The Prince, the Bailiff, and the Mir: Power, Politics, and Agency on a Russian
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THE PRINCE, THE BAILIFF, AND THE MIR: POWER, POLITICS, AND AGENCY ON A RUSSIAN SERF ESTATE, 1810-1858 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Monica B. Bykowski Alexander Martin, Director Graduate Program in History Notre Dame, Indiana September 2017 © Copyright 2017 Monica B. Bykowski THE PRINCE, THE BAILIFF, AND THE MIR: POWER, POLITICS, AND AGENCY ON A RUSSIAN SERF ESTATE, 1810-1858 Abstract by Monica B. Bykowski The Prince, the Bailiff, and the Mir: Power, Politics, and Agency on a Russian Serf Estate, 1810-1858 argues that Russian serfs practiced economic agency even before the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. This agency was possible, despite serfs’ legal status as the property of others and place in the soslovie, social estate, hierarchy, because of local social dynamics. Although landlords had authority over their serfs, large magnates such as Prince Sergei Mikhailovich Golitsyn did not live on their provincial estates. Consequently, they relied on local institutions – namely the mir, or peasant commune, and estate bailiff – to fulfil their directives and inform them of estate affairs. The unique intermediary position between serf and landlord empowered the mir and bailiff, giving them their own authority on the estate. These groups did not necessarily share the interests of the landlord, being part and parcel of the peasant community themselves. And yet, within the larger social system of serfdom, they needed each other to operate. The landlord, bailiff, and mir, therefore, negotiated their interests. Monica B. Bykowski Within this arena of competing interests, serfs found the space to pursue their own interests. They used the administrative apparatus created by the landlord and local institutions to secure their private transactions, including extending credit, renting, and buying property. Moreover, they used one or another interest group to advance their goals and minimize risks. When they wanted to build counter to Prince Sergei’s estate designs, they turned to the bailiff or mir for permission. When they opposed the actions of the bailiff, they appeared before the mir or petitioned Prince Sergei himself. When the mir conscripted their sons, they appealed once more to Prince Sergei. The case studies presented in this project demonstrate the importance of social dynamics in the functioning of institutions on the ground. Moreover, they help us understand how unfree people could exhibit economic agency. This project begins by investigating Prince Sergei’s designs on an estate in Iaroslavl’ province, Rostov district, showing that planning did not succeed without local cooperation. Intermediaries are added to the dynamic in the following chapters. Case studies examining foresting and army conscription delineate the extent and limits of the bailiff and mir’s authority while also illustrating how the landlord, bailiff, and mir interrelated. The final two chapters consider peasant economic agency within this social system, examining how serfs interacted with estate authorities to secure their own private transactions as well as household divisions. The Economic Agency of Russian Peasants Under Serfdom closes by acknowledging the importance of local processes when evaluating macro social structures such as the Russian soslovie system and serfdom. For my mother, the memory of my father, my brother, and my dearest sister who said the moon was not good enough ii CONTENTS Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................. vi Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................1 1.1 Historiographical Considerations .......................................................................4 1.2 The Economic Environment and the Estate .......................................................8 1.3 The Soslovie System, Landlords, and the Enlightenment ................................23 1.4 Peasant Agency and Social Structures .............................................................29 1.5 Dissertation Plan ..............................................................................................33 1.6 A Note on Transliteration ................................................................................35 Chapter 2: The Landlord and His Estate ............................................................................36 2.1 Landowners ......................................................................................................41 2.2 The Golitsyns ...................................................................................................43 2.3 Prince Sergei and His Estate ............................................................................48 2.4 Enlightened Estate Design ...............................................................................51 2.5 Instructions .......................................................................................................54 2.6 Estate Design in Practice .................................................................................59 2.7 Estate Design and the Church ..........................................................................62 2.8 Obrok versus Barshchina .................................................................................68 2.9 Landlord Management .....................................................................................70 2.10 Obrok and the Market ....................................................................................74 2.11 Obrok and Mobility ........................................................................................82 Chapter 3: The Power of Intermediaries ............................................................................91 3.1 The Bailiff ........................................................................................................96 3.2 Estate Dynamics and the Limits of the Bailiff’s Authority ...........................103 3.3 Contested Space, Administrative Solution ....................................................111 3.4 Foresting Instructions .....................................................................................118 3.5 Conclusion .....................................................................................................126 Chapter 4: Recruitment, the Mir, and the Community ....................................................127 4.1 The Mir ..........................................................................................................128 4.2 The Mir: Historiographical Debates ..............................................................133 4.3 Conscription and the Community ..................................................................138 4.4 War and Recruitment: 1853 ...........................................................................152 4.5 Conclusion .....................................................................................................164 iii Chapter 5: Serf Economic Activities and the Soslovie System ........................................166 5.1 Institutional Support for Private Transactions ...............................................167 5.2 Justice: A Local Matter ..................................................................................180 5.3 Serfs’ Private Transactions ............................................................................182 5.4 Conclusions ....................................................................................................186 Chapter 6: Serf Economic Activity and Household Divisions ........................................188 6.1 Households and Economic Development ......................................................190 6.2 The Peasant Household ..................................................................................197 6.3 Amicable Household Divisions .....................................................................203 6.4 Contentious Household Divisions .................................................................222 Chapter 7: Conclusion ......................................................................................................232 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................234 iv TABLES Table 4.1 Recruitment Families, 1953 .............................................................................155 v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This journey would not have been possible without the support and advice provided along the way. I am indebted to the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame and the Dominica and Frank Annese and Katie Murphy McMahon families for supporting my field research in Moscow. For support of preliminary research conducted in Russia, I would like to thank the Notre Dame Graduate School, the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts at the University of Notre Dame, and the Nanovic Institute. I would also like to thank the Nanovic Institute, the Center for the Study of Languages and Culture, and the Department of State for helping provide me with the language skills necessary to fulfil this project. Finally, I would like to thank the Department of History and the Union of Graduate Historians for their support during the entire process. I would especially like to thank Alexander Martin for sharing