elections indicate there are more parties in nations using proportional than plurality methods.1 This indicates more competitive elections as more perspectives are vying for office, and also presumably indicates more candidates competing. However, this result is for national, partisan elections.

Tables 6 through 9 present results for municipal elections based on data available on the world-wide web. All the data is for elections in 2000 and after.

Tables 6 and 7 compare the number of the average number of candidates competing for a seat before and after implementation of ranked choice in the cities in the Bay Area currently using that method. A limitation of this comparison with regard to Albany is that ranked choice is only being used for single seat races in these cities. Still, it is instructive that with just one exception, there is no obvious increase in the number of candidates per seat associated with the shift to ranked choice.

The exception is the Oakland City Council district races where the number of candidates per seat increased substantially. These comprise just 12% of the ranked choice races though. The minimum and maximum number of candidates per seat, which is not shown on the table, remain largely the same as well.

Tables 6 and 7 also show the percentage of uncontested elections in each city. These generally show only small changes except for the Oakland City and School District elections. The percentage of those elections that were uncontested elections decreased dramatically with the implementation of ranked choice. These elections also make up one quarter of the ranked choice elections. This suggests ranked choice may reduce the percentage of uncontested elections. However there are not enough elections yet to statistically affirm this correlation. Even if there were it is unclear if this would be relevant to Albany given its many differences from Oakland and its electoral districts (such as population size).

Because Tables 6 and 7 only regard single seat ranked choice elections, data for the multi seat ranked choice elections in Cambridge, Massachusetts presented in Tables 8 and 9 provides another vantage. To provide context for this data, data for the comparison cities listed in Table 5 is included in Tables 8 and 9.

According to Tables 8 and 9, in general the Cambridge elections have as many to slightly more candidates per seat as the other at large elections, but not significantly so except perhaps for Cambridge versus Medford city elections. Interestingly, there were no uncontested multi seat elections despite there being more seats per election than in Albany.

1 Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction, pp. 234-237.

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Table 6. Number of candidates in Bay Area cities prior to and after implementation of ranked choice. Values are from elections in 2000 and thereafter (for which data is readily available on line). Albany shown for comparison.

Population Average Average Uncontested elections Number of Number of Number of in each seats candidates elections seats candidates City Method Seats election /election /seats Number Percent district (thousands) prior after prior after prior after prior after prior after prior after prior after Albany Plurality Multi 20 7 18 2.6 33 1.8 1 14%

Ranked Berkeley Single 10 21 8 21 8 1 1 59 22 2.8 2.8 1 1 5% 13% choice Ranked Single 400 3 1 3 1 1 1 13 5 4.3 5.0 0 0 0% 0% Oakland1 choice Single 60 18 7 18 7 1 1 47 32 2.6 4.6 5 0 28% 0% Ranked San Francisco Single 70 16 30 16 30 1 1 112 207 7.0 6.9 2 3 13% 10% choice Ranked San Leandro Single 80 6 6 6 6 1 1 17 15 2.8 2.5 1 1 17% 17% choice

Table 7. Number of candidates in Bay Area school districts prior to and after implementation of ranked choice. Values are from elections in 2000 and thereafter (for which data is readily available on line). Albany shown for comparison.

Average Average Uncontested elections Number of Number of Number of Population seats candidates City Method Seats elections seats candidates (thousands) /election /seats Number Percent prior after prior after prior after prior after prior after prior after prior after Albany Plurality Multi 20 7 17 2.4 24 1.4 1 14% Ranked Oakland Single 60 18 7 18 7 1 1 35 13 1.9 1.9 8 2 44% 29% choice

1 Two district sizes are listed for Oakland because it has representatives elected by the entire city as well as by districts within the city.

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Table 8. Number of candidates in comparable cities in Massachusetts with and without ranked choice. Values are from elections in 2000 and thereafter (for which data is readily available on line). Albany shown for comparison.

Average # of Uncontested Population Elec- # of Average City Method Seats seats/ candi- elections (thousands) tions seats candidates election dates /seats Number Percent Albany Plurality Multi 20 7 18 2.6 33 1.8 1 14% Ranked Cambridge Multi 100 6 54 9 112 2.1 0 0% choice Medford Plurality Multi 60 4 24 6 37 1.5 0 0% Multi 80 1 4 4 7 1.8 0 0% Somerville1 Plurality Single 10 7 7 1 10 1.4 4 57% Multi 180 6 36 6 73 2.0 0 0% Worcester2 Plurality Single 40 30 30 1 60 2.0 8 27%

Table 9. Number of candidates in comparable school districts in Massachusetts with and without ranked choice. Values are from elections in 2000 and thereafter (for which data is readily available on line). Albany shown for comparison.

Average # of Uncontested Population Elec- # of Average City Method Seats seats/ candi- elections (thousands) tions seats candidates election dates /seats Number Percent Albany Plurality Multi 20 7 17 2.4 24 1.4 1 14% Ranked Cambridge Multi 100 5 30 6 45 1.5 0 0% choice Medford Plurality Multi 60 4 28 7 40 1.4 0 0% Somerville Plurality Single 80 7 7 1 7 1.0 7 100% Worcester Plurality Multi 180 6 36 6 53 1.5 0 0%

1 Two district sizes are listed for Somerville because it has representatives elected by the entire city as well as by districts within the city. 2 Two district sizes are listed for Worcester because it has representatives elected by the entire city as well as by districts within the city.

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So the results on Tables 6 through 9 suggest the number of candidates per seat is the same to slightly higher in ranked choice elections, and the percentage of uncontested elections is the same to slightly lower than in plurality elections. However the differences are not significant, so it appears at this time as if plurality and ranked choice have the same number of candidates per seat on average and the same proportion of uncontested elections.

Cumulative and Limited

Rather than conduct the effort seeking out, collating and analyzing data for cumulate and limited, it seems reasonable to rely on the results from these methods likely being intermediate in effect between plurality and ranked choice because they are semi-proportional. This perspective suggests that the candidate increase and uncontested election decrease under these methods relative to plurality would be even more subtle than that found for ranked choice.

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Simplicity/Ease of Use

This criterion could regard either the process of physically marking the ballot correctly or the process of deciding how to vote given strategic considerations. The first understanding is the meaning of the criterion for the purpose of this analysis.

The structure of current ballots designed for use with scanning systems generally requires one mark per vote cast. Limited allows one mark on a list of candidates’ names in a single column, even though there are more positions to be filled. Plurality allows any number of marks up to the number of seats to be filled. Cumulative is the same with the additional allowance for marking more than one occurrence of the same candidate’s name. Ranked choice requires marking one candidate’s name in any given column of candidates’ names, and allows marking a different candidate in each column. In Alameda County the number of columns on a ranked choice ballot, and so number of candidate rankings available, is currently three.

A metric of the ease of use of the different methods is the invalid vote rate. Invalid ballots are those that are not marked properly, and so cannot be counted. While some ballots may be improperly marked by mistake even though the voter understands how to mark the ballot, it seems reasonable to presume the invalid vote rate correlates with the proportion of voters that do not understand how to properly mark the ballot.

A comparative survey of election results from nations using different election methods found the percent of invalid ballots in non proportional methods was 1.6% and in proportional methods was 2.1% (considering only countries with non compulsory voting).1 Analysis of the data indicates the difference is not statistically significant (p-value > 0.05).

Locally, the question was studied by analyzing overvotes, a type of invalid vote. Overvoting occurs when a voter marks more than the allowed number of candidates. The rate at which it occurs provides a measure of voters’ understanding of how to vote, and so method complexity.

San Francisco commenced overvote reporting with the 5 February 2008 election. Alameda County commenced overvote reporting with the 2 November 2010 election. All available overvote data for elections in San Francisco and Alameda County with three to seven candidates, and two to three seats in the plurality-at-large and limited elections was considered. Three to seven candidates is the historic range of the number of candidates in Albany. Two to three seats is the historic range of the number of seats to be filled in Albany elections.

Table 10 lists this plurality-at-large overvote data. Table 11 lists this ranked-choice overvote data. Table 12 lists the overvote data for races in the top two primary in June 2012, in which voters were limited to one vote for the two general election positions.

Table 13 lists summary statistics for the overvote rates for each of the methods. Figure 2 shows some of this information as box plots.

1 Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction, p. 226.

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Table 10. Plurality at large elections with reported overvotes, 3 to 7 candidates, and 2 to 3 seats in Alameda and San Francisco Counties # of can- # of Over- % over- Date County Election Vote didates seats votes votes Hayward, Board Member, 6-Nov-12 ALM 7 3 90,807 336 0.37% Unified School District 6-Nov-12 ALM Albany, Member, City Council 7 3 18,403 39 0.21% 6-Nov-12 ALM Alameda, Member, City Council 7 2 48,510 884 1.79% Fremont, Board Member, 6-Nov-12 ALM 6 3 132,572 291 0.22% Unified School District 6-Nov-12 ALM Dublin, Members, City Council 6 2 23,202 320 1.36% 6-Nov-12 ALM Fremont, Member, City Council 6 2 104,743 790 0.75% Emeryville, Member, City 7-Nov-11 ALM 5 3 3,324 33 0.98% Council San Lorenzo, Board Member, 6-Nov-12 ALM 5 3 38,987 102 0.26% Unified School District Castro Valley, Board Member, 6-Nov-12 ALM 5 3 42,713 108 0.25% Unified School District Piedmont, Board Member, 7-Feb-12 ALM 5 3 9,602 0 0.00% Unified School District 7-Nov-11 ALM Newark, Member, City Council 5 2 10,205 22 0.22% Dublin, Board Member, Unified 6-Nov-12 ALM 4 3 31,120 60 0.19% School District New Haven, Board Member, 6-Nov-12 ALM 4 3 39591 72 0.18% Unified School District Livermore, Member, City 7-Nov-11 ALM 4 2 27,900 52 0.19% Council Berkeley, Director, Unified 6-Nov-12 ALM 4 2 71,140 84 0.12% School District Livermore Valley Joint, Board 6-Nov-12 ALM 4 2 47707 46 0.10% Member, Unified School District Pleasanton, Member, City 6-Nov-12 ALM 4 2 46,613 28 0.06% Council Member, Community College 2-Nov-10 SF 3 3 328,155 126 0.04% Board Albany, Board Member, Unified 6-Nov-12 ALM 3 2 10,532 8 0.08% School District Piedmont, Member, City 7-Feb-12 ALM 3 2 6,861 2 0.03% Council

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Table 11. Ranked choice elections with reported overvotes and 3 to 7 candidates in Alameda and San Francisco Counties # of can- Over- % over- Date County Election Vote didates votes votes 6-Nov-12 SF Board of Supervisors, District 5 7 35,147 242 0.68% 6-Nov-12 ALM Oakland, Member, City Council, District 1 7 28,562 149 0.52% 2-Nov-10 ALM Oakland, Member, City Council, District 4 7 20,994 60 0.28% 4-Nov-08 SF Board of Supervisors, District 9 7 26,486 352 1.31% 6-Nov-12 ALM Berkeley, Mayor 6 52,956 157 0.30% 6-Nov-12 ALM Oakland, Member, City Council, District 3 6 21,991 146 0.66% 2-Nov-10 ALM San Leandro, Mayor 6 22,484 59 0.26% 2-Nov-10 SF Board of Supervisors, District 2 6 24,094 97 0.40% 6-Nov-12 ALM Oakland, Member, City Council, At Large 5 143,924 1,071 0.74% 7-Nov-11 SF District Attorney 5 183,487 682 0.37% 6-Nov-12 ALM Oakland, Member, City Council, District 5 4 11,245 83 0.73% San Leandro, Member, City Council, 6-Nov-12 ALM 4 23,090 115 0.50% District 4 7-Nov-11 SF Sheriff 4 183,233 471 0.26% 2-Nov-10 SF Board of Supervisors, District 8 4 34,950 94 0.27% 6-Nov-12 SF Board of Supervisors, District 3 3 23,470 64 0.27% 6-Nov-12 ALM Berkeley, Member, City Council, District 2 3 5,787 16 0.28% 6-Nov-12 ALM Oakland, Member, City Council, District 5 3 14,982 39 0.26% 6-Nov-12 ALM Oakland, School Director, District 3 3 20,580 47 0.23% San Leandro, Member, City Council, 6-Nov-12 ALM 3 25,266 147 0.58% District 2 2-Nov-10 ALM Berkeley, Member, City Council, District 7 3 4,184 5 0.12% 2-Nov-10 ALM Berkeley, Member, City Council, District 8 3 4,601 6 0.13% 2-Nov-10 ALM Oakland, Member, City Council, District 6 3 12,911 12 0.09% San Leandro, Member, City Council, 2-Nov-10 ALM 3 20,044 35 0.17% District 1 4-Nov-08 SF Board of Supervisors, District 4 3 29,439 83 0.28% 4-Nov-08 SF Board of Supervisors, District 5 3 35,513 95 0.27% 4-Nov-08 SF Board of Supervisors, District 7 3 30,986 50 0.16%

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Table 12. Top two primaries with reported overvotes and 3 to 7 candidates in Alameda and San Francisco Counties # of can- Over- % over- Date County Election Vote didates votes votes 5-Jun-12 SF U.S. Representative, District 8 6 119,617 1,181 0.98% 5-Jun-12 ALM State Assembly, 20th District 5 56,665 452 0.79% 5-Jun-12 ALM State Assembly, 18th District 4 62,290 699 1.11% 5-Jun-12 SF State Assembly, District 19 4 55,923 375 0.67% 5-Jun-12 ALM U.S. Representative, 15th District 3 84,478 286 0.34% 5-Jun-12 ALM U.S. Representative, 17th District 3 19,023 30 0.16% 5-Jun-12 ALM State Assembly, 25th District 3 15,537 57 0.37% 5-Jun-12 SF U.S. Representative, District 12 3 16,265 112 0.68%

Table 13. Overvote rate statistics for data in Tables 10 to 12

Plurality Ranked Top-two Statistic at large choice primary # of contests 20 26 8 average 0.37% 0.39% 0.64% median 0.20% 0.28% 0.67% standard 0.48% 0.27% 0.33% deviation skewness 2.03 1.83 -0.03 kurtosis 3.57 4.33 -1.11 minimum 0.00% 0.09% 0.16% maximum 1.79% 1.31% 1.11% 1st quartile 0.09% 0.26% 0.36% 3rd quartile 0.20% 0.28% 0.67%

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Figure 2. Overvote box plots for plurality at large, ranked choice and limited

The skewness of the plurality at large and ranked choice populations indicates a parametric test of significance is not appropriate for comparing the populations. Consequently the non parametric Whitney- Mann test was used to test the significance of the difference between populations. This indicates the overvote rates for top-two primaries, a form of limited, are significantly higher than the rates for ranked choice, which is significantly higher in turn than the plurality-at-large rates using a 0.05 p-value, two- tailed criterion.

However the median ranked-choice rate is only higher than the plurality-at-large rate by 8 votes per 10,000, the mean is only higher by 2 votes per 10,000, and the maximum overvote rate for plurality at large was higher than for ranked choice as indicated on Figure 2. So while the overvote rates for ranked choice are significantly higher than for plurality at large statistically, the absolute difference is so small as to be functionally insignificant with regard to the minimum historic margins in all the elections.

The overvote rate for the limited vote top-two primaries is significantly higher than for ranked choice statistically. The absolute difference in the medians is 39 votes per 10,000 and in the means is 25 votes per 10,000. These absolute differences approach the winning margin in a few elections in the data set, and so appear to be potentially functionally significant. However, no focused voter education occurred prior to the top-two primary in the same manner that it did in cities prior to the first use of ranked choice

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voting, and top-two does not benefit from tradition as does plurality at large. A reasonable presumption is that education would have reduced the overvote rates in the top-two primaries, and that the rates will also reduce as familiarity develops over time.

Cumulative voting is not used locally, so no local overvote data regarding this method is available. Given the functional similarity of the overvote rate for the other three methods though, there is little reason to suppose the rate would be functionally different for cumulative.

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Stable/Effective Government

Proportional methods at a national level result in ruling party configurations of similar duration on average to that of plurality methods.1 This involves parties and ruling coalitions however, neither of which are pertinent in municipal, non partisan government. The ranked choice method should produce more stability of representation than plurality. As shown on Figure 1, ranked choice results in the same outcomes under varying conditions whereas the other methods result in widely varying outcomes. This is because ranked choice ameliorates the consequences of split and bullet voting. Beyond this, small shifts in the prevalence of different perspectives among voters cannot translate into large, or even complete, shifts in the prevalence of perspectives among elected candidates under ranked choice while it can under plurality. The limited, and to a lesser extent cumulative, methods result in representation in proportion to the perspectives of the voters under some circumstances, as shown on Figure 1, but uneven vote splitting due to varying numbers of candidates seeking to represent various perspectives or uneven bullet voting could also result in one perspective or another being overrepresented.

As to governing effectiveness, study of national governments formed by proportional versus plurality methods concluded that the performance of the former was the same or better in all policy areas.2 This study has also been characterized as demonstrating that proportional methods result in “a far greater degree of policy consistency over time.”3 The aforementioned study of ranked choice in five Ohio cities last century concluded that it “led to greater consensus” on the governing bodies, 4 and that “contemporary sources generally give credit to the PR-elected council and their city managers for effective government.”5 These results suggest that ranked choice performs best relative to this criterion followed by cumulative, then limited and plurality.

There is disagreement that adequate study has occurred to determine the effectiveness of governments formed as a result of proportional versus plurality methods though.6 Consequently while there is readily available research suggesting proportional methods may result in more stable and effective government than does plurality, this is not a consensus position among academics. So while a ranking of the methods relative to this criterion is suggested in the previous paragraph, the foundation of this ranking is more tenuous than that under all the other criteria.

1 Farrell, p. 214-216 2 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, p. 301 3 Farrell, p. 220 4 Barber, p. 121 5 Ibid., p. 83. 6 Gianfranco Baldini and Adriano Pappalardo, Elections, Electoral Systems and Volatile Voters (Plagrave MacMillan: New York, New York, 2009), pp. 174-175.

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Answers to Election Methods Questions from Mayor Peggy Thomsen

15 May 2014

The Charter Review Committee (“the Committee”) has considered four at large election methods: plurality (the current method), limited, cumulative and ranked choice. In limited voting each voter has fewer votes than there are seats (for instance one vote in an election to fill three seats). In cumulative voting, each voter has a number of votes equal to the number of seats, like in plurality, but can cast more than one vote for a candidate.

Ranked choice applied to multiple seat elections is explained in a video from Minnesota Public Radio at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNxwMdI8OWw. In brief, each voter has one vote but indicates the order in which candidates should receive their vote. The vote counting is done in rounds. If some seats remain unfilled after a round of counting, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and the votes for that candidate transferred to those voters next preferred choice for counting in the next round. In this manner, rank choice voting simulates a series of runoff elections.

1. Who benefits? Why? How?

Under plurality at large voting, the largest group of voters by shared perspective benefits because it can garner a much larger share or all of the available representation. This can occur even if this group is not a majority. It only has to be the largest group. For instance in a fairly even three-way split in the electorate, a group constituting a bit more than a third of the electorate can garner 100% of the available representation.

Under ranked choice a group constituting about a third of the electorate will garner about a third of the representation. Outcomes from limited and cumulative voting tend to be between plurality at large and ranked choice.

2. What are the costs? Political? Financial?

Starting with the financial costs, plurality voting is the least expensive because it is the currently available system and voters already understand it Albany budgeted $35,000 for the costs of the November 2012 election. This includes paying the Registrar for running the election, which charges a set fee per registered voter no matter the number of races and measures on the ballot. It also includes the cost of printing ballot statements for Albany races and measures.

We must estimate costs for other election methods; the Registrar does not conduct elections using the other methods listed here (the ranked choice method used by four Alameda County cities is for single winner-only elections). Estimates of the first time and ongoing cost of using each method are given in Table 1.

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Table 1. Higher end cost estimates using the four methods under consideration. Implementation of ranked choice voting is dependent either on the Registrar acquiring a new system or the Secretary of State approving vote tallying by an outside vendor.

First Later Voting Sources of cost increase Sources of cost increase election election method compared to plurality compared to plurality cost cost plurality $ 35,000 $ 35,000 limited $ 45,000 voter education $ 35,000 cumulative $ 45,000 voter education $ 40,000 ongoing education ranked $ 65,000 one-time equipment charge, $ 45,000 ongoing charge by choice – voter education, additional Registrar, ongoing Registrar work by Registrar, tally by education only vendor ($7,500 less if the count can be done by Registrar) ranked $ 75,000 one-time equipment charge, $ 55,000 ongoing charge by choice – voter education, additional Registrar, ongoing Registrar work by Registrar, tally by education, tally by vendor with tally vendor by vendor

The cost to switch to ranked choice is due in part to charges by the Registrar. There would be a first time charge to defray the cost of the ranked choice election system, administration and voter education. Based on the one time charge to the nearby cities of Berkeley, Oakland, and San Leandro the first time they implemented ranked choice, the Registrar’s first time charge to Albany would be about $30,000, for a total election cost of $65,000.

The current software used by the County cannot perform a ranked choice count for a multi-seat election. There is a possible option for implementing ranked choice for these elections using the County’s current system. This system generates an electronic file containing the preferences marked on each individual ballot. This file can be input into any one of various other available software systems that can perform the multiple-seat ranked choice count. One vendor of such services is TrueBallot, which performs the RCV counts for Cambridge, MA, Portland, ME and Takoma Park, MD among others. This firm estimated the cost of providing such a count for Albany would be between $5,000 and $10,000 per election. Taking the upper end of this estimate combined with the Registrar’s first time charge yields the estimated cost of $75,000 for the first ranked choice election, which is $40,000 additional compared to the cost for the latest plurality at large election.

Based on the precedent of Oakland, Berkeley and San Leandro, the Registrar would charge less than $10,000 additional for each election using ranked choice thereafter. This pays for the extra ballot and effort entailed by ranked choice. Adding this to the upper end of the TrueBallot

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estimate for counting the votes yields an ongoing election cost of $45,000. This cost would include some funds for ongoing education.

The next system to be available from Dominion, the vendor of the voting hardware and software currently used by Alameda County, will have the capability to tally a multi-set ranked choice election. It is not known if and when Alameda County will acquire this, and it is not known if the one time and ongoing cost for Albany to use the RCV capability of that system would be the same as the cost to opt in to the current system.

Limited would have no additional ongoing costs because it can be run on the system currently used by the County. The only transition cost would be for voter education. Based on the $30,000 one time additional cost for switching to ranked choice discussed above, which included equipment and administrative as well as education, the additional cost of education ahead of the first limited election would likely be less than $10,000 for a total cost less than $45,000. No ongoing education is specified because using limited would result in almost the same election rules as for other races, namely cast one vote for one candidate. So only those used to Albany’s current system need education at the point of transition. Voters new to Albany would readily be able to vote according to the new method.

The County’s current system can also run cumulative voting. This is achieved by listing each candidate’s name as many times as each voter has votes, which in turn is the number of seats to be filled. For instance in a three seat election, each candidate’s name would be listed three times. This allows a voter to mark all three instances of the name, thus casting three votes for that candidate. The system counts the votes cast for each instance of the candidate’s name. The totals for all the instances would be summed by the City Clerk to provide the vote total for each candidate. This would determine the winner. So the only additional cost would likely be for a voter education effort. This is estimated to be the same as the voting education effort of $10,000 for the transition to limited. In addition, an additional costof $5,000 ongoing education is shown in Table 1, resulting in an ongoing election cost of $45,000, because cumulative is not used in other elections. Consequently voters new to Albany would require education ahead of every election.

Regarding political costs, please see the response to question 1 regarding the proportion of representation garnered by each group of like-minded voters under the different election methods.

Some contend that ranked choice is complex and so significantly confuses voters relative to plurality and limited. However ballot error rates in San Francisco and Oakland’s ranked choice elections are similar to that in simultaneous plurality elections, such as for school boards and State and Federal offices. This is one indicator that voters understand how to cast a ranked choice ballot properly, and so are not confused.

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Plurality at large voting provides an incentive for individuals to cast fewer than the available votes to increase the odds of the most preferred candidate gaining office. This is called bullet voting. Past Albany election results indicate this is common. Assuming the same number of people vote in a Council election as an Albany measure on the same ballot allows an estimate of the percentage of voters casting bullet votes. This indicates one out of ten to two out of three voters have bullet voted in individual Albany Council elections since 2002, with an average of one out of four doing so.

Voters using ranked choice do not need to be strategic. It transfers each voter’s vote to their most preferred and electable candidate, so voters can vote for candidates in their preferred order.

Some contend ranked choice provides an incentive for candidates not to campaign negatively against each other as this would work against garnering a higher placement on the ballots of voters that most prefer other candidates. There is some evidence this is true, such as in the 2010 Oakland mayoral candidacies of Jean Quan and Rebecca Kaplan. However it seems to extend primarily to how candidates campaign against candidates other than the leading candidate. Negative campaigning against the leading candidate can still be effective because votes for that candidate will likely not be transferred to any other candidate, as indicated by most candidates overtly campaigning against Don Perata in the 2010 Oakland mayoral election.

Some contend that ranked choice leads to candidates with lesser support winning. For instance this is a common characterization of the election of Jean Quan as Mayor of Oakland. This perspective is based on Don Perata receiving substantially higher voter support in the first counting round. However, he did not receive support from a majority of voters, and so subsequent counting rounds occurred. As candidates were eliminated and votes transferred, Jean Quan received far more of the transferred votes than Don Perata such that she won. The contention by some that this indicates ranked choice can result in unrepresentative outcomes is contrary to the apparent acceptability of the two-round runoff system. A candidate that is behind in the first round can win the runoff. This is, after all, is why a runoff is held.

There is also concern that voters cannot sufficiently educate themselves about a large number of candidates in order to rank them. However ranked choice does not require voters to rank any more than one candidate should they desire. In addition, this concern is not as germane to the Albany context where voters must decide how many and which candidates to vote for in the current plurality system. This is not dissimilar to deciding how to rank the candidates and how many to rank.

3. Does the system allow candidates to manipulate the election so results of the majority of voters are thwarted?

Under plurality, candidates can adopt various (legal) strategies to improve their chances of election relative to the level of support for their viewpoint in the community. Such strategies include matching the number of candidates with their viewpoint to the number of seats available

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or perhaps fewer, encouraging numerous candidates with opposing viewpoints to run in order to split the opposition vote, and encouraging bullet voting.

As an example of the second strategy above, in the late 1990’s Don Perata encouraged Keith Carson, northern Alameda County’s current supervisor, to run against Dion Aroner in a special election to fill the State Senate seat representing northern Alameda County. Carson entered the race on Perata’s promise he would not run.1 However after Carson entered the race, Perata announced his candidacy. Aroner and Carson had similar political positions and a larger constituency than Perata, but because they split the vote Perata was elected with far less than a majority of voter support. Had ranked choice voting been used, it is highly likely Aroner would have won with the support of a majority of voters.

The strategies described above can result in a Council majority with a viewpoint that is different than the majority viewpoint in the community. These strategies are similarly effective in limited voting, less effective in cumulative voting, and much less effective in ranked choice voting.

4. What size cities use each method?

The National Demographics Corporation generated a table listing the geography used for electing each city council (or Board of Supervisors in the unique case of San Francisco) in California.2 The options are at large, by district, from district, and mixed. From district requires nominees to live in the district up for election but to be elected by the voters of the city at large. Mixed means the city elects representatives using two of the electoral district options. For instance, Oakland elects one council member from the city at large and the rest by district.

This data was augmented by the election method. All cities in the State that elect their council at large do so by plurality. The election method for cities electing by districts, from districts and mixed was discerned from election data available primarily at smartvoter.org. For the few cities for which data was not available on that site, the election method was discerned from the relevant county registrar web site or media articles.

Figure 1 shows the election geography and method used to elect each city council in California. As shown on the figure, the larger the city the more likely it uses a districts and runoffs (which includes ranked choice, otherwise known as instant runoff). Use of districts and a runoff method is most common among cities with the largest populations. The nine largest cities elect by districts, with Oakland the only one among these that also has a member elected at large. The six largest and nine of the 13 largest cities use a runoff method.

1 http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/manipulating-the-vote/Content?oid=1371773 2 http://www.scribd.com/doc/153187475/California-cities-and-election-systems

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Figure 1. Geography and method used to elect each city council in California ordered from most to least populous city

Table 2 gives the percentage of city councils elected by each geography and method. It indicates ten out of 11 cities use at large exclusively and more than 34 out of 35 cities use plurality.

Table 2. Percentage of California cities by election geography and method

Election Plurality Separate Ranked Total geography runoff choice At large 91.2% NA 0.0% 91.2% From 1.3% 0.2% 0.2% district 1.7% Mixed 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% By district 4.6% 1.7% 0.4% 6.7% Total 97.3% 1.9% 0.8%

Table 3 gives the percentage of the population living in cities using each geography and method to elect the councils. Because the largest cities by population use districts, over four out of ten people live in a city using districts even though less than one in 11 cities uses this geography.

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Because the largest cities use runoffs, three out of ten people live in a city with runoffs even though less than one in 35 cities uses this method.

Table 3. Percentage of population electing its city council by each election geography and method

Election Plurality Separate Ranked Total geography runoff choice At large 59.2% NA 0.0% 59.2% From 2.3% 0.9% 0.3% 3.5% district Mixed 0.4% 0.0% 1.3% 1.6% By district 8.2% 24.4% 3.0% 35.7% Total 70.1% 25.4% 4.5%

Figure 2 shows the size of the population using each geography and method to elect their city councils. Besides most of the largest cities, four cities with a population of about 100,000 use a runoff method (Berkeley, Inglewood, Compton and San Leandro).

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Figure 2. Size of the population using each geography and method to elect city councils in California ordered from the most to least populous city

Thirteen cities use a majority single seat method, which requires a runoff method. The nine of these cities outside the San Francisco Bay Area use a separate runoff. The four of these cities in the Bay Area (San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley and San Leandro) use ranked choice. San Francisco is the fourth largest city in the State with a population of about 805,000, and Oakland is the eighth largest city with a population of about 391,000.3 San Leandro is the smallest of the California cities using ranked choice voting with a population of about 85,000 (86th largest in the State). However its Council members are elected from district, meaning they must live in a particular district but they are voted on at large. While Berkeley is larger than San Leandro, its Council members are elected by district. The population of Berkeley is about 114,000 (52nd largest in the State), and the population of each of its eight districts is about 14,000.

Some cities that use ranked choice in other states are Minneapolis (population about 380,000), Saint Paul (population about 290,000), Portland, Maine (population about 66,000), Takoma Park, Maryland (population about 17,000), and Telluride, Colorado (population about 2,000). These all use single-seat elections for their governing bodies (although Minneapolis does use multiple- seat ranked choice to elect some of its parks commissioners and tax board members).

The only city in the United States that currently uses multiple-seat ranked choice to elect its governing bodies is Cambridge, Massachusetts. It uses this method to elect all nine Council members and six School Committee members every two years. It has been using the method since 1941. The population of Cambridge is about 105,000.

No cities in California use cumulative voting. However the City Council of Santa Clarita, which has a population of about 180,000, recently voted to switch from plurality at large to cumulative starting with the 2016 election. Outside California, cumulative is used to elect over 60 and limited over 30 county boards, city councils and school boards respectively in the United States.4 Numerous cities in Texas, typically with population in the thousands, use this method. It is also used by Peoria, Illinois and Amarillo, Texas with populations of about 115,000 and 194,000, respectively.5

No cities in California use limited voting. This method is used in a number of cities in Alabama and one in North Carolina. The population of these cities ranges from hundreds to thousands.6

5. What kind of system does each CA city use? What is the population of the city?

This is discussed under the previous question.

3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_California_cities_by_population 4 http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=2101 5 http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=2101 6 http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=2101

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6. What cities have changed to a method other than plurality at-large electoral system and then returned (or are in the process of voting on return) to that voting method? With which system did the cities experiment?

A large number of cities switched from plurality at large to multiple-seat ranked choice voting and then back to plurality at large in the last century. Almost two dozen cities, including Sacramento, adopted multiple-seat ranked choice sometime in the first half of the last century. All but Cambridge, Massachusetts, switched back. Removal of ranked choice was typically led by the group that had garnered a share of representation larger than its share of the electorate under plurality at large. This faction was variously conservative or liberal depending on the history of the city.

Removal of ranked choice was affected in some cities by repeal. In many of these cities repeal was only successful after multiple attempts. Successful repeal measures often included overt appeals to racism because multiple-seat ranked choice had allowed the first election of racial and ethnic minorities to office.

In this century, two cities and one county have repealed ranked choice to the Committee’s knowledge. Burlington, Vermont, repealed ranked choice after what is termed a non-Condorcet outcome in the race for Mayor. This means that the winner of the election was not the winner of hypothetical head-to-head contests between each pair of candidates. This outcome is possible in plurality at large and two-round runoffs as well, but ranked choice makes it more apparent because the election occurs in one round and the ranking provides more detailed data regarding the voters preferences. Non-Condorcet outcomes are much less relevant to multi-seat ranked choice as they can occur with only the last candidate elected as counting proceeds.

Aspen, Colorado, also repealed ranked choice. Aspen elects its City Council at large, as does Albany, but rather than implement multiple-seat ranked choice voting it instituted a form of single-seat ranked choice for filling multiple seats. This again is not relevant to the multiple-seat ranked choice method that is more appropriate for any city conducting multiple-seat elections, such as Albany.

