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The Egyptian Muslim brotherhood and the road towards the Ummah Stoenescu, Dan

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Stoenescu, D. (2008). The Egyptian Muslim brotherhood and the road towards the Ummah. Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, 8(3), 677-706. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55996-8

Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur (Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden see: Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0/deed.de The Egyp tian Muslim Brother hood and the Road Towards the Um mah DAN STOENESCU

In the past three decades, ever since politi cal Islam became a power ful force in the Mid dle East, many scholars wonder if the ideal of unity of Ar abs and Mus- lims is still possi ble in the cur rent in ter na tional po liti cal con text. The concept of Ummah (Is lamic com mu nity of be liev ers) as a base of author ity always existed in the Middle East even since the rise of Islam. In order to bet ter un derstand why this concept became so impor tant nowadays after it was dormant for centu ries, it is nec es sary to look into the rise of the Mus lim Broth er hood in Egypt and its strife for the Ummah . The ob jec tive of this essay is to critically ana lyze the con tempo rary devel op- ments of the Ummah, a concept which be gan to receive more atten tion due to the global iza tion of politi cal Islam. Although this concept is as old as Islam it came on the Middle Eastern po liti cal stage propa gated by dif fer ent Islamic politi cal or gani- zations. Out of these organi za tions the most prominent is the Egyp tian Muslim Brother hood. Through the years and in fluenced by the po litical changes in the region, the Mus lim Broth er hood devel oped and gained millions of adepts not only in Egypt but in the whole Mus lim World. After the great Arab de feat of 1967 the Arab pub lic be gan to turn to Is lam in or der to find solu tions for the day-to-day prob lems they were facing. Since the Ummah is one of Islam’s ulti mate goals, the Muslim Brother hood started to strive for this concept through its politi cal activ ity over the past decades and through its in volvement on the in terna tional stage. The essay is divided in three parts. The first part will ana lyze the con cept of Ummah and its impli ca tions with re gard to Arab and Islamic unity. The second part will search for the rea sons of the emer gence of the Mus lim Brother hood in Egypt and around the Muslim and Arab World. What are the ideo logi cal and political factors that de termined the rise of the Muslim Brother hood and the strife for the Ummah ? The third part will look into the role that the Mus lim Brother hood plays on the in terna tional stage concen trat ing on its foreign pol icy stances with re gard to the all-in clusive Ummah .

The Con cept of Um mah

Accord ing to the Muslim Broth ers, the Ummah is the ba sis of author ity. It is the Ummah that ”ap points the one whom it trusts and is sure of his faith fulness, loyalty, knowl edge, ex perience, etc. Power cannot be taken by force or with the sword, but it is gained through proper free choice”1. Fur thermore, the Muslim

1 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI,”Politics in Islam”, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/POLITICS_IN_ISLA1.doc, p. 10. Accessed on 10/02/2007.

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Ummah is consid ered to be un der the direct guid ance of Allah alone and has the obli ga tion to imple ment the Quran and the Sunnah . Also, the Brethren be lieve that man has to rule the Ummah only in the way revealed by Al lah in the form of sharia. This way the rul ers have to rule accord ing with the laws of Al lah and they should be al ways pre pared to teach the Ummah the prin ciples of Islam 1. Only in modern times the concept of Um mah began to receive more atten tion, espe cially from the Islamist politi cal move ments around the Muslim World. Also global iza tion was a reason that brought the Ummah in the world’s atten tion 2. Accord ing to Abu Su layman, the Um mah has many resources, oppor tu ni ties, and values and the problems of the Um mah are ob viously connected to mysti fied thinking, wrong social vision, inap pro pri ate educa tion, and the decline of its insti tu- tions themselves in general. Moreover he consid ers that Islami za tion of knowledge is the most signifi cant is sue on the Um mah’s agenda in the next dec ades in order to sus tain ac tive po liti cal ac tion and mobi li za tion all over the Muslim world3. One of the main ob jec tives of the Muslim Broth er hood is the estab lish ment of a na tion based on Islam. This goal was also advo cated by the Brother hood’s ideo- logue and leader Sayyid Qutb. Ahmad S. Moussalli identi fies Qutb’s goal as an Is- lamic system ”where Islamic law is executed, where the idea of Islam rules, and where its prin ci ples and regu la tions de fine the kind of gov ern ment and the form of soci ety” 4. Ac cord ing to Salih, a pre req ui site to the use of Quran as a po liti cal model is the ex istence of the Um mah. Moreover, ”the dif fi culty of cre at ing a po liti cal sys tem based on the Quran in the ab sence of a homoge nous Muslim nation leads to a con- tradic tion between the Ummah as a re li gious com mu nity and the state as a sys tem of govern ment that ca ters for Mus lims and non-Muslims alike”5. Islam has the concept of uni versal ism that stems from the call for the creation of a strong cohe sive Ummah . Tibi states that ”if this call is restricted to the real Um- mah, to ex isting Muslims, then we may talk with some restric tions of an Is lamic-nation al ist Um mah”6. In this context po liti cal Is lam is a real threat not only to the nation states them selves but also runs against the Pan-Arab project 7. The idea of forg ing a distinc tive Islamic World sepa rate from the West is a conse quence of the frag men ta tion of the in ter na tional sys tem and of the Islamic doctrine it self. In order to bet ter un derstand this trend one has to com pre hend the main pre cepts of the Quran. In the Islamic holy book, Ummah means nation and was started to be used as a term by both Islamists and Arab na tion al ists. The term

1 Ibidem, p. 11. 2 Bassam TIBI, Arab Nationalism – Between Islam and Nation-State, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1997, pp. 223-224. 3 Abdul Hamid A. ABU SULAYMAN, ”Crisis in the Muslim Mind”, The International Institute of Islamic Thought – Islamic Methodology No. 1, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/Crisis%20in%20the%20Muslim%20Mind-AbuSulaym an.doc, p. 80. Accessed on 10/02/2007. 4 Ahmad S. MOUSSALLI, ”Sayyid Qutb: The Ideologist of Islamic Fundamentalism”, al-Ab- hath, no. 38, 1990, p. 60. 5 M.A. Mohamed SALIH, ”The Bible, The Qur’an and the Conflict in South Sudan”, in Niels KASTFELT (ed.), Scriptural Politics – The Bible and the Koran as Political Models in the Middle East and Africa, C. Hurst & Company Ltd., London, 2003, p. 117. 6 Bassam TIBI, Arab Nationalism...cit., p. 222. 7 Ibidem.

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Ummah , has a differ ent his torical and reli gious background than the tra ditional European term of a na tion. Early Islam achieved the first Ummah that was sup- posed to be uni ver sal not na tional or lo cal. Histori cally there never ex isted a har- moni ous Ummah 1. Al-Banna has also a strongly de fined po sition regard ing Is lamic unity. Al- though he rec og nizes the fact that Is lam is fore most a re lig ion, Al-Banna sees it also as patri ot ism and na tion al ity. The be lieve in Ummah , the commu nity of be lievers, still ex ists and thus he does not see distinc tions of nation al ity or race between Mus lims, nor geo graphi cal bor ders for Islam. This relig ion in his view forms by itself a single na tion-the Is lamic homeland 2. Further more, the foun der of the Muslim Brother hood makes a connec tion and even a classi fi ca tion in terms of national, Arab and Islamic unity. Al-Banna recog- nizes that in Egypt the Mus lim Broth ers have to be real Egyp tian na tion al ists first in or der to seek a true re vival. This posi tion is truly un derstand able when it is seen in the con text when Al-Bana wrote it, shortly af ter the end of the Sec ond World War when Egypt was still un der Brit ish colo nial rule. The second link advo cated by Al-Banna is the support for Arab unity, also an impor tant pillar in the movement of re vival. Fi nally, Al-Banna consid ers that the per fect en closure for the larger Islamic homeland is the estab lish ment of the Islamic League (al-jami’ah al-islamy yah ) in the context of world unity. World unity is consid ered as the true goal of Islam 3. Nowa days, the Mus lim Broth er hood changed in many ways from what Has- san al-Banna en vi sioned it to be. For ex am ple the po si tion on party status dif fers since al-Banna be lieved that the dawa could not be re stricted to a party as so ci ated with pa trons of the rul ing au thori ties. Ac cord ing to him the dawa was ment to address the common inter est of the en tire Ummah , and not just an organ ized part of it. Al though, nowa days the Brother hood still be lieves in address ing the Ummah, it admits that organi za tion must begin at the lo cal level, start ing with the com mu- nity and the state. The Mus lim Brother hood now recog nizes that if the state within whose politi cal sys tem they func tion has regu la tions al low ing the po liti cal in- volvement only for organ ized parties, in this case they must form a party4. Almost a hun dred years ago, Abd al Rahman al Ka wakibi in his book Umm al Quran, ex plained in the un am bi gu ous terms how a contem po rary Is lamic re surgence might be de vel oped. His ef forts amounted only to a few lo cal ized achievements that did not actu ally change much in the actual impor tance to the Ummah overall 5. Nowa days, the Ummah needs more ef forts at the in ter na tional level so it can reach a truly Is lamic ref or ma tion. Abu Su lay man ar gues that the schol ars of the Ummah must

”fo cus their de ter mi na tion and at ten tion first of all on the re form of Muslim thought and the clari fica tion of Its vi sion for the Ummah and Its leader ship.

1 Ibidem, p. 223. 2 Hassan AL-BANNA, ”On the Doctrine of the Muslim Brothers”, in Hisham SHARABI (ed.), Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, p. 110. 3 Ibidem, p. 110. 4 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 27, no. 3, August 1995, p. 328. 5 Abdul Hamid A. ABU SULAYMAN, ”Crisis in the Muslim Mind”, cit., p. 81.

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Thereaf ter, should it be the will of Al lah, the Ummah will take over with the work of building for the fu ture and progress ing toward new ho rizons” 1.

The concept of the Ummah is an es sen tial con cept in the Muslim mind. This con cept repre sents the unity of Mus lims all over the world in their Islamic faith. Striving for the Ummah has been the aim of every move ment rooted in politi cal Is- lam as a way of pre serv ing the na tional iden tity of the Arab peo ple and to unite them in a commu nity of faith.

His tori cal Evo lu tion and Ide ol ogy of the Breth ren

Islamists are divided in many groups, the more fun da men tal ist groups call for revolu tion ary change to be im posed on the people and on the po litical system. The Muslim Broth er hood of Egypt is not part of these fun da men tal ist organi zations and advo cates for a gradual change that should emerge from within the political system with the help of the Mus lim voters 2. The Muslim Brother hood is the most prominent Islamist politi cal move ment in the Arab World. Some other exam ples of Islamist movements in the Arab world include the Jus tice and De vel op ment Party and the Jus tice and Benevo lence So ci ety in Morocco; the Renais sance Movement in Tuni sia; the Islamic Salva tion Front, Hamas (The Movement for Peaceful Soci ety), the Na tional Re form Movement and al-Na- hda in Alge ria; the Muslim Brother hood in Jordan; The Re form Party in Yemen. Mistak enly, many times, the gen eral pub lic consid ers the Muslim Brother hood as a militant fun da men tal ist Is lamic group. Ac cord ing to Ibra him, Islamic militancy can be de fined as ”actual vio lent group be hav ior com mit ted col lec tively against the state or other ac tors in the name of Islam” 3. Nowadays only two groups of substan- tial size met this defi nition: the Islamic Lib era tion Or gani za tion (Munaz zamat al-Tah- rir al-Islami), known in the Arab mass me dia as Ga ma'at al-Fan niya al-Askariya (Techni cal Mili tary Acad emy group) and Ga ma'at al-Muslimin (the Muslim group) known in the Arab pub lic as Repen tance and Holy Flight (al-Taktir wa -l- Hi jra)4. Compared to these groups the Muslim Brother hood is a moder ate politi cal movement rooted in Islam and thus fight ing to re unite the Ummah . Accord ing to Shahin moder ate Islamist movements such as the Broth er hood adopted certain guidelines in the po litical process such as

”the recog ni tion of the ex isting politi cal re gimes and the insti tu tions of the state; respect for the rules and regula tions that gov ern the po litical proc ess; re jection of violence; willing ness to work in pub lic and gain some form of offi cial rec og ni tion; and willing ness to make al li ances and coali tions with other politi cal parties that do not share their orien ta tions” 5.

1 Ibidem. 2 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 321. 3 Saad El-Din IBRAHIM,”Egypt Islam and Democracy- Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups Methodological, Notes and preliminary finding 1980”, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/Egypt_Islam_and_Democracy. doc, p. 5. Accessed on 15/02/2007. 4 Ibidem, p. 5 5 Emad El-Din SHAHIN, ”Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?”, Working paper, The American University in Cairo, February 2005, p. 5.

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Of ten re ferred to as the Broth er hood or under their name in Ara bic al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun , or the Ikhwan, this or gani za tion is a group viewed by many scholars as the foun der of salafi Islam. The movement calls for a return to the fun damen tal ba sics of Islam as practiced by the origi nal foun ders, the salaf. The Muslim Brother- hood originated in Egypt, and in its glory days, from the 1930s to the 1950s, was an ex tra-par lia men tary group which ap pealed occa sion ally to violence and assas- sina tion to reach its goals1. Con tem po rary Mus lim Broth er hood re nounced to the vio lence advo cated in the first half of the 20th cen tury. Actu ally the broth er hood strongly re jects violence and ter rorism against the state and inno cent ci vilians as means to achieve their aims. In his inter pre ta tion on the teach ings of Hasan al-Banna, al-Tilmisani en dorses al-Banna’s under stand ing of ji had. Although he vali dates the fact that ji had is a key ob li ga tion for each Muslim, al-Tilmisani stresses that there is a holy pro hi bi tion against ag gres sion (tahrim al-’idwan) and of fen sive at tacks. As an alter na tive, he be lieves that ji had stipu lates ”jus tice to ward enemies and the guid- ance of Muslims to show mercy in this re spect”2. Over the time the Breth ren changed their tac tics and approach in or der to bet ter in te grate into the secu lar Egyp tian po liti cal sys tem but in the same time they main tained their main origi nal goals. The rise of the re li gious move ment in Egypt dates back to af ter math of the Arab de feat of 1967. Later on, Presi dent An war Sa dat had a rec on cilia tory pol icy towards Islamist groups from 1970 to 1973 in order to counter bal ance the Nas ser- ist-leftist oppo si tion. Contrary to his succes sor, President Anwar Sadat was not opposed to the Islamic Ummah 3. This politi cal envi ron ment was a fa vorable ground for the de vel op ment and growth of the Mus lim Broth er hood and of other smaller Islamic groups that actu ally repre sent the small hard core of a ”broad but amorphous mass of religi os ity in the soci ety a whole”4. Accord ing to Choud hury, na tional es sence, lo cal tra di tion, and the re li gious com mit ment of the popu la tion indeed survived the ideolo gies of the last part of the twen tieth century, return ing the peo ple to Islam 5. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s the main goal of most fun da men tal ist Is lamic mili tant groups in Egypt was to cap ture the state and Islam ize it from the top down. The Muslim Broth er hood would like to do the oppo site start ing from the bot tom up wards6. This is the main differ ence be tween the Broth er hood and all the other Islamic groups in Egypt and else where. The mid 1980s was the time when for the first time the Muslim Brother hood be came heav ily in volved in contem po rary Egyp tian poli tics. They formed a coali- tion with their his toric ri val Al-Wafd Party in the 1984. The cru cial year 1987 rep re- sented a boost for the Brother hood. Their slo gan in the leg isla tive elections of 1987 was ”Islam is the key so lu tion” and was a novelty on the Egyp tian politi cal scene

1 Joshua TEITELBAUM, ”The Muslim Brotherhood and the ’Struggle for Syria’, 1947-1958 Between Accommodation and Ideology”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40, no. 3, 2004, p. 134. 2 Umar AL-TILMISANI, ”Do the Missionaries for God Have a Program?”, Liwa al-Islam (The Banner of Islam), June 1987, p. 8. 3 G.W. CHOUDHURY, Islam and the Modern Muslim World, Scorpion Publishing Ltd., London, 1993, p. 111. 4 Saad El-Din IBRAHIM, ”Egypt Islam and Democracy...cit.”, p. 3. 5 G.W. CHOUDHURY, Islam and the Modern Muslim World, cit., pp. 111-112. 6 Fawaz A. GERGES, The Far Enemy – Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 49.

Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008 682 DAN STOENESCU dominated by secular discourses 1. Fur ther more, in 1987, they formed the ”Is lamic Coali tion” with both Al-’Amal and Al-Ahrar par ties while in the 1995 elec tions, which were organ ized on an indi vid ual system, the Muslim Brother hood gained only one seat2. In 2000 the Muslim Broth er hood gained seven teen parlia men tary seats. After 2000, hav ing this in creased num ber of members of Par liament the Mus lim Broth er- hood deputies were able to be heav ily in volved in legis la tion and judi cial re view3. Later on, the Breth ren joined the leg is la tive elec tions 2005 as in de pend ent can didates. With time the Mus lim Broth er hood pres ence in the Egyp tian Par lia ment steadily increased. Just looking at the time line of the in volvement in the Egyp tian elections we can see this change. In the elec tions of 1984, Egyp tians voted for seven members of the Broth er hood while in 1987, 35 members won the elec tions out of 60 members of Par liament from the Islamic Coali tion. In the 2000 elec tions, the Mus lim Broth er hood gained only 17 seats then their gains in creased to a sur pris- ing 88 seats in the 2005 elec tions4. Af ter the fall of Com mu nism and other ideolo gies that failed in Egypt be fore the 1990s, the Mus lim Brother hood came with a new kind of discourse. In the 2005 legis la tive elections of their ex perience taught them to be less ideo logical except concern ing their gen eral slogan ”Islam is the key solu tion” and more effi cient and pragmatic offer ing so cial ser vices for citi zens as alter na tives to the govern ment’s inca pac ity to address the immense social problems of the country 5. Throughout the decade 1984-1994, the Muslim Brother hood members man- aged to in filtrate into nu merous social and govern men tal insti tu tions. This fact obvi ously worried the Egyp tian regime and made it power less when facing the heighten ing increase of the Brethren’s influ ence spread in the soci ety. During this decade the Mus lim Brother hood was able to have a grasp on many so cietal insti tu- tions such as the syndi cates for exam ple 6. The last part of the 1980s all the way through the 1990s, was a pe riod charac- ter ized by popu lar disap point ment with gov ern ment poli cies and vocal calls for other kinds of politi cal repre sen ta tion of the large Muslim masses. This general disap point ment encour aged Islamic funda men tal ism and made the future of sta- bility and peace in the Middle East to look quite bleak. For this rea son the general trend towards funda men tal ism needed to be counter bal anced by more moder ate Islamic elements that do not ad vocate violence but at the same time would like to fol low the Islamic path in chang ing the Egyp tian soci ety based on Is lamic moral, social, and economic norms. Throughout the past 20 years, the

1 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies – Cairo, Egypt, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/brotherfuture.doc, p. 24. Accessed on 15/02/2007. 2 Ibidem, p. 24. 3 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”Why We Stand For Elections”, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/ikhwanprogram.doc, p. 43. Accessed on 04/02/2007. 4 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., pp. 19-20. 5 Ibidem, p. 24. 6 Amr Abdel Karim SADAWY, ”Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian Regime: Equations of Struggle and the Quest for a Path”, Al-Manar Al-Jadid Magazine, issue 31-32, summer-spring 2005, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/Muslim %20Brothers%20and%20the%20Egyptian%20Regime-AmrSadawy.doc, p. 1. Accessed on 11/02/2007.

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Muslim Broth er hood be came a cen trist mod erate group, repre sent ing conven- tional po liti cal Is lam1. At the be gin ning of the 1990s, the su prem acy of the old guard in the lead er- ship of the Egyp tian Muslim Broth er hood caused some younger members to leave the move ment and es tablish al-Wasat Party (Cen ter Party) in 1995. Among the second-gen era tion reform ists that stayed was Abd al-Mun’im Abu al-Fu- tuh, a dy namic and eloquent spokesmen member of the Brother hood’s supreme de ci sion-mak ing body, the Guid ance Bureau (Mak tab al-Ir shad). He was one of the first Breth ren to de clare that Is lamic discourse is not holy; rather, it is found- ed on human judgment (ijti had) and can be amended and updated to the modern era2. The Muslim Brothers gained more success in the 1990s because they were able to build a wide-rang ing net work of social rela tion ships and to at tain a great abil ity to mobi lize and gather. The social net work played the role of a buffer between the gov ern ment and his tar get of tak ing away the his tori cal repu ta tion from the Muslim Broth ers in or der to destroy the social dimen sion of the movement. The abil ity to mobi lize the masses exceeds the abil ity of any other group or politi cal party in Egypt. Many times this abil ity ex ceeds the capa bil ity of the gov ern ment it self3. Ac cord ing to Mu hammad Mahdi Akef, chairman of the Mus lim Broth er hood, since the year 2000, elec tions demon strated that an Is lamic project of setting up a re gime in Egypt is fea sible. Accord ing to him:

”The fi nal goal of the Mus lim Brother hood to get in the Par liament or other elected councils, syndi cates and all civil soci ety estab lish ments, is set up the Muslim soci ety which leads to setting up the Is lamic state in which good for all human beings, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, is achieved”4.

A nota ble evolu tion for the Muslim Broth er hood was the Reform Initia tive in March 2004, an ini tia tive pro pos ing re forms in 13 ar eas. This ini tiative is extremely im por tant for re form ing the Egyp tian soci ety and the Muslim Brother hood itself but also it could affect its affili ated organi za tions through out the Is lamic world. The Initia tive unam bi gu ously confirms the Brother hood’s commit ment to a repub- li can, par lia men tary, consti tu tional, and democ ratic sys tem in Egypt fol low ing the princi ples of Islam. Fur thermore the ini tiative

”calls for other politi cal parties to ad here to a na tional charter that calls, among other things, for recog niz ing the peo ple as the source of all author ity, re spect ing the prin ci ple of the trans fer of power through clean and free elections, confirm ing the free dom of be lief and ex pres sion, guaran tee ing the free- dom of the forma tion of politi cal parties, putting a limit to the term of the president, and enhanc ing the in de pend ence of the ju dici ary” 5.

1 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 322. 2 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, vol. 3, January 2006. Article available on the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/ Ideology_of_Egyptian_Muslim_Brotherhood.pdf, p. 2. Accessed on 04/02/2007. 3 Amr Abdel Karim SADAWY, ”Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian Regime...cit.”, pp. 8-9. 4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”Why We Stand For Elections”, cit., p. 43. 5 Emad El-Din SHAHIN, ”Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?”, Working paper, The American University in Cairo, February 2005, p. 6.

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In re cent years be sides the Mus lim Brother hood, sev eral other move ments appeared in Egypt. For ex ample, the Movement for Change (Ke faya), the Move- ment of the Judges, En gi neers Against Cus tody, the March 8th Group for the Inde- pendence of the Uni versity are just a few movements, most of the secular. These move ments form the new vo cal oppo si tion 1. In spite of the compe ti tion for votes on the Egyp tian po liti cal scene, the Mus lim Broth er hood re mains the main op po sition force in Egypt. The Muslim Brother hood’s recent successes after 2005 are the re sult of over twenty years of al li ances with other par ties and strenu ous po liti cal work. Also, the favor able inter na tional and inter nal envi ron ment helped the Broth- er hood achieve high scores in the elections. In the 2005 par lia men tary elec tions the NDP (Na tional De moc ratic Party), that is also the gov erning party for a num ber of years, won most of the seats in the Par lia ment ob tain ing a to tal of 311 seats. Tak ing into con sid era tion that the Par liament is composed of 444 elected deputies and ten ap pointed by the president, this victory allowed the NDP to benefit from a comfort able major ity in all major political matters when it came to vot ing2. Although the NDP was the ex pected win ner of the No vem ber-De cem ber 2005 elections, the great sur prise was repre sented by the ex cel lent per form ance of the Mus lim Broth er hood. The Breth ren won a to tal of 88 par lia men tary seats, by far the best re sults by an Egyp tian op po si tion party in over 50 years. And even more re mark able was the high rate of suc cess since 61% of the 144 can didates it nominated won the par liamen tary elections. This repre- sents an ex traor di nary six-fold in crease in compari son with their 2000 gains when they won only sev enteen seats. In the 2005 elections other secular oppo si tion parties per formed quite poorly3. The recent success of politi cal Islam influ enced not only the strat egy of the Mus lim Broth er hood but also that of the rul ing NDP. Sometimes the cause of radical Islam is advo cated by the rul ing re gimes them selves when they re al ize that this could be a viable venue that could replace the na tional ist and state ideolo- gies4. Rely ing on reli gious legiti macy is the easy way out for corrupt regimes that loose popular support in the Arab World. In or der to use the newly found Islamic fervour in Egypt in his fa vour president Muba rak is manipu lat ing the vari ous sub-groups that make up the Is lamic movement includ ing the Muslim Brother hood. Moreover, he is toler at ing, if not en cour ag ing, the par tici pa tion of these groups in the po liti cal process in a limited way5. Choudhury states that the Muba rak regime in order to suppress the so-called funda men tal ism started to use bru tal meth ods against Muslim groups, al though some of these groups were truly us ing vio lence against the gov ern ment

1 Amr Abdel Karim SADAWY, ”Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian Regime...cit.”, p. 11. 2 Amr HAMZAWY, Nathan J. BROWN, ”Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More Democratic Future?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Democracy and Rule of Law, December 2005, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO24.brown.hamzawy.FINAL1.pdf, pp. 3-4. Accessed on 11/02/2007 3 Ibidem, p. 4. 4 Emmanuel SIVAN, ”Why Radical Muslims Aren’t Talking Over Governments”, in Barry RUBIN (ed.), Revolutionary and Reformers: Contemporaries Islamist Movements in the Middle East, State University of New York Press, New York, 2003, p. 5. 5 Denis SULLIVAN, ”Islam and Development in Egypt: Civil Society and the State”, in Hussin MUTALIB, Taj ul-Islam HISHMI, Islam, Muslims and the Modern State – Case-Studies of Muslims in Thirteen Countries, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994, p. 212.

Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 685 and in no cent ci vil ians. This way the Muba rak gov ern ment vio lates ba sic hu man rights and disre gards the rule of law when fight ing fun damen tal ism. Although this regime toler ates some Islamic organi za tions and promotes Islam at some level, Muba rak is nei ther a de moc ratic leader nor an Islamist. Fur thermore, accord- ing to Choud hury, the presiden tial elections 1 in Egypt are simi lar to those of ”the com mu nist and authori tar ian states – it is a one-party elec tion which is the ne ga- tion of one of the fun da men tal in gre di ents of a free soci ety”2. In the af termath of Sep tember 11, 2001, the Egyp tian gov ernment has strength- ened the control measures over Islamist organi za tions. The rela tion ship with the Mus lim Broth er hood became quite tense es pe cially af ter the 2002 run off of the leg- isla tive elections when many Brother hood activ ists were arrested in Alex an dria, al leg edly for at tempt ing to hin der pub lic bal lot ing, ri ot ing and il le gal gath er ing3. Sadawy ar gues that link ing what is oc curring to the Muslim Brothers in Egypt to the in terna tional politics, in par ticular the West’s stand to wards the Islamist movements when facing violence and ter rorism, is an unavoid able approach. The inter- nal fac tors in Egypt in ter min gle with the ex ter nal fac tors to gen er ate a po liti cal situation where it is impos si ble to separate the in ternal from the ex ternal factors 4. The unfa vour able inter na tional condi tions do not allow the Islamists to as- sume power in many coun tries in the Middle East. The growth of the Hu man Rights Movement worldwide and the in creasing in ter na tional sym pa thy for po litical prison ers would stop many Middle Eastern gov ernments to suppress Islamic move ments such as the Muslim Brother hood. In the gen eral trend for the democ ra- tiza tion of the Middle East, even the US State Depart ment sees the rela tion ship with the Breth ren in a more prag matic light. Sec re tary of State Rice does not see anymore the Muslim Brothers as inflexi ble enemy but more of a possi ble partner. 5 Al though it may seem surpris ing, many scholars consider that the strong showing of the Muslim Brother hood in the 2005 par liamen tary elections can contrib ute to Egypt’s democ ra ti za tion. These results may con vince the Egyp tian gov ernment to find ways to recog nize the movement’s popu larity and al low some room for political reform. This way, the United States is in ter ested to en courage these reforms 6. Al-Cho baki ar gues that the stance of the Mus lim Broth er hood towards democ racy var ied in dif fer ent ages sig nifi cantly. In the 1930s, the Breth ren re jected de moc racy since they consid ered it as a product of the west ern civili za tion. Later on, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Muslim Brother hood became a revolu tion ary move ment and thus they ac cepted democ racy as a venue for politi cal change. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Muslim Broth ers fo cused on re spect ing de moc racy and hu man rights in Egypt and ef fi ciently led the Egyp tian op po si tion groups against gov ern ment abuses7.

1 The 2005 presidential elections were the first multi-party presidential elections in Egypt’s history. Hosni Mubarak, the incumbent president of Egypt won a fifth consecutive six-year term in office, with official results showing he won 88.6% of the votes cast. 2 G.W. CHOUDHURY, Islam and the Modern Muslim World, cit., p. 112. 3 David THALER, ”The Middle East: The Cradle of the Muslim World”, in Angel RABASA et al, The Muslim World after 9/11, Project Air Force Rand Corporation, Santa Monica CA, 2004, p. 98. 4 Amr Abdel Karim SADAWY, ”Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian Regime...cit.”, pp. 3-4. 5 Ibidem, p. 11. 6 Amr HAMZAWY, Nathan J. BROWN, ”Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More Democratic Future?”, cit., p. 9. 7 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 3.

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After decades of os traciz ing Muslim world’s Islamists, some western schol ars re al ized that it is ac tu ally in the in ter est of Middle East stabil ity that west ern foreign pol icy-makers come to terms with the more moder ate Islamist groups willing to work within the mod ern na tion-state sys tem. This new approach that ”ac como- da tion ists” call for is the best way in or der to avoid the bru tal sei zure of power by the fun da men tal ists1. A very ef fec tive way of pene trat ing the dif fer ent so cial class- es and espe cially the poor are non-gov ernmen tal or gani za tions. The suc cess of the Broth er hood in this civil soci ety sec tor gave them the op por tu nity to be heard by the edu cated masses and thus gather the support of many members of Egyp tian intel li gent sia. The new members of the Broth er hood are able to have an in tel lec- tual secular ap proach as good as their reli gious one skilfully using the Ara bic lan- guage in a way in which their views are easily un der stood by all2. Al though many re form ist ac ceded in the high ranks of the Mus lim Broth er- hood, the conser va tive still have a strong grip over the organi za tion’s ideol ogy. In 2004, for ex am ple, the March Re form Initia tive clearly states in its in tro ductory section that the fi nal ob jective of reform in Egypt is the in tro duction of sharia. It goes on to say:

”Our only hope to achieve pro gress in all the as pects of life is by re turn- ing to our re lig ion and imple ment ing our sharia [. . .] We have a clear mis- sion – working to put in place Al lah’s law, on the ba sis of our belief that it is the real, ef fec tive way out of all of our prob lems – domes tic or exter nal, political, economic, social or cultural. This is to be achieved by forming the Mus- lim indi vid ual, the Muslim home, the Muslim govern ment, and the state which will lead the Islamic states, reunite the scattered Muslims, restore their glory, retrieve for them their lost lands and stolen homelands, and carry the banner of the call to Al lah in order to make the world happy with Islam’s blessing and instruc tions” 3.

The Muslim Brother hood, although an of fi cially banned po liti cal move ment, has surprised analysts with its strong show ing in Egypt’s 2005 par lia men tary elec tions. Strength en ing the role of Islamic law (sharia) is the main aim of this organi za tion in Egypt and among the group’s many off shoots around the Islamic world. In spite of this clear goal Broth er hood leaders are quite vague when asked for specif ics on how they would leg is late and imple ment Is lam if given the op por- tunity. Recently, some leaders have actu ally deempha sized the impor tance of sharia in their elec tions mes sages although some times they de mand rather clear the im ple men ta tion of Islamic law. Accord ing to Heba Raouf Ez zat, a po liti cal sci en tist spe cial ist in the Mus lim Broth er hood from Cairo Univer sity: ”Their program re mains deeply am bigu ous”4. The current po litical envi ron ment in Egypt forces the Mus lim Brother hood to work within the po litical system in order to ad vance its goals. This strat egy makes

1 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 322. 2 Ibidem, p. 329. 3 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 5. 4 Sharon OTTERMAN, ”Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Parliamentary Elections”, Council on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9319/muslim_brotherhood_and_ egypts_parliamentary_elections.html. Accessed on 10/02/2007.

Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 687 the Brother hood a credible partner and brings votes from the moder ates. Although histori cally, politi cal accom mo da tion is not a new tac tic for the Broth er hood, it is ac tu ally a new phe nome non in terms of con crete practice on the Egyp tian po litical scene1. More over, ever since 1941, the Muslim Broth er hood called for partici pa- tion in the sys tem. ”Early in its de vel op ment the Muslim Brother hood accepted that it had to con test elec tions if it was to exer cise real in fluence. It resolved to field can di dates in any forth com ing na tional elec tion.”2 Nev er the less, the Breth ren failed be cause of corrupt elec tions and govern ment prohi bi tions against it. The current status of the Mus lim Broth er hood in Egypt looks vague since it does not enjoy a legal po si tion. Al though it is a banned soci ety the Brethren were able to win 20% of vot ers as well as about ten folds of what other oppo si tion parties rep re sented in the Par lia ment (6 seats for Al-Wafd party, 2 seats for Al-Ta- gammu’ party and one seat for Al-Ghad party)3. In or der to un der stand the incredi ble gains made by the Muslim Brother hood in the 2005 elections we have to look be yond ideol ogy. The success lies in the movement’s concen trated presence in many social spheres and its work as a grass-roots service-pro vi sion organi zation. More over, the Broth er hood is an exten sive social movement heavily involved in the fields of health care, educa tion, and poverty al le via tion. Since Egyp tian state in sti tu tions from such social and economic fields since the mid-1970s per- form poorly this civil space was filled by the lo cal re li gious forces rep re sented by the Brother hood. The Muslim Brother hood was able to use its new so cial net works based on re li ance among citizens in or der to gain and use ef fec tively fi nan cial resources, organ iza tional capaci ties, and charita ble work4. Looking at the evo lution of the Muslim Broth er hood over the decades we can ob serve a cer tain flexi bil ity and prag ma tism that drove the or gani za tion in the fore front of the Egyp tian and Middle East politics. Although the organi za tion fo- cused on national prob lems dur ing the elec tions its core ideol ogy re mained the same and sees the Quran and conse quently the im ple men ta tion of the sharia and the uni fi ca tion of the Ummah as main ob jectives on the long run. Nowa days the Egyp tian branch of the Mus lim Broth er hood still re mains the most signifi cant Brother hood group, al though some other off shoots have thrived through out the Mid dle East and even Europe. In spite of the cur rent specula tions, there is actu ally no Islamist ”Comintern” since the Broth er hood’s In terna tional Or gani za tion is in re al ity a weak coali tion hardly able to as semble its own members. Many scholars believe that this in terna tional debil ity is a result of the Broth- er hood’s successes at the national level. Be cause of the na tional auton omy and adapta bil ity to lo cal condi tions, the Broth er hood’s inter na tional links de pend in di- vidually on every country’s na tional pri ori ties5. The na tional branches of the Mus lim Brother hood do not al ways have simi lar views regard ing various issues such as their stance on the rela tion ship with the United States. Although, for ex ample, in Egypt and Jordan, in order to fight their

1 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 328. 2 John L. ESPOSITO, James P. PISCATORI, ”Democratization and Islam”, Middle East Journal, no. 3, Summer 1991, p. 429. 3 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 35. 4 Amr HAMZAWY, Nathan J. BROWN, ”Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More Democratic Future?”, cit., p. 4. 5 Robert S. LEIKEN, Steven BROOKE, ”The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 86 no. 2, March/April 2007, p. 115.

Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008 688 DAN STOENESCU gov ern ment’s au toc racy and the Muslim Brothers see favora bly some US policies, overall they se verely criticize the United States, es pecially during the elections. In the case of the Syr ian Brother hood there is a reverse situation since this Brother hood branch supports the Bush admini stra tion’s move to isolate Bashar al Assad and his regime 1. Po liti cal Is lam knows no bor ders. Only look ing of the way Mus lims in the West sup port differ ent po litical aims in the Mid dle East we can re al ize that the Um- mah became truly trans national. Suppressed throughout much of the Arab World, the Broth er hood found ref uge also across the Mediter ra nean in Europe via stu- dents and ex iles. Fur ther more Islamic scholars that act as higher le gal and moral authori ties are not estab lish in their na tive coun try. For ex ample, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi of Egypt’s Muslim Broth er hood lives in Qatar and is at the same time the su preme mufti of the Pal es tin ian Hamas while Shaykh Ibn Qatada, a Pal es tin- ian-Jor da nian re sid ing in Brit ain, is a mufti for some branches of the Al ge rian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Also, an Egyp tian such as Abu Hamza is one of GIA’s main ideologues and propagan dists 2. Although inde pend ent, the Muslim Brother hood offshoots collabo rate with each other to the ex tent of their own na tional in ter ests. At the be ginning of the 1990s the Muslim Brother hood adopted a more conser va tive line. This fact influ- enced also the re la tion ship with its branches bring ing dis advan tages to the organization since it contrib uted to the loss of control over those Muslim Brother hood branches out side Egypt. For ex am ple, the Syr ian branch of the Mus lim Broth er- hood, adopted a more prac ti cal ap proach while the In ter na tional Or gani za tion of the Muslim Brother hood (IOMB) has been gradu ally trans formed. Nowa days, the promoter of IOMB, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi estab lished World Asso cia tion of Muslim Clerics, which replaces the tra ditional role of the Muslim Brother hood as the Sunni fun da men tal ist source of au thor ity (marja’iyyah)3. Al though in the early 1980s, the Egyp tian Broth er hood’s Inter na tional Or gani- zation sought to coor di nate its off shoots around the Arab World they en coun tered fierce op po si tion eve ry where. For ex am ple the Su da nese Mus lim Broth er hood leader Hasan al-Turabi pro tested, ”You can not run the world from Cairo”4. Moreover when Iraq in vaded Kuwait in 1990, the Ku waiti Muslim Broth ers ob jected to the tacit con sent of the In ter na tional Or gani za tion and with drew from the or gani za tion and also cutting their fund ing. Also, the Iraqi branch of the Mus lim Brother hood col labo rates with the US-con trolled gov ern ment in Bagh dad against the pro tests of their fel low Muslim Broth ers world wide. Moreover, in 2006, the coa lition between the Syr ian Muslim Broth er hood and Abdel Halim Khaddam, the re bel for mer Syr- ian vice president, has been ex tensively criticized by other Brother hood branches. The 2006 Leba non war further di vided the Brethren in the Arab world. The Syr ian Mul sim Broth ers condemned Presi dent Ba shar al-As sad’s in ter fer ing in Leba non, while the other offshoots of the Muslim Broth er hood supported Hez bollah 5.

1 Ibidem, p. 116. 2 Emmanuel SIVAN, ”Why Radical Muslims Aren’t Talking Over Governments”, cit., p. 5. 3 Reuven PAZ, ”Qaradhawi and the World Association of Muslim Clerics: The New Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood”, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM), Occasional Papers, vol. 2, no. 4, November 2004, www.eprism.org, Accessed on 04/02/2007 4 Robert S. LEIKEN, Steven BROOKE, ”The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 115. 5 Ibidem.

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Although the differ ent offshoots of the Muslim Broth er hood do not act as a whole, they still have the same ob jec tives in mind and they strive for the Um mah. Moreover, the Muslim Broth er hood has normal re la tion ships with other Is lamic movements not in volved in politics be cause they are still part the greater Islamic so ci ety1. As the main pro moter of politi cal Is lam in the Arab World, the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood became a catalyst for other Is lamic or gani za tions and for their branches in the Mus lim World. Further more, the Egyp tian Brethren gained a truly in flu en tial role in the Is lamic soci ety all over the world by be com ing a model for politi cal achieve ments through their moder ate stance. This moder ate stance is essen- tial for the Brother hood’s foreign pol icy making and in terna tional re lations since it is giving a real hope to those Muslims looking to wards uni fy ing the Um mah. In order to bet ter un derstand the Muslim Brother hood’s strive for the Ummah it is nec es sary to look into its his toric ideo logical devel op ment and vi sion for socio-politi cal change. Al-Chobaki be lieves that ”the Mus lim Brother hood’s speech con tains many contra dict ing du ali ties such as the dual ity of re lig ion and politics on one side, and the par tial struc ture and re nounc ing au thor ity on the other”2. Moreover, ac cord ing to Al Muba rak, ”the the ory and practice of Islam, over four- teen cen tu ries and in dif fer ent coun tries and conti nents can provide evidence of compel ling and even contra dic tory in ter pre ta tions”3. These duali ties mentioned above both in terms of theo logical approach and secular poli tics make the Muslim Brother hood a pragmatic organi za tion that never lost sight of the Um mah. Compared to the other ma jor po litical movements in Egypt, the Mus lim Broth- er hood has a unique theo logical approach to wards politics. Since the Mus lim Broth er hood preaches intense spiri tual re newal, the or gani za tion does not even per ceive it self as a politi cal party (hizb) but more as a soci ety (jama’a) coor di nat ing a wide range of ac tivi ties in tended to imple ment Islam in all aspects of life4. The phi loso phy of the Egyp tian Muslim Broth er hood in Egypt has a few ma jor objec- tives and strate gies. The most impor tant goal pur sued by the Brother hood is the found ing of an Islamic state governed by Sharia, Is lamic law. Besides this goal that has been al ways in the minds of Islamic scholars and rulers, other aims are more simi lar to the aims of West ern so cie ties. Such aims include the impo si tion of democratic ideals such as liberty, rep re sen ta tion, and re spon si bil ity; and the pur suit of socio eco nomic fairness 5. The dawah is an Arabic term meaning ”in vite” or ”in vita tion” and it is consid- ered to be an ob liga tion on every Mus lim to invite oth ers to Islam, it is also the preach ing of Islam. For the Muslim Broth er hood ever since 1928 the dawa is a great con cern. In terms of the Arab world the dawa is ex cep tion ally ef fec tive in coun tries such as Jordan where Jab hat Al-’Amal Al-Islami (the Islamic front) is a very impor- tant po liti cal force, and in Yemen where the Is lah (ref or ma tion) Party in flu ences the poli tics of the country 6.

1 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/A_QUIET_ DISCUSSION_ON_HEATED_ISSUES.doc, p. 10. Accessed on 10/02/2007 2 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 47. 3 Khalid AL-MUBARAK, Turabi’s ”Islamist” Venture Failure & Implications, El Dar El Thaqafia, Cairo, 2001, p. 43. 4 Anthony GORMAN, Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century Egypt, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, p. 98. 5 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 336. 6 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 16.

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In or der to un der stand ac cu rately the goals of the Egyp tian Muslim Broth er- hood, one must first under stand that Is lam is not just a relig ion; it is much more than that. Ac tually, a precise defini tion of Islam would unavoid ably inter pret that Is lam is both ”re lig ion and state” (din wa dawla). Umar al-Tilmisani, the Gen eral Guide of the Mus lim Brother hood until his death in 1987 had this kind of in terpre- tation. He charac ter ized Islam as ”creed, worship, homeland, citizen ship, creation, the physi cal, culture, law, forgive ness, and power”1. His tori cally the Muslim Brother hood has been a commu nity of Muslims dedi- cated to the rule on Islamic prin ciples and to the strife to revive them. The Brother- hood has two essen tial aims: liber at ing “the Islamic homeland” from any foreign occu pa tion; and creat ing in that free homeland a free Islamic state that will fol low the prin ci ples of Islam, includ ing its social order. Before reaching these es sen tial goals the Breth ren have other seven in ter me di ary goals pre scribed by found ing fa ther of the Muslim Brother hood al-Banna. These seven inter me di ary goals are arranged hier ar chi cally 2. At the base of the hi erar chy is the for mation of the Mus lim as a person, fol- lowed by the for mation of the Muslim family, which is the base of the fu ture Mus- lim soci ety that will de cide later on to choose a Mus lim gov ern ment. Fur ther more, abiding by Al lah’s law, the Mus lim govern ment will create an Islamic state. This Islamic state will be the main force that will lib erate Muslim lands occu pied by for eign forces. This Islamic state will be, ac cording to al-Banna, the state that will gather all other Mus lim countries in a un ion. The main objec tive of that un ion is not only to gov ern accord ing to Is lam over the Muslim lands but also to spread Is- lam in the en tire world. Al-Banna states that work ing to wards es tab lish ing an Is- lamic govern ment is truly a re li gious duty (faridhah ) for every Muslim since only this way the po liti cal, eco nomic, so cial, do mes tic and ex ter nal prob lems of the Muslim Nation can be solved3. The Muslim Brother hood’s program recog nizes shariah as the main path way for creat ing progress, devel op ment and reform in a way in which poli tics would be link with re li gious mor als and thus making the po liti cal dis course truly no ble. Moreover, the Mus lim Broth ers rec og nize shariah as the only way for fol lowing the wish of Allah and identify this means as ab so lutely nec es sary for the commu nity since it stems from Islam 4. Legal Counselor Muham mad Ma’mun Al-Hudaibi, the dep uty of the Mur- shid (gen eral guide of the Mus lim Broth er hood), ar gues that the ide ol ogy of the Muslim Brother hood has two key pillars: the in tro duction of sharia and the strife towards unifi ca tion of Islamic countries, mainly among the Arab states. Fur thermore he calls for lib er at ing them from for eign in flu ence and occu pa tion 5. Histori- cally this goal has al ways been on the Breth ren agenda. The Muslim Brother hood ever since its estab lish ment has been heav ily in volved in the fight for lib era tion of

1 Umar AL-TILMISANI, ”Do the Missionaries for God Have a Program?”, Liwa al-Islam (The Banner of Islam), June 1987, p. 7. 2 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 2. 3 Ibidem, p. 2. 4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/ ikhwanprogram.doc, p. 2. Accessed on 04/02/2007. 5 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI,”Politics in Islam”, cit., p. 6.

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Egypt from British occu pa tion and achieved it later on with the par tici pa tion of other po litical forces1. Al-Hu daibi ar gues that in the sharia there are unequivo cal texts that call for the obliga tory im ple men ta tion of Islamic law. More over, accord ing to sharia, Mus- lim rulers should abide by the texts. Such Quranic texts are:

”O ye who be lieve! Obey Al lah, and obey the Apos tle, and those charged with au thor ity among you. If ye dif fer in any thing among your selves, re fer it to Al lah His Apostle, if ye do be lieve in Al lah and the Last Day: that is best, and most suitable for fi nal deter mi na tion”. (An-Nisa: 59) ”But no, by thy lord, they can have not (real) Faith, un til they make thee judge in all disputes be tween them, and find in their souls no resis tance against thy de cisions, but ac cept them with the fullest convic tion”. (An-Nisa: 65) ”The answer of the be lievers, when summoned to Allah and His Apostle, in or der that he may judge be tween them, is no Other than this: they say, ’we hear and we obey’: It is such as these that will at tain fe licity.” (An-Nur: 51) ”Then we put thee on the (right) way of Re lig ion: so fol low thou that (Way), and follow not the de sires of those who know not”." (Al- Jathiya: 18) ”To thee we sent the Scrip ture in truth con firm ing the Scrip ture that came before it, and guarding it in safety: so judge be tween them by what Al- lah hath revealed….” (Al-Ma’idah: 51)2.

Al though in many speeches and even documents the Breth ren preach oth er- wise, of fi cially the Mus lim Broth er hood has insisted on the fact that they do not seek to es tab lish a re li gious state or a re li gious gov ern ment. On the con trary they ad vo cate the es tab lish ment of a civil govern ment and a civil state in which Islam is the main ba sis of author ity. The reason behind this is that: sharia in an ulti mate source of au thor ity that de rives from God, while the govern ment derives its au- thority from the peo ple it gov erns3. Compared to the other ma jor po litical movements in Egypt, the Mus lim Broth- er hood has also a distinc tive politi cal agenda where social issues are in tertwined with relig ion and poli tics. The Muslim Brother hood’s politi cal dis course is not only a purely reli gious one but has deep social features that ap peal to the im pover- ished Egyptian masses. In its 2005 elections program the Brother hood

”sees that Egypt has suffered for long time from the absence of democ racy, the monop oly of wealth and author ity, the ris ing of corrup tion, the abun dance of laws and clauses that oppose public freedoms and human rights, the in creasing number of the po litical detain ees and the various types of torture” 4.

This approach has existed since the founding of the Brother hood and did not change in terms of tac tics for winning popu lar support. The founder of the Mus- lim Brother hood, Hassan Al-Banna envis aged three phases for the de velop ment of the Muslim Brother hood:

1 Ibidem, p. 6. 2 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI,”Politics in Islam”, cit., pp. 9-10. 3 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 5. 4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 26.

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”1. Winning adher ents through ’propaganda, commu ni ca tion and in for- mation’. 2. ’Forma tion, selec tion and prepara tion’, in which cadres would be chosen, members ranked accord ing to their status and kind of activ ity in the movement, and an enor mous empha sis would be placed on pub li ca tions, journal ism, and meetings. 3.’Execu tion’, in which all kinds of changes in society would be strug gled for”1.

Nowadays the same approach is used. The Muslim Brother hood’s program for the par lia men tary elec tions of 2005 is obvi ously based on Islam in or der to reform ”the de mocratic mechanisms of the mod ern civil state”2. The main rea son ing behind the Islamic approach for a renewal of soci ety is the fact that

”each man wishes for others what he wishes for himself and faith in creases. Con se quently, man’s conscience comes to life and every one feels Allah’s Pres- ence; thus, the rates of corrup tion in soci ety decrease on economic, politi cal and social levels” 3.

In the Egyp tian po liti cal en vi ron ment where cor rup tion can be found at many levels this reli gious approach gained many sympa thiz ers among the large masses espe cially among young ur ban poor and reli gious bour geoisie. The social base of Is lamic or gani za tions around the Mus lim world is al most uni form: stu dents in tech ni cal fac ul ties, re cent migrants to cit ies and members of the ur ban lower-middle class4. In Egypt, the Mus lim Broth er hood thrives in the pro fes sional as so cia- tions of doctors, lawyers, phar macists, and engi neers and thus has the oppor tu nity to at tract younger pro fes sion als and re cent uni ver sity gradu ates5. The pro gram with which the Broth er hood gained most popular support was its 2005 elections program. The 2005 Muslim Brother hood program is divided into three parts: revival, devel op ment and reform. The revival part in cludes the Broth- er hood’s stand on moral values, culture, free dom, human rights, rights of citi zen- ship, devel op ment of man, media, youth, women, and children. The second part analyses the organi za tion’s vision on the devel op ment of few impor tant sectors such as agri cul ture, educa tion, sci en tific re search, in dus try, construc tional development, health, and envi ron ment6. The largest part of the Mus lim Brother hood’s 2005 electoral program deals with reform at a po litical, economic and social level. The program is very com pre hen sive since it in cludes do mes tic and for eign pol icy is sues, things that con cern the civil soci ety, but also re form ing the na tional se curity and the lo cal rul ing. In terms of economic and social re form the is sues are the same issues that all the other par ties in Egypt want to tackle: un em ploy ment, budget defi cit, in ter nal and ex ter nal debt and in fla tion, so cial se cu rity ser vices,

1 Michael GILSENAN, Recognizing Islam – Religion and Society in the Modern Middle East, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 2000, p. 219. 2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 1. 3 Ibidem, p. 1. 4 Mohammed M. HAFEZ, Why Muslims Rebel – Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2003, p. 16. 5 Ibidem, p. 16. 6 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 4.

Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 693 in sur ance and re tire ment rights, health in sur ance and pro mot ing moral val ues, a point high on the Brother hood’s agenda1. As a contem po rary po liti cal move ment on the Egyp tian po liti cal scene, the Mus lim Brother hood proves to be a very prag matic organi za tion that not only re- jected violence but also embraced west ern ideals and called for the devel op ment of democ racy within a state ruled by Is lamic law. In spite of the scholarly debate on the com pati bil ity be tween sharia and democ racy, the Mus lim Broth er hood estab lished in Egypt a real model for the pursuit of Is lamic ideals. This politi cal model is a much more moder ate way than the model fol lowed by other more radical groups2. Be sides the theo logi cal and socio-politi cal fea tures of the Mus lim Broth er- hood’s politi cal discourse, the Brethren display a cer tain kind of Egyp tian na tional ism that is com ple men tary with the higher goal of unit ing the Ummah and lib er at ing it from for eign in vad ers. In this proc ess Ar ab ism also plays a key role. The Muslim Broth er hood calls for the es tab lish ment of an Is lamic state for the all-inclu sive Ummah , a state based on val ues such as truth and jus tice not only among its citi zens but also among all na tions on the same standards 3. Not only the Mus lim Broth er hood, but other Egyp tian Islamist or gani za tions see Egypt as essen tial in the spread of Islam and the uni fica tion of the Ummah . For exam ple, one leader of the Islamic Libera tion Or ganiza tion (MA) in Egypt said in an in terview that

”we be lieve that the Egyp tians are ba si cally the most re li gious of all Islamic peoples. They were so before Is lam, from the time of the Phar aohs. They have contin ued to be very re li gious. Egypt would there fore be a good base to start the world Muslim re vival. All that the re li gious Egyp tians need is a sincere Muslim leader ship. This convic tion, we be lieve, had a deci sive im- pact on shaping the strat egy of MA, as will be shown later”4.

Accord ing to Cot tam, the change in Egyptian-iden tity patterns was in fluenced by the growth of the po liti cally par tici pant popula tion. In the 1920s the Egyptians per ceived themselves as Egyptians first only af ter as Muslims and Arabs. Later on dur ing Nas ser the three identi ties con verged. Tak ing into consid era tion the growth of the po litical partici pa tion and in view of the fact that reli gious masses started to go through a process of crys tal li za tion of their iden tity, the popu la tion started to loose their Egyp tian and Arab iden ti ties and be came more Islamic. This way the Egyp tians started a trans for ma tion at their iden tity level to wards in te gra tion with the larger Ummah . Their links to their Egyp tianess and the Arab commu nity com- plicate this process 5. The Muslim Broth ers proudly con sider them selves na tion al ists since they fought for the in depend ence of Egypt and the other Arab coun tries.

”The Muslim Brothers love their country and are anx ious to preserve its unity; they find noth ing wrong for any man in be ing loyal to his coun try,

1 Ibidem, p. 5. 2 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 337. 3 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 8. 4 Saad El Din IBRAHIM, ”Egypt Islam and Democracy...cit.”, p. 8. 5 Richard COTTAM, ”Nationalism in the Middle East: A Behavioural Approach”, in Said Amir ARJOMAND (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1984, pp. 36-37.

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dying for the sake of his people, and whishing for his father land every glory and every honor, and every pride. All this is from the par ticular standpoint of nation al ism [min wijhat al-qawmi y yah al-khassah ]…”1

Moreover the Breth ren see them selves as an essen tial tool in unit ing all the Arabs under the flag of Is lam in order to achieve their higher goal, the Ummah :

”The Arabs are the core and guardians of Islam…Arab unity is an essen- tial prereq ui site for the resto ra tion of Islam’s glory, the rees tab lish ment of the Muslim State, and the consoli da tion of Muslim power. This is why it is the duty of every Muslim to work for the revival and support of Arab unity-this is the posi tion of the Muslim Brothers in regards to Arab unity”2.

Look ing at the Mus lim Broth er hood’s politi cal agenda we can also distin- guish cer tain fea tures that pro mote Ar ab ism. In terms of edu cation the Muslim Broth er hood stresses some nation al is tic and reli gious aims. For exam ple, the 2005 electoral program views educa tion as means to coin cide ”with the iden tity of the nation and the consti tu tion, and maintains the Ara bic lan guage”3. Moreover, the Arab and Islamic values 4 in educa tion are strongly enshrined in the Brother hood’s program. The most respected Islamic univer sity in the world, Al-Azhar, has a cen- tral role in this proc ess and the pro gram re quests fur ther sup port for the uni versity’s ba sic aims and needs5. Although, Al-Az har Univer sity is seen as a model for educa tional devel op ment the Mus lim Broth er hood rec og nizes the need for im- proving the cur ricula and the educa tion plans in order to bet ter serve reli gious people, scien tists and educa tors from both Arab and Is lamic worlds6 and to provide guidelines for them. Fur ther more, an other move that proves the Arabist aims of the Broth er hood is their de mands to the High Coun cil of the Uni ver si ties and to the syn di cates to adopt a na tional plan to Arabize the sci ences and edu cation 7. In Egypt, and in many other Ara bic speak ing countries, many sub jects and sciences in particu lar are taught in Eng lish or French. This is not only a legacy of the colo nial period but also a way for the curric ula to keep up with the lat est scien tific and techno logi cal ad vances of the time. Since the el ites in the Mid dle East have been tra di tion ally edu cated in a for eign lan guage there was no oppo si tion and actu ally it made much sense. The Muslim Brother hood calls for trans lating books and research into Arabic 8, in vent ing new words in Arabic in order to develop the lan guage and bring it in mod ern times but also for the large masses that speak only Arabic to have ac cess to some fields in educa tion that were banned for decades by the foreign edu cated, and many times more lib eral, rul ing elite.

1 Hassan AL-BANNA, ”On the Doctrine of the Muslim Brothers”, in Hisham SHARABI (ed.), Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, p. 110. 2 Ibidem. 3 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 19. 4 Ibidem, p. 21. 5 Ibidem, p. 20. 6 Ibidem, p. 21. 7 Ibidem, p. 22. 8 Ibidem.

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Accord ing to the Muslim Brother hood, Marx ism and secular ism bring per version, corrup tion, and falsehood espe cially among the young peo ple thus divert ing their at tention from the teach ings of Islam. Further more in many Muslim countries the west ern media spreads obsceni ties such as half-naked drunken women, obscene litera ture, songs, plays, films, and porno graphic mate rial. These obsceni- ties are corrupt ing the Muslim people and thus they repre sent a Western menace to Is lamic socie ties1. This west ern cul tural in va sion is also seen by the Mus lim Broth er hood as a continua tion of the cru sader spirit of the West. This crusader spirit lasted from the Mid dle Ages to this day and it is di rected against the Mus lim Ummah . Although many Mus lim intel lec tu als doubted the au then tic ity of this Western crusad ing spirit, claiming that na tional in ter ests are overrid ing and they are gen er ally the only rea sons for the West when at tack ing Is lamic coun tries, the Mus lim Broth er hood believes that cur rent circum stances have demon strated the crusad ing spirit is still the driv ing force of the West in Middle East politics 2. Muham mad Mahdi ‘Akif, a more conser va tive leader of the Broth er hood, states in a few ar ticles 3 published in 2005 that the fun damen tal aims of the Brother- hood did not change. To lib erate the Islamic homeland and to found a free Islamic state are the guid ing prin ci ples that the old guard still adhere to. Fur thermore he be lieves that Is lam’s princi ples are des tined to or gan ize peo ple’s af fairs in this world and in the af ter life, and the sum of Islam’s laws is constructed of indu bi table prin ciples that can not be over stated. He consid ers that the differ ent parts of Is- lam are in te grated and each part is symbi oti cally linked to the other: the faith (‘aqidah ), the law (sharia) and the acts of devo tion (‘ibadat). These cannot be separate ”re lig ion from poli tics, or re lig ion from the state, or the acts of de vo tion from [politi cal] leader ship” 4. Al though mod er ate Islamist movements and parties such as the Muslim Broth er hood have not completely aban doned their goal of estab lish ing an Islamic state, they call for a grad ual ap proach and working through au thorized channels in order to reach their aims. Muslim Brother hood members competed in local and leg is la tive elec tions, many times as inde pend ents or in al li ance with other po liti cal parties, thus demon strat ing adher ence to democ racy. This strategy of moder ate Islamist movements made them aware that they have more oppor tu ni ties for success in the democ ratic game rather than us ing to vio lent means5. The ideol ogy of Islamic militant groups in Egypt is far more conser va tive than that of the Mus lim Brother hood. For exam ple in their lit erature they use axio matic statements consid er ing that man was created for a reason to repre sent the will of God by lead ing a vir tu ous life and fol lowing the right path (al-sirat al-mustaqima).

1 Yusuf AL-QARADAWI, ”Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism”, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/ Islamic%20Awakening%20.doc., p. 37. Accessed on 10/02/2007. 2 Ibidem, p. 40. 3 Muhammad Mahdi ‘AKIF, ”We Never Did and Never Will Talk to the Americans”, June 22, 2005; IDEM, ”The MB and the Return of the Islamic Revival”, July 10, 2005. The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanonline.com. Accessed on 10/02/2007. 4 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 4. 5 Emad El-Din SHAHIN, ”Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?”, Working paper, The American University in Cairo, February 2005, p. 5.

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Fur ther more, they be lieve that to be come a good Muslim one must not be content with only ob serv ing the command ments, taboos, and other ritu als. In their view a person has to do more, the moral Muslim cannot ex ist alone; he must struggle to build and preserve a right eous commu nity of the faith ful (the Ummah ). This strug- gling to build up the Ummah is a duty of every true Mus lim1. Islamic militant groups have many things in com mon with the Muslim Broth- er hood. In terms of ideol ogy the main differ ence be tween them and the Brethren is the means to achieve their goals. They view the present as a funda men tal part of their prin ciples consid er ing the cur rent gov erning system in Egypt as cor rupt and incom pe tent. Accord ing to Islamic militant groups the enemies of Islam like the Chris tian West, the Jew ish Zi on ism, and athe ist commu nism humili ated the govern ment and force it to make un ac cept able con ces sions. For this rea son the re gime devi ated from ”the straight path” and was not able to fight against the foreign as- saults on Dar al-Islam (the homeland of Islam) on the home front. More over, they con sider that the re gime did not im plement sharia well enough fa vor ing western-im ported le gal codes. While the politi cal leaders of the country live in moral decay, poverty, disease, illit er acy and the vices (radhila) are rampant in Egypt. Ac- cording to mili tant Is lamic groups but also to the Muslim Brother hood the only way for a moral revival of soci ety is to im plement the sharia2. Radi cal Islamist groups cre ated also a split in the Mus lim Broth er hood between reform ers and conser va tives. The best ex am ple of the in ter nal fric tions between con ser va tive and re form ist mem bers of the Muslim Broth er hood is the policy shift in the 2005 presiden tial election. The reform ists encour aged the Broth- er hood to join other oppo si tion groups in an effort to force politi cal change while the con ser va tives strongly op posed this move since they were re luc tant to risk the long-term at tempt to Islamize the so ci ety for politi cal gains on the short-term. The con ser va tives were rep re sented by the Gen eral Guide Akif. In 2005 they over ruled the re form ist side rep re sented by Abu al-Fu tuh. In the 2005 elec tions the Mus lim Broth er hood declared that its can di dates would now consider themselves as rep re- senting the Muslim Brother hood and not ”the Islamic Trend”, as they had done pre vi ously since the 1990s3. This trend towards a more conser va tive approach is actu ally the gen eral trend in many Arab countries in the region. The rise of Hezbol- lah in Leba non and Hamas in Pales tine are only a few ex am ples of this trend. The move towards a conser va tive ap proach has helped the Muslim Broth er hood, Hamas and Hezbol lah to preserve their organ iza tional unity and raise funds from rich Islamist benefac tors from around the Islamic world. Many scholars consider Islam as a compre hen sive sys tem gov ern ing all aspects of hu man life. Islam covers all mate rial and spiritual as pects, soci ety and in- divid ual, politics and personal aspects. For this rea son a re mark able re surgence of Islamism in the past two dec ades it is not surpris ing and it is very likely that in the fu ture the Mus lim Broth er hood’s slogan ”Islam is the solu tion” will gain more mo- men tum all over the Mid dle East4. Accord ing to Abu al-Fu tuh and other reform ist Mus lim Broth ers the Ca liph ate is a purely po liti cal, non re li gious mat ter, and our times call for other types of po litical unity, and the European Union is consid ered

1 Saad El Din IBRAHIM, ”Egypt Islam and Democracy...cit.”, p. 7. 2 Ibidem, pp. 7-8. 3 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 9. 4 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 323.

Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 697 an ex cel lent ex am ple. Al though this view ob vi ously con tra dicts the con ven tional un der stand ing of the Muslim Brother hood as a Sunni source of reli gious author ity (marja’iyyah), which would re store the abol ished Caliph ate, the more reform ist idea gains more and more support ers among the members of the Brother hood 1. The Muslim Brothers have a distinct na tional fo cus and talk in their 2005 electoral pro gram about terms such as the na tion’s identity, devel op ment and revival. The focus is on Egypt more than it is on the Mus lim commu nity of believ ers, the Ummah . Accord ing to them, the na tion’s identity should be reflected by its cul ture and the de vel op ment of ”the hu man be ing” in a way in which the mem bers of the na tion are strong and will ing to fur ther de velop for the bene fit of the coun try2. Moreover, the flaws of the na tion strength en ing proc ess come from low morals, ”the weak ness of the culture of be longing and bad manners” and there fore re viv- ing the moral val ues is essen tial 3. This view comes from the teach ings of Prophet Mu ham mad who said, ”I was sent but to complete the no ble man ners…And ver- ily, you (O Mu ham mad) are on an ex alted stan dard of charac ter. (Al-Qalam: 4)”4 The Brother hood’s strive for the Ummah is not only a result of its historic ideo- logical devel op ment but also a ne cessity in the even tual estab lish ment of an Islamic state. The imple men ta tion of the sharia is cru cial in the strife for the Ummah . Also, the only way to gain le gitimacy for an Islamic state is to fight for the Ummah . The Egyp tian Muslim Broth er hood was truly able to abide by the Quran and preach the uni fi ca tion of the Ummah view ing Egypt as the core cata lyst in this process. This way the Muslim Broth ers fight for the in de pend ence of Egypt in or der to be able this way to unite the Ummah around the Egyp tian core. Fur ther more, the strife for the Ummah can also be ob served in the moves to Arabize the country even more. The Arabs are the peo ple of the Quran, and Allah re vealed the holy book in Ara bic to them. For this rea son strength en ing the Arab ele ment in Egypt and else- where in the Arab World is a step forward to wards the unity of the Ummah .

The Mus lim Broth er hood on the In ter na tional Stage

The Muslim Brother hood’s stance in the inter na tional arena has a few guiding lines that stem from the Quran, ele ments of Egyp tian na tion al ism and secular politi cal pragma tism. When ana lyzing the foreign pol icy stance of the Brethren we can ob serve a few key ele ments that are essen tial to their world view. First, we have the strife to unite the Ummah by in tegrat ing the Arab and Is lamic countries around the Egyp tian core. The second objec tive is the libera tion of Pales tine, an objec tive that is seen more as a reli gious duty rather than a stra tegic goal. Another objec tive of the Brother hood is further ing Islamic causes around the world and pro tect ing Mus lims against for eign in vad ers.

1 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 3. 2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., pp. 8-9. 3 Ibidem, p. 9. 4 Ibidem.

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In the Brother hood’s view, Egypt needs to be a pow erful country in order to be able to gather the Um mah. The strate gies to achieve this aim call for the estab lish- ment of an in tegrated infra struc ture in order to develop an in dustrial and tech nical base. The main strate gies of the Muslim Broth ers propose not only in tegrated national projects such as devel op ing Sinai, Al-Wadi Al-Gadid, the Red Sea, the North- west Coast, the West Desert, but also spe cialized national programs such as nuclear pro gram, space and aviation pro gram, ar ma ment pro grams, vital tech niques programs. These strategies are essen tial to achieve a compre hen sive de vel op ment in Egypt. What dif fer en ti ates the Broth er hood from the other Egyp tian po liti cal par ties is the distinct fo cus on the Islamic world. Even in its electoral program the Brother- hood calls for a devel op men tal in te gra tion with the Is lamic and Arab countries. The novelty that dis tinguishes the Egyp tian Mus lim Brother hood from its sis- ter organi za tions across the Arab world is the dis tinct fo cus on the inte gra tion of Egypt with its west ern and south ern neighbours, Libya and Sudan. This strategy is consid ered a focal point in the de velop men tal proc ess of Egypt1. The move towards re gional in tegra tion is not surpris ing taking into consid era tion the fact that dur ing the Brit ish Empire Su dan was un der Egyp tian con trol while dur ing Nas ser’s time there were some moves towards an Egyp tian and Lib yan in te gra tion. The focus on the re gional in te gra tion puts the poli cies of the Mus lim Brothers in per spective and shows that actual na tional Egyp tian in ter ests prevail in the geo strategi cal arena. In spite of this re gional in te gra tion ap proach, the path to wards in te gra tion with the other Is lamic and Arabic countries is still the back bone of the Broth er hood’s strategy. An ex am ple of this strat egy is found in the 2005 Electoral Program in the sec tion dedi cated to the sup port of ag ri cul tural de vel op ment. This section rec og nizes the ab so lute need for inte gra tion with some Arab and Islamic countries in order to ” increase the reve nue of the in vest ment in the ag ri cul tural pro duc tion”2. In the na tional se cu rity sec tion of their 2005 elec toral pro gram the Muslim Broth er hood stresses the fact that eco nomic stabil ity and tra di tional cul tural values are a shield against ”for eign in va sion, west erni za tion, threats, and ag gres- sion”3. More over the Broth er hood rec og nizes the high im por tance of the army for the so ci ety and for national secu rity. In terms of foreign rela tions, re gional Islamic re la tions are seen as the key in Egypt’s geo-stra te gic scheme. In or der to main tain Egypt’s sta bil ity the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood advo cates for broad en ing re lations with Libya and Su dan, not only be cause they are in the geo graphical prox- imity but also for the his tori cal links that al ways ex isted. In terms of stra te gic inter ests the Brother hood calls further at tention the se curity of Sinai and the Arab-Israeli conflict 4. The Muslim Brothers do not mention in their offi cial documents the state of Is rael in stead they name it the Zi onist regime. This practice is very common among organi za tions rooted in politi cal Islam. The Muslim Brothers see Africa as a playground of strate gic impor tance for Egyptian inter ests espe cially when it comes to defend ing Egypt’s in ter ests in the Nile Ba sin. For this rea son the Broth ers ad vo cate ”car ing for the coun tries of the River Nile’s ba sin and ac ti vat ing trade agree ments among them for sav ing the

1 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 12. 2 Ibidem, p. 15. 3 Ibidem, p. 32. 4 Ibidem.

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Egyptian inter ests” 1. While Brit ish colo nial era trea ties grant Egypt an ex ces sively large allo ca tion of the Nile run off, there are other Afri can nations that need that wa ter. For the mo ment, the agree ments on water al lo ca tion have been up held because of Egypt’s military and stra te gic po si tion. Egypt’s depend ence on Nile wa- ters presents a dramatic exam ple of resource economic and politi cal vulner abil ity. About ninety-five per cent of Egypt’s wa ter comes from outside of the country, flowing into it through the Su dan2. Since the 1980’s, the Sudan has been ruled by an Is lamic military dic tator- ship. This situation cooled down the close links between Cairo and Khar toum. For this rea son Egypt can not rely that much on Su dan to help main tain the status-quo for its guar an teed vol ume of water sup ply3. From this perspec tive it is un der stand able that the Egyp tian Muslim Broth er hood supports ”in te gra tion projects between Egypt and Su dan, and drawing up a time table for ac com plish- ment”4. More over, the his tori cal links and the ideo logi cal simi lari ties be tween the Islamists in Khartoum and the Egyp tian Muslim Brother hood make this inte gra- tion project a desir able goal. Other na tion al ist ac tions taken by Mus lim Broth er hood members in the Peo- ple's Assem bly are their fight against the foreign ers’ posses sion of the Egyp tian lands. They consider this prac tice as dan ger on the Egyp tian na tional se cu rity. Fur- thermore, they be lieve that the gov ernorates where there was no indus trial development, espe cially the Red Sea area, should be taken into spe cial consid era tion 5. A com mon fea ture of Islamic groups around the Arab World and the Muslim Broth er hood is the pan-Islamic nature of their economic thinking. Fur thermore, mili tants in par ticu lar dis agree with the ex ces sive dif fer en tial in the wealth of various Islamic countries and thus they be lieve that no true Mus lim ruler should toler- ate some Muslims to en joy ex ces sive wealth (as in Saudi Ara bia) while other fellow Muslims are starving (as is the case in Bangla desh) 6. In terms of economic inte gra tion the Muslim Brother hood recog nizes the cen- tral ity of the Arab League in this proc ess and supports an ex tensive role of the organi za tion in the po liti cal, so cial, cul tural, eco nomic and stra te gic fields, es pecially in the move to wards es tab lish ing a joint Arab mar ket7. The same inte gra tion move is advo cated when it comes to economic reform. Inte gra tion with the Arab, Is- lamic and Afri can coun tries is a strate gic economic prior ity for the Brother hood. Fur ther more, the eco nomic Arab unity could only be achieved by the es tab lish- ment of joint projects between differ ent Arab capi tals8.

1 Ibidem, p. 33. 2 Peter H. GLEICK, ”Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security”, International Security, vol. 18, no. 1, Summer 1993, p. 86. 3 Ashok SWAIN, ”Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, December 1997, p. 684. 4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 33. 5 Abdul Moez MOHAMMED, ”News of Muslim Brotherhood Bloc”, Non-periodical bulletin on News of MB parliamentary bloc members in newspapers and internet, Fourth issue – April 2006, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/News%20of%20MB%20parliamentary%20bloc(4).doc. Accessed on 10/02/2007. 6 Saad El-Din IBRAHIM, ”Egypt Islam and Democracy...cit.”, p. 9. 7 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 33. 8 Ibidem, p. 37.

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In many conflicts around the world the Muslim Brother hood has a foreign policy that pri oritizes the Um mah. Ever since the Bos nian con flict in the be ginning of the 1990s the Brother hood became very much involved in helping its fellow Muslims. The Islamic en thusi asm of that dec ade be came less dur ing present day be cause of the violent ac tion that took place by some fight ers in Afghani- stan. For this rea sons, nowa days in the Ara bic and Muslim govern ments put ob- stacles to this kind of trend. The simplest strat egy is gov ern ment con trol over this trend by cur tail ing the rais ing of do na tions for Islamic causes all over the world1. In the case concern ing the Kash mir prob lem, the Broth er hood supports the UN resolu tions demand ing a refer en dum, and de plores India’s refusal to hold the ref er en dum2. In the case of the first Gulf War the cen tral ity of the Ummah was also a key fac- tor in deter min ing the Brother hood’s stance. Although the Egyp tian Muslim Broth- er hood was among the first to condemn Iraq’s inva sion on Ku wait, it be came opposed to a retalia tory act against Iraq since it viewed this ac tion as an in ternal feud among Arab leaders. In the Broth er hood’s view these feuds were the fore- most threat to the in tegrity and unity of the Um mah. For this reason, although the Breth ren started by con demning Saddam’s inva sion of Kuwait, they ended up sup- porting the Iraqi regime 3. Accord ing to its 2005 elections program, the Muslim Brother hood has a truly pan-Ara bic agenda ad vo cat ing na tional re sis tance not only in Pal es tine, but also in Is raeli-oc cu pied Go lan Heights, a ter ri tory claimed by Syria. More- over, the or gani za tion calls for re sis tance in Iraq, a country that was dur ing 2005 still un der the occu pa tion of an American-led coali tion that top pled Saddam Hus sein in 2003. It is men tioned spe cifi cally that these ter ri to ries are Ara bic and the na tional resis tance can be achieved by ”all pos sible means”4 suggest ing that armed resis tance could be a way. This armed resis tance is not uncom mon in Is- lam and is one of the five meanings of the word Ji had, specifi cally Ji had by the sword (ji had bis saif). This form of ji had repre sents armed fight ing for God, a holy war for the de fence of Muslim lands. Off shoots of the Muslim Broth er hood, such as the Sala fis, adopted pre vi ously this kind of ap proach. Leiken and Brooke ar- gue that the Broth er hood does author ize ji had in oc cu pied ter ri to ries such as Af- ghani stan un der the So vi ets, Iraq and Pal es tine. They view this ji had as ”de fen sive ji had” against foreign in vaders 5. Al Hudaibi sees the Muslim Brother hood as a popular movement chained all over the Arab world. As any Is lamic popu lar movements in Arab coun tries the Mus lim Broth er hood is banned since it is seen as antago nis tic to the state. Moreover, Al-Hu daini sees that the Arab pub lic has been in the last years less re spon sive to the problems of their fel low Ar abs in coun tries such as Leba non, Af ghani stan or Sudan. When the United States bombed Sudan and Afghani stan few demon stra tions took place in Arab and Islamic countries with the ex ception

1 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 24. 2 Ibidem, p. 24. 3 Gehad AUDA, ”An Uncertain Response: The Islamic Movement in Egypt”, in James PISCATORI (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Chicago, 1991, p. 119. 4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 32. 5 Robert S. LEIKEN, Steven BROOKE, ”The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 116.

Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 701 of Sudan, where demon stra tions were ar ranged by the gov ern ment it self1. When the mas sa cre of Qana took place, dur ing the 2006 Is raeli at tack on Leba non, there were a few dem on stra tions only in Pal es tine but no re ac tion in Egypt, Syria or other Arab2. Of fi cially as an Islamic movement, the Muslim Brother hood does not partici- pate in any kind of gov ernment, except the Islamic ones which apply the rules of sharia. In other coun tries with Mus lim popu la tions the dif fer ent cir cum stances ac tu ally dic tate other ap proaches. In other countries such as in India, where the Mus lims com prise over 200 million, they can not rule by them selves and therefore they have to par ticipate in the rul ing of the state to gether with the Hin dus in order to protect their wel fare. The same case is in Lebanon where half of the Leba- nese are Marinates and Or tho dox Chris tians, and thus Muslims cannot ask for an Is lamic state3. In this case they have to reach an agree ment and govern to gether with the Chris tians and Druze. In the case of Egypt where only 10% of the popula tion are Chris tians, the Muslim Brother hood does not see this minor ity as an im pedi ment in estab lish ing an Islamic state. The pan-Islamic idea of unity is also reflected in the fact that the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood actu ally con sid ers Pal es tine as a common pro pri ety of all Mus lims be cause of the im por tance of Jeru sa lem. Therefore Pal es tini ans do not have the right to give away any part of this holy land4. Moreover, they do not have this right be cause, accord ing to Is lam, on the Day of Judg ment, Muslims will be judged if they de fended this holy city and for this rea son all have a re spon si bil ity in this mat ter5. Accord ing to the Mus lim Brother hood Jeru sa lem is the main reason for which Pales tine is a Holy Land. This ancient city ac tu ally gives Pal es tine its unique ness and impor tance. Moreover:

”Pal es tine with out Je ru sa lem is nothing but a pure politi cal struggle for liberty Just as Si nai in Egypt, Go lan in Syria and the southern boundary strip of Lebanon” 6.

The rea son for which in Islam Jeru sa lem is a sacred place is the fact that here is the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the First of the Two Qib lahs and the third Holy Place after Mak kah and Madina. This holy mosque is impor tant because of its distance far from Makkah and Madina. Moreover, the mosque and Jeru sa lem itself indi cate the weak state of the Mus lims in history and vice versa. For this rea son they repre sent a real test of the force and strength of the Mus lims all over the world7. The Muslim Broth ers con sider that the con tem po rary state of Je ru sa lem truly repre sents the weak nesses of the en tire Islamic Nation 8. Also, Jeru sa lem is a sacred city for Ar abs and Muslims be cause is the city of the Al Aqsa mosque, the

1 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 3. 2 Ibidem, p. 10. 3 Ibidem, p. 14. 4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”What Does JERUSALEM Represent for Muslim?”, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/ images/ Jerusalem.doc, p. 1. Accessed on 04/02/2007. 5 Ibidem, p. 2. 6 Ibidem, p. 1. 7 Ibidem, p. 16. 8 Ibidem, pp. 25-26.

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Holy place where Mu hammad passed through during his mid night jour ney to the seven heavens and the city of the resur rec tion of Jesus the Christ, the son of God for Christians and an impor tant prophet for Muslims. One of the first pan-Arabists was the Egyp tian scholar and politi cian, Ahmad Zaky Pa sha (1884-1934). He was among the first to call for Arab unity and that is why he was consid ered ”The Sheikh of Arab ism”. In 1929, he left Egypt and went to Pal es tine to par tici pate in the fights of Ha’it al-Bu raq be tween the Ar abs of Pal- estine and the Jew ish Zion ists. As a pan-Arabist, Ahmad Zaky Pa sha used to de- plore the loss of Arab ter rito ries to in fidels and non-Arabs. He was the one that called Andalu sia ”The lost paradise” and even with his great in ter est in Pal es tine, he never thought that this land would be ”The sec ond lost paradise” 1. However, the Brethren strongly be lieve that in Pal estine

”the conflict is continu ing and Jihad is pro ceed ing and Pales tine is not a second Andalu sia and surely Al mighty Al lah shall grant Victory to His Believ- ers in the end. All Praises and Thank are due to Allah, the Almighty” 2.

The Muslim Broth er hood rec og nizes that the Jew ish colonies and the Jew ish policies have been highly effec tive in Pal estine and for this reason the situa tion dete rio rated gravely. In this situa tion it is clear that the Mus lims might loose Jeru- salem forever 3. The strate gic impor tance of the city is cru cial since:

”Jeru sa lem is the pivot point; the point at which Arab iden tity and Is- lam meet without any op posi tion or con tra dic tion and Muslims meet and par tici pate with Chris tians with out con flicts. In a word, Je ru sa lem gath ers all people regard less of their approach to life, whether secular or reli gious” 4.

The lib era tion move ment of Pales tine is charac ter ized by an Is lamic approach and identity al though Is lam was in the be gin ning not that im por tant and be came es- sential only later on5. In the conflict be tween the Is lamic re sis tance move ment Hamas and the Pal es tin ian Au thor ity ruled by Fat tah, the Broth er hood’s stance is clear. The Breth ren do not nec es sar ily sup port reach ing a solu tion to the problem through nego- tia tions and they strongly sustain Hamas. More over, when deal ing with the con flict between Israelis and Pales tini ans there is a gen eral consen sus among Muslim Broth- er hood leaders around the Arab world since they ex press will ing ness to fol low suit if Hamas, the Pal estin ian offshoot of the Brother hood, recog nize the Israel 6. Ac cord ing to the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood, the new Islamic movement of Pal es tine is the true rep re sen ta tive of the Pal es tin ian peo ple. This movement rep re sented a true chal lenge to the his tori cal con trol of the Pal es tin ian Lib era tion Or gani za tion (PLO) over the lib era tion move ment7. They call for Fat tah and Yasir Arafat to stop be ing a ”de structive element” and work to gether with Hamas. Fur thermore, the Brother hood views Hamas martyr dom

1 Ibidem, p. 3. 2 Ibidem, pp. 15-16. 3 Ibidem, pp. 3-4. 4 Ibidem, p. 4. 5 Ibidem, pp. 8-9. 6 Robert S. LEIKEN, Steven BROOKE, ”The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 116. 7 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”What Does JERUSALEM Represent for Muslim?”, cit., p. 9.

Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 703 opera tions as totally differ ent from those taking place in Egypt where some civil- ians are hurt. They be lieve that the op erations in Pal estine are consid ered martyr- dom opera tions since they have the bak ing of Is lamic scholars in cluding the pre sent Sheikh of Al-Azhar 1. Also, re gard ing the re la tions with the Pal es tin ian-Is raeli con flict, the Muslim Brother hood calls for a cancel la tion of ”the laws and resolu tions which prevent the fi nancial aid to the occu pied people (espe cially the mili tary gov ernor’s resolu- tion number 4)”2. Military De cree no.4 of 1992 forbids collect ing or re ceiv ing do nations for any rea son with out au thori za tion from the Min is try of Social Affairs and stipulates a minimum of 7 years impris on ment to pun ish ment for in fringe ment of this de cree3. Although this de cree is used usually when prosecut ing oppo si tion civil soci ety lead ers and or gani za tions on the home front, in Egypt, in the case of the Pal estini ans there were US and Israeli pressures to cut fi nancial aid to them. The pres sures were height ened af ter the Sec ond Inti fada of 2000 when arms and funds were channelled to Gaza through tun nels coming from North Sinai. Be cause, all Arab gov ern ments, with out ex cep tion, con sider Pal es tine as be- long ing to all Muslims and Arabs, it is the re spon si bil ity of all the Arab gov ernments to protect this ter ritory 4. The Muslim Broth er hood consid ers that main tain ing Pal es tine as an Arab and Islamic ter ri tory is a mat ter of na tional se cu rity for all neighbour ing and distant Arab coun tries. In this stra te gic game the United States has high in ter ests. Although neighbour ing countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Leba non are certainly ca pa ble of support ing the Pal es tin ian move ment against Is raeli oc cu pa tion, they are wak ened by the United States. The US is us ing other Arab coun tries such as Iraq, Sudan and Libya to distract the at ten tion from Pal estine and thus the Mus lim Broth er hood consid ers that Pal es tine’s neighbour ing countries are losing their po litical and strate gic impor tance in case of conflict 5. Concern ing the call for an economic boycott of Israel and the United States, many Brother hood leaders hope for the boy cott to take place. More over they call for move to ”be backed by a strong au thority and it needs enormous public ity” 6. Broth er hood leaders do not consider this economic boycott as fruit less since the fight against ”Zi on ism” should be taken on the eco nomic field and there fore re sist- ing the for eign goods of the countries support ing the Zi onists would be a vic tory towards the lib eration of Pales tine 7. In terms of foreign pol icy the Mus lim Brother hood has well defined views that re flect the in ter ests of an active Islamic politi cal movement. The Muslim Broth ers also focus a great deal on the re la tion ships be tween Arab coun tries, es pe cially Egypt, and Is rael. They sup port the move ments of boy cott and call for re sis tance against all kinds of nor maliza tion of rela tions with Israel. Moreover they ap peal to all Arab countries to adopt a single pol icy for deal ing with ”the Zi onist policy” and

1 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 23. 2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 33. 3 The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, ”2002 Report”, http://www.eohr.org/ report/2002/omtc1.htm. Accessed on 04/02/2007. 4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”What Does JERUSALEM Represent for Muslim?”, cit., p. 12. 5 Ibidem, pp.14-15. 6 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 24. 7 Ibidem, p. 24.

Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008 704 DAN STOENESCU also re con sid era tion of the na ture of ”the Egyp tian-Zi on ist re la tions”1. This kind of discourse, although popular with the masses, seri ously goes against the recon cilia- tion pol icy promoted by Egyp tian president Anwar Sadat and his succes sor, president Hosni Muba rak. Fur ther more, Egypt’s role as a credi ble me dia tor in the Mid dle East and that of an US ally in the re gion might be threaten if this kind of policy would be adopted offi cially by Cairo. The Egyp tian Muslim Broth er hood calls for a re con sid era tion of the Is- raeli-Egyptian rela tion ship. Now about twenty years af ter the late Egyp tian Presi- dent An war Al-Sadat went to Is rael in 1977 as a sign of concilia tion, the situa tion in the Middle East is still volatile. Even af ter Egypt be came the first country to sign a peace treaty with the Jew ish state in 19792, the re la tion ships be tween the en tire Arab World, Pales tini ans in par ticu lar, and Israel are still marked by vio lence. The re peated at tacks in Gaza and the Leba non war of 2006 are just a few ex am ples of the con tem po rary vio lence. In the light of these events, the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood sees Egypt as a key player in the re gional geo-stra te gic game. The friendly Egyp tian-Is raeli re la tions are seen as damag ing for the Arab world, for the Pal es tin ian cause and for the Ummah in gen eral. By break ing the Israeli-Egyp- tian part nership for peace, the Muslim Brother hood hopes to turn the most populous and power ful Arab coun try against the Jew ish state thus cre at ing an imbal ance in the regional power system. The Muslim Broth er hood rec og nizes that much of the prob lems in Pal es tine re sult from the support of the United States for Is rael against the whole Arab world. Because of this stance the US is viewed by the Broth er hood as a new colo- nial power. An exam ple to prove this point is the US history it self. The Brethren do not forget the United States waged vio lent wars against the Na tive Americans under the ex cuse of estab lish ing peace and stabil ity in North America 3. Brother hood lead ers con sider that there is an American and ”Zion ist” role in fight ing the Broth- er hood in particu lar and Islam and Muslims in general 4. The sugges tion put for ward by the Mus lim Broth ers that the ba sis of the future Egyp tian, Ameri can and Israeli re la tions5 should be re vised by an an nual confer ence where politi cal powers, parties and research centers would partici pate is not new. Although not new it is an un re alis tic approach to the amiable dip lo- matic rela tions that should ex ist in the Mid dle East. Of fi cially, the Mus lim Broth ers deny the ac cu sa tion that their or gani za tion is anti-Se mitic and they ar gue that there is no conflict be tween the Mus lim Brother hood and the Jews, but them and the Zi onists (which the Brother hood does not consider Jews). Re gard less of these deni als, Brother hood writings 6 have ex pressed de tes tation for both Jews and ”Zi on ists”7. Such ex am ples are al ways pre sent in the Arab and Egyp tian press.

1 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 32. 2 IDEM, ”What Does JERUSALEM Represent for Muslim?”, cit., p. 12. 3 Ibidem, p. 5. 4 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 24. 5 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, cit., p. 32. 6 The October 1980 children’s supplement to the Brotherhood newspaper Al Dawa, was published to teach children on ”the enemies of your religion”: ”Such are the Jews, my brother, Muslim lion cub”. 7 Robert S. LEIKEN, Steven BROOKE, ”The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 116.

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For ex ample, the Mem bers of the Mus lim Broth er hood continue their fight against Zi onism and Israel even from the benches of the Egyp tian Par liament. Their repre sen ta tives in the foreign rela tions commit tee lobbied actively to reject a resolu tion of the UN Gen eral Assem bly de mand ing to cele brate the Jew ish Holo- caust, on Janu ary, 27th annu ally. The demand was sent by the head of the Israeli Knes set to Par lia ment speaker, Dr. Fathi So ror. The Muslim Brothers together with the other par liamen tary groups stated that:

”Egypt is not concerned with the occa sion and the inter na tional soci ety should celebrate as well with the Zi onist massa cres against the Arab nations like Deir Yassin, Sabra and Shatila, Qana massa cre and Bahr Al Baqar School in addi tion to many other occa sions. The members added that the UN Gen- eral Assem bly reso lu tion is issued for govern ments and not Parlia ments and those resolu tions are not obliga tory for the na tions”1.

Fur ther more, the fight of the Mus lim Broth er hood against Israeli in ter ests goes also on the home front. In 2006, Dr. Moham med Al Beltaji – secre tary of the MB parlia men tary bloc in the Egyp tian Par lia ment – sub mit ted an ur gent state- ment to the Prime Min is ter and Minis ter of Plan ning and Re gional De vel op ment against the sell ing of a build ing of the Ameri can Univer sity in Cairo (AUC) to the Israeli embassy. This initia tive came after a number of newspa pers spoke about the AUC in tention to sell its lands downtown Cairo to the Israeli embassy. The issue was seri ously ana lyzed and pub li cized by the Broth er hood and the leg is la tive was asked to take preven tive measures 2. Muslim Brother hood’s strife for the Ummah on the in terna tional stage can be seen from differ ent per spectives. The venues to achieve this goal are di verse: po litical and economic inte gra tion, empow er ing Egypt to be come the core of the Um- mah, support ing Islamic causes and Muslims all over the world and the libera tion of Pal es tine. The success of these venues depends not only of the Muslims in general but on the po litical power the Muslim Brother hood and its branches around the Muslim World manage to ac quire.

Con clu sion

The emergence of Islamic militant move ments in Egypt in the past two decades is es pecially impor tant for the general politi cal context of the Mid dle East since Egypt has been consid ered for cen turies the cen ter of the Arab-Mus lim world. It is the most populous and power ful Ara bic coun try, and its stra te gic lo cation make it a gate not only to wards the Mid dle East but also to North and Sub-Sa- ha ran Af rica and the Mediter ra nean. Histori cally, in the past two cen turies, what hap pened in Egypt in flu enced po liti cal and ideo logical currents in the Arab World and be yond. Be cause Egypt is con sid ered a true cul tural uni fier of the

1 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”News of Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary bloc (1)-Non periodical bulletin issued by MB Parliamentary bloc in Egyptian People’s Assembly-First Issue”, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/ images/kotla1_translation.doc. Accessed on 10/02/2007. 2 Abdul Moez MOHAMMED, ”News of Muslim Brotherhood Bloc”, cit.

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Arab-Mus lim world it has the poten tial to in fluence the vast area of the Arab and Islamic world to respond to it as one center, particu larly in times of crisis 1. Ac cord ing to Ibra him, the dream of estab lish ing an Islamic social or der has always been the ob jective of Mus lims for centu ries. History showed that actu ally it usu ally be comes an ar dent de mand during na tional cri sis or in the af ter math of a hu milia tion at the hands of for eign ers. Ibra him be lieves that ”the Is lamic vi sion will never be cut down to its proper size until it is tried at least once. This is why the Iranian Revolu tion is uniquely sig nificant for the present and the near fu ture”2. In the past two dec ades the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood proved to be a strong po liti cal force not only in Egypt but across the Arab World. Its ideol ogy spread across the Arab coun tries and influ enced them in their own na tional po litical fab ric. The old Islamic concept of the Um mah, a concept long forgot ten by many Ar abs, was brought again to light from the an nals of the rise of Islam and the Arab Empire. Although the prag matic in ter nal poli cies ad vo cated by the Mus lim Broth- er hood might seem to focus on Egypt and its na tional in ter ests, the Brother hood ac tu ally ad vo cates the re es tab lish ment of the all in clu sive Ummah where Egypt, as the most impor tant and populous Arab country, should play a pivotal role. The foreign poli cies promoted by the Mus lim Brother hood and its branches across the Arab World stem from aims derived from the Quran and the his tory of the Arab peo ple. Al though real is tic, the Muslim Brothers posi tion themselves in inter na tional matters follow ing the Islamic holy texts. Few po litical or ganiza tions around the world could claim such re ligi os ity and vi sion in the for eign-pol icy making process. What differ en ti ates the Muslim Brother hood is the merging of guiding lines from the Quran, elements of Egyptian na tional ism and secular politi cal prag- matism in order to be come a major player in Egyp tian and Middle East politics. They are the first truly de mocratic movement that strives to unite the Ummah through the bal lot box. The me die val con cept of the Um mah be came a re al ity with the po ten tial of in tegrat ing the Arab and Islamic coun tries around the Egyp tian core, only be cause of the Muslim Brother hood. Also in this new real ity pan-Arab is sues such as Pales tine are seen from a differ ent per spective thus fur ther unit ing the Ar abs towards the Ummah as a way of protect ing Muslims against foreign in vaders. The practi cal re al ity has proved the in ca pac ity of many Islamist groups to solve soci ety’s prob lems ef fi ciently. For ex am ple ”Is lam is the key so lu tion” was also the Taliban’s slogan in Afghani stan. Their true loy alty to fun damen tal Islam was well-known, how ever, they took dev as tat ing po liti cal de ci sions that pushed Af ghani stan back wards. In the same fashion the Su da nese Islamists (the friends of the Muslim Broth er hood) ruled in a revo lu tion ary man ner, and main tained the civil war in Sudan thus imped ing the progress of democ racy in the coun try3. Although the Egyp tian Brethren did not have yet the chance to come to power and solve soci ety’s prob lems, they gained a truly in flu en tial role in the Is lamic soci ety all over the world. They truly be came a model for politi cal achievements through their moder ate stand point. This moder ate stand point is criti cal for the Broth er hood’s role in the Middle East since it is giving a real hope to those Mus- lims looking to wards uni fy ing the Ummah .

1 Saad El Din IBRAHIM, ”Egypt Islam and Democracy...cit.”, p. 3. 2 Ibidem, pp. 22-23. 3 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 28.

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