VIOLETTE, Aurele Joseph, 1941- RUSSIAN NAVAL REFORM, 1855-1870. the Ohio State U Niversity, Ph.D., 1971 H Istory, Modern
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
72-15,316 VIOLETTE, Aurele Joseph, 1941- RUSSIAN NAVAL REFORM, 1855-1870. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1971 History, modern University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan t © 1972 AURELE JOSEPH VIOLETTE a l l r ig h t s r eserv ed RUSSIAN NAVAL REFORM, 1855-1870 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By ’ Aurele Joseph Violette, B.A., M.A. ****** The Ohio State University 1971 Approved by A dviser Department of History PLEASE NOTE: Some pages have indistinct pri nt. F i I med as received. University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company PREFACE This study examines a hitherto unexplored aspect of the "Era of Great Reforms" associated with the reign of Alexander H i the reform movement in the M inistry of th e Navy in th e f if te e n years immediately following Russia's disastrous defeat in the Crimea at the hands of France and England* No attempt is made to trace the actual development of the Russian navy in this period—to describe the number and types of ships constructed, their armament, and their other characteristics* These are aspects of Russian naval history which have already been competently documented by several historians* Rather, this study focuses on the attempts of the Ministry of the Navy in the immediate post-war period to reform the systems of naval administration, justice and education* It intends to analyze reforms to which many historians allude but never describe and to point to the fact that the Ministry of the Navy, under the energetic leadership of the tsar's brother Konstantin Nikolaevich, was a major center of reformist activity during the reign of Alexander II and not only undertook reforms which made possible a naval rebirth but also contributed significantly to reforms in other areas of Russian life. All materials used in this study have been published. Unless other wise indicated, the dates are in the "old style"—i.e. according to the Julian Calendar in use in Russia at the time the events described in this study transpired. The Library of Congress transliteration system has been used throughout with a few recognizable exceptions when familiar spellings have been adopted. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE................................................................................................................i i Chapter I . "AN ADMIRAL WITHOUT A FLEET"..................................................... 1 I I . ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS, 1855-1860 ................................. 29 I I I . ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS, 1860-1870 ........................................ 73 IV. JUDICIAL REFORMS .............................................................................. 108 V. REFORMS OF NAVAL EDUCATION ........ ....................... 138 VI. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................176 BIBLIOGRAPHY................. i . ................................................................................................................................................. 179 iii BoMHa oaHana^a kohblj napycHorD (Jj/ioTa, a flpyroBO (Jj^oTa b Pqcchm hb CHAPTER I ••AN ADMIRAL WITHOUT A FLEET" 1. Navies in Transition The Crimean War marked the end of a chapter in Russian history and signaled the beginning of an era of liberal reforms associated with the reign of Alexander II. Perhaps no period in Russian history prior to the revolutions of 1917 witnessed such a fundamental restructuring of Russian life and institutions as occurred between 1861 and 1874. Peasant emancipation provided the keystone of the reform program. The courts were recast along new lines. Autonomous and popularly elected organs of local self-government were established* Institutions of higher learning received greater autonomy, and m ilitary reforms im proved the efficiency of the imperial army and made all classes of Russian society liable to m ilitary service* One aspect of the reform movement has received little attention from historians: the thorough-going series of reforms undertaken by t lT E.D. Dneprov, *"Morskoi Sbomik* v obshchestvennom dvizhenii perioda pervoi revoliutsionnoi situatsii v Rossii," in Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v Rossii v 1859-61 gg.f edited by M.V; Nechkina et al, (Moscow, 1965), P» 236. 1 the Ministry of the Navy in the period immediately following the con clusion of the Crimean War* Naval reforms were dictated by the same general considerations which generated reforms in other areas of govern ment. They were designed to decentralize administration and decision making, to improve the system'of justice and to make education relevant to the highly technical demands of the age. In addition, the techno logical backwardness of Russia’s navy in comparison to those of the other European naval powers made reform imperative. Technological improvements in warship design and construction in the decade pre ceding the outbreak of war had doomed the Russian fleet to obsolescence on the eve of war. That decade had witnessed the birth of the modern battleship, operating with steam power, propelled by the screw, fortified or built with iron and steel, and carrying shell guns. Before the war, the French and British navies had energetically begun the transition from sail to steam, from wood to iron and steel and from solid shot to shell fire. The Russian navy had not,^ The events of the Crimean War emphasized the precarious position of the Russian navy in relation to the navies of her enemies. In the main, Russian ships were propelled by sail. Those ships equipped with steam were fitted with the ponderous wheel instead of the screw, and they were so badly armed that their effectiveness remained in serious doubt. The Black Sea F leet did ta s te v ic to ry —b r ie fly —in November 1853 T* On this subject see P.I. Belavenets, Znachenie flota v istorll Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1916), pp. 22ffj Sir George S. Clarke, Russia’s Sea Power, Past and Present (London, 1898), pp. 98-102; E.B. Potter (ed.), Sea Powert A Naval History (Englewood C liffs, N.J., 1960), pp. 232-4j and B.I. Zverev, "Osnovnye itogi krymskoi voiny v oblasti oruzhiia i tekhniki i taktiki flota," Doklady, soobshcheniia Instltuta Istorlia S.S.S.R., No. 5 (1955), 53-701 3 when Admiral Paul Nakhimov met and destroyed a Turkish squadron at Sinope Bay, but the victory only prompted a joint Anglo-French squadron poised at the entrance to the Straits to press on through the Straits into the Black Sea* The initial Russian victory was of little consequence* With the appearance of the Anglo-French squadron in the Black Sea, Prince Alexander Menshikov, the commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in the south, ordered all vessels of the Black Sea Fleet to withdraw to the protection of the harbor at Sevastopol—»a tacit recognition of the allies* superiority in numbers and of the technical quality of their naval craftW hen, in September 1854, allied forces threatened Sevastopol, Menshikov ordered part of the Black Sea Fleet scuttled to protect the northern approaches to the city, and its crews moved ashore to man the defenses of the city. Russian sailors and naval officers did distinguish themselves during the course of the war, but on land- on the redoubts of Sevastopol where thousands perished during the siege of the city.^ Following the Crimean War, the editor of the Kronshtadtskii Vestnik expressed succinctly the magnitude of the task of naval reconstruction* 3Ti The same situation prevailed in the Baltic where the Baltic Fleet withdrew to the defenses of the naval base at Kronstadt where it remained for the duration of the war* 4. The best account of the military aspects of the Crimean War is Evgenii V. Tarle, Krymskaia voina (Moscow, 1959). See also Walter C* Hucul, "The Evolution of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, 1853-1953," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Berkeley, 1954), pp. 113-48, and John S. Curtiss, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, N.C., 1965), pp. 314ff. Arguing that Russia always retained the potential of remaining on a par with the best European fleets as long as ships were constructed of wood, he noted: But ‘the introduction of steam, then the screw propeller and finally heavy artillery and the ironclads changed the situation to our disadvantage; we were unprepared for that energetic activity which a contemporary fleet demanded* Our poorly developed industry did not satisfy these new demands adequately; the inadequacy of our own /naval7 specialists forced us to turn to foreigners; forced . Tlabor satisfied the needs of the former wooden, sail fleet but showed itself inadequate in the light of new requirements, and it was necessary to replace it with more productive—if somewhat more costly-free labor.^ The transition to a modern navy meant the construction of ships from materials which Russia did not have the capacity to produce in quantities sufficient to meet the needs. It meant the building of new dockyards and port facilities and the deepening of existing harbors. More important was the necessity for a complete review of naval education and training for everyone from new recruits to admirals. Naval education and training had been neglected during the reign of Nicholas I when appearance on the parade ground, '*precision and beauty during exercises on the roadsteads'* and "excessive cleanliness" had been the major criteria for gauging performance.** In an era when scientific and technical knowledge was 5^ "Morskoe obozrenie," Kronshtadtskii