It is also instructive to consider activities by ranked choice repeal supporters in Oakland and San Francisco following the 2010 election. In both cities there were unsuccessful efforts to have measures replacing ranked choice with two-round runoffs placed on the ballot, both by the respective legislative bodies and by initiative. All these efforts failed. In Oakland, the legislative effort was pursued by Ignacio de la Fuente on the Council, who is a close associate of Don Perata's. The initiative effort was pursued by an associate of Don Perata’s campaign manager.7

7 http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/ranked-choice-voting-repeal-blocked/Content?oid=3184720

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In San Francisco the legislative effort was pursued by the more conservative supervisors.8,9 The lower turnout in one of the rounds in a two-round runoff tends to favor conservatives due to relatively greater participation by conservative voters. Conservative interests are also generally associated with greater availability of campaign funds, which provides an advantage in a two- round runoff system.

7. Would any State laws impact a possible change in the voting system in Albany, or would a change in the city charter be all that is needed?

To the Committee’s knowledge, no State law would impact a possible change to the voting method Albany chooses, other than the necessity for the voting system to be approved by the Secretary of State. Election at large is specified for the Council in Charter Section 2.01. Section 5.01, also regarding the City Council, states, “Except to the extent otherwise provided by ordinance hereinafter enacted, all elections shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Elections Code of the State of California.” City Attorney Craig Labadie has advised that a Charter amendment would be needed to change election method.

Election at large is specified for the School Board in Charter Section 6.01(a). The specific method is not defined, and so the choice defaults to the State Election Code. Section 10600 of that Code specifies the plurality method for at-large election of the governing board of a school district. Consequently changing the method of electing the School Board would require a Charter amendment.

8. Given that voters in Albany do not seem to be clamoring for a change in the current voting system, what is driving the committee’s desire to pursue the current study?

There has been change in the election methods used by cities and other jurisdictions in California over the last decade. This prompted the Charter Review Committee to consider if there may be a better method for Albany.

8 http://www.sfbg.com/politics/2012/07/05/rcv-repeal-effort-gets-tricky-three-alternatives 9 http://www.sfbg.com/politics/2012/07/17/feeling-heat-olague-kills-rcv-repeal-now

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Charter Review Committee Resolution Recommending Development Of A Draft Charter Amendment Regarding A Transition To Use Of Ranked Choice Voting At Large

WHEREAS, data from other jurisdictions, including Berkeley, San Francisco and Cambridge, Massachusetts, indicate ranked choice voting increases voter participation relative to other methods,

WHEREAS, Albany’s elections are “at large,” meaning multiple representatives are elected from the city as a whole in each election,

WHEREAS, Albany’s elections currently use plurality at large voting,

WHEREAS, plurality at large voting can result in precluding representation for viewpoints held by a large portion of the electorate, including more than half the electorate in some circumstances,

WHEREAS, a number of California cities are switching from plurality at large voting to other election methods less prone to such outcomes,

WHEREAS, using ranked choice voting in at large elections is the best method to assure all viewpoints held by large segments of the electorate are represented in all circumstances,

WHEREAS, this is in accord with Albany’s mission of “responding to the needs of a diverse community”,

WHEREAS, ranked choice voting used in at large elections provides for more consistent translation of voter viewpoints into representation than does plurality at large, and so greater governing consistency and policy direction through time,

WHEREAS, the Alameda County Registrar does not currently have the capability of conducting ranked choice voting in at large elections,

WHEREAS, the cities of Berkeley, Oakland and San Leandro established the goal of using ranked choice voting in their elections prior to the County Registrar having the capability to conduct elections using this method,

WHEREAS, these cities established that a transition to use of ranked choice voting would only occur when the County Registrar had the capability to conduct elections using this method,

WHEREAS, the County Registrar subsequently developed this capability,

WHEREAS, the cities of Berkeley, Oakland and San Leandro conducted their first elections using ranked choice voting four to ten years after establishing its use as a goal,

Albany Charter Review Committee 16 March 2014 CRC 5/15/14 Attachment 3 DRAFT

WHEREAS, the main disadvantage of Albany using ranked choice voting is increased election cost, and

WHEREAS, it appears this cost increase could be constrained to 0.1% of the city budget,

BE IT RESOLVED, the Charter Review Committee recommends the City Council direct the Committee to prepare a draft charter amendment for the Council’s consideration that establishes the goal of using ranked choice voting in Albany’s at large elections,

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, the draft amendment should include conditions, including cost and the capability to conduct the election, under which a transition to ranked choice voting would occur.

Albany Charter Review Committee 16 March 2014 CRC 5/15/14 Attachment 4

Greetings Albany Commission and Committee Members:

We on the city council thank you for your service in 2013 and send you wishes for a happy and productive new year.

We also want to remind you of some of the responsibilities of all members of a specific commission or committee: Meeting agendas must be published and posted in accordance with the Brown Act, and the meeting must proceed in accordance with the published agenda. Discussion of the performance of city personnel or departments is appropriate only in a closed session of the city council. Issues forwarded to the city council should include pros and cons gained from research rather than one recommendation. Your attendance is necessary to the work of the committee.

Again, thank you for your dedication to the betterment of Albany through your continued service.

Sincerely,

Marge Atkinson, Michael Barnes, Peter Maass, Joanne Wile, Peggy Thomsen

ALBANY CITY COUNCIL POLICIES

ADOPTED BY RESOLUTION NO. 2012-74 REVISED BY RESOLUTION NO. 2014-7 EFFECTIVE DATE: DECEMBER 3, 2012

City Council Review of Work Plans

Work plans shall be presented to the City Council annually in February. At times, some work plans may be presented to the Council in March if an additional meeting of the Advisory Body is necessary to finalize the work plan prior to submittal to the Council. The Chair of the Advisory Body or a designee should attend the Council meeting to respond to any questions raised by the City Council regarding the work plan. The Council may choose to revise work plans as necessary to ensure Advisory Bodies remain focused on their respective charge and on implementation of City Council Strategic Plan goals.

7. CHANGES/ADDITIONS TO ANNUAL WORK PLAN

Any changes or proposed additions to the annual work plan must be submitted by the Advisory Body to the City Council for review. The submittal shall be prepared using the attached form “REQUEST FOR AMENDEMENT TO ADVISORY ANNUAL BODY WORK PLAN” (Exhibit 1).

8. MANNER FOR BRINGING ITEMS TO THE CITY COUNCIL

a. Matters Referred to the Advisory Body by the City Council The City Council may refer items to the Advisory Bodies for further analysis, research and discussion. Items referred by the City Council to an Advisory Body are to take priority. Advisory Body findings regarding these matters are to be presented back to the City Council, in accordance with any deadlines identified by the Council. The staff liaison to the Advisory Body will coordinate with the City Manager to schedule the item on a future City Council agenda. The Advisory Body Chair or designee is expected to attend the City Council meeting to present the item in coordination with the staff liaison.

b. Matters Included on the Advisory Body Work Plan At times the Advisory Body may have updates, reports or findings to present to the City Council on matters included as part of the Advisory Body Work Plan. The Advisory Body should include options for City Council consideration including pro/con analysis. The staff liaison to the Advisory Body will coordinate with the City Manager to schedule the item on a future City Council Agenda. It should be noted that the Council has the authority to prioritize items intended for the City Council agenda.

c. Other Matters Other matters raised by an Advisory Body to the City Council are to follow the steps outlined below. It should be noted that Advisory Bodies of the City Council are tasked with focusing on and prioritizing their respective Work Plans. Advisory Bodies shall submit items to the City Council identifying options for Council consideration, including pro/con analysis and transmitted in the following manner:

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a. Advisory Body takes action to approve item for City Council, including options for the Council and pro/con analysis. b. Staff liaison to Advisory Body submits item including pro/con analysis as developed by the Advisory body to the City Manager. c. City Manager provides item to City Council via memorandum. d. City Council Members may request item be placed on a future City Council Agenda for discussion. Note: if the item is placed on a future agenda the City Clerk will alert the Advisory Body staff liaison. The Advisory Body Chair or designee should attend the Council meeting to respond to any questions from the City Council.

In accordance with the City Charter and Municipal Code, the Planning & Zoning Commission shall make recommendations to the City Council as related to the defined duties of the Commission including but not limited to appeals of the Planning & Zoning Commission, amendments to the Municipal Code, and/or official planning documents.

9. STAFF LIAISONS TO ADVISORY BODIES A staff liaison is assigned to each of the Advisory Bodies to the City Council. The role of the staff liaison is to support the Advisory Body by preparing the agenda in coordination with the Advisory Body Chair, preparation of action minutes, and transmittal of items from the Advisory Body to the City Manager or other entity. Advisory Body members are to take the lead in conducting research, preparation of written materials, and other items that may come before the Advisory Body.

IV. CUSTOMER SERVICE POLICY

It is the policy of the Albany City Council that residents and other interested parties be treated with respect, and that inquiries to the City be responded to in as timely a manner as is feasible. The procedures laid out in the Albany Administrative Procedures Manual establish standards for serving the public, other agencies, and other persons outside the City of Albany organization in a respectful, courteous, friendly, professional, and efficient manner.

V. ELECTRONIC MEDIA, WEBSITE AND SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY

The use of Electronic Media (i.e. voicemail, e-mail, and the internet), City Website (www.albanyca.org), and Social Media (Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, etc.) may be used by City of Albany employees and City Officials for City purposes. Use of these tools is intended to further enhance communications with the community in support of City goals and objectives. The use of voicemail, e-mail, the internet, and social networking may raise issues of privacy, liability and records retention, and users are advised to use caution when utilizing these media tools. City employees shall also act in accordance with the Electronic Media, Website, and Social Media Procedures, as established by the City Manager, to ensure all employees follow

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ALBANY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION

RESOLUTION 2013-14-09

BOARD OF EDUCATION TERM LIMITS ELIMINATION

WHEREAS, the Albany, California Board of Education operates under the City Charter of the City of Albany, and

WHEREAS, the City Charter limits members of the Board to two consecutive terms of 4 years each, and

WHEREAS, the job of a member of the Board of Education is highly technical, requiring knowledge of educational policy, school finance, school administration, labor relations, and other fields, and

WHEREAS, it takes several years for a typical member to gain sufficient expertise to become effective, and

WHEREAS, professional development and team training over many years improve the function of the board (see, for example, Dervarics, C. and O'Brien, E. (2012) Eight characteristics of effective school boards, Center for Public Education), and

WHEREAS, research into effective school boards finds that stability of the board is very important for good governance, with the typical member of an effective board having served 10 years or more (see, for example, Togneri, W., and Anderson, S. (2003) Beyond Islands of Excellence: What Schools Can Do to Improve Instruction and Achievement in All Schools, Baltimore, MD: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development and Learning First Alliance).

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Albany Unified School District Board of Education requests that the Albany City Council ask the Charter Review Committee to consider removing the term limit from elected members of the School Board, and

FURTHER, BE IT RESOLVED that if the Committee concludes that elimination of term limits for Board members would benefit the community, the current members of the Albany School Board may be excluded from any such change if the Committee or City Council find the resulting benefit of reducing perception of self- interest on the part of the current Board members is greater than the benefit provided by eliminating term limits for all members, both current and new.

PASSED AND ADOPTED by the Governing Board of the Albany Unified School District on this 14th day of January 2014, by the following vote:

AYES: 4 NOES: 1 Clerk of the Board of Trustees ABSENT: 0 Albany Unified School District ABSTAIN: 0 Alameda County, California