From Chiang Kai-Shek to Chen Shui-Bian
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The London School of Economics and Political Science The Evolution of Taiwan’s Grand Strategy: From Chiang Kai-shek to Chen Shui-bian By Chih-tung Chung A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, October 2012 (Student ID: 183629) 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 999,673 words. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Eve Richards 2 Abstract The thesis explores the concept of grand strategy and applies it to the development of Taiwan’s grand strategy between 1949 and 2008, from Presidents Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui to Chen Shui-bian. The thesis first examines the debates between the ‘classical’ war-centred and ‘neo-classical’ peace-centred perspectives in the realm of strategic studies and argues that these need not be mutually exclusive, but can in fact supplement one another. The thesis then adopts a stance of theoretical pluralism, whereby grand strategy is regarded as a process of power practice across periods of war and peace; it defines grand strategy as a cognitive state agent taking action to create and manipulate power in furthering its desired ends in a dynamic international society. This convergent perspective of grand strategy is designed to embrace these two schools of thought, since it is equally important for those who seek a better understanding of grand strategy in general and the evolution of Taiwan’s grand strategy in particular to focus both on how best to wage war and how best to preserve peace. To make sense of and to apply the concept of grand strategy, as an operational term, this thesis proposes four strategic analytical dimensions, namely, capability, choice, environment and posture, which are informed by the duality of four analytical pairs: ideational and material factors, ends and means, agency and structure, and defence and offence. Building upon this strategic analytical framework, the thesis moves to explore the perspective of leadership in Taipei against the backdrop of the political- military confrontation between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC. The thesis investigates how and how far Taiwan’s grand strategy had been conditioned and developed by the influence of the Taipei-Beijing competition for sovereignty, changes in the international context, the unique strategic perspective of the successive presidents, domestic political developments and the asymmetry of national power between Taiwan and China. Through its investigation, the thesis argues that Taiwan’s grand strategy over the past six decades has been fundamentally driven by one prime factor: to secure the perspective of the ROC’s sovereign status as understood by Taipei’s leaders, not only across the Strait but also in international society. 3 Acknowledgement There are many people I wish to thank and acknowledge for providing inspiration and support to my PhD studies. First of all, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Dr Jurgen Haacke, who, over past years, has provided me with outstanding and endless amount of inspiration, guidance, patience and encouragement in my studies. I really cannot express more my gratitude to Dr Haacke’s excellent supervision. I also wish to thank Mr Nicholas Sims whose support and kindness help me to pass smoothly in the early period of my PhD studies at LSE. I would also like to acknowledge crucial scholarship from Department of War Studies at King’s College London sparking my research interest in strategic studies where I completed my Master degree there. I appreciate many friends in Birmingham, especially members from Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, who have provided me invaluable support not just intellectually but also on a personal level too. In Taiwan, I would like to thank friends in Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University, especially Prof. Shiau, Chyuan-jenq, who has been my mentor with endless and kindest support ever since I was his undergraduate student. During working in the Legislative Yuan for eight years as a senior legislator assistant before my studies in UK, I was lucky enough to make many good friends there but wish to mention and thank two in particular. Former legislator and Prof. Lee, Wen- lang, unfortunately passing away in 2005, was my very close friend and constantly encouraged me with a special regard to my career. Former legislator Ms Chin Tseng, Jean-li, a senior member and chair of the Defence Committee in the Legistative Yuan, was almost like my senior sister who she always concerned my work and life but sadly passed away in 2010. I am really indebted to their friendships. I would also like to thank The Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange (CCKF) in Taiwan awarding me the 2004-2005 research scholarship. Finally, my foremost gratitude must go to my parents Chung, Fu-rong and Xu, Bing- ying for their endless love and support, which enables me to pursue my studies in UK for such a long period. It is my life regret that my father sadly passed away in September 2005 and could not see me to complete my PhD studies during his lifetime. Thus, I would like to dedicate my PhD thesis to my beloved father with my deepest love. 4 Table of Contents Declaration and Statement ……………………………………………………………………... 002 Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………………… 003 Acknowledgment ……………………………………………………………………………..... 004 Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………………………..... 005 Note of Romanisation ………...………………………………………………………………... 008 Key to Abbreviations …………………………………………………………………………... 009 Chapter 1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………..... 010 1.1 Why This Topic? ………………………………………………………………………..... 011 1.2 The Concept of Grand Strategy …………………………………………………………... 020 1.3 Strategy-Making and the Presidential Role ……………………….……………………… 025 1.4 Methodology ……………………………………………………………………………… 033 1.5 The Structure of the Thesis ……………………………………………………………….. 040 Chapter 2 An Analytical Framework of Grand Strategy ………...……….……….……….. 041 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………… 041 2.1 Strategic Choice: Reconciling Ends and Means ………………………………………….. 046 2.2 Strategic Capabilities: The Ideational-Material Duality …………….……………………. 052 2.3 Strategic Environment: Interplay of Agent and Structure ………………………………... 059 2.4 Strategic Posture: Synthesis of Defence and Offence ……………………………………. 064 2.5 Conclusion: Toward a Convergent Understanding of Grand Strategy ………………….... 068 Chapter 3 The First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954-55 and 1958 ……………..…. 071 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………… 071 3.1 CKS’s Outward-Looking Strategic Choice ……………..………………………………... 076 The Unfinished Chinese Civil War ………………………………………………………... 077 Defending the Legitimacy of the ROC …………………………………………………..... 080 A Statecraft of Risk Taking ……………………………………………………………….. 083 3.2 National Spiritual Mobilization …………………………………………………………... 088 “Five Beliefs” ……………………………………………………………………………… 088 Anti-Communism …………………………………………………………….…………..... 091 Optimism …………………………………………………………………….…………….. 094 3.3 Taipei’s Management of the Strategic Environment ……………………………………... 097 Upholding Domestic Security ……………………………………………….…………….. 097 Linking up with America’s Global Containment Strategy ………………………………... 102 3.4 Strategic Offensive Posture for Military Counterattack ………………………………….. 106 Relentless Military Preparation ……………………………………………………………. 107 The Offshore Islands and Eisenhower’s “Unleash” Policy ……………………………….. 111 3.5 Conclusions: Taiwan’s Grand Strategy under Chiang Kai-shek in the 1950s …………… 116 Chapter 4 The Beginning of Taiwan’s International Isolation: The Nixon Shock ……….. 120 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………... 120 5 4.1 Unfavourable Changes in Strategic Environment - Détente in Sight …………………….. 123 The Origin of Détente ……………………………………………………………………... 124 The Nixon Doctrine ……………………………………………………………………….. 126 Nixon’s Sino-American Rapprochement ………………………………………………….. 129 4.2 Continuity in Taipei’s Outward-Looking Strategic Choice ………...……..…………….... 131 Taipei’s Threat Perception ………………………………………………………………… 132 Nationalist Sinocentrism …………………………………………………………………... 135 4.3 Backfiring of Taipei’s “One China” Policy ………………………………………………. 138 Origins of Taipei’s “One China” Principle ……...………………………………………… 139 CKS’s Perspective on International Reality ……………………………………………….. 142 The Loss of the ROC’s UN Seat …………………………………………………………... 144 4.4 The Offensive Posture of “70 per cent Political Work and 30 per cent Military Effort ” …148 Retaking the Mainland by Political Means ………………………………………………... 148 From Interdependence to Dependence ………………………………………………….…. 151 Combining Political Offensive with Military Defence ..…………………………………... 153 4.5 Conclusions: